Social Media and the Arab Revolutions:
A Comparative Case Study of the Role of Social Media in Political Participation among Egyptian Students between 2011 and 2013.

Ibrahim Althagafi

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University of Limerick

Supervisor:

Prof. Helen Kelly-Holmes
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences

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Abstract

The present study aims at identifying and monitoring the roles, which social media played during the revolutions of the Arab countries, particularly the Egyptian revolutions in both 2011 and 2013. It later attempts to assess the extent to which social media contributed to achieving political change in Egypt. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to collect data from the Egyptian youth through a mixed design, using a questionnaire and interviews. The results obtained revealed that the participants believed that the political activists and young people in Arab countries used social media, which has become a strong political tool for change, as a means of political communication to activate and reinforce democracy. Additionally, social media, having a positive role in planning and encouraging demonstrations, contributed significantly to the development of the Arab Revolutions, especially the Egyptian revolution in 2011. However, Social media had a reduced role in 2013, and a fundamental change in the position of social media vis-à-vis more traditional media forms in the 2013 revolution. Which pushed all parties to work directly on the ground in most Egyptian areas.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that work presented herein is original and a result of my own work.

Ibrahim Mohammed Althagafi
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Introduction

Beginning in 2010 and early 2011, the Arab countries witnessed great and important political and social changes which emerged from the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Similar revolutions in other Arab countries, such as the Syrian and Yemen Revolution, still continue to this day. In the same way other countries, such as Sudan, are currently experiencing protests and demonstrations from time to time, and yet others are calling for political reforms and changes conducive to public freedoms and reforms in the Political systems.

It has been stated that the media is the fourth power in any country, but following 2011, the media, especially social media, became the first power in many states, and particularly in those Arab countries which have experienced the Arab Spring. The Arab revolutions started spontaneously and unplanned, without any involvement of external forces, when the people were moved to a rejection of injustice and corruption. As such, they had no way of knowing what to do or indeed, what would happen, but the activities of social media became one of the most important factors in their success. Throughout the revolutions, the use of social media contributed significantly to the advancement and organization of these events. “Twitter”, “YouTube”, and “Facebook”, were accessible internet spaces that enabled the organizers of the revolutions to speak directly to the people to disseminate their message. In this way, organizers effectively attracted large crowds to the demonstrations, as well as determining the optimum dates and locations. Through it, they also managed to publicize and broadcast wide range of images, recordings, and videos showing the effectiveness of the revolutions and the degree and severity of the repression suffered by its participants that served to fuel these revolts even further. Social media have arguably inflamed the enthusiasm of the demonstrators and inspired them to continue their revolutionary journey until they had achieved all of their demands. Furthermore, it incentivized and inspired citizens of other countries to do the same, to claim and get their rights and their demands. Social media have enabled them to break down the barriers that had prevented millions of ordinary citizens rising up to claim their previously denied legitimate rights, and suddenly make change possible everywhere in the Middle East.

It is hard to deny the role of social media in the countries of the Arab revolutions, in particular the Egyptian revolution. There, the sites people used, such as "Facebook", "Twitter" and "YouTube", created links between what was happening in the street in real time and the information circulated via social networking sites, which was then transferred to the main stream media and on to the Arab world.
The importance of the role of "Facebook" was assisted by the increase in the number of users, especially among young people. In Egypt, Salem (2017) reveals that the number of Facebook users in Egypt was close to 34.5 million accounts during 2017. It is notable that Egypt was also the first state in the Middle East to introduce and use Facebook. However, The Statistics Portal report (2015) pointed out that in 2014 Egypt had 36 million internet users. This number was projected to rise to 43.9 million internet users in 2017. In fact, the recent presence and influence of youth opposition can be traced to internet access. Youth Opposition was able to prove their presence and influence in recent years through the use of the Internet. When young people discovered the strength and influence of its social power, they used it as the means of political communication which became a strong political tool for change. This is a clear indication that what is happening today is something quite different from the past.

The importance of the study is in the monitoring of the effects brought about by social media in the Arab Spring countries, particularly in Egypt, where the revolution was sparked in both 2011 and in 2013. The Egyptian revolution is considered the prominent event in the Arab Spring due to the importance of the state and its history. Moreover, a report by Egyptian CAPMAS (2017) was presented showing that the Egyptian population reached 104.2 million, of which 94.7 million are living in the country and 9.4 million are abroad. However, the Egyptian society is considered a young one, where 32.8% of the total population is composed of youth of the age group 15-34 years. An Elzain (2012) study affirmed that “many researchers argued that social media were effective in the case of the Egyptian Revolution because this was a generational struggle instead of a political struggle”. This contention was supported by Mansuri (2012) who agreed that "the media adopted coverage of the events of the Arab revolutions website activists were YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter". In addition, the Egyptian activist Ayman Salah claims that social networking was good for the activists in the Egyptian revolution and states "Egyptian activists were catching information through Twitter, mostly from bloggers, to convey a picture of what was happening to the outside world, there has been cooperation between the activists on social networking and activists on the domain" (Akademie 2012). What makes this study significant is that, to date, there has been no actual academic research in a comparative study of the role of social media in both the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and 2013.
Research problem
Is it possible to accurately determine and evaluate the role played by the social media during the Egyptian revolution? Many commentators believe that social networking sites such as Facebook, YouTube, and others, played a significant part in the revolutions of Egypt through their deployment of coverage of the events. With social media currently emerging as one of the most influential forces in politics and political change in the world, and in particular the Arab world, how can we accurately measure an influence which has led, in some cases, to political change in the despotic regimes, especially in the case of Egypt.

In order to properly identify and monitor the revolutionary potential of mass-communication social media in Egypt it is essential to fully acknowledge and understand the role and nature of social communication in the process of the political change experienced by the Arab region, along with the impact, the nature of revolution, its shape, and how all these elements are affected by social media.

Research objectives
- Identify and monitor the roles played by social media as a means of communication before, during, and after the Egyptian revolution through covering and addressing the events.
- Identify the nature and form of social media mechanisms and how its coverage has contributed to influencing revolutionary events.
- Examine the role of social media as a means of mass communication during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013, and assess the extent of its contribution to achieving political change in Egypt.

Research questions
- What exactly was the role of social media during the Arab Spring?
- What was the nature of role played by social media during the events of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolution, and what role did the traditional media play?
- Was there any observable change in the role of social media between the first and second revolutions in Egypt?
Chapter 1: Social Media and the Arab Spring: A Review of the Literature

1.1. Introduction
In this section the term “Arab Spring” will be explained. The section will also provide a working definition of social media, as well as the media tools used by the Arab countries to effect change. It will primarily concentrate on the relationship between the "Arab Spring" and social media between 2010 and 2013. In order to fully contextualize these events, this chapter will provide an overview on the relationship between media and political regimes prior to the Arab Spring revolutions, and review the role of the social media in political protest, change, and the consolidation of the new political system. This section will further present a brief case summary of other countries which have seen an “Arab Spring”, particularly Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Finally it will present an extensive study of the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013 and demonstrate how the role of social media had a significant influence on popular mobilizations around the Egyptian revolution which impacted on its political situation.

1.2. The Media and Political Regimes
Whatever the nature of the political landscape, the traditional interrelatedness of the media and the political regime in any country in the world is such that discriminating between one and the other is extremely problematic. In fact, all political systems rely on the media to confirm legitimacy and public acceptance. Moreover, political systems routinely deploy the media when faced with various crises and problems, whether internal or external to the state. Algaf (2012) noted that there is generally a close a relationship between media and the political process wherein the media acts as the conduit between the masses and the decision-makers of the regime. This link can in turn, make a significant contribution to the success or failure of the political system’s ensuing political policies and activities. This observation is echoed by Twyn (2013) who pointed out that, "diverse media systems all are outgrowths of the political systems within which they operate, For example, in some authoritarian countries, the mass media are so compliant with the regime that the government seldom needs to crack down" (p.22). That was reinforced by HMO (2013) who concur that the media is actually neutral when used to regulate political conflict in a democratic country, but in lands of tyranny and poverty, monopoly of state systems and media dictatorship is used to impose the
position of the regime opinion and formulate acceptable public opinions. Hershey (2012) has also considered the role of media in politics and asserts that "much like traditional media acts as an agenda-setting tool for policy and government, social media is forcing those in power to stay on their toes and actually listen to what the American people are saying to the government and about the government" (pp.5-6). Abdullah (2012) further purports that the media has attained great stature and influence with regard to the socio-political debates surrounding the process of political change in the Arab world. This is especially notable in terms of their power to either support or obstruct this process by propagandising the Arab masses and directing them politically, socially and intellectually. Fama and Tam (2010) additionally note that surveys conducted by the Merdeka Centre found that about 90% of Malaysians had historically formed political opinions from the traditional media which reinforced the status quo. However, voter access to alternative internet information sources in 2008 tipped the election balance in favour of the opposition (p.80).

Media represents the link between public opinion, policy, and decision makers, generating continuous interactions between various and diverse public concerns and issues, and the decisions of the political power in the countries. Balkin (1999) also confirmed that, “Mass media can make the political system more ‘transparent’ in all three respects: mass media can help people understand the operations of government, participate in political decisions, and hold government officials accountable. In practice, however, its effects are often quite different” (p.394). Bassiouni (1993) describes how the broadcast media manages any dialogue within a community to build priorities of public opinion, while Elabidine (2011) contends that revolutions taking place in the media are synonymous with political revolution and intellectual revolution as they address the divergences between the elite and the masses, the rulers and the ruled. While various media form the traditional means of communication between the public and state system, Abdullah (2012) claims that media can also perform more significant roles, such as, the formation of attitudes and trends and providing information to the public. Along with politics and the economy, the media is one of the three main pillars of the state. This merely underscores the impact of reliable real-time communication from the political elite to the masses, and the corollary importance of the problems, issues, aspirations and perceptions of the masses being conveyed to the ruling elite. Moreover, as a source of information and data which also enables political leaders and strategists to gauge public reaction to their and policies and governance, the media is yet further implicated in the all stages associated with the political decision-making process. Balkin (1999) reiterates that politicians now accept that harnessing mass media is critical to
retaining power and influencing citizens, noting that the Internet now rivals television as a medium of political communication (p.397). Newton (1999) problematised the issue by arguing that while some accuse the mass media of alienating and cynical encroachments on modern democracy, many others herald its power to inform and mobilize the better educated and democratically awakened masses (p.577). Moussa (2012) agreed that some members of the profession have admitted “that the media bear some significant level of responsibility in the Ivorian socio-political crisis and the onset of the war” (p.28). Moreover, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) confirmed that "Social media are just one portion of a new system of political communication that has evolved in North Africa and the Middle East"(p.365). Algosoar (2011) denounces the explicit role played by the traditional Arab media in suppressing change and protecting the status quo, rather than using its considerable influence as a catalyst for progress. However, this should not negate the role played by several Arab news channels which sought to open Arab eyes to the realities of contemporary world politics, maintained a clear and consistent editorial position during the ongoing Arab revolutions once the media were deployed for mobilization and incitement, and stood squarely with or against the existing regime. Moreover, a study by Alabdullah (2012) found that Arab countries were particularly cognisant of the importance of the media in shaping public opinion and that following the Egyptian defeat by Israel in the 1967, a joint audio-visual system was established to provide them with common intelligence strategies to combat media enemies and adversaries. To achieve this end, the television satellite station, Arab Sat, was launched in 1985.

1.3. The Definition of Social Media

Social media is a collective of online channels dedicated to community-based input, interaction, content-sharing and collaboration (Wigmore 2012). As such, scholars from many disparate fields have examined Social Network Sites (SNSs) in order to understand the practices, implications, culture, and meaning of the sites, as well as users’ engagement with them (Ellison 2007, p.211).

Personal media can inform the new century, as the resulting change of mass communication allows the individual to deliver their message according to their needs, at their chosen time, and in a global manner. Furthermore, communication is no longer exclusively generated in the traditional top down model, but can also trend from bottom to top. As along with the adoption of these sites and virtual reality applications to achieve individual features and customization, they can also undermine the concept of the national and international borders. According to
Ahlqvist et al (2008), “social media consists of three elements; (a) user created contents, (b) social activities formulating communities, and (c) Web 2.0, which represents the technical aspect” (p.13). Lietsala and Sirkkune (2008) see social media as a source which “can find various and very different cultural practices related to the online content and people who are involved with that content” (p.17).

It is therefore notable that definitions vary widely due to the fact that social media continues to grow and evolve every day to match new technology trends and networks, particularly in terms of the access tools being used (BuzzMedia 2013). Social media have changed the concept of traditional communication between audiences through tools which have necessitated a redefinition of communication. Traditional contact is from person to person, while social media facilitates one to one, one to many, and many to many communications. The emergence of globalised communication technology allows Khondker (2011) to summarise, “Globalization as a complex social, economic, and technological process can be viewed in terms of the spread and wider availability of communication technology which intensifies connectivity, such connectivity is as vital for facilitating social interactions and mobilization” (p.675). According to Alrawi (2012), for example, social media features have the capability to send individual messages to arrive simultaneously to an unlimited number of people, giving equal control of the content of mutuality between the parties communicating, as well as achieving the needs and interests of the owner of the content. Furthermore, Maggiani (2014) shows how social media tools have drastically redefined communication from interpersonal, post and terrestrial telephone, and in person, to texts, emails, mobile and video phones and via the Internet (p.1). Auvinen (2012) likewise emphasises that “social media is not just text, pictures, audio, video, and animation, but all of these combined” (p.6). Krishnasamy (2014) concurs that mass media plays a crucial role in delivering influential social communications to both individuals and widespread audiences, while Landau (2011) asserts that social media have added the new elements of immediacy and sharing with ubiquitous millions to crisis communication. In his report for American Public Health Association Holmes (2011) pointed out that the social media explosion has changed the way in which risk communications can immediately transmit essential crisis information to as many people as possible (p.10).

Auvinen (2012) agrees that “social media have changed the way people communicate. So it’s important to understand that influencing social media is a much more diverse and difficult task than working with traditional media” (p.6). Several researchers have found that social media in actually multi-dimensional. Alrawi (2012) has reported that social media have
influenced changes in the features of the communities, generated added value in political life, and a warning to compete with traditional media. Furthermore, the freedom to choose from a wide range of information sources has allowed audiences to select the kind of news material they want to read. Auvinen (2012) also confirmed that any user also may also share contents and opinions, observing that, “the richness and diversity of information social media provides, users are no longer dependent on a single source for their news and other data any more, but can flexibly use several different media side by side”(p.6). Due to the dominance of newspapers and magazines, social media were initially used to modify print media for online publication. Today, social media is used to publish new events, and transfer information, as well as facilitating discussions in real-time. Harper (2010) discusses how social media enables both journalists and members of the public to report on events such as the Fort Hood shootings, the 2009 Iranian protests and Bozeman explosion, and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Holmes (2011) clearly agrees. “With social media everyone has the potential to be watchdogs, citizen journalists, and photojournalists, which can constantly survey the world around them and share what they find online” (p.10). Helenek (2013) asserts that the use of social media is an effective way for individuals to disseminate their personal beliefs and values to the world. For this reason, social media is perceived to guarantee individual freedom of expression as anyone in the world may avail of its tools. Nsabua (2011) agrees Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and personal blogs, have become popular platforms of personal expression. Starr (2012) claims that freedom of expression has benefitted from social media due to the enhanced diversity of voices in the public sphere, and benefitted from the freedom of information by generating a culture which demands transparency from powerful institutions (p.234). Forkan (2013) has also underscored that “democratic states must recognise that their citizen’s use of technology may be a more effective vehicle to promote the values of freedom, equality and human rights globally than government led initiatives” (p.22). On the other hand, the political side has had to absorb considerable impact and intervention from social media. Obare (2013) comments that, “social media has transformed social movements and grown online political behaviour. A study by the Pew research Centre on the 2008 United States election found that social media use as a political campaign tool increased political participation among young people” (p.19). Obare (2013) also referred to whether social media have improved advocacy and activism in terms of lobbying, campaigning and organizing (p.19). Kahne et al (2014) agreed that “we see that new media enabling the mobilization of cultural groups for political purposes and the mobilization of diffuse friendship networks for targeted political action” (p.11), while Giroux (2009) takes the view
that the relationship between state power, new media and the public has become more porous and less controllable with rise of the SMS, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and the Internet screen culture.

1.4. Social Media and Political participation

The nature of the political environment affects both the ability of citizens to gain access to social media and on their motivation to take to the streets. In societies where people have less access to social media or where there is a great deal of censorship and control, it is more difficult for dissidents to exploit these new technologies (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013, p.117).

The introduction of social media into political campaigns and protests throughout the world started in the Philippines. Barrons (2012) pointed out that during the 2001 popular uprisings and the subsequent fall of President Joseph Estrada, Filipino citizens used text messaging to amass a crowd of over one million in downtown Manila for what has since been labelled ‘social media revolutions’. “Yes we can”, the rallying slogan which was ultimately translated into Barrack Obama’s landslide success in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, was the first officially sanctioned use of electronic media in any presidential campaign. Thus Rutledge (2013) commented that not only was Obama the first African-American to be elected president, but also the first presidential candidate to use social media to interact with voters via Twitter and Facebook. In addition, a study by Williams and Gulati (2008) noted that social media now played as important a role in elections as traditional organisational resources and opinion polls. They went on to say that since 2008 all USA presidential candidates have routinely established some sort of presence on Facebook through which they have acquired a significant number of supporters. Williams and Gulati also asserted that “social networks are seen as a vehicle for reinforcing a campaign’s core message and increasing the commitment of its active supporters, indeed they have the potential to transform campaigns and the electoral process” (pp.2-6). Barrons (2012) notes that that during the 2009 Green Revolution Iranian opposition to presidential candidate Mir Hosein Musavi mobilised participation in a series of Tehran protest rallies via Twitter, YouTube and Facebook (p.55).

Social media is increasingly used in campaigns across Europe. Davies (2014) studied the impact of social media on elections in Ireland, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland and the UK, along with the 2009 elections for the European Parliament (EP). They
found EU27 young people in the 16 to 24 age-range were the largest group of social media users. As such, social media could be used to mobilise youth support, particularly in the case of smaller parties or lesser-known candidates. Bypassing mass-media filters meant politicians could directly engage with the young, organise participation in 'offline' events, and increase the personal appeal of a candidate (p.1).

In a study by Cho (2010) examining social media used by politicians in South Korea election, he found that “The micro blogging site, Twitter, has emerged as a major communication tool for politicians in South Korea, especially since the local elections in June 2010” (p.119). Cho also reported the live broadcast of an online political party launch ceremony which unveiled its slogan as ‘Together, Open, and People’ (p.120). Cottle (2011) stated that in 2011 the Chinese authorities detained suspected activists and heavily censored social media following calls for a ‘Jasmine Revolution’ inspired by the wave of Middle Eastern pro-democracy protests which were being transmitted to the global community via Facebook and YouTube. Davies (2014) also agreed that “there are indeed signs of increasing political activism on the Internet and social media. For example, a 2011 UK survey showed that 9 percent of people had sent an electronic message supporting a political cause and an equivalent number commented on politics on social media, and the percentage of people who signed an online petition doubled between 2007 and 2011 to 14 percent” (p.7). As Obare (2013) has remarked, “During the 2013 presidential elections in Kenya, new media played different roles for different parties, voters and media” (p.27), and explains that new media was a means for people to communicate their thoughts, and also communicate with the political candidates.

The importance of mass media to political regimes in the Arab world can be seen in some of the events that occurred there before 2010, such as, dynastic inheritances of power, military coups or election frauds to install a candidate or perpetuate the military powers that be. Also there is very little social media evidence of change from within or by the people, even within the Arab democracies of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. But the launch of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in late 2010 and the beginning of the year 2011, encouraged the number of journalists and Western scholars in particular, to pay attention and to consider rebellions mainly fomented on social media, especially ‘Facebook’, ‘YouTube’ and ‘Twitter’. In response to questions of how important social media is in Arab political life, Albanna (2011) stated that the Internet has allowed new players with new rules to enter the political game. Rutledge (2013) elaborates that social media creates a new peer-to-peer political dialogue. In his study Alexander (2013) claimed that the Western media relished portraying the Egyptian revolution in terms of the unstoppable galvanising force of the ‘Facebook
revolution’. His assessment was reiterated by Algosoar (2011) who agrees that the Arab revolutions demonstrate the potential of such tools to other groups on social networking sites, especially Facebook, and has taken its social or cultural uses to a new dimension. It gradually enabled other groups with political demands to make a realistic impact which attracted widespread youth, and in light of daily continuous use of the internet, has become an indispensable necessity and a new human rights platform in the 21st century. Elzain (2012) avers that social media facilitated political discussion among the people in Arab countries, influenced perceptions of Arab peoples, and promoted participation in Egypt’s ‘Arab Spring’ (p48). Ghannam (2012) argued that, “Social media have been used by Arabs to exercise freedom of expression [and] also as a space for civic engagement” (p.26). He additionally maintained that, “Social media can foster participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, youth and seniors in the democratic process. Particularly among the vulnerable groups is an essential prerequisite for post-conflict stabilization and peace building” (Sedra 2013, p.10). Browning (2013, pp.65-66) similarly asserts that, “The power of social networking as a tool for effecting political change has been played out on stages that may not be as prominent as Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring”. (See section 7.3). Tufekci and Wilson (2012) pointed out that, “Since the Arab Spring burst forth in uprisings in Tunisia and in Egypt in early 2011, scholars have sought to understand how the Internet and social media contribute to political change in authoritarian regimes” (p.363). Davies (2014) contends that social media can not only be used by democratic governments to involve citizens in decision-making, but also to help citizens to communicate with their representatives and with each other (p.2). Nevertheless, Amin (2009) describes how citizen’s digital tools originally designed for networking and entertainment purposes became a conduit for political activity, and activism became recognized as a source of political power. Khondker (2011) said that “Some writers have identified the nuances, as well as limits to the role of the new media in politics. There are those who see social media as a tool for democratic openness, even in democratic societies, as some writers point out, the new technology poses a grave threat to the freedom and privacy of citizens” (p.676). In spite of this, Davies (2014) insists that whilst social media cannot replace face-to-face contact with youth, it can nevertheless be a useful way to directly target young people who are often disengaged from politics (p.4). Bhuiyan (2011) states that “The new revolution in social media has exploded into an effective tool of communication, not only to connect socially, but also to ignite political reform and social action“ (p.18). Behnke (2010) likens new media to the Gutenberg press of the masses, as it continue to play an important part in the public
discourse of Singapore. Reflecting on the impact of new media on Singaporean politics, he observed that: (p.138)

- Internet usage
  Internet usage has increased the amount of engagement with government and improved service demands, increasing access and rights.
- Diversity of Voices:
  There has been an increase in ‘net citizens’, those that raise concerns on a variety of issues, often in criticism of the government. This has increased freedom of speech in Singapore, despite the strict controls that exist on the internet, and empowered ‘ordinary’ individuals.
- Virtual Political Organization:
  Social network communities and networks have allowed for greater political organisation and alternative forms of protest. This has helped level the playing field for alternative groups, including the political opposition.

Giroux (2009) notes that these new media and websites have proved powerfully resistant to the oppressive channels of censorship and militarism by allowing an emerging generation of young people and students articulate their political views, convictions, and voices through a screen culture, and by rewriting the space of politics through new social networking sites and public spheres. Beaumont (2011) confirmed that Facebook functions as an information source which counteracts the state censorship rife in many countries (see section 7.2). In fact, according to Fathi (2014) no less than fifteen countries, namely, China, Iran, North Korea, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Vietnam, Eritrea, Tajikistan, Syria, Turkey, Arab Spring countries, South Korea, and finally Thailand, took steps to block social networking sites between 2009 and 2014 (p.1).

1.5. The Meaning of “Arab Spring”
Abusharif (2014) explained that the use of the term ‘Spring’ was originally a Western concept as the European idea of ‘Spring’ resonated the 1848 ‘Spring of Nations’, the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968, and the ‘Eastern European post-communism Spring’ of the late 1980s following the fall of Communism (p.7). By association then, the phrase, "Arab Spring” evokes an Arab experience analogous to the European experience in Prague. The tumultuous events of the Arab world have attracted many different epithets, such as, “the Jasmine Revolution”, “the January 25th Revolution, “the Facebook revolution”, and so on. But all have been used to refer
to the revolutions and protests in the Arab areas, where the revolutions, protest movements and pro-democracy demonstrations have been reported on by media and political commentators. This miscellany of names soon condensed into the unifying phrase ‘Arab Spring’, a soubriquet which became instantly synonymous with popular revolution. In this way, as, Tombaugh (2014) points out, the metaphor of the ‘Arab Spring’ corresponds to the Westernised hegemony of democracy, equality, modernity and individual freedom reflected in Arab uprising against dictatorship (p.18). Goldstone (2011) compared the wave of Middle Eastern revolutions to previous political earthquakes, such as the 1848 European popular revolt which was fuelled by inflated food prices and mass unemployment, the 1989 Velvet Revolution against oppressive Soviet communism, and the fall of once mighty political regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (p.8). Tadros (2012) has also emphasised that “The Arab Spring was originally used by George Bush in 2005 to refer to the short-lived phase in which Arab leaders were opening political spaces for citizen activism, albeit in a controlled manner. This year, ‘Arab Spring’ was the most popular used phrase coined to describe the series of revolutions and social protests which have rocked the Arab world” (p.1). In short, the term refers to Arab nations who launched revolutions between 2010 and 2013 in protest against the widespread corruption and economic stagnation, restrictions on political security and concerns about the electoral integrity of most Arab countries (see section 2.1). Originating in the self-immolation protest of Mohammed Bouazizi which ultimately resulted in the depositions of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt and Gaddafi in Libya, it also includes popular resistance to the transfer of the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s powers to his deputy under the Gulf Initiative, civil uprisings in Syria and Yemen, major protests in Algeria, Iraq and Morocco, and minor skirmishes in Lebanon, Mauritania, and Sudan. (Ali et al. 2012, p.1163).
1.6. The Social Media and the Arab Revolutions

The Arab Spring idea was sparked by demands for changes in freedom, justice and the application of democracy, and an overthrow of the repressive regimes of the established Arab world. Many Arab Spring countries used Social media to question the status quo. Allagui and Kuebler (2011) observed that these new genre of revolutions occurred almost simultaneously, shared many features, and were particularly distinguished by the informational and organizational role played by social networks (p.1435). Elzain (2012) claimed that the Arab Spring generated widespread belief that social media could foment political revolutions in any country of the world. He also pointed out that, “social media were witness to the revolutions especially in Moldova and Iran which are also popularly known by the term Twitter Revolutions and Facebook Revolutions”(p.4). Sedra (2013) also argued that Facebook and Twitter were used by political activists to advocate, communicate and disseminate information as the events of the uprisings unfolded (p.8). While, Khondker (2011) contends that, “Overstating the role of the new media may not be helpful, due to conventional media playing a crucial role in presenting the uprisings to the larger global community who in turn supported the transformations” (p.677). Comunello and Anzera (2012) also play down the importance of social media claiming that only a minority of Arab have internet access. On the contrary, they suggest that it may have been used by the secret services to identify and localize activists (p.453). Furthermore, Kassim (2012) emphasizes that new platforms of social media did not bring about the Arab Spring but rather played a communication role which assisted the revolutions in the long term. Prosviryakova (2012) also highlighted that Freelon’s study remains uncertain whether social media is necessary to depose dictators and refers to Malcolm Gladwell’s assertion that revolutions have pre-existed the advent of social media by thousands of years. Gire (2014) also assessed the role played by social media in the Arab Spring revolutions, similarly noted the journalist Malcolm Gladwell’s opinion that it was ineffective, and agreed with him that, “With social media, there is no central leader, so networks have real difficulty reaching consensus and setting goals which makes them prone to conflict and error, Social media also leads to weak ties” (Prosviryakova 2012). Hisham Matar also contends that although social networking sites had provided a vital means of communication for protesters during the Arab Spring uprisings its importance should not be exaggerated (Behnke, 2011).

Nevertheless, when Khondker (2011) examined the role of the new media in the Arab Spring he concluded that, “when the fruit seller, Mohamed Bouazizi resorted to self-immolation to protest at the price hikes and political repression, conventional media and the new media such
as Al Jazeera and Facebook both played a significant role in disseminating information and mobilizing the masses of protestors in Tunisia: both virtual and real revolutionaries came out in droves to protest” (p.676). Khaled Koubaa, President of the Internet Society of Tunisia, reinforced this by revealing that three months prior Bouazizi self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid, a similar incident took place in Monastir, but because it was not filmed or posted on Facebook it had no political impact (Beaumont, 2011). Faleh (2013) claims that new media exposed a lot of political figures, and also generated law reform, because Arab citizens became fully aware of the power and impact of new media, it was used to break the prestige of authoritarian regimes and authority of governments who seemed completely unable to understand the Arab revolutions.

Social media have mainly been used for personal social networking in the past, but more recently it has extended to include political facets. Many specialists currently working in the mass communication and academic areas believe that social media tools played a role in the Arab Spring, despite differing opinions on their efficacy in aiding political mobilisation. As Elzain (2012) maintains, “the Arab Spring Revolutions in recent times have fostered the ongoing discussion and dialogue about the role of social media in protest related activities and political mobilization towards change of regime and bringing pro-democracy movements to the Arab world” (p.4). Furthermore, in Sedra’s (2013) view, the Egyptian revolution showed how new media and social networks can transform from an entertainment and daily communication tool into a force for mass political activity and the primary source for clarifying events happening on the ground. These results are confirmed by the results of the current study in (section 6.2), with a change in the role played by social media in the Egyptian revolution of 2013 compared to the revolution of 2011.

Allagui and Kuebler (2011) deem that the Arab revolutions, specifically in Tunisia and Egypt, illustrate the powerful solidarity among members of networks who challenged dictators, police and online censors. In fact, the revolutionary content they initially distributed to friends, families and network allies through personal mobile phones and digital media ultimately reached the mainstream media and satellite channels (p.1436). While Soengas (2013) judged that, “The Internet and social networks served as elements for supporting the process and as a counter-balance to official censorship and to government-supportive media, and were useful for overcoming the isolation of Arab society” (p.147), Howard and Hussain (2011) insisted that, “Social media have allowed communities to unite around shared grievances and nurture transportable strategies for mobilizing against dictators” (p.48). In his study Huang (2011) discussed the impact of social media on the Arab Spring, concluding that
social media had made a profound contribution to all aspects of the revolutionary process. Storck (2011) agrees that an analysis of the activists’ media strategies reveals how the characteristics of the Internet and social media inherently tended toward the fomentation of collective action in Egypt (p.41). Huang (2011) further contends that government attempts to block social media sites backfired on them, claiming that although 28% of Egyptians and 29% of Tunisians felt that censorship had disrupted their efforts to organise and communicate via Facebook, a further 56% of Egyptians and 59% of Tunisians claimed it had had the reverse effect of motivating them to persevere and mobilise others. In terms of the relationship between social media and the community, Khondker (2011) avers that “globalization promoted social media in communities, as a complex social, economic, and technological process, through facilitating transactions as it is for social interactions and mobilizations, thus, inadvertently creating a space for civic activism and a new communication technology which spread to wider arenas” (p.675).

According to researchers Allagui and Kuebler (2011), “Social media played an instrumental role in the success of the anti-government protests and call for further examination of the proposed incorporation of social media as an important resource for both collective action and the organization of contemporary social movements” (p.1440). In their study, Chebib and Sohail (2011) also maintain that during the early months of 2011 the Middle East witnessed many popular uprisings which have been variously described as ‘Facebook’ or ‘Twitter’ revolutions, questions remain as to the extent to which social media actually affected these movements (p.139). On the other hand, Khamis and Vaughn (2011) argued that new media were effective in both promoting civic engagement and supporting democratic activists by establishing free speech forums, providing political networking opportunities and virtual assembly spaces, and supporting opportunities to organize and execute peaceful protests. Moussa (2013) further confirmed that, “Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are among the platforms that were used most during the Arab spring, these technologies and platforms have in fact played a critical role in expanding the limits of agonistic public spheres and collective action repertoires over the last decade” (p.57). Shirazi (2013, p.43) also avers that, “Social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, provided citizens in repressed countries opportunities to participate in communication discourse which ultimately contributes to organized civil resistance and social actions”, (see sections 7.2 & 7.3).

Finally, in his study Elzain (2012, p.48) found that social media were crucial to promoting and encouraging political discussion and influencing perceptions among the Arab people, thereby encouraging active participation in Egypt’s Arab Spring. In fact, Iraq's
communications ministry had been ordered to block social media websites and communication applications due to security concerns. This was confirmed in a report by Arabiya (2014) which indicated that technicians claimed they were ordered to block video-sharing site YouTube, social network site Facebook, Twitter and the communications applications WhatsApp and Viber by Iraq's communications ministry when revelations that militant Islamists, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) were preparing to attack Baghdad broke via Twitter.

The pioneers of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube could never have anticipated that their audience would use these tools to change the fate of nations. Storck (2011, p.42) concludes that though the founders of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube never intended their platforms to be involved in revolutionary activism or in deposing dictators, in retrospect, they may now feel they played a vital role in the process by providing these vehicles for change. But revolutions actually begin in the minds and imaginations of those driving them and to achieve their democratic goals the Arab Spring activists co-opted every possible medium of communication, whether print, radio, blogging, or simple word of mouth, in the understanding that the strength of a movement ultimately rests in its willingness to act.

1.6.1. Facebook during the Arab Revolutions

In 2004, Mark Zuckerberg established a social media network site named ‘Facebook’ which can be accessed by anyone free of charge and run by the company "Facebook". Initially limited to Harvard University, students and personnel could join the network to communicate and interact with each other. It was so successful it was very soon extended to include other colleges and by 2013 there were approximately 1.23 billion monthly active users worldwide. Despite its American origins, over 81% percent of these users are located outside the United States, and it is significant to note that more than 945 million active users use Facebook via mobile products (Facebook 2013). Facebook has been embroiled in a number of controversies over recent years, resulting in the site has being banned or blocked by the governments of various countries for varying periods of time, This is particularly true in the Middle East in countries that have experienced the Arab Spring.

However, this has not prevented people from using proxy sites which circumvent the censorship. During the Arab Spring of 2010 - 2013, Facebook usage in the Arab region increased dramatically. In April 2010 Facebook reported 14,791,972 active users. In the following year the total number of Arab Facebook users rose from 21,377, 282 on January 5, 2011 to stand at 27,711,503 by April 5, 2011 (Mourtada and Salem 2012, p.29).
And by 2013 the total number of users was reported at 54,552,875, almost 10 million more than the June 2012 figure of 45,194,452 (Salem and Alshaer 2013, p.13). Zaghloul (2010) found that Egypt was ranked first of the Arab countries and 23rd in the world in terms of the rates of entry to Facebook in 2010. Huang (2011) also confirms that Egypt saw a 29% growth in the use of Facebook compared to 12% the year of 2010, while Tunisia also experienced a 17% percent growth compared to 10% during same period. The exception to this upward trend was Libya, where usage fell by 76%, possibly because many citizens had fled the country due to the ferocity of the ongoing conflict between the regime and rebels.

To this day, “Egypt continues to constitute more than one quarter of all Facebook users in the region and has had the highest number of new Facebook users since January 2013, with an increase of over 1.5 million users” (Salem and Alshaer 2013, p.13). Hossam Saleh, a communications and internet expert, confirms that there are around 14 million activist accounts used daily in Egypt (Ali 2014, p.35). However, the study of Salem (2017) confirmed that "Egypt still leads by far in terms of the number of Facebook users with close to 34.5 million accounts" (see Figure 3-6). In his report Huang (2011) stated that, the vast majority of people derived their information from social media sites during the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, with 88% in Egypt and 94% in Tunisia, as shown below:

![Figure 1-2: Number of Facebook Users in the Arab Region between June 2010 and May 2013](Top 10 Facebook populations), (The Arab Social Media Report 2013, p.13)

### 1.6.2. YouTube during the Arab Revolutions

YouTube, the first website solely dedicated to uploading and sharing personal video was created by three former PayPal employees in February 2005. Google purchased this company in late 2006. All users of YouTube can upload, view and share videos. Unregistered users may watch videos, and registered users can upload an unlimited number of videos on the website. Most of the content on YouTube has been uploaded by individuals and corporations.
Additionally, more than 1 billion unique users visit YouTube each month, and watch over 6 billion hours of video. This is 50% higher than last year and equates to almost an hour for every person on Earth. Hundreds of hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute, with 80% of YouTube traffic originating outside the US (YouTube 2014). According to OSTROW (2010), YouTube has enabled everybody to be a journalist or an entertainer. The ‘Broadcast Yourself’ YouTube service allows for anyone to publish whatever they want in addition to mainstream media coverage. Ding et al (2011) argue that, “With its slogan ‘Broadcast Yourself’, YouTube has been designed for sharing user generated content, and a significant fraction of videos are not originally from YouTube, but are instead simply copied from other places, such as movies, TV shows, and other professional video websites” (p.361). Moreover, Kruitbosch, and Nack (2008) state that “YouTube’s slogan ‘Broadcast Yourself’ implies that the focus of this web site is to facilitate users to upload their video, also the aim is to provide a platform where people can express their creativity. To some extent YouTube has been immensely successful” (p.7). Bordino (2012) pointed to the empirical data concerning Arab revolutions from Tunisia to Egypt (October 2011), which found that YouTube usage in the Middle East area was highest in Israel and Turkey at 47.12%, followed by the Arab Emirates at 30.06%, Jordan and Tunisia at 26.25%, and Egypt at a mere 10.23%. Khamis et al (2012) challenge the Syrian “YouTube Uprising” asserting that the use of the name negates moral force of the millions of Syrians who risked injury, disability, or death to fight for self-determination and the basic human rights of dignity, and freedom”.

Socialcapital (2013) reported that a video posted on YouTube which shows Egyptian riot police being assaulted and seriously injured by protesters was taken offline for terms of service violation. Turner (2011) claims that over 30,000 videos have been uploaded to YouTube tagged “Sidi Bouzid, the name of the city where many demonstrations occurred and where the street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, ultimately killed himself. Furthermore, Elzain (2012) states that citizen journalism characterized the coverage of Arab Spring revolutions. For instance, during their first opportunity to vote in elections since the removal of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and the death of Gaddafi in Libya, citizens were able to share personal videos with internet users around the globe through various video streaming websites such as YouTube (p.5). Safranek (2012) also confirms the popularity of YouTube as being extremely popular in the Middle East, where an average of 24 hours of video is uploaded every minute, OSTROW (2010) observes that the video captured of an Iranian woman named Neda, who was left to bleed to death in the street, made the front page of newspapers around the world for days. Reynolds (2014) confirmed that Turkey has banned
YouTube twice due to leaked videos, but went on to confirm that the ban was lifted in 2010, following a two years crack down because videos considered insulting to the country's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had been shown. Aljazeera (2014) pointed out that the Telecommunications Authority also banned YouTube on 27 March 2014 when the leak of a security meeting of senior officials in the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was deemed a violation of the principle of privacy and conduct contrary to the law.

1.6.3. Twitter during the Arab Revolutions

Founded by Jack Dorsey in 2006, ‘Twitter’ is a social media means of telling the world what is happening elsewhere and has become one of the most familiar and distinctive words heard whenever political events escalate somewhere in the world. Twitter is amongst a cluster of social media which helps users to create and share ideas and information instantly, without barriers. It permits users to send information and updates on their accounts using up to a maximum of 140 characters per message, either directly through Twitter, or via SMS text messages or instant messaging software. By June of 2010, Twitter was estimated to have 200 million users, generating 65 million tweets a day. This breaks down to about 750 tweets sent each second, handling over 800,000 search queries per day. It has been described as the ‘SMS of the Internet’ (Chebib and Sohail 2011, p.141). In 2013 there were around 40 million active users worldwide, over 77% of whom are located outside the United States. 76% of active users used Twitter via mobile means (Twitter Company Facts, 2014).

During the Arab Spring, the number of active Twitter users in the Arab World grew exponentially from just over 2 million to 3.7 million in 2012. By March 2013, Arab Twitter
users generated 336 million tweets per day, almost doubling those generated in March 2012 (The Arab Social Media Report 2013), while the first quarter of 2011 also recorded a 50% rise in unique mobile signups and a 52% rise in account signups (The Arab Social Media Report 2011).

Huang (2011) lists the most popular Twitter hash tags in the Arab region during the first three months of 2011 as “Egypt” with 1.4 million occurrences and “Jan25”, the start date of the protests in Egypt, with 1.2 million occurrences. “Libya” had 990,000 occurrences, “Bahrain” followed with 640,000 occurrences, and “protest” with a further 620,000 occurrences. Bruns et al (2013) claimed to have captured some 7.48 million “#Egypt” tweets from over 445,000 unique users between 23 Jan. and 30 Nov. 2011. Huang also observes that Tunisian tweets peaked on January 14th and Egypt February 11th when President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, and also increased activity in the days after the demonstrations which began on February 14th.

Digital activists also used Twitter to organize street protests and demand a recount during the 2009 Moldovan parliamentary elections, but in this case the protestors failed to achieve a change of leadership or obtain a new election (Amin 2009). Chebib and Sohail (2011) stated that “according to Ossama El-Badawy, the manager of the online company Competitive Intelligence, the internet in Egypt witnessed a dramatic growth after the revolution with a 100% Twitter users growth during this period” (p.141).

On 20th of March 2014, following allegations of corruption in Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s inner circle, court-ordered ‘protection measures’ were applied in order to block all Twitter service. This followed an earlier vow by the Prime Minister to “wipe out Twitter” (Reynolds 2014). However, when the Criminal Court of Peace suspended this court order, the Turkish Daily News (2014) reported that “Twitter has won a court case against the Turkish government’s decision to block access to the social media platform in Turkey”. In any event, Cho (2010, p.122) affirmed that advocates of Twitter endorse the fast reaction to postings and the ‘retweet’ potential to forward to large groups so cost-efficiently, while politicians agree the impact of the micro-blogging service has exceeded all expectations, with message delivery faster than any other media outlets.

In conclusion, despite attracting many researchers recently, research on the role of social media in Arab revolutions remains rare, which left a knowledge void which has been the topic of much discussion, and especially regarding an analysis of the role of social media in both Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013.
Many researchers recognize the importance of the role of social media in the Arab Spring, however, a significant number of studies disagreed with this evaluation, while the comparative role of social media during the different Arab revolutions was a topic of much discussion.

1.7. The youth as digital activists

Digital activism, also known as cyber activism, activism, or even social media activism, describes how citizens can use social media platforms such as Facebook, and Twitter and other ICT artefacts like smart phones and even systems that collect and process data obtained from sensors, cameras and devices connected within networks to affect socio-political and economic change (Broome et al. 2015, p.2).

In the last few years, the Arab countries have seen new aspects of Political participation and mobilization that have taken on a certain innovative character during the Arab revolutions. Among the aspects which have to be pointed out are the youth as digital activists. Graeff (2016, p.95) has stated that "If one thing defines this era of youth digital activism, it is the ability to make and widely share media". In addition, Joyce (2010, p.2) had explained the context of digital activism as that "digital activism refers both to the digital technology that is used in a given activism campaign and to the economic, social, and political context in which such technology use occurs".

Digital activism on Social media acted as platforms for youth to communicate and exchange their political ideas during the Arab revolutions which provided new opportunities for youths’ to engage with political participation. In addition, it gave them the opportunity for free speech on many issues that were not being discussed before by regimes. Al-Shafei (2013, p.31) study confirmed that "from its earliest days between 2005 and 2009, Mideast Youth was running various human rights campaigns online". Kahne et al (2014, p.5) pointed out to that "new media enable youth to have political voice and influence without being 18, having money, or even being a citizen". In addition, Broome et al (2008, p.4) claims that "the youth are the fastest adopters of the new digital technologies with the 20-39 age range being the most active on social media channels". However, Salem (2017, p.38) reveals that "Social media users in the region remain largely youthful; this is a consistent finding over
the past six years. On average, 64.3% of Facebook users in the region are now under 30 years old”.

Safranek (2012) points out that the majority of social media users are people under 25, the exact demographic which constitutes between 35-45% of the population of Middle Eastern and Northern African countries. A study undertaken by Alrawi (2012) confirmed the young initially used social media sites to chat and discharge emotion, but this soon gave way to a wave of maturity in which the young discussed ways to reclaim and improve the rhythms of political, social and economic life. Movements formed by youth which rejected the status quo in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, easily extended to a rejection of policies across the social networks of the entire Arab world.

During Arab revolutions events, Middaugh et al (2015, p.2) commented that "youth leaders and activists are credited with playing a critical role in these movements, and their support is being recognized as critical to the establishment of new arrangements and authority". Moreover, Dhillon (2014) on the Tunisian revolution, said that "what sites like Facebook and Twitter helped to accomplish was connecting these marching youth with those in the coastal, more affluent cities, and then connecting the people of Tunisia with the rest of the world".

In 2010 the Egyptian police killed a 28-year-old man named Khaled Said; the tragedy was highlighted on social media by citizen journalists which generated popular protests. The largest peaceful protest occurred after Wael Ghonim, a Google employee and creator of the Facebook page, “We are all Khaled Said”, was held in custody for the twelve days of the revolution. Saddy (2011) confirmed that ‘We are all Khaled Said’ captured the imagination of young Egyptians and Facebook users worldwide and its wall became a sharing point for news, information and organization for 77,000 members worldwide. By 2013 this figure had increased to 3,837,390 members. More than 134,000 users also watched a call to arms video by a young woman named “Asmaa” Mahfouz which appealed to men’s “honour and manhood” to participate in the in Tahrir Square protests of January 25th. But these two sites were just the tip of the iceberg. Nearly 90% of Egyptians and Tunisians surveyed in March 2011 stated they were using Facebook to organise protests or spread awareness about them, and that Facebook and Twitter had abetted, if not enabled, the historic region-wide uprisings of early 2011 (Huang 2011).
Chapter 2: The Arab Revolutions

2.1. A brief summary of the Arab revolutions countries
The Arab Spring revolutions mainly occurred as a result of various combinations of internal factors, although some external factors did play a limited role in the beginning. The subsequent impact of the Arab Spring destabilized the structure of the authoritarian states in the Arab world, which in turn has contributed to the fall of certain Arab regimes and activated political change in the Arab regions. The Arab Spring phenomenon was discussed by Khondker (2011) who theorized that “Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain were ready for revolutionary movements due to an assortment of politico-economic conditions” (p.679).

2.1.1. The Tunisian revolution
The Tunisian revolution, otherwise known as the “Jasmine Revolution”, was the first spark to ignite the Arab world revolutions which have become collectively known as the ‘Arab Spring’. This inaugural revolution occurred on the 17th December 2010, when following the confiscation of his wagon by his hometown police, the 26 year Tunisian national, Mohamed Bouazizi, publicly protested by setting himself on fire. The resultant publicity generated a scale of socio-political demonstrations, riots and strikes not seen in Tunisia for more than thirty years (Ouedraogo 2011). Although the Tunisian government initially responded by the repressive unleashing of state security forces on the demonstrators and blocking the internet, Ben Ali was eventually obliged to reshuffle his cabinet and offered to create jobs. However, it was too little too late (Noor, 2011). Rifai (2011) affirmed that although the Tunisian development minister Mohamed Al Nouri Al Juwayni hastened to Sidi Bouzid to announce a new $10 million employment programme on 20 December 2010, the protests continued unabated. In fact, an interior ministry spokesperson claimed that police were forced to “shoot in self-defence” after preliminary warning shots failed to disperse the scores of activists who were setting police cars and buildings ablaze. Conversely, Al-Ahram (2012) stated that a report for an independent commission charged with investigating abuses committed during the protests claimed that during the 28 days of the revolution protester clashes with the Tunisian security forces resulted in the death of 338 protesters, and 2,147 injuries.

On the 28th December the Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine, warned that the protests were unacceptable and would have a negative impact on the economy. Zine El Abidine also
criticised the use of violence in the streets by a minority of extremists and warned that, “The law will be applied to punish protesters”. A rally of the Tunisian Federation of Labour Unions held in Gafsa province was indeed suppressed by security forces, but then approximately 300 lawyers turned out in solidarity with the protesters near the government's palace in Tunis (Rifai 2011). Abuzakham (2011) summarized the events as follows, “After his speech, blocked sites in Tunisia, such as YouTube, after 5 years of blocking, were unblocked in addition to reducing the prices of some food products, but the protests expanded and increased intensity until it reached government buildings. On 5th January, Mohamed Bouazizi, who launched the revolution by setting himself on fire, dies of self-inflicted burns. A funeral is later held for him in Sidi Bouzid, his hometown.” Ouedraogo (2011) also notes that about 95% of The Tunisian National Bar Association lawyers went on strike on 6th January. The next day they were joined by the teachers. On 14 January Ben Ali imposed a state of emergency, fired the country's government amid violent clashes between protesters and security forces, and in a bid to subdue mass dissent, promised fresh legislative elections within six months Rifai (2011) also reported that Ben Ali flew first toward Malta, then Paris, before turning back toward the Gulf and finally touching down in Jeddah, amid French media reports that the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, would not permit him to land in France.

According to Abuzakham (2011), on the same day the minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announced a state of emergency and curfew, and that in accord with Chapter 56 of the Constitution, he would temporarily take over the reins of presidency due to the faltering performance of Ben Ali. On Saturday 15 January 2011, he further announced the appointment of Parliament Speaker Fouad Mebazaa as Acting President pending democratic presidential elections to be held within the coming 45 to 60 days.

2.1.2. The Libyan revolution
Following the Egyptian Revolution, on February 15th 2011, the Libyan Revolution, otherwise known as the “Dignity Revolution”, became the third Arab Spring revolution to take place. On February 16th, when mass demonstrations were held to demand an end to the regime, security forces fired live ammunition into the crowd killing several demonstrators. Popular uprisings continued on February 17th, beginning in several Libyan cities after a further 400 protestors were shot, killed or wounded by security forces and mercenaries who had been brought in by the authorities. Aljazeera (2011) reported that the Libyan government had resigned in protest against the repression of the demonstrators, the resignation of Minister
Mustafa Abdul Jalil and all Libyan UN delegates, and the recall of Libyan ambassadors from the Arab League, Britain, China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Poland. The National Transitional Council was constituted on February 27th, which, from the outset, took the form of two representatives abroad as well as the local councils in liberated areas. The Minister of Justice of the former Gaddafi regime, the dissident Mustafa Abdul Jalil, was chosen as the interim head of the NTC on March 5th (BBC 2014). The revolution in Libya originated in popular uprising, and the events began with a series of street demonstrations, protests, and acts of civil disobedience. However after a time, the revolution escalated into an armed conflict between forces loyal to Gaddafi and the rebels who took control of the city of Benghazi and other strategic cities in Libya. Lacher (2011) claimed that, “In the four weeks after the eruption of protests on February 15th 2011, the Libyan revolution evolved from spontaneous unrest into a full-blown civil war between the regime and a rebel leadership intent on toppling it, these developments can be adequately understood neither in terms of class nor of state institutions” (p.141). On March 10th, France recognized the National Transitional Council as the only legitimate representative of the Libyan people and the Libyan regime cut ties with Paris., and on March 17th, the BBC News (2014) reported that the UN Security Council had authorized a no-fly zone over Libya with air strikes to protect civilians and prevent Libyan government forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi from launching air attacks on protesters. On March 19th a coordinated military operation was launched by France, Britain and the United States to prevent the Libyan regime from using force against civilians (Aljazeera 2011).

Lacher (2011) focuses on two factors which explain the rapid disintegration of state institutions; firstly, the importance of tribal loyalties; and secondly, the inherent weakness of the institutions themselves. He further emphasizes that there were several senior officers, ministers and diplomats who rallied to the uprising and that in the northeast, entire army units also defected. By so doing, senior officials protested against the regime’s brutal repression and began organizing community protection against regime forces. On October 20th 2014, the BBC News (2014) confirmed that Colonel Gaddafi had been captured and killed.

2.1.3. The Yemeni revolution

Following the Libyan Revolution, the Yemeni Revolution, also known as the ‘Peaceful Change Revolution’, became the fourth revolution of the Arab Spring. It began with protests at the University of Sanaa on January 15th 2011. The revolution was started by student and other human rights activist demonstrations, calling for an end to the nepotism and corruption
of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s thirty-three year regime. On January 23rd 2011 the police arrested a number of protestors demonstrating outside the Tunisian Embassy, despite the president’s insistence that “Yemen is not Tunisia”. However, the demonstrations continued until President Hadi forced to remove his relatives from the army and steps taken to restructure the Yemen army. In the wake of these successes the organizers of the revolution announced a suspension of sit-ins and demonstrations for the first time. CNN News (2014) cautioned that although the Yemenis had managed to cut ties with the former dictatorship, the situation remained volatile because of various ongoing sectarian and ethnic conflicts within the regions and provinces, and were still enduring severe economic difficulties.

On November 23rd of 2011, Ali Abdullah Saleh visited the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh, where he formally signed off on a plan for political transition to his deputy, Abed Rabbo Mansour, within 30 days, under an agreement sponsored by the international community (CNN 2014).

2.1.4. The Syrian revolution

The Syrian revolution, also known as ‘Dignity Friday’, became the fifth revolution of the Arab Spring. It ignited on February 26th 2011, when security forces arrested fifteen children for writing slogans demanding freedom and the fall of the regime on the wall of their school in Deraa. BBC News (2014) reported that anti-government protests erupted in Homs, dubbed as the ‘capital of the revolution’ when residents rallied to calls for the overthrow of the president. By early 2011 much of the city had fallen under the control of the opposition, and by May 2011 the BBC (2014) reported that tanks had been sent in to suppress dissent in the city. In response, opposition supporters initially took up arms in self-defence, but ultimately to attack loyalist forces. Fierce street battles ensued, as newly-formed rebel brigades gradually ousted security personnel from several districts, most notably the conservative heartland of Baba Amr. CNN (2014) reported that in the three years that had passed since the Bashar al-Assad crack-down on peaceful demonstrations, the small opposition group fighting for the land and rights of the Second Geneva Convention had not achieved anything of significance. The report also claimed that the Syrian government was continuously blaming terrorists, while nonetheless maintaining its opposition to the interim government’s attempts to replace Bashar al-Assad.

On February 4th 2012, Syrian military forces launched an operation designed to crush the resistance in Homs and Baba Amr was subjected to a month of relentless bombardment leaving it destroyed and deserted. CNN (2014) surmised that Assad was being supported by
Iran and Russia, and had nothing to lose by continuing to fight. According to United Nations figures, more than 100 thousand people have been killed, more than 680 thousand injured, and at least 6.5 million internally displaced. As many as 2.5 million other Syrians have also fled to other countries.

In March 2013, the government launched yet another offensive to consolidate its control of Homs. However, despite intense shelling, the rebels were able to repel the troops after reinforcements arrived from nearby Qusair, a strategically important town that the rebels had used to funnel weapons and fighters from Lebanon to Homs and other battlefronts.

In 2014 The BBC News (2014) reported government forces had retaken most of the opposition strongholds in the preceding two years, while on the other hand, CNN (2014) reported that although the economy, housing and infrastructure in the country have been largely destroyed by three years of war, and hundreds of thousands of Syrian people are starving, there are still some unaffected clusters of elite supporters of President Bashar al-Assad.

2.2. The Egyptian revolution of 2011

The Egyptian revolution is considered the most momentous event in the Arab Spring due to the glorious history of the country and its eminence among other Arab states as ‘the cornerstone of the Middle East’ (Aftandilian 2012). Lim (2012) describes Egypt as “the most populous country in the Middle East, a population of 90 million, young people aged 15–29 make up one-third of the country’s total population, and also nearly three-fifths of the Cairo population is under 30 years old” (p.235).

The January 25th revolution is the fifth revolution in the modern history of Egypt, with the first revolution in 1805, the second in 1881, the third in 1919, and the Fourth Revolution of July 23rd 1952 (Tajuddin 2011). This section will review the Egyptian revolutionary events of 2011, the available literature review and any relevant studies. Furthermore, this section aims to acknowledge the significance of the role played by social media networks in the major popular mobilizations of the Egyptian revolutions.

2.2.1. Background to revolution: Early protests

In order to properly discuss the revolution which succeeded in 2011, it should be noted that the many previous movements on the ground which had tried to change the Egyptian political regime prior to the advent of social media had failed. Numerous protests, such as those of workers, have been cited by Storck (2011) who claims that, “There have been approximately three thousand worker-led protests in Egypt over the last decade, indicative of the latent
discontent with Mubarak’s regime” (p.20). Elzain (2012) explains that the Egyptian “Kefaya” movement’s advocacy for change rather than an enlightened intelligentsia, is generally considered the main starting point of the protest mobilization against Mubarak’s thirty year regime. (p.7). Lim (2012) agrees “Kefaya was able to mobilize and embrace diverse groups including judges, lawyers, journalists, writers, workers, farmers, women, youth, also several political parties from various ideological backgrounds, including Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, communist, liberal, and secularist” (p.236). However, Storck (2011) also takes the view that the 2004 launch of the Egyptian Kefaya Movement, which was a starting point for the mobilisation of activists against the Mubarak regime, was founded by intellectual reformers and had limited success mobilizing a critical mass of protesters, and especially difficult to reach workers (pp.20-21). For Lim (2012) the Kefaya movement was unsuccessful because although it had exploited the potential of regional and global media such as Aljazeera, and limited access to Internet use, these were not sufficient to fight against the might of the state-controlled mainstream media. As such the movement was limited to a small group of Cairo intellectuals, some of whom were arrested, but for the content of their blogs rather than their street activism (p.238). Eaton (2013) contends that Egypt was home to a thriving and diverse political blogosphere by 2005, with a first generation of internet activists who were integral to the pioneering Kefaya movement ahead of the 2005 Egyptian presidential elections. As with any technology-enabled phenomenon, the patterns of activists’ online behaviours ran-parallel to developments in technology, and the advent of social media from 2007 onwards brought a whole new generation of internet activists to the fore (p.7).

‘The April 6 Youth’ movement had been considered one of the most important movements in Egypt prior to the revolution. Lim (2012) explains that when Ahmed Maher, the founder of the April 6 Youth movement, became a labour activist in 2007, his goal was to expand the labour protest into a broader strike movement which would ultimately be transformed into a general pro-democracy movement. When the labour strikes failed Maher turned to the Internet as an alternative vehicle for mobilizing dissent, and in March 2008, Maher and his friends created the April 6 Youth Movement’s Facebook group to support the workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra (p.239). Garrido et al (2013) support Lim’s analysis and agree that the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt gathered impetus from a Facebook group created by Ahmed Maher and Esraa Abdel Fatah in order to support the worker strikes in Mahalla in April 2008 and transformed itself into one of the pivotal mobilizing forces behind the January 2011 protests which ultimately brought down the Mubarak regime. Lim (2012) avers that “the April 6 Youth Movement was one of the very first Egyptian groups strategically employing
Facebook for social movement (p.240). The group started with only 300 Facebook users who were invited through emails, but by early 2009, the Movement’s Facebook group had grown to 70,000 members. It was the arrest of the movement’s co-founder, Esraa Abdel Fatah, that catapulted membership to new heights.” The April 6 Youth Movement has also been discussed by Elzain (2012) who records that Ahmed Maher, a Kefaya movement member, was also a prominent figure who organized the strike to protest against the rise in the prices of basic commodities, unemployment and declining wages. Storck (2011) similarly affirms that, “the April 6 youth movement played a key organisational role in the 2011 protests, when Facebook made another appearance on the scene of Egyptian political activism” (p.21). Kirkpatrick et al (2011) attest that, “By 2008, many of the young organizers had retreated to their computer keyboards and turned into bloggers, attempting to raise support for a wave of isolated labour strikes set off by government privatizations and runaway inflation”(p.2). Elzain (2012) explained that in 2008, Esraa Abdel Fattah, a 27-year girl acted as the human resources coordinator of the revolution and has since become known as the ‘Facebook girl’. Her Facebook call for participation in the April 6 2008 workers strike, resulted in an exponential growth to over 70000 members, which amounted to 10% of Egypt’s overall Facebook user population at that time (Elzain 2012, p.7).

In June 2010 Facebook featured a group called, ‘We are all Khalid Said’. This group was created to publicize how, having located him in an Internet cafe, Egyptian police had arrested and tortured Khalid Said and dumped his body in the street. Lim (2012) confirms that ‘We are all Khalid Said’ quickly became the most popular Facebook group in Egypt. Between June to August 2010, the group held five silent protests involving thousands of Egyptians, amongst them the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Mohamed El Baradei (p.241).

2.2.2. The revolutionary events

President Hosni Mubarak was the fourth president of Egypt until the revolution in 2011. His thirty-year regime had begun following the assassination of President Muhammad Anwar El Sadat by fundamentalist Egyptian army officers on October 6th 1981. On January 25th 2011, the revolution was launched against his dictatorship which was finally brought to an end on February 11th 2011. Elzain (2012) asserts that his ultimate demise rested on a number of Egyptian issues shared by other Arab Spring countries, such as economic hardship, inflated food prices, high rates of unemployment, particularly among the young, political corruption, torture, and demands for democracy (p.6). Elzain also saw the Egyptian revolution as the consequence of long-term dictator regimes that had prevailed in Egypt in which the majority
of Egyptians were deprived of their basic human rights. This was reiterated by SIS (2012) which emphasizes that the most prominent of the cumulative reasons leading to the January 25th revolution, was the neglect of public opinion respecting successive Egyptian governments, reduced public participation in the political process, over-applications of emergency law, the violation of human and civil rights, weakness of dynastic political parties, election fraud, and political and financial corruption.

In order to fully understand the revolution, it is essential to be aware of the sequence of events which took between January 25th and February 11th 2011, as the events of several revolutionary days impinged on a specific catalyst or story. The events of the Egyptian revolution began to unfold on January 25th 2011, when a call by activists on Facebook to end the regime and ill treatment of people by the police was followed by peaceful mass protests involving thousands of protesters in both Cairo and a number of Egyptian governorates. Ibrahim et al (2011) theorized that in response to popular demand and youth, they chose to start these revolutions on January 25th precisely because as that was known to be the date of the police festival, and many police would be on holiday. It was only held in solidarity with Khaled Said, the young Egyptian from Alexandria, who was arrested and tortured to death in a police station on the 6th June 2010. The careful selection of the date by Egyptian digital activists was confirmed by a study of Akl (2012) which claimed the selection of the date was negotiated by several strands of the Egyptian opposition, including the April 6 Youth Movement and Kefaya movement, as along with youth Facebook groups Facebook, most of the renowned ‘We are all Khaled Said’ group and ‘Shabakat Rasd’, in protest against the living conditions and the political and economic conditions which were considered corrupt under the rule of President Hosni Mubarak.

In only three days the January 25th revolution had seen the deaths of a number of protesters, and the security forces had also arrested the activist Wael Ghonim, founder of the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page. Ibrahim et al (2011) attested that four deaths occurred during the first day alone as a result of clashes between protesters and Egyptian security forces. Over the following days, and in the light of the continuing demonstrations, police behaviour escalated in extremity and in the use of excessive violence. Akl (2012) has pointed out that when the protesters refused to leave "Tahrir" Square, the police used batons, tear-gas, and water-cannons to disperse the demonstrators, while the Interior Ministry reported that security forces had arrested about 500 demonstrators over the two days. On January 27th the Egyptian government blocked the entire internet and telecommunication networks for three days. Many human rights organizations denounced this course of action, which placed yet more pressure
on the Mubarak regime. According to Gire (2014), the blackout ended so quickly because it provoked greater sympathy with the protesters. Sedra (2013) pointed out that when the Egyptian government realized the role of social media during the revolution, they attempted to limit access to Facebook and Twitter. He claims that the government “blocked mobile phone networks to prevent people from communicating and when that did not work either, the government finally shut down Internet access in the country completely”. Howard and Hussain’s study of 2011 also contends that, “the Egyptian security services began using Facebook and Twitter to anticipate the movements of individual activists” (p.39).

On Friday 28th January, the so-called, ‘Friday of Anger’, Albulhi and Nafisa (2012) claim that the regime blocked the wireless communications and the Internet to prevent demonstrations. Nevertheless, following their Friday night devotions, many people emerged from different Cairo mosques and headed towards “Tahrir Square”, a pattern which was echoed in several Egyptian cities. Moussa (2013) elucidated whenever the internet in Egypt and Tunisia was shut down or curtailed, the people simply resorted to the more conventional media, offline societal networks and face-to-face communication to continue the revolution. For example, during the Egyptian revolution, activists resorted to distributing leaflets, which they asked recipients to redistribute by email whenever possible (p.58). On ‘The Friday of Anger’ at least 200 protestors were killed and more than a thousand injured when the Egyptian police attacked demonstrators in various parts of the Republic. By far the largest proportion of deaths was in Alexandria, where approximately 87 died, and Suez where 13 died. Eaton (2013) states that despite the media and internet blackout, many activists found proxies to get back online, or merely sent updates for contacts outside of the country to post online.

Figure 2-1: Egyptian protests on January 25th
(Almasry Alyoum 2011, part.1)
The BBC News (2011) reported that as time passed, the police were unable to disperse the protesters, and were ultimately forced to withdraw from the "Kasr El Nil" bridge in Cairo. By this time, protesters had gained control of the cities of Suez and Alexandria and burned the headquarters of the National Democratic Party. Police stations were also attacked. In the light of this, President Mubarak took a decision to impose a curfew in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, from six in the evening to seven in the morning, local time. Alittihad (2011) attests that the Egyptian army tanks which descended on the streets to prevent chaos and maintain security were welcomed by the demonstrators who regarded them as a neutral party. Akl (2012) claims that between Saturday 29th January and February 10th Egypt witnessed many tumultuous events, such as the flow of protesters to Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo in the early hours of Saturday despite the announcement of the curfew, demands for the departure of President Mubarak, and many violent clashes between demonstrators and police. The BBC News (2011) reported that President Mubarak called for the government’s resignation, along with the appointment of Omar Suleiman as his deputy on January 29th, and the President’s instruction to the former Minister of Civil Aviation, Ahmed Shafiq, to form a new government. Yet despite these steps, demonstrations continued to rage in various Egyptian cities in the following days. "Tahrir" Square in central Cairo, in particular, saw a number of demonstrations which demanded the departure of President Mubarak and the overthrow of the regime. The country witnessed the withdrawal of police from the streets, the burning of several police departments, and a rebellion of prisoners, especially in the prisons of "Abu-Zaabal" and "Torah". Badri et al (2011) documented the escape of 34 brotherhood leaders from "Natrun Wadi" prison. Among the fugitives was Mohamed Morsi, who became president of Egypt in 2012.

The opposition agitated for a general strike and train stoppage in Egypt. President Mubarak's speech, made directly to the people, refused to respond to the demands of the protesters. Mubarak said that people must choose between "chaos" and "stability" and stressed that the new government was tasked with responding to the demands of the youth. However, protesters in Tahrir Square rejected Mubarak's speech and urged him to leave immediately. According to the report of Alyoum (2011) President Barack Obama also urged an “orderly transition” to democracy in Egypt. Directed by a group of supporters of Mubarak however, some local thugs, stormed Tahrir Square on their horses and camels in an attempt to eject the protesters there by force, leading to yet further outbreaks of factional demonstrations.

On Friday February 11th 2011, otherwise known as both the ‘Friday of Crawling’ or the ‘Friday of Decisiveness’, crowds in excess of ten million across the country marched on the
presidential palaces in Cairo and in Alexandria. According to Madkour et al (2012) the president finally succumbed to the will of the people at 18:00 local Egyptian time, when Minister Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation, and also that the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces would assume the leadership of the country. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces soon after announced that it would only do so for a temporary period of six months or until the end of parliamentary elections.

2.2.3. The role of Social Media during the Egyptian revolution in 2011

Previous to 2011 there had been many attempts at uprisings against the regime. However, these would appear to have been localised and within specific groups of people which were easily controlled and supressed by the regime (see section 2.2.1). Many studies that have examined the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ agree that the 2011 revolution may well have been launched against President Mubarak because of the many indignities and privations suffered by the Egyptian people under his regime. Soengas (2013) refers to the Izquierdo study’s assessment that, “All the necessary conditions for unleashing these protests were already dormant in the general population; significant social differences, political corruption and abuse of power, lack of freedom, continuous repression and restriction of basic civil rights, and government employee privileges” (p.148). Yet Elzain’s (2012) notes that despite the catalogue of oppression, poverty, hunger, unemployment, torture, and political disenfranchisement endured for so long by the Egyptian people, the introduction and use of social communication to organize marches and to mobilize protests against the state, finally enabled them to topple Mubarak’s regime in just eighteen days.

A number of researchers, such as Attia et al (2011) assert that “The roots of the revolution came from past demonstrations and are related to the usage of social networks. Facebook, which is the third most visited website in Egypt after Google and Yahoo, played an important role in the revolution” (p.370). This chimes with Sedra (2013) who also claims that “most civil society groups, small movements and grassroots organizations that have worked in the streets before the Arab Spring were technically ready to support the revolution and to mobilize their followers via their presence in social media and the Internet” (p.7). However, Eaton (2013) reiterated the pivotal role of social media in the Egyptian revolution of 2011, insisting that, “Previous political campaigns using internet activism, such as Kefaya and the 6 April Movement, may have succeeded in mobilizing a few thousand people, but Facebook’s network society offered access to millions more; there was no physical opposition movement in Egyptian civil society to rival such access” (p.15). Bhuiyan (2011) also concluded that,
“Perhaps social media were not absolutely critical to the uprising in Egypt; however, it made protest possible sooner, and helped it develop in a way that would have been impossible without social media” (p.18). Lim (2012) maintains that the power of networked individuals and groups who toppled President Mubarak cannot be separated from the power of social media that facilitated the formation and the expansion of the networks themselves. He claimed that the most successful Egyptian social movements, including ‘Kefaya’, the ‘April 6 Youth Movement’, and ‘We are all Khaled Said’, were those attempting to network with disaffected Egyptians, maintain unity between activists, and globalize the resources and reach of opposition leaders (p.231):


(Lim 2012, p.231).

This joke did the rounds following the resignation of President Mubarak on 11th February 2011, and as Lim (2012) explains, it epitomizes the general perceptions of the core role played by social media, and particularly by Facebook, during the Arab Spring (p.231). Garrido et al (2013) pointed to research which confirmed that roles of social media during the Egyptian mobilizations of 2011. Garrido elaborated further on this asserting that social media have had a positive impact on the ongoing political transformations in the country and has actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy through the diffusion of information (p.3). Lynch (2011) concurs and stated that a Facebook-planned protest on January 25th 2011, bloomed into a massive, society-wide mobilization which drove President Hosni Mubarak and his regime from power. He also points out that the Egyptian Kefaya movement also initially used the internet and SMS through discussion lists, and only later moved creatively to organize their protests and to gather international attention. This is upheld by Lim (2012) who claimed that it illustrated that social media have been an integral part of political activism of the Egyptian for years, showing, with 54 out of 70 recorded street protests between 2004 to 2011 substantially involving online activism. In his view, the power of networked individuals and groups who toppled the Mubarak presidency cannot be separated from the power of social media that facilitated the formation and the expansion of the networks themselves (p.232). Zhuo et al (2011) mainly attributed the success of the Egyptian revolution to the Egyptian people themselves. However, the impact of social media is undeniable, and he therefore
acquiesces that “Social media played an important role in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt. It intertwined with the development of formal organizations, informal networks, and external linkages, provoking a growing sense of modernity and community, and globalizing support for the revolt” (p.8). Furthermore, Eaton (2013) has stressed that the involvement of Twitter and Facebook, along with other platforms, such as YouTube and Flickr, emphasises that mobile phones was also crucial tools for Egyptian activists. He further claims that “through the spread of online information, internet activists were able to establish networks of resistance within Egyptian political society, and despite the relative weakness of the ties between members of these networks, regular contact of activists generated access to an infinite number of networks and multiply the impact of social protest through the creation of an insurgent community”(p.20). In his study Habib (2013) also found that the political corruption in Egypt is at the forefront of the social media discussions compared to other types of corruption, such as economic or administrative, as these issues seem to lack the necessary attraction for the general public.

According to McRae (2012), “Once the protests broke out on and after January 25th, demonstrations grew and spread as videos and other information about the ongoing activities spread over the internet particularly such ICTs as Facebook and Twitter” (p.74). Abufotouh (2013) clearly concurs that social media have played a vital role in transmitting a true picture of the entire spectrum of the Egyptian people through Facebook, Twitter, and transmitted the events by audio and video via the YouTube network. In addition, Kassim (2012) also supports the contention that social networks have broken down the psychological barriers of fear by enabling many Arab people to share information and letting them know that they are not alone. Moreover, for the first time activists had the opportunity to disseminate information while bypassing government restrictions. Howard and Hussain (2011) also conclude that “Social media have become the scaffolding upon which civil society can build, and new information technologies give activists things that they did not have before”(p.48).

Following the revolution of 2011, the Egyptian Cabinet (IDSC) issued a report on the role of social media on the revolution. Written by Ghany (2011), he reiterated that social media sites on the Internet, especially Facebook and Twitter, played a significant role in not only igniting the revolution, but also in terms the leadership of the revolution until the end. This has prompted many commentators to describe the revolution in Egypt as either the ‘Facebook Revolution’ or the ‘Internet Revolution’.

From this basis, we can identify three ways in which social media played a considerable role in the Egyptian revolution of 2011:
• Activists used social media to mobilize, organize and inspire Egyptians to take to the streets on January 25\textsuperscript{th} 2011.
• Documenting the events of the Egyptian revolution and displaying it to the world without regime interference.
• Changes in the nature of the relationship between Egypt's new government and social media after the revolution.

2.2.3.1. The Egyptian revolution command structure

We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world

(Howard cited in Bhuiyan 2011, p.16)

In this simple phrase an Egyptian activist summarized the role of social media throughout the heady days of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Cairo, and highlighted that social media were vitally important to harnessing political unrest. This was reinforced by the Ghany report (2011) commissioned by the Egyptian Cabinet (IDSC), which concluded that communication occurs via social media, and the dissemination of photos and videos motivate young people to come out to protest, identify times and places of gatherings, and to warn others of the presence of danger to protesters everywhere. These findings were upheld by the McRae Study (2012) which concluded that, “Social media allowed anyone who has contact with the internet to be involved which agreed in the revolution through posting photographs, videos, and updates on marches and demonstrations, and were actions that could be taken individually to great effect” (p.74). Eaton (2013) also stated that, “The internet was used as an alternative news source to counter the control of information channels which were opposed to the interests of the activists, also to organize and mobilize the Egyptian movement on January 25\textsuperscript{th}”(p.6). In fact, Bogart (2013) claims that Social networks like Facebook and Twitter quickly became the people’s main source to follow events in various Egyptian governorates, particularly as the regime held control of traditional media and instantiated a media blackout of all revolutionary events. Ahmed Ibrahim discusses this in his study and confirmed that 90\% of Egyptian undergraduate students relied on the Internet to obtain information about the January 25\textsuperscript{th} revolution, compared to only 10\% who used television for this purpose (Ajam, 2011).

Choudhary et al (2012) claim that, “The most frequent tweets during the Egyptian revolution, almost two-thirds, on the most popular tweets on Egypt related topics were news,
communicating important updates on unfolding events” (p.79). Browning (2013) concurs that the volume of Egyptian tweets which mentioned ‘revolution’ in the week prior to Mubarak’s resignation jumped from 2,300 to 230,000 per day (p.74). Lim (2012) also stressed that because social media provided the tools for middle class youths opposing the regime to connect with each other, it expanded the protest’s sphere of participation (p.244). Khamis and Vaughn (2011) referred to the thoughts of Egyptian activist Wael Ghonim during a CNN interview on February 9th 2011. Just two days before Mubarak's resignation was brought about by popular revolution, he said, “If you want to free a society, just give them Internet access”. It is not therefore surprising that, Elzain (2012) also stated that both the citizens and the Al-Jazeera television channel were reliant on, and immensely indebted to the people for the pictures and videos of the revolution taken from their personal mobiles and cameras. The study of Bruns et al (2013) confirms that, “The substantial level of Arabic tweets in the case [of Egypt] certainly points to the fact that Twitter and other online media did play a role in informing, organizing, and reporting protest activities in the country” (p.895). Habib (2013) also claims that that calls for revolutions which were launched on Facebook pages and blogs were freer and more interactive with the Egyptian audience. Social media outdid itself in mobilizing the public for the January revolution because of the detection of corruption, and the deployment of dozens of photos and videos confirming police violations of demonstrators prior to the revolution. Lim (2012) also maintained that, “Social media afforded these opposition leaders the means to shape repertoires of contention, frame the issues, propagate unifying symbols, and transform online activism into offline protests” (p.231).

In 2010, perhaps it was a page on Facebook called "We Are All Khaled Said", which played the most critical role in Egyptian political activism. Set up by Wael Ghonim, a Marketing Director of Google in the Middle East and North Africa, this page reminded the January 25th activists of the fate of the young blogger called "Khaled Said", who was arrested, tortured, and beaten to death by the police. Elzain’s (2012) assessment also agrees that the Facebook group created by Wael Ghonim named, "We are all Khaled Said", served as a significant platform to organize like-minded individuals to mobilize and share their common interest to commemorate Khaled Said, evolved to form an opposition to the Egyptian regime of Mubarak, and eventually evolved into a movement to remove his cabinet and later resign his power as the President. In addition, Alroata (2013) confirmed that the page "We are all Khaled Said" put the issue of human rights on the agenda in Egypt. As Eaton (2013) notes, it was it was a mere 11 days before Egyptians took to the streets after the protests were first advocated by Afifi. The Facebook page mobilization of 500,000 participants in such a short
period was unprecedented. Within two days of the announcement, Ghonim’s hopeful post on WAAKS asked, “If 100,000 take to the streets, no one can stop us. I wonder if we can” (p.10). In Egypt, social media have been utilized to mobilize and galvanize the crowd. Abufotouh (2013) asserted that the Facebook page "We are all Khaled Said" was used to efficiently change public opinion through publications, opinions, and even songs, and had a profound and far-reaching impact on the Egyptian citizen and videos, while Akademie (2012) pointed that this contributed to create hundreds of pages, comprised of calls for the crowd, packaging events that objected to the Egyptian government and the police policies, and organizing vigils to take place in a peaceful manner to address the situation. He further states that during the revolution the photos and videos which were distributed on Facebook and other platforms, such as YouTube and Flickr, made people feel more willing to take to the streets and risk being injured or even killed.

Huang (2011) confirmed that 90% of Egyptians and Tunisians surveyed in March stated they were using Facebook and Twitter to organise or spread awareness of the revolutions, and therefore it is clear that social media abetted if not enabled the historic region-wide uprisings of early 2011”. Eaton (2013) upholds this by referring to a survey by the Dubai School of Government in 2011, which stated, “That Egyptian Facebook users believed that nearly 85% of Facebook usage throughout the demonstrations was to promote and organize activism, raise awareness and spread information about events” (p.13). Moussa (2013) has also noted that social media, mainly Facebook pages such as that launched by Wael Ghonim in protest against the torture and killing of Khalid Said, were the main arena of political dissent and mobilization in Egypt. By such means, tens of thousands of members located in Egypt and the diaspora have formed an online community which transcends geographical and political borders (p.61). The study of Howard et al (2011) similarly highlighted the role of social media played in the political revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt. They reiterated that, “First, social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. Second, a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground. Third, social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders” (p.2).

### 2.2.3.2. Documenting the revolution

The important role social media played in the transfer and documentation and archiving of information, events, pictures, and videos, both during and in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, has been acknowledged by numerous researchers including Abufotouh (2013). He emphasizes that one of the leading roles of social media in Egypt was to document the
course of the revolution, so that each image, video, word, post, opinion, analysis, interception, and political debate. In the same way, McRae (2012) observed that cyberactivism involved the use of mobile phones to document and disseminate images and videos of ongoing protests, which was particularly important during the three week period between the Police Day demonstrations and the downfall of Mubarak. In addition, Mansuri (2012) claims that the traditional media, during their coverage of the events of the Arab revolution used recordings of events by website activists on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter as a source of information. Egyptian activist, Ayman Salah, notes that social media were useful for the activists of the Egyptian revolution and acknowledges that Egyptian activists were using information mostly through Twitter bloggers, to convey a picture of what was happening to the outside world. There was cooperation between the activists on social networking and activists on the domain (Akademie 2012). That issue was explored by Sedra (2013) who found that, “Twitter was one of the most effective tools to document the unrest and a platform through which people coordinated the demonstrations, the activists used the hashtag #Jan25 to help spread information” (p.3). Elzain (2012) also demonstrated that researchers found social media a reliable tool of documentation and truth-telling. By providing genuine information to ordinary citizens through social networking websites, activists were able to contest sources of ‘official’ information. Habib (2013) believed that demonstrators trusted the electronic media more than traditional outlets during the revolution, while Choudhary et al (2012) argued that “A significant portion of the discussion reflected broadcast news of ongoing events, with most influential users and tweets delivering news and a large proportion of messages as a way to repost this news for others within, as well as outside, Egypt” (p.80). When evaluating the role of citizen journalism in such documentation, Eaton (2013) cited Frenchman (2011) who stated that, “There is a short video with the title, ‘The camera is my weapon’ where the cameras is used to capture every policeman who attacks peaceful protesters” (p.18). In this way, use of social media platforms fostered an air of honesty and transparency to their coverage of the revolution from Tahrir Square (Browning 2013).

2.2.3.3. Creating a new relationship between the Egyptian government and Social Media

Following the revolution of 2011, the new Egyptian government modernized social communication by using social media to open various governmental Facebook accounts which specifically targeted young people. Browning (2013) therefore claimed that “Social networking platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between
popular will and political authority” (p.69). This is confirmed by the Egyptian Cabinet (IDSC) Report produced by Ghany (2011), which confirmed that The Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces launched a page on Facebook, and sent its inaugural message on February 17th, 2011, a mere six days after the resignation of President Mubarak. The aim of the page was to create some kind of communication between the Council and the Egyptian youth, and to respond to their questions and inquiries, so as to limit the rumours circulating in the community, and by May 30th, 2011 they had posted no less than 68 messages on their page. El-Khalili (2013) contends that one of the strongest propaganda tools used by (SCAF) was the Facebook page created in the advent of the January 25th revolution, which had 1.9 million likes shortly after its launch. In 2012 the new Egyptian defence minister also launched the page of the Egyptian army spokesperson and the “Admin of the Official Page of (SCAF).” Morrow and Omrani (2013) concluded that the military council clearly realised they needed to start communicating with the public via the medium which had proven so instrumental in bringing down the former regime.

The Egyptian Council of Ministers official Facebook page was launched on February 27th, 2011. It aimed to provide effective communication between the prime minister and the public via the Internet, both through the regular dissemination of news relating to Council activities and to hear the views of citizens regarding various topics. The Ministry of Interior, responsible for homeland security and safety, also launched its official page on February 26th, 2011, in order to affect a similar level of open communication between the Ministry of Interior and the Egyptian people. The main objective of these pages was the restoration of confidence between the people and the police, and the proper dissemination of news in order to combat rumour-mongering and to foreground the efforts of the Ministry of Interior to serve Egypt. The Ministry of Education launched their page on Facebook on February 27th, 2011 in order to continue to promote the ministry to students, teachers and administrative staff in the department, and to disseminate ministry news, including examination dates for both students and teachers.

2.3. The Egyptian revolution of 2013

The Arab Republic of Egypt is the only state among the Arab Spring countries that has seen two consecutive revolutions. Nevertheless, the second Egyptian revolution of 2013 is considered dramatically different from the first revolution in 2011 in terms of its aims and participants. Nsire (2013) made this distinction clear, explaining that unlike the 2011 revolution, which began as popular demand for political reform and gradually evolved to
overthrow the Mubarak regime, the revolution June 30th was explicitly dedicated to the rescue the Egyptian state by ousting President Morsi and the control group from office. Kassem (2013) praised the Egyptian people's determination to rise again less than three years after Mubarak’s fall, in what some saw as a second wave of the 25\textsuperscript{th} January revolt and viewed as a military coup. Socialcapital (2013) claimed that Facebook was used much more prominently in the second revolution than the first. In fact, user numbers had steadily increased to reach 16.2 million subscribers in early 2013, and by August 2014 this number had nearly reached the 20 million mark. Egypt is second in terms of numbers of Twitter users, with 519,000 personal accounts on the site in 2013 (Jamal et al. 2015, p.56).

2.3.1. Background to revolution: Early events

The 25 candidates who stood in the June 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} 2012 Egyptian elections were comprised of 13 official candidates, 10 unofficial candidates, and a further 2 who withdrew, but a 61 year old candidate representing The Muslim Brotherhood through the Freedom and Justice Party received 51.73% of the vote. Therefore, almost a full year on from the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the High Elections Committee in Egypt declared the victory of Mohamed Morsi in the Egyptian presidential elections (GOH 2012). According to Wolfsfeld et al (2013), “The Muslim Brotherhood had little to do with initiating the initial protests and they were probably not the most frequent users of social media. However, they did have the best political organization available and were ultimately able to win both the parliamentary and presidential elections” (p.132). Allagui and Kuebler (2011) also aver that though officially outlawed, The Muslim Brotherhood Islamist group is nonetheless regarded as Egypt's most organized political force (p.1439).

During the ensuing rule of President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood party committed a number of political errors that were axiomatic to the fall of Morsi. A report by the State Information Service in Egypt (SIS, 2014) outlined approximately 10 reasons which underpinned the revolution of June 30th and ended the relationship between President Morsi and the people. This extensive list includes foreign policy, the Nile water, the relationship between the people of one nation, defence and security, food service and security, culture, arts and literature, the media and the press, the judiciary and public freedoms, transport and communications, and economics and finance. Moreover, Abdulaziz et al (2013) maintain that only eight months after taking office, The Muslim Brotherhood had been appointed to the positions of 8 ministers, 5 governors and 8 to the Institution of the Presidency. The Brotherhood had also penetrated a further 20 ministries through the lesser appointments of
advisors to ministers and speakers, journalists and heads of sectors, and managers to ministers. 5 vice-governors, 2 chairmen of district centres, and 13 consultants to governors were also appointed from within their ranks. Zamosh (2013) reported that the Muslim Brotherhood had committed fatal errors during the reign of Morsi which caused a major rift between them and the civilian and liberal forces, resulting in the public outrage which ultimately ended Morsi rule and led the group to an unknown fate. One of these errors was the introduction of a new constitution which was passed despite the rejection of all civil forces. This alone was enough to create a chasm between the Brotherhood and the rest of the civil and political powers. Nsire (2013) also noted that in May and June attempts by Morsi to pass a new Judiciary Law was criticized and refused by the Supreme Judicial Council. President Morsi’s controversial decision of July 8th 2012 for the return of the parliament which the Supreme Judicial Council had previously decreed should be dissolved. This was one of the first steps in the process of challenging the authority of the judiciary and an utter violation of the rule of law. Yet President Morsi characterized his opponents as potential saboteurs supported by foreign interests, and dismissed the press institutions as “lawbreakers and tax evaders” (Al-Arabiya 2013).

On November 9th 2012, the General Assembly Emergency Court of Cassation suspended its workings. Judges also protested and persistently attempted to reject the decisions of President Mohamed Morsi. On November 30th a demonstration called ‘Friday of Comply or Leave’ was launched. Supporters of President Mohamed Morsi surrounded the Supreme Constitutional Court to obstruct a ruling on the rejection of the new constitution and a resolution on the Advisory Council. The Judges Association later revealed that 90% of the High Court personnel had refused to participate in the supervision of this draft constitution. Under the pretext of purging the judiciary The Supreme Constitutional Court and Supreme Court were similarly besieged on December 2nd, and yet again in April 2013.

Nsire (2013) stated that the June 30th revolution was not created in a vacuum, but preceded by a number of huge protests, such as the march of journalists to Tahrir Square on December 4th protesting against the constitutional declaration issued by President Mohamed Morsi on November 22nd. According to Alhurra (2012), 11 daily Egyptian newspapers, both partisan and independent, also withheld publication on Tuesday 4th December in support of protests against the violation of freedom of opinion and expression. Hassan et al (2012) recounts that a demonstration under name ‘Last Warning’, trapping state institutions, including the Palace of President Morsi, to reject the constitutional declaration took place on December 4th. However, President Morsi did not react. Imbabi (2012) has also pointed to the grand
mobilization which consisted of the political parties such as 'Constitution', 'Liberal Egyptians', 'Popular Trend', 'April 6 Movement', and other political forces, along with ordinary members of the march organized by the ‘April 6 Youth Movement’, to reject the constitutional declaration and call for its abolition. The next day, on December 5th 2012, supporters of President Mohamed Morsi attacked peaceful demonstrators in the vicinity of the El-Etehadeya Palace, claiming the lives of a number of journalists and citizens. Albawabh (2012) recorded that the death toll amounted to five people and at least 46 injuries from the ranks of the protesters. In consequence, December 7th saw another demonstration against Morsi, dubbed, the ‘Friday of the Red Card’. Alittihad (2012) notes that because he had ignored their demands, the Egyptian opposition announced its refusal to participate in the ‘National Dialogue’ which President Mohamed Morsi had called on all political forces to participate in. In response to the call of the opposition hundreds of demonstrators began a rally in Cairo to march on the presidential palace and repudiate Morsi’s decisions on the so-called ‘Friday of Red Card’. Furthermore, Nsire (2013) describes how the political forces represented by the Islamic Rescue Front, the Nour Party and the Party of Egypt, joined forces to demand that President Morsi call for early presidential elections, but the president’s stubbornness and prevarication led to a lack of response to the demands of the masses. On December 11th the armed forces called for a national dialogue between the political and revolutionary forces on the one hand and the President on the other, but while the political forces accepted the opportunity for talks, the President did not. Al-Arabiya (2013) states that the rule of The Muslim Brotherhood between July 2012 and July 2013 was characterised by numerous attacks on the freedom of opinion and expression, and that protesters were subjected to all forms of abuse, including restrictions, suppression and murder. Furthermore several journalists were kidnapped, including Mohamed El Sawy, in February 2013, and Fawzi Huwaydi in March. The journalist, Mohamed Bazaid, a reporter for the ‘Weladbalad’ newspaper, also disappeared during his coverage of the bloody clashes between supporters and opponents of President Morsi, on June 26th 2013, just a few hours before the president's speech in the city of Mansoura. He further contends that the reign of Morsi was linked to the murder of a number of journalists, such as, Abu al-Husseini Guest, who died from gunshot wounds to the head while covering the events at the El-Etehadeya Palace in December 2013. Salah al-Din Hassan, a journalist for ‘The People of Egypt’ newspaper was also killed in the explosion of a conventional bomb thrown by an unidentified person in Port Said on June 28th 2013.
Zamosh (2013) claims that the crisis of confidence between President Morsi and the security establishment began with the dismissal of defence Minister Field Marshal Tantawi and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sami Annan, and ended with the departure of dozens of officers and police marching in support of the rebel movement, after accusing the Morsi security institution’s inability to protect the headquarters group. In addition to the deterioration of economic conditions and declining rates of employment and investment during their reign, The Muslim Brotherhood was accused of marginalizing the community groups. In the meantime, the Tamarod movement, launched from Cairo's Tahrir Square on Friday 26th April 2013, called for the withdrawal of confidence in President Mohamed Morsi, and early presidential elections. BBC News (2013) reiterated that the Tamarod was the same progressive Egyptian 'Kefaya' movement which had successfully pushed for political reform under former president Mubarak in 2004 and 2005. In addition, Kingsley (2013) maintained that the Tamarod activists once again focused their energies on collecting signatures for a petition calling for Morsi's resignation. In his study, Gjørvad (2013) also theorized that the Tamarod’s strength was that it captured the attention and support of Egyptians across all strata of a society facing a worsening economy and rising inflation and youth unemployment.

Kingsley (2013) further elucidated that the Tamarod had no big-money backers, but rather won the logistical support of mainstream opposition parties who realised it had harnessed the most effective form of grassroots activism. In fact, it was the political currents that supported the Tamarod movement, the Kefaya movement, the Islamic Salvation Front, the National Association for Change, the April 6 Movement, and the Egyptian Bar Association who opened their headquarters for the citizens of the Republic to process the signed forms.

2.3.2. The revolutionary events

After only one year and three days in office, the Egyptian people ended the rule of President Mohammed Morsi on July 3rd 2013 (SIS, 2014), a date that had been selected from the Tamarod movement in advance. The events were monitored by Abdelhalim (2014) who claims that the reign of President Morsi flopped because of his inability to make sound decisions on internal and external issues, his clash with the state institutions and with the political and social forces, and the Project Renaissance. Aftandilian (2013) also contends that the National Salvation Front was formed as a last ditch attempt to salvage participation in the political process, but Morsi chose to ignore The National Salvation Front strategy of street protests which ultimately evolved into the Tamarod movement (p.9), while Jumet (2014)
blames Morsi’s downfall as a response to “the high expectations following the 2011 uprising, great promises made by Morsi himself, and low performance by the Morsi government” (p.7). The Tamarod movement, founded on April 26th 2013, worked to collect signatures for a petition for Egyptians to withdraw confidence in President Morsi and a commitment to hold early presidential elections. They called on all signatories to demonstrate on June 30th. Jumet (2014) states that the “Tamarod distributed a petition demanding President Morsi’s resignation and the holding of early presidential elections, circulated online and in the streets by activists and everyday citizens alike” (p.9). Allban (2014) calls attention to the Tamarod’s confirmation that it had collected 200,000 signatures during the very first week of its existence, and less than a month later, in a news conference held on May 12th 2013, the movement announced that they had collected 2,592,465 signed forms withdrawing confidence in President Morsi. A BBC report (2013) summarised that following demonstrations by millions of Egyptians on Sunday June 2nd 2013, the Tamarod gave the President an ultimatum to either resign or face ‘complete civil disobedience’. The coverage by Rashwan (2013) also reported the Tamarod’s announcement that it had collected 22,134,465 signed forms, equalling more a quarter of the Egyptian population, had actively petitioned to withdraw confidence of the president June 29th 2013. However, President Morsi dismissed these signatures as absurd and refused to hold early elections. Meanwhile the Opposition also rejected Morsi’s call for more dialogue and the formation of a committee to amend the constitution and restore national reconciliation.

On June 23rd, the first initiative was led by former Defence Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the then Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, who called for a comprehensive bid to achieve genuine reconciliation by June 30th. El-Sisi also instigated the June 29th initiative to change the government and amend the constitution which President Morsi again rejected (Abdelhalim 2014). On June 30th approximately 22 million Egyptians opponents of President Mohamed Morsi’s regime gathered in Tahrir Square and throughout the entire country to demand his removal and the holding of early presidential elections. In Cairo, the Tamarod gathered in front of the El-Etehadeya Palace, still offering petitions forms for signature. As Helmy (2014) stated, it is difficult to underestimate the role played by the Tamarod movement in the mobilization of the Egyptian revolution on June 30th. On the Same day, the main opposition party, the National Salvation Front, issued a statement which publicly endorsing of the overthrow of the Mohamed Morsi and The Muslim Brotherhood regime. The National Salvation Front also asked that the Egyptian people protect its revolution until the peaceful
transition of power could take place and called on all political forces and all citizens to remain peaceful.

In July, a second initiative by the military establishment, announced a 48-hour deadline for all political forces to agree to resolve the crisis following the revolution of June 30th 2013. In the light of this deadline, demonstrations to reject the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood increased yet further. On the same day, the Tamarod released a statement giving Morsi the ultimatum to resign, or face marches on all palaces and a mass campaign of ‘complete civil disobedience’. They also demanded a new presidential election as part of their declaration and called on the military and police to make it clear that they supported the civilian protesters. In addition, five cabinet ministers resigned in solidarity with the protests, including the Minister of Communication and IT, Atef Helmy, Minister of the Environment, Khaled Abdel-Aal, Minister of Water Utilities, Abdel Qawi Khalifa, and Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Hatem Bagato. A further eight independent parliamentarians from the Islamist-dominated Shura Council also officially resigned from the government in protest and solidarity with the opposition's demands.

On July 2nd, while The Muslim Brotherhood was commanding their supporters to get off the street, Morsi was delivering a speech in which he affirmed his commitment to electoral legitimacy. He rejected the army’s warning and threatened violence against those who rejected him, which was later translated into a spate of injuries and fatalities. However, on July 3rd, the armed forces assembled national political and religious forces to make the decisions which would usher a new phase in the Egyptian revolution and culminating in a speech by the former Defence Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi which confirmed the end of Mohamed Morsi’s presidency and announced his successor as the former Chancellor, Adly Mansour (Abdelhalim 2014).

2.3.3. The role of Social Media during the Egyptian revolution in 2013

A number of researchers have confirmed that the roles of social media were completely different during events of the Egyptian revolution in 2013 than during the first revolution. Social media also played a significant role during the Egyptian revolution events of 2011, both by assisting with the organization of gatherings and by directing the crowds and protesters throughout the revolutionary period. The revolution plans of the virtual world were considered by Akademie (2012) who claims that social media made people feel secure as part of a vast collective protest movement and emboldened them to venture beyond the online world to the streets and public places of their country.
During the 2011 Egyptian revolution government forces did not use social media to respond or to calm the protesters, but rather to suppress digital communications. During the Egyptian revolution in 2013 however, it is clear that the role and the power of social media had become known to everyone, and that it had the ancillary role of assisting all parties participating in the process of political change in Egypt at that time, including opponents such as the Tamarod, Morsi’s regime, and the Egyptian army. Thus social media were used by all concerned to send and publish messages to ordinary grass-roots Egyptian people throughout the lengthy protest period. Bogart (2013) emphasises that social media dissemination of information was no longer limited to the activists, but that politicians also came to realize that they were only as powerful as the numbers that followed them. However, the use of social media by everyone arguably rendered it far weaker than before, as it pushed all parties to work clearly on the ground in most of the Egyptian areas. Isa (2013) attributes the increased use of virtual world from Facebook and Twitter in Egypt in 2011 to the fact that social media sites were able to mobilize activists and young people on the specific goal of toppling the regime. Gire (2014) also agrees that social media did not play the same role that it had at the beginning. This view is reinforced by Rashid (2015) who avers that the decline in the ability of social media sites to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies, sprang from declining confidence of revolutionary youth, frustration among the Egyptians about the consequences of the revolution, increasing government attention to policing such sites, and a return to the effectiveness of traditional media. Furthermore, Morrow and Omrani (2013) have avered that all too often social media now plays the more destructive role of provoking anger and hatred and of rumour-mongering.

Isa (2013) argues that social media sites from Facebook and Twitter have exhausted their role in the process of political change in the Arab world for two main reasons; firstly, because of Islamic movement control; and secondly, because of the possibility of criticisms by the traditional media, especially via satellite screens and independent newspapers, due to changes in Egypt’s political climate. Rashid (2015) also pointed out that social media sites were unable to effect real change against the junta management, the Brotherhood, or even against the current system, and condemned Facebook and Twitter’s failure to challenge parliamentary and presidential elections or the constitution through the December 2012 referendum. This perspective recalls the argument Malcolm Gladwell raised following the Egyptian revolution in 2011, in which the activists’ efforts focused on social networking sites and the ability to disappear into the crowd on the ground. Accordingly, we must examine the role of social media within each of the parties involved the Egyptian revolution in 2013.
2.3.3.1. Tamarod movement

Social media were used as a tool of change in the hands of Tamarod who demanded that their virtual audience should physically participate in demonstrations against their lack of confidence in the regime of President Morsi. Abufotouh (2013) underscores that the Tamarod movement, a youth movement initially launched via social media, then made the spectacular move from the virtual world to the real world to amass more than 22 million signature forms expressing a withdrawal of confidence from President Morsi. However, a small minority of researchers still maintain that the grass-roots Tamarod movement was more distinctly visible on social media during the Egyptian revolution of 2013. According to Iskandar (2013) following the revolution against Mubarak the Tamarod was sceptical of Egyptian protest movements which mostly focused on building an online following prior to attempting to activate the community. The Tamarod approached mobilisation quite differently. Nevertheless, Allban (2014) claims that the Tamarod movement sparked June 30th demonstrations, as a reported 3 million of the 22 million citizens who signed forms for the withdrawal of confidence from President Morsi did so electronically via the social media of the official campaign. On the other hand, the numbers of signatures collected on the internet constitute a negligible contribution compared to the Tamarod forms which were actually sent through traditional mail.

Rashid (2015) contends that the Tamarod movement was the first step in the June 30th revolution, because it also operated at street level in exhorting people to participate in demonstrations against the regime, and announced their data via traditional media and television, as well as on social media sites. Rashid noted that it could also be argued that the traditional media made a significant contribution to proselytising the June 30th revolution prior to social media sites, and wonders the whether the impact of the social media actually declined, particularly following the emergence of the Tamarod movement:

Tamarod made their rounds on virtually every private television network talk show to discuss the motives behind their campaign, its clear and concerted objectives, as well as its strategy and execution. In addition satellite television had an instrumental role in increasing public familiarity with it. It was television networks that served as the most influential medium used by the campaign to increase their overall audience footprint to reach most Egyptian households

(Iskandar 2013).
Isa (2013) justifies the Tamarod’s decision to resort to the Egyptian street to target the many Egyptians who do not use social networking sites as a tool, in order to put as much pressure as possible on the Egyptian regime, and also to confirm that their audience was not from the virtual world. Iskandar (2013) who pointed out that the Tamarod started its paper petition campaign precisely in order to gather signatures from the many Egyptian communities not serviced by social media and digital technology. At the same time it continued to use its Facebook page to publicize photos of public figures who had signed Tamarod forms, along with signing images of numerous Egyptians from different classes and backgrounds to illustrate the movement’s importance for all Egyptian citizens, while political activists’ Twitter accounts supported the Tamarod movement with continuous inducements to sign the Tamarod petitions (Isa 2013).

2.3.3.2. Morsi’s regime

President Morsi and his supporters finally recognized the importance of social media by the culmination of the 2011 revolution. Therefore, in May 2013 they launched a new campaign under the name of ‘Tagarod’, in an attempt to repel the Tamarod campaign by collecting signatures in support of the "legitimate" President, Mohamed Morsi. The Tagarod campaign was keen to exploit its presence on social media, and also commenced collecting signatures from across Egypt to this end. However, the Tagarod could not rival the success of the Tamarod. Iskandar (2013) claims that in order to undermine the success of the Tamarod, Islamist groups, supportive of the president launched the part serious Tagarod group to petition in support of Morsi. Their campaign failed to pose a threat to Tamarod. According to Al-Arabiya (2013), Asim Abdulmajid, a member of The Muslim Brotherhood and coordinator of the Tagarod movement, claimed they had collected 26 million signatures in support of President Morsi. Asim stated that to refuse Morsi would lead to civil unrest and destroy everything in the state, and what is happening now is a crusade led by extremists of the Copts on the Islamic project. In any event, a social media war was waged between the Tagarod and Tamarod campaigns, especially in Facebook where several of the political campaigns pages were hacked. Ghazzawi (2013) claimed that when that the Tagarod campaign hacked a Facebook page of the Tamarod campaign the Tamarod campaign merely announced their intention to seize one of the pages of the Tagarod campaign in retaliation. It is ironic that all concerned, from The Muslim Brotherhood, President Morsi, the Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, the General Secretary of the Party, Mohamed Beltagy, the Islamist political activist,
Mohammed El-Shater, and the rest of the Brotherhood members, now have accounts on Twitter and Facebook.

Bogart (2013) claims that The Muslim Brotherhood quite soon realised the power of social media. It is also interesting that President Morsi seemed determined to keep his account active on social media until the very last hours of his reign in order to continue communication with his supporters. For instance, a tweet published by Morsi on July 3rd 2013 read, “The president refuses any action against his legitimacy”. This tweet received attention because it was the first direct statement from the president since the outbreak of demonstrations, and indeed, Fitzpatrick (2013) states it was astonishing that Morsi was still stubbornly tweeting regardless of the military coup. However, President Morsi was not alone in keeping his social media accounts active to the last minute. His assistants were also using social media to rally supporters and to try to explain and update ongoing events. Frumin (2013) asserts that Essam El-Haddad, the presidential assistant on foreign relations final post on Facebook took the opportunity to declare, “As I write these lines, I am fully aware that these may be the last lines I get to post on this page. For the sake of Egypt and for historical accuracy, let’s call what is happening by its real name: military coup.” Fitzpatrick (2013) states the power struggle over presidential social media accounts was epitomised by the fact that a 22-minute statement posted on YouTube by President Morsi was promptly and unceremoniously deleted.

2.3.3.3. Egyptian Army (SCAF)

The Egyptian armed forces had had an active account on the Facebook network since the first Egyptian revolution of 2011 and by February 2015 it had received more than 4 million likes on its Facebook Page. Since the very first revolutionary spark demanded the overthrow of President Morsi, the Egyptian Military Council (SCAF) used its Facebook account to send and publish data from the Council. Fitzpatrick (2013) affirms that Morsi and the military were using social media to post statements which were not simultaneously available on any other media. This was corroborated by Frumin (2013) who contends that General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi took to the official Facebook page of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to proclaim a sacred oath that the army would lay down their lives for Egypt and defend its people against any unlawful threat. This post came in the wake of President Morsi’s speech declaring his commitment to his legitimacy and his refusal to respond to calls for his resignation and for early presidential elections.

Several researchers have reported that the Egyptian Military Council had posted the data on social media prior to their publication in the traditional media or official state records, so that
the public would rely on this source of information. It also helped to counter incendiary 
rumours during the time of crisis. Allbani (2014) points to evidence confirming that The 
Egyptian Military Council (SCAF) posted around 90 statements during the period from June 
30 until August 30, 2013. Fitzpatrick (2013) further claims that the SCAF preferred to use 
Facebook to disseminate its own statements, such as, for instance, posting the terms of the 
Morsi's deposition shortly after issuing them on television. Studies by both Allbani (2014) and 
Stacher (2013) confirm that typical SCAF statements revolved around publicising the armed 
forces efforts to eradicate terrorism, the official activities of the armed forces, attempts to 
clarify facts and debunk rumours, and general communication with Egyptian citizens.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction
The previous chapters have provided a general overview of the importance of social media during the revolutions of the Arab Spring states, and in particular, the Arab Republic of Egypt, which demonstrates the significant contribution to political change in the Arab world made by social media. A previous chapter reviewed literature which emphasize that social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, were used as tools for organization of the events of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions, by promoting and encouraging the youth audience, regulation and crowd mobilization, and dissemination of news images, and video clips denouncing the regimes of both President Mubarak and President Morsi. All of these issues were explored in order to develop a framework for the most suitable methodology to be adopted in this study. When conducting research, researchers have a vast array of choice when it comes to selecting the appropriate methods to facilitate data collection and analysis. In this case, the research is focused on monitoring the significance of the roles of social media during the Egyptian revolutions, through its use by activists, campaigns and protest movements. This chapter outlines the selection and scope of the methodology chosen, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of a range of methods in order to critically appraise the most appropriate method adopted for the study. To begin, the chapter delineates research questions of this study, and then goes on to introduce the chosen methodology and present a discussion of the data collection instruments.

3.2. Research questions
The research questions aimed to evaluate the nature and extent of the roles played by social media across the revolutions of the Arab countries in general, and, more specifically, during the Egyptian revolutions. Paying particular attention to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube as a means of mass communication, the research interrogated the degree of attention accorded to social networking sites covering the events of the Arab revolutions. This study aimed to analyse the roles of social media during the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions and explored how social media were used during revolution by addressing the following questions:

- What exactly was the role of social media during the Arab Spring?
- What was the nature of role played by social media during the events of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolution, and what role did the traditional media play?
• Was there any observable change in the role of social media between the first and second revolutions in Egypt?

3.3. Definitions of the study terms

3.3.1. Social media

Social media have been defined as "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content" (Kaplan 2010, p.61), while Ellison and Boyd (2007) state that social network sites are “web-based services that allow individuals to; (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and, (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system”(p.211). (See section 1.3).

3.3.2. The Arab Spring

Called the “Arab Spring” in those Arab countries which have seen uprisings, or protest movements launched between 2010 and 2013, starting from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. (See section 1.5).

3.3.3. Revolution

Yoder (1926) explains revolution as "the term includes any sudden or apparently sudden social change, so that political revolution is but one of several types. Revolution as change in the entire social order" (part, 1). (See chapter 2).

3.4. Research design

This research is based on a case study which is used to analyse comprehensive information on a wide area. Alasuutari et al (2008) claims that "the raison d’etre of case study is deep understanding of particular instances of phenomena" (p.214). The case study research required data collection from sources relating to the issue. As such, this study collected primary sources of data from the Egyptian youth who have been attributed with fuelling the Egyptian revolutions, through a mixed methodology design which combines quantitative and qualitative methods. According to a Yin (2011) case study researches are not limited to a
single source of data, and also argues that the case study design could be a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in the same case study. Creswell (2013) clearly agrees that "research designs are types of inquiry within qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches that provide specific direction for procedures in a research design” (p.43). Therefore this study uses an explanatory sequential mixed methods which combines quantitative (structured questionnaire) and qualitative (semi-structured interviews) methodological approach in order to fully determine the role of social media in the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions.

The initial data in this study were derived from the quantitative approach. This is the most preferred method for research work and allows respondents to provide answers in a quantifiable manner which produces structured indices and trends from the collated participant responses. The reason for this approach is because of the high number of students which were surveyed during the study. The on this occasion, the researcher used a structured questionnaire which was designed to collect precise and comparable data from large numbers of respondents within a relatively short time period, due to the situation in Egypt which is explained further on this chapter. These questionnaires may easily be analysed objectively and empirically. Furthermore, this questionnaire was distributed to students in the Egyptian public universities in Greater Cairo which had seen the beginning and end of the events of the Egyptian revolutions. By targeting such an extensive sample of respondents to examine and evaluate the role of social media in the Egyptian revolutions, the questionnaire made a significant contribution to this study and helped to identify whether social media had a role in mobilizing youth for the revolution, and the degree to which the Egyptian people associated social media with the events of the revolutions of 2011 and 2013.

The second method that was used in this study was qualitative in approach. It was an attempt to explore the motivation behind the use of social media and was conducted through semi-structured interviews with students from each university. The interviews introduce the deep data gathering method which has proved effective in providing a realistic overview of people’s thoughts and experiences. Furthermore, it permitted the researcher to ask the interviewees more complex and deep questions, and to seek further details or clarification as required. Consequently, the researcher depended in this study on Explanatory sequential mixed methods model, which allows collecting the quantitative data through questionnaires and then using the qualitative data to explain the research questions.
3.5. The Case Study

Thomas (2011) has stated "case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods"(p.513). In addition, the article by Hyett et al (2014) asserts “case study research is an increasingly popular approach among qualitative researchers, which provides methodological flexibility through the incorporation of different paradigmatic positions” (p.10). They both agree that case study research is a method in the research field which details the examination of a subject through an in-depth exploration. Baxter and Jack (2008) also aver that case study research has the potential to better deal with complex situations, as it allows a researcher to find answers to 'How and Why', and to determine whether the situation relates to a single individual or issue. This research required the use of case study methodology given the complexity of the various components involved in the Egyptian events, demographic, communities, and locations.

Moreover, there are different types of case studies have also been theorized amongst many researchers, but three main strands have emerged. These are exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory case studies, each of which is suitable to conduct an examination of either a single or multiple cases study. The collection of data from the youth in Egypt can best be done through explanatory case study to explain the similarities and differences in the use of social media between the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013. The engagement of different activists to collect data can be used to investigate the identified phenomenon from a broader perspective. Yin (2011) has also observed that explanatory case study is best used in evaluating complex and multivariate cases which may include problem-solving, knowledge–driven and social-interaction theory application. Baxter and Jack (2008) agreed and observed that "this type of case study would be used if you were seeking to answer a question that sought to explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies"(p.547).

Explanatory case studies are the most difficult and may be the most frequently challenged, each case study seeks to explain how and why a series of events occurred

(Yin 2011, p.89).

Creswell (2013) described explanatory research as the close examination of data to explain a phenomenon in depth. A case example is evaluating why a researcher prefers a given type of method or strategy in collecting data. Through explanatory case study researchers are able to
formulate a theory and then test it through the collected data. Explanatory case study is also used in pattern-matching where a researcher engages findings from different cases to explain a single phenomenon. However, there are two main designs of case study research; the single-case study and multiple-case study. “if your study is limited to a single organization, you would have an embedded, single case study. If you study two or more organizations in the same manner you would have an embedded, multiple case study” (Yin 2011, p.7).

The case study, while it is of the singular, may contain more than one element in its subject. If there are two or several cases each individual case is less important in itself than the comparison that each offers with the others

(Thomas 2011, p.517)

It is important to observe that this study focuses on the roles which were played by social media in the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions, which means that the single-case study may not be appropriate. Baxter and Jack (2008) maintained that "a multiple case study enables the researcher to explore differences within and between cases"(p.548). A multiple-case study was selected for this study as more relevant and appropriate. The multiple-case study is more suitable in replicating the study in order to explore the phenomenon from the different perspectives of different activities. Therefore the multiple-case study as opposed to the single case study can be effectively applied here to collect data relating to the different revolution activities among the diverse Egyptian youth who participated in the Egyptian revolutions.

The advantages of the case study as explained by Flyvbjerg (2006) stated in detail that a major strength of the case study method is that it supports the researcher’s objective of testing scientific theories in the real world. And in fact, the most common application of case study method is a combined use of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to collect and analyse data as this confirms any detailed contextual analysis of a phenomenon which may be limited to a few subjects. Furthermore, Creswell (2013) has insisted that any case study method is the most appropriate for researchers confined to exploring real-life situations because it allows the researcher to conduct an empirical inquiry into a phenomenon within its real-life context. Given that the case study objective was to understand the underlying catalyst for the Egyptian revolutions, which was ultimately about regime change, community based problems, and security issues. Given that this case study is based on two revolutions, 2011 and 2013, each one of which had a different construction, a disadvantage of the study became apparent as the study progressed. The revolution of 2011 had 100 percent of the protesters
protesting against the regime. However, the revolution of 2013 was split between those against the government and those in favour.

3.6. The Mixed Methods Research (MMR)

Mixed methods research is an approach to inquiry involving collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data, and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks

(Creswell 2013, p.4)

In identifying different research methods, O’Cathain (2010) indicates that the two main approaches are qualitative and quantitative. When these methods are combined they are called mixed methodology. In most cases, researchers select a mixed methodology because it allows them to use different approaches to explore a similar phenomenon, and then to compare the data and results of the respective methods. Davies’s work (2007) confirmed that "the case study utilises a range of different measurement techniques, the case study also is not limited to any one methodological tool"(p.2). In addition, Leech et al (2010) observed that researchers favour the use of a mixed approach when one method is considered insufficient to fully address the research problem. Researchers exploit the strengths of both approaches in an effort to capitalize on a thorough investigation of a phenomenon. In fact, the use of both approaches is considered more effective for investigation and analysis of a problem than the use of a single method.

Camerino, et al (2014) pointed out that two main types of mixed design have been identified, multi-method procedure which is based on more than one method but from the same perspective QUAN/QUAN or QUAL/QUAL. In addition, a mixed method procedure is based on more than one method from a different perspective QUAL/QUAN. In addition, Creswell (2013) contends that there are many more types of mixed methods designs, but in terms of the social sciences, the three primary models are; Convergent parallel mixed methods, Exploratory sequential mixed methods and Explanatory sequential mixed methods; in which the researcher first conducts quantitative research, and then uses qualitative research to analyse and build on the results in order to expound upon them in more detail. Consequently, Explanatory sequential mixed methods model was used in this study, where the researcher
collected the quantitative data through questionnaires from Egyptian students and then used the qualitative data to explain and get more details about the research questions.

Many advantages are associated with the use of mixed methods research, the principal among them being that during a study it can facilitate researchers to deploy the strength of one research approach to counter the weakness of the other method (Alise and Teddlie, 2010). In addition, by using mixed methods, Natasi et al (2010) has observed that researchers may be able to address a broader range of research questions, as the researcher is not confined to a single method which may limit exploring a particular aspect of the research question. Finally, mixed methods can help to increase the ‘generalizability’ of results through the combination of findings from both qualitative and quantitative approaches. As we can see it is appropriate that this study was conducted through a mixed research approach in order to study the role of social media during the Egyptian revolutions, as this study particularly aimed to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative aspects of data collection and analysis in order to comprehensively explore this the role of social media during the Egyptian revolutions.

In fact, the disadvantage of using mixed methods in a research is the time consuming and labour-intensive nature of the task. The researcher may require extensive periods of time in order to gather data using both methods, and to analyse them appropriately in order to present the findings. This research can confirm the above disadvantages as the fieldwork in Egypt took a total of seven months, and the researcher discovered the limitations of his expertise during this period which will be discussed later.

3.7. Quantitative Methods

Quantitative research is an approach for testing objective theories by examining the relationship among measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analyzed using statistical procedures (Creswell 2013, p.247).

In the broadest sense, a quantitative research approach involves collection of numerical data for statistical analysis and is one of the most frequently used approaches. The approach is applied in cases where the researcher aims to answer specific questions with quantifiable answers from a large number of participants to explore a single phenomenon.
One significant advantage of quantitative research is that it can be used to canvas an issue across a wide range of participants. Use of such a broad-ranging sample, is seen to boost the reliability of the research findings and lends credence to the overall results. The use of quantitative research in this study was of major benefit as it enabled the researcher to canvas across a wide range in a relatively short period of time. However, Quantitative research also carries some disadvantages when conducting different types of studies. For example, the method cannot narrow its focus to just a few of the main participants of the study. Quantitative research is also ineffective when evaluating behavioural aspects of identified targets because researchers may need interpersonal connections and relationships with the target.

3.8. Qualitative Methods
The other most frequently used research approach is qualitative research. Creswell (2013) explains that "qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem" (p. 35). Researchers have identified numerous advantages for undertaking qualitative research. The works of Groves et al (2011) observed that participants’ own categories of meaning in data collection are a key advantage of qualitative approach. This is very important because it presents a reliable source of information, particularly when addressing behavioural issues. An added advantage is that the method can also be introduced to describe complex phenomena which other research approaches may not. However, there are several disadvantages which deter many researchers from selecting qualitative research as a method of data collection and analysis. For Charmaz (2006), one fundamental drawback of qualitative studies is the impossibility of applying the research findings to other settings. Charmaz (2006) is also wary of the time-consuming nature of qualitative research methods which are predicated on an in-depth exploration of the issue for each and every subject involved.

3.9. Research Instruments
When conducting a research study, it is important to note that the choice of data collection method is an axiomatic step. Similarly the choice of a research instrument which may not work precisely or consistently across a given study risks producing invalid and unreliable data. For successful data collation and reliable results then, it is imperative that the researcher use the appropriate instruments. Clearly both qualitative and quantitative instruments have their advantages and disadvantages. This being so, deploying both instruments in a research study relating to issues of political activists in Egypt is deemed appropriate as it ensures that
data could be collected from both methods to enhance triangulation. Ultimately, the mixed collection of data could capitalize on the strengths of both methods to complement the reliability and validity of the research findings.

There are two main broad instruments preferred in data collection among researchers: questionnaire and interview. A comprehensive understanding of these tools, including how they work and their advantages and disadvantages, is essential for any researcher. As discussed above, the general researcher consensus is that it is most appropriate to integrate instruments into a single study, particularly when a researcher is aiming to gather different types of data via both questionnaire and interview instruments.

Figure 3-1: Validation of quantitative data design (adapted from Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 63) noted in (Camerino et al. 2014, p.11)

Therefore the use of both tools in collecting data relating to the role played by social media during the Arab Spring generally, and particularly in Egypt, was deemed more appropriate. In this study a quantitative (structured questionnaire) instrument was used to amass the quantitative data, while the interviews (Semi-structured interviews) compiled the qualitative counterpart. However, the main findings derived from using both tools facilitated the integration of a mixed methods study, which in turn, effectively enhanced and increased the reliability and validity of the overall research findings. In the following parts more details are given about the research instruments used.

3.9.1. Questionnaire

The questionnaire instrument has been popularly used by research scholars because of its ease of application in the collection of data. In addition, the questionnaire instrument is especially useful when the study aims to poll a mass audience. A questionnaire is defined as a set of questions developed by the researcher to guide in a sequence of data collection (Creswell
2007). However, there are three types of questionnaire instrument used in data collection as identified by Denzin and Lincoln (2011); these are structured, semi-structured, and unstructured questionnaires. The structured questionnaire is referred to as the use of closed-ended questions which direct respondents to particular selections relating to their responses on an issue. In this research, the structured questionnaire was used to allow Egyptian students the opportunity to participate in this research.

Many researchers have opted to use questionnaires because of the advantages they have in facilitating data collection. Fowler (2013) in particular notes that the questionnaire assists with the collection of statistics which is foundational for theoretical and hypothetical testing. Questionnaires are also often preferred for short-time studies as they facilitate timely data collection and require less analysis time. However, questionnaires may also be disadvantageous to some research studies. Creswell (2007) claimed that because of their statistical nature, questionnaires cannot be used to understand some forms of information in a given study, such as individual feelings and emotions, for instance.

3.9.2. Interview
The interview instrument has been used across numerous research studies. Fowler (2013) confirms that the interview process enables direct conversations between the researcher and respondent relating to an identified issue, and that these conversations are structured around relevant questions which direct the respondent to yield significant research-relation information. There are also three main types of interviews for researchers to choose from: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Alasuutari et al. 2008, p.218). However, in this research the semi-structured interview, which gave the opportunity to discuss, clarify, or suggest any issue of interest that may not have been covered in the directive questions specified by the researcher, was used.

The main advantage of using interviews in data collection is that they guarantee the engagement of a small group of people in an in-depth exploration of the research issue. Groves et al (2011) aver that interviews may be of benefit when collating data on a complex phenomenon which relates to human behaviour. This is because during the course of the interview the researcher retrieves additional information such as body language, along with the target data. However, one inevitable disadvantage of interviews is the extensive volume of content collected in a study, much of which can be extraneous to the final analysis of the identified phenomenon. In the same way, researchers may spend a protracted time period
analysing collected interview data that has little or no bearing on the study. In addition, certain disadvantages became apparent during the individual interviews, these manifested themselves in loud background noises, physical interruptions, and use of slang language.

3.10. The Pilot Study

Prior to travelling to Egypt, in order to verify the feasibility of questions in the questionnaire and interview questions, the researcher conducted pre-test on both the questionnaire and interview questions.

The purpose of this pre-test study was to verify that the questionnaire and interview questions fully addressed all the necessary research points relating to the role played by social media during the Egyptian revolutions of the Arab Spring. Moreover, to make sure that all the ideas and topics in the questionnaire and interview questions were translated from the English language to the Arabic language correctly and clear. The pilot study for this research took place in April 2015. Both the questionnaire and interview questions were sent by email to nine Egyptian youth prior to the actual study, in order to verify and check that all the required issues were incorporated.

Feedback was generally satisfactory, although there was one issue which was unclear for the participants, which was the second part of the questionnaire which discussed the question of the role of social media in both Egyptian revolutions. The researcher was required to reclassify that part, C-Egyptian revolutions in 2011 and 2013, to sections 1, 2, and 3 in the questionnaire form which needed to be answered twice in order to be able to compare 2011 and 2013.

3.11. The study community

The Arab Republic of Egypt, a vast, populous and ancient middle-eastern sovereign state, exercises considerable political influence, both locally amongst its Arab neighbours, and in the arena of international politics. It has seen two revolutions during the Arab Spring as explained in chapter two. This study therefore spotlights the Egyptian youth community, between the ages of 20 to 30 attending university as undergraduates and postgraduates, who are perceived to have galvanized the Egyptian revolutions and revolutions of 2011 and 2013.

A report by Egyptian CAPMAS was presented that shows that Egyptian society is considered a young one, where 32.8% of the total population is composed of youth of the age group 15-
34 years. Moreover, the Egyptian population reached 104.2 million, of which 94.7 million are living in the country and 9.4 million are abroad (CAPMAS 2017).

This research focused on the Egyptian government universities in Greater Cairo and Alexandria which had seen the beginning and end of the events of the Egyptian revolutions. ELSHEIKH (2017) reported "regarding the distribution of citizens in governorates, the population of Cairo is the highest, accounting for 10.1% of the total population, followed by Giza 9.1%". According to reports ELSHEIKH (2017) "for education, slightly less than 19% of the population have a lower-than-average qualification, 22.2% received a vocational degree, 6.9% received a secondary-school degree, and 12.4% have a higher education degree".

3.12. Sampling

In many cases purposive sampling is used in order to access knowledgeable people i.e. those who have in-depth knowledge about particular issues, maybe by virtue of their professional role, power, access to networks, expertise or experience (Cohen et al. 2013, p.157).

The researcher used a non-probability sampling strategy in this study, due to the fact that during the Egyptian revolution in 2011, social media were used to motivate Egyptian youth to come out to protest, identify times and places of gatherings, and warning of the presence of danger to protesters anywhere (Ghany 2011). However, during the Egyptian revolution in 2013, social media have been used as tools of change in the hands of “Tamarod” which was organized by the youth organisers in Egypt who demanded the audience should participate in demonstrations against the regime (Abufotouh 2013). For this research a purposive sample based in government universities was used as this was the most logical location for a concentration of youth who would have been involved in the revolutions. Cohen et al (2013) found that some researchers indicated that "it is commonplace for mixed methods research to use more than one kind of sample (probability, non-probability) and to use samples of different sizes, scope and types"(p.162). Based on the above, this research focused on a purposive sample within the Egyptian universities to study in more detail the role of social media during the Egyptian revolutions through students of government universities in Greater Cairo and Alexandria which had seen the beginning and end of the events of the Egyptian
revolutions. In addition, Cairo is the capital city of Egypt that includes Tahrir Square that has witnessed all events of the revolutions.

Greater Cairo includes three Egyptian governorates Giza, Qalyubia, and Cairo (Cairo-Governorate, 2013). These governorates include seven government universities. Moreover, Alexandria, Egypt's second capital (Nasser, 1954), has one of the biggest government universities in Egypt. Therefore, this study was conducted in eight universities which are listed in Table 4-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Governorates</th>
<th>The Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Cairo</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ain Shams University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helwan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Azhar University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Sadat City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>Cairo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalyubia</td>
<td>Benha University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Alexandria University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-1: Supreme Council of Universities in Egypt (SCU 2012)

3.12.1. Sample size and response rate

This research depended on a study of a total of 800 students through the distribution of 100 questionnaires in each of eight Egyptian government universities in Cairo, Giza, Qalyubia and Alexandria. In addition, it was necessary to conduct 80 interviews in person involving 10 students of each university. While the plan was to gather data from these eight institutions, the researcher only got permission from five Egyptian universities to carry out the research. Therefore, the study was only conducted in the following universities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Governorates</th>
<th>The Universities</th>
<th>students</th>
<th>Faculties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Cairo</td>
<td>Al-Azhar University</td>
<td>297,000</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers University</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Sadat City</td>
<td>16,707</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>Cairo University</td>
<td>207,853</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalyubia</td>
<td>Benha University</td>
<td>73,070</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2: Sample size and response rate

As a result, the researcher increased the number of questionnaires distributed from 100 to 150 questionnaires in each of the five universities which had given permission due to the exclusion of three universities (Ain Shams University, Helwan University and Alexandria University).
A total of 750 questionnaires were distributed and of these 509 questionnaires were returned. Subsequently, 86 questionnaires were excluded, (37 questionnaires had uncompleted answers, and 49 questionnaires were excluded due to double choice or more for a single option answer or some questionnaires had answers which had no variations). This resulted in a total of 423 questionnaires being available for analysis. 74 students agreed to do an interview, through choosing the option on the questionnaire and detailed their information accordingly. However, it was only possible to interview 33 respondents. This was due to the refusal of 35 students to have the interview recorded, due to the heightened security presence due to the political instability in the country at the time. In addition, 6 students had given the wrong phone number on the questionnaire.

3.13. Actual Fieldwork Procedures

Data collection procedures commenced in May 2015 and concluded in November 2015. Before Fieldwork commenced, it was necessary for the researcher to get permission from the PhD Ethics Committee of the University of Limerick for this fieldwork application (reference: 2015_04_06_AHSS). It was approved on April 27th 2015. Due to the current political situation in the Middle East, it was necessary to ensure that all permissions, from the various government agencies who might have a concern with the topic of this study, were received. Permission was received from the Saudi Cultural Mission in Ireland for the fieldwork study to commence. In addition, the researcher had gotten a letter of introduction from his Supervisor and also letters of introduction and explanation from the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Ireland and Cairo to the Egyptian universities concerning his fieldwork. These letters were subsequently ratified by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Ireland.

When the researcher arrived in Egypt, it became apparent that there would be a number of academic limitations to the fieldwork he proposed to do. For instance, because the researcher is from Saudi Arabia and studying in a foreign country (Ireland), the eight Egyptian Universities needed approval from State Security / Intelligence unit before allowing him to begin his fieldwork. However, State Security approval took more than three months and only covered five of the universities which are Cairo University, Al-Azhar University, Workers University, University of Sadat City, and Benha University. The other Universities Ain Shams University, Helwan University, and Alexandria University did not have any problem with the research, but were still awaiting approval from State Security. Another limitation was the difficulty of movement between the various governorates, especially involving long distances.
In addition, the annual vacation for all students in Egyptian universities is the end of June to the first quarter of September.

Moreover, the researcher also noted some general limitations in fieldwork especially during turbulent periods. During the period the fieldwork was being carried out Egypt saw many security challenges, which was the cause of the researcher having difficulty in his movements between Governorates. For example, the killing of the Attorney General of Egypt, a battle with militants in Northern Sinai which resulted in the deaths of 100 soldiers, the bombing of the state security building by Islamic State, also a bombing outside the Italian embassy in Cairo, and the launch of the new Suez Canal expansion. All these incidents resulted in more heightened security checks and delays. Permission had to be procured from each university before the questionnaires could be distributed. Each university had their own system, timeline, and bureaucracy which caused further delays. This permission in turn had to be ratified by the office of Campus Security. Once this was finalized distribution could begin. To insure the maximum distribution of the questionnaire, a central location was selected in each university where maximum footfall occurred. The engagement with each potential participant took between five to ten minutes to explain the questionnaire and to allay any concerns they had. Some students took the questionnaire away to fill out while others filled them out immediately. Approximately 25 per cent of potential participants refused to engage with the researcher. In addition, 241 questionnaires which were distributed were not returned. On the questionnaire form the respondent was given the option of following on with an interview with the researcher. People who opted for the interview also had to give their phone number. When the questionnaires had all been analysed the researcher contacted the people who agreed to be interviewed. Subsequently 74 respondents, when they heard the interview would be recorded, declined the offer. The balance of the respondents, 33 people, who agreed to recorded interview gave the researcher the location they would like the interview to be conducted. Some respondents selected interview on campus while others selected the location off campus. Each interview took between 20 to 30 minutes approximately.
3.14. Participants in the questionnaires

This study is based on a purposive sample of 423 students which were representative of five Egyptian universities as follows: 74 students from Cairo University, 80 students from Benha University, 97 students from Al-Azhar University, 83 students from the Workers University, and 89 students from the University of Sadat City. Moreover, the participants consisted of 395 undergraduate students and 28 postgraduate students. In addition, the participants comprised 252 male and 171 female students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Universities</th>
<th>participants</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Postgraduate</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers University</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Azhar University</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Sadat City</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo University</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benha University</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td><strong>423</strong></td>
<td><strong>395</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>252</strong></td>
<td><strong>171</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3: Participants in the questionnaires

3.15. Participants in the interviews

This study is based on all students who agreed to do the recorded interview, who are 33 students representative of five Egyptian universities as follows: 8 students from Cairo University, 5 students from Benha University, 6 students from Al-Azhar University, 7 students from the Workers University, and 7 students from the University of Sadat City. In addition, the participants comprised 18 male and 15 female students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Universities</th>
<th>participants</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers University</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Azhar University</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Sadat City</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo University</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benha University</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-4: Participants in the interviews
3.16. Description and demographic information of the Participants of the study

The previous diagram shows that 58.2% of the participants of the study were male and 41.8% female. The researcher tried hard to get more females to participate in the study but his efforts were in vain due to the nature of the Egyptian society that sometimes prevents females from participating in public political polls. Also, the researcher perceived that they were afraid and displayed some discomfort towards the research despite the continuing assurance that this data is confidential and will be used just for research purposes. However, the situation in Egypt after the two revolutions is difficult and causes some kind of anxiety towards participating in such events.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The relevant frequencies, percentages and means calculations are presented in (Appendix F).
The previous diagram reveals that the numbers and percentages of students in the universities participating in the study are close; 17.5% in Cairo University, 22.6% in Al-Azhar University, 19.6% in Workers University, 21% in Al-Sadat University, and 18.9% in Banha University. These universities represent students from Egyptian society ranging from urban represented by Cairo University, to rural group represented by Al-Sadat and Banha Universities, and the mixed group embodied by Al-Azhar and Workers Universities.
Based on the above diagram, undergraduate students represents the majority of the participants (93%) compared to graduate students (6.6%). This is mainly related to the nature of numbers of students in the two levels.

![Pie chart showing social media usage frequency]

**Figure 3-5: How often do you use social media?**

The above diagram reveals that the majority of the participants (84.2%) use social media daily, and (14.2%) weekly.

![Pie chart showing most frequently used social media]

**Figure 3-6: What kind of social media do you use most frequently?**

The above diagram reveals that 79% of the participants of this study use Facebook as the most frequent social media, followed by Twitter with 13.7% and YouTube 7.3%. Zaghloul (2010)
has confirmed that "Egypt was ranked first of the Arab countries and 23rd in the world in terms of the rates of entry to Facebook in 2010". Additionally, Huang (2011) mentions that Egypt saw growth in the use of Facebook at 29 percent compared to 12 percent the previous year, 2010. Socialcapital (2013) claimed that “There is evidence that Facebook was used much more prominently in the second revolution than the first”. By August 2014 the number of Facebook users in Egypt had risen to nearly 20 million. In fact, it has increased steadily for the past year since 2013, which amounted to 16.2 million subscribers in early 2013. As a Twitter site, Egypt is second in terms of number of users, with 519,000 personal accounts on the site in 2013. Even more Egyptians use Facebook than Twitter (Jamal et al. 2015, p.56).

![Pie Chart](image.png)

Figure 3-7: Is your use of social media mostly done by?

The above diagram reveals that 67.8% use smart phones and are the most common tool to log onto social media while desktops came second with 21.5% and Tablets came last with 10.6%.
The above diagram clearly reveals that 63.8% of the participants use social media for social purposes, 10.6% for commercial, and 25.5% for entertainment.

Based on the above diagram, 35.2% of the participants used social media before 2010 and 64.8% used it during 2010.
Figure 3-10: Are you a member of any Movement or Campaign or Party in Egypt?

The above diagram shows that the majority of the participants of the study (94.1%), were not members of any party, movement or campaign before January 2011, while 5.9% were members.

3.17. The study variables (independent and dependent)

The study concerned a number of independent and dependent variables, which were established to build the study tools and to perform quantitative and qualitative analyses. These variables are as follows:

3.17.1. Independent variables:

The study dealt with an independent variable, social media (YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter). It also addressed a number of independent taxonomic variables related to the sample and its nature:

- Gender, Male - Female.
- Geographical Area (Greater Cairo - Alexandria).
- Egyptian universities (Cairo University, Al-Azhar University, Ain Shams University, University of Sadat City, Workers University, Helwan University, Benha University, and Alexandria University).
- Level of use of social media.
- Education level.
3.17.2. Dependent variables:
The study concerned the effect of the independent variable, the social media and the independent taxonomic variables, to guide the sample's views in the following dependent variables:

- The events of the Arab spring revolutions.
- The events of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.
- The events of the Egyptian revolution in 2013.
- The differences between the events of the 2011 and 2013 revolutions in Egypt.
- Compare with the role of traditional media.

3.18. Data analysis
The quantitative data were analysed using an SPSS program. This was used because of the researcher’s aims and the nature of the questionnaire administered and descriptive statistics. It is used to identify the most frequent scores obtained and their percentages on each item. It had analysed all the items of the questionnaire together, to get the mean and the mode. Then, analysed each item alone to get Frequency and Percent with diagram.

In the beginning, the researcher had tried to analyse quantitative data through SPSS program by himself. However, there had been many difficulties with the program which were beyond the expertise of the researcher such as the extraction of the results from the program due to the fact there were so many options in the SPSS program. This necessitated assistance from a statistician expert to deal with the program and export the results.

Furthermore, forty questionnaires were piloted to test the reliability of the questionnaire, and their responses were subjected to Alpha Cronbach’s coefficient. This is to test the consistency of each item and assure that the questionnaire is uni-dimensional. The results obtained and presented in the next tables reveal that the alpha coefficient for the questionnaire items is 0.89 suggesting that the questionnaire items have relatively high consistency and that the questionnaire is uni-dimensional and reliable, as follows:
Moreover, the qualitative data analysis was fulfilled through explaining and interpreting the data obtained through interviews held with the participants of the study. The purpose was to have deep investigation and interpretation of the quantitative data.

Students’ answers to the interviews questions were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The qualitative analysis started with giving a unique number to each participant to ensure privacy. Then, the researcher analysed the qualitative data through the thematic to easy identify the major dimensions of students’ opinions regarding the main ideas listed in the questionnaire. However, in regards to the validity and reliability of the qualitative analysis of the research, I did my utmost to represent the different viewpoints of the participants by thematic analysis. This method was used because of the low number of respondents to the recorded interview. Quantitative analysis was used on the higher number of 423 students but the interview process only had a total number of 33 students. All the interviews were conducted in Arabic language. As thematic method is based on themes, it is able to analyse different languages, it can compensate for translation and slang words which were used during the interview process.
3.19. Research Ethics

In facilitating any kind of research involving human participation, important ethical issues must be taken into account. Research ethics are the procedures and policies which guide a research study to prevent incurring any harm or malice to the respondents. Ethical governance is of paramount importance in research studies which require participants to respond to politically or socially sensitive issues. Creswell (2013) has stated that "these issues apply to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research and to all stages of research" (p. 123). Anonymity may be defined as the non-disclosure of any respondent’s personal information which could inadvertently lead to revelations of his or her identity. McBride (2012) has specifically underscored the centrality of anonymity in all research ethics. Certainly, in the context of research which seeks to investigate the extremely sensitive issue of the revolutionary Egyptian youth of the Arab Spring, participant anonymity must be the prerequisite determinant of the entire study. Interacting with the youth in Egyptian universities was not necessarily a sensitive matter, but it might have been perceived to impact on the Egyptian government and other stakeholders. For this reason, the researcher undertook the following steps:

- The researcher carried a letter from the PhD supervisor which included researcher identification, along with a research definition and its goals.
- The definition letter was ratified by the Saudi Arabia Embassy and the Cultural Mission in Dublin.
- The definition letter was ratified by the Egyptian Embassy in Dublin.
- The definition letter was ratified by the Saudi Cultural Mission in Egypt.
- The definition letter to the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education or the universities to request approval to visit and gather information was shown on request.
- Contact was then made with university management and teaching staff in the various institutions.

Furthermore, to avoid any potential ethical misunderstandings during the data collection phase of this study, the researcher undertook the following:

- All participants were informed about the purpose and aims of the study.
- Participants were not subjected to pressure of any kind and were made aware that they could withdraw from the study at any stage.
All participant names, taken for interview purposes, and details were and will be maintained in the strictest confidence and will never be disclosed in any report or study.

All replies to questionnaires were anonymous.

The researcher respected all cultural, gender, religious, and all other differences amongst participants.

The researcher extended his thanks all the participants, and maintains all data files at a secure location only accessible to the researcher and in line with University of Limerick’s storage guidelines.

Confidentiality has also been identified in research studies as a significant ethical issue in facilitating a study. McBride (2012) defined confidentiality as the presentation of the information collected from the researcher without any level of alteration of prejudice, and Creswell (2013) stressed that the researcher can protect the participants from anonymity of individuals and any incidents in several ways. "in survey research, investigators disassociate names from responses during the coding and recording process, in qualitative research, inquirers use aliases or pseudonyms for individuals and places, to protect the identities of participants"(p.130). In all studies, research respondents feel more secure when they know that the information they give will be recorded as given and no alterations made. For this study concerning the youth in Egypt, the researcher practised a high level of professionalism to ensure the best possible degree of confidentiality. All data collected was recorded as given by the respondents. However, Cohen et al (2013) discussed the issue of ethics in qualitative data and pointed to the fact that "qualitative data analysis frequently concerns individual cases and unique instances, and may involve personal and sensitive matters; it raises the question of identifiability, confidentiality and privacy of individuals. Whilst numerical data can be aggregated so that individuals are not traceable, this may not be the case in qualitative data analysis, even if individuals are not named or are given pseudonyms".

When conducting research studies, providing information beforehand is important for protecting the privacy of respondents and ensuring they come to no harm. The concept of informing the respondents beforehand and requesting their willingness to engage in the study is referred to as informed consent (Creswell, 2013). For the study engaging Egyptian youth, informed consent was facilitated by a signed consent form from each participant. In this case, each participant was issued with a form containing details of the study, among them was the
topic, the rationale for conducting the study, how the study would affect them, and the scope and the nature of their contribution to the study. Thus each potential participant was able to familiarize themselves with all aspects of the study and make an informed decision on to participate or not. Data collection for this study only includes respondents who have signed the participation consent form.

Intellectual property is also a sensitive ethical issue guiding researcher studies and is defined as the formal recognition of any scholarly works either referred to or inferred in a given study. In the current study, any such information used is properly referenced and cited to acknowledge the original authors.
Chapter 4: Data Analysis 1- The general role of the social media in the Arab Revolutions:

4.1. Introduction
The current chapter presents findings on the role of social media in each of Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, and similar revolutions in other Arab countries, such as the Syrian Revolution, which still continue to this day, based on results obtained through questionnaires and follow up interviews from the perspectives of the Egyptian students. This is because all Arab revolutions were launched during that period for the same reasons, there was a number of Egyptian issues shared by other Arab Spring countries, such as economic hardship, high rates of unemployment, particularly among the young, political corruption and demands for democracy. However, there was connection between the Egyptian protestor activities and other protestor activities in other countries. In addition, there was communication between them.

The chapter is structured in order to highlight three main themes that emerged from the findings on the role of social media in these events. First of all, the role of social media as commanding the revolutions is discussed; following this, the chapter moves on to look at the role of social media as a means of political engagement; thirdly, the role of social media in strengthening democracy is explored as the final theme to emerge from the data. These results will be discussed in detail in section 7.2.²

4.2. Commanding the revolutions
For a deep understanding of the role of the Arab Spring Revolutions, the quantitative and qualitative results of the study will be presented looking at three dimensions: how the use of social media contributed to the advancement and organization of the events of the revolutions; how social media encouraged the protestors; and how the Arab Revolutions started spontaneously and were unplanned.

²The relevant frequencies, percentages and means calculations are presented in (Appendix G).
The majority of students (322 out of 423 of the participants of the study) reported that in their opinion the use of social media contributed to preparing the way for the Arab Spring revolution. These results are in line with Sedra (2013) who found that "new media played an important role in advocacy during the uprising; social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter were used by political activists to communicate with each other, publish their thoughts and report on the events as they unfolded" (p.8).

Participants of the study confirmed this in their interviews. They emphasized that social media played a prominent role in mobilizing protesters and organizing times and locations for these to take place. Interviewee 31 for instance stated that social media such as Facebook mobilized protesters to join together and make a revolution. In the same vein, interviewee 10 confirmed this idea saying social media played a dramatic role as people could communicate with each other via social media, congregate in large groups, and set dates and place to outburst the revolution. Interviewee 1 had the same opinion: via social media, people everywhere knew about revolutions and places for crowds to meet to ask for their public and individual demands whatever their class differences.

A number of participants expressed the idea that social media were particularly important because they were the source of correct, up-to-date news about the Arab Spring Revolutions. Interviewee 3 for example said yes it played an important role because it informed youth of what was happening in their country in a correct and sound way. Interviewee 21 also agreed, saying all existing information was displayed at once. When such information was posted, they helped me know the news of the Arab countries around us as well, as those countries had

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3 Translated from Arabic language.
a very important role in our revolution. Finally, interviewee 6 added that social media gave a better picture of what was going on and showed the true information about the revolutions. For example, if someone did not mobilize with the revolutionists, he would at least know what was happening in it via social media.

Another significant finding is that 301 out of 423 of the participants of the study accepted the idea that social media encouraged the protesters to protest since 71% agreed with this idea, 28% agreeing strongly as depicted in the above diagram. Qualitative data revealed that social media had a significant role in mobilising and encouraging protesters. Interviewee 24 for instance pointed to the huge number of people participating saying such a large number of people could not be mobilised without social media. They have been gathered from all governorates and all over the country to express their opinions. Interviewee 8 was of the same view. He said, Social media were the reason for connecting people and setting up revolutions through communicating via Facebook and Twitter.
Nevertheless, the results of the study indicate that more than half (66%) of student participants agree with the idea that the Arab revolutions occurred spontaneously without previous planning, with 28% agreeing strongly (see Figure 5-3). Qualitative data revealed that participants, though generally agreeing with the idea that the revolutions were not primarily prompted by social media, some of them have different opinions. Interviewee 33 for instance said leisure time which the youth enjoy allows them to walk for 24 hours holding his cell phone, and checking his Facebook or “WhatsApp” or any other means of social network. Respondent number 26 insisted that it was the actions of the politicians that directly led to the revolution rather than this being mediated: no, because many revolutions have occurred as a result of the corruption of a particular regime in such country. Therefore, the people of that country have exploded. It was a series of actions that have no connections. Respondent 33 accused the west of committing conspiracies against the country. He asked do you know who the creator of such media is and the reasons for such media to come into this country? It is the west who controls you now through this means. The west does not fight you now through soldiers. It utilizes the youth which is the base of any country.

4.3. Political engagement

To highlight the importance of the role of social media in the Arab Spring Revolutions, the quantitative and qualitative data are presented in three dimensions, which represent the themes that emerged from the research findings: first of all, the theme of how social media allowed for new players to enter the political arena; secondly, the theme of how social media
broke the psychological barrier of public fear of political participation; and, finally, how social media were used as a means of political communication.

The results clearly show that 325 out of 423 of the participants of the study accepted the idea that social media allowed for new players to enter the political arena (77% of the participants agreed on this idea with 33% agreeing strongly). Previous related studies, such as that of Albanna (2011) confirmed that the Internet has allowed for new players to enter into the political game, by their rules which were not designed by the developers of social media.

Qualitative results confirmed the quantitative ones. Interviewees pointed out that different people gained an interest in politics through social media, the most important of them being the young political activists and sports club fans like the Ultras. Participant 33 clarified this instead of announcing the news of their sports teams, they arrange for political events. Participant 1 put it differently some could not entirely understand politics. Such people watch and follow social media to understand. Therefore, it is a means for us to learn and understand such things she added.
It can be seen that the new political players appeared after the psychological barrier of public fear of political participation was broken down. The study results reveal that 292 out of 423 of the participants of the study accepted the idea as shown in Figure 5-5. Kassim (2012) supports the contention that social networks have broken down the psychological barriers of fear by enabling many Arab people to share information and letting them know that they are not alone. Moreover, for the first time activists had the opportunity to disseminate information while bypassing government restrictions. The aforementioned results are in line with those of the participants in the interviews. They confirmed that social media played a pivotal role in breaking the fear barrier most people had. Participant 30, for example, confirmed this saying yes, of course. It is enough that if I thought to do anything considering politics, I would be afraid to go to anyone or talk with him. However, nowadays I can chat or email anyone at home considering my thoughts or to meet him at a particular place. Moreover, we can arrange demonstrations because of something like that.

Young people convinced themselves to go and participate in the protest instead of watching this on virtual reality interviewee 33 added.
Moreover, 310 out of 423 of the participants confirmed the idea that social media were used as the means of political communication, since 73% of the participants agreed with this idea (30% strongly agreeing as shown in Figure 5-6). Davies (2014.p.4) confirmed in his study that "social media can be used as a means to direct political messages to certain target groups". The qualitative results obtained have established the participants’ reported view that social media were used as the means of political communication during the revolutions. Participant 20 stated the same idea in her own words saying all people could communicate with each other via social media. They have started following incidents as well as what was happening at Tahrir Square and Suez, and all incidents that happened on the 25th January and after that on the 28th January. Another interviewee put it similarly when she said it ‘social media’ was used to organise the youth and tell them their rights and they have to join to protest and ask for their own. The purpose of using such social media were stated by respondent 16 as follows social media connected us with those who are abroad and transmitted the political movements and their voices and events.

4.4. Strengthening of democracy
The role of social media in strengthening democracy was clearly identified as having taken place in three ways: first, social media tools actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy; second, social media fostered participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups, such as women, youth and seniors, within the political process; and, third, social media allowed communities to unite in their grievances and mobilize against regimes. The following sections will present this in more detail.
The quantitative results of the study pointed out that the majority, 277 out of 423 of the participants, accepted the idea as shown in Figure 5-7. Howard et al. (2011) and Dupuis (2014) pointed out that “First, social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab spring. Second, a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground. Third, social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders” (p.2).

Interviewees in this study also accepted the same idea. They confirmed that social media strengthened and supported democracy through the slogan: bread, freedom, and social justice. Participant 20 stated that *people began to use social media to stir up patriotism among individuals through meetings and communication in order to achieve bread, freedom, and social justice*. Participant 22 added that *they call for their rights*. 

![Figure 4-7: Social media tools have actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy](image)
One of the ways that social media contributed to strengthening and encouraging democracy, according to the respondents, was through fostering and enabling the participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups, such as women, young people, and senior citizens in the political process. The majority of respondents (269 out of 423) agreed with this idea, with 31% strongly agreeing (see Figure 5-8). This is in line with Sedra (2013), who states that “social media can foster participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, youth and seniors in the democratic process, particularly among the vulnerable groups, is an essential prerequisite for post-conflict stabilization and peace building” (p.10).

Qualitative results revealed some other roles for social media, for example, fostering participation of other groups in the revolution. Participant 33 pointed to the sports fans saying the Ultras, the football fans, who are utilized now in elections. Respondent 2 declared that those different groups were participating as a result of raising awareness it ‘social media’ took part in raising many people’s awareness and spread more news about revolutions in the Arab World she said. Participant 9 pointed out to another dimension, saying that everyone was writing about such crises on social media, all the young were interacting and getting down to squares without knowing or seeing each other before. One more idea was added by respondent 11. He confirmed that social media made the revolution more positive when the young got down as it helped them to mobilize into crowds and informed them about negatives of many countries which have seen revolutions. One more point to add is that revealed by interviewee 25 who declared that even if the person was not interested in politics, he was
emotionally affected as he does not know if what is happening is correct or real, so he should join the protest and participate. He must express his opinion to be more effective in society.

In addition, 269 out of 423 of the participants of the study accepted the idea that social media allowed communities to unite in their grievances and mobilize against the regime. (63% of the participants agreed on this idea, with 23% strongly agreeing, see Figure 5-9). Howard and Hussain (2011) emphasized that "social media have allowed communities to unite around shared grievances and nurture transportable strategies for mobilizing against dictators" (p.48). These findings were confirmed by the interview data. Interviewee 5 for example said people have demands so they get out to ask for them and use social media to post these demands, ask for them, and they have been achieved. Participant 25 put it differently saying this is what made them connect to each other which gave them the opportunity to exchange opinions and speech, to come, go, do, and agree. This led to a youth coalition via the internet that resulted in exchanging thoughts and speech as well as getting out to protest. Finally, Interviewee 4 explained that social media were able to unite youth and people to join together and make a revolution against this tyrannical regime.
Figure 4-10: Today there is a decline in the ability of social media to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies

However, nowadays, most of the participants of the study (249 out of 423) believe that there is a decline in the ability of social media to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring communities in comparison to the time of the revolution. Statistically speaking, 69% of the participants agreed with this idea (25% strongly agreed, and 34% agreed as can be seen in Figure 5-10).

Qualitative data gave some insight into the reasons for this decline, such as the fact that the respective governments had started to pay attention to social media and also because of a growing lack of trust in the information provided by such tools. Respondent 32 for example said **there were no means for objection or opposite views. So people were directed to the internet and to social media in particular because police and others did not pay attention to them and were not able to identify the opposing people. Police did not recognise, then, that there would be a revolution through the internet.** Respondents 1, 20, 30, and 33 have also pointed to the lack of trust in the information provided by social media. Interviewee 1 for example said **no, I do not trust such information because most of them say something and then they do something different. Especially, they do what is totally against what they wrote or said in other programs/TV shows.**
Chapter 5: Data Analysis 2 – The Role of Social Media in the Egyptian Revolutions of 2011 and 2013

5.1. Introduction

Having looked at perceptions around the role of social media in the Arab Spring revolutions in general, the results of this chapter relate to the second question of the study; namely, the nature of the role played by social media during the events of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions. The data were obtained through questionnaires and follow-up interviews about this issue, followed by a comparison of the 2011 and 2013 results. The researcher has consequently divided this section into four main roles for social media as identified from participant responses; firstly, as leading the revolutions (Action); secondly, as a source of information and documentation (Information); thirdly, as increasing awareness and participation in democracy (Participation); and finally, in creating a new relationship between the citizen and the government (Citizenship). These results will be discussed in detail in section 7.3.4

5.2. Leading the revolutions (Action)

The role of social media in providing leadership is generally evident throughout all the Arab Spring revolutions, and in the two Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013, in particular. However, the consequence of such leadership was the fall of the ruling system in Egypt on two separate occasions. The following is a detailed analysis of these results linked to this aspect of the research.

The Egyptian revolutions started on social media rather than on the ground. As such, social media can be said to have led the revolutions, and played an essential role in advocating the revolution. Social media also contributed to the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolts, provided information regarding the times and venues of gatherings, and also warning of the presence of danger to protesters at any given time and place.

4 The relevant frequencies, percentages and means calculations are presented in (Appendix H).
Figure 5-1: The Egyptian revolution started on social media rather than on the ground in 2011

The largest group of research respondents (298 of 423) believed that the Egyptian revolution in 2011 was prepared for and originated on social media rather than in the field. 35% of them strongly agreed and 36% agreed, totalling 71% overall agreement as can be seen above.

Figure 5-2: The Egyptian revolution started on social media rather than on the ground in 2013

Regarding the same issue in 2013, the chart above illustrates that just 52% of students believe that the Egyptian revolution was prepared for and started on social media rather than on the street. It was clearly not as high as for the 2011 revolt since only 22% of the participants strongly agreed and 30% agreed. The differences in opinion between 2011 and 2013
regarding this aspect are obvious, but the general tendency nevertheless tends towards the acceptance for both the Egyptian revolutions.

Figure 5-3: Comparing results of 2011 and 2013

However, the previous diagram clearly shows the differences of opinions among the study participants concerning the preparation of the two Egyptian revolutions, whether on social media or on the streets. The data obtained clearly shows this idea was not widespread in relation to the 2013 revolution. While 71% of the participants agreed on this in 2011, this percentage decreased in 2013 to 52%. Moreover, this idea was denied by 17% in relation to 2011 and increased to 22% in relation to 2013. Finally, the percentage of the undecided participants for 2011 was 12% and increased to 26% for 2013. Howard et al (2011) for instance, highlighted the role social media played in political revolutions, contending that “a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground” (p.2). Moreover, Akademie (2012) also corroborates that the sense of inclusivity generated by social media can galvanize collective both online and offline protests.

Quantitative analysis clearly revealed that social media were the gateway for the Egyptian revolution in 2011. This is evident from the rates of students’ acceptance on such an idea. In fact, participants’ perceptions towards this varied. It decreased for the 2013 revolution. Qualitative analysis confirmed these finding and provides interesting interpretations for the decline of the rate in the Egyptian revolution in 2013. For instance, Participant 7 claims this was because the revolution of 2011 had started as a crowd of young people via social media.
This small crowd started to grow until their number reached what has been seen in the 25th January revolution. Participant 8 continued in the same vein, explaining that, it is the basic means of young peoples’ coherence, setting dates and places and telecommunications of the outbreak of revolution among young people. Participant 21 put things differently. She revealed that social media, helped us contact each other and all young people were chatting via Facebook. Such media helped us communicate faster. Moreover, if it did not help us, the government would not have shut down the telecommunication and internet.

Qualitative analysis pointed to other motivations for the eruption of the Egyptian revolution. The first was the perception that the youth wanted to challenge socially entrenched injustice, especially on the part of the police. Moreover, they believe that the human motive was the reason for the eruption. Participant 27 summarized this viewpoint, saying, Frankly speaking, I do not recognize mass media. The revolution came from Egyptian people’s poverty and need for change. They already had particular demands at the beginning of the revolution. Some participants expressed the opinion that if it were not for social media and the Tamarod movement, the 2013 revolution would not have occurred. Participant 1 acknowledged that, both social media and the Tamarod movement played a role. Because when asked people generally say they are in need and they are in need, as many are, but this could not be known or officially published until media says something. The media allows such things to happen. Even if people need and need many things, media can change that they need something else other than what they have asked for.

On the other hand, Participant 12 believed that, both of them had a role. However, social media had the greatest one because it showed that Morsi is stupid, as was shown in his decisions. He was good until he took a step which was totally wrong. Moreover, Participant 21 agreed, stating, both the Tamarod movement and social media. For the Tamarod movement, they got down to protest with very large crowds. Social media enabled us to contact each other and accord with each other. Participant 19, explained that, people of all classes were aware that this date is the day of protest, and demonstrating, which was more than what happened on the 25th of January because people were still getting down to protest and they tell each other. However, two or three months before the 30th June, most people knew that the 30th June is the day of protest, i.e. it is an important day in the history of Egypt. Participant 27 was of the same opinion. He said, The period 30th of June is different from that of the 25th January. To reach all the people, to make everything clear and obvious, and to
make sure that people know that it is not a secret organization or something else. Finally, participant 22 summarized the role of the Tamarod saying, The Tamarod movement, because it collected young people in the Square and so on. Another of the participants of the study also wrote a comment on the questionnaire saying, social media mobilized for demonstrations, planning for them and then carried them out.

![Figure 5-4: Social media led the revolution in 2011](image)

The above diagram illustrates that the majority of the participants believe that social media led the revolt in 2011. In fact, overall, 67% of them accepted this idea, with 36% (154) strongly agreeing and 31%, (130) agreeing.
With regard to the same issue in 2013, the above diagram illustrates that 37% of students believe that social media did not lead the revolution in 2013. In this case, 12% of the participants (51) strongly disagreed and 25% (120) disagreed. On the other hands, 15% (64 students) strongly agreed and 20% (82 students) agreed. This means just an overall 35% of the participants believe that social media led the Egyptian revolt in 2013.

The previous illustration clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that social media led the Egyptian revolt in both 2011 and 2013. The data obtained indicate that regarding the 2013 revolution, the
acceptance of such idea was not enormous. While 67% of the participants agreed on this in relation to 2011, this percentage is decreased for 2013 to 35%. Moreover, this idea was rejected by 18% in 2011, and increased to 37% in 2013. Finally, the percentage of the undecided participants increased from 15% in 2011 to 28% in 2013. Ghany (2011) supports the contention that social media sites on the internet, especially Facebook and Twitter, played an important role not only in igniting the revolution, but also in the leadership of the revolution until the end, which prompted many to describe the revolution in Egypt as a "Facebook revolution" or an "Internet revolution". “We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world” (Howard 2011, p.16). Qualitative results highlighted the role of social media in the 2011 revolution. Participant 4 for example, said that, social media played a very big role via Facebook and Twitter. It enabled the youth to be united upon a single aim that is disposing the regime. Moreover, Participant 6 added that social media showed many incidents and through it they tried to solve the problem of demands. Moreover, through social media also, President Mubarak was disposed.

In relation to 2013, the situation is seen as different. Quantitative results revealed that the role of social media in the 2013 revolution was different from that of 2011 for many reasons. One of them was the emergence of the Tamarod movement and also the permission people had to call for change and revolution. Despite this, there are many people who believe that social media were not the only factor for the eruption of the revolution, but there were many others views. Participant 5 for example said, I think social media because it was broadcasting much incorrect news which made people flare up. Also, Participant 17 was of the same opinion. He claimed, Social media, because it changed the regime and the talk of the traditional media.

On the other hand, some believed that there was some kind of synergy between Tamarod and social media. Participant 11 argued that both of them had a great role in the fall of Morsi’s regime. However, Tamarod had the greatest role as it was working in the streets and collected people IDs to fill in their forms to be able to draw the support from Morsi’s regime. Moreover, social media had a role which cannot be compared with that of Tamarod as it was working only on the internet and not on people in the street. This made Tamarod have a dramatic role in overthrowing Morsi’s regime. Furthermore, Morsi’s regime itself had many drawbacks that was clear to people. He could not establish a respected political regime and convince people. Participant 7 was of the same mind, saying, both social media and the Tamarod movement. As the Tamarod movement was the core that was helped by social media. Moreover, Participant 1
also said, both social media and the Tamarod movement had a role. Because people generally, when they ask for something as many do, say we need and we need this but this could not be known or officially published until media say something as media allows such things to happen. Even if people need and need many things, media can deliver that they need something else other than what they have asked for. Participant 12 added that, both of them had a role. However, social media had the greatest one because it showed that Morsi is a stupid one as shown in his decisions and he was good until he took a step which was totally wrong. Participant 21 also said both the Tamarod movement and social media were crucial, saying that the Tamarod movement got down to protest and demonstrate with very large numbers. Social media let us contact with each other and accord with each other. One of the qualitative phase participants pointed out a possible reason why people may have been directed to social media rather than watching the Traditional media. He said that, the language used in social media is the language that the protesters are using, and that presenters of talk show programs deviated from the media ethical code.

Another idea clarified by a participant in the quantitative survey was that, social media is considered the leader of the revolution. It had a big role in mobilizing people and this led to the downfall of the president.

![Figure 5-7: Social media played an important role in advocating the revolution in 2011](image)

The above diagram reveals that a majority of participants (365 of 423) believed that social media played an important role in advocating the Egyptian revolution in 2011. An overwhelming 86% agreed with this idea, with 38% strongly agreeing.
In relation to 2013, the issue was a little different. The results presented in the above table and diagram illustrate that 249 of 423 believed that social media played an important role in advocating the Egyptian revolution in 2013. Overall 59% were in agreement, with 26% strongly agreeing and 33% agreeing. It is noteworthy that 23% of the participants did not agree and a further 18% of declined to express an opinion. This is a considerable percentage which cannot be overlooked.
An analysis of the above diagram, clearly demonstrates the differences in participants’ perceptions regarding the role of social media in advocating the revolts of 2011 and 2013. For 2013, this role was perceived as less significant than for 2011, since 86% agreed in relation to 2011 as opposed to only 59% in relation to 2013. Furthermore, the 9% who did not view this as an important role in relation to 2011 dramatically increased to 23% in relation to 2013. Finally, the percentage of the undecided participants in relation to 2011 was 5% which again increased to 18% in relation to 2013. Akademie (2012) pointed out that this contributed to create hundreds of pages, which call for the crowd, packaging and events that object to the Egyptian government and the police policies, and organize vigils going on in a peaceful manner to correct the situation. Participants of the study held very different opinion regarding the role of social media in calling for the revolutions of both 25th of January 2011, and that of 30th of June 2013.

Participant 3 for example said, sure, it played a very important role. This is because social media is considered as the most widespread means of communication in Egyptian society, especially among the youth. All young people are using social media now. Moreover, it helped with the spread of the Egyptian revolution. Similarly, Participant 12 explained, when I see injustice and compulsion, there is something inside me that has to move. For me, for example, I stay at home and do not see anything happening outside, even if that thing which moved me is wrong. Therefore, social media also played a great role.

Participants of the study believed that the Tamarod and Tajarod movements both used social media to call for the revolt in 2013. Furthermore, they had different opinions about whether the two movements strengthened or weakened the role of social media. Participant 8 for instance claimed that, the use of social media had strengthened the movements because all are connected via internet and social media. In the period of the 30th of June revolution, all people were using Facebook and Twitter to know the news and this was the only available means that connected all people with each other.

Additionally, Participant 10 believed that social media were used as a basic means of communication among the members of the two movements which contributed to social media strength. He asserted, I think that the use of social media among activists and movements had strengthened it because all parties were communicating via social media. Participant 11 expressed the same opinion in a different way. He claimed that the appearance of the two movements strengthened the role of social media because this created an enriched news source.
which people were discussing and following. He said, no, the two revolutions did not weaken
the role of social media because all the news was from social media. Social media actually
caused many people to follow the news. It strengthened the revolution. Participant 24 also
believed that the two movements increased the level of political, social and economic mobility
in society and created a vital news source for people to follow. Social media strengthened the
revolution because it was very clear that the political fight was effective across all national
political conditions. Moreover, it was effective in other conditions rather than just economic -
even in the educational, he commented.

A considerable number of the participants believed that the two movements weakened the role
of social media in calling for the revolution in 2013. This is quite different from what
happened in 25th of June 2011 in which people were united to achieve a unified goal, and led
to the decrease of the level of credibility. For instance, Participant 9 stated that, it weakened as
well as offended it, because in the first revolution all people had one aim. However, when
Tamarod, Tagarod and other movements had used social media, people became totally
distracted and most young people started to ignore social media. Participant 19 also said, no,
it weakened it because the crowd was via Tamarod forums or channels that were gathering to
protest on 30th June to drop the regime. This means that all types of people were aware that
this date is the day of crowding which was more than happened on the 25th of January because
people were still going down to protest and tell each other. However, two or three months
before 30th June, most people knew that 30th June is the day of protesting, i.e. it is an interval
day in the history of Egypt. Another reason was elucidated by Participant 25 who identified a
loss of confidence which weakened it because there was less faith that the social media news
was correct and a belief that two different versions of every piece of news was being written.
Participant 6 also claimed that, they weakened it as the numbers of people in the streets was
larger, so President Morsi was quickly removed.

Participant 14 succinctly states that, yes, they affected Morsi’s regime and weakened it.
Furthermore, Participant 15 said no, it has weakened it more than before because this was
something that makes them stronger. However, it was the Tamarod movement which asked for
Morsi’s fall and did not accept him. Participant 17 merely commented less powerful.
Participant 23 believed, it weakened it because social media had been reversed over them.
One of the participants in the questionnaire phase also revealed that, social media played an
essential role in the Arab Spring Revolutions. Most of them had a negative influence because
not everything they revealed was believed by viewers. People opinions diversified because of this. As a result, different political parties appeared on the stage.

Figure 5-10: Social media played an important role in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt in 2011

It is clear then, that 327 of 423 students reported agreement with the idea that social media played an important role in mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt in 2011. An overall 78% of the participants agreed to this idea, with 31% strongly agreeing and 47% agreeing.
Based on the previous data, 233 of 423 students (78%) confirmed the idea that social media played an important role in mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt in 2013. However, it is necessary to point out that 101 students (21% of the participants) rejected this idea. In addition, a further 88 of 423 of the total number of the participants (21%) remained undecided. The interpretation for such results will be explored in the later discussion chapter.
The above diagram emphasises the differences of opinion among the study participants concerning the role of social media in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolts in 2011 and in 2013. In 2013, this role was perceived be less significant than in 2011, since 78% agreed in 2011 with only 55% in 2013. Moreover, this role was denied by 11% for 2011 increasing to 24% for 2013. Finally, the percentage of the undecided participants in relation to 2011 was 11% and again increased to 21% in relation to 2013. Huang (2011) discussed the impact of social media on the Arab Spring, and found that it was a pivotal and influential tool for mobilising and empowering change. While Zhuo et al (2011) credited the success of the Egyptian revolution to the Egyptian people themselves, they nonetheless acknowledged the undeniable impact of social media to concede that "social media played an important role in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt” (p.8). Conversely, Garrido et al (2013) focused on research which emphasised the roles of social media during the Egyptian mobilizations of 2011.

Qualitative analysis revealed the comparative importance of this role in 2011 and 2013. Participant 8 expressed the view that, social media were the main cause of connecting young people. Participant 4 identified the role of mobility and awareness as unifying the opinions of the youth towards the single goal of the president’s downfall. He said, yes, social media played a very big role via Facebook and Twitter. It enabled the youth to be united upon a single aim of deposing this regime. Participant 6 held a similar view, saying that social media showed many incidents and through it they tried to solve the problem of demands. Moreover, also through social media, President Mubarak was deposed. Interviewee 11 said, yes, of course. Because social media, like Facebook and others, were used to post many things, such as the torturing techniques used on citizens in police stations. All such videos were shared on Facebook and Twitter to refer to the extent to which citizens were tortured and it helped to force young peoples’ dialogue so that they can reach a solution for what is happening. They wanted no more torture, compulsion and suppression which had dominated society. This largely helped the outbreak of the revolution and played a great role in organizing people to protest.

A number of the participants in the quantitative phase confirmed that social media played a pivotal role in the eruption of the Arab Spring revolt since it helped to call for the demonstrations and mobilize the youth in El-Tahrir Squire where people of all ages used to protest since the revolution of July 1952. Another participant added that, social media were
the conduit used for exchanging ideas and information and for arranging the times and events of the revolution.

Figure 5-13: Social media informed you of times and places of gatherings, and warned of the presence of danger to protesters anywhere in 2011

Based on the above diagram it is evident that the majority of the participants believed that social media informed people of times and places of gatherings, and warned the 2011 protesters everywhere of the presence of danger. In fact, 297 (70%) of them accepted this idea, with 142 (36%) strongly agreeing and 155 (31%) agreeing.

Figure 5-14: Social media informed you of times and places of gatherings, and warned of the presence of danger to protesters anywhere in 2013
In relation to the same issue in the 2013 revolution, the above diagram illustrates that 270 (64%) students, comprised of 118 (28%) who strongly agreed and 151(36%) who agreed, believed that social media informed protesters of times and places of gatherings and warned them of danger.

However, the above diagram plainly shows the differences among the participants of the study concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that social media informed participants of times and locations of gatherings and warned them of dangers in the Egyptian revolts of both 2011 and 2013. While 70% of the participants agreed to this in 2011, this decreased to 6% in 2013. Furthermore, this idea was rejected by 15 % in both 2011, and 2013, while the number of undecided participants slightly increased from 15% in 2011 to 21% in 2013. The Ghany Report (2011) commissioned by the Egyptian Cabinet (IDSC) concluded that Communication occurs via social media in the dissemination of photos and videos that motivate young people to come out to protest, identify times and places of gatherings, and warning of the presence of danger to protesters anywhere, which is easy to direct the crowds of demonstrators. Howard and Hussain’s study of 2011 also supported that “The Egyptian security services began using Facebook and Twitter to anticipate the movements of individual activists” (p.39).
Qualitative phase participants recognised this role for social media as the gateway for defining, coordinating and organizing time, place and dangers. Participant 8 explained, *of course it is the basic means of young people’s coherence, setting dates and places and telecommunications of out-breaks of revolt among young people during the revolution.* Participant 19 also explained that, *the lack of timely coordination in shutting down social media led to the alternative, which was to come outside to follow the events and trying to find other ways to coordinate with each other.* Participant 8 was also of the mind that, *social media were a good solution for that.* Another of the participants in the quantitative phase believed that *social media played an important role in disseminating details of times and places for gatherings.* Consequently, *he considered social media as a pillar of the revolution, or even the leader of it.*

### 5.3. Globalise the protests and source of information

The role of social media in globalising the protests can be clarified through comparisons of social media declarations broadcast during the 2011 and 2013 revolutions and by media commitments to document them for the whole world. The following section will illustrate this in detail. As the web page, “We are all Khalid Said” which became a sharing point for news, information and organization, enabling activists to use their mobile phones to document the protests exemplifies, social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded, and participants were asked about this in the study.

![Figure 5-16: Social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded in 2011](image)

Figure 5-16: Social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded in 2011
Of 423 student participants, a majority of 329 (79%) concurred with the idea that social media reported information as the events of the 2011 revolution unfolded, with 132 students (31%) strongly agreeing and 197 students (47%) agreeing. This underscores the weakness of the traditional media compared to social media in 2011.

![Pie chart showing agreement levels between 2011 and 2013](image)

Figure 5-17: Social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded in 2013

In relation to the 2013 revolution, 306 of 423 of the participants, 73%, confirmed that social media reported information about the revolution as events unfolded. As illustrated in the above chart, 138 (33%) strongly agreed and 168 (40%) agreed.

![Bar chart comparing 2011 and 2013](image)

Figure 5-18: Comparing results of 2011 and 2013
The comparison presented in the previous diagram emphasises the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that social media reported on the events and news of both 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The frequency and percentage of those who accept this idea is quite similar. 79% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and 73% in relation to 2013. A mere 11% of participants rejected this idea with regard to 2013 while 10% rejected it with regard to 2011. Undecided participants were similarly very close with only 16% in relation to 2013 and 12% in relation to 2011. Bogart (2013) claims that social networks such as Facebook became an important revolutionary news source in line with the findings of this study, while Abufotouh (2013) similarly concurs that social media played a vital role in disseminating a true picture of the entire spectrum of the Egyptian people through Facebook, Twitter, and also broadcast the key events by audio and video via the YouTube network.

The results of the qualitative phase reinforced this role during the two revolutions. For example, Participant 3 declared, yes, it played an important role. It contributed by raising many people’s awareness and spread more news about revolutions in the Arab World. Furthermore, as Participant 6 explained, social media have better displayed the picture and has showed the true information about revolutions. For example, if someone did not join with revolutionists, he would at least know what was happening in it. Participant 21 also added that, all existing information was displayed at once. When such information was posted, they helped me to get news of the Arab countries around us as well - as those countries had a very important role. Participant 25 was of the same mind. He confirmed, i largely agree because the youth and I were on the internet on the 25th January so everything was written and videos shown were effecting - even if the person was not interested in politics. One student asserted that social media actively utilised the internet in the service of the revolution since it broadcast live news coverage as the events unfolded in order to encourage the youth to participate.
Figure 5-19: The web page “We are all Khalid Said” became a sharing point for news, information and organization in 2011

The above chart demonstrates that a majority of the 294 of 423 student respondents (70%) accepted the idea that the webpage, “We are all Khaled Said”, became a sharing point for information, news and organization during the 2011 revolution, with 173 students (41%) strongly agreeing and 121 (29%) agreeing.

Figure 5-20: The web page “We are all Khalid Said” became a sharing point for news, information and organization in 2013

On the other hand, the above results reveals that only 129 of 423 participants of the study (30%) accepted the idea that the webpage of “We are all Khaled Said”, became a sharing
point for information, news and organization during the 2013 revolution, with 96 students (23%) strongly disagreeing and 110 (26%) agreeing.

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the participants of the study concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that the webpage, “We are all Khalid Said” became a sharing point for information, news and organization in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The frequency and percentage of those who accept this idea decreased when compared to the results obtained in 2011. While 70% accepted this idea in 2011, only 30% did so in 2013. In the same way, 49% of the participants of the study rejected this idea in 2013 as opposed to a mere 11% in 2011. The undecided accounted for 19% in 2011 and 21% in 2013.

According to Saddy (2011), the page, "We are all Khaled Said", was a sharing point for news, information and organization of young Egyptians during the revolution. Browning (2013) also commented that "Page of "We Are All Khaled Said", [it] grew to over 800,000 members, as Egyptians increasingly used social networking platforms to produce and consume political content, organize protests; stay connected and spread word to others about abuses of the Mubarak regime” (p.65). Moreover, Elzain (2012) also contends that the Wael Ghonim Facebook group became a significant organisational and mobilization platform for those opposed to the Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak which eventually evolved into a movement to remove his cabinet and his power as the President.
Results in the qualitative phase attributed the same level of importance on the Khaled Said webpage. Participant 24 said, for example, *it was clear in Khalid Saied’s page, if it did not affect people against whom the revolution has broken out and the remnants of ex-regime, they would not jail Wael Ghonim or shut down telecommunication and internet as if it did not have an effect. However, it had a great effect.* Participant 31 expressed his opinion saying, *a Facebook page like that of Khaled Said, the admin was Wael Nour. All the events and its details were published by this page. This, of course, ignited people who were following that to say, we have to go the square, we cannot leave those people alone. On the same train of thought, Participant 32 agreed, the regime was controlling the country and there was no chance for anyone to oppose or demonstrate. Social media were able to gather people without letting the regime know. At that time, Mohammed El-Baradei was able to communicate with people through his Facebook page. April 6 Youth was also of the same size. The page named “Kullena Khaled Said” had 3 million members interacting.*

![Activists used mobile phones to document the protests in 2011](image)

As shown in the above chart 334 of 423 student participants (79%) accepted the idea that political activists used mobile phones to document the events of the 2011 revolution, with 147 students (35%) strongly agreeing and 187 students (44%) agreeing.
The above charts illustrate that 303 of 423 participants (72%) confirmed that political activists used mobile phones to document the events of the 2013 revolution, with 127 (30%) strongly agreeing and 176 (42%) agreeing.

The comparison presented in the previous diagram highlights the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection to the idea that political activists used mobile phones for documenting events in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained are similar, with 79% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and 72% in relation to 2013. Only 12% of the participants rejected this idea in 2013 while 10% rejected it in 2011.
The undecided accounted for only 16% in relation to 2013 and 11% in relation to 2011. Participants in the study attested to the importance of such a role during the two revolutions. However, McRae (2012) observed that cyberactivist use of mobile phones allowed individual Egyptians to document the unfolding events, to broadcast their own part in the revolution, and to spread their images and videos across the wider world. In the same way, Mansuri (2012) claims that the media adopted during coverage of the events of the Arab revolutions were recorded by website activists on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, while Abufotouh (2013) asserts that one of the leading roles of social media in Egypt was to document the course of the Egyptian revolution. In this way, each image, video, word, post, opinion, analysis, interception and political debate was recorded and documented through social media by young non-specialists.

Qualitative analysis confirmed the acceptance of the participants of such a role for social media. As Participant 11 took time to explain, yes of course, because social media like Facebook and others were used to post many things, such as techniques for the torturing of citizens in police stations. All such videos were shared on Facebook and Twitter to refer to the extent to which citizens were tortured. That helped to force young people to engage in numerous discussions so that they could to find a solution for what was happening. They wanted to have no more torture, compulsion and suppression which had dominated society. This really contributed to the outbreak of the revolution and played an important part in encouraging people to protest. The revolution has basically taken place on the internet via Facebook. Nothing else was capable of mobilising them. Participant 25 echoed these views to say, I largely agree because the youth as well as I, were on the internet on the 25th January, so everything that was written and videos shown were affecting. Even if the person was not interested in politics, he was emotionally affected as he does not know if what is happening is correct or a must, so he needs to protest and participate. He must express his opinion to be more effective in acceptable society.

5.4. Increasing democracy and awareness in participation

The role of social media during the two revolutions in increasing the level of democracy and people’s awareness was one of the main focus of the study. The following section will assess the study participants’ perceptions of the democratic implications of the use of social media in terms of an active contribution to the strengthening of democracy the country, use by political activists to communicate with each other, and contribution to organized civil resistance.
As illustrated by the above chart, 271 of 423 participants of the study (64%) accepted the idea that social media contributed in strengthening democracy in the 2011 Egyptian revolution, with 147 students (35%) strongly agreeing and 187 students (44%) agreeing.

However, the chart above shows that with regard to the 2013 revolution, only 263 of 423 of the participants (62%) endorsed the idea that social media had contributed to strengthening democracy in Egypt, with 101 (24%) strongly agreeing and 162 (38%) agreeing.
The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection to the idea that social media contributed to strengthening Egyptian democracy in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained are very similar as 64% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and 61% in relation to 2013. Only 21% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2013 while 17% rejected it in relation to 2011. The undecided accounted for only 17% in both cases. Garrido et al (2013) supports this evaluation of the role of social media in reinforcing democracy during the two revolutions by strengthening and activating Egyptian democracy and effecting political transformation by the increased diffusion of information. Furthermore, qualitative analysis results further underscore participant recognition of the importance of the role that social media played. For example, Participant 20 said, yes, definitely. After 25 January, people began to use social media to awaken patriotism among individuals through meetings and communication in order to achieve living, freedom, and social justice, while another commented that social media allowed users of the internet and the different sites to practice the freedom of giving comments and conversation. This led to fierce challenges in cutting down communications and internet or even cell phones. A further participant added that, democracy is understood in Arab society as bullying. This is really a big mistake. Nobody uses democracy in the right way. This point of view was echoed by a participant who pointed out that, people used democracy as a form of bullying after the January revolution, but that following the 2013 revolution Egyptians were more conscious of the realities going on around them.
Figure 5-28: Social media were used by political activists to communicate with each other in 2011

As illustrated by the above chart, 325 of 423 of the study participants (77%) accepted the idea that social media were used by political activists to communicate with each other during the 2011 revolution, with 137 (32%) strongly agreeing and 188 (45%) agreeing.

Figure 5-29: Social media were used by political activists to communicate with each other in 2013

Similarly, the above chart shows that a majority of 297 of 423 of the student participants of the study (70%) accepted the idea that social media were used by political activists to
communicate with each other during the 2013 revolution, with 107 (25%) strongly agreeing and 190 (45%) agreeing.

![Figure 5-30: Comparing results of 2011 and 2013](image)

The above diagram clearly demonstrates the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection to the idea that social media were used by political activists for mutual communication during the Egyptian revolutions of both 2011 and 2013. While only 77% of the participants agreed on this in relation to 2011, this decreased to 70% in relation to 2013. Furthermore, this idea was rejected by 9% in relation to 2011, and increased to 12% in relation to 2013. The undecided accounted for 14%. These frequencies reveal that students' opinions regarding this issue are extremely close, a finding which supports previous related studies. Lim (2012), for example, emphasized that "social media provided the space and tools to facilitate new connections among middle-class youth opposed to the regime, and helped the popular movement for political change to expand the sphere of participation" (p.244).

Qualitative analysis results are also consistent with these results. For example, Participant 11 claimed, all political activists in any country had used Facebook and Twitter to post and publish their thoughts and communicate with people. Other quantitative analysis students held similar opinions, with one explaining that social media had a big role in the 2011 revolution in presenting news and communicating with the demonstrators and the big political changes that came into effect later. In 2013, social media did not play such role as that in 2011.
because people’s wishes and patriotism had changed. It had a role in presenting the Tamarod which gathered people under the slogan of Tahya Misr. Another participant added that, social media unified people and participated in the youth endeavour to unify them.

The above diagram reveals that a majority of 290 of 423 of the participants (68%) agreed that social media contributed to the organized civil resistance in 2011, with 25% of them strongly agreeing and 43% agreeing.

Figure 5-31: Social media contributed to organizing civil resistance in 2011

Figure 5-32 Social media contributed to organizing civil resistance in 2013
However, as the data above illustrates, only 48% of students affirmed the idea that social media contributed to the organization of civil resistance in the Egyptian revolt of 2013. Clearly, it was not perceived to be as significant as in the 2011 revolution since only 14% of the participants strongly agreed and 34% agreed with this assertion. In fact, 86 of the participants, (20%), rejected this idea completely and a further 136 of 423, (32%), remained undecided as they were unsure whether social media in Egypt has played an active part in this or not.

The previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants regarding their opinions about the contribution of social media in organizing civil resistance in the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013. The data clearly shows that this role was perceived as not being as significant in 2013 as in 2011, since 68% agreed in relation to 2011 while only 48% agreed in relation to 2013. Moreover, this role was rejected by 12% in relation to 2011 and increased to 20% in relation to 2013. The undecided, which accounted of 20% in relation to 2011, also increased to 32% in relation to 2013. Khamis and Vaughn (2011), for instance, found that social media forums were effective platforms for promoting political engagement and providing a virtual space in which to organize, assemble and execute peaceful civil protests. Howard and Hussain (2011) also concluded that "social media have become the scaffolding upon which civil society can build, and new information technologies give activists things that they did not have before.” (p.48).
With regard to the qualitative results, Participant 30 expressed the view that, *many people have helped, not necessarily in pulling down the Squares, but by protecting buildings, streets and people*, while another claimed that *social media is the one thing that encouraged women, men, youth and old people to cooperate together to unify the line*.

### 5.5. Creating a new relationship between the citizen and the government

The current study also discovered the role social media played in changing the relationship between the government and the people. The importance of this role was made clear by the attempts of the Egyptian government to handle the dissemination of information during the unfolding events of the two Egyptian revolutions. In order to communicate directly with the public and protesters the government had itself to resort to the use of social media. As a consequence of this, social media platforms may arguably be understood to have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority.

![Figure 5-34: The government used social media to communicate with the public and protesters in 2011](image)

The above chart reveals discrepancies among the participants with regard to the Egyptian government’s use of social media for communicating with individuals and protesters during the 2011 revolution. What clearly emerges is a general tendency to reject this idea. A total of 196 students (46%) refuted this idea, comprising 82 students (20%) strongly disagreeing and 111 (26%) disagreeing. On the other hand, 60 students (14%) strongly agreed, and 85 (20%) agreed with this idea, while perhaps most surprisingly, a further 30% of the participants
remained undecided as to whether the Egyptian government used the social media in communicating with the public and protestors or not.

As illustrated by the above chart 287 of 423 (68%) accepted the idea that the Egyptian government used the social media in communicating with the people during the 2013 revolution, with 130 students (31%) strongly agreeing and 157 (37%) agreeing.

The previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that the Egyptian government used the social media in
communicating with people during both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The frequency and percentage of participants is noticeably increased in 2013 in particular. While only 34% of the participants agreed with this in relation to 2011, this increased to 68% in relation to 2013. Moreover, this idea was rejected by 46% in relation to 2011 and decreased to 14% in relation to 2013. The undecided accounted for 20% in relation to 2011 and decreased to 18% in relation to 2013. This underscores that the revolutionary catalysts and events of 2013 were completely different from those of 2011.

In fact, the government made no attempt to communicate with the demonstrators through social media throughout the 2011 revolution. On the contrary, they actually shut down all means of communication with the protesters in Al-Tahrir Square and other revolutionary hotspots. But in the wake of the collapse of the regime the Military Supreme Council relied on social media to communicate with demonstrators and to try to limit the potential damage of rumour-mongering by responding to the public’s questions and demands for transparent governance. Indeed, Morrow and Omrani (2013) concluded that the military council realised they had no option but to communicate with the people using the very media which had brought about the downfall of the former regime. Ghany (2011) further noted that six days after the resignation of President Mubarak, The Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces launched their own Facebook page, and posted their first message on February 17, 2011. The 2013 revolution was a very different situation and therefore the Egyptian government also tackled the issue of social media in quite a different way. For instance, President Morsi and the Military Council routinely issued announcements and statements via social media platforms, making particular use of Facebook. In fact, Fitzpatrick (2013) asserted that The Egyptian Military Council used Facebook to clarify its activities following any televised announcements. Allbani (2014) refers to evidence which reveals that The Egyptian Military Council (SCAF) posted almost 90 statements during the period June 30 and August 30, 2013.

Some participants believed that government attempts to clamp down on social media actually hastened the downfall of President Mubarak during the 2011 revolution because such actions paradoxically mobilized the huge numbers who gathered to protest in Al-Tahrir Squire. As Participant 1 pointed out, it affected people. It made them more stubborn against President Mubarak and gather for demonstrations because they were able to reach each other in the Midan “Tahrir Square” and encourage each other. Even if some were far away from them,
they went to them and asked for support. Also, there were no other means of communications except sending individuals to tell the group news. Participant 2 also claimed that, Social media affected the occurrence and volume of demonstrations because it pushed reluctant young people to come out and protest instead of staying at home. Participant 4 claimed that, Social media had a dramatic effect to force youth to engage with and be convinced by the idea of revolution. Because young people were unable to contact each other and get proper information, it forced them to get involved in a more active way. Moreover, this action reflected that the regime is more autocratic. Participant 7 echoed this opinion saying, it affected the demonstrations because closing down social media and telecommunication almost isolated the events of Tahrir Square from the rest of Egypt. But, simple, effective communication continued to be made by individual’s moving between the square and other places to tell the news and incidents. Participant 9 believed that, the people divided into two halves. The first half was in the Square, while the other was following incidents from outside the Square. But when the internet and the social media were shut down, all people gather to the Square and motivated others to do so.

Throughout the events of the 2013 revolution, the regime utilised social media in the same way as Morsi who kept his own private Facebook page open. Participant 13 was of the opinion that, President Morsi kept his social media account open until the very last hours of his regime to try to communicate with the people and reach a compromise that could preserve his authority. Participant 19 believed that, the 25\textsuperscript{th} of January revolution use of social media were the most powerful way of protesting and had a great credibility for the people.
Figure 5-37: Social media platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority in 2011

As shown in the above diagram, a majority of 71% of the student participants in the study accepted the idea that social media platforms dramatically altered the traditional relationship between public will and political authority in the 2011 revolution, with 122 students (29%) strongly agreeing and 177(42%) agreeing.

Figure 5-38: Social media platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority in 2013

However, as the above chart reveals, a mere 58% of the student participants in this study accepted the idea that social media platforms dramatically altered the traditional relationship
between public will and political authority during the 2013 revolution, with 85 students (20%) strongly agreeing and 160 (38%) agreeing.

![Bar chart comparing results of 2011 and 2013](chart.png)

**Figure 5-39: Comparing results of 2011 and 2013**

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants their acceptance or rejection to the idea that social media platforms dramatically altered the traditional relationship between public will and political authority in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained vary since 71% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and decreased to 58% in relation 2013. On the other hand, only 13% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 26% rejected it in relation to 2013. The undecided accounted for 16% of the participants in relation to 2011 and increased to 26% in relation to 2013. Browning (2013) supports these findings, as he asserts that “social networking platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority” (p.69). While El-Khalili (2013) contends that during the 2011 revolution one of the most effective government propaganda tools was the SCAF Facebook page created in the advent of the January 25th revolution, which had 1.9 million likes shortly after its launch. Stacher (2013) notes that typical SCAF statements revolved around publicising the armed forces efforts to eradicate terrorism, the official activities of the armed forces, attempts to clarify facts and debunk rumours, and general communication with Egyptian citizens. This merely emphasises the degree to which the Egyptian revolution changed the government’s approach to social media.
Chapter 6: Data Analysis 3 - Changes in the role of social and traditional media between the first and second Egyptian resolutions

6.1. Introduction
This chapter explores the changing roles played by social and traditional media throughout the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013 by presenting the results obtained through the questionnaires and interviews of this study. The researcher has once again divided this section to four main criteria by which to gauge the degree of change; firstly, social media performance during 2011 and 2013; secondly traditional media performance during 2011 and 2013; thirdly, a review of oppositional new movements on social media; and finally, the deposition of presidents. These results will be discussed in detail in section 7.3 and section 7.4.5

6.2. Social media performance during 2011 and 2013
In order to measure the role of social media across the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013 and gain a greater understanding of the degree of differentiation and agreement between the two revolutions, participants in this study were asked a series of quantitative and qualitative questions on the participants in the study. Furthermore, the roles of social media in the 2011 revolution were different from that of 2013. The main differences of social media during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013 were as follows:

- Social media had not played the same role during the 2013 revolution as that of 2011 revolution.
- Social media were used more to follow events of the Egyptian revolution in 2013 compared to the 2011 revolution.
- Declining protesters reliance on social media for information and documentation of the revolutionary events during 2013 compared to the 2011 revolution.
- Social media were not a major influence on protesters decision to protest in 2013 revolution compared to the 2011 revolution.
- Declining confidence of the revolutionary activists on social media during 2013 revolution compared to the 2011 revolution.

5 The relevant frequencies, percentages and means calculations are presented in (Appendix I).
As shown in the above chart, a 72.5% majority of study participants confirmed they used social media for more than three hours per day during 25\textsuperscript{th} of January revolution, with 39.2% using it for more than six hours, and 33.3% using it for less than six hours. Just 27.4% used it for less than three hours per day.

By contrast, during the 2013 revolution, the above results indicate that 57.4% of the participants used social media more than three hours during the 30\textsuperscript{th} of June revolution, with 17.7% using it for more than six hours, while 42.1% used it for less than three hours per day.
The above results illustrate that the degree to which individuals’ following of the events of the Egyptian revolution of 2013 via social media decreased from 72.5% to 57.4%. Moreover, it shows that the number of hours spent doing so was less than 3 hours daily with 42.7% rather than 27.4% during the 2011 revolution.

Qualitative results showed that social media were used to follow the events in 2011 and 2013 revolutions in order to ascertain what was happening. Participant 19 confirmed this, saying, yes, it was very rare in recent times and a very small number of people followed social media just for interaction or blogged or downloaded games in the internet. However, it raised Arabic citizens and others’ awareness and recognition of political issues and what is happening in the Arab world and all over the world. Participant 11 agreed that, because social media such as Facebook and others were used to post many things such as torturing techniques of citizens in police stations. All such videos were shared on Facebook and Twitter to refer to the extent to which citizens were tortured which urged young people to talk with each to reach a solution for what is happening. They wanted to have no more torture, compulsion and suppression which had dominated society. This contributed to the outbreak of the revolution and played an important role in gathering people to be able to protest.
As shown in the above chart, a majority of 332 out of 423 study participants (79%) stated that they relied on social media to get information about the revolution in 2011, with 168 students (40%) students strongly agreeing and 164 students (39%) agreeing.

The above chart illustrates a similar response with regard to the 2013 revolution. In this case 265 of 423 participants (70%) stated that they relied on social media to get information about the revolution, with 134 participants (32%) strongly agreeing and 16 participants (38%) agreeing.
The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that they relied on social media for information and documentation of the revolutionary events of both 2011 and 2013. The frequency and percentage of those who accept this idea decreased from 79% to 70% in relation to 2013. Similar results were obtained regarding students’ rejection of the same idea. In 2011 13% rejected the idea which increased to 15% in relation to 2013.

For example, Beaumont (2011) claims that Facebook functioned as the main information source counteracting state censorship in the region. In the same way, Eaton (2013) observed that “the internet was used as an alternative news source to counter the control of information channels which were opposed to the interests of the activists, also to organize and mobilize the Egyptian movement on January 25th” (p.6), while Bogart (2013) claims that social media became the main news source of the people.

Qualitative results from the current study underscore the same idea, with Participant 8 claiming, all the people were using Facebook and Twitter to know the news and this was the only available means to connect all people with each other. Participate 6 agreed that, it allows large groups of people to communicate and know the news through it. While Participant 1 explained that, people watch and follow social media to understand. Therefore, it is a means for us to learn and understand such things.
As illustrated in the above chart, 286 of 423 of study participants (68%) confirmed that they used social media during the 2013 revolution to the same extent as during the 2011 revolution, with 138 students (33%) strongly agreeing and 148 (35%) agreeing.

Qualitative results support the findings that participants in the study used social media in the 2013 revolution in a similar way to their usage in 2011. However, the participants in the interviews explained that its use was mainly for entertainment and also for follow-up news, but most of the news was fake on social media. Participant 19 confirmed this, saying people followed social media just for interaction or blogging or downloading games on the internet. While Participant 9 explained that, Morsi and his supporters had seen that social media had ignited the 25th of January revolution and did not know that afterwards it lost its effect when its aims and demands contradicted each other. Moreover, Participant 30 confirmed that social media had returned to playfulness claiming that, at first they used it differently from how it is used nowadays for a while this made me feel lost. Participant 25 pointed out that many people were using social media during the 2013 revolution to spread gossip about people.
Figure 6-8: Social media played the same role on the 30th June as it did on the 25th January

On the other hand, the results above reveal that 50% of study participants, 213 of 423 were against the idea that social media played the same role during the 2013 revolution as that of January 2011, with 181 students (31%) disagreeing and 132 (19%) strongly disagreeing. Gire (2014) states that social media did not play the same role that it had at the beginning of the Arab Spring, while Morrow and Omrani (2013) observes that more recently social media platforms have been associated with unsubstantiated rumours and incitement to racial hatred. Qualitative data analysis confirmed that social media did not play the same role in 2013 as it did in 2011. Participant 1 stated, *yes, it played a role in the Egyptian revolution, but social media had a negative role.* While Participant 9 explained that, *Morsi and his supporters had seen that social media had ignited the 25th of January revolution and did not know that afterwards it lost its effect when its aims and demands contradicted each other. Especially when the Tamarod, Kefaya and other movements used it, people lost interest in social media.* Participant 32 stated that, *social media were difficult at that time because those who opposed the regime in 2013 were not of the same social class as those who rejected the regime in 2011. They were the poor lower class people.* Participant 19 reinforced viewpoint, saying, *the Street was angrier against the Brotherhood regime and direct assurance from streets via forms was more powerful than social media.*
The above chart reveals that 271 of 423 study participants (64%) accepted the idea that social media influenced their decisions in the 2011 revolution, with 105 students (25%) strongly agreeing and 166 students (39%) agreeing.

However, the above chart illustrates that the results varied in relation to the 2013 revolution. Just 46% of study participants confirmed the idea that social media influenced their decisions, with 56 (13%) strongly agreeing, and 141 (33%) agreeing. Moreover, 79 students (19%) disagreed and 58 students (14%) strongly disagreed. The undecided accounted for 89 students (21%) of the participants.
The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that social media influenced peoples’ decisions during both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained vary since 64% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and only 46% in relation to 2013. On the other hand, 21% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 33% rejected it in relation to 2013. The undecided accounted for 13% of the participants in relation to the 2011 revolution and 21% in relation to the 2013 revolution.

Qualitative analysis confirmed that the role of social media differed between the two Egyptian revolutions. For example, Participant 20 said that, of course. Because, as I said to you, all people could communicate with each other via social media. They have started following other incidents as well as what was happening at Tahrir Square and Suez, and all incidents that happened on the 25th January and after that on the 28th January. So this resulted in people supporting each other and plotting against the autocratic regime. Participant 6 agreed that, social media showed many incidents and through it they tried to solve the problem of demands. Moreover, through social media, President Mubarak was disposed. Participant 28 also expressed this view, saying, they played a great role. The young who saw something was wrong, captured and posted and so the people arose. They knew what was happening and all became very close to each other via Facebook and Twitter.

On the other hand, Participant 8 stated that, in his opinion all telecommunications in the two Egyptian revolutions were via internet and social media, especially via Facebook and Twitter. In the same way, Participant 2 claimed, social media played a very important role. This is
because social media is considered as the most widespread means of communication in Egyptian society, especially among the young. All young people are using social media now. Moreover, it helped with the spread of the Egyptian revolution. Participant 12 also agreed with this, saying, when I see injustice and compulsion, there is something inside me that has to move. Therefore, social media has played a great role.

The data presented above reveals that a majority 75% of study participants trust the revolutionary youth in the 2011 revolution, with 138 participants (33%) strongly agreeing and 180 (42%) agreeing.
On other hand, the above chart reveals that trusting political activists during the 2013 revolution was a far more contentious issue. The participants did not formulate a collective opinion to rely on, as 53 of 423 (13%) strongly rejected the idea, 98 of 423 (23%) disagreed, and 90 of 423 (21%) were undecided. Meanwhile, only 107 students (25%) agreed with this idea and 75 (18%) strongly agreed.

![Figure 6-14: Comparing results of 2011 and 2013](image)

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that they trust the revolutionary activists in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained are varied and contradictory since 75% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and decreased to 43% in relation to 2013. Conversely only 12% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 36% rejected it in relation to 2013. Those who were undecided accounted for 13% of the participants in relation to the 2011 revolution and 21% in relation to the 2013 Revolution.

These findings point out to a decline in the ability of social media sites to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies, which sprang from declining confidence in the revolutionary youth and frustration among the Egyptian masses from the consequences of the revolution. While many people trusted the young people who participated in the 2011 revolution, this was not the case in relation to 2013 for a number of reasons. Participant 1 for example, explained, *no, I do not trust them because most of them say something and then they do something different. Especially, when they contradict what they*
wrote or said in other programs/TV shows. In the same vein, Participant 15 said, of course, not all of them gave accurate news. Small numbers of them were telling the truth. However, no one was trusted. Participant 28 also stated that, he verified the news himself, as he no longer trusts them. Participant 25 elaborated on this viewpoint, stating, no, I do not largely trust them; I trust no more than 30% because many people are using social media to spread gossip about people. When I need to ensure accurate news, I refer to expert politicians who understand or trusted resources such as newspapers that are not biased to one side over another. Participant 27 summarised this position by remarking that he trusted only 20% of them. When I need to verify a piece of information I do it my own way via internet or ask experts for help, he said.

6.3. Traditional media performance during 2011 and 2013

The role of traditional media, along with social media, during the events of the 2011 and 2013 revolutions cannot be overlooked. To this end, participants were asked a series of quantitative and qualitative questions on this issue. Moreover, the roles played by traditional media in the 2013 revolution were completely different from that of 2011. The main differences of the roles of traditional media during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013 were as follows:

- Traditional media were not affected by social media during the 2013 revolution compared to the 2011 revolution.
- The criticism of the regime was permitted on traditional media in the 2013 revolution which was not allowed in the 2011 revolution.
- Increasing Traditional media effective during the 2013 revolution compared to the 2011 revolution.
- Traditional media influenced people’s decision to protest during 2013 revolution compared to the 2011 revolution.
- Increasing protesters reliance on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media in 2013 revolution compared to the 2011 revolution.
As shown in the above chart, a majority of 267 of 423 study participants (64%) accepted the idea that social media weakened the traditional media in the 2011 revolt, with 137 students (33%) strongly agreeing and 130 (31%) agreeing.

On the other hand, 176 out of 423 study participants (37%) rejected the idea that social media weakened the traditional media in the 2013 revolution, with 65 students (13%) strongly disagreeing and 111 (26%) disagreeing. 101 (24%) remained neutral while only 103 students (25%) strongly agreed and 52 (12%) agreed. This indicates a general number tendency towards rejection.
The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that social media weakened traditional media during both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained are diverse since while 64% accepted this idea in relation to 2011, only 37% accepted it in relation to 2013. On the other hand, 21% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 39% rejected it in relation to 2013. Neutral respondents accounted for 15% in relation to 2011 and 25% in relation to 2013. This clearly demonstrates that the influence of social media in 2013 is weak compared to that in 2011. Khondker (2011), for example, argues that “Overstating the role of the new media may not be helpful, due to conventional media playing a crucial role in presenting the uprisings to the larger global community who in turn supported the transformations” (p.677).

Qualitative analysis revealed that social media disabled the role of traditional media during the 2011 revolution. Participant 11 summarised this phenomenon, saying, *the revolution has basically taken place on the internet via Facebook. Nothing else was capable of gathering them.* Participants 15, also expressed this opinion, stating, *for sure, it played a great role in the 25th of January revolution. This is because people were posting more news and communicating via social media, so they could understand everything by following it.*

However, during the revolution of 2013, traditional media played a more significant role which was not compromised or disabled by social media. Participant 24 explained this by claiming that, *visual media was more effective than social media.* Participant 29 believes that the Tamarod was the reason behind this. He observed, *as I say to you, the Tamarod made use*
of the street, not the official Facebook or Twitter. Moreover, traditional media and satellite channels were more widespread than Facebook. In the same vein, Participant 9 asserted, it weakened as well as offended it, because during the first revolution all people shared a single aim. However, when the Tamarod, Tagarod, and other movements used social media, people became totally distracted and most young people started to ignore social media.

As the above chart illustrates, half of the participants of the study disagreed with the idea that criticism of the regime was permitted on traditional media during the 2011 revolution, with a further 85 students (20%) strongly agreeing and 128 (30%) agreeing.

Figure 6-18: There was criticism on traditional satellite media in 2011

Figure 6-19: There was criticism on traditional satellite media in 2013
However, as is illustrated in the above chart, a 67% majority of study participants accepted the idea that criticism of the regime was permitted on traditional media during the 2013 revolution, with 121 students (29%) strongly agreeing and 162 (38%) agreeing.

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that criticism of the regime was permitted on traditional media during both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained are diverse since only 50% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and increased to 67% in relation 2013. Conversely, 25% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 15% rejected it in relation to 2013. This means the extent of criticism permitted in 2013 was greater than that allowed in 2011. Previous comparable studies have attributed similar findings to changes both in the political climate of Egypt and towards the Tamarod movement who used exhaustive private and satellite television airtime to explain their campaign and familiarise the public with their plans and strategies (Iskandar, 2013).

Qualitative results revealed the perception that criticism was not permitted on traditional media to the same extent in 2011 as in 2013. Participant 14 explained, *of course not, because traditional media is a yes-man. During the revolution, they were supporting Mohamad Husni Mubarak because he was still a president, and directly after he left, they said, they were loyal to revolution. It is garbage.* Participant 32 confirmed this, claiming, *the regime was controlling the country and there was no chance for anyone to oppose or demonstrate.*
Participant 1 elaborated that, *every president wants to dominate media. For example, if the President does not want something to be known by the people, he instructs media not to say anything about it. Therefore, the media is under the control of the president.* Participant 28 also confirmed this.

![Figure 6-21: Traditional media were effective during revolution in 2011](image)

The above chart indicates that the views of study participants varied regarding whether traditional media was effective during the 2011 revolution, with 84 students (20%) strongly disagreeing on this idea, 115 (27%) disagreeing. While a further 69 respondents (16%) remained neutral, a mere 62 (15%) strongly agreed, and 93 (22%) agreed.

![Figure 6-22: Traditional media were effective during revolution in 2013](image)
In relation to the 2013 revolution, the above chart illustrates that 322 of 423 participants (76%) believed that the traditional media were effective during the time of the revolution, with 119 (28%) strongly agreeing and 203 (48%) agreeing.

The previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection to the idea that social traditional media was effective in encouraging the citizens during the Egyptian revolutions of both 2011 and 2013. While only 37% of the participants agreed on this in relation to 2011, this increased to 76% in relation to 2013. Moreover, this idea was rejected by 47% in relation to 2011, and decreased to 12% in relation to 2013.

According to survey results, there was a decline in the ability of social media sites to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies by increasing government interest in policing those sites, and a return to the effectiveness of traditional media. Isa (2013) for example, argues that Facebook and Twitter social media sites have exhausted their role in the process of political change in the Arab world, firstly, due to the pressure on the Islamic movements, and secondly, due to changes in the political climate in Egypt which has the potential to generate criticism by the traditional media, especially via satellite screens and independent newspapers.

Qualitative results indicated that traditional media were very effective in the 2013 revolution because the Tamarod movement used it for presenting their ideas and the survey results they collated. Participant 12 commented that, *it was a smart trick from the Tamarod movement to*
turn to TV as well as social media to deliver their voice to all the people. Participant 6 was of the opinion that, because the Tamarod news and data would be largely obvious and untouchable. This is because, for example, old people and other classes are not as interested in internet and social media as young people are. Ultimately, as Participant 24 concluded, the Tamarod movement had great impact via certain channels. However, there were some other channels which remained loyal to Morsi.

Figure 6-24: Traditional media influenced people’s decision to protest in 2011

The above data reveals that the majority of study participants rejected the idea that traditional media influenced people’s decision to revolt in 2011, with only 59 of 423 (14%) strongly disagreeing and 139 (33%) disagreeing. A further 101 students (24%) remained neutral. Consequently, the overall percentage of those who accepted this idea is notably low.
As made evident from the above chart, the situation with the 2013 revolution is quite different. 231 of 423 study participants (54%) confirmed the idea that traditional media influenced their decisions to protest, with 98 (23%) strongly agreeing, and 133 (31%) agreeing. The trend of the participants in the case of 2013 is acceptance. This is completely different from that in 2011 where rejection was the dominant tendency.

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that traditional media influenced people’s decisions to protest in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results
obtained are varied since 24% accepted this idea in relation to 2011 and increased to 54% in relation to 2013. On the other hand, 24% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 30% rejected it in relation to 2013. The undecided accounted for 24% of the participants in relation to the 2011 revolution and 16% in relation to that of 2013.

Qualitative results also highlighted that traditional media had a more significant role than that of the Tamarod during the 2013 revolution. For example, Participant 19 estimated that, satellite channels and traditional media had a greater role than that of Tamarod and social media in toppling the Morsi’ regime. Participant 19 shared this opinion. He believed that, traditional media played a role in protest and delivered to people the idea that the crowd and those who signed the forms are not a small number, i.e. more than millions of them. The words of Participant 1 encapsulate the view that this way is faster and reaches people who are not interested in e-media or social media. Such people only watch TV and listen, so this is the easiest and fastest way, especially for those who are not interested in politics and know everything from TV.

Figure 6-27: You relied on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media in 2011

As shown in above chart, at only 200 of 423, less than half the study participants did not agree with the idea that they relied on traditional media to get information about the revolution during 2011, with 125 students (30%) disagreeing on this idea and 75 students (18%) strongly disagreeing. This clearly illustrates the weakness of traditional media compared to social media in 2011.
Figure 6-28: You relied on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media in 2013

From the above chart, it is evident that in relation to the 2013 revolution the results are quite the reverse. In fact, 295 of 423 study participants (70%) confirmed that they did rely on traditional media to get information about the revolution, with 134 participants (32%) strongly agreeing, and 161 participants (38%) agreeing.

Figure 6-29: Comparing results of 2011 and 2013

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that they relied on traditional media, such as TV or newspapers, for information and documentation of the revolutionary events of both 2011 and 2013. The frequency and percentage of those who
accept this idea increased from 34% to 70% in relation to 2013. Only 15% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2013 while 48% rejected it in relation to 2011. The undecided accounted only 15% in relation to 2013 and 18% in relation to 2011. These results clearly demonstrate that the role of traditional media in 2013 was highly effective.

Rashid (2015) supports these results in his contention that it could be argued that the traditional media has contributed substantially to the invitation to the revolution of June 30th before social media sites got involved/active, and wonders here, if the impact of social media declined especially after the emergence of the Tamarod movement. However, qualitative results endorsed the idea that people relied on traditional media. As Participant 19 said, traditional media played a role in protest and delivered to people the idea that the crowd and those who signed the forms are not a small number, i.e. more than millions of them. Participant 21 also stated that, because there were many resources which were available on media. Participant 14 also agreed, saying, the Tamarod movement members became closer to media personnel, had a place, and were able to reach media personnel and channels. Participant 25 affirmed this, claiming that, social media were transmitting a fabricated picture and the others transmitted a true picture. Therefore, people became more distrustful of the viewpoints. One group may show a video of police torture and another video might show the brotherhood doing the same. Participant 31 concluded that traditional and satellite channels entered people homes and actually left people in a mess. Later on, it was the Tamarod movement.

6.4. Conflicting new movements on social media

In this section, the new movements that appeared on the political stage which influenced social media roles and the events of the Egyptian revolution of 2013 will be discussed. This is because all such movements endeavoured to control social media during that period and then move to the ground to gain greater popular support. However, those movements influence on social media during 2013 revolution were as follows:

- Decreased ability of social media to influence following the emergence of the Tamarod movement.
- Social media were weaker after being used by many movements to achieve their objectives.
- The impact of social media had decreased after the "Tamarod" and "Tagarod" movements moved from social media to work in the street.
The above results reveal that 238 of 423 study participants (56%) accepted the idea that the role of social media declined during the 2013 revolution, especially following the emergence of the Tamarod movement, with 101 students (24%) strongly agreeing and 137 students (32%) agreeing. Tamarod was sceptical of the Egyptian protest movements, which mostly focused building an online following prior to attempting organising. Therefore, the Tamarod approached mobilisation quite differently. Allban (2014) stated that “Tamarod” movement which sparked demonstrations on June 30th when a reported 3 million citizens of the 22 million who signed the withdrawal of confidence forms from the Egyptian President Morsi, did so electronically via social media platforms of the official campaign. In fact, the numbers of signatures that Tamarod collected by the internet constitute a negligible contribution compared to the Tamarod forms which were posted in the Egyptian areas.

Qualitative results underscore this. Participant 4 claimed that, the Tamarod movement played the big role because it was among people at street level. So it encouraged them to set up a revolution against Morsi. In the same way, Participant 6 asserted that, it weakened it as the number of people in the streets was larger, and so President Morsi was quickly removed. Participant 19 shared this way of thinking and explained, social media weakened because the gathering was via Tamarod forms and channels that joined together on the 30th June to protest against the regime. Participant 11 also attested that, social media had a role which cannot be compared with that of the Tamarod as it was working only on the internet and not with people in the street. This ensured that the Tamarod had the dramatic role in overthrowing Morsi’s regime. Furthermore, Morsi’s regime itself had many drawbacks that
were clear to the people. Finally, Participant 9 concluded that, it weakened as well as offended it, because during the first revolution all the people had but one aim. However, when the Tamarod, Tagarod and other movements used social media, people became totally distracted and most young people started to ignore social media.

![Figure 6-31: There was a war between the "Tagarod" and "Tamarod" campaigns on social media sites](image)

As is evident from the above chart, 224 of 423 of study participants (53%) accepted the idea that there was a war between Tamarod and Tagarod movements on social media platforms during the 2013 revolution, with 86 students (20%) strongly agreeing and 138 students (33%) agreeing. A further 132 (31%) remained neutral.

Qualitative results highlighted the disputes between the Tamarod and Tagarod. In order to undermine the success of the Tamarod, Islamist groups which were supportive of the president launched the Tagarod group to petition in support of Morsi. Nevertheless, their campaign failed to pose a threat to Tamarod. In fact, Ghazzawi (2013) claims that when the Tagarod campaign hacked a page of the Tamarod campaign on Facebook, the Tamarod campaign simply responded by announcing their intention to seize one of the pages of the Tagarod campaign. Qualitative data from the current study support these results. For instance, Participant 24 explained that, it was very clear that the political fight among them was very effective throughout all of country’s political conditions. Moreover, it was effective in all conditions rather than just economic even in education. Participant 6 ventured that, the Tamarod and Tagarod were competing with each other and used every means but that the Tamarod was ultimately stronger and deployed social media better than the Tagarod. Participant 29 went even further, claiming that, everyone had played his own way in this
media and also had supporters and opponents. What I think is that the Tamarod movement was helped not by social media, even with a simple share, but with the street support - because it was the first time I saw a revolution supported by the police and army. Finally, Participant 25 summed up that, social media were transmitting a fabricated picture and the others transmitted a true picture. Therefore, people became more distrustful of the viewpoints. Someone may show a video of police torture and another might show a video of the brotherhood doing the same.

As illustrated by the above chart 228 out of 423 study participants (54%) accepted the idea that social media were weak because different movements used them during the 2013 revolution, with 78 students (18%) strongly agreeing and 150 students (36%) agreeing. Wolfsfeld et al (2013) claimed that “The Muslim Brotherhood had little to do with initiating the initial protests and they were probably not the most frequent users of social media” (p.132). On the other hand Bogart (2013) noted that the use and dissemination of information on social media were no longer limited to the activists only; while Morrow and Omrani (2013) further observed that social media is now more likely to be used to provoke hatred and spread unsubstantiated rumour.

Qualitative results diverged to some extent in relation to this issue. For example, while Participant 4 and 23 purport that, the two movements did not largely weaken it because all movements of Tamarod and Tagarod were working at street level. People like those who joined on the streets to the streets and can convince the people. Participant 25 took the view
that, it weakened it because there was not sufficient trust in social media to believe that the news was correct or that every piece of news was written with two different visions. Participant 31 provided more details, claiming that, *it strengthened it*. Different parties were using it. All the statements were published on this and on that. Some follow this, and some follow that, and the rest did not know anything. On the other side, Participant 10 believed that, *the use of social media among activists and movements had strengthened it because all parties were communicating via social media*. Participant 8 concurred that *the use of social media had strengthened the movements because all are connected via internet and social media*. Participant 2 also weighed in on this position, stating, *I did not think so. Social media became more powerful after its use among movements*. Participant 5 asserted that, *it strengthened it, as Morsi’s supporters were helping and backing him via social media*.

![Figure 6-33: The Tamarod movement spectacularly moved from the virtual world to the street](image)

The above results reveal that 251 of 423 of study participants (59%) accepted the idea that the Tamarod movement spectacularly moved from the virtual world to the streets during the 2013 revolution, with 89 students (21%) strongly agreeing and 162 students (38%) agreeing. The “Tamarod” movement moved from the virtual world to the real world when it amassed more than 22 million forms "Rebel forms" expressing a withdrawal of confidence from the presidency of Morsi. However, Isa (2013) justifies this idea, claiming that the Tamarod resorted to the Egyptian streets to target the many Egyptians who do not use social networking sites as a tool, in order to put pressure on the Egyptian regime, and also to confirm that their audience was not from the virtual world.
The aforementioned results correspond with the qualitative analysis. Moreover, participants added a number of reasons why the Tamarod movement should be among the people in the street. For example, Participant 2 surmised that, the Tamarod movement wanted to include all social classes and touch people’s problems at street level, not only among the youth but also among weak and poor people. Those people can only be reached via the street. Participant 9 believed it was because they wanted to maintain the loyalty of all parties. In addition, young people only know social media as Facebook, Twitter, etc. but old people do not understand or are interested in such things. This made the Tamarod come down to the streets and go to them wherever they are. Moreover, the Tamarod’s form required hand-written ink signatures accompanied by handwritten personal ID numbers. Participant 29 suggested yet another reason. He said, of course, in the street it became credited and credible rather than collecting via Facebook, Twitter, etc. Filling out the forms and the support in the street helped it. Participant 16 noted that the Tamarod coming down to street level might be more suitable for the public, the middle, and the low class, than the high class.

Participant 15 proposed it was to collect true voices from the street and get closer to them. They wanted to reach those people who do not have social media, so this was the only way to make it easy for them. Participant 6 explored the psychological possibilities, claiming that, via the streets they get more confidence and their voice will be better heard than social media. This is because via social media, many people do not watch or listen to you but in the streets, you are very close to people. Participant 4 suggested that the reason the Tamarod took to the streets was to convince people, to be very close to them, and to be able to make contact more quickly. Participant 10 claims that by interacting with people at street level the Tamarod movement was able to amass the huge number of citizens necessary to remove President Morsi. Participant 13 explained that it was good tactic to discuss things face to face with the people, stating that, even if he/she is not fully convinced, you can convince him/her that there are many mistakes that should be corrected and that the regime is no longer valid. Hence, collecting from streets was a better way to persuade people to sign the movement’s form.

6.5. Deposing of presidents

The role which was played by both social and traditional media in the downfall of the President and the regime in two successive Egyptian revolutions, will be examined here through the quantitative and qualitative results of this study. Furthermore, there were different
roles played by both social and traditional media in the downfall of the Egyptian regime in 2011 and 2013 as follows:

- Social media played a significant role in the fall of the President in 2011 compared to the 2013 revolution.
- Traditional media played a significant role in the fall of the President in 2013 compared to the 2011 revolution.

As illustrated by the above chart, a majority of 328 of 423 of study participants (77%) accepted the idea that social media played a significant role in the fall of the president during the 2011 revolutions, with 195 students (46%) strongly agreeing and 133 students (31%) agreeing.
In contrast, the above reveals that only 262 of 423 study participants (62%) accepted the idea that social media played a significant role in the fall of the president in the 2013 revolution, with 115 students (27%) strongly agreeing and 147 students (35%) agreeing.

The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection of the idea that social media played a significant role in the fall of the president during both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained are quite similar as 77% accepted this idea in relation to 2011, and 62% accepted it in relation to 2013. On the other hand, 9% of the participants rejected this idea in
relation to 2011 while 25% rejected it in relation to 2013. Neutral respondents accounted for 14% in relation to 2011 and 13% in relation to 2013. Despite this general trend, the findings indicate that the influences of social media were more pronounced in 2011 than in 2013. According to Isa (2013) the increased use of virtual world of Facebook and Twitter in the Egypt of 2011 to the fact that social media sites were able to mobilize activists and young people on the specific goal of toppling the regime, while in terms of the 2013 revolution, Fitzpatrick (2013) draws attention to the power struggle over presidential social media accounts was epitomised by the fact that a 22 minute statement posted on YouTube by President Morsi on promptly an unceremoniously deleted.

Qualitative analysis sheds further light on the aforementioned results. Participant 17 confirms, yes, I agree, because they changed many regimes and achieved an aim which was not complete. It was a simple aim but they changed the regime. Participant 25 added it was important to be able to communicate with the young between 20 and 30 years old. Of course, this category of people has the power, and if he is able to communicate with them, he alone will be able to talk with them as many other media could not be reached or viewed by many people. Participant 33 asserted that, January 25th was completely based on Facebook for one reason - because of the police injustice. Facebook was the easiest means to communicate. It is enough to share an idea, and at least 30 to 40 million people recognise it. They started to talk with each other and convinced themselves to go and participate instead of using this virtual reality.

In relation to the 2013 revolution participants expressed this differently. Participant 4 for example believed it was, almost both of social media and the Tamarod movement. While Participant 6 declared that, the Tamarod movement was the core that was helped by social media. Participant 11 stated that, both of them played an important role in the fall of Morsi’s regime. However, Tamarod played the strongest role by working in the streets and collecting people IDs to fill in their forms so as to withdraw trust from Morsi’s regime. However, Participant 23 expressed the different idea that, Morsi might have had too weak a personality to prove himself on social media because he knows the important role of such media. Participant 5 worried that social media was broadcasting such inaccurate news that people flared up. This is because people became nervous and demanded their rights if they heard anything that annoyed them. Participant 13 revealed the negative side. He observed, yes of course they had a role but effected it in a negative way. This is obvious when they could make Morsi forfeit his presidency.
As shown by the above results, 209 of 423 students, which is equivalent to almost half of the participants of the study, rejected the idea that the traditional media played a significant role in the fall of the president during the 2011 revolution, with 98 students (23%) strongly disagreeing and 111 students (26%) disagreeing. A further 65 students (16%) remained neutral.

As illustrated by the data above, 287 of 423 study participants (68%) accepted the idea that traditional media did play a significant role in the fall of the president during the 2013 revolution, with 156 students (37%) strongly agreeing and 131 students (31%) agreeing.
The comparison presented in the previous diagram clearly shows the differences among the study participants concerning their acceptance or rejection to the idea that traditional media played a significant role in the fall of the president during both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. The results obtained vary since 35% accepted this idea in relation to 2011, while 68% accepted it in relation to 2013. On the other hand, 15% of the participants rejected this idea in relation to 2011 while 49% rejected it in relation to 2013. Neutral respondents accounted for 16% in relation to 2011 and 17% in relation to 2013. This clearly demonstrates that the traditional media played a more significant role in the 2013 revolution than in that of 2011.

Qualitative results reaffirmed participants’ views that the Tamarod successfully utilized the traditional channels. To reiterate the observations of Participant 12 in this context, he claimed it was a smart trick of the Tamarod movement to use TV as well as social media to deliver their voice to all the people. In addition, Participant 4 explained it was useful, to reach all social classes faster and more easily, especially those not interested in social media. Participant 6 added that, their news and data would be largely obvious and touchable. This is because, for example, old people and other classes are not as interested in the internet and social media as young people. Participant 8 made the valid point that, not everyone watches social media; some people only watch TV. Whilst Participant 11 observed that traditional media and TV address all classes of people, not just specific groups. Therefore, they used TV to reveal their results. Participant 14 linked this to the Tamarod movement members who became closer to media personnel, had a place, and were able to reach media personnel. Participant 16 and 15 shared the opinion that traditional media was of great importance.
because, people who were unable to be involved in the live action in the Square could watch it via TV and media and because all people could watch TV and traditional media. The internet was not understood by old people and they do not have any relationship with social media, so, this was the fastest way to reach them.

![Pie chart showing responses](image)

**Figure 6-40: June was regarded as the second wave of the January 25th revolt**

The above results reveals a wide range of participant responses as to whether the June 30th revolution was actually the second wave of the January 25th revolution, with 88 students (21%) strongly agreeing and 103 students (24%) agreeing. Conversely, students 53 (13%) strongly disagreed and 78 students (18%) disagreed. Previous comparable studies, such as those of Kassem (2013) and Nsire (2013), have argued that the 2013 rebellion represented a second wave of the January revolution. They have explicitly stated that, “June 30 was a revolution of the people against the state institutions” which sought to overthrow President Morsi and the control group and aid the recovery of the Egyptian state. This was unlike the 2011 revolution which was launched by those citizens wishing to obtain political reform, and which gradually escalated to overthrow the Mubarak regime.

Qualitative results obtained through interviews varied as to whether June 30th was a military coup or a second wave of revolution. Some participants believed it was actually due to the Tamarod movement and its role on the Egyptian streets, while others considered that wrong political decisions were the reason. Participant 24 and 9 agreed that the will of the people caused the fall of both Morsi and Mubarak, and asserted that, it was the people who played the role. Firstly, it was useless for Morsi to stay as a republican president as he entered the elections under the umbrella of the Muslim Brethren. If they selected another person rather
than Morsi, he might succeed. However, Morsi and his followers were the cause of his own downfall. Participant 9 explained, so we endured. When he became president, we were obliged to be patient. However, when we realised that everything was chaos, that he makes a decision in the morning, only to cancel it in the afternoon, all the people turned against him.

While Participant 6 believes that the Tamarod movement played a role in the fall of Morsi’s regime as they got out onto the streets in large groups and were able to affect large number of people. By contrast, Participant 19 believes that the Tamarod movement did not have a great effect and did not bring down the regime. the regime fell by itself as a result of its negativity and lack of awareness of positive political processes.

Participants 12, 14, 18 and 19, all attribute the downfall of the regime to President Morsi himself, describing him as a stupid man who left the country in a mess. Participant 19, for example, stated, I have told you that they were politically stupid. He thought that the methods they used during the 25th of January revolution of using social media is the most powerful way of protest and had a great credibility among people. However, we have said that the Tamarod affected those on the street and collected people so that all citizens were urged to protest on June 30th. Participant 24 agrees that, president Morsi was an inappropriate republican president. From my own point of view, he was unsuitable for this office despite public opinion. When given 24 hours to respond to the concept of legitimacy or whether his presidency represented the Egyptian people or a particular group, he did not reply.

Alternately, Participant 26 claimed that, Morsi’s regime was a danger to the country so it had to end. That regime was based on greed and not national benefit, so it hindered any progress. However, the brotherhood which had always supported him sensed the change taking place in the country during his regime. Participant 27 added that Brotherhood were always using religion to make people trust them while they themselves did not abide by any word of the Holy Qur’an.

On the other hand, some participants expressed opinions regarding what they called the military coup. For example, Participant 14 said, the military coup of El Sisi took place because Morsi trusted his people enough to enable them to take the military coup against him. Moreover, Participant 18 was more emphatic in his opinions, avowing, the President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, has failed Morsi. He was the one who deserved to fail. Participant 29 wrapped up the entire issue on his own words, declaring; I would not call what happened on June 30th either a revolution or a military coup. I would call it a military coup supported by people. This means that a minority of the armed forces raised a revolution and were supported by a particular category of people.
Chapter 7: Findings, Discussion and Final Conclusions

7.1. Introduction

This chapter presents a discussion and analysis of the findings outlined previously concerning the various roles played by social media across the Arab Spring revolutions. More specifically, it will assess the importance of social media as a means of mass communication during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013, and consider the extent to which it may be deemed a major contributing major factor to the recent political progress in Egypt. The chapter will therefore examine three main areas as follows:

- The role of social media in directing the revolution and strengthening democracy during the Arab revolutions.
- The role of social media in supporting protest actions, globalising the revolution, and changing the relationship between the citizens and authorities, during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013
- The role of traditional media in criticising the regime and instigating rebellion during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013

7.2. The role of social media in directing the revolution and strengthening democracy during the Arab Revolutions

The Arab Spring revolutions were characterized by having no specific inspiration or individual leader to guide the supporters through its plans and defined programmes. Instead, social media were considered their starting point. Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Egypt, the countries included in this study, had traditionally shared many similar socio-political conditions, such as, historical resistance to the ideals and practices of democratic governance, low standards of living, and violent repressions of any civil protest or political dissent. However, the proliferation of social media access enabled many heretofore unheard voices to emerge and be heard on various social platforms. Many of those involved had been political activists prior to events of the Arab Spring revolutions and found themselves in the position of leader due to the passion and articulation they brought to such forums. For this reason the concept of political activism was commonly extolled at this time (see section 5.2).
This study found that one of the most significant gains of the Arab Spring revolutions was that of mass information circulation and the emergence of political negotiation and argumentation among all social groups. This was arguably brought about because social media platforms ensured that current affairs and political discussion were disseminated to both young and old, and to women as well as men. Indeed, that social media were used by diverse social and political groups in attempts to connect people through their ideologies and with direct reference to their various needs, was reinforced through political activists and the leaders of the revolutions. Perhaps, more importantly social media also underscored the tyranny and corruption shared by the various political regimes which served to both legitimize and galvanize calls for revolution. It may then be concluded that by replacing traditional revolutionary models, the actual spearhead of the revolutions was the use of social media to garner and coordinate pro-democracy activism throughout the Arab world. These findings support the study of Hassan et al (2015) who see that "new social media generate significant support for democracy, while traditional media do not" (p.547). It therefore follows that rather than any single inspirational leader, the mass agency of social media can be effectively harnessed to organize popular protest campaigns or even initiate full-scale revolutions.

This study further confirmed the importance of the internet throughout the revolutionary period. Since it does not require advanced or expensive technology to use, by providing protesters with free and unlimited access to news, debate and campaign plans through cell phones, tablets and iPads, social media also played a critical role in broadcasting live events to remote and formerly under-informed or unpoliticized areas. Thus, it was recognized as a credible platform that everybody, and not just the politically active or educated, could rely upon to keep track of the tumultuous events. In consequence, more and more people started to use social media or wanted to learn how to use it. The effect of social media on people, then, was reciprocal.

This study identified significant impact on preparations for the Arab revolutions through many specific pages which appeared on social media throughout the Arab Spring. These pages provoked considerable outrage and triggered protests and demonstrations against the various oppressive regimes. For example, the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” induced the young into active protests against the government. Yet paradoxically, such sites were somehow considered benign and of little interest to the various police or military forces. Perhaps a more important idea that permitted such sites to assume such an essential role was
that of trust, and it is clear that the police failed to recognise the importance of social media in instigating, guiding, and even leading demonstrations. This was confirmed by the participants of the study, who stated that social media played a prominent role in mobilizing protesters and in organizing times and locations for the protests to take place.

This study demonstrates that the authorities likewise underestimated the role of social media in the revolutions. As previously discussed, activities on social media were at their height during protests and demonstrations. On finally realizing its scope and impact, the authorities tried to minimize the influence of social media by cutting all access to the internet. Ironically, this had the reverse effect, as users were then forced out onto the streets to follow the events, while yet others used more advanced technologies to continue communication and broadcast live events. The fact that this resulted in greater protest merely confirms the implications of social media for the protesters as the relationship between social media and the strength and the size of the crowd was found to be directly proportional. In addition, the study shows how different people gained an interest in politics through social media. For while the Arab Spring revolutions were not linked to a specific location, but instead bound together by the common ideals and goals of the citizens of the various provinces and territories of the region, it is clear that social media made a major contribution to establishing the parities and affinities of their protests. In this way, Albanna (2011) confirmed that the Internet has allowed for new players to enter into the political game, by their rules which were not designed by the developers of social media.

Social media underwent a change to become tools for mass communication and political work during the Arab Spring revolutions. However, this was not the first time the young of the Arab Spring countries had used it as they were accustomed to using it for entertainment purposes, public communication, and exchange of information, if not for political reasons. However, increasingly during the demonstrations, they used it primarily for political communication and to mobilize popular protests. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, utilized such networks as they offered the potential and scope to communicate covertly and safe from the monitoring of the authorities. Their habitual use of social media enabled the propagation of revolutionary tactics, such as mobilizing protesters, coordinating meetings and demonstrations, locating the hazards, and other associated activities, all of which encouraged the young to engage both with social media and political activism. Such networks highlighted
the new tools that people could use for more communication and mobilization (see also Davies 2014, p.4).

Despite the many social and economic problems throughout the Arab Spring countries, social media effectively contributed by encouraging the positive participation of diverse societal groups in adhering to the ideals of democracy. Moreover, the revolutions allowed traditionally marginalized groups such as the young, women, and older citizens, to fully partake in social and political issues, particularly at the time of the revolutions. One notable indicator for the success of these efforts was the increasing number of political parties, civic society organizations, registered electoral voters, and similar democratic organizations which started to flourish in such countries. All these factors resulted in a vast escalation in the use of social media, and in particular, amongst groups who were unfamiliar with such technologies. Clearly, these users recognized the benefits and multiple uses of social media (see section 5.3).

An extremely important role for social media across the Arab Spring countries, which the study identified, was the negative revelations regarding the many defects of the respective political regimes and the resulting political, social and economic problems. In fact, this heightened awareness of their impact on society, arguably the spark which lit the revolution. The disturbing video images posted on social media of a Tunisian protestors being driven to self-immolation and of Khaled Said undergoing torture at the hands of the Egyptian Police typify examples of the role of social media as a mobilizing factor in the Arab Spring revolutions.

Unfortunately, this study also concluded that one negative outcome of the Arab Spring revolutions was the increased societal dependency on social media as the traditional media of government-backed TV and radio channels and governmental newspapers responded with fierce efforts to regain control of the political game across the region. Moreover, several professional personnel, institutions, and even private business individuals, accustomed to exploiting their positions and relationships within the status quo, contributed considerable sums to finance traditional media in order to influence people and turn the direction of events in their favour. Significantly, they also started to invade the arena of social media to take complete control. Consequently, social media, and those non-professional and young people behind them were unable to cope with such methods of information and opinion control. The study also pointed to some lack of confidence in the information provided by social media.
The results indicate that participants were distrustful of many political activists because of frequently changed political direction or contradiction of earlier statements.

Finally, this study concluded that although the Arab Spring revolutions effectively mobilized their populations and overthrew the oppressive regimes of these countries, they were not sufficiently far-ranging in their planning or scope. Their objective remained limited to the downfall of the regime without any real plan for the aftermath of the revolution and what might happen next. One emphatic example of this oversight is that the very same protestors who celebrated the downfall of Mubarak and elected Morsi were demonstrating for the removal of Morsi by 30 June 2013.

7.3. The role of social media in supporting protest actions, globalising the revolution, and changing the relationship between the citizens and authorities, during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013

This study found that the absence of specific leaders during the Egyptian revolutionary movement of 2011 gave rise to the strong guiding role of social media therein, particularly in terms of defining political demands, encouraging protestors to take more strike action, and to hold firm to their opinions and requirements. Social media became the platform where people could gather and certain leading boards were established to articulate revolution aims and goals. Facebook pages, such as “Kullena Khaled Said” was one such empowering page which led the way for hundreds of other Facebook pages to adopt revolutionary stances. These Facebook pages were seen as the leading lights of the revolution until the fulfilment of their main objective was achieved in the downfall of the regime. This finding is supported by Ghany (2011) who reiterated that social media sites on the internet, especially Facebook and Twitter, played an important role not only in igniting the revolution, but also in directing the revolution until its conclusion. This has prompted many commentators to characterize the Egyptian revolution as the "Facebook revolution" or "Internet revolution". “We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world” (Howard 2011, p.16).

This study found that as one of the main spearheads of the revolution, social media sites had roused young revolutionaries to demonstrate and protest across all the developments of the ensuing events until the downfall of the regime in the revolution of 2011. During this time social media also embraced the slogan of “bread, freedom and social justice” which had been
agreed upon by the rebels. Under the unity of this maxim numerous websites and Facebook pages disseminated the negative aspects of the regime and exposed police excesses. The youth movement utilized social media to use what is called “strike blogging” which facilitated controversial discussions and unmonitored or censored political debates (see section 6.2). This directly contributed to raising the ceiling of demands through concerted efforts to monitor instances and degrees of police abuse towards demonstrators and was a decisive factor in the escalation of the successive steps taken by protestors. In addition, the absence of traditional human rights organizations effectively elevated social media into the guardianship of moral and political mobility. Thus it is clear that social media played a crucial role in activating mass political mobility and in rallying the demands of the various sectors to ensure those in office would hear their voices.

This study found that after breaking through the historically embedded fear-barrier during the revolutions of 2011 and 2013, Egyptians continued to resort to media platforms both to express their ongoing opinion and evolving demands. What soon became clear was that even the revolutionary successes of President Mubarak's resignation and the election of a new president had not fully realized the democratic aspirations of the Egyptians, and a mere two years later protesters were already calling for an end to the Morsi regime. During the second revolution in Egypt, the people actually faced the regime and the consequences of the protest restrictions head-on. Thus the 25th January revolution contributed to the emergence of a new approach to Egyptian civic and political empowerment by engaging in mass street demonstrations both before and after the revolution. This study identified several reasons for this unprecedented situation. These findings support the study of Kharroub and Bas (2016) who pointed out that "social media can help overcome this fear by emphasizing the sense of community and minimizing the feeling of isolation" (p.1978).

Social media were the most suitable platform for the Egyptians for many reasons. They are a closed platform where views may be expressed and analysed and alternative opinions discussed, and ideas supported or refuted freely and safely. Egyptians also became familiar with other patterns of political participations, such as participating in questionnaires and polls which generated a greater awareness of the issues faced by their local and national communities. Many Egyptians organized polls, and both displayed and discussed their results, which had the knock-on effect of further increasing public interest with politics, an echoing and adoption of the many viewpoints, and more freedom of general critical discussion. Were
it not for social media, such full participation in political issues would not have been possible in the Egyptian context. The work of Garrido et al (2013) supports this study’s finding that the role of social media reinforced democracy during the two revolutions by strengthening and activating the Egyptian democratic sphere and effecting political transformation by the increased diffusion of information. This point of view was echoed by a participant who pointed out that many people used the concept of democracy as a form of bullying following the January revolution, but that in the wake of the 2013 events Egyptians were more conscious of the realities going on around them.

The use of social media also contributed to the emergence and growth of civil resistance in the revolution of 2011 in various ways, not least in terms of the emergence of formerly unknown rebel leaders and supporters. Protecting locations, planning for and directing activities on the ground, providing logistical support and medical care, protecting important state headquarters, and undertaking policing street duties in the absence of the actual Egyptian police forces clearly attest to the strength and scope of popular support. Studies undertaken by Khamis and Vaughn (2011) confirm that social media forums were highly effective platforms for promoting political engagement and providing virtual spaces in which to organize, assemble and execute peaceful civil protests. However, while social media roles in the revolution of 2011 were largely supportive, logistical and provided communication links between the rebels and movement organizers, this study revealed that during the 2013 revolution these aspects of social media were significantly decreased. This may be accounted for by the very different nature of the two revolutions. For while the first revolution was sparked by fundamental issues, such as the practices of an oppressive regime epitomized by the systemic police barbarity and persistent civic and human rights violations, the second revolution ignited because of an increased public knowledge of corrupt governmental power-struggles, economic ineptitude, and the residual tyrannies of certain ideology-holders. In fact, at that time a possible reversion to the previous “Mubarak regime” vision of governance was the predominant fear of many Egyptian citizens (see section 6.4).

This study found that broadcasting the news in a timely manner was effective in helping protestors to minimize or even avoid the hazards against them in 2011, particularly as the official forces did not afford them adequate protection. In consequence, social media became the real youth mobilizer in the various revolution venues, as it enabled a diversity of interested parties to follow live events, disseminate warnings against hazards, assign times for
rest, and deploy revolutionary reinforcements to the protest squares in time of heightened threat. Moreover, this prompted the Egyptian security services to use “Facebook” and “Twitter” to monitor the movements of activists on the streets later. In addition, due to public perceptions of it as the sole source of unified political orientation within a single shared objective, social media maintained credibility in 2011 as the most immediate and reliable source of information with which most people could directly interact.

In 2011 political activists saw themselves as crusaders for the freedom of Egypt and tasked with the just cause of helping to promote, escalate and resolve the socio-political crisis. Their practices, which were characterized by revolutionary zeal, attracted many and ensured their numbers increased to many thousands of followers. In actual fact, even those who participated only marginally in revolutionary activities, revelled in the name of ‘political activist’. They defended themselves and their practices with the purity of their calling and public assurances that they were not financed by any external party or country. Unfortunately, subsequent scrutiny of their activities and finances has since proved that several activists were indeed financed by foreign interests, while yet others set individual agendas to achieve during the revolution. Public awareness of these issues meant that the masses started to avoid them and their role became decreased and marginalized, particularly when a number of the 2011 leaders and activists went so far as to call the owners of some Facebook pages traitors who were using the revolution for their own ends. Ironically, such outbursts seemed to coincide with substantive changes in many activists’ political orientations and moves towards personal empowerment and fame.

It is hardly surprising that at that time many Egyptians became increasingly perplexed and unable to distinguish the right from the wrong, especially in such a conflicted political environment. In this regard, a recent interview by the Chairperson of the CIA (Brennan) concerning the Arab Spring Revolution is very enlightening. Brennan pointed out that the administration of Barak Obama was wrong in its estimations concerning the Arab Spring and was mistaken in attempting to force western values and democracy on the Middle East during that time, saying, “I think there were very, very unrealistic expectations in Washington, including in some parts of the administration, that the Arab Spring was going to push out these authoritarian regimes and democracy is going to flourish because that's what people want.” (CNN, 2017) The CNN website conclusion that “Brennan also offered candid assessments about the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East and fateful decisions U.S.
administrations have made over the past two decades that may have contributed to the current strife” directly implies that, in principle, the Arab Spring revolutions were backed by the American Administration.

Be that as it may, by the June 2013 revolution, political activism in Egypt had taken a very different turn. In this instance, the Tamarod movement’s single role was to harness their rhetoric to call the people to the actual squares of the revolution. This time they were fully protected by the state police and allowed direct contact with people, and unlike 2011, all platforms were open for them without restriction or censorship. However, this study found that the Muslim Brotherhood tried to discredit any Facebook pages agitating for the overthrow of the regime. They penetrated the website of the Tamarod Movement to display an image of Shaik Hazem Salah Abo Ismail, a leader in brotherhood movement along with negative propaganda concerning some of Tamarod’s leaders and also broadcasted live videos and pictures from Rabea and Al-Nahda square. These and other similar events gave rise to bitter disputes between the conflicting ideologies and allegiances of social media users.

This study confirms that the dwindling ability of social media sites to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies sprang from the declining confidence in revolutionary youth movements and frustration among the Egyptian people regarding the aftermath of the revolution. Thus while many people had trusted young people who had participated in the 2011 revolution, this was not the case of the revolution of 2013.

This study also found that social media were instrumental in globalizing the Egyptian revolutions of both 2011 and 2013 by broadcasting the revolutionary events abroad. In fact, demonstration locations, clashes with security forces, the numbers of casualties and injured victims, meetings with the leaders, and of course, the slogans of the revolutions made international headlines in this way. ‘Personal news’ or news by which ordinary people updated social or traditional media with the latest from the revolution, outperformed the traditional news, was a major contributing factor to the ultimate success of the two revolutions (see section 6.3).

Abufotouh (2013) claims that social media played a vital role in disseminating a true picture of the entire spectrum of the Egyptian people through Facebook, Twitter, and also by broadcasting the key events by audio and video via the YouTube network. This study concurs that social media played an important role in raising considerable international awareness and
circulated more news about revolutions in the Arab World. As Participant 21 elucidated, *they helped me to get news of the Arab countries around us*. Moreover, it helps to extend the public strike to include young and old citizens, and men and women and enabled yet more revolutionary squares to spring up, particularly in the more remote governorates, which then moved in and swelled the main ones, such as Al-Tahrir Square and Al-Kaed Ibrahim in Alexandria. Social media then, helped to expand the revolution squares while supporting extended strike action. This took place in the conspicuous absence of the official media which tried to underplay the situation by broadcasting inaccurate pictures and information to the people. Social media’s revelations regarding these cynical attempts to mislead the Egyptian public emphasised its lack of credibility and served only to generate yet greater public confidence in social media platforms. This finding aligns with that of Garrido et al (2013) who stressed the critical roles of social media during the Egyptian mobilizations of 2011, while Zhuo et al (2011) while crediting the main successes of the Egyptian revolution to the Egyptian people themselves, also nonetheless acknowledged the undeniable impact of social media. (p.8)

This study found that social media helped both with documenting and disseminating information regarding the events shortly after they occurred in both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions. It also revealed that both political activists and traditional media were heavily dependent on the thousands of videos which catalogued the violent excesses of the police and other groups as neither could be present in such places, either for fear of reprisal or simply through an inability to keep pace with the ever-changing tide of events. This study also demonstrates that the phenomenon of personal news appeared, and as illustrated earlier, was instrumental in mobilizing people, documenting events, and enabling different sectors of the population to follow the events without actually being there. Abufotouh (2013) asserts that one of the leading roles of social media in Egypt was to document the course of the Egyptian revolution. As each image, video, word, post, opinion, analysis, interception, and political debate was set down and recorded by young non-specialists, many young people were persuaded to engage in numerous discussions in order to seek solutions for the conflict.

This study identified the changing nature of the relationships between some of the people and certain official institutions, particularly security organizations. During the 2011 revolution this relationship was extremely poor, while relations with the rebels deteriorated mainly due to their questionable tactics and allegiances. In 2011, the state agencies tackled what they
viewed as social media’s misinterpretation of its role in the revolutionary movement. Then, on finally recognizing the scope and power of its reach, they made the miscalculation of trying to gag it at the source by cutting off the internet as it was deemed wiser to utilize such a tool to prevent dissemination of the state position regarding political activism rather than use it to open a channel of communication with its supporters. However, this move proved counterproductive as more people than ever felt compelled to take to the streets in order to follow the events or to assure themselves of their relatives’ safety. In doing so, they found increasingly solidarity with the protesters and this in turn, increased both the numbers attending each gathering and the level of their demands.

Many study participants expressed the belief that government attempts to clamp down on social media actually hastened the downfall of President Mubarak during the 2011 revolution because this oppressive reaction paradoxically mobilized the huge numbers who gathered to protest in Al-Tahrir Squire. One of participants confirmed that “the people divided into two halves. The first half was in the Midan “Al-Tahrir Squire”, while the other half was following events from outside the Midan. But when the internet and social media were shut down, all people got down to the Midan and motivated others to do so.” This idea was supported by Poell et al (2016) who suggested there was dramatic decline in user activity when the Egyptian government shut down the internet in the country, and stated that "the vast majority of commentators on the Khaled Said page were located in Egypt itself" (p.998).

For this reason, the new Egyptian government approached the issue of social media in quite a different way. For instance, President Morsi and the Military Council routinely issued announcements and statements via social media platforms. Furthermore, in the wake of the collapse of the regime, the Military Supreme Council turned to social media to communicate directly with protesters, whilst also using it in attempts to limit the potential damage of rumour-mongering by responding to public questions and demands for transparent governance.

This study found that by time of 2013 revolution, the state had absorbed many useful lessons on the importance of social media. In addition, political and patriotic leadership was more careful to listen directly to the demands of the people in order to avoid the mistakes made in 2011. As such, they stood shoulder to shoulder to achieve their aspiration of changing the regime. Stacher (2013) notes that typical SCAF statements revolved around publicising the armed forces efforts to eradicate terrorism, the official activities of the armed forces, attempts
to clarify facts and debunk rumours, and general communication with Egyptian citizens. This merely emphasises the degree to which the Egyptian revolution changed the government’s approach to social media.

This study reveals that two very different natures marked the Egyptian street mindset in 2011 and 2013. In 2011 the hallmark of the Egyptian street mindset was unity and agreement on the objectives and visions of events. In the revolution of 2013 there was little agreement among citizens upon defining what was happening. While some regard it as the second wave of revolution in 2011, others see it as a military coup by the armed forces. Some claim that the revolution was a reaction to the unsatisfactory performance of President Morsi, while still others insist that attempts to monopolize power and fill state institutions with members of the Muslim Brotherhood was the real rationale for revolution, as they did not recognize the important role of the State institutions that cannot be overlooked by any political system or change in its orientation and soft power. Ultimately, many who lived through it contend that the revolution of 2013 was just a gift of the armed forces backed by the majority of the Egyptian people. To date however, divisions remain among Egyptians about what to call the events in 2013. However, the solidarity of more than 30 million citizen supporters of the Armed Forces confirms that what happened was indeed a popular revolution in which the traditional armed forces evolved to meet the demands of the progressive movements, and as such it must be understood as a real and successful revolution in every sense of the word.

Despite the aforementioned residual divisions, the use of social media have increased and most people continue to depend on them. While social media were the platforms for activists and protesters in 2011, in 2013 it was a platform to debate opinion and openly discuss controversial ideas. While progressive and tolerant in theory, unfortunately in practice, this often produced bitter disputes between opposing sides which sometimes degenerated into insulting or accusatory arguments. In fact, any impartial discussion of this state of division in 2013 has long been lost among these disputing views, causing several moderate activists to withdraw from the political scene and freeing more space for the two more radical sides. This has helped to enrich social media with unique ideas and made it a unique platform for political discussion.

Kassem and Nsire (2013) argue that the 2013 rebellion represented a second wave of the January 2011 revolution. Unlike the 2011 revolution which was launched by those citizens wishing to obtain political reform, and which gradually escalated to an overthrow of the
Mubarak regime, they have explicitly stated that, “June 30 was a revolution of the people against the state institutions” which sought to overthrow President Morsi and the control group and to aid the recovery of the Egyptian state. This study analysed the differences of opinion among participants as to whether the 30th June was indeed a military coup or a second wave of revolution. Several participants expressed the belief that it was actually due to the Tamarod movement and its role on the Egyptian streets, while others considered that an errant political regime was the reason. A further participant suggested that the fall of the regime was due to President Morsi himself, while another summarized the entire issue in his own words, declaring, I would not call what happened on the 30th June either a revolution or a military coup. I would call it a military coup supported by people. That means that a minority of the armed forces raised revolution and were supported by a particular large category of people.

Finally, from the findings above, it may be concluded that while during the 25th January revolution was brought about by youth movements’ calls for democracy on social media, the 30th June was democracy in action because the people were free to express their political will unhindered. Moreover, quantitative results revealed that the role of the 2013 revolution was different from that of 2011 for many reasons. Some contend that there was a mutual strategy operating between the Tamarod and the traditional media. In addition, the study confirms that the decline in the ability of social media sites to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring countries sprang from declining confidence in the revolutionary youth movements and dissatisfaction among the Egyptian people with the outcome of the revolution. While many people trusted the young people who participated in the 2011 revolution, this was not the case in 2013. Moreover, this study clearly demonstrates a sustained diminution of those roles played by social media in favour of a more dominant traditional media role throughout the 2013 revolution.

7.4. The role of traditional media in criticising the regime and instigating rebellion during the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013

This study found that throughout the revolutionary period of 2013 social media had little influence in directing public opinions due to the greater influence of traditional media at that time. Likewise, individual leaders of the revolution emerged to replace the use of social media, and the large-scale populist support replaced the specific political activists. In this context it became increasingly difficult to depend on a social media that was now perceived as the site of conflict between those who were motivated by personal gain and malicious
propaganda. Consequently, people started to look for alternative approaches to political action, such as the popular gatherings utilized by the Tamarod Movement. They collected signatures on their petition for Morsi’s resignation, assembled in public squares, held conferences and public meetings, appeared on TV and radio, and numerous other tactics which had been deployed by Egyptians in their 1919 revolution. Moreover, the reappearance of political parties and movements directed public opinions to rebel against the regime; the role played by social media in 2011 revolution. In this way, many political parties depended on traditional media rather than social media. For instance, one of participants explained that, “two or three months before 30/6/2013, most people knew that 30/6/2013 was the day of gathering, i.e. an important day in the history of Egypt” (see section 7.3).

This study found that traditional media was more effective than social media during the 2013 revolution. Traditional media played a more central role during actual revolutionary events, which further diminished the ‘personal news’ phenomenon to weaken the role of social media still further. In addition, the study emphasizes that the former control of traditional media by governments and security agencies was the major cause of its declining role both leading up to and during the revolution of 2011.

The revolution in 2011 required a driving force to persuade the people to revolt against the regime. This was not available by means of traditional media as it was an organ of the ruling regime at that time and thus fully committed to regime ideology and opinions and to ignoring the demands of the people, despite persistent strikes, demonstrations and worker activism. The people had no means to express their demands because the means of traditional communication under heavy state and security control could not represent the voices on the streets. For this reason the revolution found in social media a genuine tool that could articulate the demands of rebels and political activists. In response, the traditional media performance had fallen fully into the hands of the regime, drawing the people in the wrong directions, to both deny and forge ‘the facts’. At the time when the revolution was raging in all streets and squares, the traditional media was cynically disseminating inaccurate accounts of news to the people, assuring them that everything was quiet and that were no significant changes. This was so patently untrue that it caused the citizens to lose confidence in such media and in any event, social media were now openly disseminating the opposite version of the news which many people began to follow and trust. On the other hand, during the 2013 revolution, many factors helped traditional media to flourish once more and have a greater
influence on people’s opinions and beliefs. Some of the factors that can be highlighted are the sense of freedom in the atmosphere in the country at that time, the massive development in technology and social media, the use of conferences and meetings on social and traditional media, the creation of more political parties and movements, such as the Tamarod and the Tagarod, an increased role of traditional parties, and the taking of numerous public polls either through phone or direct contact.

The study clearly shows that the Tamarod movement used traditional media for presenting their ideas, and certainly, one of the study participants said that it was a smart trick of the Tamarod movement to turn to television. Although the study does indicates that traditional media had a more significant role than Tamarod during the 2013 revolution, the traditional media played a major part in convincing many of the vast numbers to sign the Tamarod petition. As one of the participants observed, “It was a smart trick of the Tamarod movement to use TV as well as social media to reach all the people faster and more easily, especially those not interested in social media.”

This study clearly underscores that criticism of the regime was increased on traditional media and satellite during the 2013 revolution, reflecting to the difference in the political climate in Egypt at that time. Furthermore, that the protesters relied on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media in 2013, contributed substantially to the popular support of the Armed Forces’ actions, as this study found that traditional media was particularly effective in encouraging and supporting the Egyptian citizenry at that time. This coincided with a decline in the capability of social media sites to really strike at the heart of the contemporary political and social landscape of the Arab Spring countries, to renewed government interest in policing those sites, and to a return of popular confidence and reliance on a more effective traditional media. Ultimately, it was traditional media which influenced people’s decision to protest in the 2013 revolution (see section 7.3).
7.5. **Limitations of the study**

Due to the current political situation in the Middle East it was necessary to ensure that all permissions were received for example:

- Permission was received from the Saudi Cultural Mission in Ireland for the fieldwork study to commence. Also letters of introduction and explanation from the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Ireland and Cairo to the Egyptian universities concerning his fieldwork.
- The eight Egyptian Universities needed approval from State Security / Intelligence unit before allowing him to begin his fieldwork. However, State Security approval took more than three months and only covered five of the universities.
- Permission had to be procured from each university before the questionnaires could be distributed. This permission in turn had to be ratified by the office of Campus Security.

Moreover, there were general limitations in fieldwork especially during turbulent periods as follows:

- During the period the fieldwork was being carried out Egypt saw many security challenges, which was the cause of the researcher having difficulty in his movements between Governorates. All these incidents resulted in more heightened security checks and delays.
- The annual vacation for all students in Egyptian universities is the end of June to the first quarter of September.
- Approximately 25 per cent of potential participants refused to engage with the researcher.

7.6. **Recommendations for Further Research**

Despite the many difficulties faced by the researcher in undertaking such a study in the political hotbed of the Middle East, and based on the results obtained, the current study suggests the following research ideas for further research:

- Re-evaluating the role of the social media in the Libyan, Yamen and Syrian revolutions. The events of these revolutions are completely different from those which
occurred in Egypt or Tunisia, and further enquiry is needed to explore the role of social media during full-scale armed confrontations and civil wars.

- The results of the study indicated that the governments paid more interest to social media and utilized it in communicating with the protesters. Consequently, the data issued from governmental sources, especially that from the armed forces, could be an interesting source of analysis by which to measure it’s influence in dealing with rumour-mongering and pacifying worried citizens during the time of revolution.

- The results of the study found that traditional media depended mainly on social media elements, such as videos and photographs shot during the unfolding events of the revolutions. Further research could be directed to the question of how traditional Media can filter and verify images and videos which are posted on social media.

- The time during which the Arab Spring occurred also witnessed many analogous protests and disorders throughout the greater Arab region which were similarly disseminated to the wider world via social media. However, several of the ruling regimes of these countries succeeded in quashing and controlling such events through social media or by other means. The factors which helped such countries in controlling the events could be an interesting area of further scholarship.

- The role of social media in the Arab countries in general, and the Arab Spring countries in particularly, has weakened considerably in recent time. The reasons for this anachronistic trend require further intensive study and analysis.

### 7.7. Summary and Final Conclusions

The study revealed that, prior to 2011, the Egyptian political activists used social media to urge people towards some sectorial demonstrations and workers’ strikes, however, it was limited to a small group of Cairo intellectuals, some of whom were arrested. These events were a natural and logic prelude to the Egyptian revolution in 2011.

The study confirms that the Egyptian youth believe that social media were globalising the news of the events during revolutions. Social media participated in the emergence and development of civil resistance in the 2011 revolution. For example, the Facebook pages of “Kollona Khaled Said”, “We are all Khaled Said”, and many other Facebook pages played a significant role in mobilizing the citizens against the police forces and the Egyptian Ministry of Interior affairs.

It may be concluded that social media were an essential platform for the preparation and development of the 25th January 2011 revolution. Social media were particularly active during
the protests and demonstrations, and new leaders and formerly unknown political activists utilized its potential to the utmost, appearing on every possible platform to call for the demonstrations, and protests which ultimately culminated in the downfall of the Mubarak regime.

However, in the 2013 revolution, the study revealed that the participating students viewed a decrease in the role of social media due to changes in the nature of the two revolutions, as they believed that the 2013 revolution was more organised and systematic than 2011. The study shows that new issues which appeared in these events during the 2013 revolution led to less dependence on social media. Such as, the leaders of such demonstrations were known to everybody before the events of the revolution, and direct contact with the people using untraditional means, such as the Tamarod form which when signed by citizens, led to a reduction in the use of social media to agitate for change. Moreover, the state institutions supported the mobility of people and protected them from any harm or violence, and there was a decrease in the number of people participating in the demonstrations because such Websites and Facebook pages had no recognizable influence in mobilization due to the police’s improvement in their behaviour, development of their performance, and coherence with people demands.

Social media did not succeed in mobilizing people in the newly democratized and free information-exchange climate which had been created by the earlier revolution. Instead, traditional media and private satellite channels, controlled and run by the presiding regime, assumed the main and most effective role in this instance. Moreover, the political activists and movements such as the Tamarod, succeeded in directly engaging with the people in the fields, the streets, and the squares of the revolution. In addition, as the patriotic systems of the regime actually protected the demonstrators, there was little need for subterfuge or fear of discovery on their part. These factors helped to significantly lessen the role of social media in directing the events and protestors or planning the revolution. Additionally, in 2013, traditional media such as private channels, newspapers, and many other means played the same role as social media in 2011. Traditional media and political leaders roles in 2011 was very shallow and failed to action the demands of the protesters. They did not recognise the importance and developments of the events and did not understand that reality was changing and they had to cope with this change.

It may therefore be concluded, Social media played an important part in the success of the 2011 more so than in the 2013 revolution, but it was not the sole and main influence. There
were many other contributing factors, mainly related to the bravery and commitment of its citizens, which helped in bringing about the revolutions. In fact, the dynamism and persistence of the Egyptian people are the real factors which led to the successful transition of those regimes. In addition, the armed forces responded to the democratic protests of the Egyptian people, supported their right to demonstrate and their calls to overthrow the regimes from Mubarak to Morsi, and from Morsi to the current administration.
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Appendices:

Appendix A: Information Sheet

This study aims to identify the role played by social media during Arab Spring revolutions, and also in the Egyptian Revolutions.

The study consists of questionnaire and interview. Participants are asked to fill out a questionnaire and to take part in a follow up interview if they wish. In addition, the questionnaire will take around 15 minutes, and the interview will be about 30 minutes depending on the information the participant provides.

The responses provided will remain strictly confidential. However, in the end of the questionnaire is a short note to respondents who wish to provide their names and contact details if they are willing to participate in interview.

Your participation is voluntary you may withdraw from this research at any time. In addition, if you have any concerns about this study you have the right to contact the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social sciences Research Ethics Committee, University of Limerick, Tel: +35361202286, Email: Fahssethics@ul.ie. Or contact my supervisor Prof. Helen Kelly-Holmes, Email: Helen.Kelly.Holmes@ul.ie.

I would be pleased to clarify or discuss any matters relating to this study, Tel: +353831727378, Email: Ibrahim.Althagafi@ul.ie.

Thank you for your time and cooperation with this study.

Ibrahim Althagafi
(PhD) student
University of Limerick
Limerick, Ireland (www.ul.ie)
(ARABIC VERSION TO INFORMATION SHEET)

FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
INFORMATION LETTER

This study aims to take advantage of its role in the field of media and social science, and also in the Arab Spring of 2011 and 2013.

The study consists of interviews and questionnaires, and it requires the participation of interviewees and participants in the study. An interview will take place if required. In addition, if the questionnaire exceeds 15 minutes, the participant will receive the questionnaire. It includes the information of participants who agree to participate. It includes the information of participants who agree to participate.

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The third part includes the information of participants who agree to participate. It includes the information of participants who agree to participate.

Therefore, if you participate in this study, you agree to participate in this study.

If you have any concerns about this study, you can contact me:

Dr. Ibrahim Althagafi
www.ul.ie
Appendix B: Questionnaire Consent Form

FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
QUESTIONNAIRE CONSENT FORM

The Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring:
A case study of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian Revolutions

I, the undersigned, hereby consent to participate in research towards the above academic project, with provisions as follows:

- I confirm that I have been fully briefed on the nature of this study and my role in it, and have been allowed the opportunity to request any clarifications prior to participation

- the nature of my participation has been fully explained to me and I have been informed of the potential usage of any data collected

- I understand that that my participation is this study is wholly voluntary and without obligation

- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without notice or explanation

- I am advised that both the terms of my participation and all personal details will be maintained in the strictest confidence

______________________________________         __________________________
Signature of participant                        Date
نموذج موافقة

دور وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعي في الربيع العربي: دراسة حالة لثورتي 2011 و 2013 المصرية

أنا الموقع أدناه، أؤكد على موافقتني بالمشاركة في هذه الدراسة وأأنني على اطلاع بالتالي:

- أطلعت بشكل كامل على طبيعة هذه الدراسة، كما سمح لي طلب أي إيضاحات قبل المشاركة.
- تم شرح طبيعة مشاركتي في الدراسة، وأنا على علم أن هذه البيانات والمعلومات ستستخدم في دراسة بحثية.
- أنا أنفخم أن مشاركتي هي هذه الدراسة طوعية بالكامل ودون الالتزام بشيء.
- أنا على علم أنني يمكنني الانسحاب من المشاركة في أي وقت.
- أنا على علم أن كل مشاركتي ومعلوماتي شخصية سيتم الاحتفاظ بها بسرية تامة.

____________________________________         __________________________
التوقيع            التاريخ
Appendix C: Study Questionnaire

Dear Student,

This questionnaire aims to identify the role played by social media during the Arab Spring revolutions, and also in the Egyptian Revolutions. The information you provide will be used to inform the researcher’s doctoral studies and make a significant contribution to his PhD thesis. Please note the following:

- You need to answer all the questions in the questionnaire.
- The amount of time involved for participants is around 15 minutes.
- All responses provided will remain strictly confidential and you will be completely anonymous throughout this whole survey.
- If you choose to give your personal details on the sheet at the end of the questionnaire in order to be interviewed, these will be stored separately from the questionnaire data.
- Your participation is voluntary you may withdraw from this research at any time.
- Your unwillingness to participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
- The researcher intends to abide by all commonly acknowledged ethical codes.

I would be pleased to clarify or discuss any matters relating to this questionnaire, either by telephone, on +353831727378, or via email at Ibrahim.Althagafi@ul.ie.

Thank you for your time and cooperation with this survey.

Ibrahim Althagafi

(PhD) student in University of Limerick

Limerick, Ireland (www.ul.ie)
A. General Information

Q1. Are you?
☐ Male ☐ Female

Q2. Which university do you study in?
☐ Cairo University ☐ Al-Azhar University ☐ Ain Shams University
☐ Helwan University
☐ Workers University ☐ University of Sadat City ☐ Benha University
☐ Alexandria University ☐ Other …………………

Q3. What is your Level of Education?
☐ Undergraduate Level ☐ Postgraduate Level

Q4. How often do you use social media?
☐ Daily ☐ Weekly ☐ less frequently ☐ never

Q5. What kind of social media do you use most frequently?
☐ Facebook ☐ Twitter ☐ YouTube ☐ Other …………………

Q6. Is your use of social media mostly done by?
☐ Smartphone ☐ Computer ☐ Tablet device

Q7. What do you use social media mostly for?
☐ Socializing ☐ Business ☐ Entertainment ☐ Other …………………

Q8. When did you start using social media sites?
☐ Before 2010 ☐ Since 2010

Q9. How long did you stay online on social media to follow the events of the Egyptian revolutions?

- The revolution of 25th January 2011:
  ☐ Less than 3 hours ☐ 3< 6 hours ☐ More than 6 hours

- The revolution of 30th June 2013:
  ☐ Less than 3 hours ☐ 3< 6 hour ☐ More than 6 hours

Q10. Are you a member of any Movement or Campaign or Party in Egypt?
☐ Yes ☐ No
**B. The Arab Spring Revolutions**

Please tick the appropriate response below

| Q1. The Arab revolutions started spontaneously and was unplanned |   |   |   |   |
| Q2. The use of social media contributed to the advancement and organization of the events of the revolutions |   |   |   |   |
| Q3. Social media encouraged the protestors |   |   |   |   |
| Q4. Social media broke the psychological barrier of public fear of political participation |   |   |   |   |
| Q5. Social media were used as the means of political communication |   |   |   |   |
| Q6. Social media allowed for new players to enter the political arena |   |   |   |   |
| Q7. Social media fostered participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups, such as women, youth and seniors, within the political process |   |   |   |   |
| Q8. Social media tools have actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy |   |   |   |   |
| Q9. Social media allowed communities to unite in their grievances and mobilize against regimes |   |   |   |   |
| Q10. Today there is a decline in the ability of social media to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies |   |   |   |   |

Please, write below if you have any other comments to be added about role of social media in the Arab Spring revolutions.

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- Section 1

Please tick the appropriate response below in each of the revolutions in 2011 and 2013.

| Q1. Social media played an important role in advocating the revolution | Egyptian Revolution in 2011 | Egyptian Revolution in 2013 |
| Q2. Social media played an important role in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt |
| Q3. Social media contributed to organized civil resistance |
| Q4. The Egyptian revolution started on social media rather than on the ground |
| Q5. You relied on social media to get information about the revolution |
| Q6. You relied on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media |
| Q7. Social media have actively contributed to the strengthening of the democracy sphere in the country |
| Q8. Social media influenced your decision to protest |

Please, write below if you have any other comments to be added about the Egyptian revolutions in 2011 or 2013.

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207
### Section 2

Please tick the appropriate response below in each of the revolutions in 2011 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q9. Traditional media influenced your decision to protest</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q10. You trust in the revolutionary youth (Activists)</td>
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<td>Q11. Social media were used by political activists to communicate with each other</td>
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<td>Q12. Social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded</td>
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<td>Q13. The web page “We are all Khalid Said” became a sharing point for news, information and organization</td>
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<td>Q14. Social media have positive impacts on the on-going political transformations in Egypt?</td>
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<td>Q15. Social media led the revolution</td>
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<td>Q16. Social media platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority</td>
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</table>

Please, write below if you have any other comments to be added about the Egyptian revolutions in 2011 or 2013.

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208
### Section 3

Please tick the appropriate response below in each of the revolutions in 2011 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Egyptian Revolution in 2011</th>
<th>Egyptian Revolution in 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q17. Social media informed you of times and places of gatherings, and warned of the presence of danger to protesters</td>
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<td>Q18. Activists used mobile phones to document the protests</td>
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<td>Q19. Traditional media were effective during the revolution</td>
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<td>Q20. There was criticism on traditional satellite media</td>
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<td>Q21. Social media made the traditional media weaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q22. Social media played a significant role in the fall of the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q23. Traditional media played a significant role in the fall of the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q24. The government used social media to communicate with the public and protesters</td>
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Please, write below if you have any other comments to be added about the Egyptian revolutions in 2011 or 2013.

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209
D. Egyptian revolution in 2013.
- Section 1

Please tick the appropriate response below in the revolutions of 2013 only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1. You were used social media during the revolution the same as</td>
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<td>the first revolution</td>
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<td>Q2. The Tamarod movement moved spectacularly from the virtual world to</td>
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<td>the real world</td>
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<td>Q3. During the events of 30th June social media were weaker</td>
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<td>because of it being used by many Movements</td>
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<td>Q4. 30th June was regarded as the second wave of the 25th January revolt</td>
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<td>Q5. The impact of social media declined, especially following the</td>
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<td>emergence of the Tamarod movement</td>
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<td>Q6. There was a war between the &quot;Tagarod&quot; and &quot;Tamarod&quot;</td>
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<td>campaigns on social media sites</td>
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<td>Q7. Social media played the same role on 30th June as it did on 25th</td>
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<td>January</td>
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Please, write below if you have any other comments to be added about the Egyptian revolution in 2013.

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210
Please, could I contact you if I have any further questions or wish to clarify any responses?

☐ YES  (If yes, please provide an email or telephone number)
☐ NO  Telephone..................................................
      Email.........................................................

Thank you for participating in this survey.  
Your interest is most appreciated. !
استبيان

يهدف هذا الاستبيان للتعرف على الدور الذي لعبته وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية خلال ثورات الربع العربي، وأيضاً في الثورتين المصرية، ولن تستخدم البيانات إلا لغرض البحث العلمي فقط. ويرجى ملاحظة ما يلي:

- يتطلب الإجابة على جميع الأسئلة في الاستبيان.
- مقدار الوقت المحدد للإجابة حوالي 15 دقيقة.
- جميع الردود المقدمة ستبقى سرية للغاية.
- مشاركتكم هي طوعية يمكن الانسحاب من هذا البحث في أي وقت.
- يتعهد الباحث بالالتزام بجميع القوانين الأخلاقية في هذا البحث.

سيكون من دواعي سروري لتوضيح أو مناقشة أي المسائل المتعلقة بهذا الاستبيان، إما من خلال الموبايل 353831727378، أو البريد الإلكتروني: Ibrahim.Althagafi@ul.ie

شكراً لك على وقتك والتعاون مع هذه الدراسة.

إبراهيم الثقافي
طالب دكتوراه في جامعة ليميريك.

إيرلندا (www.ul.ie)
A. معلومات عامة:

س1: هل أنت؟
☐ رجل
☐ سيدة

س2: في أي جامعة تدرس حالياً؟
☐ جامعة القاهرة
☐ جامعة الأزهر
☐ الجامعة القاهرة
☐ الجامعة العمالية
☐ الجامعة العينية
☐ جامعة حلب
☐ جامعة عين شمس
☐ جامعة الإسكندرية
☐ جامعة بني هن
☐ الأزهرية
☐ السادات
☐ بني سويف
☐ الجمعية
☐ أخرى

س3: ما هي درجة العلمية؟
☐ المرحلة الجامعية
☐ دراسات العليا
☐ الدكتوراه
☐ البكالوريوس
☐ البكالوريوس
☐ الدبلوم
☐ الماجستير
☐ أخرى

س4: في الغالب، أنت تستخدم الإعلام الاجتماعي بشكل:
☐ يومي
☐ أسبوعي
☐ شهري
☐ شهر
☐ أبداً
☐ أخيراً
☐ أخرى
☐ جهاز لوحي (تابلت)
☐ تويتر
☐ فيسبوك
☐ كمبيوتر
☐ موبايل
☐ آخر

س5: أي من وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية التالية تستخدمها بشكل دائم؟
☐ فيسبوك
☐ تويتر
☐ كمبيوتر
☐ موبايل
☐ أخرى
☐ جهاز لوحي (تابلت)
☐ للترفيه
☐ للتشغيل
☐ للتعليم
☐ للاجتماع
☐ للعمل
☐ أخرى

س6: أنت تستخدم الإعلام الاجتماعي في الغالب لـ:
☐ للاتصال الاجتماعي
☐ للتواصل الاجتماعي
☐ للتعليم
☐ للترفيه
☐ أخرى

س7: متي بدأت باستخدام الإعلام الاجتماعي:
☐ قبل عام 2010
☐ بعد عام 2010
☐ أخرى

س8: متي بدأت باستخدام الإعلام الاجتماعي:
☐ قبل عام 2010
☐ بعد عام 2010
☐ أخرى
س9: كم الفترة التي كنت تستخدم فيها الإعلام الاجتماعي لمتابعة أحداث الثورة المصرية:

- في ثورة 25 يناير:
  □ أقل من 3 ساعات
  □ أقل من 6 ساعات
  □ أكثر من 6 ساعات

- في ثورة 30 يونيو:
  □ أقل من 3 ساعات
  □ أقل من 6 ساعات
  □ أكثر من 6 ساعات

س10: هل أنت عضو في حركة أو حزب سياسي في مصر:

□ نعم
□ لا
B. ثورات الربيع العربي:

يرجى ملأ الجدول التالي باختيار أجابه واحدة لكل سؤال عن ثورات الربيع العربي.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>اوافق بشدة</th>
<th>لا أوافق بشدة</th>
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<th>أوافق</th>
<th>لا أوافق</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>بدأ الثورات العربية بشكل عفوي وغير مخطط له</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ساهم استخدام الأعلام الاجتماعي في التهور وتنظيم أحداث الثورات</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>شجع الأعلام الاجتماعي المتظاهرين على التظاهر</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>كسر الإعلام الاجتماعي الحاجز النفسي من الخوف العام من المشاركة السياسية</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>الإعلام الاجتماعي استخدم كوسيلة ل التواصل السياسي</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>الإعلام الاجتماعي سمح لشخصيات جديدة الدخول في الساحة السياسية</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>عزز الإعلام الاجتماعي مشاركة الفتيات الضعيفة كالنساء والشباب وكبار السن، في العملية السياسية</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ساهم الإعلام الاجتماعي في تشتيت وتعزيز الديمقراطية</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>سمح الإعلام الاجتماعي بتوجيه شكاوى المجتمعات والتعبير ضد الأنظمة</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>يشهد الإعلام الاجتماعي اليوم تراجع في قدرتها في التأثير على الواقع السياسي والاجتماعي في مجتمعات الربيع العربي</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

من فضلك، يرجى الكتابة أدناه إذا كان لديك أي تعليقات أخرى يمكن أن تضاف عن دور الإعلام الاجتماعي في الربيع العربي.
الثورة المصرية في 2011 و 2013:

الجزء الأول

يرجى ملء الجدول التالي باختيار إجابتين لكل سؤال، مرة عن ثورة المصرية في 25 يناير والأخرى عن ثورة 30 يونيو.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>في ثورة 30 يونيو المصرية</th>
<th>في ثورة 25 يناير المصرية</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>لا اوافق بشدة</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>محايد</td>
<td>محايد</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>اوافق</td>
<td>اوافق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>لا اوافق بشدة</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>لعب الإعلام الاجتماعي دورا هاما في الدعوة للمظاهرات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>لعب الإعلام الاجتماعي دورا هاما في التنظيم والتحشد للثورة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ساهم الإعلام الاجتماعي في تنظيم المقاومة المدنية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>بدأ الإعداد للثورة المصرية على وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية قبل العمل على الأرض</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>كان يعتمد على الإعلام الاجتماعي من فيسوك وتويتر وغيره في حصول على معلومات حول أحداث الثورة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>كان يعتمد على الإعلام التقني على تلفزيون وصحف للحصول على معلومات حول أحداث الثورة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ساهم الإعلام الاجتماعي في تعزيز الديمقراطية في البلاد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>أثر الإعلام التقني على قرارك خلال المظاهرات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>أثر الإعلام التقني على قرارك خلال المظاهرات</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

من فضلك، يرجى الكتابة أدنى إذا كان لديك أي تعليقات أخرى يمكن أن تضاف عن الإعلام الاجتماعي في الثورة المصرية 2011 أو 2013.
**الجزء الثاني**

يرجى ملأ الجدول التالي باختيار إجابتين لكل سؤال، مرة عن ثورة المصرية في 25 يناير والأخرى عن ثورة 30 يونيو.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>في ثورة 25 يناير المصرية</th>
<th>في ثورة 30 يونيو المصرية</th>
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<td>لا أوافق محيد</td>
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<td>أوافق</td>
<td>أوافق</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>كنت نثق في الشبب الثوري (الناشط السياسي)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>الانتشار السياسيين استخدموا الإعلام الاجتماعي فترة الثورة للتواصل مع بعضهم البعض</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>قدمت وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية أخبار وأحداث الثورة أثناء وقوعها</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>صفحة &quot;كلنا خالد سعيد&quot; على الفيسبوك كانت نقطة لتبادل الأخبار والمعلومات وتجميع الاحتجاجات</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>الإعلام الاجتماعي له آثار إيجابية على التحولات السياسية في مصر</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>يعتبر الإعلام الاجتماعي قائد الثورة</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>غير الإعلام الاجتماعي يشكل الكبير العلاقة التقليدية بين الأرادة الشعبية والسلطة السياسية</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>أعطى على الإعلام الاجتماعي أوقات وأماكن التجمعات، كما حدثت من وجود خطر على المتظاهرين أثناء الثورة</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

من فضلك، يرجى الكتابة أدناه إذا كان لديك أي تعليقات أخرى يمكن أن تضاف عن الإعلام الاجتماعي في الثورة المصرية 2011 أو 2013.
الجزء الثالث

يرجى ملا้ว الجدول التالي باختيار إجابة لكل سؤال، مرة عن ثورة مصرية في 25 يناير والأخرى عن ثورة 30 يونيو.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>في ثورة 25 يناير المصرية</th>
<th>في ثورة 30 يونيو المصرية</th>
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<td>أوافق بشدة</td>
<td>أوافق بشدة</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>أتوقع</td>
<td>أتوقع</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

النشاطاء استخدموا الموبايل لتوثيق الاحتجاجات

كان الإعلام التقليدي من التلفزيون والصحف فعال في تشجيع المواطنين خلال الثورة

كان الانتقادات مسموح على وسائل الإعلام الفضائي

الإعلام الاجتماعي أضعف الإعلام التقليدية خلال الثورة

لعب الإعلام الاجتماعي دورا هاما في سقوط الرئيس

لعب الإعلام التقليدي دورا هاما في سقوط الرئيس

استخدمت الحكومة المصرية ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية في التواصل مع الجمهور والمتظاهرين

من فضلك، يرجى الكتابة أدناه إذا كان لديك أي تعليقات أخرى يمكن أن تضاف عن الإعلام الاجتماعي في الثورة المصرية 2011 أو 2013.
الثورة المصرية في 2013:

يرجى ملا้ว الجدول التالي باختيار أجابة واحدة لكل سؤال عن الثورة المصرية في 30 يونيو.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>كانت تستخدم وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية بفاعلية خلال ثورة 30 يونيو مثل ثورة 25 يناير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>انطلقت أعمال حركة تمرد على الإعلام الاجتماعي ثم انتقلت إلى العمل في الميادين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>خلال أحداث ثورة 30 يونيو كانت وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية ضعيفة بسبب استخدامها من قبل العديد من الحركات الاحتجاجية والحزام السياسي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>تعتبر ثورة 30 يونيو الموجة الثانية من الثورة 25 يناير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>انخفض تأثر الإعلام الاجتماعي على ثورة 30 يونيو بعد ظهور حركة تمرد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>كان هناك تنافس تصل لدرجة الحرب بين حركة تمرد وحركة تجرد على صفحات الإعلام الاجتماعي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>لعبت وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية خلال ثورة 30 يونيو نفس الدور الذي لعبته في ثورة 25 يناير</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

من فضلك، يرجى الكتابة أدناه إذا كان لديك أي تعليقات أخرى يمكن أن تضاف عن دور الإعلام الاجتماعي في الثورة المصرية عام 2013.

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من فضلك، هل يمكنني الاتصال بك إذا كان لدي أي أسئلة أخرى أو أحتاج إلى توضيح بعض الردود؟

☐ نعم (إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، يرجى تسجيل رقم التلفون والبريد الإلكتروني)

----------------------------------------
هاتف: ........................................

----------------------------------------
إيميل: ........................................

☐ لا

شكرًا لك على المشاركة في هذا الاستطلاع

لك مني خالص التحية والتقدير،
Appendix D: Interview Consent Form

FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM

The Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring:
A case study of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian Revolutions

I, the undersigned, hereby consent to participate in research towards the above academic project, with provisions as follows:

- I confirm that I have been fully briefed on the nature of this study and my role in it, and have also been allowed the opportunity to request any clarifications prior to participation

- the nature of my participation has been fully explained to me and I have been informed of the potential usage of any data collected

- I understand that my participation in this study may be recorded (video/audio) and that I may request the termination of recording at any stage of the interview process

- I am entitled to request copies of any such recordings and have been fully informed of the stipulations for recordings following completion of the study

- I understand that my participation is this study is wholly voluntary and without obligation

- I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without notice or explanation

- I am advised that both the terms of my participation and all personal details will be maintained in the strictest confidence

_________________________________                      __________________
Signature of participant                                                 Date
نموذج موافقة

دور وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعي في الربع العربي: دراسة حالة لثورتي 2011 و 2013 المصرية

أنا المواقع أدناه، أؤكد على موافقتي المشاركة في المقابلة وأنني على اطلاع بال التالي:

• اطلعت بشكل كامل على طبيعة هذه الدراسة، كما سمح لي طلب أي إيضاحات قبل المشاركة.
• تم شرح طبيعة مشاركتي في الدراسة، وأنا على علم أن هذه البيانات والمعلومات ستستخدم في دراسة علمية.
• أنا أعلم أن مشاركتي في هذه الدراسة مسجلة (صوت/فيديو)، كما يمكنني طلب إنهاء تسجيل المقابلة في وقت.
• يحق لي طلب نسخة من التسجيلات، بعد الانتهاء من الدراسة.
• أنا أفهم أن مشاركتي هي هذه الدراسة طوعية بالكامل ودون الالتزام بشيء.
• أنا على علم أنني يمكنني الانسحاب من المشاركة في أي وقت.
• أنا على علم أن كل مشاركتي ومعلوماتي شخصية سيتم الاحتفاظ بها بسرية تامة.

___________________________________         __________________
التوقيع          التاريخ
Appendix E: Interview Questionnaire

Thank you very much for taking part in this interview. The purpose of this interview is to identify the role played by social media during the Arab Spring revolutions, and also in the Egyptian Revolutions. Your individual responses will remain anonymous and all information will be treated in the strictest confidence.

1. Do you believe that social media have played a role in Arab Spring? If yes, can you explain what this role was?
2. Do you agree that social media played a significant role in the events of 25 January? Why?
3. Do you think that social media can be transformed from an entertainment tool to a tool for mass political activity? Why? Why not?
4. Did you trust the information you got from social media about the Egyptian revolutions?
5. Do you think the five day social media block by Mubarak had an impact on the demonstrations? Did you use another means of communication during that time?
6. Which do you think played a more significant role in the fall of Morsi regime on 30 June, social media or the Tamarod Movement? Why?
7. Do you think that the use of social media by the activists, the Tamarod movement and supporters of Morse’s Tagarod movement, on 30th June actually made social media less powerful than before? Why? Why not?
8. What motivation do you think was behind the Tamarod movement collecting forms from the street rather than from social media?
9. Why do you think Tamarod announced their data via the traditional media and television as opposed to social media?
10. Why do you think Morsi was keeping his account active on the social media until the very last hours of his reign?

Thank you for your time and help to me.
أسئلة المقابلة الشخصية للبحث

شكرا جزيلا على المشاركة في هذه المقابلة، والغرض من هذه المقابلة هو التعرف على الدور الذي لعبته وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية خلال ثورات الربيع العربي، وأيضا في الثورات المصرية. وستبقى الردود الفردية الخاصة بك المجهول وسيتم معاملة جميع المعلومات في سرية تامة.

هل تعتقد أن وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية لعبت دور في الربيع العربي؟ إذا كان الجواب نعم، هل يمكن أن توضح ما كان هذا الدور؟

هل توافق على أن وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية لعبت دورا هاما في أحداث ثورة 25 يناير المصرية؟ ولماذا؟

هل تعتقد أن وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعي يمكن أن تتحول من أداة ترفيه إلى أداة للنشاط والاتصال السياسي؟ ولماذا؟

هل ثقت في المعلومات التي حصلت عليها من وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية عن الثورات المصرية؟

هل تعتقد أن الخمس أيام التي أغلقت فيها وسائل الاتصال و الإنترنت خلال المظاهرات على الرئيس مبارك أثرت على أحداث المظاهرات؟ وهل استخدمت وسيلة أخرى للتواصل خلال تلك الفترة؟

في رأيك من له الدور بشكل واضح في سقوط نظام مرسي في 30 يونيو ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية أم حركة تمرد؟ ولماذا؟

هل تعتقد أن استخدام الناشطين وحركة تمرد وانصار الرئيس مرسي من حركة تجرد لوسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية في ثورة 30 يونيو أضعفتها وجعلها أقل قوة من ذي قبل ولماذا؟

ما الدافع في رأيك لانضمام حركة تمرد لجميع نماذجها من الشارع وليس من وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية؟

في رأيك لماذا أعلنت حركة تمرد بياناتها عبر وسائل الإعلام التقليدية والتلفزيون بدلا من وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية؟

لماذا تعتقد أن الرئيس مرسي كان يحافظ على حسابه على وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية نشط حتى الساعات الأخيرة من حكمه؟

شكرا لك على المشاركة في البحث...
Appendix F: Data Analysis Tables - Description and demographic information of the Participants of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F-1: Are you male or female?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cairo University</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Azhar University</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers University</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Sadat City</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benha University</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F-2: In which university do you study?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate Level</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Level</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F-3: What is your Level of Education?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less frequently</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F-4: How often do you use social media?
Table F- 5: What kind of social media do you use most frequently?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F- 6: Is your use of social media mostly done by?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smartphone</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tablet device</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F- 7: What do you use social media mostly for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socializing</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F- 8: When did you start using social media sites?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2010</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F- 9: Are you a member of any Movement or Campaign or Party in Egypt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G: Data Analysis Tables - The general role of the social media in the Arab Revolutions

The results of this section are linked to the first question of the study; what is the role of Social media during the Arab Spring Revolutions? To answer this question, frequencies, percentages and means were calculated. The following table presents this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1. The Arab revolutions started spontaneously and was unplanned</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2. The use of social media contributed to the advancement and organization of the events of the revolutions</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3. Social media encouraged the protestors</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4. Social media broke the psychological barrier of public fear of political participation</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5. Social media were used as the means of political communication</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6. Social media allowed for new players to enter the political arena</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7. Social media fostered participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups, such as women, youth and seniors, within the political process</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8. Social media tools have actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Q9. Social media allowed communities to unite in their grievances and mobilize against regimes |
|---|---|---|---|
| N | Mean | Mode | Std. Deviation |
| 423 | 0 | 2.37 | 1.127 |

| Q10. Today there is a decline in the ability of social media to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies |
|---|---|---|---|
| N | Mean | Mode | Std. Deviation |
| 423 | 0 | 2.45 | 1.221 |

Table G - 1: Descriptive Statistics of Students Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 2: The Arab Revolutions started spontaneously and was unplanned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 3: The use of social media contributed to the advancement and organization of the events of the revolutions

228
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 4: Social media encouraged the protestors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 5: Social media broke the psychological barrier of public fear of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 6: Social media were used as the means of political communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 7: Social media allowed for new players to enter the political arena
Table G - 8: Social media fostered participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups, such as women, youth and seniors, within the political process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 9: Social media tools have actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Table G - 10: Social media allowed communities to unite in their grievances and mobilize against regimes

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>14.7</td>
<td>92.7</td>
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<td>423</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table G - 11: Today there is a decline in the ability of social media to influence the political and social realities in the Arab Spring societies.

230
Appendix H: Data Analysis Tables - The Role of the Social Media in the Egyptian Revolutions of 2011 and 2013

The results of this section are associated with the second question of the study; what is the nature of the role that social media played during the two Egyptian revolutions, 2011, and 2013? In addition, what is the role of the traditional media during this time?

To answer this question, frequencies, percentages and means were calculated. The following table presents this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th></th>
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<th>2013</th>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mode</td>
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<td>1.045</td>
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<td>2.19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.208</td>
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<td>Q5. You relied on social media to get information about the revolution</td>
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<td>Q9. Traditional media influenced your decision to protest</td>
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<td>Q10. You trust in the revolutionary youth (Activists)</td>
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<td>1.096</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1.089</td>
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<td>Q14. Social media have positive impacts on the on-going political transformations in Egypt?</td>
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<td>1.038</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Q17. Social media informed you of times and places of gatherings, and warned</td>
<td>423</td>
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<td>2.16</td>
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<td>1.14</td>
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<td>Std. Deviation</td>
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<td>of the presence of danger to protesters anywhere</td>
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Table H - 1: Descriptive statistics of students general responses to the this dimension in 2011 and 2013

Because the means of students’ responses varies, frequencies and percentages of each item will be presented based on other sub-sections that illustrate and compare the role of social media in those two revolutions.

<table>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
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<td>48.2</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>91.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>94.8</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Table H - 2: Social media played an important role in advocating the revolution in 2011
Table H - 3: Social media played an important role in advocating the revolution in 2013

<table>
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<td>76.8</td>
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<td>disagree</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>92.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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</table>

Table H - 4: Social media played an important role in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt in 2011

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<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
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Table H - 5: Social media played an important role in the mobilization and organization of the Egyptian revolt in 2013

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<td>25.8</td>
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Table H - 6: Social media contributed to organized civil resistance in 2011

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<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Table H - 7: Social media contributed to organized civil resistance in 2013
Table H - 8: The Egyptian revolution started on social media rather than on the ground in 2011

<table>
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<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>82.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>48</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>93.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.4</td>
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Table H - 9: The Egyptian revolution started on social media rather than on the ground in 2013

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Table H - 10: Social media led the revolution in 2011

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<td>67.4</td>
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<td>14.7</td>
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<td>82.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>54</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>94.8</td>
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<tr>
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Table H - 11: Social media led the revolution in 2013

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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>15.1</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
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<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>34.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>62.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>106</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>87.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Table H - 12: Social media informed you of times and places of gatherings, and warned of the presence of danger to protesters in 2011

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>70.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>15.1</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>95.0</td>
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235
### Table H - 13: Social media informed you of times and places of gatherings, and warned of the presence of danger to protesters in 2013

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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### Table H - 14: Social media were used by political activists to communicate with each other in 2011

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<tr>
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### Table H - 15: Social media were used by political activists to communicate with each other in 2013

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<td>14.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>20.1</td>
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### Table H - 16: The government used social media to communicate with the public and protesters in 2011

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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>Neutral</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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</table>

### Table H - 17: The government used social media to communicate with the public and protesters in 2013

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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Valid</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.1</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Table H - 18: Social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded in 2011

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
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<td>32.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<td>39.7</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>72.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>95.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
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Table H - 19: Social media were used to report on the events as they unfolded in 2013

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<td>Agree</td>
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<td>69.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>88.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table H - 20: The web page “We are all Khalid Said” became a sharing point for news, information and organization in 2011

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>51.3</td>
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<td>77.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table H - 21: The web page “We are all Khalid Said” became a sharing point for news, information and organization in 2013

<table>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>34.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>79.0</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>89.6</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>97.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table H - 22: Activists used mobile phones to document the protests in 2011
### Table H - 23: Activists used mobile phones to document the protests in 2013

<table>
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<td>30.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>71.6</td>
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<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table H - 24: Social media have actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy sphere in the country in 2011

<table>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<td>37.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>81.3</td>
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<td>12.3</td>
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<td>93.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table H - 25: Social media have actively contributed to the strengthening of democracy sphere in the country in 2013

<table>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table H - 26: Social media platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table H - 27: Social media platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between popular will and political authority in 2013

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
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<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Data Analysis Tables - Changes in the role of social and traditional media between the first and second Egyptian Revolutions

To identify this role, responses of students on the third section of the study, changes in the role of social and traditional media between the first and second revolutions in Egypt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1. You used social media during the revolution the same as the first revolution</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2. The Tamarod movement moved spectacularly from the virtual world to the real world</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3. During the events of 30th June social media were weaker because of it being used by many Movements</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4. 30th June was regarded as the second wave of the 25th January revolt</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5. The impact of social media declined, especially following the emergence of the Tamarod movement.</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6. There was a war between the &quot;Tagarod&quot; and &quot;Tamarod&quot; campaigns on social media sites</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.057</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q7. Social media played the same role in 30 June as it did on 25 January</td>
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<td>3.24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.311</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 1: General descriptive analysis of students' responses

Detailed description of students’ responses on this dimension will be presented in the next part using frequencies and percentages.
Table I - 2: Traditional media were effective during the revolution in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>93</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>69</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>84</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
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</table>

Table I - 3: Traditional media were effective during the revolution in 2013

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<tr>
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<td>76.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>52</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>88.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.7</td>
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Table I - 4: You relied on social media to get information about the revolution in 2011

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</thead>
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<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 5: You relied on social media to get information about the revolution in 2013

<table>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
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<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 6: You relied on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media in 2011
| Table I - 7: You relied on obtaining information about the Egyptian revolution from traditional media in 2013 |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Strongly Agree | 134       | 31.7    | 31.7           | 31.7               |
| Agree          | 161       | 38.1    | 38.1           | 69.7               |
| Neutral        | 64        | 15.1    | 15.1           | 84.9               |
| disagree       | 42        | 9.9     | 9.9            | 94.8               |
| strongly disagree | 22   | 5.2     | 5.2            | 100.0              |
| Total          | 423       | 100.0   | 100.0          |                    |

| Table I - 8: Social media influenced your decision to protest in 2011 |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Strongly Agree | 105       | 24.8    | 24.8           | 24.8               |
| Agree          | 166       | 39.2    | 39.2           | 64.1               |
| Neutral        | 55        | 13.0    | 13.0           | 77.1               |
| disagree       | 57        | 13.5    | 13.5           | 90.5               |
| strongly disagree | 40   | 9.5     | 9.5            | 100.0              |
| Total          | 423       | 100.0   | 100.0          |                    |

| Table I - 9: Social media influenced your decision to protest in 2013 |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Strongly Agree | 71        | 16.8    | 16.8           | 16.8               |
| Agree          | 53        | 12.5    | 12.5           | 29.3               |
| Neutral        | 101       | 23.9    | 23.9           | 53.2               |
| disagree       | 139       | 32.9    | 32.9           | 86.1               |
| strongly disagree | 59   | 13.9    | 13.9           | 100.0              |
| Total          | 423       | 100.0   | 100.0          |                    |

| Table I - 10: Traditional media influenced people’s decision to protest in 2011 |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Strongly Agree | 98        | 23.2    | 23.2           | 23.2               |
| Agree          | 133       | 31.4    | 31.4           | 54.6               |
| Neutral        | 67        | 15.8    | 15.8           | 70.4               |
| disagree       | 66        | 15.6    | 15.6           | 86.1               |
| strongly disagree | 59   | 13.9    | 13.9           | 100.0              |
| Total          | 423       | 100.0   | 100.0          |                    |

<p>| Table I - 11: Traditional media influenced people’s decision to protest in 2013 |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Strongly Agree | 98        | 23.2    | 23.2           | 23.2               |
| Agree          | 133       | 31.4    | 31.4           | 54.6               |
| Neutral        | 67        | 15.8    | 15.8           | 70.4               |
| disagree       | 66        | 15.6    | 15.6           | 86.1               |
| strongly disagree | 59   | 13.9    | 13.9           | 100.0              |
| Total          | 423       | 100.0   | 100.0          |                    |</p>
<table>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>32.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42.6</td>
<td>75.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>87.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Table I - 12: You trust in the revolutionary youth Activists in 2011

<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>64.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

Table I - 13: You trust in the revolutionary youth Activists in 2013

<table>
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<td>74.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 14: There was criticism on traditional satellite media in 2011

<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>66.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>85.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Table I - 15: There was criticism on traditional satellite media in 2013

<table>
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<td>32.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15.4</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Table I - 16: Social media made the traditional media weaker in 2011
<table>
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</tr>
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<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>103</td>
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<td>24.3</td>
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<td>26.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Table I - 17: Social media made the traditional media weaker in 2013

<table>
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<td>46.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13.7</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Table I - 18: Social media played a significant role in the fall of the President in 2011

<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>61.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
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<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Table I - 19: Social media played a significant role in the fall of the President in 2013

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 20: Traditional media played a significant role in the fall of the President in 2011

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>36.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>31.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

Table I - 21: Traditional media played a significant role in the fall of the President in 2013
Table I - 22: You used social media during the 2013 revolution the same as in the 2011 revolution

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
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<td>32.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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Table I - 23: The Tamarod movement moved spectacularly from the virtual world to the street

<table>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 24: During the events of June 30th social media were weaker because they were used by many Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 25: 30th June was regarded as the second wave of the 25th January revolt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 26: The impact of social media declined, especially following the emergence of the Tamarod movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 27: There was a war between the "Tagarod" and "Tamarod" campaigns on social media sites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - 28: Social media played the same role on 30th June as it did on 25th January.
Appendix J: Official Papers for Fieldwork

20/03/2013

Ref: Registration

To Whom It May Concern:

I wish to confirm that Ibrahim Althagafi, 13170996 is a current Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Limerick with the faculty of Arts Humanities and Social Science for the academic year 2014/15. This is a four year full time research programme. Ibrahim Althagafi commenced his studies on 01/Jun/2014 and is due to complete on 01/Jan/2018.

Term Time Address: Apt 506, City Central
Bedford Row
Henry Street
Limerick

Should you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours faithfully,

Sinead Cooney
Graduate School
University of Limerick
Limerick
Email: Sinead.Cooney@ul.ie
Cultural Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

11th March 2015

Re: Mr. Ibrahim Alhagaif

To whom it may concern,

This is to confirm that the above-named student will be carrying out fieldwork in Egypt for a period of four months, starting on 1st May 2015. This fieldwork is necessary for the successful completion of his PhD thesis.

Please let me know if there are any issues/queries with this.

Yours faithfully,

Dr. Helen Kelly-Holmes
Senior Lecturer in Sociolinguistics and New Media
helen.kelly.holmes@ul.ie
School of Modern Languages and Applied Linguistics,
Ollscoil Luimnigh / University of Limerick
Guthrion / Phone: +353-61-234206
Republic / Email:

University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland. Tel: +353-61-202700 Fax: +353-61-330316 Web: www.ul.ie
إفادة

تهدي الملحق الثقافيق السعودية في جمهورية مصر العربية أطيب تحياتها
للاستاذة مستوى وتفقد بأن الدارس السعودي، إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي (رقم جواز السفر P624241)، يدرس للحصول على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة (LIMERICK) في بارنارد، تخصص إعلام (النشر الإلكتروني).

ومن ثم، تقوم الدارس بمدرسة علمية للجمهورية المصرية، بجامعة المجلة العلمية، تعمل لحيتها بجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لإكمال بحثه لدرجة الدكتوراه.

لذا تأمل التحفيز بمساحة مهتة، وقد أعلنت له هذه الإفادة بناءً على طلب، ودون أدنى
lescope على الملحق الثقافي فيما يخص حقوق الزائر.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتي وتقديري ...

الملحق الثقافي

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالنيابة

เจ. محمود بن عبد الله الحاديسي

248
السيد اللواء مدير إدارة الأمن بالجامعة

تحية طيبة وبعد

بالإشارة إلى تأشيرة السيد الاستاذ الدكتور جابر نصار رئيس الجامعة بالموافقة على قيام السيد إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي بتوزيع الاستبيانات على طلاب جامعة القاهرة وتحويل الأوراق على مركز المعلومات والاتصال وتسهيل مهمة الطالب.

إذا ارجو التصريح للسيد إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي بتوزيع الاستبيان الخاص برسالة الدكتوراه الخاصة به من أجل الحصول على عينة من الطلاب في حدود مائة طالب من كلية جامعة القاهرة.

وتفضلاً بقبول فائق التحية والاحترام

[_signatures]

الناظر العام
عمرو زكريا البلناوي

[additional information]

العنوان: مبنى المكتبة العامة، جامعة القاهرة.
العنوان الفرعي: مكتبة الصحف ووسائل الإعلام.
الرقم التلفني: 02-27767388.
البريد الإلكتروني: idc@cu.edu.eg.
الموقع الإلكتروني: http://id.cu.edu.eg.
إفساد

تحدي الملحقية الثقافية السعودية في جمهورية مصر العربية أطباق تحياتها
المستقبل الأزهر وتقدير بأن الدارس السعودي / إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي (رقم جواز السفر
UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK, P62424) يتشرف في الحصول على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة ر
بترولندا - تخصص إعلام (نشرة الالتهام).

ويرجى القيادة الدائرة بدرجة الدكتوراه. اقتراح من القيادة الدائرة، يまとب فحص
للذي تأمل التحكم بشريته، وقد أعلنت له هذه الإفادة نهائياً على طالبه، دون أي
مسؤولية على الملحقية فيما يخص حقوق الفرد.

وإنتمؤ خالصاً تحياتي وتقديري.

الملحق الثقافي
سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالإدارة

د. ماجد بن عبد الله الحامسي

250
الإدارة العامة للعلاقات العلمية والثقافية

السيد الأولستاذ الدكتور/ الملحق الثقافي بسفارة المملكة العربية السعودية بالقاهرة

سلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته 2000 وبعد ؛

- تهدي جامعة الأزهر - أطيب تحياتنا لسيادتك وبالإشارة إلى كتاب سيانتكم والمتضمن تسعيل
- مهمة الدارس السعودي/ إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي - طالب الدكتوراه في الإعلام نظرا لقيامه
- برحنة علمية لجمهورية مصر العربية لجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لإكمال بحثه لدرجة الدكتوراه
- ننفر، بالإحالة بأن السيد نائب رئيس الجامعة لشؤون التعليم والطلاب وافق على تسهيل
- مهمة السيد المذكور بعالية وذلك دون تحمل الجامعة أية نفقات مالية ؛
- ونفضل بها بقبول فائق الاحترام والتقدير ؛

وشمل علىكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ؛

(محمدي عبد العزيز السيد)

تحرير في : 13/8/2000
إِفَادَة

لهِدِيِّ اللَّمْحِيَّةِ التِّقَانِيَةِ السَّعُودِيَّةِ فِي جَمِيعِيَّةِ مَصرِ النَّشرِ النَّصِيِّ أُطِيبُ تَكْبِيَاتُها

الجَامِعَةِ المَكْرِيَّةِ وَتَفَيدُ بِأنَّ الدَّارِسِ السَّعُودِيَّ/ إِبْراهِيمُ مَحْمَدُ وَعَلِيٌّ التَّقْنِيُّ (رَقْمُ جَواِزِ السِّفَرَ
UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK) (بَالْأَرْبَائِنَةَ - تَخصِيصُ إِعلامِ النَّشرِ النَّصِيِّ)

وَتَنْظُرُ إِلَىِ الْقَيْمَةِ الدَّارِسِ بِرَجَلَةِ عَلْمِيَّةٍ لِجمَيِعِيَّةِ مَصرِ النَّشرِ النَّصِيِّ.

تَقْمِيُ خَلَاهَا بِجَمَيِعِيَّةِ المَشَغُولِيَّةُ الْوَلاَئِيَّةِ لِإِجْمَالِ بَحْثِهِ لِدَرَجَةِ الدَّكَتُوْرِ.

لَذَا تَأْمُلُ التَّحْكُمَ بِتَسْهِيلِ مَهَمَّتِهِ وَقَدْ أُعْطِيتُهُ هَذِهِ الإِفَادَةَ يَنَأَا عَلَى طَلِبُهُ، وَدَونَ أَنُدْعِيَ مَسْتَقْلَىَّةِ عَلَىِ اللَّمْحِيَّةِ قَيْماً يَخْصُحُ حَقَوْقِهِ.

وَتِبَيْنُوا عَالِمَيْنِ تَحْيَاتِيَ وَتَقْدِيرِي . . .

اللَّمْحِيَّ التِّقَانِيُّ

بِسْفَارَةِ الْمَكْرِيَّةِ السَّعُودِيَّةِ فِي الْقَاهَرَةِ بِالْإِنَّابَةِ

د. مَاجِدُ بْنُ عِبَّادُ اللَّهِ النَّحَالمِيُّ
السيد الأستاذ الدكتور / الملحق الثقافي بسفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
د/ ماجد بن عبد الله العازم

نعتبة طيبة ... وبعد "

إيماء إلى كتاب سعادتك الوارد إليه والخاص يتسهيل مهمة الدارس/ إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي

لجمع المادة العلمية لدراسة الدكتوراه الخاصة به

- نتشرف بأفادة سعادتك بموافقةنا للدارس على جمع المادة العلمية المطلوبة وذلك دون

أدئى مسئولية قانونية أو مالية تتحملها الجامعة العمالية.

العميد

[توقيع]

[تاريخ] 11/1/2010
إفادة

تهدي الملحق الثقافيا للمملكة العربية السعودية في جمهورية مصر العربية أطيب تحياتنا
لجامعة بها، وقد أفاد أن الدكتور السعودي / إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي يدرس في جامعة UNIVERSITY OF
P624341 (LIMERICK)
(بإيرلندا) - تخصص إعلام (النشر الإختروني).

وتضمن في ثلاثة عقود شركة لجامعة مصر العربية، يقوم خلالها بجمع المادة العلمية
اللازمة لcassert بإمساك دكتوراه. 

لذا نأمل أن تكون بتسهيل مهنته، وقد أعطيت هذه الإفادة بناء على طهية، دون أدنى
مسؤولية على الملحق، فيما يخص حقوق الخير.

ويبقوا خالص التحيات والتقدير،

الملحق الثقافي
سعودية للمملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بإثابة

د. محمد بن عبد الله الحاكمي

المملكة العربية السعودية
العميد الأستاذ الدكتور / عميد كلية الآداب

أيمناً إلى كتاب المحقق الثقافي بسفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالاتي: د/ ماجد بن
عبد الله الحامدي بشأن الدارس السعودي/ إبراهيم محمد علي التفلي الذي يدرس للحصول على درجة
الدكتوراة من جامعة (UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK) بـ (باثورندا) - تخصص اعلام

تطلب

- ونظراً لقيام الدارس بجريمة علمية بجمهورية مصر العربية يقوم خلالها بجمع المادة العلمية
اللائقة لإكتمال بحثة لدرجة الدكتوراة.

لذا نأمل من سيادكم تسهيل مهامه العلمية وجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لبحثته.

نرجوونا التفضل بالإجابة.

نائب رئيس الجامعة

(أ.د. هشام أبو العينين)

Fax: 00223765924

vp.pg@bu.edu.cg

تليفون: 02 00311445
إفسادة

تحدي اللحقيبة الثقافية السعودية في جمهورية مصر العربية أطيب تحياتهما

لمهندة مدينتي السادات وتفيدي بأن الدارس السعودي / إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي ( رقم جواز

السفر 5624214 ) يدرس للحصول على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة LIMERICK

( باردو لندن - تخصص إعلام / نشر الألكتروني).

وتنظراً لقيام الدارس بمرحلة علمية في جمهورية مصر العربية، يقوم خلالها بجمع المادة العلمية

اللازمة لإكمال بذله للدرجة الدكتوراه.

لذا نأمل التعامل بتسهيل مهامه، وقد أعطيت له هذه الإفادة بناء على طلبه، ودون أدنى

مسؤولية على اللحقيبة فيما يخص حقوق الفار.

وتهنئه خالص تحياتنا وتقديري

الملحق الثقافي

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالنيابة

د. ماجد بن عبد الله الحازمي

المؤسسات، الموافقين، التاريخ:

2022-08-20

E-mail: contact@emb.mebr.gov.sa
http://eg.amb.se.gov.sa
تصريح

السيد الدكتور / عميد كلية التربية

طيب ني أن أتقدم لميادينك بخلاص الشكر وتعظيم التقدير على صدق تعاونكم المبهر والبناء، وقد
الإشراف على إعداد السلسلة الثقافية السعودية بشأن تدريس اللغة السعودية / إبراهيم محمد على الثقلي
( رقم جواز السفر ۱۲۴۲۵۱ ) الذي يقوم برحلة علمية لجمهورية مصر العربية لجامعة السادة
( النشر الألكتروني ).

بناء على ما تقدم

وفي ضوء موافقة السيد د. أ.د. رئيس الجامعة على قيام سياسته بتوزيع الإستيلات على طلاب جامعة مدينة
السادات.

ارجو التصريح للسيد / إبراهيم محمد على التقلي توزيع الاستيلات الخاصة برسالة الدكتوراه الخاصة به من
أجل الحصول على عهده من الطلاب في حدود ( ۲۰ ٪ ) طلاب من كليكم الموقعة.

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام...

نائب رئيس الجامعة
للدراسات العليا والمبيوت

E-mail: president@usc.edu.eg

web site: www.usc.edu.eg

جامعة مدينة السادات - المنطقة الخصبة - مدينة السادات - محافظة الشرقية

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إفادة

تهدي اللحقية الثقافية السعودية في جمهورية مصر العربية أطيب تحياتها

لجامعة الإسكندرية، وتفيد بأن الدارس السعودي، إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي، رمز جواز 624241، يدرس للحصول على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة (LIMERICK، بولندا) - تخصص إعلام (النشر الإخباري).

ونظراً لقيام الدارس برحلة علمية لجمهورية مصر العربية، يقوم خلالها بجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لإنجاز بحثه لدرجة الدكتوراه. لذا نأمل التحكم بتسهيل مهامه، وقد أعطيت له هذه الإفادة بناءً على طلبه، دون أدنى مسئولية على اللحقية فيما يخص حقوق الفرد.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتي وتقديري...

الملحق الثقافي
سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالنيابة

د. ماجد بن عبد الله الحازمي
إفسادبة

تهدي الملحق الثقافى السعودى في جمهورية مصر العربية أطيب تحياتهما
لجامعة عين شمس وتفتيد بأن الدارس السعودي / إبراهيم محمد علي الثقفي (رقم جواز السفر UNIVERSITY OF P624241 ) قد حصل على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة ( LIMERICK ) بآيرلندا - تخصص إعلام (النشر الالكتروني).

ونظراً لقيام الدارس بالدورة العلمية لجمهورية مصر العربية، يقوم خلالها بجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لإكمال بحثه لدرجة الدكتوراه.

لذا نأمل التحكم بتسليم ميهمته، وقد أعطى له هذه الإفادة بناءاً على طلبه، دون أن يملك
مستوى-trained على الملحقية فيما يخص حقوق الفكر.

وتبليغ خالص تحياتي وتحياتي

الملحق الثقافي
سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالنيابة

د. عامج بن عبد الله الحاجزي
إنشاء

تحدي الملحق الثقافية السعودية في جمهورية مصر العربية أطيب تحياتها

لumlualmualami ، هؤلاء الذين جاؤوا في مصر العربية

UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK (BAIRENDA - تخصص إعلام) (LIMERICK)

وتتولى القيادة في الحياة العامة لجمهورية مصر العربية.

النظام اللازم كي يتحقق من ملاذ الأوائل.

لذا نأمل أن يكون هذا بسهولة ودعمًا، وقد حقق من هذه الإفادة بناءً على طلبك، دون أي

مسؤولية على الملحق الثقافي فيما يخص حقوق الخير.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتي وتقديري . . .

الملحق الثقافي

بسفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في القاهرة بالإنابة

د. ماجد بن عبد الله الحازمي

E-mail: contact@eg.mohc.gov.sa
http://eg.mohc.gov.sa

Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Higher Education

KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

E-mail: contact@eg.mohc.gov.sa
http://eg.mohc.gov.sa

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السيد/ مدير عام الإدارة العامة للاستطلاع والمعلومات

وزارة التعليم العالي

بعد التحية...

رجاء التكرم بالتثبيت نحو سرعة الرد على كتابنا المؤرخ في 2/7/2010 بشأن موافقتنا بالرأي من الناحية الأمنية نحو حضور السيد/ إبراهيم محمد علي الطفلي - طالب سعودي (قسم أعلام النشر الإلكتروني) من جامعة UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK في رحلة علمية بـ... مع يقوم خلالها بجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لاجتياز لدرجة الدكتوراه وبدون نفقات على الجامعة...

وتفصلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام... 

امين عام الجامعة المساعد

أ/ د. محمد عبد المجيد لطفي
الدكتور / مدير عام الإدارة العامة للاستطلاع والبحث

العنوان:

الexcel / مدير عام الإدارة العامة للاستطلاع والمعلومات

بوزارة التعليم العالي

بعد الانتهاء

الترشح

باني أوفق بهذا الكتاب من خلال المعهد الخاص باستعداد / إبراهيم حمدي علي الثقي

فازت في جامعة الاكاديمية (فارم أكاديمي) من جامعة LIMERICK

برعاية فنية بـ 1340.000 دينار. أعددت هذا المكتب للجامعة الأكاديمية للأعمال بحثًا لدرجة الدكتوراه.

رجاء التسهيل بموجبًا بالإذن من الأحادية الأممية نحو حضوره للجامعة.

وذلك حتى يتسنى اتخاذ الألزم

وتفضيروا بقبولًا بโทรศ mounts 1,1000.

قال: بأعمال

العاجل

أحمد أكاديم

الدارة / مدير تعليمية
السيد / امين كلية الآداب

تحية طيبة وبعد....

اتشرف بإبلاغ سعادتك بان السيد ٢٠٠٨/٥/٢٠٠٤ رئيسي الجامعة وافق في ٢٠٠٨/٥/٢٠٠٤ على استضافة السيد/ إبراهيم محمد علي النظري - طالب سعودي (قسم اعلام التشتر الالكتروني) لزيارة كلية الآداب لمدة شهرين اعتبارا من ٢٠٠٨/٥/١ لجمع المادة العلمية اللازمة لأكمال بحثه بدرجة الدكتوراه وبعد نفقات على الجامعة وعلى اليمين استضاء سعادته الا بعد وعود الموافقة الأمنية.

رجل التكرم بالاحترام واتخاذ اللازم وسنوافقكم بالموافقة الأمنية فور ورودها...وتقضيان بقبول قانون الاحترام.....

مدير العام
١٠١٦