

to need repeating here. The interest for me lies in the way Nehamas uses this example to illustrate the manner in which friendship uniquely provides a space for personal development, exploration, and growth in ways that may constitute goods for the participants even if and as it leads them morally astray. Indeed, Nehamas goes so far as to argue that “their friendship is a good, not *despite* the fact that it leads them to kill, rob, intimidate and destroy but *because* of it” (195). Thelma and Louise become stronger, more independent, and autonomous in part through the decisions they make and the (morally wrong) actions they perform together. This idea is uncomfortable, but rejecting it means rejecting the account of friendship on which it is based. It means rejecting the idea that friendship involves and requires the kind of responsiveness to the other described here.

That friendship does require this special kind of responsiveness and openness to the other is further illustrated in a chapter-length discussion of the end of friendship—a topic which has received little philosophical attention. When friends are no longer open to each other’s passions, or reject each other’s interpretations—that is, when they are no longer open to being shaped by the other—friendships break down. Nehamas illustrates the process beautifully via his close reading of Yasmina Reza’s play *Art*. He closes the chapter and later the book with the intriguing suggestion that there is an analogy between our engagement with our friends and our engagement with works of art. He argues for a particularity in our relationships to each. We are attracted to and fix upon different features of works of art, just as we do with our different friends. We interpret and assign meaning and significance to works of art, and in our interactions with paintings, plays, and novels different aspects of the self are highlighted and developed.

Nehamas says, “We love some people, but not others, just as we love some artworks but not others, and we treat everything we love differently from the way we treat everything else.” Neither love of a particular work of art nor love of a particular person is required of us. Rather, “what we find beautiful . . . what we love . . . always reflects, and helps determine who we are” (184). He concludes that “aesthetics and friendship are both . . . among the most important mechanisms of individuality available to us” (185).

The interwoven case Nehamas makes in the closing chapters for the value of friendship and art is, to my mind, the most original part of a thoroughly interesting book and is well worth further attention and analysis from philosophers.

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Segall, Shlomi. *Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning and Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. 268. \$99.99 (cloth).

In his third monograph, Shlomi Segall sets himself the ambitious task of justifying egalitarianism. This is a much-needed enterprise since, in spite of the vast literature of egalitarian theories of justice, there is little to satisfy the reader who asks herself, why is equality good after all? Segall offers an original and thought-

provoking argument that may nevertheless prove less than compelling for the inquisitive reader just mentioned.

In a sense, this book can be seen as an extended reply to the “leveling-down objection” (LDO) to telic egalitarianism. Since Segall’s discussion is restricted to “telic egalitarianism” (TE), it is worth clarifying what this means. Telic views, generally, refer to the goodness and badness of outcomes or states of affairs; telic egalitarianism is thus the view that equality makes an outcome better. According to Segall, the most basic definition of TE says that “it is in itself bad if some people are worse off than others” (3). This is, strictly speaking, not a definition of TE but what we might call the “principle of equality,” which, on Parfit’s view at least, is a necessary and sufficient condition for TE, so in that sense they are equivalent. It is this principle that Segall seeks to defend from the LDO. The objection points out that if equality has value in itself regardless of the contribution it makes to well-being, leveling down in the interest of equality should be regarded as good, as least in one respect, even if it is good for no one. This is considered counterintuitive, or rather in conflict with the widely held person-affecting view (PAV) or restriction, which can be stated as follows: “a state of affairs X cannot be better (or worse) than a state of affairs Y if there is no one for whom X is better (or worse) than Y” (Iwao Hirose, *Egalitarianism* [Abingdon: Routledge, 2015], 89).

The book has three parts. The first part, which is the core of the book, provides an argument for the (dis-)value of (in)equality; here, Segall makes several distinctive claims: that TE has unrestricted scope, that inequality is noninstrumentally bad, that only inequality matters but equality is never problematic, and that inequality is not bad impersonally but rather bad for the worse-off. The second part considers some alternatives to egalitarianism, such as sufficientarianism and prioritarianism. Segall rejects sufficientarianism but finds some merit to prioritarianism and combines it with egalitarianism; the result is the novel view that we should be egalitarian about complete lives but prioritarians about time slices. Finally, the third part of the book elaborates on some aspects of egalitarianism. Segall claims that egalitarians should only care about outcomes, not chances, and that some voluntary inequalities can also be unfair.

This review will focus on the first part of the book, in which Segall addresses the “why equality?” question. In the first two chapters Segall seeks to defend TE against two objections that are usually referred to as “the scope objection” and “the levelling-down objection” (see Hirose, *Egalitarianism*, 63–86). However, Segall claims that they are usually run together and proposes to “unpack” them by distinguishing between what he calls (1) the groundlessness objection and (2) the counterintuitiveness objection, offering a separate reply to each. According to the groundlessness objection, no ground can be offered for the view that inequality is bad as such or in itself; in other words, there is nothing (noninstrumentally) good about equality. The counterintuitiveness objection claims that TE has implausibly wide scope; hence, it is identical to the more aptly named “scope objection.” The thought here is that, if inequality as such is bad, then the dimension of time or space should make no difference to our assessment of inequalities. The inequalities between ourselves and dead Inca peasants, as well as between ourselves and similarly sentient creatures on other planets or undiscovered worlds, are just as bad as inequalities between human beings who share a society or a

planet. This, the objection maintains, is implausible. According to Segall, the first objection amounts to the claim “that there is nothing good about equality” and the second to the claim that “there is something bad about (pursuing) equality” (37).

In response to the scope objection, Segall accepts that TE does have very wide scope and takes no notice of space or time but wants “to simply bite the bullet and deny that there is anything counter-intuitive about such an implication” (38). He claims that the reasons that might be given to support its alleged counterintuitiveness do not hold against the thought that inequality, even across space or time, is “bad” or “regrettable” rather than unjust. The general motivating thought he identifies is that it is impossible (or, in some cases, only possible by leveling down) to rectify this kind of inequality, and he replies that this is not an objection to telic or rather axiological egalitarianism, which is a view merely about the badness of unequal outcomes. Axiological—as opposed to teleological—egalitarianism does “not imply that a given act should be performed or a particular policy adopted,” although it may give us a reason to pursue equality (Nils Holtug, “Theories of Value Aggregation: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism,” in *Oxford Handbook of Value Theory*, ed. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015], 267–84, 268).

But this is a weak reply to the objection in my view. First, it is not clear that the scope objection is aimed at telic or axiological egalitarianism (Hirose, *Egalitarianism*, 80); if it were, it would also apply, as Segall points out, to other telic views, such as prioritarianism, that may give us a reason to redistribute to the Incas. The fact that TE has no scope restrictions is not due to its egalitarianism but rather to the fact that it is a telic view. So if it is an objection to telic views, it is not an objection to egalitarianism specifically. But inasmuch as it is a (coherent) objection to telic egalitarianism, its motivating thought was probably not identified correctly. One can imagine stronger objections to TE, for instance, a conceptual objection according to which well-being differentials across time cannot be conceived of as inequalities in the relevant sense. A stronger reply would either consider other motivations or show that the objection is incoherent.

Segall concludes that the objections to egalitarianism “rest entirely on pointing to its alleged groundlessness,” which he spells out as the claim that there is no reason to hold the principle of equality (42). It is unclear what the distinction he proposed between the two objections was in the first place, but I would actually suggest that there are indeed two different objections to the value of equality. The scope objection is in effect an objection to the noninstrumental value of equality since it claims that inequality between unconnected people, which has no effects, cannot matter; the LDO, on the other hand, is an objection to the impersonal value of equality since it points out that an outcome that is good for no one cannot be good.

In the introduction, Segall claims to be defending the intrinsic but not the impersonal value of equality (14). Hence, his reply to the “groundlessness objection” should offer a reason why equality is intrinsically valuable. Segall also believes that the objection that “there is nothing bad about inequality as such” is so strong that “any counter-suggestion that successfully provides a reason, *no matter how minor*, would be sufficient to refute it” (49). The reason he provides is the familiar luck egalitarian thought that unchosen inequalities are bad. What is bad

about (unchosen) inequalities—he says—is the fact that “they make a person undeservedly disadvantaged (compared to another person)” (49). This makes “arbitrary inequality (intrinsically) bad wherever and whenever it obtains” (50). Furthermore, he claims that his “dialogical” account of the badness of inequality supports the wide scope of egalitarianism. The dialogical aspect refers to the imagined dialogue between the disadvantaged members of a “justificatory community,” who put their claim to have their disadvantage justified to them to the more advantaged members of this community. This justificatory community is meant to include all moral agents, “past, present and future, terrestrial as well as extra terrestrial” (50).

One problem with his “dialogical justification” is that it undermines rather than supports the wide scope of egalitarianism (see also Blain Neufeld, review of *Equality and Opportunity*, by Shlomi Segall, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/56510-equality-and-opportunity/>). To my mind, imagining a (justificatory) community between us, dead Incas, unborn people, and intelligent creatures on other planets stretches the meaning of this notion beyond comprehension. What is, however, more troubling is that Segall does not succeed in defending the intrinsic value of equality. First, he does not want to defend the value of equality but rather the disvalue of inequality, even though he does appear to believe that equality has value since an equal outcome, in his view, can never be bad. Second, his argument does not show that inequality is intrinsically bad but rather that it is bad (as such) when accompanied by certain features. This claim is reminiscent of arguments for conditional egalitarianism that have been put forward in response to the LDO, but Segall also wants to distance himself from those. The resulting view is less clear than it should be.

Segall’s argument is that unchosen inequalities are bad as such. In line with his statement that it is “intrinsic value” he wants to defend, I will assume that ‘as such’ means ‘intrinsically’ here. Intrinsic value is value that supervenes solely on intrinsic features of some F (which could be, e.g., properties, facts, states of affairs) that is assessed. This implies that F retains its value in whatever context it appears (see Jonas Olson, “Intrinsicism and Conditionalism about Final Value,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 7 [2003]: 31–52, 32; and Hirose, *Egalitarianism*, 70). In other words, if inequality is intrinsically bad, then all inequalities (in whatever matters) are bad. So an outcome that contains an inequality is bad at least in one respect or pro tanto, even if not all-things-considered bad. The overall value of the outcome may be different from the (sum of the) value of its parts, but the inequality in it will, nevertheless, remain bad, unless we switch to a different account of final value, as discussed below.

But on Segall’s account not all inequalities are bad; only unchosen inequalities are. Hence, we might conclude that inequality is not bad as such, but rather only undeserved inequalities are bad, that is, they make an outcome bad. One might further ask why it is (morally) bad that some are undeservedly disadvantaged. Segall’s reply to this would be that it is bad because it is morally arbitrary. Thus, it seems that it is arbitrariness that is ultimately bad, and inequalities are sometimes indicative of arbitrariness. Segall responds that if this were the case, arbitrary equalities would be bad too, and he maintains that equalities are never bad. On his account then, both arbitrariness and inequality make an outcome

worse. The problem then is that this account is telic merely in the sense that it refers to outcomes, not in that it defends what he calls “the most basic reading” of it, to wit, the principle of equality.

One could respond here that a telic egalitarian account need not defend equality as an intrinsic value but rather as a final value. Values can be noninstrumental or final without being intrinsic. It is only if final value is interpreted in the Moorean sense of intrinsic value that inequality would always be bad. But once we accept, as indeed many value theorists have done, that the appropriate contrast is not between intrinsic and instrumental value but between final and instrumental value, it is no longer the case that an outcome containing X must always be valuable for X to have noninstrumental value. X could be valuable in certain conditions, extrinsic to it. This is the kind of response offered by conditional egalitarians, who claim that equality is valuable only given certain conditions, to wit, that it benefits the worst off. This response thus evades, rather than answers, the LDO.

But this is not what Segall wants to argue; he claims that his account is not conditional, or at least not more so than “its most canonical statement” attributed to Parfit (69). Of course, this canonical statement could be interpreted as conditional egalitarianism. He does, however, criticize conditional egalitarianism for being “arbitrary,” that is, “it does not give an explanation as to why equality should be valuable *only* when it benefits one person” (29). It is unclear how Segall’s own account avoids this objection, since it does not explain why inequality is only bad when arbitrary. So we are left without an argument for telic egalitarianism, understood either as the claim that equality is intrinsically valuable or as the claim that inequality is intrinsically dis-valuable.

What Segall’s account may provide is a justification for deontic egalitarianism. His argument says that (some) inequalities are bad when and because they came about in a certain way; this is precisely Parfit’s definition of deontic egalitarianism: “what is . . . bad is not strictly the state of affairs but the way in which it was produced” (Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority,” *Ratio* 10 [1997]: 202–21, 208). Segall, however, explicitly denies that “deontic egalitarianism hinges on the way in which equality came about” and claims that deontic views “concern what we ought to do” (10). Notwithstanding the fact that this does little to clarify the admittedly confusing contrast that Parfit sets between the deontic and telic view, let us accept that this is the relevant contrast, that is, between deontic and axiological views. If this is the case, Segall’s view must rely on a value in order to be a telic account, to wit, the value of equality.

He replies to this accusation by saying that his view does not rely on the seemingly deontic notion of a complaint but rather “locates the badness of inequality in the complaint that *individuals* have” (71), which, he goes on to say, “is a feature of egalitarianism that has been defended repeatedly by both Temkin and Broome” (71). I find this reply unconvincing for two reasons. First, Temkin’s view, as Segall himself says, “might be faulty for flirting too closely with desert,” thus arguably falling prey to a deontic temptation (71). Second, Broome’s account is rather complex and denies that goodness or badness should be understood in the impersonal way that Parfit understands it (Hirose, *Egalitarianism*, 74). But Segall rejects Broome’s understanding of goodness in favor of a “hybrid view,” which “implies first understanding inequality as a non-welfare affecting bad (and in that

sense, like Temkin's impersonal bad), and *then* parcelling this impersonal badness out, and identifying it with particular individuals with whom it rests" (114).

This seems to rest on a novel axiological framework, but unfortunately Segall does not elaborate on it. Without an explicit statement and defense of the kind of axiological view that his account relies on, it is difficult to reconcile the seemingly contradicting claims that Segall makes in this book. He claims to defend the intrinsic value of equality but actually denies that equality has value at all. He rejects conditional egalitarianism yet argues that inequality is not always bad. He adopts Broome's understanding of value but claims to support—rather than reinterpret—Parfit's principle of equality, which arguably relies on a different conception of value. It would have been helpful to have more details about how these claims fit together into one coherent axiological framework. These criticisms aside, this book is a tour de force through the important but dense literature on telic egalitarianism, which makes it required reading for anyone interested in this area.

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Vallor, Shannon. *Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a World Worth Wanting*.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. ix+309. \$39.95 (cloth).

We are living in an era of unprecedented technological change. And such change seems set to become still more rapid and wide-ranging with ongoing advances in robotics, digital surveillance, biomedical enhancement technologies, and other fields. How are we to make wise moral decisions about these and other technologies—which ones to embrace and under what circumstances? Shannon Vallor's *Technology and the Virtues* is an extended exploration and defense of the claim that our best option is to develop "technomoral" virtues appropriate to these new circumstances.

Divided into three parts, Vallor's book is strikingly ambitious. Part 1 introduces virtue ethics and its potential role in the philosophy of technology. Vallor presents three prominent virtue ethical traditions—the Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist—and argues that they provide a suitable background for understanding and cultivating the "technomoral virtues" we need for the twenty-first century. Part 2 begins with an extended look at common methods of virtue cultivation across the traditions, after which Vallor turns to characterizing twelve representative technomoral virtues. In part 3 Vallor applies these technomoral virtues to a range of important areas of technological change, including social media, digital surveillance and monitoring, robotics, and the bioenhancement of human beings.

Vallor argues that human virtues always operate in "technosocial" contexts (2). Diverse and changing technologies in manufacturing, transportation, the arts, medicine, and other domains shape our ways of life, our values, our possibilities for action, and so forth; the expression of our virtues varies with these changing