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Leadership practices by senior position holders in Higher Educational Research Institutes: Stealth power in action?

Abstract
Using Webb’s (2008) concept of stealth power and a critical realist perspective, this article identifies leadership practices that obscure the centralisation of power, drawing on data from interviews with 25 academic decision-makers in formal leadership positions in HERIs in Ireland, Italy and Turkey. Its key contribution is the innovative operationalisation of stealth power and the inductive identification of four practices which obscure that centralised power i.e. rhetorical collegiality, agenda control, in-group loyalty and (at a deeper level) the invisibility of gendered power. The purpose of the article is emancipatory: by creating an awareness of these leadership practices, it challenges their persistence. (101 words)

Key words: leadership practices, stealth power, Higher Education Research Institutes, senior position holders, rhetorical collegiality, agenda control, in-group loyalty, invisibility of gendered power, centralised power, interviews

Introduction
Using a critical realist perspective, and drawing mainly on Webb’s (2008) work (but also on Lukes, 1974, 2005 and Lawrence’s 2008) this article examines the perceived centralisation of power in three higher education and research institutes (HERIs) and the leadership practices that obscure that centralisation. The HERIs are in Ireland, Italy and Turkey, and the data is drawn from interviews with 25 academic decision-makers in formal leadership positions in them.

HERIs are affected by neo-liberalism. An ideology that is now global (Lynch et al, 2012; Deem et al, 2008), neo-liberalism values competition, metrics, and financial profit over collective interests, cooperation and community. Managerialism, as an aspect of neo-
liberalism, is characterised by the public sector’s adoption of ‘organisational forms, technologies, management practices and values more commonly found in the private business sector’ (Deem, 1998: 47). The centralization of senior decision-making power is a key characteristic of managerialism. External stakeholders, such as states, favour a rapid response to their directions and requests and so foster the centralization of power in HERIs. However, the legitimacy of managerialism is questionable in such contexts because it undermines their traditional internally representative, collegial ethos and structures (Deem et al, 2008; Capano and Regini, 2014; O’Connor, 2014).

This article is located in a critical leadership studies tradition (Collinson, 2019) in its focus on leadership as involving asymmetrical situated power relationships. Thus, there is a recognition that leaders holding formal positions of power can limit the decisions made by other participants through using ‘stealth power’ (Lukes, 2005; Webb, 2008). The practices through which this occurs in HERIs have attracted little attention. HERIs are also alleged to be gender-neutral, although a substantial body of research shows that women are under-represented in senior positions, with gender being an organizing feature of these structures (Acker 1990; 2006; Sinclair, 2005). In that context, a critical realist perspective which draws on ‘the notion of underlying power structures that might not be conscious to people’ (Kempster and Parry, 2011: 110) is used to suggest that the gendering of power positions constitutes a ‘deep’ level of reality (Fleetwood, 2004) and that it is a further significant manifestation of stealth power.

Using Webb’s (2008: 127) concept of stealth power, this article ‘examines power as a concept that operates covertly and panoptically’. Webb (2008:133) identifies a continuum of such power ranging from covert forms, ‘reflected in decision-making in opaque forms’ including situations where ‘deals are struck’ ‘behind the scenes’ but where power may potentially be witnessed, to invisible forms that are reflected in people’s desires, and not
interpreted as power. The leadership practices which obscure the centralisation of power, enable us to transcend a post-heroic (Collinson, 2019) leader/follower paradigm, and have rarely been applied to understanding leadership in HERIs.

Drawing on 25 interviews with academic leaders in formal power positions, and using an inductive approach in the grounded theory tradition, this article shows that (male) power is centralised in these HERIs. Four leadership practices exemplifying different aspects of stealth power (Webb, 2008) are identified through an analysis of the data i.e. rhetorical collegiality, agenda control, in-group loyalty and (at a deeper level) the invisibility of gendered power. Such leadership practices, although they have face validity to many academics working in HERIs have not been previously identified in research.

Little attention has been paid by critical realists to the study of leadership, and even less to the study of leadership practices in HERIs. Thorpe (2018) stresses that critical realism brings a contextual understanding of the nature of that leadership and of how agency is facilitated and inhibited by its enactment in such contexts. This article builds on that work and on other work which has tried to ‘disrupt’ constructions of leadership (Blackmore, 2010, 2013; Martin, 2003, 2006; Morley, 2013; Collinson, 2019). It does this in an innovative way by identifying the practices through which leaders in formal positions of power in HERIs attempt to obscure centralized gendered power. It has some similarities with work on toxic leadership and implicitly challenges the ‘excessively positive constructions of heroic leadership’ which ‘is often reluctant to address issues of power and privilege’ (Collinson, 2019:266). There are also some similarities with Lumby’s (2018) focus on ‘subtle forms of power’; her themes focusing on denial of power; creating a favourable impression; shaping discussions and decisions; acquiring support and weakening opposition. It is located in a critical leadership studies tradition with its focus on asymmetrical and situated power (Collinson, 2019). The practices it describes are very much ‘normal’ taken-for-granted ones in HERIs.
Implicit in the perspective underlying this article is an ‘emancipatory axiology’ (Thorpe, 2018: 8) which ‘seeks to change the social world through the identification and deconstruction of operational social structures’ (Egbo, 2005: 270-1). The identification of these practices is emancipatory (Corson, 2000) since it provokes an awareness of the ways through which power is obscured and agency frustrated and undermined. It thus challenges the leaders involved in those practices to decide whether they will resist or collude with the centralization of power.

**Onto-epistemological Perspective**

This article starts from a position of recognising that leadership by those holding formal positions of organisational power involves ‘asymmetrical relationships, influencing processes… where people in some kind of formal dependency relationships are targeted’ (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2003: 365; see also Learmonth and Morrell, 2017). Numerous definitions of leadership have referred to leadership as a process of influence (Kempster and Parry, 2011; Gunter, 2010; Bien, 2006). Implicit in that definition is a relational element.

Webb (2008) is particularly concerned with the opportunities presented by moving beyond a binary of authority-influence. Leadership rooted in asymmetrical power positions can be enacted in a potentially manipulative way; a possibility that has also been recognised in critical leadership studies (Collinson, 2019) and in studies of toxic leadership (Lipman-Blumen, 2004; Kellerman, 2004). In any asymmetrical formal leadership situation, resources can be mobilised by the influencer and actions taken to shape the context of those in formally dependent relationships so that the range of options available to them is reduced or the desired actions appear more obvious or attractive. In this article we explore the existence of leadership practices which exemplify different aspects of stealth power and which obscure its centralisation.
Throughout the western world, government pressure has encouraged HERIs to concentrate power at the top (Capano and Regini, 2014). This reflects the influence of neoliberalism characterised by the strengthening and legitimacy of vertical forms of control based on hierarchization and the promotion of strong leaders, particularly those who are appointed rather than elected (Deem, 1998; Deem et al, 2008). However, despite this centralisation of formal power at the top, the ‘lived’ internal organisational structure of decision-making varies. External pressures on HERIs are simply ‘inputs that ‘individual universities can process in different ways’ (Capano and Regini, 2014: 98).

Although power is a fundamental concept in social science (Clegg, 2002, 2010), its definition is contested. Weber (1947:152) defined it as ‘the probability that an actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests’. This definition rests on the assumption that power is overt and comes into play when there are clearly opposing views, with the intentions of the most powerful prevailing. It has been recognised however that the enactment of power is more subtle than this (Lukes, 2005, 1974).

Leaders in positions of formal power have access to resources that are not simply the ‘carrots and sticks’ that affect individuals. Thus, Lawrence (2008: 174) argues for a more explicit focus on systemic power as an ‘automatic form of regulation that enforces compliance, without involving episodes of actions’. For Webb (2008) and Lukes (2005) a key issue involves the exercise of what the former calls ‘stealth power,’ i.e. power which is not seen as such. Leaders occupying formal positions of power can create structures which give the illusion of participative decision making. They can create contexts (Cunha et al, 2013) through which stealth power is enacted i.e. they can set agendas so that power is exercised subtly without the awareness of those subject to it. By creating in-groups they can exercise power through the desires of those subject to the enactment of power. In this article, using qualitative
inductive analysis (in the grounded theory tradition) we explore whether such leadership practices exist in HERIs in three countries.

A critical realist perspective assumes ontological realism (i.e. that there is a real world that exists independently of our perceptions, theories and constructions), while also accepting a form of epistemological relativism (Maxwell, 2012; Thorpe, 2018). For Sayer (2001:973, 972) research from a critical realist perspective explores ‘the dependence of bureaucratic forms of organisation on non-bureaucratic processes’. Thus, he suggests that bureaucratic models with their rules, appropriate procedures etc are underpinned by informal relationships, understandings, arrangements, coalitions and vested interests. It is suggested that a focus on stealth power (Webb, 2008) and the leadership practices that perpetuate is an important development of this model.

The question of whether ‘the pervasive gendering of bureaucratic organisations’ is inevitable (Ferguson, 1984) or historically contingent (Connell, 1994) has been much discussed (Sayer, 2000; Holmwood, 2001; Sayer, 2001). For Sayer (2001: 980) ‘gender’ in itself is an abstraction and an immensely important one: without it we would be liable to naturalise masculine and feminine behaviours and the oppression of women as if they were as indispensable to being human as breathing’. Sayer (2001) thus problematises not only the content of the construction of masculinities and femininities but also their relationship with power- and in particular the taken-for-granted subordinate position of women (see also New, 2005). In organizational contexts (Martin, 2003, 2006; Connell, 1987, 2005) gendering practices occur at many levels. Thus: ‘the gendering of bureaucratic organisations goes beyond the matter of selection of men and women for different kinds of jobs to the design of the jobs themselves and especially the kind of behaviour required of their occupants’ (Sayer, 2001: 975). In those contexts, powerful archetypes become activated when women have power (Sinclair, 2005; Kanter, 1977/93). Thus, women are often assessed against a higher standard
than men; their accomplishments are scrutinised more- with more ‘doubt raisers’ about their achievements; criteria are shifted to favour male candidates and a ‘double bind’ is evoked so that in a situation where men and women are seen as equally competent, men’s perceived greater likeability ensures that they are hired/promoted over women (Moss-Racusin et al, 2012 in the United States; Nielsen, 2016 in Denmark; Correll 201 and Ely and Padavic, 2007 in wide ranging reviews of the literature). Male dominated power structures are also perpetuated through processes such as homosociality (Blackmore et al., 2006; Grummell et al., 2009; Van Den Brink et al 2016). In critical realist terms, gender is seen as a ‘deep’ structure which is generally not perceived, and which constitutes another aspect of stealth power.

The concept of leadership underpinning this article is rooted in its enactment by those who are in formal positions of power. In the context of a critical leadership studies tradition, this article uses the concept of stealth power (Webb, 2008) to make sense of the leadership practices that, to varying degrees, obscure male dominated ‘circuits of power’ (Logue et al, 2016).

Research methods, Informants, Organisational Contexts

This research was undertaken as part of a European study of women’s careers in HERIs in seven countries: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Bulgaria, Turkey and Ireland. The design of the overall project was such that a limited number of countries were involved in each of the various sub-projects. The inclusion of a particular country in a particular sub-project partly reflected the interest and the capacity of the team in that country and their involvement in other sub-projects. Three countries (Ireland, Italy and Turkey) were involved in this sub-project on decision-making. In Turkey and Ireland, the case study HERIs were universities and in Italy, a research institute (Author D et al, 2014). HERIs exist in a wider national context. The economic well-being of the countries, as reflected in their national rank on the Human
Development Index (HDI), varies substantially, with Turkey being lowest and Ireland highest (UNDP, 2014). However, measures of gender equality in the higher education context, as reflected in the thinness of the national Glass Ceiling and the proportion of women in Grade A posts (i.e. full professor) present a different picture. Turkey, which at the time of the interviews (2012-14), ranked lowest of the three countries involved on the HDI, had the thinnest national glass ceiling (EU, 2013). Documentary analysis, undertaken on the location of women on the academic hierarchy in each of the case studies, showed that the Turkish HERI also had the highest proportion of women in Grade A (full professorial) posts, both overall and specifically in natural science, engineering and technology.

The methodology was processual and reflexive in the grounded theory tradition (Charmaz, 2006). This is a relatively underdeveloped approach in leadership research (Kempster and Parry, 2011). Typically, such an approach, used in conjunction with a critical realist perspective, focuses on one context. The centralised male dominated character of decision-making structures in HERIs has been seen as a global phenomenon. However, collegiality is an important legitimating motif in some contexts (e.g., in some HERIs in Ireland: O’Connor, 2014) and awareness of the gendering of power structures might vary between HERIs. Looking at more than one context lets us explore similarities and differences and the relationships between them (de Vaus, 2008).

Our data were derived from interviews with 25 informants (16 men and nine women) in three HERIs. The respondents were selected purposively because they were academic decision-makers with varying levels of formal power over the allocation of resources, whether as individuals and/or as members of boards or committees at various levels of the organisation (i.e. president/rector, vice presidents/vice rectors, deans, heads of department; members of the governing authority/board, of the senate, of the executive committee, of other ad hoc committees established for a single purpose). The more senior members of the research team
had pre-existing links with the HERIs. The project was funded by the EU and required a sign-off by senior management, prior to application. There were no refusals by the academic decision makers (Author D et al, 2014).

**INSERT TABLE 1**

Nine informants in the Irish organisation (three women and six men) were interviewed; as were eight informants in the Italian organisation (one woman and seven men), and eight in the Turkish organisation (five women and three men). The goal was to explore the phenomenon of decision-making and its relationship to women’s underrepresentation at senior levels in the three HERIs. Our conceptual tools were power and gender, with a particular focus on the process of decision making. An interview guide was developed for individuals holding positions in line management outside a committee structure (e.g. presidents/rectors, deans, heads of department) and for committee members. In the former case, we asked questions about how they became a position holder; decisions they made involving the allocation of different kinds of resources; whether there was a procedure for making decisions; and whether they were ever challenged. In the latter case, questions focused on how they came to be a member of resource allocating committees; the gender profile of the committees; the decisions that they made; the processes involved and whether such decisions were ever challenged. Respondents were also asked for their views on training members of committees and heads of department in gender awareness. In some instances, informants were asked for examples of situations they might have experienced. For example: *Is it easy or difficult to reach consensus? Can you give me an example?* The same core questions were asked in each of the HERIs, translated into the appropriate language and administered by local project members. Since the HERIs were involved in other sub-projects as part of the overall project, these interview guides
were sometimes combined with questions related to other issues (e.g. involving informal decision-making in the case of the Turkish HERI: Author D et al, 2014).

The data were analysed using content analysis. Each unit of analysis was a word or piece of text from the interview transcripts (Weber, 1990). A common set of codes and code descriptors (i.e. descriptive statements) were developed and used to analyse each interview. The methodology facilitated interrogation of the everyday leadership practices of decision-making and let us explore how power operates and is obscured, and the extent to which it is perceived as gendered. Themes were identified on the basis of responses to the interview schedule and a review of the literature on gender and decision-making. The researchers then arranged emergent categories into meaningful clusters for analysis (for example, organisational power, resources, discipline, gender, programmed decisions and institutional control were arranged into one cluster Control, Power and Gender). Cross-national research poses challenges in terms of the articulation of particular concepts and the interpretation of ‘common-sense’ ones (Author D et al, 2014). For example, in Turkey it was difficult to work with the theme subversion, demonstrating linguistic as well as cultural differences. Such difficulties were resolved by the partners creating new codes, or more detailed descriptions of existing codes, or deleting codes, a process that continued throughout the analysis and generated reflections on how power is exerted, presented and understood.

The focus on the centralisation of power reflects this theme in the literature on the nature and consequences of managerialism. The leadership practices emerged from reading and re-reading the qualitative data, focusing particularly on the nature of consensus and how it was purportedly achieved. Leadership practices revolving around deferral of decision making was first identified, followed by agenda control and in-group loyalty. The titles of these practices changed somewhat in that process e.g. rhetorical collegiality was initially referred to as ‘talking shops’ – but this did not communicate cross nationally. The juxtaposition of male
dominance of leadership positions and the apparent absence of gendered leadership practices culminated in the identification of the invisibility of gendered power as the fourth practice. These leadership practices have face validity to those working in HERIs. Three of them are observable: rhetorical collegiality; agenda control and in-group loyalty. Sayer (2001: 969) notes that: ‘As critical realism insists, we can only know the world in terms of available discourses…. which may make it impossible to see or think some things’. This allows for the possibility that informants may not perceive certain phenomena or at least may not refer to them. It is suggested that awareness of gender inequality exists at this ‘deep’ level (Fleetwood, 2004), where it has not been extensively explored (Kempster and Parry, 2011).

We identify informants with a pseudonym (chosen by themselves); the country in which the HERI was located; their gendered presentation; positional location (e.g. governing authority/board; president/rector; executive committee member; dean; head of department; ad hoc committee member). Given the small number of respondents, we use these categories as indicators of positioning rather than as explanatory variables.

Identifying Informants and Overview of HERIs

An overview of each HERI is below (Author D et al, 2014). They vary in size and age. The Italian HERI is a research foundation, while the other two are universities and this raises issues of comparability. However similar globalised pressures arising from neo-liberalism are impacting on all three contexts. The leadership practices identified in that setting are also apparent in Italian universities. Nevertheless, more detailed examination of both types of contexts in these and other countries would enhance our understanding of their similarities and differences.
**Ireland.** The Irish organization is a relatively new, public university which provides research and teaching from undergraduate to postdoctoral level. Overall authority for the university is vested by the state in the governing authority (GA), chaired by an external chancellor. The president who is the chief executive officer is appointed by GA and is accountable to it. The president is ultimately responsible for all of the operations of the university with the support of the executive committee. He also chairs the academic council which is a representative structure concerned with academic matters. Insofar as the decisions of academic council involve university wide human or financial resources, they need to be actioned by the executive committee. There are four faculties, each with a management committee chaired by a dean who is appointed by the president. Each department is led by a head who may be nominated by its members but is also ultimately appointed by the president. At the end of 2012, the organisation had 13,000+ students and 1,300 staff.

**Italy.** The Italian organization is a non-profit organization, operating as a research foundation conducting research in the fields of technology, science and humanities. Research and technology transfer are the main tasks. Teaching is not part of its activities so there are no undergraduate students. However, in partnership with a university, it provides funding for PhD students who conduct research there. The president is elected by the public local government body which is in charge of public administration in the area. The president convenes and chairs the board of governors and sets general policies and regulations as well as the annual budget, advised by a scientific committee. An executive head, elected by the board of governors, oversees a unitary approach to the guidelines and objectives set by the board of governors and is accountable to them. Each of the seven research centres is led by a director, who is appointed by the board of governors. That board is chaired by the president. The heads of the units within each centre are appointed by the centre directors. At the end of 2012, the organization had 482 staff and 88 PhD students.
Turkey. The Turkish HERI is an older state-funded technical university, providing research and teaching from undergraduate to postdoctoral levels. The appointment of a rector involves the election of candidates by the academic staff, with six names being sent to a central authority called The Council of Higher Education (CoHE). It shortlists three of these and from these the president of Turkey appoints the rector. The rector has vice-rectors, a general secretary and advisors: collectively known as the rectorate. University governance and management operate under the rectorate through two main bodies: the senate which is concerned with all policy decisions and the executive board which deals with day to day management. Both are chaired by the rector. The HERI includes 13 faculties, each of these having faculty councils and executive boards, chaired by the dean. Each faculty has a number of departments, each with a head. At the end of 2012, this university has 30,000 students and 2,300 academic staff.

Centralisation of power

In all three HERIs decision-making power as regards strategy and resources is concentrated at the top of the hierarchy. Managerialism is embedded in the Irish case study organisation (as it is in most of the Irish higher education system: Lynch et al, 2012). However, it has had little impact on the Italian higher educational system in general (Boffo, 2010) and the Italian HERI in particular. In the Turkish higher educational sector, elements of managerialism are enforced through the Public Financial Management and Control Law No 5018 (2010). However, a growing emphasis on institutional autonomy and a presidential style of governance has been linked with increased executive presidential power.

Thus, structurally, power in all three HERIs is centralised. In the Irish HERI, it is divided between the president/rector and the chair of governing authority. Under the Universities Act (1997) it is tilted in the direction of the president. However, in the Irish case
study HERI the strength of centralised power predated managerialism. Power in the Turkish HERI is centralised in the rectorate, with the rector chairing both the senate and executive boards. Furthermore, structurally his/her power is underpinned by the power of the president of Turkey since he/she ultimately appoints the rector. Centralisation in the Italian HERI is in the president and is somewhat reduced by the existence of an executive head, who is elected by and reports to the board of governors. Thus, at a structural level power is centralized in all three, although the extent and the manner in which it is centralized varies.

In all three organizations, the informants, who hold formal positions of power, see power as concentrated at the level of the president/rector. In the Irish HERI, power is centralised in the president, advised by the executive committee. As Alex, a male head of department (HOD) in the Irish HERI sees it, the lower level management committees dispersed throughout the organization have no substantive influence on the HERI’s strategic direction:

The faculty management and university management [committees]... they’re the main ones... Are they effective? No… The big decisions are taken at the executive [committee]. Like there’s no discretion about, you know strategic direction on any of these committees or where we’re going…it’s usually about following process rather than developing process.

The strategic direction of the organisation is formally approved by governing authority (GA), of which the president is a member, but which he does not chair. However, the rejection of a presidential strategic plan by GA would be unprecedented. Rules, regulations and procedures are perceived by Dan, a male HOD in the Irish HERI, as subject to the political exigencies of centralised power holders: ‘there are people who behave as dictators in the academic sphere, yes, yes’.
Strategic direction and financial power in the Turkish HERI as perceived by Canan, a female ad hoc committee member, is held by the rectorate: ‘the influence from university management is getting stronger’. Only those at the very top are seen as being able to influence strategy and budgets. In the Italian organization, at a structural level, strategic and financial decisions are made by the board of governors, chaired by the president. Boffo (2008) found that the role of Italian rectors/presidents involved persuading and bargaining. The president is depicted as creating consensus and his role is seen by Caleb, a male member of the governing board, as that of a mediator:

it can happen to have diverse positions but he [the president] always manages to mediate, to postpone the decision, finding the situation of mediation… So I would say so, that we can say the president is very good at this and a president has to behave like this, he must listen to the diverse positions.

In budget negotiations, Austin, a male executive head (who is elected by the board of governors) sees his role as attempting to create consensus, albeit ultimately underpinned by executive power: ‘if there is no agreement in the end I decide’.

In all three HERIs the total budgets for departments, faculty and support functions are, our informants say, decided centrally and handed down through line management (e.g. through deans/directors and heads of department/units). In the Irish HERI much is made of the financial powerlessness of the head of department. Resources are perceived by Alex, a male HOD in the Irish HERI, as limited and largely pre-allocated: ‘the major budget in the department is pay, which you have no control over… the amount of money that you have discretion over is less than five per cent of the total pay budget’. Thus, although nominally
there is a budget line at department level, financial resources are as Dan, a male HOD in the Irish HERI sees it: ‘certainly… not on the [agenda at] departmental meetings’.

In all three organizations, power as regards appointments is also highly centralised. In the Turkish HERI, Gokhan, a male HOD and member of the executive, noted that: ‘We have no influence about the new vacant positions that our department needs. Instead of positions that we are asking for, they allow us to open up some other positions.’ As he saw it, at departmental level, appointments are something that they can talk about at meetings, but their views carry little weight: ‘We are certainly being bypassed. We list the positions needed in the department and send it to the dean’s office. Nevertheless, whenever the process is finalised, we see positions which are not requested by the department’. In the Irish context, not just the allocation of posts for new appointments, but also their level is effectively controlled centrally. Thus, as seen by Blake, a male vice-president and member of the executive committee, the recruitment committee (which is a sub-committee of the executive committee) effectively shapes decisions in relation to recruitment, by directing attention to policies, bureaucratic rules and procedures:

A faculty could decide we’re only going to hire professors...or at the other extreme you could say I’m only going to hire junior lecturers ... but in either of those extreme cases we’d [the committee] be saying to the faculty ‘what’s going on here, have you looked at your overall faculty profile in terms of senior versus junior, have you looked at the leadership positions you need?’ So we want to see a balanced profile. Yeah, and there’s also a profile about the balance between expenditure on pay and non-pay. Some of these are specified in our strategic plan, others are specified in other policy documents.
In all three organizations, policies, rules and procedures, rationality and logic are depicted as at the heart of a culture which is designed to be stable and predictable. This conceals the fact that in all three HERIs power is centralised at a very high level.

HERIs are also portrayed as gender-neutral. The inclusion of women in power positions has been found to have positive effects on the collective intelligence of a team (Woolley and Malone, 2011); on research innovation (EU, 2012); on governance and effectiveness in business contexts globally (Richmond, 2015) and ultimately on economic growth (OECD, 2012). There is a good deal of evidence, particularly but not exclusively from the US and the UK that having more women in senior positions is a benefit to more junior women in terms of their confidence, identity and odds for advancement (Sealy, 2010; Sealy and Singh, 2010; Ibarra et al., 2013; Ely and Padavic, 2007), although this has been challenged by a study in an Irish context (Cross et al., 2017).

In the three HERIs, power is concentrated in male hands at the top reflecting wider national trends. Thus, at national level, 93 per cent of those at presidential/rector level in Italian universities are men, as are 96 per cent of those in Turkish ones and 100 per cent of Irish ones: EU, 2016; EU, 2013). Those at president/rector level in the three HERIs were men, as were the majority of those in mid-to-high level positions of power (i.e. deans/directors of centres, heads of department/unit) (see Table 2). Equally men dominate in key structures such as governing authority, senate and executive committee. In the Turkish HERI the proportion of men having positional power ranged from 69-100 per cent at different levels; in the Italian one, between 78-100 per cent and in the Irish one, between 50-100 per cent. It has been recognised that increases in the proportion of women in such positions of power may not change masculinist leadership practices and processes, although it may be important at a symbolic level. It will be shown that most respondents do not refer to the gender profile of such structures.
Centralisation of gendered power and leadership practices

We identified three observable leadership practices that we see as manifestations of stealth power. In contexts where a model of collegiality has considerable potential legitimacy, rhetorical collegiality is seen as one such practice i.e. fostering collective decision-making as long as it comes to the ‘right’ decisions. Agenda setting which is seen as domination: ‘a systemic power that works by altering the range of options available to actors’ (Lawrence, 2008:177; see also Lukes, 1974, 2005) is also identified. Power which is not even perceived was also seen as a reflection of stealth power, with in-group members wanting to do what the powerful want them to do (Lukes, 2005, 1974; Webb, 2008; Lawrence 2008). These leadership practices which are seen as manifestations of stealth power (Webb, 2008) are discussed below.

Rhetorical Collegiality

In a collegial model, discussion occurs in democratic structures, with a view to creating consensus between equals leading to action. The concept of rhetorical collegiality, developed inductively from the data, refers to leadership practices that appear to be democratic and collegial but where discussion as such is the main activity: the fora in which collegiality occurs are in effect ‘talking shops’ with no relationship to action. Like the concept of distributed leadership, rhetorical collegiality gives ‘the illusion of consultation and participation while obscuring the true mechanisms by which decisions are reached and resources allocated’ (Bolden et al, 2009:273). It was devised to capture the idea that collegiality is perceived in HE ‘primarily as a rhetorical device’ (italics in original) (Bolden et al, 2009:273). Rhetorical collegiality includes the deferral of action and endless non-action related discussions. It seems to be most common in the Italian HERI. Thus, for example, Samuel, a male head of a research
unit in the Italian HERI, acknowledges that he encourages extensive discussion in order to influence those in the meeting to reach the ‘right’ decision i.e. until they come around to the preferred option:

There have been debates and sometimes also quite strong and passionate…. I think it is a natural way of doing, I think it is good. It is like this because on certain issues you have different ideas and if we discuss openly obviously there are clashes… But, let's say that I slowly try to go toward the “road” I consider to be the right one

In Italy, going ‘slowly’ is viewed as significant (see also Boffo, 2008, 2010). Thus, many discussions take place with the expectation that eventually there will be agreement with the route chosen by the most senior power holder. This creates a sense of participation and obscures the centralization of power. The culture at the HERI is characterised by the deferral of action and a tolerance of endless discussion unrelated to action. Thus, Makayala, a female member of governing authority noted that: ‘Many issues remain suspended, are reported, and then again are reported in the Board of Governors’. For Austin, a male executive head in the Italian HERI, there is an expectation that some kind of convergence with the views of the most senior position holders’ views will be reached eventually: ‘discussion may take two minutes… or it may take an hour. It is a kind of process that, let's say, highlights what are the pros and cons of various scenarios, what are the consequences of a choice…. there is no decision by a show of hands’. Disallowing a show of hands prevents members from seeing how their associates feel. Effectively the practice of rhetorical collegiality has the effect of allowing people to express opinions while preventing them from making a decision that conflicts with the ‘required’ one.

In the Italian HERI, the executive head also controls the allocation of space. Office space is seen as a sign of prestige (Peterson and Jordansson, 2017) and decisions about it are
frequently fraught. In that context, Austin, a male executive head, set up a committee to give the appearance of democratic control. Ultimately however he makes the decisions: ‘Because on the allocation of space no-one agrees. So, at some point you have to cut’ [off discussion]. Even in contexts where the positional power holder has the power to make a decision if there is no consensus, this is not seen as desirable, and the appearance of collegiality is maintained: ‘I could also make a decision totally in disagreement with 100% of the board but it would not be nice and it would not be right’. Allowing the free expression of ideas obscures the fact that he makes the eventual decision. Deetz (1995) refers to this process as ‘involvement but no voice’, whereby participants are free to express their ideas but their decisions are only accepted if they coincide with those of more senior position holders. This practice which we view as reflecting an aspect of ‘stealth power’ (Webb, 2008) appears most often in the Italian HERI.

Agenda Control

A second leadership practice that obscures centralised power is control of the agenda in meetings. Multiple scholars claim that power is most effective when it appears not to have been exercised (Clegg, 1989; Hardy, 1994). Agenda control is a practice that involves manipulation by deciding in advance of meetings what issues will/will not be addressed (Lukes, 2005; Webb, 2008; Lawrence, 2008). It is effective for maintaining control and can be seen as reflecting another aspect of stealth power. It has some similarities with one of Lumby’s (2018:6) ‘subtle forms of power’ i.e. ‘shaping discussion and decisions’, although agenda control is more theoretically rooted and specific. Agenda control is diametrically opposed to encouraging debate and challenging the status quo since it restricts the perceived options available. Lawrence (2008) has referred to it as domination, since it inhibits the ability of participants to act as moral agents.
This practice was particularly likely to be referred to by respondents in the Turkish HERI. The rector, as chairperson of the executive board, has the authority to set the agenda. ‘Pre-cooking’ decisions, that is, shaping them by informal decision-making processes before the board meeting is referred to. Nida, a female member of the senate indicated that: ‘Sometimes I feel that all decisions are pre-cooked’. Gokhan, a male HOD and member of executive committee in the Turkish HERI indicated that: ‘This is not about one specific rector, this is the general tendency of universities’. For him, control of the agenda inhibits discussion: ‘For some issues, they can ask what we think as members. But for some other issues, you can observe they have been planned before the meeting ...if they have been planned before the meeting, then the meeting becomes only symbolic’. The only task of the meeting is to think through the implications of the decision and how it is to be implemented. As seen by Nisan, a woman dean, member of the senate and of executive committee: ‘The discussions take long generally but not for arguing against each other’. ‘Pre-cooking’ is seen as inhibiting creative or lateral solutions.

Other informants in the Turkish HERI referred to agenda control leadership practices. Murat, a male member of the senate notes that: ‘There is nothing to discuss or disagree because all the meeting agenda is about faculty budget or things like that. There is nothing to discuss about those as we have limited resources’. Consultation about the level of resources to be allocated to a particular faculty is unthinkable in the Turkish HERI. The appearance of total transparency copper-fastens the impossibility of even asking questions. As Gokan, a male HOD and member of executive committee notes: ‘Each year we announce the budget and the expenses on our department’s website’.

In the Italian HERI, there are occasional examples of situations where decisions about resources were ‘pre-cooked’. There is also some evidence in the Irish HERI of manipulating decision-making structures so as to inhibit democratic consideration of issues. Thus,
departmental meetings are held infrequently and those that are held run out of time and difficult or sensitive items are moved to the end of the agenda where they are never discussed. Departmental loyalty, which inhibits discussion at faculty board, is also seen as a form of institutional control. As Marissa, a female ad hoc committee member in the Irish HERI sees it: ‘you’ve got faculty boards where you are basically quietened because you’ve got external people there, so you can’t really wash your laundry in public’. Once the department reaches a position on an issue, all members are expected to comply. Thus, loyalty to the department effectively silences the individual, and inhibits him/her from raising the issue at faculty board. Controlling the agenda, which is seen as an aspect of stealth power, appears to be most common as a leadership practice in the Turkish HERI.

**In-group Loyalty**

In-group loyalty is the third category of leadership practices referring to an aspect of the enactment of stealth power (Webb, 2008). It reflects a model of HERIs in which there are in-groups created by senior decision-makers. With managerialism, the appointment of line management personnel (such as deans) by the president/rector because they are known to them or can be counted on to comply, has become common. They form part of his/her in-group, bound to the power holder not only by line management considerations but also by ties of personal loyalty and the anticipation of future rewards. This practice has some similarities with Lumby’s (2018:7) focus on ‘acquiring the support of others’. Implicit in the idea of in-group loyalty is a reciprocal relationship (Alvesson, 2017) rooted in the anticipation of mutual benefit. In situations where one is beholden to a more senior person for one’s position, deferral to the wishes of that senior person is common. In such circumstances, the enactment of power is often not seen as such by the in-group.
In the Irish HERI deans are directly appointed by the president. Respondents (presumably from out-groups) claim that in-group loyalty regularly subverts the implementation of policies. Thus as Dan, a male HOD in the Irish HERI saw it: ‘Even though there are polices here there and everywhere, they can be... they can be (...) ignored ... and interpreted in certain ways that, that [suit] the bosses’. It was noted that those outside the in-group also exercise their academic freedom to prioritise projects that they themselves favour.

In Turkey, there is also evidence that in-group loyalty as a practice is less than effective. In that context the CoHE tends to select the first candidate on the rector’s list, and thus they are perceived as the rector’s appointees. Lale, a female member of the senate in the Turkish HERI noted that: ‘The deans in the senate are all appointed by the rector, they never disagree with the rector. The situation is very absurd and worrying. If a dean cannot think independently, this is not acceptable’. There are also occasional references to informal lobbying before decisions are announced, with the implicit suggestion of undue influence. As Asli, a female HOD sees it: ‘We can never know what is the result of such meetings’.

In-group loyalty, as an aspect of stealth power, appears most common in the Irish HERI.

Invisibility of gendered power

Stealth power operates covertly. Taken-for-granted markers of privileging, such as gender or race, are typically not seen, particularly by those who are privileged. In critical realist terms gender is seen as a ‘deep structure’ which is not perceived. It is suggested that the invisibility of gendered power (Acker, 2006) is a manifestation of stealth power in the sense that it is a covert enactment of power. However, it is at a different level to the previous three practices in the sense that leaders themselves may not be consciously aware of it. Sayer (2001:981) highlights the importance of asking questions that expose and challenge ‘the
naturalisation of gender’. In a critical realist perspective much is made of the existence of a ‘deep embedded causal influence not necessarily recognised by respondents’ (Kempster and Parry, 2011: 115). It is suggested that the invisibility of gendered power reflects such a deep influence (Acker, 2006).

There is a well-documented tendency for men to be less likely than women to ‘see’ gendered power and to be more likely to depict male dominated structures as gender-neutral (Currie et al, 2002; Kloot, 2004; O’Connor, 2014). This reflects a wider tendency for masculinity to be equated with public power (Connell, 2005; Hearn, 2001). Such patterns are not inevitable. Thus, in Sweden male dominance of management positions in HERIs is seen and negatively evaluated (O’Connor and Goransson, 2014) indicating the importance of the wider social and cultural context.

In this study gendered power appears to be overwhelmingly invisible in all three HERIs and among both men and women. It was referred to, and then subsequently discounted by Alexandra, a female ad hoc committee member in the Irish HERI. Her women colleagues and herself were so disgusted with men’s behaviour in a resource allocation committee that they subsequently refused to participate:

I sat on [a committee] once and it was all men and myself. There was a very definite gender biased comment made at that meeting and I was astounded by it. Yea. Very… The general profile it seemed to us was of white males in their fifties and certainly that was the case on all boards we encountered, and all committees… After being in a couple of their processes, we felt we were well out of it. We felt this culture is not a modern culture, it’s not a relevant culture, it’s antiquated and it’s going nowhere, so we didn’t want to be part of it.
Yet, she subsequently discounted the role of gender in organizational processes: ‘I do think everything you’re talking about is about group dynamics more than gender, yes of course there is gender, but the gender issue didn’t dominate, it was the individual personalities’. In this way she obscures the effects of gender by viewing social behavior as an individual issue. Elsewhere she accepted gender ‘as a label’ but avoided considering its negative effects (Fraser, 2008; Mackenzie Davey, 2008): ‘The issue of gender is also there in teaching too, very strongly [in the differential evaluation of male and female teachers] … So the gender thing is there in every human interaction, and people know it, don’t they?’. Thus, it is clear that her naming of gender as an issue is fraught with qualifications and contradictions.

The invisibility of gendered power in the present study occurs in a context where male respondents are more likely to comment extensively on power in their HERI. This may reflect their organisational position, their greater awareness (as men in male dominated organizations) of organisational power, or their frustration, particularly if mid to lower level decision makers, that most of them have less power than they might have expected or hoped for. There was a tendency for women to be more likely to refer to agenda control, the practice that has been perceived as reflecting domination (Lawrence, 2008). However, gendered power appears to be largely invisible.

Women in the Italian and Turkish HERIs made no references at all to it (reflecting in the latter case, a similar pattern in an earlier study: O’Connor, 2011). This could reflect situational factors such as the elite status of academic women relative to other women in Turkey or the fact that academic jobs in public universities in Turkey are relatively poorly paid (see Healy et al, 2005; Ozbilgin and Healy, 2004); or that academic women in Turkey in general, and the Turkish HERI in particular, have higher proportions of women at full professorial level. Similarly, the absence of references to gendered power in the Italian HERI
might reflect situational factors such as the fact that all but one of the Italian informants are men (see Table 2).

Alternatively, since gendered power is overwhelmingly invisible to both men and women and in all three HERIs, it is possible that it is a manifestation of stealth power enactment, albeit reflecting a deeper reality. This needs to be further explored in other studies. Highlighting it implicitly challenges the taken-for-granted character of male dominance of positions of power in HERIs and the accepted nature of men’s relationship with power.

Discussion and Conclusions

Within higher education little attention has been paid to how leaders in formal positions typically enact power since the dominant discourse is that such leaders have little power: in a collegial system they are constrained by their representative function and in a managerialist system, real power it is suggested, rests with external stakeholders such as the state (see Lumby, 2018 on the denial of power). However, from the point of view of internal stakeholders (such as staff or students) it is obvious that leaders in formal positions of power make decisions which have substantial consequences. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a bureaucratic structure such as a HERI functioning without the enactment of power by those in formal leadership positions.

Using an inductive approach, in the grounded theory tradition, this article identifies leadership practices that exemplify various aspects of stealth power, and that obscure its centralisation. Thus, in rhetorical collegiality, the leadership practice involves discussions continuing until the decision reached is that favoured by the senior position holders. The leadership practice of agenda control recognizes that power can be (and is) exercised covertly by power holders. The leadership practice of in-group loyalty suggests that, because of
personal or professional interests, power may be invisible to in-group members (but not to 'out-group' ones). Our findings suggest that particular practices are more common in some HERIs than in others. Thus, rhetorical collegiality is most common in the Italian HERI; agenda control in the Turkish HERI; in-group loyalty in the Irish HERI.

All three of the HERIs provide evidence for the centralisation of power in the hands of those leaders at the top of the hierarchy: both structurally and operationally through control over strategic direction and resources. Men are the predominant occupants of the most powerful positions. Such patterns are typical (Blackmore and Sachs, 2007; Deem et al, 2008; Lynch et al, 2012; O’Connor, 2014; EU, 2016). The gendering of power was overwhelmingly not perceived in this study by these leaders in formal positions of power. The possibility that this reflects situational factors cannot be eliminated. However, we suggest that this invisibility constitutes a ‘deep’ level of influence. This is compatible with the tendency for women in this study to be more likely to be aware of agenda control, a practice that reduces their status as moral agents and which has been likened to domination (Lawrence, 2008).

Although the structures involved in the concentration of power in the hands of men vary, there is no relationship between the level of centralization and masculinization. Thus, the Italian HERI which is the least centralized is the most male-dominated in its decision-making structures. The case study HERIs also vary in terms of managerialism: with the Irish one being the most managerialist. Centralisation of power existed in that HERI prior to managerialism. Thus, it raises questions about the assumption that managerialism is the universal creator of centralised power in HERIs.

This article is innovatory in operationalising Webb’s (2008) concept of stealth power and in identifying leadership practices that obscure the centralisation of power in HERIs. The identification of such leadership practices (viz rhetorical collegiality, agenda control and in-group loyalty), underpinned by the operationalization of stealth power, constitutes the major
contribution of this article, theoretically and empirically. Kempster and Parry (2011:110) noted that a ‘‘deep’ level of leadership reality has not been explored effectively thus far.’ Our focus on gender, and its identification as a ‘deep’ manifestation of stealth power, is a further important contribution of this study. The very identification of these leadership practices is emancipatory since it provokes an awareness of how power is obscured and agency frustrated and undermined in HERIs. It challenges the dominant discourse of HERIs as power neutral and gender-neutral organizations. It shows that the leadership by those in formal positions of power in such HERIs, and which is predominantly done by men, involves the exercise of stealth power. It implicitly challenges the leaders enacting such practices to decide whether they will resist or collude with the centralisation of power. It is a contribution to critical leadership studies and moves a discussion of leadership beyond a post-heroic leader/follower paradigm (Collinson, 2019). It offers new insights into the ‘normal’ leadership practices exerted by those in formal positions of power in HERIs. All of the practices can be seen as manifestations of stealth power (Webb, 2008).

The article implicitly raises questions about the implications of stealth power for concepts of academic freedom and for the ability of HERIs to speak truth to power (a valued ideal for many academics). It also raises fundamental questions about the normalisation of such leadership by those in formal positions of power in HERIs and the implications for internal stakeholders (such as staff and students), for the mission of the HERIs and for the leaders’ role in advancing that mission. It raises questions about whether the leadership of those in formal positions of power inevitably involves the enactment of stealth power and the implications of this for accountability and transparency in publicly funded organizations. Since leadership and power are the invisible, culturally legitimate domains of men (Calas and Smircich, 2006; Logue et al, 2016), it also implicitly raises the question of whether HERIs can ever fully integrate gender into their constructions of leadership, and ultimately into the nature
and purpose of education and the values and interests of key stakeholders (Martin, 1993; O'Connor, 2017).

Since only three HERIs were included (and only two of which were universities), future work might look at the extent to which these and other leadership practices exemplifying the enactment of stealth power exist in other kinds of organizations, and the conditions under which these and other leadership practices emerge. It might also look at the extent to which particular cultural contexts shape organizational leadership practices e.g. whether deferral of decision making in organisations reflects and reinforces wider cultural trends in the Italian context; domination (in Lawrence’s 2008 terms) in the Turkish context and in-group loyalty in the Irish one. Finally, we encourage the study of HERIs as political organizations, with attention to the leadership practices used to resist as well as to obscure power.

References


Table 1-- Power Structure by HERI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power structure</th>
<th>Irish HERI</th>
<th>Italian HERI</th>
<th>Turkish HERI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Governing Authority</td>
<td>Board of Governors</td>
<td>University Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Rector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vice-Presidents</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Vice Rectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
<td>Executive Head</td>
<td>Rectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Deans</td>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>Deans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Heads of Department</td>
<td>Heads of Research</td>
<td>Heads of Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Members of other committees</td>
<td>Members of other committees</td>
<td>Members of other committees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Men’s Representation in Decision-making Positions in HERIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power structure</th>
<th>Irish HERI</th>
<th>Italian HERI</th>
<th>Turkish HERI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing Authority/Board of Governors/Senate</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President/President/Rector</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Presidents/Vice Rectors</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee/Executive Head/Executive Board</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deans/Directors of Centre</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of Department/Heads of Unit</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
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</table>