University of Limerick Institutional Repository

Regulating havens: the role of hard and soft governance of tax experts in conditions of secrecy and low regulation

DSpace Repository

Show simple item record Killian, Sheila O'Regan, Philip Lynch, Ruth Laheen, Martin Joseph Karavidas, Dionysios 2020-07-21T11:28:07Z 2020-07-21T11:28:07Z 2020
dc.description peer-reviewed en_US
dc.description.abstract International tax governance is significant societally as it impacts both inequality and the capacity of governments to deliver on their social contracts. Tax experts forma key, under-researched, heterogeneous element of the tax ecosystem, subject to a range of hard and soft governance influences. While problematic tax regimes are appropriately identified by reference to lax regulation or financial opacity, few empirical studies explore how operating in these jurisdictions affects the governance of tax experts individually. Using international survey data, we find that the influence of soft governance on tax experts varies across conditions of secrecy or lax regulation. Soft governance, including that of the workplace and the profession, is most influential in challenging regimes. Beyond a tipping point of economic freedom, regulatory knowledge and the threat of sanction become less influential. Elements along the continuum between hard and soft governance interact in a non-homogenous way that indicates a role for professional bodies and firms in tax governance en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Wiley en_US
dc.relation COFFERS en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Regulation & Governance;12347
dc.subject expertise en_US
dc.subject governance en_US
dc.subject orchestration en_US
dc.subject profession en_US
dc.subject secrecy en_US
dc.title Regulating havens: the role of hard and soft governance of tax experts in conditions of secrecy and low regulation en_US
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article en_US
dc.type.supercollection all_ul_research en_US
dc.type.supercollection ul_published_reviewed en_US
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/rego.12347
dc.contributor.sponsor ERC en_US
dc.rights.accessrights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess en_US
dc.internal.rssid 3003792

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search ULIR


My Account