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A formal security proof for the ZRTP protocol

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Show simple item record Bresciani, Riccardo Butterfield, Andrew 2011-07-21T14:43:20Z 2011-07-21T14:43:20Z 2009
dc.description peer-reviewed en_US
dc.description.abstract When some agents want to communicate through a media stream (for example voice or video), the Real Time Protocol (RTP) is used. This protocol does not provide encryption, so it is necessary to use Secure RTP (SRTP) to secure the communication. In order for this to work, the agents need to agree on key material and ZRTP provides them with a procedure to perform this task: it is a key agreement protocol, which relies on a Diffie-Hellman exchange to generate SRTP session parameters, providing confidentiality and protecting against Man-in-the-Middle attacks even without a public key infrastructure or endpoint certificates. This is an analysis of the protocol performed with ProVerif, which tests security properties of ZRTP; in order to perform the analysis, the protocol has been modeled in the applied calculus. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher IEEE Computer Society en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries The 4th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions 2009;
dc.rights ©2009 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. en_US
dc.subject zrtp protocol en_US
dc.title A formal security proof for the ZRTP protocol en_US
dc.type Conference item en_US
dc.type.supercollection all_ul_research en_US
dc.type.supercollection ul_published_reviewed en_US
dc.type.restriction none en
dc.contributor.sponsor SFI

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