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The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?

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dc.contributor.author Costello, Rory
dc.contributor.author Thomson, Robert
dc.date.accessioned 2015-09-17T08:35:16Z
dc.date.available 2015-09-17T08:35:16Z
dc.date.issued 2013
dc.identifier.citation Costello, Rory, and Robert Thomson. "The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?." Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 7 (2013): 1025-1039. en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10344/4637
dc.description peer-reviewed en_US
dc.description.abstract The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the European Union (EU) institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. We assess how the codecision procedure works in practice using data on the preferences of legislative actors on a large number of proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on the relative bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that, in comparison to the consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP and weakened the Commission. However, the Council holds certain bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP has not achieved parity with the Council under codecision. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Routledge: Taylor & Francis en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of European Public Policy;20/7
dc.relation.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.795393
dc.rights This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version of Record, has been published in the Journal of European Public Policy, 20 (7), pp. 1025-1039. 2013 ©Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.795393 en_US
dc.subject social sciences en_US
dc.title The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why? en_US
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article en_US
dc.type.supercollection all_ul_research en_US
dc.type.supercollection ul_published_reviewed en_US
dc.rights.accessrights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess en_US
dc.internal.rssid 1442635


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