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Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament

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dc.contributor.author Häge, Frank M.
dc.contributor.author Ringe, Nils
dc.date.accessioned 2020-09-16T09:06:45Z
dc.date.available 2020-09-16T09:06:45Z
dc.date.issued 2020
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10344/9219
dc.description peer-reviewed en_US
dc.description.abstract Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European Parliament (2009-2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a thirdparty arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as suggested by principal-agent theory. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher SAGE Publications en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries European Union Politics;
dc.relation.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116520934865
dc.subject European Parliament en_US
dc.subject shadow rapporteurs en_US
dc.subject self-selection en_US
dc.subject delegation en_US
dc.subject principal-agent theory en_US
dc.title Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament en_US
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article en_US
dc.type.supercollection all_ul_research en_US
dc.type.supercollection ul_published_reviewed en_US
dc.identifier.doi 10.1177/1465116520934865
dc.rights.accessrights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess en_US


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