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Weakening the Dolev-Yao model through probability

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dc.contributor.author Bresciani, Riccardo
dc.contributor.author Butterfield, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned 2012-12-20T15:32:46Z
dc.date.available 2012-12-20T15:32:46Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10344/2765
dc.description peer-reviewed en_US
dc.description.abstract The Dolev-Yao model has been widely used in protocol verificaion and has been implemented in many protocol verifiers. There are strong assumptions underlying this model, such as perfect cryptography: the aim of the present work is to propose an approach to weaken this hypothesis, by means of probabilistic considerations on the strength of crypto- graphic functions. Such an approach may effectively be implemented in actual protocol verifiers. The Yahalom proto- col is used as an easy example to show this approach. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Association for Computing Machinery en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries SIN '09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks;pp. 293-297
dc.relation.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1626195.1626265
dc.rights 2009"© ACM. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in SIN '09: Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1626195.1626265 en_US
dc.subject portocol verfification en_US
dc.title Weakening the Dolev-Yao model through probability en_US
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject en_US
dc.type.supercollection all_ul_research en_US
dc.type.supercollection ul_published_reviewed en_US
dc.contributor.sponsor SFI en_US
dc.rights.accessrights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess en_US


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