TRANSFER OF MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (MPA) PROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTATION IN CHINA

Author: Di HU

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Supervisors: Maura ADSHEAD and Neil ROBINSON

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Abstract

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Di HU

Current comparative studies exploring Chinese administrative reforms within the broader international context of administration tend to compare Chinese administrative reforms with industrial democracies. In other words, current studies on the topic of policy transfer and learning from the West are mostly in the category of interpretative research aimed at developing a better understanding of the learning phenomena in current Chinese public administration reforms.

Popular researchers ‘from the West’ have failed to acknowledge that ‘learning’ is locally based. In order to fill this theoretical gap in comparative oriented research, this research aims to further develop the literature by recognizing the need to explain what has been transferred and the underlying reasons for the Chinese administration system from a party-state perspective and through the mechanism of policy transfer literature. The focus of this dissertation is to better understand how the regime development struggles in communist China affect how policy transfer is understood and interpreted in the Chinese administrative system. In order to develop the basis for understanding and analyzing policy transfer, this research develops a multi-level analysis, including the central steering level and local implementation level.

This thesis applies case study method to explain policy transfer elements that are based on Jowitt’s model. After applying elements of Jowitt’s policy transfer model to analyze Chinese transfer of Master of Public Administration (MPA) program, this thesis found that MPA policy transfer from Western countries, especially from the United States, was a network that includes both ‘hard transfer’ and ‘soft learning’. ‘Hard learning’ aspects of the MPA which include cadre training tools, programs and implementation are more telling of international policy in terms of influences on recipient policy changes in cadre training system. Yet ‘soft learning’ aspects are professional and systematic conception that are differed from the pre-existing training approaches.

This research strives to demonstrate how communist party adaptations serve the furtherance of regime development, while at the same time incorporating policy transfer elements from abroad. The evolution of MPA training within the Chinese system of administration demonstrates the continuing balancing between central control and local implementation, maintained by the Chinese communist regime.
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At the beginning of the 21st century, the People’s Republic of China is unrecognizable from the stark political landscape that depicted the country 40 years ago. Then, the country was in the throes of the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, a radical solution initiated by Mao Zedong in 1965 and carried out primarily by the Red Guards to consolidate the proletarian regime and ‘purify’ the masses by beating, killing and imprisoning those denounced as conservatives or counter-revolutionaries. Civil society ceased to function as industries and schools were shut down, and food supplies were insufficient owing to the poor distribution capabilities of the central authorities.

The theme of political class struggle started to change in the late-1970s when Deng Xiaoping proposed that the ruling party of the state – the Communist Party of China (CPC) – should prioritize the development of a socialist market economy to solidify the regime’s political legitimacy.

“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” became the fundamental idea behind the socialist market economy. This directive was proposed at the Third Plenary Session of the 13th Central Congress of the CPC, to steer the country towards a liberalized market with the aim of supporting economic and social recovery. This has made Chinese development distinct from other communist regimes due to the economic growth and internationalization that it brought about. However, a liberalized Chinese economy and rapid economic growth also created demands for increasing openness and political cooperation with the West. As a result, the CPC has also come under immense pressure to reform. This challenge has been observed and described by scholar (Pei 2006, p.32) that: “China’s economic boom has dazzled investors and captivated the world. But beyond the new high-rises and churning factories lie rampant corruption, vast waste, and elites with little interest in making things better”.

The development of the CPC has taken place upon the grand stage of the Marxist-Leninist struggle, whereupon the party must not only survive in a world dominated by Western liberal-democratic powers but also succeed in developing a socialist market economy. The CPC was required to develop a socialist market to not only satisfy the economic needs and demands of the Chinese people, but to also produce a market
capable of functioning within the international economy and competing with the economic standards advanced by Western capitalist states.

In recent decades, the economic benefits of social liberalization have demonstrated to the Chinese people that the CPC is adaptable and resilient (Pei 2006). However, in the post-Mao age, the policies of social and market liberalization have gradually revealed the inherent shortcomings within the single-party regime. For instance, it has become especially apparent that an elected legislature is required to support further market development (Kotchegura 2008).

The gradual but inexorable transition from a centrally-planned economy to a form of market-based system has weakened the state’s monopolistic influence as Chinese society has diversified (Cao 1998). The CPC has struggled to maintain its Marxist-Leninist ideology as it has sought to manage the state and this process. Ideological inconsistencies have not been effectively overcome by the CPC on its road towards liberal-market development. As Pei (2006, p. 36) demonstrates, the main hazard in managing a liberalized market economy based on a central authoritarian political regime is that the state could easily fall victim to a “marriage between unchecked power and illicit wealth”.

Problems of social inequity have produced a fractured, uneven form of economic growth in China (Sun 2002; Touraine 2003). This is particularly evident in the rural areas, where change has occurred at a much slower rate than the industrialized urban centers. Economic development has also come at the expense of the environment, as the central authorities struggle to implement environmental policies that alleviate increasing levels of air and water pollution without stifling industrial progress. From the above arguments, it can be witnessed that further adjustments are necessary if the CPC is to manage the structural, fiscal and environmental problems stemming from regime development.

What has distinguished China from other Leninist regimes is that the CPC has been more successful in its ability to provide the necessary economic adjustments while being resilient against political change. For example, the Soviet Union engaged in partial economic reforms in 1957, 1965 and the late-1980s, with Gorbachev’s more daring socioeconomic policies of glasnost and perestroika. Other Soviet ‘satellite’ states in Eastern Europe also attempted reforms (e.g. Poland in 1956, Yugoslavia in
1952 and 1965; Hungary in 1956; Romania in 1967; and Czechoslovakia in 1968). The success of economic reform in China is all of the more striking as most of the aforementioned countries largely failed in their efforts to reform their economic structures (Shirk 1993). Leninist regimes globally have not adapted well. They have either tried to adapt but failed (i.e. the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries) or they have not tried to adapt at all (i.e. North Korea).

Although the starting line for all Leninist regimes was the same, the CPC alone has developed the ability to engage in the process of self-adaptation. This distinct feature – along with the governmental capability to manage adaptations – has distinguished the CPC from all other Leninist regimes. Obviously, the CPC cannot manage the economy and society in the same way as 40 years ago, and perhaps not even in the same way as during the first years of the proposed socialist market economy. For what has been facing the communist regime in China are the problems that Dickson (2000, p.518) argued applied to all Leninist regimes: “… how to liberalize its economy without destabilizing the political system … (and) how to balance the need to adapt with the need to uphold party traditions”. Reflecting on the Chinese experience, Chow (2001, p. 417) indicates that the path of economic development has revealed a ‘striking regularity’ compared with other countries, in that “socioeconomic development has always resulted in political and administrative reforms…” (Chow 2001, p.417).

Nonetheless, scholars and politicians cannot help but wonder how far economic and social developments can go when Leninist parties retain their ability to manage the economy through the party mechanism of self-adaptation. In addition to the extent to which Leninist parties can engage in adaptation while avoiding regime change, a more fundamental concern is the various ways in which Leninist parties adapt. Only by understanding these processes of self-adaptation can we produce better explanations for current adaptations while being able to offer proposals for the future. This research adopts Jowitt’s (1975) theory of regime development stages and its conflict-accommodation struggle to explain the problematic nature of party self-adaptation and its aptitude for managing its host society.

Governmental capabilities are one essential factor towards interpreting party adaptations. The implementation of a modern public administration system and an effective civil service would serve as a pragmatic CPC adjustment towards China’s
political reform. As previously outlined, the problems that emerged within the Chinese administration system were rooted in both the accomplishments and struggles of the CPC in its attempts to maintain the traditional nature of a Leninist party while steering the development of the Chinese communist regime towards market liberalization and modernity. Therefore, administrative reforms are expected to resolve the issue of how to manage high levels of socioeconomic reform with lower levels of political reform (Q. Wang 2010, p.101), given that each will determine the scale and depth of administrative reform required. However, to be successful, administrative reforms must be able to interpret the interests and requirements of both.

The willingness of China to engage in learning experiences of administrative reforms in Western countries (Ngok and Zhu 2007; Christensen et al. 2008; Dong et al. 2010) has been acknowledged as a major contributing factor in the CPC’s adjustment of governmental capabilities in the post-Mao era. For Lee and Lo (2001, p. 1), this has been a “most salient trend [that] has been intertwined with an overall transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a post-revolutionary society to a post-Communist society in China”. For instance, many parallels of reform can be drawn between the Chinese administrative reforms and American administration developments (Zhang 2003; Zhang 2009).

In China, six stages of administrative reform have occurred in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008 (Christensen et al. 2008; Q. Wang 2010). These post-Mao reforms are “incremental in nature” (Q. Wang 2010, p.104) as there has been a slow, gradual engagement of China towards embracing international influences and the reformative themes offered by Western industrial democracies (Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991). This is especially noticeable in the more recent rounds of administrative reforms, which were primarily driven by economic globalization, and where China’s adaptation of Western reform practices is much more apparent.

The most important basis for this study is the notion that China has largely accepted that the Western administration model is efficient because it is compatible with economic globalization. As a result, Chinese policy transfers from the West “became more specific and selective in the later reforms” (Christensen et al. 2008, p.365). The decisive factor behind the Chinese adaptation of Western administrative reforms was based on
the CPC’s need to increase the mobility and resilience of the party without losing its monitoring ability and fundamental control (Solinger 1995).

The difficulties in explaining the Chinese adoption of administrative lessons from Western countries to further the CPC’s regime development and self-adaptation have been noted by scholars, because “a Public Administration theory is inevitably a political theory” (Sayre 1958, p.105). Based on the Jowitt’s theory, the primary question of this research is: How well has the conflict-accommodation struggle been managed as China utilizes policy transfer from Western political systems? This fundamental question further develops two separate but related considerations: the ways in which the adopted Western administrative experiences will result in a more inclusive Chinese public administration system, as well as the ways in which Western policy transfers have been managed and function towards furthering the ‘traditional’ communist political agenda in China (1975, p.80).

The primary consideration or this research is to study how the communist party legitimizes itself through the further development of the communist regime, which is arguably the point of departure that distinguishes the Chinese administration system from its Western counterparts. The focus of this dissertation is to better understand how the regime development struggles in communist China affect how policy transfer is understood and interpreted in the Chinese administrative system. The contextual differences between communist regimes and industrial democracies have further aggravated the difficulties in adopting administrative reform experiences from Western countries. Rosenbloom (1983, p.224) addresses the differences in administrative values with specific reference to the United States’ political, managerial and legal systems, which “emphasizes the separation of powers rather than integrated political actions”. By contrast, the Chinese public administration system is legitimated by the communist ideology with reforms being directed by the political elite who are loyal to the regime. In the Chinese context, the administration system is rooted in “an integrated system of rulemaking, implementation, and adjudication, featuring a party-state regime” (Jing and Zhu 2012, p.137). The Chinese administration system retains an “ideological orientation on a broad spectrum” (Lee and Lo 2001, p.3) that is designed to maximize the party’s centralized coordination of the state.
This research appreciates studies noting the differences between the public administration system in China and those of industrialized democratic countries (particularly the United States in this research). Scholars both within and outside of China have always taken strong interest in comparative studies of public administration systems between China and Western countries (Holzer and Zhang 2001; Zhang 2001; Zhang 2003; Zhang 2006; Zhang 2009). Current comparative studies exploring Chinese administrative reforms within the broader international context of popular administrative reform trends include the works of (Straussman and Zhang 2001), while other studies (Zhang 2003; Christensen et al. 2008; Zhang 2009) have compared Chinese administrative reforms with industrial democracies, concentrating especially on the US with the aim of generalizing similarities with West countries. Scholars and researchers studying the evolution of public administration in general (and within the China-US comparative study in particular) have found trends of convergence and diffusion between the two regimes. However, comparative-oriented researchers ‘from the West’ have failed to acknowledge ‘learning’ that is locally based. As Hood (1989, p. 348) states, the limitation of public administration comparative studies is that “… public administration scholars live in what is much more of a ‘global village’ conceptually, in that it would be hard to write an acceptable research degree thesis in the subject today which did not draw on an international literature for its conceptual framework. It is hard to see this trend going into reverse”.

In other words, current studies on the topic of policy transfer and learning from the West are mostly in the category of interpretative research aimed at developing a better understanding of the learning phenomena in current Chinese public administration reforms. This research aims to further develop the literature recognizing the need to explain ‘what has been learned and why’ (Sigelman 1976, p.623) in the Chinese administration system from a party-state perspective and through the mechanism of party self-adaptation.

This research will inquire into a specific field within the civil service system – the civil service training system – to lay the foundation for the study of Western policy transfer. The aim is to analyze the policy transfer and learning from abroad to China. This research has investigated the policy transfer literature to explore the ways in which China has transferred the Master of Public Administration (MPA) program to train its civil servants. The research is predicated on a thorough understanding of the Western
administration study, as well as reforms in the Chinese civil service training system that overall can contribute towards making generalizations and recommendations on the communist regime’s development requirements and struggles.

Another aim of this research is to learn through empirical studies the extent to which MPA training experiences from the US have been transferred to China in the vision of regime development. This research endeavors to learn how Jowitt’s (1975) model of conflict accommodation can be ascribed to the MPA transfer in two related areas: 1) how contributions from the MPA program have facilitated the development of an inclusive regime in current China; and 2) the ways in which the MPA program has been modified in the Chinese political and public administration context to conform with the political heritage of mobilization and exclusion that exists from the previous regime stage.

This dissertation will study how Jowitt’s (1975) conflict-accommodation model can serve to identify the struggles that the Chinese administrative system faced when adapting the MPA. The challenges faced by the CPC can be observed at three different levels of analysis: 1) the macro level, which serves as the ideological stage for the Leninist regime and upon which the party strives to continually legitimate itself through self-adaptation; 2) the meso level, where reforms in the public administration system serve to strengthen the government’s ability to accommodate for regime development; and 3) the micro level, which corresponds to the adjustments made within the administrative system through the cadre/civil service training system. Only by analyzing all three levels can a cohesive understanding of CPC policy transfer be attained.

Studies have strongly drawn on publicly-available government documents to analyze official thinking (Chan and Gao 2013, p.369). This research also uses first-hand data from in-depth balanced interviews conducted in various locations throughout China.
1. APPLYING GOVERNANCE LITERATURE TO THE CHINESE CASE

In order to understand the MPA transfer that occurred within the Chinese political context, this chapter explores the relevant components of policy transfer, taking into considering the tension between individual MPA program cases and the central mandates.

1.1 UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE

‘Governance’ is defined as steering approaches from the center to local agencies to implement policies. Implementers at local levels include state organizations, lower levels of governments and social institutions. This illustrates the governance dilemma: on the one hand, the central state wants to achieve the national policy goal; while on the other hand, the central state cannot steer the direct implementation of the frontline without the local level implementing support. This creates a mixture of governance mechanisms that are sometimes in tension with each other. This chapter reviews the governance literature and explains the ‘steering dilemma’ in the Chinese context, which is explored in further detail in the following chapter, which examines communist regime development stages.

In order to avoid this confusing signal, this chapter subsequently classifies steering instrument into four categories – nodality, authority, treasure and organization – which are resources to steer. The present study does not placed different categories of steering instruments on a hard-soft continuum; instead, this study believes that there are hard form and soft forms in each category of steering instruments with determinants to differentiate them.

After instruments have been classified, it is necessary “to explore functional connections (that) matching instruments to goals, policy problems, social impact and organizations” (Linder and Peters 1990, p.307). There are analyses of the factors affecting instrument choices (Majone 1976) combining both technical and political factors. Among all factors, the pursuit goal and the structural conjunctural context of certain choices are considered as essential (Kirschen 1964). The goal of pursuit is articulated as policy causal theories of defining and solving problems. They include
fundamental value priorities, basic perceptions concerning the general seriousness of the problem and its principal causes, as well as the basic policy instruments to be used (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p.122). At the same time, the institutional context is “responsible for the changing steering relationships between policy-makers and frontline policy implementers in terms of – for example – decentralized organizations, coordinating over organizational boundaries” (Pierre 2000, pp.3-6; Pierre and Peters 2000, pp.2-7, 15-24).

This dissertation applies the proposed theoretical tests using a case study in the area of civil service training in China. This case study is especially useful for analytical purposes because it is the comprehensive test ground for different steering approaches. The civil service training system provides a context of completed organizations in which party schools represent party agents, schools of administration represent state agents and MPA programs represent social agents. As such, the civil service system accommodates all three institutional systems of agencies. Moreover, it pushes the problems of hard/soft governance to the extreme. The cadre training system provides a decentralized and expertized area where a soft governance approach is indispensable. However, the extent of political sensitivity in framing the cadre training issue in public administration system is also sufficient to discard the hard approach of steering.

1.2 GOVERNANCE AND STEERING

1.2.1 GOVERNANCE: IN TERMS OF DIFFERENT STEERING APPROACHES

The term governance is nowadays employed in a widespread fashion (Vigoda-Gadot 2003), albeit with ambiguous usage because it “has strong intuitive appeal, precise definitions are seldom thought to be necessary by those who use it” (Lynn Jr et al. 2001). In order to draw a general picture, Rhodes (1997, pp.36-38; 2000, pp.55-60), Pierre and Peters (2000, pp.12-16) as well as Kersbergen and Waarden (2004) have identified a number of associated usages of governance in social science, such as the usage category of ‘corporate governance’ adopted from the study of economics; ‘good governance’, as proposed by the World Bank, which could be further applied in private sectors and public sectors; ‘global governance’, which is mostly concerned with international relation studies, especially in European studies; governance as a socio-cybernetic system; as well as economic governance in institutional conditions. Similarly
dispersed definitions of governance and their usage create additional hinders for researchers (Bevir 2006; Bevir 2009). Thus, a conceptual boundary must be applied to understand this conception in this present study: in this study, governance only concerns the relevant criteria in public policy and public administration in a domestic manner. Within this criterion, governance is broadly defined as “a set of steering mechanisms by which policy is formulated and implemented” (Kickert et al. 1997, p.2; Kjaer 2004, p.57; Meuleman 2008, pp.45-50).

After decades of theoretical evolving, two comparative governance steering mechanisms (within the conceptual boundary) between state intervention and society autonomy in terms of politics and policy dimension have constituted the majority of governance literature (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1994; Rhodes 1996; Peters and Pierre 1998; Pierre 2000; Kooiman 2003; Mayntz 2003; Pierre and Peters 2005; Rhodes 2007; Treib et al. 2007). Bearing in mind the governance dilemma in terms of how the state achieves the policy goal while the implementing actors at lower levels cannot be steered and managed by a direct command-and-control approach, this study focuses on the policy dimension, considering governing approaches to steering actors in the policy process. Even though the politics dimension of governance is not examined in this present thesis, it can explain the need and necessities of a lesser state intervention steering approach.

In the politics dimension of governance, the rubric of governance is considered as broader than government since its coverage includes the distribution of the political, social and economic power “of a wider range of non-governmental actors” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, p.1). It is “a mix of all kinds of governing efforts by all manner of social-political actors, public as well as private” (Stoker 1998, p.17) to perform in policy process. According to the growing complexity in the environment, actor constellations and power relations between them have changed (Treib et al. 2007, p.3).

Indeed, a widespread strand of the governance literature comprises the neo-liberal ‘bottom-up’ notion that encourages the state and government being “hollowed out” (Rhodes 1994; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000) or at least “marginalized” due to the maturity of civil society (Rhodes 1997), and globalization (Rosenau 1992), as well as the growth of transnational organizations, with the most representative being the European Union (Flinders 2004). Proponents of ‘society-centric’ governance believe that one state-
government prepares for the challenging domestic and international environment by repositioning itself (Kettle 1993; Kickert 1993). As Sørensen and Torfing (2008, p.3) state, “the sovereign state is losing its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about pluri-centric government based on interdependence, negotiation and trust”. The involvement of a wider range of actors in governing challenges the role of government accordingly (Stoker 1998; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). This is considered as a “fundamental transformation not just in scope and scale of government action, but in its basic forms” to a society-centered manner (Salamon 2002, pp.1-2).

While society-centric governance has its merits and subsequently become widely spread, there has been an undergoing skirmish surrounding the role of the state (Pierre and Peters 2005). Although the state-centric family of arguments do not support the idea that the state could or should be ‘hollowed out’, scholars in favor of a state-centric approach also argue for a change in governing approaches. The role of the government is central and essential to consciously choose its governance mechanisms in “establishing and operating governance strategies, develop strategic relationships or partnerships with a range of non-state actors” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, p.4).

In the belief of ‘society-centric’ governance, the role of the state is negligible, if not irrelevant. To negate the argument, there is another strand of voice arguing that the “government is still highly resourced and has at its disposal a range of powers” (Marinetto 2003, p.592) and that “ambitious interventionist government is alive and well” (Crawford 2006, p.455). In several of their works, Pierre and Peters (Peters and Pierre 1998; Pierre and Peters 2000; Pierre and Peters 2005) proposed the thematic ‘state-centric’ approach of governance, which proclaims that the state “remains the key political actor in society and the predominant expression of collective interests” (Pierre and Peters 2000, p.25) that are interpreted by public policy steering.

The merit of politics dimension is to carry the preserved tasks of government, including steering, controlling, managing and extending to a wider range of various actors (Hirst 2000). These actors involve a wide range from inter-organizational and intergovernmental (like most of Rhodes’ studies) as well as transnational and international (Newman 2001). The vision of state-centric governance is “governments and the broader set of agencies and public bodies that together constitute the state are, and should remain, central players in governance processes” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, p.2).
However, the involvement of a variety of actions from different actors in governance would have “consequences for governance” (Peters 1995, p.86).

The policy dimension of governance indicates that governance is a relational manner concerned with “the act or manner of governing; the office or function of governing” (Kooiman 2003). In this term, this relational conception indicates governing as a process that “to form, guide and restrain collective activities of various shareholders” through policy dimension (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, p.24). This definition captures the important character of governance in the policy relational emphasis of inter-organizational explanation.

Governance is defined quite consistently in this steering sense, which claims that governance implies “a new process of governing” (Rhodes 1996, p.652; Stoker 1998, p.26) ‘from government to governance’. First, there is the verb to govern in English, which drives from the Latin gubernare, meaning “steer, direct, and rule” (Kooiman 2003, pp.135-152). The Latin word is a translation of the Greek word kybernetes, which is used in the sense of “the art of steering” or “the art of government” (Hughes 2010, p.88). Steering has largely become a synonym for governance (Lynn 2010, p.2). For instance, (Hughes 2010, p.88) sees governance as being “about running organizations, about steering as in the original derivation, how to organize and how to set procedures for an organization to be run”.

Apart from NPM theory with its focus of intra-organization, an adaptive focus of inter-organizational relationships explains the highlighted changing nature of policy process in recent decades (Richards and Smith 2002, p.2; Osborne 2006, p.380). (Schneider 2004, p.30) paraphrased governance from the Oxford English Dictionary: “Governance is the action or manner of governing, that is, of directing, guiding, or regulating individuals, organizations, nations, or multi-national associations in conduct or actions”. Thus, the governance process reflects an attempt “to steer communities, whole countries, or even groups of countries in the pursuit of collective goals” (Bevir et al. 2003, p.13). In the age of governance, the policy arena is characterized by networks, partnerships, collaboration, decentralization and local discretion, blurring responsibilities and mutual responsibilities that interpret the changing relationships in a relational manner (Rhodes 1996; Kickert et al. 1997; Stoker 1998; Pierre and Peters 2000; Pierre and Peters 2005; Stoker 2006; Rhodes 2007). As “a change in the meaning
of government, (governance is) referring to a changed condition of ordered rule; a new process of governing; or the new method by which society is governed” (Rhodes 2000, p.56). Governance theory has a relational focus, which is different from the government conception, understood as “the formal institution of the state with their coercive power… (and) processes which operate at the level of the nation state to maintain public order …” (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001, p.5). In this term, this relational conception of governing indicates a process “to form, guide and restrain collective activities of various shareholders” through steering (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, p.24).

The approaches to steer inter-organizational relationships involve articulating ways to develop policy design preferences. Thus, determinants are identified in terms of control mechanisms in the public policy process (Kickert et al. 1997, p.2) through which inter-organizational relationships are managed. These inter-organizational relationships cover different levels of administration systems and/or governmental and non-governmental organizations such as NGOs, private sector organizations, etc., through which public policies are implemented (Leftwich 1993, p.610). Accordingly, any governance approach to manage inter-organizational relationships develops through a preference set of policy-steering mechanisms.

A similar conception is what Howlett (Howlett 2009, p.79) calls ‘policy regime logics’, reflecting the combination of “a preference for certain types of tools along with a more or less generic set of overall policy objectives”. Accordingly, any governance approach to managing the inter-organizational relationship to formulate and implement policies is developed through a preference set of policy-steering mechanisms. Bearing its inter-organizational stress in mind, “governance is a relational conception that is defined as a totality forms of steering relationship of policy issues between central state and societal actors” (Nye and Donahue 2000; Lynn Jr 2010). Moreover, a governance instrument is defined as “a set of instrument choices adopted by state to steer agencies to implement policies”. This research endeavors to systematically study steering instrument combinations adopted by hard and soft governance, respectively, as well as the reasons for certain choices. Bringing in the dilemma in the Chinese context stated in the previous section, the research question for the present study is: “How does the state steer social organizations to implement policies of cadre training?”.
Images of contrasting steering mechanisms enable a picture of comprehensive steering instrument set classifications in terms of hard/soft. As the dependent variable of this study, it could only be analyzed well in terms of an overall understanding of its coverage and classification. The importance of a systematic examination of implementation instruments and instrument choices – as grandly noticed by scholars – “would … lead to insights into the factors driving the policy process and the characterization of long-patterns of public policy-making” (Howlett 2011, p.43). Among all of the independent variables indicated in the quotation, this study explores: 1) the ‘administrative tradition’ (section 2.4) of national policy style literature whose focus lies on the preferences and reasons of states in making policies and choosing policy instruments; as well as 2) the ‘causal theory’ (section 2.5) of policy design literature, which is considered to be ‘driving the policy process’ since the extent to which and specific approach state would intervene policy process is decided by the way in which a certain policy problem is defined.

1.2.2 THE GOVERNANCE DILEMMA IN CHINA: REGIME DEVELOPMENT STAGES IN LENINIST COUNTRIES

The use of governance in the Chinese context is applicable since the governance conception denotes “beyond the functioning of governance institutions and administrative departments… (and includes) broader issues of how individual citizens groups and communities relate to state” (Saich 2010, p.xiv). This section will explain not only the governance dilemma existing in Chinese public administration but also the reason for its existence.

Even though Leninist regimes differ from each other and differ over time, scholars (Gilley 2008, p.265) have developed a normative framework of the regime development path including three stages: revolution, consolidation and inclusion. The shared character identified by these scholars is that Marxist-Leninist regimes are based on elite political tasks and incentives used by the party for different stages of development (Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Jowitt 1975; 1983).

The political task of the party during the revolutionary stage is to set up a communist regime in the state. For this purpose, the party uses coercive and mobilized forms associated with military occupation while maximizing socio-political support outside of
the party “to decisively eliminate the political and military capacity of opposition elites” (Johnston and Mueller 2001, p.356). In the consolidation stage, party elites mobilize society to achieve certain specific economic, military or political goals to develop and solidify the core of the newly-established political system. In order to maintain its “institutionalized charismatic organization” (Jowitt 1975, p.69), party elites exclude party membership from the whole society by seeking to “depersonalize the party’s contacts with the society” (Jowitt 1975, p.72). Economic and social developments ensure the regime’s continuation yet also create political uncertainties for the party’s self-maintenance. Taking into consideration the potential for “undesired and uncontrollable influences” (Jowitt 1975, p.70), party elites have to justify the rationale behind any action in the consolidation stage to secure the regime’s political legitimacy.

Although the mobilized way in which society was managed during the revolutionary stage of the Chinese regime never entirely withered away, the party’s stance considerably altered during the consolidation phase as the core task of the party became its isolation from society. The reasons for this are explained by Jowitt (1975, p. 81), who demonstrates that in order to sustain the revolutionary momentum as a Leninist party, political elites tried to mobilize all of society into the proletarian camp through radical social transformation, while at the same ensuring that control of the party did not fall into the hands of the people but instead resided firmly in the hands of the communist party authority. Take – for example – the Chinese political campaigns that served to consolidate the newly-established communist regime under the leadership of Mao Zedong: the series of political campaigns undertaken by Mao essentially recruited members of the proletariat party from classes other than the working-class peasants, yet the campaigns were always based on large-scale mobilization.

According to (Jowitt 1975, p.70), the regime consolidation techniques that the CPC adopted when it changed its role from a revolutionary party to a ruling party in 1949 served to further the ‘original justification’ of the party. During the revolution period, the persuasiveness and mobilization techniques (Guo 2003, p.3) that the CPC adopted relied on an inner party core ideology, and information was disseminated to other parts of society to attract as much support for the communist revolution as possible. Comparably, the CPC’s persuasive ruling style turned into a radical and coercive control technique when the party turned its attention to consolidating the communist regime. However, the legitimacy that the CPC relies upon for its continued existence
has remained centered on the same original justification of communist political ideology, which inherently refers to the theoretical and historical rightness of the communist ruling authority. Even though the role of the CPC in the Mao Zedong stage changed from a revolutionary party into a ruling party, the CPC still retained one important feature of a revolutionary party, namely its continued role in serving to advance the purity of socialist ideology through political mobilization (Teiwes 1976). Another practical reason why the CPC has retained its revolutionary character well into its regime consolidation stage was due to all of the economic and political events during this stage. When the regime was set up, the CPC was essentially building a new communist regime from scratch. Therefore, mass mobilization was regarded as the most effective means of acquiring public support for dealing with all of the societal challenges.

The consolidation techniques of mobilization and exclusion diminished when the party was required to create a more inclusive and pragmatic regime (Harding 1981), although they have not entirely disappeared. After consolidating the socialist regime, the inclusive approach towards society is necessary because the co-optation of the policy and policy influence must be based upon “critical scrutiny of problems” rather than “indiscriminate emulation of external references and/or dogmatic adherence to past policies” (Huntington 1970; Lowenthal 1970; Geddes 2004). However, both socio-occupational identity and political-organizational identity remain. The shift of party leadership to a more normative incorporation of broad societal support serves to “give a stake in the system to various sections of their populations, and perhaps preempt demands for more far-reaching … change” (Jowitt 1975, p.76).

However, problems arose from the expansion of policy influences from popular forces that were necessary for the continuation of the regime’s development. Since the problem was common and inevitable for Leninist regimes, Jowitt (1975) described the general response to this problem as the ‘reversal’ of inclusion, which was implemented by the Leninist camp during the 1960s. This was achieved through re-assertion of the mobilization character of the party and a re-emphasis on “ideological and organizational exclusiveness” (White 1986, p.470). The Chinese Leninist regime has experienced regime transformations while also dealing with the same problems as other Leninist regimes. The CPC has shifted to consider the development of the economy and society on a broad basis, in which a party adaptation to a more inclusive regime is necessary to
take more popular forces into account for policy decisions. At the same time, this has created political uncertainty for the party’s self-maintenance. Serving as a trigger for development in China’s case, the liberalized socialist market economy would gradually but inexorably clean out the state’s monopoly influence over markets and lead to political pluralism (Jowitt 1975, p.90). For an authoritarian regime, embracing the full level of economic liberalization would undermine and eventually wipe out the dominant role and functions of the authority party.

The combined approach of exclusion and mobilization has evolved into an inclusive regime because the perceived challenge to the party’s institutionalized identity requires a reaffirmation of its privileged character. The communist regime has worked on balancing between the necessity of aligning itself with society through regime modernization and maintaining its Leninist nature, specifically by bringing “the security apparatus” under its exclusive control (Cao 1998). Nonetheless, it is not realistic that a liberalized market and society could fully function in an authoritarian state like China due to the risk of political pluralism or extinction of the authoritarian party (Johnston and Mueller 2001, p.357).

With the co-existence of mobilization, exclusion and inclusion as the primary building blocks of the Chinese communist regime, Jowitt (Z. Wang 2010) states that it is arbitrary to conclude that inclusion is always positive or that mobilization and exclusion are always negative. For the Chinese communist regime, it would not be pragmatic to simply pursue a high level of commitment to an inclusive regime, given that this would increase the risk of sabotaging the party’s privileged Leninist role. The task that truly matters for CPC is to succeed as a political authority that exists to manage and balance all tasks within the politically-legitimated system. The inclusive social force needs to be controlled by the regime so that the state becomes overwhelmingly powerful and can subordinate “all other state functions and institutions” (1975, p.95). However, an “omnipotent” regime could lead to absolute political control, which stifles social and economic development. On the other hand, if political power expands beyond the party and/or is liberalized to the extent that the party is captured by other interests, then this would jeopardize the party’s status and further threaten the continued legitimation of the CPC.
The CPC has moved on from its former identification as a Leninist party. This identity also served as the origin of its political authority. However, party legitimation experienced a dramatic change when the CPC embraced the long-ignored pragmatic approach to legitimation. This approach stresses the regime's important role of representing the common interests of the Chinese people to ensure the sustainability of domestic support. “In modern times authoritarianism has been justified by nationalism and by ideology…” (Huntington 1993, p. 46) towards “…addressing the needs of different constituencies with the nation…” (Shambaugh 2009, p. 3). The existence and function of the Chinese communist regime is based on the people’s belief in the party’s authority, the empirical political legitimacy of “utilitarian justification” (Guo 2003, p. 3) as well as the capacity of the CPC and government to maintain power.

The durability of these three regime stages strongly differs among Leninist regimes. However, this research draws upon one important point to understand the development of communist regimes: through utilizing regime stages, it can be witnessed that changes in leadership are a central component to understand the ways in which the communist party adapts in the process of communist regime (re)construction.

These regime adjustments primarily occur as a result of the changing demands of society and the necessity of the party to continually legitimate itself and its function of managing society.

1.3 POLICY-STEERING INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNANCE

Policy instruments are techniques that help governments to achieve their goals. Research on instruments in public administration has taken on different names such as ‘policy instruments’, ‘instruments of government’ or ‘governance instruments’. Despite being applied to describe slightly different emphases, they are often used synonymously as an instrumental element in the sense that it modifies target individuals and agents to devote (or not) efforts towards certain matters (Schneider and Ingram 1997; Anderson 2014). In the present study, a steering instrument is defined as “the set of techniques by which governmental authorities – or proxies acting on behalf of governmental authorities – wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect social change” (Vedung 1998, p.50; Howlett 2017). Despite policy implementation instrument choice being the central link between the goal and the frontline implementation, it is something
of an under-researched ‘missing link’ (Howlett 2009, p.84). Thus, Vedung (Vedung 1998, p.50) states that the “systematic, empirical study of policy instruments still has hardly got off the ground.”

This section endeavors to fulfill this theoretical gap by contributing a typology of policy instruments. This effort is based on previous classical works from Christopher Hood (Hood 1986) classifying steering instruments by the governing resources required. Subsequently, a particular category of procedural policy instrument is separated based on works of Howlett (Howlett 2000; Howlett 2009). Another typology of instrument is based on a continuum from hard to soft in terms of the degree of coerciveness from the state (Doern and Phidd 1983).

1.3.1 POLICY INSTRUMENT

Based on primary resources lying behind each tool, Christopher Hood (Hood 1986) constructed an inventory of instruments based on four resources that governments can use to either effect or detect changes in their environment. Accordingly, the acronym NATO comprises nodality – also understood the as ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’ resource hold by the government given its connecting character in political and social networks – authority, treasure and organization.

Table 1.1 Hood’s taxonomy of policy instruments based on governing resources of NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governing resource</th>
<th>Nodality</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Treasure</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principle use</td>
<td>Detectors</td>
<td>Surveys</td>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectors</td>
<td>Public information campaign</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>Government agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from (Hood 1986; Howlett 2009).

Despite being heuristic, Hood’s classification of policy instruments is presented in a ‘bundle’ fashion that does not distinguish between the substantive and procedural uses. Being his major contribution to governance literature, such procedural policy instrument categories can affect the behaviors and activities of interest groups or target groups (Howlett and Ramesh 1993; Howlett 2000; Howlett 2009; Howlett 2017). In contrast to
substantive instruments – which directly affect the delivery of goods and services in society, and hence the policy outcomes – procedural policy instruments indirectly affect policy outcomes through manipulating state-societal interactions in policy processes (Howlett 2000, p.412). The procedural policy instrument category is used to steer and influence actors by manipulating the alternatives placed before them (Bressers and Klok 1988). This category of policy instrument is especially serviceable for governance studies since the ability of the government to independently affect policy outcomes is strongly influenced by such factors of “increasingly complex networks of inter-organizational actors whose coordination and management are increasingly problematic” (Howlett 2000, p.413).

Table 1.2 Howlett's classification of substantive and procedural policy instruments based on governing resources of NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of tool</th>
<th>Governing resource</th>
<th>Nodality</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Treasure</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantive</td>
<td>Nodality</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Treasure</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public information campaigns</td>
<td>Independent regulatory agencies</td>
<td>Subsides and grants</td>
<td>Public enterprises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Official secret acts</td>
<td>Administrative advisory committees</td>
<td>Interest group funding</td>
<td>Government re-organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Howlett 2000).

The dimensional taxonomy of policy instruments is the ideological preferences of governments for state activity extension and “the difficulties posed to this principle by the relative political ‘strength’ of the societal actors in resisting government efforts to shape their behaviour” (Howlett 2011, p.49). Canadian scholar Bruce Doern (Doern and Phidd 1983) and his colleagues classify policy instruments based on the ideological preferences of the state – a liberal-democratic regime in their case analyses – to range from the minimum of state coercion to the maximum of coercion.
Figure 1.1 Continuum of policy instrument choices based on degree of coercion


However, there is no straightforward movement or wholesale from so-called ‘hard’ instruments (in terms of state intervention) to ‘soft’ instruments (in terms of society autonomy) and the capacity and importance of the state has not declined as society-centric governance scholars would expect (Jordan et al. 2005). On the one hand, the increased legitimacy of ‘soft’ instruments is becoming increasingly intriguing in the governance era given the growing diversify of governance actors. On the other hand, the traditional ‘hard’ instruments are relatively weak in legitimacy or feasibility, but effective. Given these characteristics, a toolbox that combines all worlds could capture all of the goods (Howlett and Rayner 2006). Thus, an over-simplified story ‘from hard to soft’ is insufficient to capture the complexity of present-day governance (Zehavi 2012).

The dilemma in regulatory organizations is the co-existence of hard and soft degrees of steering approaches over implementing agencies, not the simultaneously wielding of different steering instruments. Thus, understandings of the soft versus hard steering category reject the progressive order from a regulatory instrument being the hardest coercive governing approach and an information instrument being the softest governing approach, with the financial incentive instrument in the middle. Instead, scholars argue that there are different levels of ‘hardness’ in ‘stick’ instruments and levels of ‘softness’ in ‘sermon’ instruments. For example, besides laws and regulations as relatively ‘harder’ binding instruments, other instruments such as recommendations, guidelines and directives are also obligate as such but ‘softer’. Moreover, there is a co-existence of three categories of instrument representing a continuum containing both ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ forms (Maycraft-Kall 2010, pp.66-70). “Besides the interaction between
binding and non-binding instruments we can observe that varying degrees of obligation and precision do not only occur between instruments but also within them” (Slominski 2008, p.7). Based on the recognized dilemma from the previous literature review, a further classification of procedural policy instruments of governance steering is necessary based on the hard/soft degrees. This is a development based on Kall’s policy instrument classification (Table) by extracting determinants that identify hard and soft instruments, respectively, in a procedural term.

Table 1.3 summary policy instruments – hard and soft steering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument type</th>
<th>Hard steering</th>
<th>Soft steering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory “the stick”</td>
<td>• Legislation with high level of detail and obligation.</td>
<td>• Framework legislation with low level of detail and obligation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Directives and binding guidelines.</td>
<td>• Imprecise guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial/ incentive</td>
<td>• Negative incentives based on compliance and threats.</td>
<td>• Incentives and ‘free money' general grants and subsides with few strings attached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the carrot”</td>
<td>• Financial penalties and sanctions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information “the sermon”</td>
<td>• Theoretically voluntary information but with threats and conditions attached.</td>
<td>• General information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mild persuasion forms based on ‘learning’ strategies.</td>
<td>• Mild persuasion forms based on ‘learning’ strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Maycraft-Kall 2010, p.69)

1.3.2 HARD VERSUS SOFT POLICY INSTRUMENTS

As the most representative scholars in policy instrument research, Hood and Howlett perceive the choice of policy instrument as a pure technical issue and propose a straightforward approach to categorize policy instruments according to the one or crossed governing resources upon which they. This taxonomy has gained attention because it cracks the ‘black box’ of why certain steering decisions are made by governments based on the inputs associated with instruments¹. Canadian scholars

¹ For similar classifications of policy instruments, see Vedung and Salamon (1998); Lowi (1972); Schnieder and Ingram (1990); May (2002); May (2003); Van der Dolen (1998); Bememans-Videc (1998); Hood (2006); Linder & Peters (1989).
representing the choice of policy instrument as a gesture decided by state ideology.

In contrast with previous policy instrument classifications, the present combining attempt is based on the idea that policy instrument analysis is and should be an ideological and a technical issue. In this term, the classification and choices of policy instrument in this study reflect a spectrum from the maximum (hard) to the minimum (soft) of state coerciveness within each column of policy instrument that is based on the primary governing resource to steering interested actors in the policy process.

The following sections identify determinants that differentiate hard manifestations from soft ones. These determinants should be able to grasp the most crucial features of the steering approach in terms of hard and soft paths. Determinants are important since they are “the basis for classification (which) reveals the hidden meanings and significance of the phenomenon, suggesting what the importance hypotheses ought to be concerned with” (Lowi 1972, p.299).

NODALITY/ INFORMATION

- Likelihood of coerciveness

The degree of coerciveness is the main definitional criterion applied to distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information policy-steering instruments (Slominski 2008). Hard steering instruments are obligated, binding requirements with a high level of coercive and compulsive, and of course “imposing cost for noncompliance” (Wilms 1982). By contrast, soft steering instruments – the “soft path” of policies demonstrated by some scholars (Wilms 1982, p.553) – are “not coercive and impost costs for compliance”.

In learning the case of Dutch disaster management, Brandsen and colleagues offer an example demonstrating the comparison between hard versus soft informative-steering instruments. According to their study, hard steering instruments are “formal regulative frameworks” and “official guiding principles” that must be obeyed by local agencies (Brandsen et al. 2006, pp.550-552). By contrast, soft instruments are unofficial guidelines that should not have sanctions for those who do not obey or follow. However, the boundary between hard and soft steering instruments is not always clear cut. During
their research, Brandsen and colleagues found that informative-governing instruments – namely unofficial guidelines – should be a soft governance instrument that could “raise the level of expertise and standards of performance without having formal regulatory framework (which often carries with it financial, political, and administrative burdens)” (Brandsen et al. 2006, p.546). However, in the case of the Dutch disaster management case, guidelines become the extension of formal regulative frameworks, which limit professional autonomy in the organizational field \textsuperscript{ibid}. Due to the highly-sensitive political environment and the ambiguity role of guideline ‘senders’, unofficial guidelines are interpreted as hard ones.

The term ‘guideline’ in soft governance is an adversary, unofficial status tool (Brandsen et al. 2006, p.546). Even though guidelines have no official legal binding status, in practice they can prove a useful tool for steering the implementation of national policy by taking on the character of formal regulation to encourage conformist behavior in implementation. Forms that carry such information can range from “letters, handbooks, manuals, and websites to conferences and network meetings organized by professional association”. Because they are not legally binding, guidelines can raise the level of expertise and standards of performance, as well as leaving room for innovations in local environments without altering the formal regulatory framework. This instrument of light-handed governance applies especially when the task in question calls for expertise.

Along the hard style of governance, the information policy-steering instrument adopted in the UK to reform local mental health care is considered to reflect harder steering in terms of its centralized and prescriptive nature compared with that in Sweden. The information instrument in Britain is wielded through a ‘good practice guidance’-based norm prescription. The main focus of such information instrument of guidance is to persuade municipals to provide standardized formats of documents and information for the central agencies to evaluate, inspect and audit municipal reforms (Maycraft-Kall 2010, p.81). At the same time, the aim of such a hard information-resourced instrument can be learned from its aim. In the case of the UK mental health care, the sermon instrument was used to meet centrally-set financial targets instead of mental health care services and user needs that should be concerned in a local discretion manner. Furthermore, the associated conditions and threats to information through central audit and inspection indicate a hard way of steering in the UK. Municipals were required to produce information relating to nationally-set performance indicators and standards.
Local variations declined since the stressed focus in the information instrument on the detailed central standards. The invention of ‘star’ ratings between municipals from the central ministry and departments indicated strings and threats attached, since the government signaled to take actions against non-compliance, marking by receiving a low star rating.

Again, a much softer information-steering approach has been adopted by the Swedish government compared with that in Britain. The government established general categories and priorities for reform projects, albeit in an implicit way, whereby the detailed content was “neither stated nor steered by the government, as each municipality had freedom to formulate its own projects according to local priorities” (Maycraft-Kall 2010, p.93). In the major form of the information policy-steering instrument of evaluation reports issued by the National Board of Health and Welfare, the role of the central board was to issue implicit guidance for the reform’s interpretation and implementation. The government was not directly involved in the evaluation. Moreover, the evaluation reports were identified in a general manner in outlining implicit recommendations and a legislation focus. The information-steering instruments were “non-binding and appeared mild” compared with the British way of “naming and shaming” (Maycraft-Kall 2010, pp.92-94). This unconditional instrument arranges its forms from stimulus finance, professional development and other informal information steering.

- Likelihood of sanctions

Enforceability in terms of the presence of sanctions presence (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Goldstein et al. 2000). In the study of Dutch disaster management, Brandsen, Boogers and Tops (Brandsen et al. 2006) conclude that local agencies are ‘threatened’ by two main reasons. First, hard guide principals have ‘hard consequences’ from not obeying them or have performed below the standard in guidelines. This relates to according sanctions, threats or the fear of being left out of some sort, which creates the “general perception that unofficial guidelines are official in all but name” (Brandsen et al. 2006, p.547). Second, the role of the ‘sender’ of the guidelines is ambiguous to local organizations (Brandsen et al. 2006, p.550). Many local organizations consider that the ‘guideline maker’ – namely the Ministry of Home Affairs in the case of Dutch disaster management – is simultaneously the ‘inspector’ as well as the ‘rule maker’. A confusing
role of the department to issue and inspect adversity guidelines would harden the soft ‘recommendations’ by stating that as “the guidelines contained with the document are not legally binding… (but/and) we expect you to have implemented these guidelines within a year’s time” (ibid.). In this case, the ministry is “more than simply advisory in nature” to make guidelines more mandatory and “encourages confirmative behavior” in local organization. Learning from this Dutch disaster management case, a hard form of information relied governing instrument is 1) conditions and sanctions attached if not containing and 2) the lack of a clear role statement of the issuer of the guideline in question.

By contrast, soft ‘guidelines’ do not “impose” central official rules to local experiments but rather “advising” them without conditions or strings attached (Maycraft-Kall 2010, p.69). Adversary guidelines can accommodate deviations from different options from guidelines due to local learning or “to a more general conviction that they can do better” (Brandsen et al. 2006, p.547).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Brandsen et al. 2006)</th>
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<th>(Maycraft-Kall 2010)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hard information governance instrument</td>
<td>Soft information governance instrument</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Attached sanctions and conditions on intuitive professional information if not been attained</td>
<td>✓ Recommendation of information allowing reasonable local deviation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Confusing role of information sender between adviser and authority</td>
<td>✓ Distinguished role of information sender and inspector</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Strings such as penalties and threats and other conditions attached</td>
<td>✓ Recommendations that accommodate local learnings</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Persuasion to adhere the 'best practice' of providing standardized information for central agencies</td>
<td>✓ Unspecific information and non-binding legislative regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Central audit and inspection</td>
<td>✓ Unconditional and non-prescriptive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4 Summary of hard and soft information policy instruments

**AUTHORITY**

Procedural authoritative instruments attempt to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of government actions through activating policy actor support. Indeed, both hard and
soft authoritative instruments can attain such support, hence presenting advantages and disadvantages for both sides. For instance, hard authority tools such as direct regulation can inhibit technological progress due to the limitation of opportunities to experiment, while soft authority tools such as delegated regulation can save costs in such a professional area where there are information asymmetries between regulators and the regulated (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, pp.120-121). Nonetheless, hard authority tools allow for better coordination of government efforts due to the greater predictability that they entail (Mitnick et al. 1980, pp.401-404).

- Likelihood of delegation in regulation

The likelihood of delegation in regulation refers to the extent to which governments allow involved actors to regulate themselves or through a third entity such as an advisory committee (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, pp.119-122). In the case of command-and-control regulation where no delegation exists, hard instruments of governance are adopted with the governments in a commanding and “rule-making” position (Kerwin 1994; Kerwin and Furlong 1994). For example, some regulations in the form of law or prohibition to prescribe criminal activities or national defense, army, police or involved judicial departments work directly under government orders. By contrast, where there are delegations of regulation to entities that are more or less autonomous from governmental control such as quasi-judicial government agencies, non-governmental actors and advisory committees, authority instruments for regulating the involved actors will be comparably soft, whereby they “consciously refrain from regulating activities in a more directly coercive fashion” (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, p.121).

- Likelihood of precise of implementation

Precise implementation is also an important parameter in distinguishing between soft and hard governance. (Treib et al. 2007, pp.6-7; Slominski 2008, p.6) state as a rule of thumb: “The more precise a provision is the more the authority in charge is willing to regulate the matter by itself. In contrast, a vague provision is a sign that the competent authority is not able or willing to exploit its power thereby delegating- be it explicitly or implicitly – this power to another authority to fill this regulatory gap”.

Soft governance involves directing local authorities and agencies “not by hierarchically imposing what should be done but by providing unofficial guidelines on how to
improve the quality of local practice” (Brandsen et al. 2006, p.546). Hence, a soft steering approach leaves more leeway for local adaptation “by providing a range of alternative options to choose from, by offering possibilities to derogate from individual provisions or to exempt certain groups of persons or branches of the economy from being covered by the rules” (Treib et al. 2007, p.6).

The hard regulatory policy instrument adopted by the UK in mental care reforms is characterized by strongly binding proclivity for legislation, formal directives and rules. Formal legislation involves detailed directives with the primary focus on supervision and coercion rather than improving service provision (Maycraft-Kall 2010, p.37). Under such a hard regulatory instrument, local agencies – municipals in the study – are forced to constantly obey, follow, adapt and respond to regulations without formulation in accordance with local needs and conditions (p.78). For instruments such as “guidance” or “standard” for mental care reforms, despite the termed titles they are considered as a higher degree of ‘hardness’ of information instrument, since they are “clearly Ministerial directives as many circulars contained directions made with reference to Ministerial powers” (p.74). Moreover, the purpose of these instrument is to maintain ‘hardness’ in terms of exerting control and municipal administration from the government instead of the ‘quality’ of mental health management reforms in question (ibid.).

By contrast, soft policy instruments that use authority as a principal governing resource are characterized by a flexible legislation framework with general norms that are open to variations in lower levels to interpret and formulate reforms in greater accordance with local circumstances Maycraft-Kall (2010) pp.84-89 observed a soft regulatory instrument preference in Sweden compared with the UK. On the one hand, Swedish government does not steer the policy interpretations, but rather it is up to lower levels of authorities and agencies to determine the extent to which the official issued policy is applied locally. Moreover, the evaluation standards regarding the local implementation of ‘good’ or ‘reasonable’ are also not defined specifically. It should be noted at this point is that there is no good or evil in hard or soft steering instrument sets (Howlett 2004). While soft regulatory instrument adoption ensures regulatory stability and generates more discretion for local organizations, there is a lack of a clear standard of services and terminology, which might lead to confusion interpretations of policy norms.
In this respect, they are generally less effective than hard instruments in achieving compliance (May 2005).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1.5 Summary of hard and soft authority instruments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard authority governance instrument</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Maycraft-Kall 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Strongly binding proclivity for legislation, formal directives and rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Primary focus of supervision and coercion based on interventionist stance of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Detailed directives from center authority asking local implementations to live up to</td>
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**TREASURE/INCENTIVE**

An incentive system has been developed in studying political relations in public administration. The study of incentive systems is essential for understanding individual and organizational behaviors since according to organization behavior studies humans are purposeful creatures (Clark and Wilson 1961). Based on different driving forces, debates concern financial and non-financial incentives.

Financial incentives are mostly material benefits and monetary payments, while non-financial incentives are those related to promotion, rewards, reputation and other psychological driving forces (Theisohn and Lopes 2013).

- Likelihood of sanctions

In steering local agencies to implement health care policies (Maycraft-Kall 2010), many financial instrument used by the British government are coercive to force localities “to achieve the central objectives and fail(ed) to result in the type of freedoms to tailor services to local conditions mentioned in the government’s reform proposals” (p.80). Hard incentives in financial investments have strings attached “with benefits for compliance and penalties for those not meeting requirements” (p.79). Since 80% of municipal funding is from the center, the hard financial incentives adopted in British
mental care service reforms are used to ensure the control of central authority such as ideological commitment of the government to market and favored external contractors. Accordingly, municipals have to comply with government conditions to obtain reform finance.

By contrast, a soft form of financial steering strategy is adopted in Sweden in reforming mental care policies. Soft financial steering instruments are stimulus-based financial support. Central government ‘seeds’ local reforms for starting up the program and accompanying them with the first three years of development. Positive financial incentives are also wielded for training staff to implement the municipal reforms. Nonetheless, the steering is still soft since there is freedom for municipals to determine the content of training projects (p.90). At the same time, there are some pre-conditions attached with central financial investment, although it is up to localities to decide whether to apply for central investment and thus whether to meet the conditions of the central authority. The soft financial steering leaves space for localities to formulate their own projects within government-designated categories (p.91).

<table>
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<th>Table 1.6 Summary of hard and soft incentive instruments</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hard incentive governance instrument</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Maycraft-Kall 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Financial incentive is a steering form of control which have strings attached, with benefits for compliance and penalties for not meeting requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coercive or negative instruments based on compliances and penalties in terms of accordance with prescriptive government controls</td>
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1.4 INSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS: CONTEXT FOR APPLYING STEERING INSTRUMENT

Choosing the steering strategies of governments towards performing agents is the central mechanism for national policy reforms (Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung 1998, p.21). The ways in which institutional traditions influence the choices of governance
steering instruments are based on the idea of historical institutionalism, which argues that current decision-making is based upon a path dependency of historical legacies (Peters 2002; Peters et al. 2005; Painter and Peters 2010). It is the “standard operating procedures” of countries’ policy strategic norms (Richardson 2013) that originated from historical and traditional factors of the state-building process (Kelman 1981). Under this “invisible frame” of historical preferences, policy-makers will choose policy-steering strategies that align with such patterns (Feick 1992, p.262). Although the concept of path dependency is that ‘tradition matters’ for decision-making, it is not deterministic nor unchangeable (Kay 2005). For example, the legit constituent part of institutional traditions in historical legacies of administration could deviate from the traditional path given outer shocks, dynamic forces or individual decision-makers (Ebbinghaus 2005; Schneiberg 2006).

1.4.1 DETERMINANTS

As the context for applying governance steering instruments, policy reforms are interpreted through an institutional framework. Thus, institutional traditions are sought to understand underlying historical mechanisms that affect the steering approach of the performing system of actors to implement policy reforms. The present study identifies two indicators interpreting different institutional traditions.

DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Like governments across the world in the current globalized age, the Chinese government is seeking to respond to marketization and globalization (Evans and Cerny 2003). Therefore, it is understandable that China would adapt administrative and institutional reform practices from the West in its efforts to reform its civil service. For example, the Chinese administrative system has exhibited traits that are compatible with new public management practices.

Responding to similar challenges, China has engaged in decentralization and the promotion of accountability and transparency of governance (Hood 1991; Burns 2000; Lan 2000). For example, the latest “sunshine government” approach sought to improve its transparency with adopted democratic values (Xue and Liu 2012) and the administrative tool of building e-government to improve access and participation. These efforts fall under the enduring theme of ‘scientific management’ in an effort to create a
more responsive, accountable and outcome-oriented government, comparable to the US model (Boston 1996; Barzelay 2001). However, in contrast to Western democratic states (and specifically the US) that have adapted NPM reforms, China has omitted to explain that it has modified these practices to serve the CPC’s continuing self-adaptation. It is unclear why some of the NPM reforms in the public administration system can be found in China while others cannot, such as the occurrence of deregulation and marketization within the government.

**DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION**

Degrees of system centralization examine the power disposal and discretion of central and actors at lower levels. This indicator relates to relationships between central policy-makers and implementers including lower-level government and social actors. The institutional structure of interactions between involved actors can be either a hierarchical or market structure at opponent poles. A hierarchical structure limits the extent of actors who could access to binding decisions without consent, while the market institutional form generates actors’ freedom to choose appropriate action accordingly.

The interactions of decision-making and implementation in performing governance activities are formally institutionalized in a hierarchy structure, where the authority of decision-making is situated centrally (Wallace 2000, pp.3-37; Treib *et al.* 2007, pp.9-10). In this term, when decisions and implementation processes are constitutionally specified, there will be less freedom for actors to choose their preferred courses of action, since “clear rules as to who is involved in decision-making, how decisions may be reached, how they have to be implemented and who is in charge of monitoring compliance” are relatively specified (Treib *et al.* 2007, p.10).

By contrast, authority is dispersed in a decentralized market institutional form. Under a non-institutionalized process, the governance approach allows for flexibility in decision-making and implementation.

There are forms of governance institutional structures along the continuum between hierarchy and market (Scharpf 1997: chs 5-8), the most notable of which is the ‘network’ structure, in which the power of decision-making is horizontally dispersed.
The underlying theory that policy causal theory could influence the choice of governance steering instruments is policy design literature (Birkland 2014). The policy design approach to policy analysis evolves from previous theories in policy sciences, organization theory and policy formulation. Policy design is a central component in public policy, where governments choose steering strategies for reformative programs (Ben-Zadok 2006). Generally speaking, policy design in a governance setting involves interpreting mechanisms of policy steering, which are important components of public policy design (Cashore and Howlett 2007, p.538; Howlett 2009, p.75).

The origin of the normative dimension of policy is essentially political, “derived from favourably particular worldviews…and inextricable tied to the political convictions …that are accordingly judged against various economic, social or ethical values” (Givoni et al. 2013, p.5). Normative elements of policy design include policy problem defining, goal setting and causal theory, all of which interpret ‘what to do’ and ‘objectives’ for implementation (Ben-Zadok 2006; Birkland 2014). The normative dimension of policy is positioned in the *policy core beliefs* level of the belief hierarchy system (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Policy core beliefs are policy propositions in the policy sub-system (or domain) (Sabatier 1988, p.144). They include fundamental value priorities, basic perceptions concerning the general seriousness of the problem and its principal causes and the basic policy instruments to be used (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p.122). Core beliefs represent normative and empirical commitments and rationalize actor perceptions based on a problem’s sources and strategies to achieve goals (Ben-Zadok 2013, p.591). Hence, elements that are rooted in policy core beliefs articulate different beliefs regarding the problem’s source and definition and further influence choices of problem definition, policy goal setting and intervention plans.

Underlying different understandings of defining a problem is the dynamic shifting values between ideological preferences (Ringeling 2002; Maycraft Kall 2010). As one of the prescriptive elements of policy design, policy instruments are defined as “elements in policy design that cause agents or targets to do something they would not do otherwise or with the intention of modifying behaviour to solve public problems or attain policy goals” (Schneider and Ingram 1997, p.93).
When governments embrace alternative governance steering approaches besides the traditional one, “rather than relying on command and control instruments, (they) are now utilizing ‘softer’ instruments to achieve their policy goals” (Pierre and Peters 2005, p.218). Besides the policy context and content, policy implementation also takes influences from the formulation of policy.

1.6 POLICY TRANSFER LITERATURE REVIEW

Policy transfer is a case study as well as an analytical framework which structures the study to answer what is transferred and what is transformed. Policy transfer theory typically studies processes of how one nation-state or government intentionally and rationally learns and then applies knowledge of policies and programs that exist in another nation-state or government. Specific policies are chosen for adoption based on the perception that the importing state has of the original policies and programs as well as both exogenous and endogenous characteristics of the implemented system (Bennett 1991a; Bennett 1991b; Dolowitz 1996; Dolowitz 1997; Evans 2004).

The contemporary study of policy transfer emerged from the study of policy diffusion, which is a sub-set of the comparative politics literature (Evans 2004). Policy diffusion and policy transfer both try to understand how public policies spread into different policy environments. This study adopts the policy transfer conception and literature body instead of the policy diffusion one for two reasons:

First of all, policy diffusion literature works well when there are equivalent units, such as amongst different states in the U.S. federal system (Walker 1969). Policy diffusion literature can help to explain the reasons for different speeds and tendencies toward innovation of similar policies and programs. The adoption in this dissertation, however, is clearly not among similar or equivalent units. The adoption of the MPA from the U.S. to China represents the occurrence of policy transfer between two significantly different jurisdictions; China has a communist rather than democratic regime, a centralized-unitary political system rather than a federal system, and maintains a politicized civil service rather than an ostensibly non-partisan one. Policy transfer literature is preferable for this study because it recognizes variations in policy that originate outside of the importing nation-state’s jurisdiction. This can help to identify the nuances in the learning/adoption process. Policy transfer methodology is especially attractive when it
comes to nations such as China where the administration values are not Weberian in their orientation and have their own distinguishing characteristics in many aspects (Welch and Wong 1998; Berman et al. 2010). Applied to the current research, policy transfer could add to the theoretical literature on the Chinese civil service and its adoption of the MPA by considering how China’s policy requirements differ from the nation-state which it imported the policy from – namely the United States.

Another advantage of the policy transfer literature is that it enables one to identify grand objectives within the scope of the research. Policy diffusion literature, on the other hand, focuses more on a particular pattern of adoption, specifically “the origin and speed of the idea” (Walker 1969, p.882) rather than on the “reasons for the diffusion itself” or what might happen during implementation (Bennett 1991b, p.221). Policy transfer literature can therefore better analyzed policy adoption than the policy diffusion literature. Specifically, the policy transfer literature also focuses on how the policy is adapted by the recipient state during the learning and implementation processes. Once an adopted idea or model becomes institutionalized, then policy diffusion is no longer enough to theoretically explain the process of adaption except “by the demands of organizational routines and by being promoted by self-interested actors” (Strang and Meyer 1993, p.495). However, by employing the policy transfer literature all of these institutionalized factors that influence both the learning and implementation are able to be examined and discussed. This is also a key reason why the current case study approach fits well with policy transfer theory to form a compatible analytical framework and methodology.

1.6.1 RESEARCH CASE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK: STAGES IN POLICY TRANSFER ACTIVITY

There are two particular aspects or levels of analysis relating to China’s policy transfer of the MPA training program that will be taken into consideration during the course of this research. The first aspect focuses on the attempts made by the Chinese communist system to reform the cadre/civil service in an economic and socially sympathetic way. This study will indicate possible reasons to explain why China undertook this administrative reform with specific reference to the decision to adopt the MPA program throughout China. Secondly, this study will look at the way in which the transferred program has been implemented and operates at the subnational level. This second level
of analysis will contend with the transfer and implementation of this specific reform; namely the MPA program, within the context of the Chinese public administration system.

This reason for examining these two levels is to assess the specific learning process envisioned through the policy transfer of the MPA program. The two-fold framework designates both the learning and post-learning stages for this dissertation, which primarily views the MPA program as a transfer effort from abroad. Analysis then includes the two different levels of analysis which takes into consideration not only the different stages of the transfer process, but also explores the management approaches of the regime authority over the growing power of the non-apparatchik sector.

**1.6.1.1 POLICY TRANSFER ACTIVITY ANALYSIS**

The aim of this study is to understand how the Chinese decision to adopt the MPA program was made and carried out from the perspective of balancing both consolidation and inclusion forces, which may be interpreted as the struggles between maintaining the traditional format of party authority while embracing modernity. Specifically, the research explores the challenges of how the CPC manages to secure the exclusionary forces of maintaining central control of government while claiming to meet the inclusive task of social representativeness.

**1.6.1.2 DOLOWITZ AND MARSH’S POLICY TRANSFER MODEL**

This dissertation not only pays attention to how China made the transfer decision and its policy learning process, but it also takes into account the adjustments made in the Chinese version of the MPA. In order to conceptualize these adjustments, this dissertation adopts the Dolowitz and Marsh framework as a heuristic device for empirical analysis (Dolowitz 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b).

The Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b) framework offers a solid understanding of similarities and differences between countries/institutions that are involved in the transfer process. By comprehensively analyzing these similarities and differences, the Dolowitz and Marsh framework can assess “their importance for policy transfer” and it offers a “systematic and analytic approach” to study a specific policy transfer (Wolman 1992, p.35). The researcher is then able to learn the extent to which a transnational transfer is based on learning from other’s experiences (Laguna 2010). The
outcome of the transfer can then be evaluated by tracking the transfer process and analyzing the various elements. By utilizing the Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996b; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b) framework, this study will be able to examine the MPA as a transfer outcome and learn about the policy adjustments made by China as the recipient nation. Specifically, in the Chinese context the CPC as the governing party, this study will evaluate how authority has discerned the need to improve the governing capabilities of its personnel on the one hand, while ensuring that the introduction of non-apparatchik social forces will not challenge its dominant leading role.

Based on the learning and adoption process, the research components within this dissertation will use six elements from the original framework (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b, p.9) along with additional process (Common 2001; Benson and Jordan 2011), since the model focuses on adoption processes that lead to specific discernible policy transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996a, pp.343-344; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b, p.8). Each of these is discussed in turn in the following.

**WHY DO ACTORS ENGAGE IN POLICY TRANSFER?**

According to Dolowitz (1997), “a crucial element in establishing the occurrence of policy transfer is to demonstrate that policy makers in the borrowing system were aware of the originating system’s policies and programs”. Having a high level of awareness about the original policy offers the recipients a degree of freedom, which they can utilize through a recognition of where to learn from and what to learn from.

Different types of transfer are based on the reasons that the recipient country/government engaged in during the transfer learning stage. The extent to which recipients could decide to transfer and adapt a policy are identified in Figure 1.3 (Dolowitz 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996a; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b). This figure depicts policy transfer on a continuum from being a perfectly rational lesson-drawing (i.e. voluntary transfer) experience to the direct imposition by an outside force (i.e. coercive transfer). The continuum is based on the perspective of the recipient who adopts a policy and their motivation to do so. Few cases reside at either extreme end point on this continuum because policy analysis is seldom – if ever – perfectly rational,
and because the very word “nation” implies the existence of a moderate degree of autonomy.

Voluntary transfer happens when (1) the current policy or program starts to function poorly or creates public dissatisfaction or there are changes in the government and new policies and/or programs are needed to meet the changes (Jones and Newburn 2002).

Direct coercive transfer happens when a policy or program is forced to be introduced against the desires of a government, and thus was more widespread in the age of imperialism (i.e. colonialism). Such colonial powers remain in place in parts of the world. In federal systems, these may be referred to as “intrusive policies” and/or “unfunded mandates” from the national government to sub-national units of government.

Figure 1.2 Policy Transfer Continuum

Source: Based on Dolowitz and Marsh (2000a, p.13)

In most common cases, policy transfers are made with limited information and/or limited analytical power rather than perfect rationality. This is because the limited
rationality of transferring policies is due to the actors’ subjective views about the essence of policies, the way in which policies are utilized in export countries and/or a misunderstanding of the social, cultural and/or political differences between the countries. Besides the incompleteness of knowledge about the policy and its context, the difficulties in making perfect rational policy decisions include the problem of “predicting what will occur in the future … and the inadequate scope of alternative behaviours that are considered or analysed” (Simon 1976, pp.80-84).

The basis for policy transfer lies more in coercive reasons than motivation the farther that one moves towards the direct coercion end of the continuum. The voluntary though driven by perceived necessary category – which also includes elements of coercion – is common in the history of Chinese policy transfer. By contrast, moving towards the coercive end, obligated transfer best describes what occurs when nations are part of international or supra-governmental organizations, which may then seek to have all participating nations adopt specific policies and programs as part of their membership or participant obligations. For example, when China joined in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the membership status brought great opportunities for Chinese economic development. However, there were also policies required by the WTO such as reductions in non-tariff barriers. These are negotiated rather than enforced through direct coercion because China made a choice as a sovereign nation to join the WTO, yet the policies may work against a country that is seeking to protect some industries by restricting imports.

Conditional transfer happens when conditions from the exporting country are required to be met by the recipient country. Generally, the recipient countries have a great desire to obtain technology or economic support from the exporting countries, which means that the recipient countries may have to sacrifice their national interests and possibly the will of the people to meet the conditions set by the exporting nation. For example, a loss of economic sovereignty occurred in African nations when colonial powers acceded to sovereignty. Nonetheless, colonialism also brought development to these regions such as the construction of ports and railways. Although these developments undoubtedly served the imperial powers in their extraction of resources from the colonies, the example demonstrates how conditional transfer can also accelerate economic development.
More generally speaking, the main driver behind negotiated policy transfer may be global interdependence. The recognition that we are living in an inter-dependent global society is the motivation that pushes some governments to work together or learn from each other to solve similar (or collective) problems and implement possible solutions. Interdependence includes global economic integration such as China joining the WTO as well as international consensus-building efforts such as attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. When a nation joins an international organization or agreement, they will find it difficult to maintain membership without adopting the group’s preferred solutions.

Another motivation for negotiated transfer is the fear that a nation will fall behind its neighbors or competitors. For instance, the Japanese recovery and rapid economic growth after World War II became exemplar for the Asian nations. This inspired Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Chinese Taiwan to adopt similar policies and programs in search of the same level of economic development. In the 1970s, these countries became the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ and they became famous for their “East-Asia Economic Model,” which strongly relied on labor-intensive industries and comparatively low wages. Mainland China eventually pursued a similar economic strategy.

Different reasons and categories of policy transfers lead to different degree of transfers. The degree to which recipients decide to learn from external policies/programs depends on the role of recipients, which are outlined in the different categories of transfer activities.

**FROM WHERE ARE THE LESSONS DRAWN?**

Policies can be transferred from three levels of governance: the international, the national and the local (i.e. sub-national) (Dolowitz 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000a). The “near at hand” concept suggests that “within country” transfers would be the first choice. This allows looking at other units of government within one’s country as well as back in time under the same or former systems of rule.

This research predominantly looks at policy transfer at the international level. Conscious learning from outside one’s jurisdiction leads to the necessary adjustments in recipient country. These adjustments reveal the struggles that exist for China where
“tradition has historically produced distinctive political, social, cultural, and economic amalgams” (Jowitt 1975, p.89) while at the same time recognizing the necessity to embrace modern practices of governance.

**WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF TRANSFER?**

The framework (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996b) develops the idea of degrees of policy transfer from Rose’s lesson-drawing work to denote the ability to make partial transfers and mix-and-match ideas from multiple source nations/governments. As the authors state, “policy transfer is not an all-or-nothing process” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000a, p.13). There are four degrees of transfer in their model: copying, emulation, hybridization and synthesis, as well as inspiration. Different degrees of transfer indicate the extent to which the recipient country has embraced ‘modernity’ at one end of the spectrum or alternatively the degree to which it has chosen to maintain its policy ‘traditions’.

*Copying* is perhaps the simplest as the transfer is made with few intentional changes and considers variables such as the cultural, political and institutional environments as constants. This makes more sense within the same nation since these variables are seldom constant in research on comparative administration. On the other hand, *emulation* assumes that the recipient country will need to adjust transferred policies or programs to adapt them to the new environment. The recipient country thus accepts that the policy or program can provide a standard or exemplar, and thus it is more concerned with the essential ideas and concepts than all of the details. *Hybridization and synthesis* combine elements of policies or programs in two or more nations to develop and transfer one that is better suited for the recipient country. Finally, Dolowitz and Marsh enlist *inspiration* to denote how ideas in one place or time may simply serve to motivate changes in another place or time. In this case, the idea is transferred but the details are created internally.

The framework also illustrates the extent to which the recipient country may alter the policy according to its needs during the transfer process. This research will focus on the extent to which China has changed from the US model of the MPA in its effort to maintain the CPC’s dominant role as the leading party authority.

**WHAT IS TRANSFERRED?**
The main body of policy transfer studies focuses on the analysis of the content and outcomes of policy transfers. This involves a direct study of the elements of the policy that is transferred to the recipient country. At the same time, the elements of the policy that were not transferred or adjusted can be concluded as being incompatible with the traditional political foundations that exist within the recipient country. The outcomes of the transfer also indicate the approach taken by the recipient side to reconcile the conflicting differences inherent within the experience of advanced policy learning and transfer from other countries.

The Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework lists things that can be transferred, including policy goals, policy contents, policy instruments, programs, institutions, ideas and concepts, ideology and even negative lessons. Essentially, anything can be transferred from one society or culture to another, from one system of governance to another, including an entire political system or way of governing. Dolowitz and Marsh do not argue that such large-scale transfer is routine, although ‘multiplicity’ is one characteristic of many transfers, which means transfers may include both policies (policy goals, policy contents and policy instruments) and programs (policy tools, institutions and structures). Moreover, some ‘soft’ elements (spread of norms, ideology, values) would belong to the transfer process (Stone 2004).

**WHO ARE THE KEY ACTORS IN THE POLICY TRANSFER PROCESS?**

The original framework (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b) presents nine categories of actors in their work, including elected officials, political parties, pressure groups, civil servants, policy experts, supra-national governmental and non-governmental institutions, transnational corporations, think tanks and consultants. This research evaluates the extent to which public administration education has been managed in China by key actors involved in the transfer process.

**WHAT RESTRICTS OR FACILITATES THE POLICY TRANSFER PROCESS?**

Both Rose (Rose 1991; Rose 1993) and Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000a) discuss factors that may constrain policy transfer. Their suggestions include the number of policy or program goals, the complexity of the problem (Thompson 1967), the relationship between the problem and the solution, perceived side effects, the information that the recipient has (or does not have) about the policy or
program and the predicted outcomes. However, Evans (2009) holds that all of these factors are cognitive obstacles: they are potential barriers around the transferred policy or program before a transfer actually happens.

The framework reveals two types of obstacles that may be present in the policy transfer process. These include endogenous and exogenous factors. Exogenous factors refer to the uniqueness of a policy or program to the original country (Rose 1993). Dolowitz (Dolowitz 2003) includes this by reference to the wider social and policy context, making policy transfer more difficult. Endogenous factors are concerns that the recipient country has, which might include policy history (past preferences and experiences that may constrain future inclinations for policy transfer), institutional and structural factors (size and the efficiency of the bureaucracy), domination ideology and culture background (incompatibility here would suggest less transferability of policies) and finally the resources that the recipient country possesses (human, economic, technological).

1.6.1.3 POST-TRANSFER STAGE: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The policy transfer literature builds a solid theoretical basis for international transfers and the framework provides a comprehensive framework for an empirical analysis of relevant elements. The decisions to adopt the MPA program as an international policy transfer was made and designed through a series of foreign on-site learning involving discussions and demonstrations between professors and professionals in China’s public administration education (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009). Undoubtedly, the Chinese decision to transfer the MPA program from the US was made with great consideration in terms of its outcome on the Chinese political system. The political context is important because the policies and norms adapted from the international level are conditioned by the domestic political structure and culture (Checkel 1999). The party’s dominant role is one cognitive factor in the pre-transfer stage. A high level of consideration for China’s authoritarian political culture explains and describes why and how modifications have been made during the rational transfer process. State behaviors towards international norms can be explained by the political environment where adopted policy transpires (Cortell and Davis Jr 2000).

In contrast to the policy transfer decision at the national level, the study of individual MPA programs (i.e. the cases) and how they have been structured, constituted and
operated is an operational dimension (Bovens et al. 2001; Marsh and McConnell 2010). The goal to study the MPA program at the implementation stage is to learn the extent to which it has been implemented to retain the transfer goal of including public administration institutions into the civil service training system. In order to achieve this goal, the study needs to examine the respective educational institutions that were involved in the implementation of the MPA program as well as how they have been mobilized by the central authority. In the post-transfer stage, the central authority has incorporated educational institutions where the MPA programs are offered. However, this requires a managed approach that would not threaten the centralized control/authority of the party.

This study of post-transfer implementation is necessary to validate the existence and degree of transfer. Analytical elements listed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996a; 2000b) could be considered as ‘pre-action’ factors because recipients can be quite aware of them before the transfer happens, such as where to draw lessons from and what is going to be transferred. However, research must also study the implementation of relevant factors from the pre-transfer stage to the post-transfer stage because policy transfer is not a simple once-for-all activity.

The standards of transfer validation can only be ensured and tested based on the dynamic perspective of the policy transfer literature. For example, Sharman (2010) suggests that the standard is determined by the differences between the two entities, rather than simply playing “cut and paste” by policy-makers who are just demonstrating they are “doing something”, something that is clearly not based on policy learning (Sharman discovered such dysfunctional policy transfers in his study on National Blacklists). Similarly, the main idea from Evans and Davies (1999) about the validation of transfers is that a transfer did not occur if the “original ideas of a policy or programs have been discarded or filtered out…”. Specific to the present research, it is important to avoid facile and superficial comparisons when analyzing policy initiation and development in the Chinese civil service system; rather, it is vital to look at the actual operation of the MPA in China. At the same time, the essence of the MPA program adapted from the US must also be apparent within the Chinese-based MPA program.

Eventually the adopted lesson will be implemented according to the recipient’s contextual settings, which Evans (2009) termed ‘environmental factors’ and as such
have important influences on the transfer implementation stage. However, analysis is incomplete if it is simply based on assumptions of successful experiences from some jurisdictions. It is insufficient to simply say that policy transfer should occur because “there is some value in doing so” (Marsh and McConnell 2010, p.573) or that the benefits will become apparent if the policy is transferred to other jurisdictions. One missing field in most current policy transfer literature is the implementation of transfer outcomes after the transfer effort and how the ‘environmental factors’ affect the implementation of policy objectives. This dissertation aims to fill the gap in the current literature by demonstrating the ways in which development struggles within the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist regime have affected the policy transfer.

In order to fill this gap, the research utilizes a multiple case study methodology. This makes the research more integral by exploring the extent to which policy transfer has been implemented through field research. The specific cases are then presented in Chapters 6 to 9.

1.7 CONCLUSIONS

Previous studies about the Chinese MPA program have focused on the changes that the adopted MPA would bring to the Chinese administrative system; these include studies about the contribution it has made to “improving professional knowledge and techniques” (Yin 2001; Zhou and Ynag 2008), and “systematic public administration education” (Zhang and Zhang 2008). The importance of the policy learning process can become apparent by evaluating the degree to which the political and administrative structures have been adjusted due to the adopted MPA program. However, studies have not analysed the policy transfer from the alternative perspective which involves understanding the reasons why the Chinese public administration have adopted the MPA program in its current shape. From my point of view, it is important to know the extent to which the existing “traditional” policy environment affects how a new, ‘modern’ policy is adapted and implemented to function within an existing regime. This study is therefore concerned about the ways in which the introduction of a non-official group (i.e. professionals and academics) has resulted in the CPC having to update its approach in balancing out the inherent conflict it faces between maintaining its privileged role as the leading party authority and improving its administrative
capabilities through the adaption of the cadre/civil service training program. In order to understand the MPA transfer that occurred within the Chinese political context, this research explores the relevant components of policy transfer, taking into consideration the tension between individual MPA program cases and the central mandates. Four cases are then evaluated to help to reveal the extent to which the dominant CPC has adjusted to a “effective, efficiency and resilient” (Bovens et al. 2001, p.20) goal-achieving way of intervention and management.

Through different regime development stages, cadre training in China could be framed as a political model, a managerial model and a professional model (H.Y. Lee 1991; Lam and Chan 1996; Chen 2007; Pieke 2007; Pieke 2009b). Cadre training programs are assigned with different missions due to alternative understandings of the overarching reform goal. In order to understand this better, the next chapter examines Chinese communist regime development, illustrating the primacy of alternative ‘reform’ goals in the evolution of Chinese communism.
2. CENTRAL STATE STEERING: EXPLAINING CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME DEVELOPMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The dominant role that the communist party plays towards legitimating the socialist regime needs to be understood as the basis of all Marxist-Leninist regimes. This chapter puts forward the argument that the original source of legitimation for the party is to advance the transition of the regime towards full communism. However, for this purpose, the party needs to remain in power and thus it must continually legitimate itself to the people through party adaptation and development. This chapter primarily employs Jowitt’s (1975; 1983) normative framework to learn about the inherent tensions and struggles relating to party legitimacy that have existed across the history of the Chinese Marxist-Leninist-Maoist regime development.

This chapter outlines a general theory of communist regime development with two particular aims. The first is to examine the struggles faced by the CPC between tradition and modernity at the macro, meso and micro levels. The second is concerned with the training of civil service personnel in China and the specific case of the MPA program as a means to illustrate how these tensions influence policy transfer.

2.2 THE MACRO-LEVEL: THE LEGITIMATION OF LENINIST PARTIES AND THE STAGES OF REGIME DEVELOPMENT

As an abstract political concept, legitimacy may simply mean the rightfulness of authority. However, for any political authority, sustainability – which requires domestic social support – is the essential pre-condition (Zhu, 2011). Although it can be such a simple concept, political legitimation has multiple dimensions. One of the earliest attempts to classify the legitimacy dimension was three forms suggested by Max Weber, including “rational-legal” grounds, “traditional” grounds and “charismatic” grounds. However, scholars recognized that these ideal dimensions of political legitimation are not absolutely isolated from each other and thus they could develop in divergent ways and to different extents (Beetham, 1991, pp. 16-49). The commonly recognized-conditions of political legitimacy should first be the origins of its ruling authority.
In the context of Leninist regimes, the ways in which the communist party changes to remain in power – as decided by party elites – has constituted a dynamic, evolving form of party legitimation. In other words, once a certain type of legitimacy has been established, it will generate new challenges, so the regime must continually look for other sources of legitimation. For communist regimes, the legitimation of the communist party has been relied on to explain the evolving states of the regime, as well as explaining the regime tasks for each stage.

The ideal-type Leninist regime is based on a vanguard party that claims absolute power to achieve a communist utopia as outlined by its ideology as the “declaration of truth” (Lenin 1977a, p.295). Therefore, understanding of the communist regime development should be based on the knowledge of the role of the communist party because the party serves as the foundation for the regime. The dominant role of communist parties in the Marxist-Leninist regime originates and is legitimated by communist ideology. It is the communist party that helps society to collectively understand the need for a socialist transformation and revolution. It also represents the refined consciousness of the “proletariat … and articulates an ideology that paves the way for socialist revolution” (Mandel 1983, p.13). Without the communist party, there could be no promised transition to socialism (Robinson 1995).

The ultimate historical goal for communist regimes is to reach a state of communism in which the “special apparatus for coercion called the state” could begin to wither away (Lenin 1977b). However, the special apparatus for coercion called the state is not just going to wither away without the communist party imposing the vision of communist telos on the society as it leads the society progressively towards the pursuit of communism (Mahoney 2009, p.158). The communist telos includes two aspects of consideration: (1) the vision of communism and (2) the access to the vision of communism (Mahoney 2009, p.158). The telos of communism represents the vision or end goal of communist regimes that has ultimately privileged the leading role of the communist party. The party holds the vision of communism and serves as the means to direct society on its “right path” towards communism, holding an advanced knowledge and understanding of the “contemporary socio-political conditions” that have “ideologically and organizationally equipped” the communist party for its leadership role (Marquit 2005, p.554). Take the Chinese communist regime, for example: the CPC is legitimated by convincing the Chinese people that the party-led government is taking
the right direction, doing the right thing and that has the ability to do it correctly. The ancient political philosophy of “the water (people) that bares the boat (authority) could also swallows it up” (Press 1954) is echoed with “the mass-line” from Maoist Thoughts, which indicates the Chinese communist revolution should heavily rely on domestic support. Chinese people have trusted and supported the regime because they believed in its legitimacy, instead of feeling co-opted by the state (Gilley 2008, p.265).

Even though Leninist regimes differ from each other and over time, scholars (Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Jowitt 1975; 1983) have developed a normative framework of the regime development path including three stages: revolution, consolidation and inclusion. The shared characteristics identified by these scholars is that Marxist-Leninist regimes are based on elite political tasks and incentives used by the party for different stages of development (Johnston and Mueller 2001, p.356).

The political task of the party during the revolutionary stage is to set up a communist regime in the state. For this purpose, the party uses coercive and mobilized forms associated with military occupation while maximizing socio-political support outside of the party “to decisively eliminate the political and military capacity of opposition elites” (Jowitt 1975, p.69). In the consolidation stage, party elites mobilize society to achieve certain specific economic, military or political goals to develop and solidify the core of the newly-established political system. In order to maintain its “institutionalized charismatic organization” (Jowitt 1975, p.72), party elites exclude party membership from the whole society by seeking to “depersonalize the party’s contacts with the society” (Jowitt 1975, p.70). Economic and social developments ensure the regime’s continuation, yet they also create political uncertainties for the party’s self-maintenance. Taking into consideration the potential for “undesired and uncontrollable influences” (Jowitt 1975, p.70), party elites have to justify the rationale behind any action in the consolidation stage to secure the regime’s political legitimacy.

Although the mobilized way in which society was managed during the revolutionary stage of the Chinese regime never entirely withered away, the party’s stance considerably altered during the consolidation phase as the core task of the party became its isolation from society. The reasons for this are explained by Jowitt (1975, p. 81), who demonstrates that in order to sustain the revolutionary momentum as a Leninist party, political elites tried to mobilize all society into the proletarian camp through
radical social transformation, while simultaneously ensuring that control of the party did not fall into the hands of the people but instead resided firmly in the hands of the communist party authority. Take – for example – the Chinese political campaigns that served to consolidate the newly-established communist regime under the leadership of Mao Zedong: the series of political campaigns that were undertaken by Mao essentially recruited members of the proletariat party from classes other than the working-class peasants, yet the campaigns were always based on large-scale mobilization.

According to (Guo 2003, p.3), the regime consolidation techniques that the CPC adopted when it changed its role from a revolutionary party to a ruling party in 1949 served to further the ‘original justification’ of the party. During the revolution period, the persuasiveness and mobilization techniques (Teiwes 1976) that the CPC adopted relied on an inner party core ideology and information was disseminated to other parts of society to attract as much support for the communist revolution as possible. Comparably, the CPC’s persuasive ruling style turned into a radical and coercive control technique when the party turned its attention to consolidating the communist regime. However, the legitimacy that the CPC relies upon for its continued existence has remained centered on the same original justification of communist political ideology, which inherently refers to the theoretical and historical rightness of the communist ruling authority. Even though the role of the CPC in the Mao Zedong stage changed from a revolutionary party into a ruling party, the CPC still retained one important feature of a revolutionary party, namely its continued role in serving to advance the purity of socialist ideology through political mobilization (Harding 1981). Another practical reason why the CPC has retained its revolutionary character well into its regime consolidation stage was due to all of the economic and political events in this stage. When the regime was set up, the CPC was essentially building a new communist regime from scratch. Therefore, mass mobilization was regarded as the most effective means of acquiring public support for dealing with all of the societal challenges.

The consolidation techniques of mobilization and exclusion diminished when the party was required to create a more inclusive and pragmatic regime (Huntington 1970; Lowenthal 1970; Geddes 2004); however, they have not entirely disappeared. After consolidating the socialist regime, the inclusive approach towards society is necessary because the co-optation of the policy and policy influence must be based upon “critical scrutiny of problems” instead of “indiscriminate emulation of external references and/or
dogmatic adherence to past policies” (Jowitt 1975, p.76). However, both socio-occupational identity and political-organizational identity remain. The shift of party leadership to a more normative incorporation of broad societal support serves to “give a stake in the system to various sections of their populations, and perhaps preempt demands for more far-reaching … change” (White 1986, p.470).

However, problems arose from the expansion of policy influences from popular forces that were necessary for the continuation of the regime’s development. Since the problem was common and inevitable for Leninist regimes, Jowitt (1975) described the general response to this problem as the ‘reversal’ of inclusion, which was implemented by the Leninist camp during the 1960s. This was achieved through re-assertion of the mobilization character of the party and a re-emphasis on “ideological and organizational exclusiveness” (Jowitt 1975, p.90). The Chinese Leninist regime has experienced regime transformations while also dealing with the same problems as other Leninist regimes. The CPC has shifted to consider the development of the economy and society on a broad basis, in which a party adaptation to a more inclusive regime is necessary to take more popular forces into account for policy decisions. At the same time, this has created political uncertainties for the party’s self-maintenance. Serving as a trigger for development in China’s case, the liberalized socialist market economy would gradually but inexorably clean out the state’s monopoly influence over markets and lead to political pluralism (Cao 1998). For an authoritarian regime, embracing the full level of economic liberalization would undermine and eventually wipe out the dominant role and functions of the authority party.

The combined approach of exclusion and mobilization has evolved into an inclusive regime because the perceived challenge to the party’s institutionalized identity requires a reaffirmation of its privileged character. The communist regime has worked on balancing between the necessity of aligning itself with society through regime modernization and maintaining its Leninist nature, specifically by bringing “the security apparatus” under its exclusive control (Johnston and Mueller 2001, p.357). Nonetheless, it is not realistic that a liberalized market and society could fully function in an authoritarian state like China, due to the risk of political pluralism or extinction of the authoritarian party (Z. Wang 2010).
With the co-existence of mobilization, exclusion and inclusion as the primary building blocks of the Chinese communist regime, Jowitt (1975, p.95) states that it is arbitrary to conclude that inclusion is always positive or that mobilization and exclusion are always negative. For the Chinese communist regime, it would not be pragmatic to simply pursue a high level of commitment to an inclusive regime as this would increase the risk of sabotaging the party’s privileged Leninist role. The task that truly matters for CPC is to succeed as a political authority that exists to manage and balance out all tasks within the politically-legitimated system. The inclusive social force needs to be controlled by the regime so that the state becomes overwhelming powerful and can subordinate “all other state functions and institutions” (Jowitt 1975, p.76). However, an “omnipotent” regime could lead to absolute political control which stifles social and economic development. On the other hand, if political power expands beyond the party and/or is liberalized to the extent that the party is captured by other interests, this would jeopardize the party’s status and further threaten the continued legitimation of the CPC.

The CPC has moved on from its former identification as a Leninist party. This identity also served as the origin of its political authority. However, party legitimation experienced a dramatic change when the CPC embraced the long-ignored pragmatic approach to legitimation. This approach stresses the regime’s important role of representing the common interests of the Chinese people to ensure the sustainability of domestic support. “In modern times authoritarianism has been justified by nationalism and by ideology…” (Huntington 1993, p. 46) towards “…addressing the needs of different constituencies with the nation…” (Shambaugh 2009, p. 3). The existence and function of the Chinese communist regime is based on the people’s belief in the party’s authority, the empirical political legitimacy of “utilitarian justification” (Guo 2003, p. 3) as well as the capacity of the CPC and government to maintain power.

The durability of these three regime stages strongly differs among Leninist regimes. However, this research draws upon one important point to understand the development of communist regimes: through utilizing regime stages, it can be witnessed that changes in leadership is a central component to understanding the ways in which the communist party adapts in the process of communist regime (re)construction. These regime adjustments primarily occur as a result of the changing demands of society and the necessity of the party to continually legitimate itself and its function of managing society. Governmental resources and state capacity along with a functioning
administration system are two of the most important aspects of the communist regime’s ability to facilitate the party’s adaptive approach to regime legitimation. However, the changes and reforms implemented to date have generated tensions and struggle within the Chinese administrative system, especially the personnel system, which is the backbone of governance (Gilley, 2008). The next section will further investigate Jowitt’s (1975) ‘conflict-accommodation struggle’ model as a theoretical method of interpreting the reform developments occurring within the Chinese public administration system.

2.3 THE MESO LEVEL: REGIME DEVELOPMENT AND THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM IN CHINA

The regime development framework provides an explanation for different understandings of public administration that exist within each respective stage of development. The influences of the different stages of regime development on public administration and its personnel system can be analyzed from two perspectives. The first approach investigates how political tasks implemented through the different stages of regime development have directly affected the public administration system and the requirements of its public personnel. The Chinese public administration system operates differently than Western bureaucracies due to the ways in which the party has adjusted to maintain its legitimated role. This requires a different kind of relationship between the party and its host society. The second perspective is to learn how regime development struggles are interpreted by the public administration system. The inherited qualities from the last regime stage lead to “…interaction of consolidation and inclusion forces within Leninist regimes…” (Jowitt 1975, p.89), which also affects the public administration system.

The adaptations that the party elite have made include the appointments of non-apparatchik (non-party officials) and individuals from a broad range of professional sectors. Although party adaptations have been made in political, productive and decision-making systems, this research will focus on the public administration system. In support of this research decision, it will be suggested that an administrative perspective might better articulate the way in which the party has managed to “allow a more institutionalized mode of consultation with a variety of social groups” (Jowitt
1975, p.75) to be sensitive to its environment (Burns 2001), including the political, economic and social environments. Administrative reforms have been directed by regime stages alternations. Respective elite-designated political tasks various in each stage. Self-perceived stages of Leninist regimes accordingly lead to changes of political uncertainties and regime structures (Jowitt 1975).

Moreover, because administrative reform is regarded as being at the lower end of political reform and upper end of economic reform (Q. Wang 2010), administration reforms might better articulate the contradictory needs of the political authority and the economic and social realities (i.e. the administrative system might be described as the bridge that connects these two worlds). Within the Chinese communist regime, problems in the administration system could be explained as the inability of authority to properly manage the development of a liberalized socialist market within the Leninist political context (Burns 1993). This could even become a controversial political issue due to the administration’s strong influence on the distribution of political power and the formation of public policy (Harding 1981, p.2).

At the same time, the ways in which the public administration system is organized are very telling of the regime structure at any given time. Different regime structures indicate the current method(s) in which the party exercises its control over society. The ways in which the party relates to its host society can be analyzed through identifying the organizational structure of the public administration system.

In Chapter 3, a further study concerning local-level implementation examines how party adaptation has adjusted governmental capabilities in accordance with changing party perceptions of legitimation. A detailed analysis draws on essential elements of policy learning within the administration system, namely administrative values. In this chapter, the corresponding central character of the Chinese administrative system is explored, paying particular attention to its ability to implement the different political tasks assigned to its personnel by the CPC, with the overall aim of securing legitimation for the party.

During the consolidation regime stage, the public administration system was mostly organized exclusively through the party’s political authority, without any external forces. In order to achieve the political task of consolidation, the party leadership was isolated from society to “secure the undivided commitment of its cadres by reducing the
reference groups” (Jowitt 1975, p.70). The CPC’s exclusive control of the administrative system meant that the administrative system displayed irrational characteristics as represented by the personalization of political leadership. One example is presented by Liu (2001) as a ‘vicious trend’ in the size of administrative sectors, which has been characterized by the ebb and flow of administrative swelling – downsizing – swelling – downsizing that appeared (see Figure 1.2). In the first three decades of the PRC, the administration system merely served as a supplementary mechanism for political aims that have been primarily driven by the communist ideology and class struggle.

Figure 2.1 Ebb-and-flow numbers of agencies in the state council, 1952-1978

In the consolidation stage, under the overlapping and undivided party-state regime, the value and approaches of the administration system was strongly decided and influenced by those members of the party who were politically oriented. As the component of the political system most capable of performing administration work, government personnel became a decisive influence that served to further the political agenda. Therefore, in the consolidation stage, the members of CPC were insulated from surrounding uncertainties by their uniform commitment to the party. In response to their political insulation, regime-biased cadres became defined as those who were “most likely to depersonalize the party’s contacts with the society and to maximize obedience within the party” (Jowitt 1975, p.70). Due to the coercive and violent command structure as well as the party’s necessity to continually legitimate itself, it advocated members who had personal merits including a proletarian class background and strong revolutionary commitment.

When communist regimes entered into the inclusion stage (the most current stage of development for the Chinese regime), the party’s legitimation status could no longer be
maintained solely by the charisma of the centralized party and administration control. Instead, during the inclusion stage when the party transforms from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, this stage requires the regime to insure “that the social products of its developmental efforts identify themselves in terms that are consistent with the party’s ideological self-image and organizational definition” (Jowitt 1975, p.71). Efforts towards development involve emphasizing empirical practices instead of ideological assumptions. In order to achieve the rational-oriented solutions to economic and social problems, a greater appreciation has been placed on the consultation, discussion and conferring with non-official, professional and social forces. Since inclusion becomes the core task, power is expanded and separated in the inclusion stage in comparison to the overwhelmingly powerful state witnessed during the consolidation stage.

Uncertainties in the reform process have emerged due to the increased recruitment of non-official consultants and experts to further development across various sectors. However, the party faces more problematic challenges including “the regime’s intention to enhance its legitimacy without sacrificing the charismatic exclusiveness of its official components” (Jowitt 1975, p.73). Nonetheless, given the exclusive leading role of the party, the party’s political tasks and values have strongly influenced the administration system in the same way as in the consolidation stage. However, from an administrative perspective, the inclusion stage needs to move forward towards a more pragmatic and rational regime in which the political party remains as the decisive leading power. The co-existence of inclusive and exclusive regime characteristics has resulted in the ongoing reshaping of the personnel system to include high levels of politicization and “sometimes immoral” (Jing 2010, p.37) bureaucracy owing to insufficient legal forces. As an inherited character from the exclusion stage, the overlapping and integration of the CPC with the public administration system has retained the party’s political control over the Chinese administrative system (Lam and Chan 1996).

In response to the party’s efforts to maintain its legitimation, inclusive efforts in reforming the political and administrative system were attempted. The aims of these reforms were to essentially facilitate the new structural relationship between the party and the integrated non-official forces that were based on both manipulation and cooperation. By adopting economic development as its priority since the late-1970s, the Chinese administration system attempted to incorporate popular forces into reforms “in an experimental and gradual manner” (Jing 2010, p.37). Indeed, it was since then that
the Chinese administration system has been on its path towards restructuring the public administration system in China.

In the inclusion stage, the party favored cadres who shifted their skill sets into one of manipulation and persuasion. This is because the regime-society relationship changed into one that emphasized a greater level of incorporation (Jowitt 1975, p.78) with society. This new type of cadre differed from those whom operated within the consolidation stage. These previous types of cadre were known to be equipped with political certifications and were command-oriented in their approach and policy implementation. By contrast, the cadre corps most appropriate for the current inclusion stage should be proficient in their interactions with society, as well as maintaining the ability to manipulate the incorporated social forces.

In the next section, the specific research questions of this dissertation will be outlined. Moreover, this section includes details on the field study conducted on the Chinese administration system’s policy transfer and specifically the program that it adapted for cadre/civil service training.

2.4 MICRO LEVEL OF RESEARCH: THE CADRE/CIVIL SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAM AS A RESEARCH FIELD WITHIN THE CHINESE ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM

Regime adaptations have always had a direct influence on the favored abilities of party cadres. The management of cadres – including recruitment, training, deployment, etc. – has been a major issue of the communist party’s mode of governance (Barnett and Vogel 1967; Harding 1981).

The Chinese word ‘Cadre 干部’ is borrowed from Japanese, but its connotation was developed in the context of the Russian revolution. Colloquially, in socialist and communist parties, the term refers to party members who are in a leading position of authority and enjoy a higher rank or status in the hierarchy (Schurmann 1968, p.162). Nonetheless, while the control and power of the party has remained the same, the requirements and qualifications of party cadre have changed according to regime development.
During the Chinese revolution, cadres were understood to be the ideological, guerrilla-fighters, described as “ascetic, fearless and disciplined” combat leaders (Vogel 1967, p.36) who followed the party’s command owing to their high level of political commitment and consciousness. The high level commitment to the party’s ideology made them indispensable for achieving the political tasks of the revolution, in comparison to the masses, which followed them to fight the war (H.Y. Lee 1991, p.4). This was the perfect cadre role during the revolution stage.

However, in the years after the revolution, the CCP finally seized power and became the monopoly authority party of the country. Once labeled with the leading role, the conception of cadre after 1949 was “namely that of institutional leadership” (Schurmann 1968, p.165). The definition of cadre in the 1954 version of Revised New Phrases Dictionary (in Chinese) reflected how cadres – from the perspective of the party – were:

“…persons who work in state institutions or a department of production, capable of unifying and leading the masses to carry out Party and government policies and directives, to implement duties and programs promptly under the leadership of the Party and higher-level government institutions... (they) must possess revolutionary character and revolutionary working manner, be capable of cementing ties with the masses and taking the lead activity.” (Press 1954, p.5079)

This meant that cadre corps served as administrative officers in a government unit and were required to act as “command-oriented apparatchik” (Jowitt 1975, p.78), who were abstracted from the masses to guide them according to party’s will. The scope of the cadre corps changed significantly after 1949. However, even after the CPC became the authoritative party, the term cadre was still a demonstration of the controlling and leading nature of communist party, like during the revolutionary stage. On behalf of the party’s leading role, cadres were the “rule, ideological exemplars, and autonomous combat leaders” (Pieke 2009a, p.29) who were selected from society. In other words, attaining the title of ‘cadre’ required the individual to pledge a grand commitment to communist party ideology. During the Maoist stage, the party’s monopolistic control over the cadre system served to emphasize political correctness as the means of securing and maintaining the leading role of the CCP.
The cadre/civil service system has always been a tool for delivering the party’s interests and corresponding tasks. Factors that shape the cadre system include the qualifications expected from cadres and the tasks that the party seeks to fulfill in a certain period. A given cadre system is constituted with sets of cadre-related policies that are made “within the limits of environmental constraints and as a means of carrying out a specific core task (from the party) at a given moment” (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.3). On the other hand, the particular cadre system “in turn decisively influences the structure, orientation, and capability of the political system” (Schurmann 1968).

Within the Chinese administrative system, there is a range of tools at the CPC’s disposal to manage the state and thus secure the party’s dominant role and the continuation of the communist regime. Centering on the state and party bureaucracies, the cadre system has been a key administrative apparatus that has “exercised broader and tighter control over Chinese society than any previous government in the country’s history” (Harding 1981, p.1; Pieke 2009a, p.17). This importance explains why the cadre/civil service system has been under tight control from the party. Meanwhile, it is under great pressure to moderate the regime. In order to fully understand communist regime legitimation and development, it is essential to study the efforts that the CPC has been engaged in to control changes and ensure the continuation of its management over the party’s personnel system. A review of the development of the cadre/civil service system and the current reforms based on regime development requirements will provide further insights into the CPC’s management of the cadre system.

Nonetheless, there have been remarkable adaptations that indicate the adaptive character of the CPC (Dickson 2000; O’Brien 2008; D.L. Shambaugh 2008): in the post-Mao stage, the stable exclusive control over the cadre system has not been changed but has strengthened. For example, it was clearly reflected in Article 4 of the National Civil Service Law in 2005 that:

“The civil service system shall take directions from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the ‘Three Representatives’; to carry out the basic route of the preliminary stage of socialism and the cadre routes and guidelines of the Chinese Communist Party; and adhere to the principle of Party manages the cadre system”.

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The continued control by the CPC of the cadre is an essential feature of China’s communist governance. However, the cadre conception in the post-Mao era has started to include dual competences including political leaders, managers and technocrats since economic and social construction became the major tasks in the post-Mao regime consolidation stage. The cadre system then sought to excel in dealing with the dual pressures of catering to the development of economic and social life along with the ultimate principle of authoritative control under the CCP (H.Y. Lee 1991; Bo 2004).

The interaction inclusion and exclusion forces within the conflict-accommodation struggle (Jowitt 1975) has also been interpreted within the cadre system. This has served as “a fascinating window on the continuities and changes in CCP governmental practice” (Pieke 2009a, p.35). Being an important part of administrative reform, cadre management reform (the civil service system only began in 1993 in China) has been an important agenda to construct the communist regime in China by rationalizing the relationship of the party-government with society (Pieke 2009a). This dualistic approach has been confirmed by the dual track that China has adopted through its cadre/civil service reforms. China is “adopting modern, Western style merit-based strategies” while also “strengthening the historical role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of controlling and managing the civil service through its ideology, policies and Nomenklatura system” (Zhang and Zhou 2010, p.146).

Although there are several aspects involved in managing the civil service system, this research specifically focuses on reforms that have occurred in the training system for public officials. This is clearly a key system for any form of modern governance and thus it is worthy of extensive research. The cadre/civil servant training system is “a direct insight in how the CPC views itself ” (Pieke 2007, p.5), not only at present but also for the future. In other words, the cadre/civil service trainings embody the ideas/methods that the CPC takes to prepare itself for current and further regime developments.

An analysis of cadre education and training policies within a given period fits the research problem. Being one of the critical organizational factors within the communist regime, it is a way to study the extent to which regime management has been developed in the perspective of training. Any given policy of cadre education and training is limited to explaining the context of the political environment of the day. However, a
series of policy decisions on education and training of cadres that function at a given moment all add up to form a cohesive cadre training system. Cadre/civil service training policies are decided by the party based on the autonomy that it enjoys. The chosen training policies then operate as a channel to interpret and implement the party’s political task during a certain period.

The training system has been controlled exclusively by the party-government, the apparatchik sectors, in post-Mao China through to the late-1990s. The training system has been well received as the training goals have been naturally selected as those that best serve towards advancing the party’s goals of exclusivity and representativeness of society. The consolidation format in the training field emphasizes an education in political theory offered exclusively to cadres in leading positions\(^2\) (Wu 2011). In other words, the training system has not been able to engage very well with party adaptations geared towards inclusive tasks. Lacking external forces from market and society, the reforms in cadre trainings are like a “cat (that) might have gotten a lot fatter, but not necessarily caught more mice” (Pieke 2009b, p.954).

This study focuses on the relatively recent development of formal graduate education (i.e. MPA) as a reform effort in the cadre training system. The most recent, and largest, scale reform – the national MPA program – was launched with the aim to solve problems that could not be solved in the pre-existing training system (Dong and Wu 2004a). This research argues that the pre-existing ‘not-so-vocational’ training situation was due to the lack of external social or market forces in the training system. Therefore, the pre-existing training programs operated to meet the national cadre training plan designed by party-government and as a result has also been managed by it. Since the apparent defects of the former traditional cadre training system are a result of the absolute control from apparatchik sectors, the objective of the MPA program should aim to achieve Jowitt’s prescription for inclusion, resolving to promote a “... greater reliance on empirical, procedural, and leadership premises – in short, by the commitment to the inclusion task” (Jowitt, 1975). The decision made by the CPC to include academic professionals in the reform of the public administration training

\(^2\) There are no distinguishing categories of political or practical civil servants in China, but instead there are leading positions and non-leading positions. Furthermore, there are no politically-neutral corps in this civil service system.
system was to transform the existing ‘unprofessional’ status of the cadre training system (China-MPA-NECS 2001; Dong and Wu 2004b).

However, the reforms that included non-apparatchik sectors are taking place within a society that is excluded from government processes, as stated within Jowitt’s conflict-accommodation struggle. As a reform process that assigns cadres functions via the public administration education system in accordance with the requirements of party adaptation, it should be inevitable that there will be a challenge to the authoritativeness of the party’s authority, i.e. the consolidation basis of the regime structure.

This research aims to learn how the conflict-accommodation struggle is apparent within the MPA programs and the ways in which it advances not only civil service training but about how it manages the pursuit of social inclusion. In order to achieve this, one should acknowledge both the “existing exclusion format” of pre-existing public administration system and cadre training system in China as well as the MPA program that has “demanded consideration and adoption of more inclusion-oriented postures and responses” (Jowitt 1975, p.89).

The following chapters will navigate the meso and micro levels of analysis to explore the MPA program in China. Chapter 2 presents the differing values and approaches of public administration in both China and Western countries. Among the apparent differences, exclusive characteristics rooted within the consolidation stage as well as inclusive interpretations in public administration system will be categorized. Specific field research into the cadre training program in the Chinese public administration system will be outlined in detail in Chapter 3. Based on a historical analysis of training programs in the history of the Chinese administration, this chapter offers a clearer vision of the struggles inherent within the training programs.

The Chinese MPA program is an adopted program from the West, specifically the US. One option to learn about the MPA program as an inclusive-oriented reform is to take the learning process as the basic analytic framework (i.e. how would the CPC learn about and decide to utilize the MPA?). The following section argues in favor of the utilizing policy transfer literature to understand MPA adoption in China, and it specifically argues for the Dolowitz and Marsh framework as a heuristic device for this dissertation. Reviewing this body of theory is indispensable because the MPA program was adopted by China from the West and policy transfer theory examines how and why
such policy adoptions might take place, including the concept of policy drift during implementation.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has illustrated how the problem of the conflict-accommodation struggle in the Chinese Marxist-Leninist-Maoist regime operates at a general level as well as in relation to specific training programs. By focusing on the party’s personnel training programs as a means of exploring the ways in which the CPC has been dealing with the co-existence of the ‘traditional format’ and the ‘modern requirements’ in its administrative reforms, this chapter has illustrated how the cadre/civil service training program is operated in China, which has often been debated by scholars. From both within and outside of China, the communist regime has been criticized as being “dead in all but name” (Shirk 1993; Baum 2004; Zheng 2004; Chang 2010). However, this chapter is optimistic about the communist political system in China from its party-government relations to the specific field of research that this dissertation focuses on, namely the MPA training system, which demonstrates the presence of ongoing party adaptation and regime development.

Policy learning experiences taken from Western countries have been a popular way to modernize the Chinese administration towards developing a more inclusive regime. This research adopted the policy transfer literature to study the research problem in the most currently reformative MPA program. Based on different stages of the policy learning and transfer process, this chapter has also sketched out the levels in which to study the MPA program as an adopted lesson, namely the transfer at the state level and implementation at the local level.
3. LOCAL LEVEL REFORM IMPLEMENTATION: A REVIEW OF CADRE/ CIVIL SERVICE EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN CHINA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Chinese regime is legitimated by convincing the Chinese people that the party-led government is taking the right direction, doing the right thing and has the ability to do it correctly. The ancient political philosophy of “the water (people) that bares the boat (authority) could also swallows it up” (Press 1954) is echoed in “the mass-line” from Mao Thought which indicates the Chinese communist revolution should heavily rely on domestic support. Chinese people, on the other hand, have trusted and supported the regime because they believed in its legitimacy, instead of feeling co-opted by the state (Gilley 2008, p.265).

The CPC has moved from over emphasis on its Leninist identification as the origin of the ruling authority to consolidate the newly-established communist regime in China to a dramatic change to develop the long-ignored pragmatic legitimation that stresses the regime’s capacity to represent common interests of the Chinese people, to ensure the sustainability of domestic support. “In modern times authoritarianism has been justified by nationalism and by ideology” (Huntington 1993. p. 46) by “addressing the needs of different constituencies with the nation” (Shambaugh 2009, p. 3). The existence and function of the Chinese communist regime is based on the capacity of the CPC and government to maintain power, as well as on the people’s belief in the authority, the empirical political legitimacy of “utilitarian justification” (Guo 2003, p. 3).

Based on changing demands from legitimation needs, there, accordingly, have been adjustments in regime construction and development. Changes and reforms are generating values in legitimacy of the party, especially the personnel system as its backbone for governance (Gilley, 2008). A given cadre system is constituted with sets of cadre-related policies that are made “within the limits of environmental constraints and as a means of carrying out a specific core task (from the party) at a given moment” (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.3). On the other hand, the particular cadre system “in turn decisively influences the structure, orientation, and capability of the political system”
(Schurmann 1968). This review of the cadre/civil service system and its training system, and its history, is to explore reforms in this area according to adjustments in regime development requirements. Furthermore, review of cadre/civil service trainings in different stages also explores measurements in this system to maintain the ruling authority’s capacity for legitimacy.

3.2 LEGITIMATION AND ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND THE PARTY’S CADRE IN MAO ZEDONG STAGE

The initial ruling legitimacy of the CPC from a revolution-based regime came from two sources (Beetham 1991, pp.181-182) including the communist ideology and support from Chinese people to its revolutionary discourse. From the perspective of reserving the source of communist ideology as hegemonic domination for the justification of the communist regime, through the mobilization mode of legitimacy (Beetham 1991, p.95), the CPC has imposed ideological learning through the whole society (Zhu 2011, p.126). The aim was to exclude any rival potential political ideologies, while achieving the full-range commitment to the rightness of its authority. As for the other legitimacy source essential for the party, the CPC has mobilized political campaigns to achieve social transformation to consolidate the key interest group of the regime, namely the worker-farmer proletarian class.

The same source of “original justification” (Guo 2003, p.3) explains the regime consolidation techniques even after the CPC changed its role from a revolutionary party to a ruling party in 1949. During the revolution period, it was the persuasiveness and mobilization techniques (Teiwes 1976) of the CPC that relied on an inner party core ideology, and information was disseminated to other parts of society to attract as much support for the communist revolution as possible. Comparably, the persuasive ruling fashion turned into a radical and coercive control technique when the CPC was the ruling party, and became even more serious about consolidating communist regime power. However, the ruling legitimacy that the CPC turned towards has remained mainly on the same original justification of political ideology, which merely refers to theoretical and historical rightness for the communist ruling authority. This is the reason that even though the role of the CPC in the Mao Zedong stage towards its host society changed into a ruling party, the CPC still carried on the feature of a revolutionary party;
that is, the criticisms over the purity of socialist ideology through political mobilizations (Harding 1981). Another practical reason the CPC has carried on its revolutionary character into its regime consolidation stage was all of the economic and political events in the stage. When the regime was set up and they tried to build a new communist regime from scratch, mass mobilization was regarded as the most effective means to deal with all of these societal challenges.

The communist political elites were quite aware that the changes in superstructure do not automatically apply to changes in the technical-material base (Peck 1975, p.117). After seizing power in China, the CPC turned from a revolutionary party into a ruling party. This change was needed to deal with the more complex tasks of reconstruction and development so it could keep its authority justification from Chinese people as another important power source. In the first few years right after Liberation, the grand social development to ensure society stability and unity, as well as developments in industry and agriculture, fulfilled the party’s task of exercising leadership by leading, directing, controlling and inspiring all institutions of governance in the centralized system (Pieke 2009a).

However, because the party considered political rightness to be the foundation of all of the development, the CPC has continued its role as the moral capital (i.e. decision-maker) for the governed, instead of considering its capability to meet people’s needs or materialize the “social compact.” Based on this view, it was considered necessary to take politics as a command, which meant that the social development could only be actively pursued in the context of politicization of all fields (Macciocchi 1972, p. 471). For example, the CPC has always been aware that control of economy is “one of its weapons” for a communist regime, whereby the centered economic system in the Mao age was “neither independent nor external (from the political control)” (Schurmann 1968, p.323). This is why so many economic construction projects turned out to be politically related. The typical example is the radical “Great Leap Forward” with the aim “of closing the gap between city and countryside, of breaking the connection between work performed and wages received, and of catching up with the West in industrial output,” but which instead turned into another national political campaign (i.e. another mobilization effort) (Harding 1981, p.189).
The reliance on political ideology has been the CPC’s major legitimacy since the revolutionary stage. In order to preserve this form of legitimacy, the CPC first insulated the committed group of people, the proletarian class as an undivided committed group, compared to the rest of the society. At the same time, the party tried to consolidate its ruling position by mobilizing the rest of society to be committed to its political legitimacy so it could prevent other “unconstructed” forces – “excising any uncontrolled and undesired influence over the development (that) favoured by the party” (Jowitt 1975, p.70). These two missions of the CPC intertwined towards the party’s host society and developed social stratifications that centered on the level of commitment to the legitimation of the CPC. They also developed a series of major political campaigns with the aim to mobilize the whole society into a ‘class struggle’ to eliminate their rival classes.

In the cadre system, this dual mission of trying to secure its committed group of people, the proletarian cadres, while ensuring cadres from other classes were committed to party’s ruling position by coercive mobilization, could be learned from the stratification of ‘virtue’ and ‘ability.’ In the ways the party trained cadres in this period, “the tasks of the control cadres were still clearly political” (Schurmann 1968, p.322).

As early as 1938, in his work *Position of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Struggle*, Mao Zedong stated his criteria of “ability and virtue” to being a good cadre (Schurmann 1968, p.164). To the party, what ‘virtue’ meant was always loyalty to the party and the ideology (i.e. no dissent). It meant one’s commitment to Marxism-Leninism as well as Maoism, namely political loyalty and always supporting the party policy line. Ability represented different qualities during different stages, and it is the area where diverse opinions arose. Back in the revolutionary stage, the way the party ruled and performed was characterized by grand mass mobilization (Jowitt 1975). Back then, ability meant the capacity to mobilize people to support the war through serious political tasks. After seizing power in China, the CPC turned from a revolutionary party into a ruling party, which needed to deal with the more complex tasks of reconstruction and development to stress party and its government’s capabilities. This was required to retain power. The new tasks required for cadre’s ability after 1949 were performing administrative, economic and social duties. The party was aware of its new role and engaged itself in these changes by trying to recruit more educated young cadres as well as retaining officials from the Nationalist regime who had administrative and
governance skills. On the other hand, the party continued to appreciate the revolutionary cadres because the party needed to secure its committed cadre group. Therefore, the mass movement and mass mobilization became mere tools for implementing the radical policy chosen for ideological reasons (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.69).

The dual mission interpreted in the cadre training system was the mobilization of training in learning socialist ideological theories. Political ideological training extended beyond the party and to the entire cadre. The party excluded and stratified its personnel system via different training institutions that covered different social class stratifications in cadre corps.

The communist revolution in China started in agricultural villages. The peasant class was the majority of the party cadres for a long period and thus the proletarian class had the most radical intent to fight for what was described and promised in the party’s ideology. However, almost all peasants were illiterate. The peasant-based CPC contributed grandly to the revolution in the anti-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 and the Civil War with the Nationalist party from 1945 to 1949. It was the major source of cadre corps right before the establishment of the PRC, and so the role of peasants as revolutionaries was greatly appreciated by the party. However, when the CPC became the ruling party, the quality of cadres needed to change from fearless revolutionaries to bureaucrats, which required both literacy and management skills (Vogel 1967, p.37). This meant many peasant cadres were incompetent on the ability factor. It became urgent for the CPC to rely on as many other social forces to support communist construction.

The legitimation reason was the fundamental reason for ideological emphasis and, accordingly, socialist theory education for party cadres. Regime consolidation requirements meant the CPC needed a reliable alert system to the possible restoration of the bourgeois class. Given the fear of ideological foes, it was natural that the CPC could not over emphasize its ideological rightness as its legitimation towards the underlying society, as well as its personnel system. In order to achieve this goal and ensure its control over the cadre system, it was essential for the CPC to secure commitment to the communist ideology by imposing ideological theories as the only significant qualification to cadre corps on the one hand, as well as mobilizing personnel who could
contribute to socialist constructions for the exclusive communist camp on the other hand.

3.2.1 SOCIALIST THEORY TRAINING INSTITUTIONS AND CURRICULA UNDER MAO

The cadre corps was a means for the party to achieve economic and political mobilization through mass manipulation. They were the people who carried out all of the policies and implementation of the party’s tasks of regime development. From this perspective, the party needed to cultivate cadres beliefs by propagating revolutionary ideological discourse, to force people into compliance through coercive measures (Liu 2010). The requirement of awareness of and commitment to socialist ideology (i.e. the ‘virtue’ quality as a core value for Leninist parties) (Zhang and Zhou 2010), was one decisive factor in Mao’s administration. Cadre education and training programs were designed around this theme.

Cadre training under Mao was centered on the party school system and took all cadres through party-operated training agendas. In order to ensure the national mobilization of cadre training, the CPC diversified training institutions to include the whole cadre corps based on social stratifications. Social stratification was the ‘greenhouse’ of class struggle in Mao’s revolutionary morals. With Mao’s attitude being the benchmark (Watson 2010), there were three major categories of Chinese social stratification: socioeconomic strata, political attitude towards the party, and rank in the cadre hierarchy. Different training organizations for socialist theory education were designed for different groups based on these social categories. However, educational level was also taken into consideration as (Vogel 1967) due to the educational gaps in the cadres. Figure 3.1 visualizes the educational background of party cadres at the end of 1949.
Based on social stratification in this period, the party relied on four groups as the sources of cadre recruitment, in addition to the party members (Harding 1981, p.36):

1. new graduates from high schools and universities,
2. skilled technicians and intellectuals who had a non-communist ideological background,
3. retained former Nationalist regime officials who were mostly in middle-level positions where political qualifications were relatively less crucial, and
4. mass activists who emerged during the land reform (1950-1952), preferably those of a peasant or worker background due to their greater political reliability.

The party designed various training institutions for stratifications within the cadre corps, and also took direct management over all cadre training institutions.

PARTY SCHOOLS

Party schools were designed exclusively for party members. It used to be considered a huge honor for people who qualified for party school trainings. As a Moscow-trained cadre, Liu Shaoqi – who directed the institute – re-emphasized the importance of learning Marxism-Leninism theory for party members after the PRC was established.
Therefore, in order to improve the party members’ Marxism-Leninism theory understanding nationally, “it was party school’s responsibility to continue teaching Marxism-Leninism and be the ‘instructor of the whole party’ (Liu 1981, p.412).

In order to strengthen the commitment of party members to the CPC and Chinese communist regime, the party set out to retrain its own members in the cadre system through party schools, to improve their recognition and understanding of party and government policies (Harding 1981, p.38). The party schools were supposed to teach a little of everything from science to literature, all within the context of heavy political indoctrination. There were elementary-, middle- and senior-level party schools, each responsible for cadre education and training based on different ranks in the bureaucratic system.

In order to carry on its principles and equip party members with Marxism-Leninism theory, a national network of party schools according to <Central Plan for Rotational Training of High-Level and Middle-Level Cadres and Adjustment of Party Schools 中共中央关于轮训全党高、中级干部和调整党校的计划> (hereafter <Plan>) was needed to ‘improve the learning level of Marxism-Leninism theory’ to ‘establish a socialist society and work along with it’ (Central Document Press 1993)

Party school trainings were classified and operated based on bureaucratic ranks in the hierarchy of cadres (Table 3.2). The most senior training institution was the Central Party School, which was named the Marxism-Leninism Academy (马列学院) from 1947 to 1954 and then changed to the Central Committee Senior Party School 中共中央直属高级党校 (hereafter, Senior Party School). It was directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the CPC. Until 1966, the Senior Party School offered a strictly ideological curriculum of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, with the aim to cultivate cadres who were specialized in socialist theory. Courses were based on the main components of Marxism-Leninism, surrounded with Dialectical Materialism, Historical

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Materialism, Political Economy, Scientific Communism and logic. The other levels of party schools followed suit.

All seven intermediate level party schools were directly under the Central Committee of the CPC, and they have gradually assumed the responsibility of taking rotation trainings. The students were at a lower level than in the Central Party School, namely county manager, etc. These seven intermediate party schools were reorganized all across the state, geographically into the Northeast Bureau party school, West-East Bureau party school, East Bureau party school, Middle-South Bureau party school, West-South Bureau party school, Shandong Bureau party school and South Bureau party school. In 1955, another seven intermediate party schools were added in Beijing, Hebei province, Neimengu province, Heilongjiang province, Xinjiang province, Fujian province and Yunnan province. Although junior level party schools were managed by individual provinces or cities, the <Plan> already made clear rules of ranks of cadres that should be trained as well as the curricula for the junior party schools (see Table 3.2). However, soon thereafter, the central government combined the intermediate party schools with the former junior-level provincial party schools and they were merely in charge of rotational training of cadres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of party school</th>
<th>Hierarchy rank of cadres</th>
<th>Prior education level</th>
<th>Curriculum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Party School</td>
<td>Prefectural manager and equivalent rank</td>
<td>High School graduate</td>
<td>History of the Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>History of the Communist Party of Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Western history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dialectical materialism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Historical materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of the Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thoughts of Mao Zedong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Party School</td>
<td>County manager and equivalent rank</td>
<td>Junior high school graduate</td>
<td>History of the Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>History of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As early as 1949, there were four Soviet experts teaching ‘History of the Communist Party of Soviet Union’ in the Marxism-Leninism Academy.
SOCIALIST THEORY SCHOOLS

Starting in 1951 when the CPC Central Committee promulgated the <Decision for strengthen the theoretical education from the (draft) 中共中央关于1953-1954年干部理论教育的指示 (草案)> (hereafter <Draft>), training institutions were designed for cadres who were not party members to improve their knowledge of the theory of Marxism-Leninism. The <Draft> issued three grades for ideology theory education based on different degrees of a cadre’s educational background (Wu 2011).

In the primary grade, which involved cadres who recently joined the party or had the preliminary degree of education, educational contents would cover political elementary knowledge including knowledge about the People’s Republic China and Chinese Communist Party. Those cadres who had the junior degree of education and already had elementary political knowledge were placed in the intermediate grade to learn about historical materialism and the political economy, CPC history and the achievements of Marx, Engels, Stalin and Mao Zedong. The cadres in the senior grade – with a college degree – would learn about the works of Marx, Engels, Stalin and Mao Zedong in order to solve actual problems (Wu 2011, p.199). Based on the principles issued in the <Draft> and the guiding ideology conferred by the First National Publicity Conference, detailed instructions were issued in <Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party’s Instructions about Cadre Theory Education from 1953-1954 中共中央关于1953-1954年干部理论教育的指示> (hereafter <Instruction>).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elementary Party School</th>
<th>District manager and equivalent rank</th>
<th>Junior high school graduate</th>
<th>Theoretical Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Knowledge of Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Knowledge of the Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Central Committee of CCP 1954; Wu 2011)
There were two main schooling institutions to carry on the ideology theory education in keeping with the *Instructions*: “cadres’ spare-time theory school” (干部业余理论学校) and “night schools of Marxism-Leninism” (马列主义夜校).

“Cadres’ spare-time theory schools” focused on cadres who were in the junior and intermediate grades, and they were set up by different organizations separately. Until 1953, there were as many as 842 schools and serving 430,000 cadres (Wu 2011). Another functional way was the “Night schools of Marxism-Leninism”, which was based on the experience from the Soviet Union and relied on higher education organizations to provide theoretical education for cadres within the core curriculum of *30 years history of the Chinese Communist Party*, *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism*, *Foundation of Marxism-Leninism theory*, and *Political Economy*.

**PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY COLLEGE**

Before the 100 Flowers movement (1956-1957), Mao Zedong’s focus on socialist education stemmed from the optimistic attitude that all people who were willing to lend themselves to communist thought reform were capable of being rectified by learning Marxism-Leninism. By ‘who’, there were two main channels of cadre sources, the intellectuals and technicians. Furthermore, there were officials from the previous Nationalist regime, namely older cadres whose social class stratification was not so supportive of the communist regime.

For those older intellectuals and technicians, normally their socioeconomic background was bourgeois rather than proletarian, so that they did not hold positive, passionate attitudes towards Chinese communist revolution. The previous Nationalist officials were also considered as a group of cadres who generally lacked commitment to the communist ideology. The party encouraged Nationalist officials to serve under the communist party as early as September 1949, but only if they had gone through “thoughts reform” and short-term ideological training (Harding 1981, p.37). In other

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5 The 100 Flower Movement is considered as the origin of the following political campaign. It was started in the cultural field but spread both horizontally and vertically. More information about this movement is provided later.
words, unless he had been ‘reformed’ and ‘rectified’ from his ‘poisoned’ background, an intellectual could not serve the mass regardless how badly they needed him.

In keeping with Mao’s statement “…as for the intellectuals… (proletarians should) train them with thought reform” (Mao 1999b, p.20), the original design of the People’s Revolution College was short-term training courses on Marxism-Leninism theory and communist ideology designed to struggle against their ideological ‘shortcomings’. The system of the People’s Revolutionary College began to emerge as parallel to the regular education system.

The first People’s Revolutionary College, Central Plain College 中原大学, was founded even before the establishment of communist China in 1948 due to the great needs of intellectuals and technocrats in regions where the communist regime had already taken hold (Wu 2011). The curriculum in Revolutionary Schools was also ideology centered. For example, Lifton (1989, p.257) described the North China University curriculum including courses in History of the Development of Society, Lenin – The State, Materialistic Dialectics, History of Chinese Revolution, Theory of the New Democracy – Maoism and Field Study (i.e. visits to old communist workshops and industrial centers).

Required reading was another part of the ideological education for intellectuals (Harrison 1965, p.495). The reading list included Mao’s “On Practice 实践论”, “On Contradiction 矛盾论”, “Reform Our Studies 改造我们的学习”, “Rectify the Party’s Style in Work 整顿党的作风”, and “Oppose the Party Eight Legged Essay 反对党八股”, as well as Stalin’s “History of the CPSU” and “Short Course.”

The Revolutionary College was not an entirely delightful experience for students, like the example of Mr. Hu who expressed a tight idealistic monitor in the days he was at North China University in his memoirs (Lifton 1989). Nonetheless, this system clearly functioned as a screening process for bureaucratic appointments (Vogel 1967). The leaders and instructors evaluated student virtue and ability based on weekly or even daily discussions, and so they could recommend proper graduates for vacancies in the government and party bureaucracies.
3.2.2 Explanations for socialist theory training in Mao’s stage and of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (CR) from communist legitimation perspective

As explained, a tremendous emphasis on the political ideology was a key feature in this period. Unified courses and intense training from a variety of schools aimed to strengthen cadres’ commitment to the party’s legitimacy via imposing with political theories of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Marxism-Leninism and Maoism were always the compulsory courses and the major content of different training programs, classes and organizations. This was especially true late in 1957 with the “The 100 Flowers” movement, where the CPC turned more radical and stressed class struggle and political movements (Deng 1993, p.269) after the break up with the Soviet Union.

The preamble to party rules adopted in 1945 at the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 建党七十年 (7th NCPC) stated that the CPC would take its basic elements from Marxism, Leninism and ideas developed in the Soviet Union, and the unified thought of the Chinese revolution practice – the Mao Zedong thoughts – to make its ideology a systematic set of ideas. This would be used to create its own organization and achieve its own goals.

China received strong influence from the Soviet Union on educating and training cadres, especially in the early years from 1949-1956. The newly-established socialist China had accumulated experience to train revolutionary cadres in the long war period and Yan’an period (延安时期); however, they had little experience training cadres who could perform economic and social construction duties. Foreign policies proposed by Mao and later approved by The Central Political Bureau Meeting 中央政治局会议 followed the theme of a “single way (the Soviet way) of socialist regime.” China received direct support from the Soviet experts, and major influences can be seen in the introduction of the cadre training textbook.

Nonetheless, the honeymoon period with the Soviet Union ended around 1956 and was followed by de-Stalinism and questioning the Soviet model of the socialist way. Having observed the devastation of its ‘moral role’, the CPC felt great insecure of its legitimacy

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The Yan’an period started 1935 and was named after the town where the communists were based. This period was characterized by a renewed united front with the Nationalists against Japan an the rise of Mao to unchallenged party supremacy.
based on emulation of the Soviet Union. Healing from the break up with the Soviet Union meant more than ascertaining its own socialist construction framed by its independent history and the current situation of its society, namely Maoism. Its very source of its authority, “a reassertion of the mobilization or charismatic character of Leninist regimes” (Jowitt 1975, p.92) as its rightness to rule, had to be re-created.

From September 15-27, 1956, the 8th National Congress of the CPC 中国共产党第八次全国代表大会 (8th NCPC) confirmed the theme that cadre education was mostly socialist theory education, demonstrated by a series of committee reports. Deng Xiaoping emphasized the importance of retaining a stress on socialist theory education because “given that 1.03 million party members joined the CPC after the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945, there was a large percentage of members who had committed at the organizational level but not at the ideological level” (Deng 1994, p.212). Furthermore, Liu Shaoqi – who was the Chinese Vice President at the time – stressed that it was both important for the newly-recruited and the senior cadres to keep strengthening their knowledge of socialist theory studies (Wu 2011, p.245) and utilize the classic Marxism-Leninism theory to analyze their practical problems (Mao 1999a).

Following the instructions from the 8th NCPC, the socialist theory education focused on the efforts to explain and analyze Chinese practical problems using Marxism-Leninism (i.e. Maoism) for “uniting theory with practice,” thus avoiding simple repetition or replication (Deng 1957, p.19). However, the spread of approaches and experiences in training cadres from the Soviets, not only directly imported Stalinism as one important part of classic socialist theories, but also sought to increase the quality of Soviet cadres. Hence the way the CPSU trained its own cadres to learn classic Marxism-Leninism theory in the context of the Soviet party’s history – the concept that “identified with the ideology and political structures associated with totalitarianism” (Li 2010, p.108) – remained with the CPC. In fact, it was even further developed by Mao into the period of the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ 无产阶级文化大革命 (hereafter CR).

As for the origin of the CR, there are diverse arguments. From the perspective of the party’s legitimation and party’s roles in communist regime development stages, the CR was due to the radical results of flatly taking the ‘original legitimation’ of political
rightness as the only legitimation for the communist regime in China. Furthermore, there was confusion between exclusion and mobilization of the party to maintain legitimacy. On the one hand, the central authority tried to abstract the proletariat class out of the other social stratifications, while on the other hand it tried to mobilize the whole society into a proletarian camp through radical social transformation.

Like most parts of party and government organizations, the party schools and other forms of cadre trainings at every level went through great destruction during the years of the CR (Wu 2011, p.270). For example, the education and training process constantly received interruptions from a wide range of political campaigns. According to documents, the party school in Tianjin was closed for a whole year with the start of the Rectification movement (Tianjin-Municiple-Paty-Committee 1999, pp.28-30).

However, from the only existing so-called cadre training or transformation during the CR, one could tell that it was extreme and only political ideology of the communist regime in China was relevant to this training. The only approach to train cadres, if it could be called training, in the CR age were classes to study Mao Zedong thoughts, which at least at a small level could be seen to “have amounted to some form of continuation of the local party schools” (Pieke 2009a, p.40). As Wang observed during his visit in 1973 (Wang 1975, p.524), during the early-1970s two theoretical works were especially stressed and required for all cadres to read (inside and outside of cadre schools): Marx’s *The Communist Manifesto* and Engel’s *Anti-Duhring*. However, even though the required readings were about basic Marxist knowledge, he also found that the study of them was with an “overall emphasis … to relate Mao’s Practical ideology to pure theory” (1975, p.525).

Defending the ideological purity of Maoism as the almost complete educational emphasis devastated the existing cadre education and training system by making cadres rusty about their specialties and jobs. And, at the same time, after ten years of upheaval, the huge lack of qualified cadres became crucial to reverse in Deng’s administration (Wu 2011, p.339).

The development of the Chinese communist regime in Mao Zedong stage possessed the character of blending the former revolutionary stage of unfinished political tasks with current political uncertainties. One of the reasons is that as a revolution-based Leninist party, the development stages of CPC regime did not gradually evolve but marked with
factitious landmarks. Divided with the landmark of establishment of a new communist regime and based on the devastation of years of Liberation wars, the CPC was forced to continue with the “original legitimation” of communist ideology, even though it had many more tasks to achieve and there was a different role for the ruling party to play.

3.3 LEGITIMATION AND ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND PARTY CADRES AFTER MAO ZEDONG TO THE PRESENT

“The CPC’s ruling status is by no means a natural result of the Party’s founding, and will not remain forever if the Party does nothing to safeguard it” (Daily 2004).

The official discourse of political and institutional reforms in post-Mao China is different from the intellectual one, even though both sides were trying to set up a reformative agenda – for the CPC to retain its dominant role over a rapidly changing economic and social environment. With the most recently announced governing theme of ‘people-centered’ 以人为本, it seems the CPC regime had been turned into a ‘full-range inclusive one’ that is ruled for people. And also it made “the people believe it (the party) is serious in pushing forward the rule of law, ‘cleaning up’ and professionalizing the cadre system … (and)… enhancing public control over the government bureaucracy…” (Heberer and Schubert 2006, p.13). Opposition from Western intellectual world, on the other hand, did not quit questioning the democratic level and distribution of power in China given the exclusive monopoly power from the CPC. However, one cannot explain its ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’ reformative strategies in China without seeing beyond to the legitimation sources the CPC used to remain in power in the post-Mao age.

The Leninist-style CPC was still looking for answers about how to maintain the Leninist party’s privilege when the class struggle as the pre-condition for the revolutionary natured communist party could not be the focus to keep its legitimacy. The reason to label this stage ‘post-Mao’ starting in 1978 is because the emphasis of communist regime construction in China changed from class struggle to economic development. More fundamentally, in seeking to retain its legitimacy after the turmoil of the CR, the CPC switched from traditional and charismatic grounds to the rational ground of “socioeconomic performance” as a “social promise” (Tökes 1979, pp.226-227; Fehér et
al. 1983, pp.277-279; Beetham 1991). This developed the role of government as “providing social and economic benefits for its citizens” (White 1986, p.463). It was not until 1978 when Deng came into power that the CPC leadership realized that the regime should not only have its domestic support to justification its ruling position, but also should represent their ‘supports’ (i.e. Chinese people’s common interests) to ensure the consistency of supports from Chinese people for its legitimacy. Deng realized that the decades long political campaigns and class struggles failed to keep the “social promises” of “providing significant improvements of people’s living standards” (Guo 2003, p.11). This greatly weakened the faith in the CPC from the Chinese people and thus threatened the party’s legitimacy. Given more than two decades of a closed Chinese state, and the suffering from the CR chaos which was a radical consequence of charismatic political legitimation, “the first momentous step towards the liberalization of a communist ruled economy” (Harvey 2005, p.1) taken by Deng was critical. This step sought to shift burdens of authority justification from political and procedural bases towards economic performance. With the aim of building its legitimation based on the social compact, Deng emphasized the liberalization of the Chinese communist economy to improve the socioeconomic performance of the Chinese state. Since then, China has adopted a pragmatic legitimacy which means that it relies on the government’s performance on concrete goals including socioeconomic growth, social stability and national unity (Wang and Zheng 2000; Laliberté and Lanteigne 2007) as evidence of being a ‘good government.’ In December 1978, the CPC leadership under Deng Xiaoping announced a program of economic reform to launch a socialist market instead of central planning. Deng sought to protect and advance the interests of the Chinese state, which were based upon the role of the party’s government to provide social and economic benefits for its host society and citizens (White 1986, p.463). In the first decade of Deng administration, he successfully put into practice economic reforms and the “opening up” policy.

Accordingly, the role and missions for the communist party and state when they were proposing a liberated economy was to propose a new central guiding principle of economic thought and management, as well as other social structures such as the military and judiciary, to ensure they would be appropriate for creating markets and managing a liberalized economy (Harvey 2005).
China certainly was not the first Leninist regime that sought to reform its economic and social situation. The strategy in Eastern European countries dealing with similar economy development requirements was a ‘shock therapy’ path to abolish the party committee system in functional areas to prevent “unnecessary political organizations detrimental to efficient economic management” (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.379). However, this approach clearly would weaken the party’s role and was not applied in China because the CPC would not accept any challenge to its privilege and dominance that were legitimated by the communist ideology since its revolutionary phase. This had always be a key part of the ongoing party-state quest to legitimate itself, and was also an aspect of governmental practice (Pieke 2007, p.5). The no-leeway holding on its dominant role was because it was only by referring to the original authority of political ideology consensus and consistency (Teiwes 1995) that the CPC could ensure its ruling position in the non-political command period since post-Mao.

In order to keep the communist ideology’s consensus and continuity in a pragmatic context, as a communist party, the CPC needed to work out a more “relevant, viable, and appealing doctrine for China’s modernization” (Burton 1987, p.431) to “justify the goal of economic development in Marxist” terms (H.Y. Lee 1991, p.319). To keep consistent with the original legitimation of the CPC, Deng Xiaoping tried to make references to communist ideology and he harkened back to Mao’s leadership and laid down the Four Principles (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, the socialist road, the people’s democratic dictatorship, and the leadership of the party) as the core values of the CPC. Consulting with ideology to legitimate the party’s role of privilege and its reform decisions carried on the revolutionary nature of being a Leninist-style party and mobilization mechanisms – albeit with a more practical “utilitarian legitimation” – sought to fulfill both material and social benefits expected by the Chinese people. However, the party found it difficult to develop continuity of legitimation in an environment where the original objective of achieving ideological orthodoxy was subordinated to practical economic goals to meet the requirements of social promises.

Having shifted its legitimation basis to improve its performance in economic and social development to remain in power, both the leading role of the CPC and its ruling techniques were affected in many ways. Since Deng’s administration, it has significantly promoted the socioeconomic situation and strengthened the government’s capability of governance, hence affecting regime legitimation in a positive way. At the
same time, changes in regime legitimation also challenged the Leninist ruling character of the CPC because it also changed the relation between the party-state and the society by the growing need to empower the demos.

The success of ability to represent the common interests of Chinese people depends on the regime’s performance on missions that stand for people’s interests, including socioeconomic growth, national unity, government accountability, etc. (Guo 2003). In order to improve the party’s government performance, the recognition that it was impossible for the CPC to be a heroic party in charge of all activities at all levels was commonly agreed upon. The new legitimacy emphasis asked the CPC to decrease the direct interruption of economic and social constructions because the needs for a more institutionalized political process and limitations on arbitrary power were important requirements for economic and social development.

On the other hand, while the improvement of governmental performance was crucial, the purpose of the party-government to meet the people’s needs was not quite enough. With reforms that increasingly promoted the needs of “being legitimate by the underlying society” for communist regime (Fukuyama 2004, p.26) in recent years, it is safe to say that the challenge now for the CPC’s government became the pressure for legitimacy by meeting the needs from its underlying society and people. The party leadership, of course, could sense this pressure and tried to give the expression that people wanted. The re-emphasis on its original legitimation source, and the authority position of CPC from the demos, could be read from the evolving ideological discourse through generations of CPC since post-Deng stage.

The “theory of three represents” that Jiang Zemin proposed was an effort at ideological reconstruction. It sought to transfer the CPC from a revolutionary party to a ruling party by “broadening the party’s social support and boosting the party’s image as a party of the people” (Guo 2003, p.16). Even though the theory of “three represents” reclaimed the authority to govern by expanding the party’s representativeness of the traditional proletarian to an overall representation of “the most advanced productive force in China, the most advanced Chinese culture and Chinese people’s best interest,” it committed itself to be “a representative but elite governing institution” (Zhu 2011, p.127).
In the following administration of Hu Jintao, the CPC still appreciated that the consciousness of performance as its empirical source of its utilitarian legitimation could only be achieved by improving its capability of governance and representativeness. The very obvious reason is that the political regime needed to open up in the long run due to the complexities of economic and social development (Heberer and Schubert 2006). However, the 4th generation of the CPC leadership centered with Hu Jintao tried to remedy the subtle social stratification of the Jiang Zemin administration and promote grand social support and cohesion. It also reached out for a more populist and inclusive representation. In 2004, the 16th Central Committee of CPC adopted what Hu proposed as the “all-inclusive” ideology of a “harmonious society”, towards a political spectrum to construct shared beliefs and gain grand consent from the underlying society. However, even with his grand expanded representativeness, Hu’s political philosophy of “governing for people” (Guo 2003, p.19) consistently emphasized the party’s leadership as leading the whole society to agree on the justification and lawfulness of CPC authority, instead of putting restrictions on this power.

In order to achieve this greater inclusive regime, the CPC has engaged in reforms that directly take people into regime construction and development to intensify the interactions between the state and society. For example, the increasing level of political participation from the Chinese people, the People’s Political Consultative Conference (Yan 2011). Furthermore, the Xinfang system indicates that people have obtained rights to appeal comments on the party and government (Heberer and Schubert 2006; Zhu 2011, p.132).

The following section studies other solutions this research has found that the CPC has adopted to retain legitimacy, especially in the cadre/civil service system. However, in brief, the other solutions include (1) taking social elites with certain expertise into governmental institutions to help improve its performance and (2) the strategy to legalize the party’s authority position via jurisdiction so that it could bring the ruled to the same page with the ruler to acknowledge the party’s ruling position.

Naturally, there are difficulties and certain dangers from the expanded inner boundary initiated from society instead of from the authority, whereby it is very difficult to control the reform extensions. From most Western scholars’ observations, the ability of the CPC could contain its political supremacy and its results in a high level of social
stability during the reform stage. However, with reforms continually expanding, these scholars make their caveats that the communist rule will slow down and eventually demise because it “nevertheless comes closer to the unavoidable intersection of full-scale privatization and democratization” (Heberer and Schubert 2006, p.10). However, the following section argues that the inclusive regime has affected the communist regime in a positive way that could prolong the communist party’s ruling role. The efforts to re-emphasize its legitimation by improving party-government capacities such as representativeness and performance, in its limited sense of the cadre/civil service system in this study, ensures a more systematic and rationalized personnel system focused on the government’s pragmatic performance in economic growth and social stability.

3.3.1 CADRE/CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AFTER MAO

In the transitional stage of the post-Mao era, so many institutional reforms have taken place in a way that required great political power to ensure achievements. These reforms stressed “modernization of the state” (Wang 1998) by strengthening party-state capability as well as bureaucratic efficiency. However, there have been no changes to the CPC’s constitutional monopoly of political power (Gilley 2008).

Drawing on David Easton’s (Easton 1979; Gilley 2008) model of a political system, the legitimacy-based approach conceptualizes that institutions are the infrastructure for generating the performance on which legitimacy is based. In other words, institutional reforms happen when people/citizens have troubles with the performance they generate, hence the legitimacy of the authority to hold and exercise its political power. Since the second general of leadership in post-Mao stage, the justification of the ruling position of CPC has changed into realizing the “social compact” between the party-state and its underlying society, which initially focused on economic construction. The mission for the CPC to achieve was to ensure governmental institutions were in favor of economic reforms and market liberalization. As the ‘backbone’ of communist regimes, shortcomings of the cadre system had become acute.

The most prominent drawback of the cadre system was its unified and overly-centered power to party members in leading positions (i.e. the political or leading cadres). From this point, it caused incompetency in meeting the new needs of internal economic
development (Jones and Newburn 2002) and also hindered the socio-political structural of the party leadership. Accordingly, one of the primary aims of civil service reform in the post-Leninist regime was a change from the previous cadre institutional and management approach (Witesman and Wise 2009). The first concern was to allocate powers of control between party committees and administrative agencies at different levels. Ability needed to be taken more seriously. The freedom of government to manage civil servants and for civil servants to implement decisions required a system that was more independent of politics.

As a nation with a monopoly ruling party and a required functional government under development, the CPC was faced with an increasing pressure towards decentralization and a rationalized allocation of its authority (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As early as 1987 at the 13th National Congress of the CPC, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang proposed a plan to reform the old cadre management system which was characterized by over centralization, over politicization and supported or at least tolerated, abuse of bureaucratic power, so that it did not meet the needs of rapid socioeconomic changes in China. The original hope of setting up a civil service system in China was to enhance the state’s (contrast to the party’s) ability to respond to the rapidly-emerging socioeconomic changes during the transitional stage by differentiating and depoliticizing the civil service system from the cadre personnel management system. For example, all leaders agreed on the past experience of an over-centralized cadre management system should be changed. The <Regulation Regarding Reform of the Cadre Management System> adopted on October 5, 1983, formally decentralized the scope of cadre management at various levels. Based on this <Regulation>, the central authority is only in charge of leadership of the provincial organs, ministers, vice ministers, members of the party within government ministries, and directors and deputy directors of bureau-level organs (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.359). Management of all other cadre corps was delegated to provincial party committees.

Vertically, the civil servants could be divided into two parts based on how they were to be appointed. Political civil servants included all leading cadres who are considered as ‘policy-makers’ and who constitute the backbone of government, would need approval from the People’s Congress for their appointments. The rest of the civil servants, acting as ‘policy implementers’, could only enter the civil service system by passing examinations and meeting other requirements.
Even though the provisional proposal had many troublesome aspects and left some problems unsolved (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.378), the proposal for a civil service was a landmark towards using civil servants as a means for government administration rather than a Maoist mobilization tool. Instead of direct control over cadres, the party was supposed to help other administrative authorities (i.e. the Personnel Ministry and Bureau at that time) to manage civil servants. The fact the regime was proposing a civil service system could be considered the first step towards separating the party from the administrative hierarchy (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.384).

Based upon transferring personnel management from the party control to governmental institutions with the aim of facilitating a response to social and economic changes, the urgency was changing the cadre’s role from “revolutionary cadres” to “bureaucratic technocrats” (Hong-Yung Lee 1991) who could rationalize and professionalize the civil service system. The most remarkable and leading reform was moving some educated technocrats into the party leadership. In the post-Mao era, bureaucratic technocrats (Hong-Yung Lee 1991) were imbued with political authority to exercise their knowledge and skills for modernization, and some of them have ‘infiltrated’ the highest political offices such as the Politburo and the Secretariat of the party. The qualitative transformation of the leadership of the cadre system was considered an essential reform before other policies could follow (Manion 1985, p.206). This is true because it could help remove obstacles and also ensure the qualifications for further development of the system. The leadership transformation that started at the end of the CR reached its peak at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987. This was part of a broader and more fundamental change from revolution to reform within Chinese society. The reforms emphasized political institutionalization, economic development and social stability.

The rise of bureaucratic managers and technocrats to the highest positions indicated the CPC’s commitment to economic development and modernization. In the central government – for instance – by 1981 there were 92,000 newly promoted cadres to leadership positions with a higher educational background (Cheng and White 1988, p.379; Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.195). See Table 3.5 for the changes of educational background in leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected Politburo</th>
<th>Highest Educational Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 3.2 Changes of educational background in leadership

86
### Members from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Primary School</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>Military School</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Congress</td>
<td>4 (15.4%)</td>
<td>5 (19.2%)</td>
<td>6 (23.0%)</td>
<td>5 (19.2%)</td>
<td>6 (23.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Congress</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>10 (35.7%)</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>9 (32.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Congress</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (27.7%)</td>
<td>1 (5.6%)</td>
<td>12 (66.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Cheng and White 1988, p.379)

Technocrats had fundamental influences on justification of the party’s monopoly role in post-Mao due to their movement into party leadership positions. As Baily (1974, p.85) argues, they do not see communist ideology as dogma but rather as something that needs to be flexibly interpret to support economic goals. This flexibility also allowed the technocrats to push through institutional reforms. On the other hand, the post-Deng leadership had to build legitimacy by “delivering the promised economic benefits to all the Chinese people” (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.289) so the party’s charisma did not fade as leader style changed.

Furthermore, it reinforced the direction of changes to the cadre system. The cadre system in Mao’s administration reflected the interests and experiences of old revolutionaries. With the dramatic increase of specialists in leading positions (Cheng and White 1988), the cadre system in the transitional stage changed to represent the knowledge, work experiences and understanding of the needs of China at that time through the bureaucratic lens. Led by the great change in direction from the top party leadership, through the whole cadre system efforts were launched including ones to transform revolutionary veterans to bureaucratic technocrats and managers throughout the cadre system and rationalize deployment of cadres to perform political and economic objectives effectively while emphasizing the capacity for these missions.

In the transitional period in post-Mao stage, the force of CPC legitimacy, expressed as claims on people’s common interests, had great pressure on the rise of regulative institutions as in capitalist economies (Polanyi 2001, p.159). In response, there should have been grand scope of decentralization and depoliticization in reforming the pre-existing cadre system into a modernized civil service system. However, all Leninist parties consider cadre system as the “basic source of authority” (Zhi 1985, p.7) and the “organizational guarantee” to complete their political missions. Even though the principle of “party manages cadres” declares the exclusive authority over cadre system...
and hence the elite status of the communist party, it never indicated how to exercise this authority.

As Naughton and Yang (2004, p.22) put it, “the Chinese government today has grown fingers, but it is not ready to abandon its strong thumbs.” The cadre/civil service system is one of the aspects that have been proposed to reform in catering to the economic development and pragmatic legitimation while at the same time the control capacity has significantly strengthened from the party and its government. As Zeng Qinghong\(^7\) described, it must concretize the principle of party control and this has been achieved by including the party organization into the civil service system. One way is the extent of the party’s role in state law and another way is the placement of party organizations into the administrative management of the cadre/civil service system, namely the Ministry of Personnel (Chan and Li 2007, p.388).

The first evidence showing the improved control level from the central authority was the extended definition of cadres and civil servants. Since the early-1990s when a new civil service system was proposed, the term *civil servant* has gained more prominence and the term *cadre* now has a less consistent meaning, hence becoming a broader concept (Yang *et al.* 2012a; Yang *et al.* 2012b). ‘Cadres’ now includes the civil servants and also professionals from outside the party or administration executive organizations, such as state-owned enterprises and other public institutions. In the State Civil Service Law 国家公务员法 (SCSL) promulgated in 2005, Article 2 defines civil servants as: (1) performing public duties (Jones and Newburn 2002), (2) hired according to an established post plan (bianzhi 编制), and (3) paid all their wages and benefits by the state.\(^8\) In comparison, Article 3 of the Provisional Regulation of State Civil Servant 国家公务员暂行条例 (PRSCS) in 1993 applied to all personnel in administrative organizations of the state at all levels except for manual workers\(^9\).

The definition for civil servants in the SCSL thus expanded to include all employees of all branches of government and the party-mass organizations, including the People’s Congress, People’s consultative commissions, courts and procuracy. To quantifi

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\(^7\)Zeng Wasan alternate member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and head of the Central Organization Department from 1999 to 2002.

\(^8\)Source: [http://law.51labour.com/lawshow-39364.html](http://law.51labour.com/lawshow-39364.html).

expansion, under the new definition, there would be 1.44 million civil servants added to the 4.9 million under the previous definition (Zhang and Zhou 2010, p.151). In other words, an additional 1.44 million officials from listed organizations would be under the control and management of the party.

The expanded definition of civil servants from the SCSL is a criterion for not being civil servants rather than a reference to people who are (i.e. a negative definition rather than a positive one). The new definition does not limit the scope within the administration system like the former one in the Provisional Regulation, which provided the three aforementioned broad criteria. This general definition might not have made the idea sufficiently clear, although it significantly broadened the scope of the term civil servant.

Furthermore, the enlarged scope of civil servant personnel management system has also included cadre personnel management. Despite some ‘written differences’ as listed above, between the categories of civil servants and cadres, the personnel management system still wraps these together. First, a clear example is classifying leading positions and non-leading positions within the same personnel system. Article 16 of the SCSL divides civil servants into leading positions involving officials in party committee organizations while non-leading positions include the ordinary staff of an organization’s internal departments and offices. Second, this was to be interpreted by the managing organization. The State Administration of Civil Service, a bureau of the State Council’s Ministry of Personnel, is in charge of the implementation of civil service policies. It was set up by the organization department of the CPC, so that the bureaus work seamlessly together (Burns 2005) and ensure that control resides in the party. The civil service management framework “truly concretized the principle of party control cadres” (Chan and Li 2007, p.388) by unifying two layers of personnel management including leading cadres and personnel staff of the party and state departments.

Around this issue, scholars have been concerned about whether the established civil service system can meet the current government’s need to be a ‘good government’ (Chou 2008) with a separated personnel management framework for professional administrators, or if it will return to the old cadre management system (Chan and Li 2007) with the exclusive direct control from the party and no distinction, in terms of ideological expectations, between leading cadres and administrative staff in the party or state departments. The worry about a return to the closed cadre management system for
“political credentials, patronage, and nepotism buttressed in the pre-reform personnel system” is understandable (Chou 2008, p.56) because the leading role of the party must remain relatively unchanged so that the leading party group is excluded from, rather than transferred to, a leading position in the civil service system.

Nonetheless, similar to the Leninist party’s mobilization implementation pattern, the CPC has not only been setting goals for civil servants to achieve, but also generalizing the education and training contents needed to fulfill the party’s mission.

Based on previous explanations for the changed role of cadre/civil service system in post-Mao period, the following section looks at the training system in this period and legitimacy explanations for reforms and existing problems. The following sections will first look at how the Party has set up qualifications for being a qualified civil servant according to the pursuit of party legitimation, and the mobilized goals for cadre/civil service training at different stages. Then the implementation of the party’s mobilization on civil service training is outlined, in terms of the structure and content of two major training systems – the party school system and the administration school system.

### 3.3.2 CADRE TRAINING INSTITUTIONS AND CONTENT AFTER MAO

The mission that stressed governmental performance asked different abilities from the cadre corps. Established in 1993, the academy administration school system aimed to facilitate improving civil servants with professional knowledge and skills that could benefit administrative duties. Although this section is divided into two main parts to explain the way cadre/civil service training has been evolving in the post-Mao stage, the two sides of training institutions and training content and qualifications of cadre and civil servants are always interrelated.

When the ‘Three Represents’ officially became the orthodox for the party, it was unsurprising that it came from the party center given the self-identity of the “most advantaged knowledge” of the CPC. It issued the training plan for party and state leading and lower-level cadres and also covered for “state enterprise managers, cadres in juridical and legal system, grassroots cadres below the country level, minority cadres, cadre who are not members of the Communist Party, female cadres and cadres working in the remote western parts of the country” (Pieke 2009a, p.48). Besides the training objectives that the party placed into its unified plan, it also officially mentioned ‘other
schools and centers’ along with the party school system, comprising the whole training network. The *plan* itself was rather short, yet it had important implication in the endorsement of diversifications in cadre/civil service training not only in the personnel system, which was the training objective, but also diversified the subjective side, training institutions.

3.3.2.1 TRAINING INSTITUTIONS: TRAINING CENTRALIZATION

At the end of 1978, the ‘Four Modernizations’ had become the party’s new direction for action, demanding stronger party-state governing capacity, which was fairly new to both party and its government. Directed with this official orthodoxy, not only has the role of party school system been evolving, but also a whole new training system leaded by the National Academy Administration School was established to facilitate the civil service system.\(^{10}\)

REFORMS IN THE CADRE SCHOOL SYSTEM

The reforms in the cadre training system – like all other reforms during the transitional stage – were not undertaken overnight. The end of the CR served as the turning point and thus the reformative direction moved from the centralized, planned economy to a market-driven economy. In May 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping not only announced the start of reform in China with the parameter of the ‘Four Basic Principles’ but also the open-door policy and the methodology of ‘practice is the sole criterion for testing empirical truth’ to achieve his destination.

The ‘reform and door open’ policy proposed in 1978 also affected the requirements for cadres (Wibowo and Fook 2006). With the rapid changing outer environment, the leading cadres needed to be equipped to fully acknowledge and respond quickly to different situations. Furthermore, they should have a clear understanding of the inner situations, including the structure of the economic system and methods to manage the society. In order to reflect and cater to this change, the cadre training system as led by

\(^{10}\)There is a third set of cadre schools established by the organization department of CPC Central Committee, but there are only three of them now. They are the China Executive Leadership Academy of Pudong (website: http://en.celap.cn/), Jinggangshan (website: http://www.celaj.gov.cn/English/) and Yan’an (website: http://en.celay.org.cn/). On the one hand, these have not become a national option for civil servant training and on the other hand they are designed to train reserved leaders for the party. While these clearly seek to train leading cadres, these are not the object of this research, which explores the broad national training.
the party school system, should have adjusted its curriculum and training focus. It was not until the mid-1980s, that Song Renqiong, as head of the Central Organization Department, announced the organizational work readjustment from the “leftovers from the history” through resolutions for the new period (Song 1980, p.2). Moreover, among all of the new tasks, the foremost one would be the “qualitative elite transformation to propel China’s modernization drive” (Manion 1985, p.206).

The party’s cadre training was started with the party school and has established different forms through its ongoing development. The party school system – especially the Central Party School (CPS) – could not only interpret the requirements for cadres as service instruments for the current regime, but it could also predict the pulse of the regime evolution in the future (Tran 2003). “As the foremost institution in China responsible for inducting new blood into the party and government, the CPS has to constantly adjust itself to stay relevant” (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.142). As one of the foremost institutions of the party, the CPS played a unique role of both offering a platform for existing and aspiring leading cadres (D. Shambaugh 2008, p.840).

Throughout different political stages, the major mission of party schools has been consolidated to equip the party a pool of unified and qualified cadres to support the party’s interests. What has changed is the curriculum’s party orientation in different political periods (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.151). Along with the development of the party school system, the vast network that was built across China was centered with the CPS. The leadership considered the party school at the central level paramount, while local party schools were to complement and follow the CPS as exemplar (Wang 1992; Wibowo and Fook 2006).

Under this reformative direction, the party school launched its reforms with the leadership of Wang Zhen, a staunch supporter of Deng’s reform ideology. Standardization of party schools could only be realized after determining the reform direction. The policy of the ‘standardization’ of party schools was defined as “an overall and systematic reform of the school by retaining the tradition of the party while at the same time adjusting to the new situation” (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.145). As part of this, the image of party schools should have to change so it could no longer be seen as “the moldy remnants of a tainted past, secretive and inward looking” (Pieke 2009a, p.44), but rather a promise of the party’s confidence to consistence for a socialist future.
even with challenges from opening up, capitalist market and social liberalization. The foundation of the CPC ruling confidence identity made the standardization of party school system urgent.

After issuing the mission of standardization for party school education, a directive document “Decision of the Central Committee Regarding the Realization of a Standard Education in the Party School” 中共中央关于实现党校教育正规化的决定 (Central-Committee--of-the-Communist-Party-of-China 1983) was approved and carried out through the Central Committee to formulate and confirm the policy of standardization. Following the ‘Decision’: (1) training mission of party school system has been confirmed as taking the short-term rotational training as its major mission, (2) training objectives have been confirmed as cadres who were in leading positions, (3) examinations became the concurrent enrollment approach with the previous method of recommendations to enter the party schools, and (4) rotation trainings have been organized into three class categories (advanced training class 培训班, theoretic training class 理论班, and general training class 进修班).

All of the reforms moved the party school system towards the standardization in the Decision and have not only paved the basic tone for subsequent reforms, but, more importantly, officially adopted the training degree and certification from party schools as the pre-condition for cadres’ promotions. The training program also started to develop into standardized training over longer time periods. Both classroom management and curriculum arrangements were major targets for standardization in the party school system.

As for the curriculum, in order to meet the standards of Four Modernizations for cadres, half of the courses kept emphasizing Marxist-Leninist and Maoist theory, whereby ‘requisite modern scientific and cultural knowledge’ and ‘professional knowledge’ held equivalent importance. The party school rearranged the curriculum following the tripartite principle of one-third each to Marxism theories, modern knowledge of a particular subject, and science and culture (Liu 2009, p.108). Newly-added courses included economic management, jurisprudence, international politics, dialectics in nature and modern science and technology, and foreign language. Therefore, the students not only had more elective courses available, but they were also opened to
foreign scholars from both socialist and capitalist countries (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.146).

With an overall reform in the school, the emphasis on ability to master ‘modern scientific culture and knowledge’ (Editorial 1983) arose to a sufficiently important level to be mentioned alongside the classic Marxism-Leninism and Maoist theories. This reform direction put an end to the dogmatic pursuit of the ideology and began a new epoch of party schools as the cadre training system.

Reforms in this transitional stage were still adjustments made based upon the original structures, because ideological education to train cadres was still there. This function of the party school system eased due to the ‘less ambitious and defensive’ ideological requirements for cadres. There were rational developments such as professional knowledge taught beside the ‘old-five courses’ to keep party schools relevant. However, it was not until 1992 when the development ideology of CPC, “Market Socialism,” was promulgated and an institutionalized civil service system was introduced. Before then, the stubbornness of the party schools to remain relevant and at the same time hold onto the importance of ideological theories made the ‘new’ curriculum quite removed from the individual needs of the cadres to perform their daily work. The courses given in party schools were simply “regurgitate the party’s documents” and did not interpret “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, the sole reform spirit of Deng Xiaoping, and also avoided the issue of the dogmatism of the party and society (Wibowo and Fook 2006).

The role of party schools, especially the CPS in post-Mao China has moved beyond its original function of cadre education and training. The party school system is a desire and a proof of the party’s leading role over its administration. It is further a combination of advanced knowledge of administration and strict ideological disciplines to ensure party’s guidance and access to its ruling position.

REFORMS IN ACADEMY ADMINISTRATION SCHOOL SYSTEM

The academy administration school system made remarkable diversifying and interpreting training qualifications from the party-state’s government work given the needs from the party legitimation of improving governmental performance. At the same time, the separation between organizational management over Cadre Schools and
Academy administration schools created the possibility of a separate training institution, and hence a different training emphasis on professionalize knowledge and skills for government administration. However, aside from the National Academy Administration School, administration schools at the local level went through a hard time identifying themselves (LIU 2005) and turned ‘party-school’ alike.

Since the 1990s, there has also been progress with academies of administration for the training of non-leading government cadres, namely the established academy of administration school system as one aspect of the creation of the civil service system in 1993. The academy of administration school system is managed by the state council and more than 2,000 affiliated local schools of administration have now set up a network to train the senior and middle ranking officials from the state council, provincial governments, and municipal governments.

Although the national academy school is completely independent from the CPS, the administration school system is affiliated with the party school system and essentially supplements the party school system at the local level. The two systems share similar structures and simultaneously undertake the tasks of training party cadres and government officials. Thus, it could be interpreted – especially at the city and county levels – that the administration school system is “riding on the structure of the party school system” (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.141). See Figure 4.1 depicting these relationships.

The establishment of academy of administration school system was started with the desire to professionalize the state bureaucracy with qualified personnel. It has developed since then with the spirit of fulfilling training requirements from the state-government strengthening in ‘market economy’, ‘international business’, and ‘professionalize public administration’ (Zheng 2005). However, it came with the fear of their possible lack of ideological commitment to the party and socialism, whereby the academy of administration school system continued to fulfill the needs to “control and monitor high-level staff and staff promotions through their unique combination of ideological training, monitoring and assessment, and non-political education” (Pieke 2009a, p.46). Indeed, the academy administration school system is simply a different aspect of the

http://www.nsa.gov.cn/web/index.html
same task of the party school system, only for cadres who are in non-leading positions. Furthermore, the annual targets of an academy are part of an overall national cadre training plan set by the party leadership committee.

The academy administration school system succeeded in setting up a system for civil servants who are not in political leading positions so that the training of governmental personnel has been taken into consideration to improve government performance. Even more importantly, trainings in academy administration schools are based on the requirements from the government instead of only party-state needs. The academy administration school system was a sign that the CPC has engaged to stress its utilitarian legitimacy instead of the original legitimation.

The overall responsibility of cadre/civil service training at each level of administration rests in a party committee called the Cadre Education and Training Committee (干部教育培训委员会). Responsible for drafting annual cadre education and training plans, this committee has been directly under the party’s committee at each level. Institutions of cadre training, including the party schools and administration schools, “essentially have executive, rather than decision-making, responsibility for parts of the plan” (Pieke 2009a, p.56).

The latest 2008 <Provisional Regulations on Civil Servant Training> defined in Section 1, Article 5 that “the Organizational Department 组织部 of the CPC Central Committee is responsible for all aspects of civil servant training, while the Ministry of Personnel 人事 which directly responsible for State Council, is responsible for directing and coordinating civil servant training in administrative agencies.” Thus all schools in the administration school system then are the same as party school system are in the national party’s plan and should follow policies set by the CPC organizational department, the organizational department.

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12Source: Provisional Regulations on Civil Servant Training (2008), Beijing: The Organizational Department of the CCP Central Committee.

The State Administration of the Civil Service as created in 2008 is a bureau of the State Council’s Ministry of Personnel, which now clearly implements civil service policies established by the Organizational Department of the CPC Central Committee. It is under the management of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS), which resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Personnel and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. The function of the administration covers management, recruitment, assessment, training, rewards, supervision and other aspects related to civil service affairs. Regardless of what name it has, this ministry under the state council manages and implements policies and plans for cadre/civil servants training from the organization department. Nonetheless, the overall responsibility of training rests with the general party committee at each administration level and this responsibility is delegated to a separate committee directly under the party committee called the ‘Cadre Education and Training Committee 干部教育委员会’. It
is responsible for drafting the annual cadre training plan and thus is the main forum political decision-making on cadre trainings. As for all specific works, this training committee has taken – including organizing institutions – mainly party schools and academy administration schools to ensure that the relevant operating institution would carry out its part of the training plan. This workload is fully in the hands of the party’s organization department, specifically the ‘Office of Cadre Education and Training Committee 干部教育委员会办公室’ under the training committee. Therefore, it is very telling that the training process and overall system is still on the party’s managing schedule instead of the government’s managing schedule, and represented by these committees managed by the party rather than government. As Pieke (Pieke 2009a, p.56) declared “it is in coordinating committees such as this that the party’s Leninist leading role over state and society finds concrete expression.”

After many years of ‘improving’ and ‘developing’ the civil service/cadre training, “the cat might have become a lot fatter, but it did not necessarily catch more mice” (Pieke 2009b, p.954). This is because at the implementation level, the party school system and administration school system had set up as a network that covered all of the levels of government. This training argues, in a circular fashion, that the retention of party over the cadre/civil service training system benefits the ideological and institutional training because it would work better with a centralized government structure (Witesman and Wise 2009) and mobilization tactics. However, the education and training over policy techniques and government capacity building skills generally work better in a customized decentralized context. Because, fundamentally speaking, civil servants ought to be responsible for carrying out the policies and the business of reforms, and that is difficult without a more decentralized implementation.

The continued power holding on from party over the whole training system has one fatal flaw, despite significant reforms such as the establishment of a new administration school training system and a different curriculum from the party school system. Similar to other aspects of China’s training system, the great breadth of activity in terms of party intervention makes it difficult, if not impossible, to provide the problem-oriented training that civil servants need to be effective in their jobs. Embracing the entire discipline of public administration would be problematic to say the least.
The next sub-section explores the trajectory of the development of the civil service training system according to all of the official documents that were issued over the field of cadre/civil service training by the CPC Central Committee in the post-Mao era. Subsequently, by presenting the implementation of training goals required from the party, it is demonstrated that the organizational structure and altered training focus party schools and administration schools continued the problems that have already been described.

3.3.2.2 CADRE/CIVIL SERVANT QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING CONTENTS

Extract from all this the required identity, the desired qualification of cadres, and hence the education and training purpose is to strengthen/re-build one’s self-consciousness of Chinese communism while at the same time strengthening/re-framing one’s cognitions about the outer world. The first aspect to strengthen/re-build one’s self-consciousness could be explained as what the party expects the identity and attitude of cadres to be towards the communist party, communist regime and institution – selfless devotion to ideology. Via ideological theories, cadre could understand the role the party has been played in the regime and social construction. Only based on acknowledgment of the party’s role could cadres understand their relevance to the party. The second, and more important aspect about re-building one’s self-consciousness through education and training is that this ideological training may inform students of their identity as ‘cadres’, who are separate from the mass and authorized by the party. One should always be responsible for his authority and power. Cadres in China should be responsible for the party and serve it in the same way that cabinet secretaries in the US take responsibility for actions of their President because they get their authority from the President, who can also dismiss or reappoint them13.

Compared to the cadres’ consciousness of the CPC role and communist regime, outer world knowledge includes the broad context and setting within which cadres work. This broad dimension covers time, geography and depth of understandings. To achieve that, one should hold the ability to understand and explain: (1) the current situation in a historical dimension (Jones and Newburn 2002), (2) the local environment in a national

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level and international context, and (3) the underlying linkage and explanation of key administrative phenomenon.

It used to be sheer stress on the ideological consciousness of cadres, in Mao’s age and the centralized management approach to carry it out. The tension was not as serious back then compared to the post-Mao stage when the party’s a priori mission was no longer looking for the communist utopia, but rather has gradually evolved into a “technocratic objective of a strong, peaceful and modern China that is almost synonymous with strong, effective and forward-looking government” (Pieke 2007, p.4). In the Maoist era, the ideological and political education aimed to generate completely genuine commitment to Marxism-Leninism and an absolute loyalty to the party. Consequently, almost all activities in that era were somehow politically oriented and hence controlled by the party ideology. The Maoist ideological and political education had been quite aggressive in seeking to embed political ideology into all activities. In contrast, in the transformative post-Mao era the goals of the regime sought through the political ideology were “less ambitious” (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.201). In other words, the ideological and political education in the transitional stage was more defensive, whereby its purpose was to discourage challenges to the regime and stabilize the political situation.

Since the reformatory efforts were launched, what the cadre trainings should have done was to strengthen both the ideological and administrative competency of cadres for government performance. Furthermore, in the immediate years healing from the CR, the paramount mission among the cadre corps was to re-establish faith in the party by interpreting people’s common interests, led by the revival of the economy.

With the damage and dissatisfaction from both inside and outside the party, the second generation of CPC leaders realized the great imperative to reform both the party-state and the society. It did not take long for the leadership to notice that neither the existing cadre corps nor the cadre qualifications from the Maoist era could meet the needs of the Four Modernizations for social and economic development. Modernization and rationalization of the party and the policy procedure called for a new type of cadre whose specialties must not be totally imbued with revolutionary qualities.

The establishment of civil service system and academy administration school system shows the party has committed to the belief in the science and engineering methods and
governmental development issues rather than merely consulted with ideological orthodoxy. The proposal of a socialist market as China’s model was the watershed event for Chinese development in both economics and administration. Since then, the preferences for civil servant qualifications established by the party in the post-Mao age have been accordingly changed. In order for the civil service system to achieve that goal, the party has been constantly setting up goals for training system to fulfill even before the actual establishment of the civil service system in 1993. However, party heritage and character remains a relevant cadre qualification.

Before setting up the socialist market as a characteristic of Chinese development and a civil service system, what the party wanted from cadres was still heavy reliance on the ideological and institutional knowledge. In both the <Circular Regarding the Strengthening of the Work of Party School 中共中央关于加强党校工作的通知>\(^\text{14}\) and the <Gist of National Cadre Training Planning, 1991-1995 (1991-1995 年全国干部培训规划要点)>\(^\text{15}\), the preferable qualities of cadres were still quite unilateral to strengthen the proletarian regime by strengthening the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism theory and the party polices.

In the 1990 <Circular>, the very first quality listed is that cadres “should have a firm grasp of Marxism-Leninism theory”, so that one would “apply a Marxist position to concretely carry out Party’s strategic objectives and tasks” on the pre-condition of “believing in socialism” and also “oppose to bourgeois liberalization.” It was only “prominent that Marxism theory education to cadres (can only be) under the direction of Marxism-Leninism theory, Mao’s Thoughts, that the regime authority could be secured by those who have loyalty to Marxism”.

In 1992 with Deng Xiaoping’s South Tour and confirmation of socialist market establishment and in the followed 14\(^\text{th}\) National People’s Congress, the announcement that the party’s mission in post-Mao years was switched into social construction and economic development was made clear. New challenges thus arose for cadres. As stated in the document title, <Suggestions Regarding the Strengthening of The Work of Party School under the New Circumstances 中共中央关于新形势下加强党校工作的意见>

\(^{15}\)Accessible at http://law.51labour.com/lawshow-30714.html.
As promulgated in 1994, the major spirit of the new circumstances is Chinese socialism, tagged as the socialist market and the ‘open-door’ policy.

The same as other post-1989 reforms, the <Provisional Regulations for the Work of Party Schools 中国共产党党校工作暂行条例> showed that the ability requirements for cadres had turned away from the utopian communism. By “sticking to the road of Chinese socialism”, cadres should “hold basic knowledge and leading ability for one’s work” and should always “carry out the party’s guidelines with local realities.” Based on Deng’s ‘economics in command’ theme, cadres should meet the needs of “knowing knowledge about the socialist market while being open to learn and borrow experiences of the market-driven economy from Western countries”.

When the cadre system was trying to prepare itself for the 21st century, the <Gist of National Cadre Training Planning, 1996-2001 1996－2000 年全国干部教育培训规划> proposed to cultivate a cadre corps for the new century. The qualifications for being a cadre were: (1) a technocratic bureaucrat, who is expert in theory and professional knowledge to perform one’s job and (Jones and Newburn 2002) a politician, who is loyal to Marxism, sticks to the road of Chinese socialism, and contributes to party building and managing the state.” In order to achieve these combined qualifications, stress on learning ability, political rightness and rectitude qualifications were raised in the documents. Chinese dualism continued.

The ‘cadre-politician’ identity has been clarified since then, in the <Decisions Regarding the Strengthening of the Work of Party School in 21st Century 中共中央关于面向 21 世纪加强和改进党校工作的决定> in 2000. This listed out the qualifications for being a Chinese cadre-politician, including:

1. theory basis (i.e. Marxism-Leninism theory, Mao Thoughts, Deng Theory);
2. an international vision requiring a strong grasp of “contemporary knowledge of international economics, modern knowledge, legal system, ideological trends, etc.”;

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3. an emphasis on party spirit, emphasized by training institutions penetrating each aspect of training with special education about party history, party building and party principles.

The party school training has been playing a role in raising the “overall competence of party and state cadres” (Chin 2011, p.36) after the establishing of the national civil service system in the late-1990s, while their emphasis was on political integrity, ideological coherence, and upholding the “importance of the concept of the ‘Three Represents’” (Xin 2002, p.33). It offers an array of mid-career training programs including Marxist-Leninist ideology and the latest party policy documents, mechanisms and methods of party organizational control, administration, management and leadership science and basic knowledge in economics, accounting, history, international relations and philosophy (D. Shambaugh 2008, p.828).

Because the CPC has not been transparent about the specific courses of its party schools, it is only possible to draw conclusions based on curriculum categories for the CPS. The CPS has traditionally enjoyed a degree of autonomy to “determine the components of training priorities and curriculum guidelines for all training programs inside the entire national Party School system” (Chin 2011, p.34). Therefore, the courses from the CPS should shed some light on an overall image of the curricula for the whole party school system. Besides their organizational structure, the contents from the party school system and administration school system may help interpret the party’s efforts to combine the need for ideological theoretical reinforcement with the economic desire for globalization.

After several modifications and discussions of the curriculum of the CPS, it gradually became clear by the late-1990s and early-2000s. The “three basics 三个基本” equipped cadres with ideological grounding, and “five contemporary courses 五个当代” updated knowledge and competencies relevant to the contemporary age (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.149). Table 4.1 shows the variety of topics under these two categories. This shows that studies have been on the theme of the “system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and have aimed to improve the theoretical quality of students while strengthening their party spirit.

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20 The Central Party School has summarized the main courses existing before 2000 and published a two-volume textbook for students.
The “three basics” courses provide a firm grounding of classic Marxist-Leninist theories and how they could be utilized, or in other words, how the revolutions and developments in China could utilize Marxist-Leninist theory through Mao’s thoughts. With the political stages have changed, this part of the training content has remained steady. On the other hand, in order to fulfill the party’s expectations from cadres to “develop a socialist market economy with an understanding of the current complex situation including the opposition to capitalism and learning from the West in all the classic socialist theories,” the study of Deng Xiaoping was essential. Only a full understand of Deng Xiaoping Theory “provides full legitimacy to pursue this course” (Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.152).

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Source: (Yu and Yang 2002b; Yu and Yang 2002a; Wibowo and Fook 2006, p.150)

From the tale of training topics above, even though the ‘basic’ of socialist theory and ideological disciplines are still stressed, the current ideological commitment is more pragmatic and ‘advanced with the time’, compare to the stubborn revolutionary zeal cultivated in Mao’s years.

As for the School of Administration system, it was supposed to be a fundamental difference between their curriculum and the party school courses focused on political and ideological knowledge. School of Administration courses focused almost exclusively on economic and other applied knowledge and skills. However, a very similar competency structure could be drawn up to compare what the administration
schools have been required to teach according to the required abilities from the <Regulations for administration schools> in 2010.

Article 6\textsuperscript{21} says the administration schools should engage to improve the abilities of civil servant students: to stick to and carry out the party’s policy directives; to provide public services; to improve scientific management over a harmonious society; to implement policy decisions with reference to legal knowledge; to analyze the current situation and develop solutions to practical issues; to manage knowledge about socialist markets, social management, and such as required by ones job; and to combat corruption and build a clean government.

Accordingly, the courses are comprised of four groups. The first group is courses on political theory. This includes classic Marxism-Leninism theory, the question of establishing and carrying out scientific development, the question of building a harmonious society, etc. The second group is about administering according to law, such as the question of constructing a government of law, the question of administrative institutional reform, and questions concerning the Civil Servant Law and civil service system. The third group is courses studying public administration, such as how to improve public administration, the question of governing verses managing, changes in the functions of government, etc. The last set of courses is for economic and social development, such as the question of establishing and perfecting the socialist market economy, the question of social economy and social development, etc. The curriculum structure in the academy administration school system is more committed to training civil servants in the knowledge for their work performance compared to the party school system.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

The extent to which a communist regime would adjust and the ways in which it could take does not necessarily mean that that the communist regime has turned away from Leninist party identity as its legitimation. On the contrary, the communist regime in China has the instinct indicating China has already turned away from the orthodox fashion of being a Leninist party. The CPC has paid more attention to exploring its

\textsuperscript{21} Accessible at: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-12/24/content_1495866.htm
power sources and authority justifications. For China in the current highly-globalized age, a successful adjustment is the security of its communist identity. More importantly, it is the ability to ensure a socialist future even with capitalist and liberalized needs of development existing in its underlying society.

The centralized control over the whole training system has one fatal dilemma despite significant reforms such as the establishment of a new administration school training system and different curriculum from the party school system. Similar to other aspects of China’s training system, the great breadth of activity in terms of party intervention makes it difficult, if not impossible, to provide the problem-oriented training that civil servants need to be effective in their jobs. Embracing the entire discipline of public administration would be problematic to say the least. Similar to the Leninist party’s mobilization implementation pattern, the CPC has been setting goals for civil servants to achieve and also generalizing the education and training contents needed to fulfill the party’s mission.

The fundamental reason for the struggle in civil service training in the post-Mao stage is that the party and its administrative organization – the state council – are still trying to push forward decentralization-oriented policy techniques and government-wide capacity building through the civil service training. Nonetheless, this is being undertaken through an approach based on a highly-centralized government structure and a re-centralized civil service system.

The centralized and mobilized fashion of education and training of party cadres has always fit the party’s internal mission (Hong-Yung Lee 1991, p.367). In the post-Mao era, the party leadership tends to react to priority issues and problems largely by strengthening central institutions, spending more money at the central level, and centralizing control over policy-making and implementation (Pieke 2009a, p.49). In the context of civil service training, training for understanding the ideological orthodoxy helps to ensure that civil servants still keep political integrity and loyalty to the party, and also urge them to continue to submit to Leninist party disciplines (Pieke 2007). The institutional/value/attitude-based training in the cadre/civil service system, such as socialist theory education and anti-corruption education, has worked well with this centralized approach. The emphasis on the socialist theory and ideological principles from party schools and academy administration schools indicates a certain consistency
with the revolutionary nature from Leninism and the spirit from Mao’s stage, yet also is very telling about the democratic centralism commitment to the Leninist mechanism. On the other hand, the grand mobilization of advanced knowledge of administrative learning reflected in the CPC has been seriously committed to the technocrat to develop and modernize its administrative system. However, a tight party control would lead training contents to emerge that are less relevant to the circumstance or problems of the public administration than other potential training topics (Balogun 1983). Proposals for a different and more innovated form of civil service training have advanced in China, but after years of experience the Party has generally stuck with a continuity of organizational control that dominates the implementation of this current reform atmosphere.

Behind the structural control over whole training system is the everlasting issue of balancing original legitimation and utilitarian legitimation. The importance of its personnel system to the ruling authority has been confirmed in last chapters. Holding on its privilege of making decisions over cadre/civil service training policies and implementation could ensure the party’s ruling ‘backbone’ of group of exclusively committed to the communist regime, which is rooted in the original legitimation. On the other hand, the overwhelming need to strengthen the party’s utilitarian legitimation since post-Mao stage has been calling for growing level of professional administration knowledge, which eventually would take in experts and management organizations outside of party or government personnel system.

While the aim of the reform was to transform the Chinese bureaucracy from a political weapon to a rational administrative apparatus, the structural constraints of the bureaucratic system have been stubborn and difficult to reform compared to the policy changes in the reform stage (Zhou 1995). To further advance according to the legitimation requirements, the proposal of a new form of training into a systematic party-based training system is fairly difficult. It either requires strong desire and support from political powers or starts as a system that could be isolated from the bureaucracy system, i.e. the higher education system.
4. CASE STUDY: THE NATIONAL DECISION TO ADOPT THE MPA PROGRAM AND TRANSFER PROCESS ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Separating the civil service system from the cadre system as well as the establishment of the Academic Administration School System (AASS) were efforts to cater to the growing needs for improved professional performance of government, which resulted from economic liberalization and the socialist market. The AASS training – especially the National Academic Administration School – has greatly improved the civil servants’ administrative skills and knowledge of public administration when compared to the pre-existing party school training system. However, further economic and social developments, and the proposal for China to join the WTO, again challenged civil servant competencies and the civil service training system.

As reviewed in Chapter 3, as part of the national civil service training plan, the AASS’s weakness was cultivating civil servants’ target knowledge based on their diversified working positions and ranks; rather, it hosted short-term training courses rooted in CSL. Moreover, the lack of systematic professional knowledge and relatively low level of academic certifications hindered government performance for the new century. This challenged the party’s utilitarian legitimation.

Considering the MPA professional education program as a potential solution was not first advocated by party-government authority in China, but started in academia then moved into the state. Adopting the MPA program to train civil servants was a distinct step for the authority to include the regular education system and academic elites into its personnel training system. It also was, because the great involvement and function of these non-official agencies in the policy transfer and policy-making process, a telling step that the CPC could move towards an inclusive regime pattern given the growing needs to consolidate its utilitarian legitimation.

This chapter is based on analysis of the essential elements in the policy transfer process as reviewed in Chapter 1 to explore the MPA learning process from the United States. Studies proposed that although adopting the MPA program to train civil servants was a
national-level decision actively launched by the Ministry of Education (hereafter MoE) and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (hereafter MoHRSS), the inclusive involvement of academic elites improved the program’s transferability. In the pre-transfer stage, academic elites used their intellectual expertise to promote and reinforce the American-style MPA program as the “best practice” (Stone 2004, p.556), and also ensured the learning capability in the transfer process by acting as a ‘think tank’ for national policy-making. As for the Chinese MPA program as an outcome of transnational transfer, due to the engagement of Chinese academia, the core spirit, values and knowledge of the US MPA program have been reinforced and transferred despite the differences in program practices due to the jurisdictional differences.

4.2 ‘WHY’: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND SYSTEMIZATION APPEALS IN TRAINING SYSTEM

The traditional mobilization pattern in Mao’s years with blind implementation left no automatic space to meet the government’s needs and goals. In the cadre training system, the party pushed its willingness and goals by imposing ideological knowledge. The pre-existing training approach of party school system designed by the central authority to implement competencies the central authority required from its personnel, left gaps between the need to carry out the party’s goals and the autonomy needed to meet the government’s concerns. In the post-Mao stage, the CPC has placed relatively more attention on the needs of its government and the quality of its personnel. The effort to establish the academy administration school system achieved the goal of separating the training focus of the government and the party. Furthermore, there are more detailed categories of civil servant training classes in academic administration schools targeting the training requirements from PRSCS and SCSL, including subject-oriented learning classes, on-the-job training classes, and classes for civil servants who are new to the civil service system (Zhang 2010). With advancements in the academy administration school system to introduce practical knowledge of administration compared to the pre-existing party school system, the monolithic system that covered the basic needs of systematic education for different civil service professionals left space for further developments in the training system.
The reason why public administrators are so important in governments in the Western administration cultural is because responsibilities of public personnel are structured into all government functions. Functions of administrators including (Stillman 2009) decision-making, administrative communications, executive management, public personnel motivation, public budgeting and implementation, are differentiated from each other and have a professionalized system of knowledge of their own. Besides the higher level of professionalization and the systematic needs from the inner training system of the Chinese civil service, the professional education of the civil service is appealing for China for many of its own reasons. This professionalized merit from Western administrative culture has always appealed to both Chinese politicians and scholars given the Chinese tradition of a large and compressed government structure. The requirement to professionalize each aspect of government’s work requires improved knowledge and skills in certain specialties and has become increasingly essential in improving Chinese government performance and delivering services to Chinese people (Chou 2008; Dussauge-Laguna 2011).

In order to fill this gap in the personnel training field, a training innovation was needed – a training program that would be both systematized in program structure to cater to different civil service posts and professionalized in contents for each expertise. In this training content, the effective curriculum also needed to help meet the concerns from civil servants in the different organizations of government. It first needed to develop techniques of civil servants to formulate and implement policies and programs efficiently and effectively: techniques that would be considered as both responses to and pre-conditions for rapid economic and social development. Scholars have noticed such weaknesses in the traditional cadre training system (Lam and Wong 2000; Dong and WU 2004c; Pieke 2009b) and their suggestions including emphasizing a diversified base of administration theory and introducing other forms of training. These suggestions would work for the existing problems of civil servants who lacked practical professional knowledge and had no real discipline or expertise.

The training system is an ‘exclusive’ separation aspect of personnel that separates the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ of the system compared to an ‘inclusive’ enrollment system established to engage the whole society into its personnel system. It is either preparing people who want to get into civil service system, or training civil servants to better accomplish their existing jobs. However, to properly respond to the growing interaction
of political, economic and social factors since the late-1970s, consulting with different knowledge resources had increased. For example, there was a growing influence of think tanks in policy decisions (Zhu and Xue 2007; Zhu 2009) and also for enhancing governing capability to develop a civil service system “moving towards maturity and modernity” (Pieke 2007, p.10). It was not a total block out of professional lectures and professors to train civil servants. As of 2012, the National Academy Administration School had 102 full-time teachers and 99 of them had a Doctoral Degree in various administrative-related areas. However, all of these pre-existing forms that utilized academia were still in the nature of consultancy because the expert or professors in AASS did not decide the training courses except for providing the centrally designed classes categories and courses within each category (Yang and Jia 1999), even though the courses were designed to better consider the requirements for government workers and experts who could deliver the administration knowledge at a high academic level.

Another aspect from the pre-existing civil service training approach that hindered the student-servant from improving their professional level in their jobs was the comparably short training period. There have been five class categories in the pre-existing training system that are required from the CSL: they ‘monographic study class 专题研究班’, which lasts for one month; ‘pre-post class 任职培训班’, which lasts for three months, ‘further training class 进修班’, which lasts for three months; ‘key state entrepreneurs class 重点国有企业领导人员培训班’, which lasts for one month; and finally the longest training ‘class for young back-up cadres 青年干部班’, which lasts for two years but only admits 30-50 students per year from throughout China.

Given the growing stress on improving the government performance to develop and stabilize the society, these comparably short-term trainings could not meet the needs of systematic training that could provide a whole set of professional knowledge. Besides the short period of training time, because the training subjects were more general than specialized by ranks and positions of civil servants (see Appendix 3 for the whole rank name in Chinese cadre/ civil service system), the training contents were difficult to

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22 See webpage of National Academy Administration School: http://www.nsa.gov.cn/web/a/shizixinxi/20120919/982.html
focus on knowledge or skills that student-servants needed to improve their work performance. In further detail, ‘monographic study class’ is designed for civil servants who are in minister and governor rank leading positions; ‘pre-post class’ is for civil servants who have been promoted to leading positions including deputy bureau chief, deputy departmental and deputy bureau levels in all provinces, municipalities districts and municipalities cities, as well as central state organs; ‘further training class’ is for civil servants at the ranks of bureau chief, departmental and bureau level in all provinces, municipalities districts and municipalities cities, as well as central state organs; ‘key state entrepreneurs class’ for managers, party secretaries and presidents in 1,000 core state-owned enterprises; and the ‘class for young back-up cadres’ is for preparing outstanding bachelor graduates and young on-the-job cadres being groomed for future leadership roles.

Since the start of this century, the leadership realized the requirements of different disciplines of jobs – so instead of a system being based on generalist managers, it was thought important to develop civil servants with specialist skill sets. The existing training methods did not provide the targeted knowledge (e.g. public health, transportation systems, disaster response, wastewater treatment, etc.) for individual civil servants from different positions and more basic level knowledge to perform jobs effectively.

By starting to use the regular Chinese education system to training civil servants, and the different perspectives from educated professors, the professional education and training program sought to build systematic knowledge sets so that it could deal with the dilemma that what had been taught had little use in daily jobs.

Professional education and training programs for civil servants have diversified models in Western countries. Besides the American models (MPA, MPP, MPM), there are Master of Business Administration/Public Service (MBAPS) in Great Britain, the French National School of Administration (Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA), and Civil Servant Research and Training Institution of National Personnel Authority (人事院公务员研修所) in Japan. However, the following section offers the reasons and possibilities why it was the American MPA that China used as the point of departure for its own MPA program.
4.3 ‘WHERE’: REASONS FOR REFERRING MPA PROGRAM MODEL FROM THE UNITED STATES

Studies on Chinese MPA programs have taken for granted that they are based on American experiences from the beginning. Yang (2005) has argued that the emerging MPA was a response to globalization, but he referred specifically to learning and communication efforts from the American application, like the US MPA model, was already the exemplar. Tong and Jeffrey (2003) mentioned that scholars from China had “visited the leading school of public affairs in the United States [meant Western countries in general]” to consult and learn from their experiences. In 2004, Ye (2004) suggested there was a direct proposal to learn from American theories and practice to develop China’s MPA curriculum. However, no scholar ever confirmed that the MPA program in China was clearly a transfer of the US MPA program, and this is not immediately obvious as the MPA was a national program in China compared to the university-by-university approach in the US. However, the conclusion from this chapter is that it is not only possible that the US MPA model had attracted China’s attention, but it was also a very rational option for China.

It is admittedly harder and harder to distinguish the exact export side of a policy transfer activity in the globalized information era than it used to be. On the one hand, there are increasingly more international communications among countries that are experiencing similar problems, and this may blur the origin of a specific policy or program. Transfers may also originate from multiple exemplar countries rather than having one major reference point. On the other hand, increasingly more rational transfers happen nowadays, in which the import countries strongly interpret their own context into the transfer process and outcomes. Furthermore, the complexity of the transfer matters, with the possibility of transferring a whole policy or program, just parts of it or even simply the general conception of it. This makes identifying the origin even more difficult. This is equally true when studying the MPA transfer into China. From the initial appeal from the party for a civil service system and thus the need for a more professional and systematic training approach, it did not take China too long to see the MPA program as one potential solution to improve the civil service through higher education in public administration (Chen 1999). Before China proposed and designed its own MPA

\[\text{Words added by author.}\]
program, scholars studied MPA programs globally. According to the official records, scholars studied the US MPA program designs at George Washington University, the Maxwell School of Citizenship at Syracuse University, and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, as well as others (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009, pp.257, 235, 239). According to the <Development Report of MPA in China>, China also paid great attention to several universities in continental Europe (2009, pp.231,248,260), Great Britain (2009, p.253) and Japan (2009, pp.261,268).

Studying these programs was useful but, due to its communist institutions and traditions, it was the official position that China could not and should not directly adopt the MPA program model from any of these industrialized democracy countries. As the current General Secretary of the National MPA Education Steering Committee of China, Professor Dong described, “We [Chinese MPA program] are not directly copying anyone else because both the political and social situations in China are distinguished from Western countries.”

4.3.1 ‘WHO’: ACTIVE ACADEMIC ENGAGING IN LEARNING FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCES

One of the important factors that contributed to the possibility of learning from MPA program experiences in the US is that key scholars proposed and pursuit the transfer activity. There were two key articles that enjoyed great influence and respect as they proposed the urge to learn MPA from Western countries to China. Both articles (Zhu et al. 1998; Chen 1999) referred to MPA experiences from “Western countries” followed with “concentrated with the US”, and made specific reference only top-ranked American MPA’s as exemplars, such as the Maxwell and Kennedy schools. These authors had great academic respect and influence in the public administration field, so that looking at the US became the preferential point of reference for transferring the MPA. This trend of looking at the US MPA model rather than other models is because the leading scholars committed to the American model when they sought to absorb the idea of how to establish an MPA program in China.

24Interview notes, Professor Dong Keyong.
Proposed by scholars and started in the academic area with supports from Ministry of Education and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security was the distinguish character of MPA program comparing to other training approaches. Both pre-existing training systems were set up by the party-government authority and its personnel system and needed to stick to national cadre training plans that were made by the Central Committee of the CPC or the state council. The party school system is not only centrally controlled by the CPC but also a branch of the whole party system. The CPC enjoys right to mobilize and control all party schools through the country according to official documents it has issued, see Appendix 1 for documents from the CPC considering party school system. On the other hand, as a government organization, the academy administration school system is subordinate to state council to implement trainings through national civil service system according to requirements from CSL. Moreover, because the trainings from academy administration school system have been legalized by the CSL, any regulations and documents issued by Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security concerning the academy administration school system have been secured by law and hence have to be implemented through the system.

Comparably, the MPA program transfer was proposed by scholars from educational institutions and launched by the Ministry of Education, which was separate from the party-government personnel system. Officers from the Ministry of Education and Degree office have been actively involved since the start of learning for experiences from Western countries (Liu 2000; Zhu 2003; NESC 2009). Moreover, due to the involvement of Ministry of Education in program practice, the MPA training in China turned out to be a centralized planning approach like all other training programs, even though it has its own system (separate from national cadre training plans) that covered program authorization, students’ enrollment planning, teacher training, conferences and graduation plans from the national level to the local level. It has successfully maximized the academic reputation to ensure separating administration professional training and administrative power (Liu 2000).

Another factor that promoted the transfer between China and the US is the interactions between international academic organizations. International organizations have long played an important role in promoting excellence in public administration education and training worldwide, including the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and NASPAA (Holzer and Zhang 2001). NASPAA strongly asserted this on March 1,
2013, by changing its name from the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration to the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration, and adopting the marketing tagline, “The Global Standard in Public Service Education.”

However, before NASPAA engaged with globalized public administration education, cooperation among the public administration communities in China and the US had been greatly promoted through the establishment of the US/China Public Administration Secretariat at the Department of Public Administration (now the School of Public Affairs and Administration) at Rutgers University in 2000. While this organizational channel was approved by ASPA as it developed concrete connections with numerous nations, NASPAA’s more recent actions further ensured that joint activities could proceed between the US and the China Public Administration Society (CPAS).

Official memoranda between ASPA and CPAS were signed in March 2001, June 2002 and October 2004, with the agreement that the two Societies would “continually explore broad communication and cooperation in the field of public administration.” These documents are key evidence of the likely source of the transfer and are in Appendix 2. In order to contribute to the study and practice of public administration on both sides, academic cooperation between ASPA and CPAS serves as bridge between the two national public administration communities (Holzer and Zhang 2001).

In order to ensure the introduction of academic achievements by American scholars, CPAS first established a column of “Research Methodologies of Public Administration” in the *Journal of Chinese Public Administration*. Subsequently, this effort took a step forward with ASPA and CPAS jointly sponsoring an international conference on “Public Sector Productivity and Performance Measurement,” facilitated by Remin University (i.e. where the official Secretariat of MPA Education Directing Committee in China is housed) and Rutgers University.

Since then, communications have been ongoing through these academic channels (i.e. journals and joint conferences). As more American values and experiences have seeped into Chinese public administration, it has increasingly become an active learning of administration from the US. The most recent efforts were in 2010 when the Chinese Academy of Governance (i.e. the central administration school) and the Chinese Society
of Administrative Reform (CSOAR), separately signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ASPA to “establish lines of communication and cooperation, which will allow for the discussion of a wide-range of activities, programs, and interactions to be jointly undertaken.” This key document is also in Appendix 1.

4.3.2 RATIONAL REASONS TO LOOK AT THE US MPA MODEL

Starting with the reasons why China wanted an MPA program from the US, earlier sections demonstrated that the CPC has a long history centralized influences over decisions on cadre training. With the promulgation of the CSL – which was an effort to manage the civil service system via a non-statutory management framework (i.e. by the centralized cadre management from party approach) – the party-government authority retained absolute managerial authority over the entire bureaucracy.

What China was looking for was not just the MPA teaching program but also an organizational approach to manage and coordinate MPA programs throughout the country. In this area, NASPAA may have provided a valuable reference point for China due to NASPAA’s national accreditation system and its role of being “instrumental in developing quality curricula...and to promote and maintain educational quality” (NASPAA 2008). Both these functions could help ensure that China’s centralized power retained authority, in which centralized power does not have to mean power from the CPC. With an accreditation approach and a managing organization like NASPAA, the Chinese authority could launch an MPA program based on its standards and seek to maintain and promote MPA program quality.

Another important aspect that attracted China to the American approach was the professional and systematic structure of its specialties and curriculum. NASPAA’s systematic approach requires common or “core” subject matter for all graduates, yet also supports the development of clear specialties or concentrations. This approach was attractive as China sought to move from the cadre all being generalist managers to cadre members with specialized disciplines who could accomplish the work of economic and social development. Even though the NASPAA standards have a significant impact primarily on curriculum and program autonomy, diversity across the curriculum is quite common based on the differences of student audiences, and local/state/regional needs (Uveges 1987).
Table 4.1 shows the extent of this commonality among core MPA topics that would be required of all students regardless of specialization while Table 4.2 lists the most commonly offered specialties in the late-1990s when China was in the early process of adopting the MPA program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1 Common courses in MPA programs in the 1990s</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Common courses list</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public management/administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance/financial management/government finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy analysis/policy-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resource management/personnel management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American politics/politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information system/computer applications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law/administrative law</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009)

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<th>Table 4.2 Common specializations in MPA programs in the 1990s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialties list</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel and human resource management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public policy analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public health management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative law/justice</td>
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Source: (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009)

The purpose of transferring the MPA degree was to educate practical public servants so they could carry out their day-to-day work effectively and in a manner informed by broad understanding and relevant perspectives (McSwite 2001, p.111). The common curricular components seek to enhance the student’s values, knowledge, and skills to act ethically and manage effectively (NASPAA 2008, p.9), included developing governance.
abilities that were missing in the traditional cadre training in China (NASPAA 2009, p.7):

- to lead and manage in public governance;
- to participate in and contribute to the policy process;
- to analyze, synthesize, think critically, solve problems and make decisions;
- to articulate and apply a public service perspective; and
- to communicate and interact productively with a diverse and changing workforce and citizenry.

Besides the institutional concerns, even though the US may not be the birth place of public administration as a professional education, it is where the MPA degree education was first used to develop a professional education for civil servants (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009, p.213). It was a natural choice to look at the origin of the MPA-as-civil-servant-training model and the American experience was most reflective of this practitioner-based approach.

Finally, similarities of administrative reforms between the US and China also provided a solid basis for transferring activities. With the promotion of globalization, the whole administrative reform trend tends to present convergence rather than divergence nowadays. Even though there may be few apparent similarities between these governments at the same stages, similarities in government reform trends and pursuits have been noted between the US and China (Chan and Li 2007; Zhang 2009; Zhao and Peters 2009). Many Chinese administrative reform directions in the last decade resemble earlier American efforts, although it is not the role of this dissertation to show this is due to explicit transfers. For example, one of the most recent examples of the resemblance between the two is that President Clinton’s proposed transforming “government agencies into performance-based and results-oriented” organizations in 1993. Comparably, China proposed “service-oriented, learning-oriented, and innovation-oriented” governance at the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012. These are similar ideas in both nations, yet on slightly different timelines.

In the civil service context, a surprising similarity struggle to create a balance between political accountability and professional expertise also exists throughout American history (Tsao and Worthley 2009). This is the so-called politics-administration
dichotomy that emerges repeatedly throughout more than a century of American public administration literature. The similar Chinese trend concerns the party’s role (Chan and Li 2007, p.384), where the expansion and power of the CPC creates cleavages between it and the civil service system – functionally quite similar to the growth of political appointees at the upper level of the US federal civil service (Light 1995).

4.4 ‘RESTRICTS’ AND ‘FACILITIES’ IN THE POLICY TRANSFER PROCESS

Although the American MPA programs attracted China for the above reasons, factors that would affect the transfer process and further transfer outcomes still need to be acknowledged. As reviewed in Chapter 1, there are two categories of factors that could affect the transfer process. Cognitive factors in the pre-transfer stage, and environmental ones that could both hinder and facilitate transferability from different perspectives in the learning process.

4.4.1 COGNITIVE FACTORS IN PRE-TRANSFER PROCESS

Cognitive factors was named by Evans (2004) to include factors in DMF that in his argument that could be recognized before transfer happens. Cognitive factors are including policy/program complexity and its inherent uniqueness (Rose 1993, p.118) and institutional and structural feasibility (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996b, p.353; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000b, p.9). Nonetheless, the “most significant cognitive barriers … of policy transfer to overcome at this stage … are normally issues arising from the prevailing organizational culture and the need for effective cultural assimilation of policy alternatives” (Evans 2009, p.246). As Robertson (1991) and Bennett (1991a) remarked, the transfer that from other jurisdictions have never be a “neutral intellectual” activity in a context filled with predilections and prejudices, including professional education – which based on regular education system to training civil servants – is a breakthrough for China. Learning for a MPA program from a capitalistic country such as the US was a challenge with obvious reasons.

China meant it when it engaged to “reorganize the administrative system based on simplicity, unity, and effectiveness, and the necessity to improve the civil service
system by developing a highly capable, professional government workforce.” 25 However, the problem for China is different and also complicated by the need to consider, even in the pre-transfer period, the extent to which the transfer of the MPA program, together with background and values from other industrialized democracies, whereby all of the factors that would potentially conflict with the tradition of autonomy role of the party over bureaucracy and its management framework, would become cognitive barriers for policy learning-oriented transfer before the transfer process.

First of all, identities of civil servants to the authority party are different between China and Western countries; this is a key cognitive factor that would count against transferring civil servant training approach. The civil service system in China is “under the direction of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, Deng Theory and the ‘Three Represents’; stick to socialist development path; stick to the cadre directions from the CPC; and implement the principle of ‘party manages cadres’ (Article 4, CSL)”. The identity of civil service system explains why the ‘neutral’ feature of the civil service class in the US is not possible in China. Given that the communist party equates politics in China, the whole civil service system cannot be de-politicized. Although the CSL gave the impression that the party has been working on reform and trying self-construction towards to a depoliticization, it actually has expanded “its political control to ensure greater cleavage over bureaucracy” (Chan and Li 2007, p.383) as Chapter 3 explained.

Besides the differences from the political aspect, there are structural diversities in educational systems that would increase the challenges of transferring the MPA program. In China, the party has this constant monopoly control over its civil service training institutions of PSS and AASS. Comparably, NASPAA is a non-governmental academic association that sets up standards for MPA education and does accreditation of applying MPA programs via the Commission on Peer Review and Accreditation (COPRA). For example, the previous and current Presidents of NASPAA 26, are all from educational institutions, thus demonstrating the academic focus and concern. Comparably, among the present Dean and Deputy Directors of NESC 27, only two of the


26 Accessible at: http://www.naspaa.org/about_naspaa/staff/president.asp

27 Accessible NESC page at: http://www.mpa.org.cn/mpajzw.asp?id=69
six are professors from educational institutions, while the other four are from the central level of government organizations.

Even though the MPA degree is needed in the US when applying for certain positions (Liu et al. 2013), NASPAA takes no orders or responsibilities for government except for its two-fold mission “to ensure excellence in education and training for public service and to promote the ideal of public service”28. The spiritual challenge of MPA education and NASPAA membership association for pre-existing pattern of training institutions management was to include and rely on elites in public administration to train the party-government personnel corps, its ruling backbone.

4.4.2 ENDOGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN TRANSFER PROCESS: THE FAMOUS ‘CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS’

Environmental factors are factors involving “importer jurisdiction” (Page 2000, p.2) including of institutional, political, economic and social ones, in the recipient environment that could able to develop a framework or network to ensure, or restrict if not, the policy transfer learning process (Evans 2004; Evans 2009).

All of the traditional training approaches in the Chinese civil service system have been characterized by the expansion of the central power to ensure greater leverage over the whole bureaucratic system. Especially after the promulgation of CSL in China, the merger of the centered cadre management framework with the civil service system became statutory, thus placing the party back in the driver’s seat so that the centralized cadre management holds absolute managerial power over the whole bureaucracy. Since the party-government authority would not let go of its centralized control over the civil service system, one can expect continued influence from the party and its administration institution – the state council – which is in charge of the specific transactions of the civil service system. This different start point in China has led to obvious “policy resistance” with entrenched interests (Bache and Taylor 2003) from the central authority that was different from NASPAA, which ought to provide a non-governmental coordination to help to increase program quality and help market accredited MPA’s.

28 Accessible NASPAA webpage: http://www.naspaa.org/
At the same time, the centralization from authority also facilitates and strengthens the
collection between ‘transfer and change’. There are scenarios that policy-makers
engage in policy transfers, but with no immediate policy changes. There are reasons
from the learned policy itself – for example, there are chances the policy impacts could
be negative (Rose 1993, p.ix) – while there are also chances that the policy that is
transferred has not quite been determined by the policy-makers (Boston 1996, pp.116-
117). However, among all sorts of reasons that hinder the transferred policy lessons into
policy changes, the mobilization from the central authority of China has cleared the way
to ensure that there would not be any policy conflicts or conditions (Jacobs and Barnett
2000, p.194) that would restrict advancing changes from cross-national learning.

4.5 ‘WHAT’ HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED, AND ‘DEGREE’ OF TRANSFER: MPA
PROGRAM AS TRANSFER OUTCOME IN CHINA AT NATIONAL LEVEL

“The conceptualization of learning as a kind of intervening variable between agency
(independent variable) and the change (dependent variable), however, may never be
successfully operationalized. It may be impossible to observe the learning activity in
isolation from the change requiring explanation. We may only know that learning is
taking place because policy change is taking place.” (Bennett and Howlett 1992, p.290)

Even though there are top-down and bottom-up approaches to evaluating policy
success/failure, both acknowledge the importance of congruence of policy outcomes
with original intensions (Chou 2004, p.212). Being a public policy activity, evaluation
of successful policy transfers should clearly also meet the policy intensions. The
uniqueness in the arena of policy transfer is that there is always more than one entity
involved in the process (i.e. policy export side and policy recipient side), and usually
there is more than just one transfer objective. Therefore, before an evaluation can be
conducted, there should be a set of indicators to form the basis to evaluate the
congruence of transfer outcomes with transfer intensions. It is not sensible to evaluate
the success or failure or the degree of transfer activities based on comparison
similarities between recipient country and export country because difference are
inevitable and often part of the initial intension to transfer. Thus, a full range of learning
policy transfer process and outcome must stand on the side of Recipient County to learn
its needs for the transfer and determine if they were achieved, and the adaptations they
made to ensure the transfer congruence. The current point is to look at the nature and extent of local environmental factors in shaping the adoption and delivery of this public administration education to train civil servants for Chinese government.

The MPA program in China is a technical education more than a US-style professional education given the separated systems of MoE and MoHRSS. To name MPA in China technical education is majorly because graduation from MPA program in China cannot promise subsequent personnel connections (Shang 2001). In contrast, the professional education of MPA in the US is a certification for job positions in some governmental organizations and public sectors. According to Wang’s (2004, p. 43) research in 2004, certain job descriptions in public sectors ask for a MPA degree as one of conditions. MPA education in China on the other hand, aimed to improve the level of administration skills and knowledge. It was neither permission that students could be enrolled in the civil service system nor a promise for further promotions. However, despite the differences between jurisdictions, from the following sections it was clear that the essential value of MPA and NASPAA in the US has been secured and learned by the recipient side China due to the great engagement of academic elites with their intellectual expertise.

4.5.1 THE CONCEPTION OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF MPA PROGRAM

In order to cater to socialist market development and administrative globalization, the “short duration” style of training that existed to provide both ideological and non-political education to leading cadres and high-ranking administrators, has been challenged with not providing a satisfactory educational level or the required professional administrative skills and techniques. For example:

“…the current knowledge (of civil servants) could not fit into needs of work, they are in urgent desire to get acquainted with government administration, to learn practical professional knowledge about modern administration, market economy, economic management, financial and taxation, legal theory and computer-information management; hoping to improve (their) abilities of scientific decision-making, administration, analysis and coordination” (Academic Degree Office of the State Council 1999).

According to the State Council of China, the MPA education is designed “to meet the needs of a more modern, scientific and professional management for a society, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of serving a socialist market economy, and to
improve the quality of administrative corps in the public sectors” (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009, p.79). Comparing this to the description of MPA’s education aim from NASPAA is that the program is designed to “aid students in developing the skills and techniques used by leaders and managers to implement policies, projects, and programs that resolve important societal problems.” It is easy to see from these statements that the conception of a Chinese MPA was combined with the American one, with Chinese special development requirements such as socialist market.

The MPA in China is really a combination of Master of Public Administration, the Master of Public Policy (MPP) and the Master of Public Management (MPM) types of American degrees, all three of which can receive NASPAA accreditation. The reason for this broad coverage of the MPA in China, is that public administration is taken as a management branch, which means administration of public organizations based on management, economics, politics, law and sociology (Dong and Wu 2004b). Furthermore, from the implementation perspective, at the starting stage of public administration education for China it was more workable to include public policy and public management as specialists in the MPA program rather than establish separate degrees because public administration education was not well developed compared to the US. Moreover, these developed as separate degrees at different points in time, in the US, because approaches to governance kept developing over the past 50 years, whereas all of these academic approaches were in existence when China adopted the MPA program. Thus, China could start with one firm educational experience. Therefore, the MPA program in China is patterned on a conceptualized professional education, and built based upon distinguishing itself from the traditional civil service education and trainings. It diverges to a great extent from the traditional party school and administration school training in several ways, including academic-based teaching from the professoriate, requiring a much longer period of study (3 years), and integrating across topic/substantive areas, to name but a few.

Furthermore, in order to meet the spirit of professionalization of education, Chinese MPA learned to build its educational segments after American ways, including using

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29 Interview notes, Professor Chang, Vice Dean of Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University.
the case-based teaching method, engaging in cooperation with local governmental organizations via internship and hiring government officers to be part-time lectures, etc.

4.5.2 STANDARD AUTHORIZATION AND EVALUATION SYSTEM: NESC

Even though there are differences between the missions of China’s MPA NESC and NASPAA in the US, a shared mission could be extracted – to coordinate and manage MPA programs at the national level. NASPAA is intended to provide prospective students, professional associations, employers, and the public with the names of academic programs that deliver a basic level of educational quality (Breaux et al. 2003, pp.259-260) while NESC would seek to ensure that MPA programs across China are much more uniform.

Some national-level coordination is needed for large countries like the US and China, and so it is natural for an institution to coordinate so that the quality of MPA education can be managed and assured. What has been adjusted and transferred from the US to China would be the character and function of the institution.

Unlike NASPAA, the MPA NESC is an authorized and affiliated organization of the Ministry of Education, and managed by the Academic Degree Management and Postgraduate Education Department (学位管理与研究生教育司), under the Ministry of Education (教育部), assisted by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (人力资源与社会保障部). Therefore, the NESC is a formal institution of government rather than a non-profit organization like NASPAA, which relies on member schools for its revenues.

The accrediting arm for master’s degree programs within NASPAA is COPRA, which is specialized and allows member institutions and universities to seek professional accreditation through site visits and peer reviews (NASPAA 2005). Programs must meet comparatively general requirements as required in the General Information and Standards for Professional Masters Degree Programs (hereafter Standards) (NASPAA 2008):

1.0 Eligibility for Peer Review and Accreditation

2.0 Program Mission
3.0 Program Jurisdiction

4.0 Curriculum

5.0 The Faculty

6.0 Admission of Students

7.0 Student Services

8.0 Supportive Services and Facilities

9.0 Off-Campus and Distance Education

Based on the consideration of a program’s application and supporting documents per the NASPAA Standards, COPRA balances between conformity and variety, while acknowledging that programs have different missions, different student bodies and different approaches to fulfill excellence in MPA programs. There is no one “cut and paste” MPA design in the US. Instead, COPRA assesses each new and continuing applicant university MPA program to maintain the quality of public administration education and “facilitate the continuing development and quality of public service education” (NASPAA 2008, p.2).

The MPA NESC and Academic Degree Management and Postgraduate Education Department (学位管理与研究生教育司) are in charge of evaluation of MPA programs based on following the standards. “Assessment Standards for Universities Conducting Master of Public Administration (MPA) Programs in China” (hereafter the Standards) 公共管理硕士专业学位教育评估方案, was promulgated in 2012 to assess the fourth batch MPA programs. With the aim to pave the path for the expected following batches of MPAs, the <Standards> have sought normalization and standardization since 2005, and there have been three versions to date. The NASPAA website also refers to their “standards,” which are periodically adjusted.

The assessment project is undertaken by the Ministry of Education and carried out on site by a group of experts recommended by the NESC. It has eight general first-level grades 一级指标 and 25 specific second-level grades 二级指标. Among all of the first-level grades, those involving the education process are detailed in Table 4.3.
### Table 4.3 Assessment standards for universities conducting Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs in China (part of)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First-level grades</th>
<th>Second-level grades</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching experience</td>
<td>Practical work experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training experience</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Admission</td>
<td>Admission process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student source and qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>Curriculum setting mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syllabus requirements</td>
<td>Seminars and lectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internship arrangement</td>
<td>Learning time length on campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission grades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case-based education construction</td>
<td>Case construction requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case-based education requirement</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Being an academic graduate education program membership organization, the broad basis for COPRA accreditation is ‘voluntary participation’. Application for peer review and accreditation is open to all institutions who want to apply for accreditation. At the same time, programs can voluntarily terminate their membership in NASPAA, thus also ending the national accreditation for their MPA degree (National-MPA-Education-Steering-Committee 2009, p.225). Degree programs are accredited rather than faculty members, departments, schools, colleges or universities.

On the other hand, due to its organizational background of NESC, only after gaining the accreditation from the MPA NESC could a university or research institution even launch an MPA program while many non-accredited programs exist in the US because
NASPAA has no such power. The <Standards> have been effective at providing a reference for individual MPAs to improve their programs. Consulting with factors from the <Standards> and the evaluation reports, individual programs will notice their strong points and areas in need of improvement. The evaluation scheme forces MPA programs throughout China to meet the same goals because a failing evaluation result would affect a university’s eligibility to house an MPA program. This would damage its academic reputation and threaten its funding.

Because much of the <Standards> focus on program construction due to the centralization characteristic of the administration system, the goal to hit the targets set at the central level still carries the spirit of mobilization, as described in Chapter 3. On the surface, the MPA programs seem quite isolated from the authority control compared to both the party school and administration school systems. However, policies about the MPA education process are also centrally made by the Ministry of Education, which is directly under the state council, after which policies are executed by the NESC. For example, the policy for entrance examinations is specified as “national exam, centralized testing, centralized grading, and centralized recruitment” (Yang 2005, p.112). This is significantly different from the US model, where each university controls admissions within NASPAA’s comparatively loose oversight. On the other hand, from the organizational perspective, the NESC is not an administrative organization that enjoys independence and policy-making rights, neither is it an academic association organization like the NASPAA, which does not carry any legal responsibilities from government. With the centralized policy pattern, NESC in China is rather a combination of a ‘think tank’ organized as an academic experts’ association that makes policy recommendations to national ministries and an organization with the responsibility to implement policies from those ministries.

The purpose of adopting the MPA program was to supplement the pre-existing training approaches and contents with the hope of adjusting the capabilities of civil servants to meet the challenges of the rapid social-economic changes by including academic experts into the educational process. The transfer outcome did achieve the goal of engaging academia in the civil service training system so that civil servants could deliver the expression of party’s willingness of consulting, inclusively, with multiple sources to strengthen and advance the party. Furthermore, central control to both grant membership to universities and evaluate them has strengthened the top-down role of the
standards set by the NESC experts. Furthermore, since the party has always strongly valued bureaucracy, the statutory centralized management framework over the civil service system established in the SCL has facilitated the functional role of the NESC and the promulgation of its regulations based on the policy learning-oriented transfer.

The MPA programs in China seem to have relatively greater autonomy compared to the traditional training approaches. Although the national MPA program organizational structure ensures that a certain portion of teaching content needs to be certified by the Ministry of Education, it was entirely experts in public administration academic area who made the proposals and executed the proposals. However, from another perspective, the MPA program could not transfer the merit principle as characterized by an applied substance with management and understanding from academic institutions in keeping with the American pattern (Waldo 1975; Cleary 1990) due to these centralized public policy traditions in China. Therefore, the MPA program in China has continued rather than challenged the control from central authority.

4.5.3 STANDARDIZED CURRICULUM

Prior to the MPA implementation in China, neither the party school nor the administration school training approach offered academic degrees to civil servant students, and accordingly neither had a degree-based systematic curricular structure. On the other hand, because the central authority has a long history of achievement in cadres’ education via centralization and mobilization, this institutional education might be best delivered in a centralized environment (Witesman and Wise 2009). NASPAA always permitted diverse curricula, but the adoption of mission-based curriculum in 1991 gave the programs more flexibility. Although a wide difference of focus and specializations existed, there were four basic similarities among American MPA programs in the early-1990s (Chen 1999, p.74): (a) the common courses covering basic theories and methodologies of public management and public policy analysis; (b) specialized courses are decided by individual MPA programs based on their expertise and reference courses provided by NASPAA; (c) elective courses that are chosen by the students based on their interests and career aspirations, often leading to an academic concentration or specialization; and (d) internships and seminars in public administration, management and policy.
Based on the pilot MPA-cadre class in Xiamen University from 1995 to 1999, which involved consultation from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (Chen 1999, p.75), a comprehensive curriculum of MPA program was promulgated by the Academic Degree Office 学位办 (predecessor of Academic Degree Management and Postgraduate Education Department) in 2000. Table 4.4 shows the compulsory structure that is shared among all 24 first batch MPA programs.

Table 4.4 Curricular structures for MPA programs, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China’s Initial Compulsory MPA Structure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core courses</strong>&lt;br&gt;30 credits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist theory and practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public policy analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative analysis methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information technology and practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resource management and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist courses</strong>&lt;br&gt;10 credits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialized area</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public policy evaluation and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial restructuring policy analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology policy analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance management and evaluation in public sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of public sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technique and methodology in public projects evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative research of civil service system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel assessment and appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgeting and costs management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management system and operation mechanism of public economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security of personnel in governmental organizations and public institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public affair management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public affair management foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of intermediary organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education economy and management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic management of educational institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike the situation that would normally occur in transitional post-Leninist countries where policy decisions and advice from the political authority have an implicit character (Cardona 2000, p.11), the Chinese authorities offered a centralized and explicit direction, both a framework and major contents, based on academic consultation with professors. Core courses were obliged in both credits and credit hours from NESC. The ten core courses list in Table 4.4 were considered the foundational courses by academic experts.

As for the specialized courses, each individual university could choose one or more specializations based on their strengths. However, it needs to be highlighted that this research does not seek to determine if the competence of civil servants was clearly and unequivocally increased by the adoption of the MPA program in China. That question is different in scope than the current goal of determining if the MPA program managed to include academic elites’ influence and reduce the involvement of authoritarian party and government, as the overriding curriculum and training factor for civil servants.

Besides the existing centralized administrative system, there are some other reasons that help explain the central control over MPAs. First, the central authority placed strong expectations on MPAs from an organizational perspective. Public administration education in the pre-existing training institutions was hindered by the inevitable mixture student source of skilled management personnel and veteran personnel who have been asked more focused on ideology acknowledgment. This variance of students led to training content devoted to ideological indoctrination to continue interpreting the
party’s political interests into the training system. Given the tension between these political-oriented training institutions and processes, and the needs of merit and professional-oriented personnel training that would come to be based on the higher education system outside of the existing training system, achieving balance could be a challenge. Another expectation of MPA programs to train civil servants is under the party’s consideration for different hierarchy ranking of civil servants. The party school system was for leading cadres while the administration school system was for intermediate ranking cadres/civil servants. Thus, there were training needs to cover the gap of the junior ranking civil servants who also need to articulate the party’s interests (Xu Guangjian, Interview notes).

Besides the great expectations, the MPA education program challenges the party’s monopoly control over the cadre training system that had been in place for a long time. In the current broad inclusion stage, management over MPAs from the Central Committee is no longer exclusively based on party and government’s interest, but also empowers professors in the NESC, which is primarily an academic-based institution that seeks to implement standardization. For such a difficult change and challenge to both party and government, standards for MPA programs needed to seek uniform development. At the same time, the center wants to ensure that this policy tool to train civil servants of party-state does not lose the party-state-oriented policy concerns. From this perspective, the structure and content for the core courses seeks to keep the MPA under central control. In other words, by generalizing the standards on the core courses of ‘public administration education’ in MPAs, the central government wants to ensure students properly interpret the party’s interests as they develop professional knowledge and improve administrative skills.

4.6 CONCLUSIONS: MPA PROGRAM TRANSFER PROCESS - A NETWORK OF ‘SOFT’ LEARNING AND ‘HARD’ LEARNING

China did not simply ‘copy’ the MPA program from the US, nor arbitrarily ‘transfer’ the program that has been used and functioned well in other countries. On the contrary, there seems to be ample evidence that academic elites have gathered both information and experiences from the American MPA programs and accreditation structure, and also
assessed it, before they proposed this ‘best practice’ to policy-makers in the Chinese central government organizations.

MPA program transfer was first proposed and launched in the academic world by non-official agencies such as academic elites. These ‘de facto’ agencies, as opposed to ‘de jure’ bureaucrats, politicians and government experts are better at ‘soft’ transfers of ideas, concepts, norms and attitudes (Evans and Davies 1999; Stone 2004, p.550) that influence the policy agenda. In the case of transferring the MPA program to China, rationalization and systematization concepts from the American MPA program were ensured by the extensive involvement and engagement of academic elites before and during the transfer process. The Chinese MPA program as an outcome of policy learning was telling of the fundamental spirit and knowledge (Stone 2004, p.546) of advancing civil servants’ capability to perform their administrative jobs has been transferred by the systematically structured program. Nonetheless, the program structure, including the authorization and evaluation methodology to manage the MPA in China, and all other teaching elements in MPA program were proposed by the resource banks of MPA education, academic elites association of NESC.

However, as Stone (2004, p.549) indicates, “soft transfer of norms and knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient condition for learning in conjunction with policy transfer.” In other words, even though the policy knowledge transfer is more extensive than policy transfer, the ‘hard’ transfer (Evans and Davies 1999; Stone 2004; Stone 2010) of policy tools, programs and implementation is more telling of international policy in terms of its influences on domestic recipient policy changes (Checkel 1997). The policy transfer practice is where environmental factors of political and policy context could affect the transfer, given that “the degree of transfer is likely to be more shallow or superficial when it is imposed and/or when little local learning is involved” (Stone 2004, p.552). In the case of transferring MPA program into China to train civil servants, the bureaucratic structure (MoE and MoHRSS) would need to strengthen their influence within the domestic environment.

As a national-level policy activity, since the first visit to learn experience from MPA programs and their hosting universities in Western countries, the Ministry of Education, delegated by officer Ji Mingming (Liu 2000) from the Degree Office, has been involved in the learning process. Since then, the governmental organizations not only transferred
the professional degree education of MPA structure into the Chinese education system, but also adaptively learned the further certification method from NASPAA to mobilize authorization and evaluation of the MPA program at the national level based on its central institutional role.

The MPA program transfer outcome at the national level was a network including ‘hard transfer’ aspects of the MPA program “practice and instruments involving formal decision-making, legislation and regulation” (Stone 2004, p.556) that was implemented based on Chinese policy environmental factors, and ‘soft transfer’ aspects of professional and systematic conception that differed from the pre-existing training approaches.

Transfer of MPA program at the national level ensured policy centralization via national organizations including MoE and MoHRSS. To further ensure its centralized influence over policy practice, national government organizations established the NESC as a formal organization in charge of MPA implementation. This unitary method seemed to imply that “policy and implementation process are comparatively less problematic – and therefore perhaps can be considered less intriguing – than in federal systems” (Toonen 1983, p.247). It cannot be easily guaranteed that there would be no pressure at the sub-national level on the implementation. Previous researchers have sketched out the growing local interests’ representativeness to resolve conflicts between governments at different levels to secure the political stability of China (Zheng 2006; Lei 2013) The knowledge and pursuits of civil servant abilities from local educational institutions might not necessarily be synonymous with central interests that delivered the program.

This dissertation strives to demonstrate how communist party adaptations serve the furtherance of regime development, while at the same time incorporating policy transfer elements from abroad. The evolution of MPA training within the Chinese system of administration demonstrates the continuing balancing between central control and local implementation, maintained by the Chinese communist regime. It demonstrates also how and why policy transfer, with Chinese characteristics, has occurred in the Chinese system of administration. In authoritarian China, the party used to have the monopoly power over the cadre system. Pre-existing training institutions were funded by party-government organizations and they were also managed by them. With the MPA as a new approach to train civil servants, this means some power was channeled to the
academic institutions, although for now the balance clearly remains with the central regime.


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