ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with how Irish peacekeeping policy and practice has evolved in response to the changing nature of international peacekeeping. It asks specific questions about how changes in international peacekeeping doctrine since the end of the Cold War have affected Irish peacekeeping policy and practice, and why, in the light of a more general disengagement by Western countries from peacekeeping, Ireland has continued to commit to a strong presence in international peacekeeping. The thesis explains what international peacekeeping is and describes the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice by reviewing the political and legislative changes in peacekeeping policy and the changing practices of peacekeeping by the Irish defence forces. In addition, four peacekeeping missions have been chosen as case studies; two of United Nations traditional peacekeeping missions and two of Regional Organisations peace-enforcement missions, namely, Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Chad.

The thesis will argue that Irish peacekeeping policy and practice has evolved slowly and has become a hybrid in which interpretation of enforcement mandates are conditioned by values and norms and organisational conventions which stretch back deeply into the force’s history. This thesis will argue that this is a not weakness, but a strength.

Irish foreign policy prioritises a well regulated international environment and to that end Ireland is committed to active participation in international peacekeeping. This reflects a strong belief among politicians that peacekeeping helps to consolidate Irish international standing. The Irish army has an institutional interest in participation in peace enforcement operations with United Nations and Regional Organisations; indeed without such engagements it would have been reduced long ago to a very limited domestic range of functions to do with internal security and ceremonial. However, United Nations peacekeeping operations remain the main function of the Irish defence forces, enjoys cross-party political support, and continues to be a source of Irish patriotic pride.
DEDICATION

To the eighty six Irish peacekeepers who have paid the ultimate sacrifice and died in the service of peace on United Nations peacekeeping missions
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A sincere thank you to my PhD supervisor at U.L. Professor Tom Lodge, who at all times offered me the highest standards of advice, criticism and support. Thanks are also due to my external examiner Professor Paul Rodgers of Durham University and my internal examiner Professor Neil Robinson of U.L.

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I would like to acknowledge the invaluable services of Kim Arnold in the editing process.

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<td>AAK</td>
<td>Alliance for Future of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE’s</td>
<td>Armed Element’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID’s</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP 9</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication 9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKR</td>
<td>New Kosovo Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Asian Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-east Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCP</td>
<td>Aid to the Civil Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief Administrative Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Coy</td>
<td>C Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>The CFA franc is the name of two currencies used in Africa which are guaranteed by the French treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communication and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRV’s</td>
<td>Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Chief of Technical Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACOS Ops</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI</td>
<td>Designated Areas of Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFF</td>
<td>De Facto Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFHQ</td>
<td>Defence Forces Head Quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIID</td>
<td>Department for International Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECMM</td>
<td>European Community Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMCOyas</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOR</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESST</td>
<td>Engineer Special Search Team</td>
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</table>
MUP   Ministry of Internal Affairs (Serbia)
NAM   Non-Aligned Movement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO’s IFOR  NATO’s International Force (BiH)
NGO   Non Governmental Organisation
OAS   Organisation of American States
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGB   Observer Group Beirut
OGE   Observer Group Egypt
OGG(T) Observer Group Golan (Tiberius)
OGL   Observer Group Lebanon
OHQ   Operational Head Quarters
OMIK  OSCE Mission in Kosovo
ONUCI Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire
OP    Observation Post
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OMiFRY OSCE Mission in Federal Republic Yugoslavia
PARP  Planning and Review Process
PDCI  The Côte d’Ivoire Democratic Party
PDF   Permanent Defence Force
PDK   Democratic Party of Kosovo
PiP   Partnership for Peace
PISG  Provisional Institution of Self Government
PIT   Ivorian Workers Party
PLO   Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PKO’s Peace Keeping Operations
RDR   The Rally for Republicans
RFC   Rally of Forces for Change
ROE’s Rules of Engagement
RRF   Rapid Reaction Force
R2P   Responsibility to Protect
SFOR  Security Force
SFRY  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SG    Secretary General
SOP   Standard Operational Procedures
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General
SUV   Sports Utility Vehicle
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UDI   Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFDD  Union of Forces for Development and Democracy
UK    United Kingdom
UN    United Nations
UNCIVPOL UN Civilian Police Force
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observation Force
UNEF  United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHQ  United Nations Head Quarters
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force (Yugoslavia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAK</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United National Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXB’S</td>
<td>Unexploded Bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>South Lebanese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM’S</td>
<td>Tactical Aide Memoires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP</td>
<td>Vehicle Check Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>Very High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>ZOC</td>
<td>Zone of Confidence</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview

1.1 Preface

The aim of this thesis is to examine the way in which Irish peacekeeping has been affected by the doctrinal and strategic shifts in international peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War.

Today we work shoulder to shoulder in Bosnia and the Middle East. But I think you should know, that as nearly as I can determine, in the 40 years in which the world has been working together on peacekeeping, the only country in the world which has never taken a single, solitary day off from the cause of world peace to the United Nations peacekeeping operations is Ireland. And I thank you.

President William J Clinton, 1998

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, its architects had ambitious plans to ensure world peace by means of ‘Collective Security’. This plan envisioned a United Nations army comprising of troops from around the world which would be for available for deployment to trouble spots to deter the outbreak of war. Unfortunately the Cold War which subsequently emerged between the superpowers prevented this vision of ‘collective security’ from becoming a reality.

An alternative to ‘Collective Security’ emerged when the first United Nations peacekeeping mission was deployed during the 1956 ‘Suez Crisis’, the nature of which was such that the superpowers permitted the United Nations to deploy the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This deployment of lightly armed, neutral soldiers from medium sized countries facilitated the disengagement and withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops from Egypt. The success of this UNEF mission gave a green light for future such operations and this type of peacekeeping, which became known as ‘Traditional Peacekeeping’ became the template for peacekeeping operations for the next thirty years.

The collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989 signalled the end of the Cold War and heralded a wave of optimism for the future of world peace. The then American president, George Bush, spoke of ‘a new world order’. However, the initial euphoria was short lived and before long a number of conflicts erupted throughout the world, caused mainly by the relaxation of control by the superpowers in what had previously been their areas of domination and the re-emergence of nationalism, irredentism, tribalism and religious animosity. By the mid 1990’s dozens of conflicts had erupted, most of which were intra-state, and to which the UN responded by deploying peacekeeping forces. Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the traditional peacekeeping template which had been designed to facilitate international post-conflict disengagement could not cope with what were, in effect, civil wars. A series of reviews of peacekeeping called for more robust methods to which the UN responded by activating a combination of more assertive peacekeeping missions and peace-enforcement missions. In addition, the UN outsourced peacekeeping to ‘Regional Organisations’, such as, the African Union, NATO and the EU.

This change in the ethos of peacekeeping operations has divided opinion in the international community. On one side, countries such as the US, Canada and EU states now favour interventionism and the more robust mechanisms of peacekeeping in order to protect the human rights of individuals as is laid out in the Preamble of the UN Charter, while on the other, many non-aligned and autocratic states continue to favour the neutrality ethos of traditional peacekeeping and emphasise the sanctity of the nation state as laid out in the UN Charter, Chapter 1.

In the debates around these issues, the western states refer to the preamble to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which declares that every state has a responsibility to prevent genocide and cannot abuse the human rights of its citizens. As such, they maintain that if a state fails to protect the human rights of its citizens it faces the prospect of international humanitarian intervention. It is somewhat paradoxical that while Canada and the Western European states who were the major contributors during the ‘golden age’ of peacekeeping (1956-1999), and who now champion humanitarian-intervention and robust peacekeeping, have been conspicuous by their absence from UN peacekeeping operations in the last decade, while the non-aligned states who champion the traditional peacekeeping model remain the major contributors to contemporary UN peacekeeping operations.
The first contingent of Irish peacekeeping troops went to the Congo in 1960, and although it was something of a baptism of fire, the Irish authorities remained steadfast in their commitment to the United Nation. Over the next thirty years, Ireland was a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Throughout the 1990’s the concept of international peacekeeping fundamentally changed however, thereby necessitating a radical reappraisal and overhaul of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice.

In the context of this background, the aim of this thesis is to examine the ways in which Irish peacekeeping has been affected by these doctrinal and strategic shifts. It will explore whether Irish peacekeeping deployments have become increasingly influenced by those who espouse the interventionist concept. Alternatively, it will also consider the possibility that Irish peacekeeping practice continues to adhere to the traditional peacekeeping model and the sanctity of the nation state.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis will address two key clusters of inter-related questions.

Firstly, it will examine how changes in international peacekeeping doctrine since the end of the Cold War have affected Irish peacekeeping policy and practice. In particular, it will explore whether Irish peacekeeping between 1990 and 2015 has become increasingly organised around a peace enforcement model or whether it remains a hybrid of traditional and post 1990 doctrine. It will consider whether peace enforcement has effectively replaced adherence to a traditional model of lightly armed neutral forces geared to facilitating disengagement. Ireland’s original engagement with peacekeeping was arguably shaped by its diplomatic tradition of military neutrality. As such, this thesis will also evaluate whether recent peacekeeping operations have affected this neutrality.

Secondly, the thesis will seek to explain why, in the light of more general disengagement by Western countries from peacekeeping, Ireland has continued to commit to a strong presence in international peacekeeping. In addressing this question, this thesis will explore the effects of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy and assess whether this development has shaped Irish peacekeeping policy or practice. Arising from this, it will further consider
whether Irish engagement in regional organisations, including the European Union, have helped to change the kind of peacekeeping policy and practice that was fostered by Ireland’s earlier commitment to the United Nations peacekeeping. Given their involvement with regional organisations, including the OSCE and NATO, along with the European Union, another important question under consideration is whether Ireland has reduced or diluted its traditional support for United Nations peacekeeping. A final issue which must be addressed in any consideration of the enduringly high levels of Irish commitment to peacekeeping is that of institutional self-interest. To this end, this thesis will assess the hypothesis that Irish peacekeeping may be prompted by the need to find a justificatory purpose and a revenue generating capacity for the military establishment.

Four case studies of specific peacekeeping missions will help to address these questions. The first of these is the United Nation’s Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a traditional United Nations inter-state mission initiated during the Cold War period, and which continues until time of writing (2016). The second case study is of the UN political mission, MINUCI, which monitored the early stages of the peace process following the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. This is an example of one of the myriad observer/liaison missions throughout the world in which Irish military officers have played significant roles. The third case study is of the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (KFOR), which demonstrates the evolution from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement by the Irish defence forces in keeping with the evolution of humanitarian intervention in response to demands from the international media (‘the CNN Factor’), foreign aid actors, and the ‘The something must be done club’. The fourth case study is of a European Union Peace-enforcement mission that was conducted in Chad and the Central African Republic at the request of the UN Security Council. For Ireland, the Chad mission was especially challenging in terms of the scope of the deployment, and as will be later discussed in detail, highlights some of the complexities arising from even traditionally styled humanitarian or “protection” missions which occur in fragile and embattled states. The alliance with France also represented a departure from traditional neutral peacekeeping.

From ‘traditional peacekeeping’ to peace-enforcement, from UN to Regional Organisations, these four case studies represent the different types of peacekeeping missions for which the significant contribution of Irish peacekeepers is internationally recognised. They were chosen to demonstrate the response by the Irish authorities to the changing nature of peacekeeping following the Cold War. The author considers the study of the NATO and EU missions
particularly important, as many observers, particularly on the left of Irish politics, feared that they marked a change in the Irish policy of prioritising support to UN. They cited the example that many ‘First World’ countries who had been a bedrock of support for UN peacekeeping during the Cold War period from the 1950’s until 2000, had withdrawn their support from the UN and moved to supporting Regional Organisations such as NATO’s (PfP) and the emerging EU’s forces such as the Rapid Reaction Force.

1.3 Contribution to scholarship

The research questions are prompted by a general recognition among the standard authorities of the changes over the last couple of decades in peacekeeping approaches. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams in *Understanding Peacekeeping* (2010) explained that UN peace operations were initially conceived as a tool for maintaining order between states in an international society based on rules arising from state sovereignty, especially non-aggression and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. This is the ‘Westphalian’ conception of inter-state relations. Within this international society, they explain that the principal role of peace operations was the facilitation of peaceful settlements between states. As globalisation gathered pace, so the relationship between states deepened, casting doubt on the political significance of state boundaries and giving rise to new concepts of sovereignty. According to these new ideas, states enjoy full sovereign rights only if they fulfil certain responsibilities towards citizens, such as protecting them from genocide and mass atrocities. Within this conception of international society, which they label ‘post-Westphalian’, the role of peace operations is to assist states in fulfilling these responsibilities, and where necessary, to assume these responsibilities where the host state proves itself unable or unwilling to do so.

However, as Bellamy and Williams point out, although this new concept has come into ascendancy and informs the majority of contemporary UN peace operations, it remains highly controversial. It is resisted by some states of the global South, particularly China and India, who continue to defend the Westphalian order, and indeed consider the liberal consensus as bordering on neo-colonialism. The new consensus is championed by western liberal democracies especially the EU states. However, a perusal of UN statistics for September 2015 shows that the ideals are not supported by actions. Of the 105,480 UN peacekeepers
deployed throughout the world, the EU states provided 5,405 peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations, with Spain, France and Italy providing over half of the total EU contribution. Whereas, Bangladesh provided 8,420, Ethiopia 8,307, India 7,793, and Pakistan provided over 7,675 peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations. The USA by contrast provided just 79 peacekeepers to the UN.

Bellamy and Williams also discuss liberal peace theory, cosmopolitism, and critical theory in relation to peace support operations. In addition, they discuss contemporary globalisation and the ‘New Wars’ which have dominated peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. New Wars or ‘State Disintegration Wars’ are intra-state rather than inter-state wars. They take place in the context of state failure and transformation. These are driven by globalisation and liberal economic forces in which ethnic and religious differences are placed above political ideology, and where civilian casualties and forced displacement increase dramatically, primarily because civilians are being deliberately targeted. Bellamy and Williams claim that building peace out of new wars has required the transformation of governing systems along liberal lines by external interveners. They also point out that the dominance of liberal peace theories which hold that democratic states with market economies are less prone to conflict than those having other systems of governance, have pushed peace operations towards the early adoption of competitive elections and economic liberalisation despite evidence of their destabilising potential. This argument is reinforced by Collier’s book, *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (March 2009), in which he points out that 40% of civil war peace settlements reverted to violence within a decade, which reversions actually account for half of all the world’s civil wars. He questions whether “democracy the key to peace in these societies”:

A post-conflict election shifts the risk of conflict reversions. The year before the election the risk of going back to violence is very sharply reduced: the society looks to have reached safety. But in the year after the election the risk explodes upwards. The net effect of the election is to make the society more dangerous.\(^2\)

In terms of the purely economic benefits of peacekeeping, Collier conducts a detached cost benefit analysis on peacekeeping operations to report that:

Expenditure on peacekeeping strongly and significantly reduces the risk that a post-conflict situation will revert to civil war. We estimate that an annual expenditure of

$100 million on peacekeepers reduces the cumulative ten year risk of reversion to conflict very substantially from 37% to 17%.3

Collier also examines the concept of ‘Over the Horizon Forces’ as practiced in Francophone Africa by the French government and in Sierra Leone by the UK government. In this model the former colonial rulers give a security guarantee to come to the assistance of the administration if threatened by external forces or coup d’état. He found that the French security guarantee to Francophone Africa prior to the late 1990s reduced the risk of civil war breaking out from around 10% to 3% in any five year period. ‘Over the Horizon Forces’ have proven to be effective and cheap as the forces can be utilised for alternative purposes in addition to being on standby for peacekeeping.

The debate however, remains contentious. Brian Urquhart, arguably the main architect of traditional peacekeeping, is very clear about the tenets and limitations of peacekeeping, and cautions against the dangers of the rush to deploy peace-enforcement missions which are under-resourced, and which lack proper mandates and the requisite political support. His writings include his autobiography, *A Life in Peace and War* (1987) and *The Origins of UNIFIL in Al Janoub* (2008), in which he details the background to the setting up of UNIFIL in 1978. This recounts the impossible situation in which the peacekeepers were placed and the lack of support from the Security Council which had established UNIFIL. He goes on to contrast UNIFIL under the new robust mandate and the resources it received in 2006. In the *New York Review of Books* (November 1999), Urquhart outlined the Principles of Peacekeeping, insisting that force is to be used only in self-defence:

This principle was often derided by critics as pusillanimous and feeble; but in fact it recognised the essential limitations of such operations. The non-use of force was a vital condition for the countries making peacekeeping troops available to the UN. In addition, one of the main reasons for peacekeeping operations is to help the countries in which they are deployed. No matter how tiresome or difficult they may be, it is their country, with its own history and traditions, and these have to be respected if their cooperation is to be secured. The real strength of a traditional UN peacekeeping force lay not in its capacity to use force, but precisely in its not using force and thereby remaining above the conflict. The traditional experience was, that in most circumstances, the moment a peacekeeping force starts killing people it becomes part of the conflict it is supposed to be controlling, and therefore becomes part of the problem. The force loses the essential quality that distinguishes it from the people it is dealing with and sets it above them…A traditional peacekeeping operation was much more a policing and assistance mission than a military action. The regular participants

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3Ibid p81
in UN operations became accustomed to this sort of duty, even though it often required great patience and restraint in the face of insult and sometimes injury. The Congo, southern Lebanon, Cyprus, Cambodia, Angola and other places did not provide easy conditions for peacekeepers.4

In his autobiography, *Peacekeeper: the Road to Sarajevo*, the UN’s first commander in Sarajevo, Maj Gen Lewis MacKenzie, supplied insights into the problems encountered in a post-Cold War peacekeeping mission and the frustration experienced by the commander on the ground with the civilian bureaucracy thousands of miles away. MacKenzie provides a succinct portrayal of traditional peacekeeping, describing how he happened to be located in Sarajevo when his mission, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was mandated to operate in the Serb dominated area in Croatia, had its Headquarters located in Sarajevo in neighbouring Bosnia Herzegovinain for political reasons. The UN had no function in Bosnia, as this was supposedly the responsibility of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). UNPROFOR was thus conceived and deployed under a traditional peacekeeping mandate, but as events unfolded, it was forced to change from peacekeeping to wider-peacekeeping, and eventually become involved in peace-enforcement and nation-building:

Until the Yugoslav conflict erupted in 1991, United Nations Peacekeeping, with a few notable exceptions, was pretty straightforward. Two or more countries or warring factions within a country decided they wanted to stop fighting and turned to the UN for help. A ceasefire was arranged after which a multinational force of peacekeepers arrived with their white vehicles and blue berets and paced themselves in a demilitarised zone between the parties…For thirty-six years, as the UN inserted its peacekeeper and /or observers in some thirty-three trouble spots around the world the pattern of intervention remained reasonably consistent…The UN has not willingly or deliberately involved itself in civil conflicts where there is no peace to keep…in Yugoslavia, it literally backed into its new role, establishing a precedent that dominates its current activities.5

In mid-afternoon, we were visited by the EC’s Colm Doyle who advised us that his colleagues lives were been threatened by the Bosnian Serbs and the negotiations were going nowhere. Accordingly, EC headquarters in Zagreb had directed them to pull out of Sarajevo at 0600 hours the following morning…Like it or not, it seemed inevitable that we would now be getting involved in the peace-making activities that had been the EC’s responsibility until their decision to leave. We realised that we had no other choice...with the departure of the European Community, we were the only game in town and, slowly but surely, had already been getting involved.6

6Ibid P 182/3
There are other key contributions to the general literature on modern shifts in peacekeeping that will inform this thesis. The UN secured the release of the international hostages in Beirut in 1991. The UN negotiator responsible for their release, Giandomenico Picco (1994), provides perspective on the politics of peacekeeping from a senior UN insider.

This thesis’ main claim to originality will rest upon its exploration of Irish experience during these decades of shifting strategic orientation among peacekeepers. There is a significant body of work in relation to the Irish defence forces and peacekeeping which deals with a myriad of different aspects of the activities of the Irish defence forces both at home and on peacekeeping deployments. Broadly speaking, the relevant published material falls into three groups.

Firstly are the standard histories of the Irish Army which elucidate the traditions and norms that have undoubtedly affected the way Irish peacekeeping deployment has evolved. Eunan O’Halpin is probably the most widely cited authority in this respect, especially in his text, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its enemies since 1922* (1999). Another key text in this vein is John Duggan’s, *A History of the Irish Army* (1991). Following his discussion of the civil war he reviews the evolution of the DF from the Irish volunteers through the ‘Emergency’ period up to the time of publishing in 1991. In addition to providing a chronology of the DF’s history, Donal Carron’s, *The Irish Defence Forces since 1922* (2001) also contains excellent illustrations of uniforms, badges and insignia. Theo Farrell (2001) also examines the impact of transnational norms on military development. Using a constructivist analysis of systemic norms and primarily focusing on the two transnational norms of conventional warfare and of civilian supremacy, he illustrates how these have shaped the development of the Irish Defence Forces.

Secondly, an important body of autobiographical writing or journalistic accounts heavily informed by personal recollections that focus on peacekeeping experiences are useful in this context. Retired soldier’s memoirs include, *An Irish Soldiers Diaries* by Michael Moriarity (2010), *The Lebanon Diaries: An Irish Soldiers Story* by Martin Malone (2007), and *Tough at the Bottom* by Mick O’Farrell (1999). In 2010 Valerie O’Brien wrote of her experiences as a female soldier in the Irish army in, *In the Shadow of Men*. In addition to the description of army life in Ireland, O’Brien describes her experiences on two overseas missions and relays the tensions generated by men and women serving together in the claustrophobic confines of
a UN military camp. One aspect of her account that received much publicity was her description of how some Irish peacekeepers exploited local women who engaged in survival sex. There is a considerable body of popular writing in relation to specific Irish Peacekeeping experiences, with the Congo and Lebanon dominating these works. They include, Henry MacDonald’s *Irish Batt: The story of Ireland’s Blue Berets in Lebanon* (1993), David Donohue’s, *The Irish Army in the Congo 1960-1964: The Far Battalions* (2005), Ralph Riegel and John O’Mahony’s, *Missing in Action: The 50 Year Search for a Lost Soldier* (2010), Raymond Smith’s, *Under the Blue Flag* (1980), and Dan Harvey’s, *Peacekeepers: Irish Soldiers in Lebanon* (2001), *Peace-Enforces: The EU Military Intervention in Chad* (2011), and, ‘A’ Company Action: *The Battle of the Tunnel – 16 December 1961* (2012). Rose Doyle and Leo Quinlan’s *The Heroes of Jadotville* (2006) tells the story of an Irish infantry company which was presented with an impossible task by na"ive and inexperienced UN management. It chronicles a deplorable list of poor logistics, an horrific battle in which hundreds of Congolese were killed, and the subsequently shameful treatment of the Irish peacekeepers by the Irish military and political leadership on their return to Ireland. This body of writing provides invaluable insight into the day-to-day experience of peacekeepers in the field and is useful for tracking the operational effect of doctrinal shifts in peacekeeping mandates, but first hand and journalistic writing is, on the whole, less concerned with the broader strategic considerations which affect peacekeeping and does not address such matters systematically.

Thirdly, there is a somewhat limited body of academic and analytical studies of Irish peacekeeping, essentially consisting of four key authorities. Both Oliver MacDonald and Jim Parker have provided closely argued early assessments of Irish peacekeeping, informed partly by their own experience as serving officers. Both are largely concerned with peacekeeping under its traditional facilitative mandate. More recently, Katsumi Ishikuza and Ray Murphy have emerged as the standard academic authorities on Irish peacekeeping. This thesis will engage most directly with both of these more recent authorities.

Oliver MacDonald provides the historical background to Irish peacekeeping, stating that from 1960 until time of writing, Irish peacekeeping had been predominantly of the traditional or classical type. He outlined the Irish national peacekeeping policy as a preparedness to participate in peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the United Nations as being one of the roles specifically designated by government for the Irish defence forces. He stresses that
the extensive corpus of peacekeeping experience gained by the Irish over many years has been identified as a major factor which informs consideration of requests from the UN for Irish participation in peacekeeping operations. He also contends that there was little need for peacekeeping to be codified in its first forty years of operation and that a combination of principles which included non-use of force, consent of the parties, and a post-conflict state of peace had initially been sufficient. Traditional peacekeeping needed a relatively low level of personnel, arms, and equipment, as such missions were never designed to engage in wide scale combat. Therefore it is essential that the limitations of successful peacekeeping are recognised for what they are. He explains that the Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace recognised that peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and peace-building require different actions and resources, including a clear mandate and the support of the Security Council. Experience in the 1990’s highlighted the need to reduce the time taken to deploy peacekeeping missions and he cited the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) as the proper mechanism to address this.

Writing in 1986, Jim Parker, later Chief of Staff of the Irish Defence Forces, begins with a brief history of Irish peacekeeping, and then goes on to discuss Ireland’s commitment to UNIFIL at its inception in 1978. He points out that if a peacekeeping force is to be effective the full cooperation of all the parties involved is essential. In the case of UNIFIL there was never any such cooperation, and Parker provides a detailed outline of the different expectations of the Israeli’s and Arabs to that affect. He describes the on-going conflict between UNIFIL and the Israeli proxy army the South Lebanon Army (SLA) which UNIFIL never formally recognised but named the De Facto Forces (DFF). In addition he describes how the Lebanese resistance grew up in the area to become more problematic for Israel and UNIFIL than the PLO had ever been. In his view, participation in UNIFIL brought considerable benefits to the Irish army, supplying opportunities to apply and adapt staff procedures and develop the full range of military skills, organisational techniques, and leadership qualities. He underscores the obvious value of this training environment, stating that it would be impossible to simulate the conditions at home, as no matter how well planned or executed, training exercises could not hope to provide the experience or results gained under real conditions.

policy considerations that have prompted Irish commitment to peacekeeping. Ishizuka assesses Ireland’s motivation for participating in peacekeeping operations and gives detailed descriptions of the Dáil debates which resulted in two amendments of the Defence Act which legalised Irish participation in international peacekeeping operations in 1960. Irish neutrality was a major issue during the debates and Ishizuka highlights that the Taoiseach of the day argued that ‘wars adversely affected smaller states and consequently it was in the Irish national interest to be active participants in preventing conflict; and UN peacekeeping operations replacing collective security could be a major instrument for international conflict resolution into the future’. Subsequent analyses addresses the lessons learned from the experiences in the Congo going forward into the Cyprus operation, Dáil debates in relation to Cyprus, UNEF II (Egypt), and the consequences of the withdrawal of Irish troops from UNEF II following the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan in 1974.

UNIFIL it given its own chapter in which to describe the background to the setting up of the mission, along with a detailed account of the Dáil debates in relation to Irish participation in UNIFIL. In this chapter Ishizuka notes the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy as a result of membership of the EEC. He highlights that one of the consequences of this Europeanization was the 1980 ‘Bahrain declaration’ by the Irish foreign minister which recognised the legitimacy of the PLO as representatives of the Palestinian people. Soon after that declaration there was an escalation of hostilities in Lebanon resulting in several UNIFIL fatalities, including three Irish killed in action (KIA). In the ensuing diplomatic wrangle the Israeli authorities claimed that Irish peacekeeping was compromised by this new Irish diplomacy. Ishizuka also describes the benefits that accrued to the Irish defence forces from participating in UNIFIL. Ishizuka then turns to Ireland’s peacekeeping policy in the post-Cold War era. He describes the Dáil debates on the third amendment to the Defence Act (1993) which allows Irish peacekeepers to participate in peace-enforcement operations conducted by the UN and regional organisations. He explores the debates on the expansion of Irish peacekeeping into regional peacekeeping in addition to UN peacekeeping, and particularly focuses on the contentious debate on Ireland joining the NATO ‘Partnership for Peace.’ In his conclusions he recommends the restructuring and re-equipment of the Irish army in order that it may remain abreast of post-Cold War developments in international peacekeeping practice and fully participate in UN and Regional Organisation peace-enforcement operations.
Ishizuka’s study is an important analytical work on Irish peacekeeping which greatly informs this thesis. However, this dissertation is more concerned with the way in which operations developed on the ground rather than Ishizuka’s preoccupation with the national policies that guided initial deployments. On operational issues, the analysis in this thesis will propose a rather different set of positions to those projected in Ishizuka’s overview. His review ends in 2000, by which time, in his estimation, Ireland had made only token contributions to Regional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, with a transport company of eighty personnel to the UN peace-enforcement mission in Somalia (UNOSOM11) and fifty military police personnel to the NATO peace-enforcement mission (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also asserted that the non-NATO members of the EU, namely, Austria, Sweden and Finland, took a more pro-active approach to Regional Organisation peacekeeping than Ireland, and suggested the Irish defence forces did not have the military hardware to participate in peace-enforcement operation. He therefore recommended that the Irish government raise the quality of its military capability.

This thesis will confirm that in the years following 2000 the Irish government did indeed raise the military capability of the Irish army, thus enabling it to actively participate with the UN in peace-enforcement operations in Eritrea, Liberia, Chad, Lebanon and Syria. Also at this time Ireland actively participated with mechanised infantry units in Regional Organisations peacekeeping missions in Kosovo with NATO’s PfP (KFOR) and with the EU force in Chad (EUFOR Chad/CAR). The case study on Lebanon will deal with the Irish deployment of light infantry units in UNIFIL in the Cold War era and will also address the re-deployment of Irish peacekeepers to UNIFIL in 2011 with a mechanised infantry unit operating under the more robust 2006 UN Security Council mandate. The chapter on Cote d’Ivoire will demonstrate the experience that Irish officers brought to establishing the military liaison element of the political mission MINUCI which was a critical enabler in the speedy establishment of this new mission, and which in turn, allowed for timely and informed decisions which led to the upgrading from a political mission to the full peace-enforcement mission ONUCI.

In relation to the chapter on Kosovo, the author was a commanding officer of the Irish contingent in the peace-enforcement mission in Kosovo and as such, not only had access to primary source material but means that much of the study could be classified as ‘participant observation’. The Kosovo chapter will provide a very detailed account of the operation of the
KFOR mission, and in particular, the operation of the Irish mechanised unit in KFOR. In addition this chapter critically examines the transitional administration UNMIK and comments on the unfortunate effects of its neo-liberal philosophy and the ‘structural adjustments’ which contributed to the increased unemployment which arguably drove former workers into the black economy under the control of the patrimonial clans.

The chapter on Chad provides a detailed description of the EU peace-enforcement mission to Chad/ Central African Republic which acted as a bridging mission for the follow-on UN peace-enforcement mission. In this instance, the Irish peacekeepers took a prominent role heading up the operational HQ and deploying a mechanised battalion on the ground. This thesis will show that Ireland has surpassed the non-NATO members of the EU and most of the NATO members in its commitment to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions, not only with the UN, but also with the EU and NATO (PfP). Many EU member states are strong on rhetoric about robust peacekeeping and the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P). However, unlike Ireland, many have been conspicuous by their absence from actual UN and Regional peacekeeping operations since the millennium.

Ray Murphy’s work concerns Irish peacekeeping commitments since 2000 and there is some overlap between his discussions of various campaigns and the developments addressed in this thesis. In particular he has addressed peace enforcement operations in the Lebanon and in Kosovo. Murphy’s UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo Operational and Legal Issue in Practice (2009) is a comparative analysis of the traditional peacekeeping in Lebanon with the more robust peace-enforcement mission in Somalia and the international administration in Kosovo. While it supplies a helpful overview of the general setting within which Irish soldiers served, their role is not foregrounded and mentioned only in passing. Indeed Murphy’s major preoccupation in this book is with the legal instruments and institutional framework that governed both peacekeeping and enforcement operations and the degree to which these served their purpose successfully. For Murphy the question of command and control is one of the more serious issues confronting the formation of an international peacekeeping force. He explains this, using Ireland and Canada as examples of how troops cannot be put under the command of an officer from another country. He explains various ways this technicality is overcome, such as the use of (national) officers on the Force Commanders staff to transmit force directives, and also explains the difference between the terms ‘Operational Control’ and ‘Under Command’ and how they are used to command and
control peacekeeping operations. He further explains the use of Secretary General’s directives which are issued prior to the peacekeeping force operations. Such SG Directives are based on the mandate and provide the Force Commanders with instructions for carrying out the tasks assigned.

Murphy engages with the legal framework for peacekeeping missions, which include the resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly, the use of ‘Status of Forces Agreements’ (SOFA’s) between the UN and the host state, the agreement by exchange of letters between each of the participating states and the UN, and the ‘Regulations for the use of Force’ issued by the Secretary General.

He explained that UNIFIL operated for 20 years without a SOFA and in their place Articles 104.105 of the Charter were used. These state that “UN organs enjoy such privileges and immunities in the territories of member states as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions”. However, one important issue in this respect is that of criminal immunity which only exists in respect of acts in the course of official duties. He points out that KFOR had no SOFA. Instead the legal instrument was the Military Technical Agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia signed on 12 June 1999.

In relation to crimes perpetrated by peacekeepers, SOFA’s usually make provision for the perpetrators to be tried and punished under the judicial system of the particular troop’s contributing country (TCC). He gives the example of Irish troops being initially charged with the holding charge of article 168 of the Defence Act 1954. ‘Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline’ and then being prosecuted through the Irish military court’s martial system.

With respect to the Use of Force Murphy contends that in Lebanon it evolved in response to the provocations being perpetrated on the UN force by warring militias. He gives the example of an attempt by Israeli backed militia to take over a UN protected village called At-Tiri in south Lebanon and how the use of force by the UN in that situation which was later endorsed by the Security Council, whereas, in Somalia use of force was permitted not only in self-defence but also to pursue its mission. He highlighted many of the contentious issues in Somalia, such as dual-control meaning that US and UN peacekeepers were operating in the same area but under different command, complicated control structures which ultimately had
unfortunate consequences due to confusion and misunderstanding. In relation to Kosovo he described the 1994 riots and the different responses of various contingents averring that, with the exception of the Scandinavian commanded sector (where the Irish troops served), KFOR failed to protect the beleaguered minorities from Albanian attacks. He also highlighted that the US operated in conjunction with the Albanian forces in the south of Kosovo whereas in the north, the French operated in conjunction with the Serb forces. In fact, only the Scandinavian-led sector operated independently.

In his conclusion Murphy stresses the need for UN reform, particularly with regard to the composition of the five permanent member states, of which he states, “This ruling oligarchy represents one of the major obstacles to the proper functioning of the UN and is a major impediment to peace based on justice and universal suffrage.” In relation to legal issues he also objectsthat “The ad hoc and improvised structures and procedures of the UN have long been a source of concern and difficulty and forces on the ground have enough to contend with besides the ineptitude of their own organisation…a review of the UN’s legal framework is long overdue.” He further cautions against the UN undertaking peacekeeping and peace-enforcement as part of one mission saying that this amalgamation caused doctrinal confusion and contributed to the mission failure in Somalia. He writes that enforcement of humanitarian law is especially problematic in respect to UN forces as they do not serve under the full command and control of the UN. Relying on TCC’s is one solution but TCC’s may have different standards. He states that UN Peacekeeping has serious operational and legal limitations, but neverthelessremains one the more successful multilateral attempts to maintain peace and security.

As will be evident from this summary, Murphy draws upon Irish material at different stages in his analysis for illustrative purposes. His main focus however, is upon the broad context of international legal authority. In contrast, this thesis will foreground specifically Irish experiences, because its aim is not so much to evaluate the utility or merits of different doctrines of peacekeeping, but rather to explore their operational effect on the particular military formation of the Irish army. However, in doing this, and byexploring particular terrains of peace-keeping and peace enforcement from a ground-up perspective,alternative evaluations of particular campaigns which take direct issue with much of Murphy’s recent workwill be introduced.
Most recently, for example, Murphy has addressed the issue of the protection of civilians. In order to do so, he examines the peacekeeping force UNIFIL, noting that the original mandate made no reference to civilian protection (2012). The protection of Lebanese civilians became an issue of concern when their treatment by Israeli forces in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion was brought to the attention of the Security Council. He writes that while the performance of humanitarian tasks as an interim measure was a worthwhile attempt to ease the plight of the local population, the loss of face regarding their inability to prevent Israeli incursions damaged both the credibility and morale of UNIFIL. This thesis will dispute this kind of unsupported statement in the Lebanon case study, contending that to expect a lightly armed peacekeeping force to prevent a heavily-armed invasion force with modern air, naval, tank and artillery assets at their disposal is completely unrealistic. Murphy goes on to claim that the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel ‘radically changed’ the context in which UNIFIL operated during the summer of 2006 when Resolution 1701 authorized a reconfigured UNIFIL to take all necessary action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The primary responsibility for the protection of civilians remained the Lebanese Government. The 2006 conflict demonstrated that it is not possible to provide effective protection in the context of armed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. “Today”, he writes, “UNIFIL seems dependent on the Government and maintaining good relations with armed elements for its security. Such a situation is inconsistent with it performing an effective protection role.” This is once again a highly controversial statement, as in the author’s experience, it was wholly consistent for UNIFIL to work in conjunction with the Lebanese authorities to provide effective protection for vulnerable civilians during times of active hostilities.

In summary, the keyway in which this dissertation contributes knowledge to the extant analytical literature on Irish peacekeeping is that it will significantly extend the empirical analysis of Irish peacekeeping commitments during the post 1990 peace enforcement era, both by engaging with case studies that have not previously been subjected to any sustained critique, and by providing a more detailed on-the-ground operational analyses of Irish commitments to the Lebanon and Kosovo theatres than exist at present.
1.4 Chapter Outlines

1.4.1 Chapter 2: Methodology

In this study, in addition to secondary sources, I have also drawn upon my personal experience as a serving army officer in three of the four case study operations included here, interviews with other serving and retired Irish officers, UN and NGO personnel, local politicians, military commanders, and police officers. Community activists have also proved to be useful sources, as have internal Irish defence forces documentation, manuals, instructions, and so on, along with United Nations reports and other official assessments in the public domain. Each of these sources inhere particular methodological constraints which determine and shape the way they are used as evidence. This chapter will illuminate these issues.

1.4.2 Chapter 3: International Peacekeeping

The chapter begins with a history of peacekeeping and then charts the evolution of peacekeeping from the inter-state, traditional peacekeeping missions of the Cold War era, to the post-Cold War era of intra-state, complex peacekeeping missions, in order to analyse the implications of wider-peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and the outsourcing of peace-enforcement to regional organisations such as EU, the OSCE and NATO. The chapter goes on to discuss humanitarian intervention and peace-building, including assisting transitions and transitional administrations. It reviews what the military term non-kinetic assets in peacekeeping, particularly Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC), and addresses the issues which have arisen between the peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies in relation to ethical boundaries and the overlap of areas of responsibility.

1.4.3 Chapter 4: Irish Peacekeeping Policy and the Irish Defence Forces

The first section of this chapter examines the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice. It begins by considering peacekeeping within the context of Irish Foreign Policy and outlines how Ireland became involved in international peacekeeping during the Cold War era. It then analyses Ireland’s political, legislative and military responses to the post-Cold War
changes in international peacekeeping policy and practice. Next, it explores the implications of European Union membership and its impact upon Irish peacekeeping. The chapter then rehearses Irish peacekeeping policy in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in particular, assesses Irish policy and practice in relation to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, this section reviews the strategic decision-making process in relation to CSDP and outlines the Irish government’s commitments to it 2000.

The second section of the chapter examines the Irish defence forces. It begins with a history of the Irish defence forces (DF) from its origins in the Irish Volunteers and the War of Independence. Following the initial overview the chapter will reflect on the various ways in that peacekeeping operations have shaped the Irish military. International peacekeeping commitments, which began in 1960, have fundamentally changed the Irish defence forces. At that time the general staff embraced the opportunity for overseas service, but sent wholly unprepared troops into the tropics on a dangerous peacekeeping mission. It is notable that throughout the Cold War era, Irish troops were deployed on ‘Aid to the Civil Power’ (ATCP) duties at home and ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations overseas. The signing of the ‘Good Friday’ agreement in 1998 resulted in a radical downsizing of the ATCP commitment and a corresponding increase in international demand for hi-tempo peace-enforcement missions. Accordingly, the general staff abandoned the commitment to conventional homeland defence and tailored their bargaining position to growing international political pressure on the Irish government to participate in such missions and a deeper integration in EU foreign policy structures.

1.4.4 Chapter 5: Case Study: Lebanon

The first case study is the Lebanon and the UN interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a traditional, Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission first deployed in 1978. It detailshow UNIFIL adapted to the changing situation on the ground in four sections; firstly, from 1978 when UNIFIL was established until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; secondly, the activities of UNIFIL during the Israeli occupation 1982 to 1985; thirdly, the period 1985 to 2000 which outlines how UNIFIL operated when Shia militias, principally Hezbollah, conducted a military campaign against Israeli occupation of a strip of land from the Israeli border up to twelve kilometres into Lebanon; and finally, from 2000 to 2015, dealing with the activities of UNIFIL since the Israeli withdrawal, more specifically from 2006 onwards, when UNIFIL
received the more robust mandate 1701. The overall focus of the chapter is on Irish deployment in UNIFIL, how Irish peacekeepers were operationally engaged over the four distinct periods outlined above, and how their story charts the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice over five decades of the most protracted international peacekeeping deployment by the DF and the most costly in terms of manpower, resources and fatalities.

1.4.5 Chapter 6: Case Study: Côte d'Ivoire

The UN political mission to Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) was established in June 2003 when the Security Council determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region. The case study traces the role of Irish officers in setting up this new political mission in 2003. The author was the first UN military officer to arrive in the country in 2003, and was the information officer in the military liaison section of the political mission MINUCI. The case study will show the value of the pivotal role played by the Irish officers in setting up this mission. MINUCI had limited Irish involvement but it is an example of the myriad of missions in which small numbers of DF Officers are deployed in trouble spots throughout the world. The case study was selected because of the authors personal experience in the mission and the access this gave to primary source materials and documentation, along with access to key actors within the country, including political and military leaders on the government and rebel side, journalists, senior police officers and NGO’s. Côte d’Ivoire is also an example of a military intervention by the international community into an intra-state, civil war. This type of mission, typically in sub-Saharan Africa, was once shunned by the UN, but is now the most common type of mission that it undertakes.

1.4.6 Chapter 7: Case Study: Kosovo

This case study of Kosovo was chosen for a number of reasons, not least that it is representative of deployments of Irish troops to a peace-enforcement mission being conducted by NATO. In addition, the author was the commanding officer of the Irish contingent in 2007, and as such, has unique insights into how the Irish peacekeepers operated in this NATO mission which places him in a first-hand position to compare and contrast the differences between a UN and a NATO deployment. The case study also analyses the operation of the ‘Internal Administration’, United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and discusses the philosophy of requiring internal administrations to give a critical review of the
operation of UNMIK and the effects of its Neo-Liberal policies and IMF Structural Adjustments on the economy of Kosovo. The case study gives a detailed description of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), particularly the Irish contribution, describes the advantages of NATO’s infrastructure over UN structures and conversely describes where UN structures have advantages over NATO structures. The case study then considers the political and diplomatic implications of Ireland’s involvement in KFOR, and concludes by summarising the outstanding issues related to the ‘Final Status’ for Kosovo.

1.4.7 Chapter 8: Case Study: Chad

On 25 September 2007, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1778 which instantiated the UN peacekeeping mission MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic, in order to prevent a worsening of the Darfur crisis and a spill-over into neighbouring regions. However, due to the remoteness of the region and the lack of infrastructure the UN estimated it would take a year to establish a mission there. Consequently, UN Resolution 1778 authorised the EU to establish a peacekeeping bridging mission for a 12 month period with a view to handing it over to the follow-on UN peacekeeping force at the end of that time. This case study examines the EU political decision-making process and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which authorised this EU peace-enforcement deployment. It details the planning issues for the EU, the paucity of critical enablers, the operation of the Operational HQ, the deployment in the mission area, financial planning issues, the performance of the mission in the area of operations, and issues arising.

From both a logistical and financial perspective, the Chad mission was the largest deployment ever undertaken by the Irish DF. In addition to the deployment in Chad, the DF supplied the operational commander who also brought Irish staff-officers with him to the Operational HQ in Paris. The case study examines the preparations in Dublin, the activities in the Operational HQ in Paris, and the deployment of the Irish unit in the Mission Area (AO). It includes the establishment of camps by the Irish corps of engineers who were protected by the Irish Special Forces. The impact of the critical lessons learned from UNMIL (the UN peace-enforcement mission in Liberia 2004-2007) on the Irish deployment in Chad is described. The tactical deployment is discussed, as are logistical issues, such as helicopter leases, which made the Irish news. Finally the section describes the issues in relation to the re-hatting of the Irish contingent from the EU mission into the follow-on UN force.
This chapter addresses the research questions. It will additionally make recommendations on how Ireland can improve the cohesiveness of its peace-building strategy.
Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Introduction

As explained in the overview of this thesis, this research addresses two main questions; namely, the ways in which changes in international peace-keeping doctrines since the end of the Cold War have affected Irish peace keeping policy and practice, and the reasons for Irish levels of commitment to engagement in peacekeeping missions.

I have used three different types of original or primary data. Firstly, in order to obtain an understanding of how doctrinal changes have been interpreted by the Irish military I have drawn upon internal Irish defence forces’ documentation, manuals, instructions, and so on. I have also made reference to United Nations reports and other official documentary sources. I have also availed of insights into the way Irish offices have responded to changes in doctrine from first-hand memoirs. Secondly, my own personal experience as a serving army officer in three of the four case study operations has supplied an understanding of the on-the-ground experience. Thirdly, interviews with other Irish officers, both serving and retired, UN personnel, NGO personnel, local politicians, military commanders, police officers, community activists, and so on, have provided supplementary perspectives to validate the accuracy of my own recollections and records and help gauge the extent to which they are typical.

This methodological chapter will have two main concerns. It will initially focus on the issues which arise from the sources of the evidence used in this thesis. For each of these sources there are inherent methodological constraints that determine and shape the way they may be used as evidence. This chapter will illuminate such issues. It will then address the methodological implications of exploring the experience of Irish peacekeeping through the selection of particular episodes within this history as case studies, as well as assessing the degree to which Irish peacekeeping itself may offer grounds for generalisation.
2.2 Documentation

What follows below then, is a review of the key documents concerning international peacekeeping doctrine. As they are cited, their titles will appear in boldface italics. I will then refer to the Irish documents which show how shifts in international doctrine have affected Irish understandings of peacekeeping strategy. My third documentary source will be the briefings and manuals that were prepared at the outset and during the course of specific missions. In this instance, I will cite examples. Finally, memoirs by serving soldiers reveal the extent to which individual officers are aware of doctrine and the ways they have interpreted it, and conversely, the extent to which they may retain predispositions from earlier training and the historic culture of the Irish Defence Forces. Here again, I will refer to cornerstone works by way of example.

Irish peacekeeping doctrine has changed and adapted throughout the years to remain aligned with the changes in international peacekeeping doctrines that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. The main international influences on Irish peacekeeping doctrine are the United Nations, the European Union and NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

2.3 The United Nations

Following the Cold War a quantitative and qualitative change occurred in UN peacekeeping. The United Nations Security Council dramatically transformed the practice of UN peacekeeping and missions were deployed to settings that were previously considered unsuitable under ‘traditional peacekeeping’ principles. The quantitative change in peacekeeping saw the number of peacekeeping missions rising from the 15 peacekeeping missions that were deployed in the forty years between 1948 and 1988, to 38 missions deployed in the twelve year period 1988 – 2000, and fourteen missions deployed between 2000 and 2010.\(^7\) The qualitative change saw peacekeepers being sent to intra-state conflicts which resulted in the traditional peacekeeping tenets of consent, neutrality and limited use of force, being stretched beyond their limits.

Within the United Nations, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated an expanded role for the United Nations in peacekeeping and security for which he produced the ‘An

Agenda for Peace’ document in 1992. As will become clear in Chapter 3 many countries were unhappy with this redefinition and actually withdrew support for peacekeeping. However, by 2000 it had become obvious that the concept of ‘traditional’ peacekeeping was no longer fit for purpose, to which end the UN produced the “Brahimi Report”. Once again it recommended strengthening its capacity to manage and sustain field operations, and once again, unanimity on the issue could not be found amongst the UN Member States. So began a series of reform proposals which are listed in Appendix 2.1.

In August 2015 the United Nations operated 16 peacekeeping missions throughout the world consisting of 106,245 uniformed personnel, 90,889 armed troops, 13,550 police and 1,806 unarmed military observers. Of these, 9 are peace-enforcement missions, 2 are peacekeeping missions and 5 are observer missions.

2.4 The European Union.

The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, but as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 9, the EU has a serious expectations capability gap as its member states have consistently failed to resource the various plans initiated under the auspices of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP).

The Irish Government’s Defence White Paper 2000 states that the European Union treaties do not provide Mutual Defence Guarantees. However, it acknowledges that it is clear that security interests of member states are increasingly interdependent. The White Paper committed the Government to initiating a planning process to examine how personnel might be drawn together in a more integrated way for service abroad, and at a Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000 Ireland pledged 850 troops to an EU Rapid Reaction Force. In 2006, the Irish Government pledged 100 troops to the Nordic Brigade of the EU Battle Groups, which necessitated legislation to be passed in the Dáil to legalise Irish troops training in foreign jurisdictions. Irish involvement in EU peacekeeping activities are discussed in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 9.

9 Irish Government White Paper Defence 2000. Para 2.2.4

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2.5 **NATO Partnership for Peace**

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was originally instantiated by NATO in 1994. Ireland joined and became a partner in this programme of bilateral cooperation between individual countries and NATO in 1999. It allows non-NATO countries to build up individual relationships with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. The Irish defence forces have supplied contingents to NATO PfP missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and staff officers to ISAF in Afghanistan. Chapters 3, 4 and 7 provide a detailed analysis of NATO’s PfP and the issues surrounding Ireland’s membership of it. It is worth noting that although the leftwing of Irish politics has consistently opposed Ireland’s membership of PfP, successive Irish governments have reiterated their commitment to continued membership.\(^\text{11}\)

2.6 **Irish Peacekeeping Policy Changes**

In the late 1990’s several factors, both international and domestic, combined to bring about a radical review of the Irish defence forces. On the domestic front, the signing of the Belfast Agreement’ in 1998 resulted in a radical reappraisal of the focus on internal security and ‘aid to the civil power’ by the army. A series of reviews and reorganisations resulted in the Irish defence forces being reduced in size to 9,500 across all ranks, and expenditure on defence being reduced from 1.3% of the GDP in the 1990’s to 0.48% in 2015. However, the DF were modernised in the interim and the focus shifted from internal security to international peacekeeping. Chapter 4 delineates this reorganisation and restructuring process.

The restructuring process resulted in a much reduced defence organisation but one with the new vision of being a mobile force with expeditionary capacities and capabilities commensurate with the demands of contemporary UN, EU and NATO PfP peacekeeping operations. On the international front, the reviews conducted by the United Nations called for a different type of peacekeeper from the one that served during the Cold War period. The UN had no shortage of volunteers from Asia and Africa for static ground holding troops. What they actually required, especially from Europe, were highly mobile forces with the expeditionary capacity and capabilities to deploy rapidly and efficiently and self-sustain in theatre to establish missions into which garrison troops could later deploy.

\(^{11}\) Minister of Defence Alan Shatter quoted in The Journal.ie 21 March 2013
The Europeanization of Irish foreign policy which is discussed later in this dissertation, resulted in Ireland committing resources to the EU ‘Rapid Reaction Force’, the EU Battle-groups, and the EUFOR Chad/CAR bridging mission. The concept of EU peacekeeping based on the Petersberg principle, called for highly-equipped expeditionary troops capable of deploying rapidly and sustaining themselves in theatre for a defined period. There is no role envisioned for garrison, static troops in the EU peacekeeping doctrine, and consequently participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) institutions has had a profound effect on the doctrine, training, and equipping of the Irish Defence forces. The joining of NATO’s PfP by Ireland in 1999 had a significant influence in the transformation of the Irish army and ensuring it acquired the capacity for inter-operability with other NATO forces.

As the previous review of the key official documentation that has informed Irish peacekeeping doctrine demonstrates, there is an abundance of textual material that lends itself to tracing the impact of global changes in doctrine on national practice. Appendix 2.2 both lists and categorises the key documentation. Chapter 4, which focuses on Irish peacekeeping policy will track the impact of doctrinal change on Irish policy in order to assess the degree to which Irish policy has become organised around a more complicated “peace enforcement” role, as well as the extent to which tensions continue to affect Irish peacekeeping’s doctrinal formulation, pulling it between the ambitious tasks envisaged in the Brahimi report and the more restricted concepts of peacekeeping which align with traditional Irish foreign policy preoccupations arising from historic commitments to military neutrality. Political debates on the Dáil that have accompanied Irish engagement with NATO and the European Union are especially significant in respect of Security Sector Reform.

When discussing doctrinal change in this thesis care has been to refer to the documents themselves rather than the summaries that are supplied in analytical overviews. Arising from the research questions that this thesis addresses, a key concern will be the way in which the general strategic imperatives of peacekeeping and peace enforcement have been understood and interpreted in a particular national setting. This thesis will therefore pay considerable attention to Irish policy responses to international doctrinal developments to ascertain the extent of a match between international conventions and national policy.
A second interpretive issue may arise in any reading of this documentation. Fully understanding the content of statements contained in, for example, documents such as the Brahimi Report or the Irish Government’s White Paper, arguably requires professional expertise. The tactical implications of certain kinds of strategic mandate are not always clear to the lay reader. For this reason, in discussions of the case studies in particular, plenty of contextual operational detail on, for example, the organisational basis of force deployment and the ways in which soldiers are equipped is provided. Both of these information resources represent key evidence of the impact of doctrinal change on the ground.

In addition to engaging with reflections of global doctrines in the Irish documentation that directly addresses broad strategic concerns, in tracking the impact of doctrinal developments on Irish peacekeeping practice, a key source will be the internal operational textual materials used in different peacekeeping missions which my professional experience as a serving officer has allowed me access. Thus, for example, this thesis will draw upon the training circulars and country briefings issued to Irish units while preparing for missions, and here again, will be questioning the nature and character of the roles and different kinds of deployment which such documentation envisages. As a consequence of my command role in the Irish contingent in the NATO Kosovo force, I have been able to avail of an especially rich range of such materials with respect to that mission. More recently, I have been able to acquire the circulars and briefings used in training officers in preparation for their deployments in Chad and Lebanon. A final internal record which has been of great utility are the unpublished histories of overseas units which are archived at the Military Archives in Cathal Brugha Barracks in Rathmines, Dublin.

As noted in the literature review in Chapter One, there is a substantial body of autobiographical accounts published by Irish peacekeepers, though by and large, most of these focus on pre-1990 missions, with an emphasis on Congo and the Lebanon. Martin Malone’s Lebanon Diaries and Valerie O’Brien’s In the Shadow of Men yield more recent perspectives on Irish involvement in the Lebanon missions. With this in mind, the thesis will focus on an exploration of rank and file perceptions and understandings of operational procedures, rules of engagement, and the extent to which they were able to adhere to these in their day-to-day activities. Rank and file perceptions of Kosovo are further revealed in Michael Whelan’s Recollections: an Oral History, an interview archive lodged in the Irish
2.7 My own service record as a source

In drawing upon my own service record I need to address systematically my status as a source of evidence. Here I will outline the extent of my engagement in Lebanon, Kosovo and Ivory Coast, describe what I did there and the scope of my responsibilities, and the degree of operational discretion I enjoyed. I will indicate the extent to which my memories will be the key source for different sections of the thesis. As I will be drawing upon the experience of a “participant observer”, a concept which will be further explained, and given the normal methodological issues associated with participant observation, the risks and drawbacks in drawing upon my own memories must be addressed. What therefore follows is a narrative of my service record in peacekeeping operations arranged chronologically in geographical segments:

I served in the Irish army for thirty-nine years during which time I was deployed to eight overseas missions. In 1980 I went on my first overseas trip commanding the weapons platoon of C Company 47 Irish Battalion in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The Irish battalion was deployed in approximately a dozen villages in South Lebanon and we were billeted in local houses. I was a platoon commander of some thirty Irish peacekeepers responsible for one of these villages. Throughout the tour we were harassed by an Israeli-backed militia which UNIFIL called the De Facto Forces (DFF). They subjected us to frequent heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. Occasionally, we clashed with PLO elements when we prevented them from infiltrating through our lines to attack the DFF and Israeli Defence Force (IDF) positions. In 1980 there was no peace to keep as the PLO had no intention of curbing its attacks on Israel and the DFF and Israeli’s responded aggressively to every assault from the PLO. The local Lebanese civilians and UNIFIL were caught in the crossfire and at that time we began to detect the emergence of Lebanese militia in the Shia Muslim community in response to the violence being visited upon them. UNIFIL had been set up by the Security Council in 1978 but it was under-resourced and was devoid of political support. However, the peacekeepers on the ground did the best they could under the circumstances. In addition to patrolling, observing and manning checkpoints, we also
negotiated ceasefires for farmers to tend their crops at planting and harvesting times. We taught English in the local schools, provided medical care, financed an orphanage, assisted the civilians in fighting gorse fires, and couriered exam papers from Beirut to the schools in our area for the Lebanese Department of Education. In the absence of Lebanese security institutions, UNIFIL was the only institution to whom the citizens of South Lebanon could turn for assistance.

In 1987, I returned to Lebanon, this time as a staff officer in the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura near the Israeli border. By this stage the PLO were gone, expelled following the Israeli invasion in 1982. However, the Lebanese Shia Muslim militias, Amal, and the much more active Iranian backed Hezbollah, were consistently increasing the tempo of their attacks on DFF and IDF positions in South Lebanon.

In 1992 I embarked on a two year observer mission with the UN Truce Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO) Its HQ is in Jerusalem and its unarmed personnel, called UN military observers (UNMO’s), are deployed on both sides of the Israeli borders with its Arab neighbours. My first posting in April 1991 was to Observer Group Beirut (OGB). In my time there the civil war had just been brought to an end by the Syrians but the situation was tense and occasionally violent. Meanwhile, eleven western hostages were being held by Shia militia groups in the southern suburbs. Several attempts to secure their release had been attempted over the years but had failed. In 1991 an initiative undertaken by the UN Secretary General Peres de Cuellar proved to be successful. His personal representative, the Italian, Giandomenico Picco, approached Beirut via Teheran and Damascus. Shunning the publicity of his predecessor, he was ultimately successful in securing the release of all the western hostages. In my capacity as the Senior Liaison Officer in OGB I liaised with the Lebanese and Syrian army, Christian and Muslim militias, and the Iranian embassy on his behalf. I drove him through the ruins of Beirut to many meetings with different groups and accompanied him on his trips from Beirut to the UN post on the Israeli/Lebanese border at Rosh Hanikra for meetings with Israeli officials.

In January 1992 I was transferred to Observer Group Egypt (OGE) which has its HQ in Cairo. OGE was tasked with manning six observation posts (OP’s) in the Sinai desert and patrols the Sinai to ensure compliance with the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. UNTSO has a tradition of being used by the UN to set up new missions. In June 1992
I volunteered from OGE to help set up the new UN mission in Sarajevo. The civil war was just beginning there and no serious attempt had yet been made by the international community to end it. The OSCE tried and failed. The EU took over but only provided a monitoring mission (EUMM) which no deterrence capacity, and there was little political will in the EU to provide one. The EUMM mission to Sarajevo was short lived and hurriedly departed the city following threats from the Bosnian-Serbs. The UN Security Council is tortuously slow in responding to military emergencies. It had deployed a peacekeeping force in Croatia called the UN protection force (UNPROFOR) which for political reasons had its HQ sited in Sarajevo, capital of the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Therefore this UNPROFOR HQ found itself in the middle of a newly emerging civil war. The UNPROFOR HQ moved temporarily to Belgrade and a handful of UN personnel remained to set up UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo. They were protected by a few dozen French troops. Into this fledgling mission I arrived in a party of sixty unarmed UNMO’s. I was appointed the Deputy Operations Officer because of my previous peacekeeping experience and I was a native English speaker. Meanwhile, the EU, the US and the UN Security Council failed to agree on any initiative to stop the emerging civil war. The UNHCR responded to the humanitarian disaster, all commerce had ceased, and with no transport moving, no food, no medicine, while the infrastructure was being destroyed in the shelling. The plan was to airlift humanitarian supplies into Sarajevo airport for UNHCR to distribute initially throughout Sarajevo and later throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo was tasked to secure and run the airport and escort the food convoys throughout the city. In addition, we organised temporary ceasefires to get technicians into areas to repair utilities, extract dead and wounded from the streets, and bury the dead, but sometimes snipers would ignore the ceasefires and ambulance men, utility workers, and mourners at gravesides were shot at, killed and wounded. The level of hatred between the communities grew daily and it became increasingly difficult to negotiate agreements to allow UNPROFOR and our colleagues in UNHCR to do the humanitarian work. When I left Sarajevo, UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo’s mission was well underway with thousands of peacekeepers from Egypt, the Ukraine, Canada and France running the airport and escorting humanitarian convoys, but unknown to me, as I returned to Cairo in August 1992, the killing had just begun.

In January 1993 I was posted to Observer Group Golan in Tiberius, Israel (OGG-T) where I served as an UNMO on the Golan Heights between the Israeli and Syrian armies.
In 1998, I returned to Lebanon as the company commander of C Company of 83 Irish Battalion, this time in charge of 150 peacekeepers. By now Irish Batt had left the rented houses in the villages and was deployed in fortified position on the outskirts of the villages. C Company occupied six of these posts. The PLO was gone but the violence continued as Hezbollah launched and maintained a sustained campaign of assaults against IDF and DFF positions in south Lebanon. In 1998 the Israeli’s had declared their intention to withdraw behind the internationally recognised border but their delay in doing so had the adverse effect of invigorating Hezbollah and spurring it to greater action.

From November 2001 until November 2002 I was seconded to the OSCE where I served in a civilian capacity as the Chief of Administration and Finance to the OSCE mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY). The work of the OMiFRY was to assist the host government in post-conflict transformation. I lived and worked in Belgrade but I travelled extensively throughout Serbia and Montenegro during the course of my duties. My job as Chief of Administration and Finance was to manage the administrative and logistical support for the activities of the mission to supervise the spending of the €20 million budget and to draft the budget proposal for the following year.

In May 2003 I was posted to a new UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire. The background to the civil war, the international peace initiatives, the activities of the UN mission (MINUCI) and the contribution made by the Irish members of the mission are dealt with in detail in the Chapter 6 case study of Cote d’Ivoire.

In 2007 I was the Commanding Officer of the Irish Contingent in Kosovo Force (KFOR) the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) peace-enforcement mission in Kosovo. This was my first experience of working in a Chapter 7 peace-enforcing mission. The background to the conflict in Kosovo which led to the NATO deployment, the NATO deployment and the activities of the Irish contingent in KFOR are dealt with in detail in the Chapter 7 Kosovo case study. In addition, this case study compares and contrasts my experiences of the difference between Chapter 6 UN peacekeeping and Chapter 7 NATO peace-enforcement for Irish peacekeepers.

My last deployment overseas was back again to UNIFIL where I began thirty years earlier. This time I was Chief of the Coordination and Planning Cell in the Office of Political and
Civil Affairs and I was stationed in UNIFIL’s Beirut office. The Irish Defence Forces have been active participants in UNIFIL since 1987. The background to the deployment of UNIFIL, the activities of UNIFIL from 1978 until 2006 operating under UN Resolution 425 and since 2006 under the more robust mandate 1701 is dealt with in detail in the Chapter 5 Lebanon case study, and the modus operandi of the Irish peacekeepers operating under both mandates is compared and contrasted.

As is evident from the above resume, I served in the Lebanon at various intervals through all of the key phases of operational development and can therefore speak about the Irish peacekeeping experience from first-hand experience that stretches over three decades and in which I held positions at different levels of seniority, from platoon commander to senior staff. With respect to Kosovo, as can be seen I was deeply implicated in the planning of the deployment at a mature stage of the operation. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire I was the senior Irish officer at the inception of the MINUCI mission. Of the four case studies critiqued here, Chad is the only operation with which I had no direct involvement.

In certain respects therefore, through relying on personal knowledge, there are parallels methodologically between my approach in this thesis and the situation of a researcher acting as a ‘participant observer’.

2.8 Participant Observation.

Participant observation is suitable for research on processes into complex fields of activity with numerous situations and persons, or as a method of exploration to discover relevant variables of the behaviour of actors or in their relation to an organisation.12

I am a former army officer and as such I have extensive first-hand experience of peacekeeping. I served in three of the missions discussed in the Case Studies and not only had access to primary source material but much of the study was conducted by means of participant observation. In the case of the EU Mission to Chad I did not personally participate, but instead interviewed Irish army officers who were responsible for the

intelligence, operational, administrative and logistical planning in DFHQ Dublin, staff officers who held influential positions in the operational HQ in Paris, and commanders and staff officers who served on the ground in Chad.

As noted by Friedrichs and Ludtke, “participant observation is to be understood primarily as a method for discovering the real processes of interaction in their natural setting.” The term refers to the researcher taking a role in the social situation under observation. There are various configurations of ‘participant observation’ such as overt and covert forms, both of which have advantages and disadvantages. The fact that I was a participant in three of Case Study missions and was a career army officer gave me unique access to primary source material and access to key actors in the mission areas. It must be remembered however, that unlike an academic participant observer, at the time of most of my operational experience, I was not consciously undertaking research. Even so, given the positions I held, many of the maxims applying to participant observation are valid, for example: “The better the strategic position the observer’s role…the easier it is to secure relevant information.”

What I bring to the research then, is the actor’s perception, understanding and interpretation of the mission in the case studies. This access is “a form of narrative inquiry and stories; in house tales that would not be told to an outsider in the belief that they simply wouldn’t understand as they hadn’t shared the experience.”

In my case, the key methodological challenges arise in analysing the data and presenting the results. As a latter day researcher I am required to move away from my emotional and moral engagements. As a serving officer I was keenly aware that my level of objectivity could be questioned; indeed, I could be accused of not so much ‘going native’ as ‘being native’. But this does not distinguish me from many other participant observers as one of the basic problems in participant observation is subjectivity: “Perception is selective. We only believe what we see; unfortunately we only see what we want to believe.”

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2.9 Interviews with other peacekeepers, affected civilians and informed observers

Being conscious of the dangers of selective perception I have done my utmost to remain objective in my observations. I have discussed my observations with civilians in conflict areas, with colleagues from Ireland, NATO countries, former Warsaw-Pact countries, other European neutrals and non-aligned movement states. I have also discussed my observations with diplomats and members of NGO’s I met in conflict areas and academics. Also, through my participation in some of the latter Case Study missions I was conscious of that in addition to having to perform the tasks which were assigned to me in the course of my duties, I had developed an academic interest in what the mission was striving to achieve, which I believe gave me an additional appreciation of the missions from both the tactical and strategic perspectives.

These considerations have helped to guide my choice of interview participants.

Firstly, and most obviously, I have interviewed Irish military colleagues with direct experience of the operations under analysis in this thesis. For each of the case studies I have made a point of speaking to Irish soldiers who have operated at command level in the field. My respondents here are people with field experiences dating from 1980 to 2010, thereby enabling me to draw upon first hand perceptions across the period under review. In each case I have interviewed several serving Irish officers, speaking to them separately and confidentially. Some of the Irish military personnel I interviewed were selected precisely because their experience and career paths differed from mine. This ensures they bring a different perspective to the issues I dealt with and help give additional credibility to my analysis. They include:

- **Col Brian O’Keeffe**- served two tours of duty in Lebanon and as General Secretary of the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers for twenty-four years he brings a unique insight into the trials and tribulations of the reform of the Irish defence forces.
- **Col Con McNamara**- deputy chief of operations in the EUFOR Operational HQ in Paris.
Col Paddy Moran - commanding officer of the first Irish peace-enforcement battalion which deployed to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and as such was the first Irish commander in a UN peace-enforcement mission. He spoke of his experiences and contrasted the Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 missions.

Comdt Garry McKnown - deputy commander of the first Irish contingent to deploy to Chad and also served in UNMIL and UNIFIL.

Col Paddy McDaniel - commander of the first Irish battalion to deploy in EUFOR Chad/CAR.

Lt Gen Pat Nash - operational commander of the EU peace-enforcement mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR). This is the highest command ever held by a serving Irish army officer in an international peacekeeping mission. Prior to that he had extensive service as a general in the Irish defence forces serving as GOC 1 Southern Brigade and as Deputy Chief of Staff Operations in DFHQ Dublin.

Sergeant Major Jimmy Kerrigan - served in the army for forty-two years. In addition to his service in the 1st Infantry Battalion (An Chead Chath) in Galway, he served in border units during the 1970’s and 1980’s. He had extensive overseas service serving two tours in Cyprus, four in Lebanon and also in Iran, Liberia, East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia.

Working with non-Irish officers, both neutrals and NATO members, in addition to conversations I had with Soviet and Chinese officers in earlier missions, has provided further insight into the diverse interpretations of what peacekeeping was and how it should be conducted. A key influence in this respect was:

General Lew MacKenzie from Canada with whom I served in Sarajevo. The leadership skills he portrayed in setting up the UN mission in Sarajevo were immense. At that early stage of the civil war he realised that a peacekeeping mission was the wrong option and he was years ahead of his time in calling for a peace-enforcement mission to impose a cessation of hostilities.

The US, and Soviet officers I served with in UNTSO enlightened me and brought into stark contrast the difference in ethos and doctrine between the armies of super-powers and the armies of neutral countries.
Thirdly, I have been influenced by a smaller group of civilians who very often have quite different understandings of the purpose and functions of peacekeeping operations. The military can be narrowly focused on How, Who, What, Where and When, whereas the civilians tend to focus on Why. In my experience they place much more emphasis on the political process striving to achieve consensus and take the long-term view on post-conflict nation building. Military officers rotate frequently, rarely spend much time in one place, and consequently tend to favour short term objectives, with end-dates and exit strategies, whereas, civilians are usually in-situ for the long haul and see peacekeepers as being there to provide a safe and secure environment for peace-builders to operate in.

- **Milos Struger**, the Political Officer in UNIFIL taught me the importance of political solutions for the success of peace operations.
- **Giandomenico Pico**, the UN hostage negotiator in Beirut 1991, epitomised the importance of diplomatic and negotiation skills in resolving seemingly intractable problems.
- **Richard Chambers**, a barrister who served in the OSCE mission in Yugoslavia taught me how to organise and run elections in a post conflict society. His negotiation skills breached hurdles that seemed insurmountable and he convinced enemies who had never spoken to or trusted each other, to sit down together, forge solutions and implement them.

In conducting these interviews and conversations a number of methodological considerations may affect the status of the testimony they contain as evidence. In the case of military sources my own standing as a colleague may have affected a respondent’s willingness to be interviewed. On the other hand, knowing me as a colleague probably encouraged them to speak frankly. I can also rely on my own knowledge and expertise in evaluating their testimony with respect to accuracy and representativeness.

The quality of testimony as evidence has generated an enormous amount of academic, medical and legal scholarship and discussion. In law, testimony is a form of evidence obtained from a witness who makes a solemn statement or declaration of fact. However, there are many qualifications on the value of evidence. For example, a vested interest casts the
veracity of testimony into serious doubt. In philosophy, a testimony is known as statements that are based on personal experience or personal knowledge.

My interviewees were chosen in the main because of their experience in the field of peacekeeping. The Irish military contributors were chosen because in many instances their career paths differed from mine. I was keen to incorporate their views on the modernisation of the Irish defence forces and their own peacekeeping experience, especially regarding the case study of Chad in Chapter 8, as I had never served on an EU peacekeeping mission there, and their testimony enabled me to compare and contrast the UN, EU and PfP missions. Irish military officers are not a homogeneous group. Their career paths vary, they serve in different corps, and consequently their training and experiences give them different perspectives on many issues. Some officers find their career paths are in the military college, some serve as staff officers in administrative appointments, whereas others serve in operational and logistical units. For this reason I was able to elicit a broad range of differing opinions on several issues amongst the Irish officers I interviewed.

The non-Irish military contributors opened my eyes to perspectives on peacekeeping which diverge from the mainstream Irish perspective. The views of American, French and British officers I spoke to about peacekeeping were very much rooted in the Realist/Conservative paradigm of International Relations Theory, whereas I found that the views of the officers from neutral countries including Ireland tended to be rooted in the Liberal/Idealist paradigm. As I explain in Chapter 3, International Peacekeeping, and in the case studies, the peacekeeping position adopted by countries with military alliances tends to differ from that of neutral countries. The civilian interviewees also brought an enhanced perspective on peacekeeping, as most adhered to a broader perspective of peace-building of which peacekeeping was but a constituent part. In fact, many civilian members of NGO’s and Irish Aid with whom I spoke were extremely suspicious of military peacekeepers and particularly aggrieved by what they saw as the encroachment of CIMIC into the area of humanitarian aid. This concern is explored in Chapter 3, International Peacekeeping, and across the case studies. Different contributors brought their own experiences, views and prejudices to the discussion and I combined them with my own experiences and research into the secondary literature to produce this work.
I have compiled in the Sources and bibliography section a list of my respondents in each of the operational theatres and they comprise of a mixture of staff officers and field commanders. In addition, I had daily contact throughout those various missions with embassy staff, local government politicians, public servants, such as teachers, police officers and administrators, members of the public, members of NGO’s, government soldiers, rebels and refugees. I always endeavoured to make contact with personnel outside the security environment and to meet local people in their community. I joined rowing clubs and made rowing friends in Cairo, Tiberius and Belgrade. I joined running clubs in Abidjan, Belgrade and Beirut and in training and socialising with the members of these clubs I gained an appreciation of life in their communities, their fears, apprehensions and ambitions.

In relation to EUFOR Chad/CAR in which I was not a participant, I have rigorously reviewed the secondary literature. Most helpfully, as a staff officer in DFHQ, Dublin, I had access to EUFOR published and non-published reports on the mission, Irish Defence Forces briefs for departing troops and monthly reports from the mission area. In addition, I knew and spoke to several of the officers who served in the Operational HQ in Paris, EUFOR HQ in Chad and the Irish contingent.

2.10 Ethical Considerations

The serving and retired officers listed above were informed that the interview conformed with the University of Limerick ethical guidance on interviews and that the research study has received Ethics Approval from the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (Approval number: 2014_02_08_AHSS). They were also informed that if they had any concerns about this study and wished to contact an independent authority, they were free to contact:

Chairperson Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, AHSS Faculty Office, University of Limerick

Each interviewee was contacted by the author by phone and was sent an Information Letter (Appendix 1.1) which explained the nature of the study and outlined the form of the interviews and the interviewee’s rights. They were also given a Consent Form (Appendix 1.2)
which each signed. Each interviewee was informed that should the thesis directly quote from their interview they would be notified to confirm consent prior to the quotation being attributed.

2.11 The Case Study Method

All case study research starts from the same compelling feature: an in-depth understanding of a single or small number of “cases” set in their real world context.¹⁷

The case study method I chose was the holistic case of international peacekeeping conducted by the Irish Defence Forces. I have used four embedded sub-cases of peacekeeping operations (PKO’s) in which members of the Irish Defence Forces have participated.

The Irish defence forces first involvement in international peacekeeping was in 1958 when they sent UN military observers to Beirut. In 1960 an Irish peacekeeping contingent was sent to the Congo. Since then Irish peacekeeping can be divide into two groups; observer missions in which officers serve, and peacekeeping missions in which contingents of troops are deployed. Irish officers have served in 36 observer missions which are listed in Appendix 2.3. In addition to the observer missions, Irish officers and NCO’s have served on secondment to the OSCE since the mid 1990’s, and in UN HQ in New York, in NATO HQ in Mons, Belgium, and in EU HQ in Brussels. They also serve in Sweden on the staff of the Nordic Battle Group and Irish troops deploy to Sweden for Battle Group training exercises. Since 1960 Ireland has sent troop contingents to 11 peacekeeping missions which are listed in Appendix 2.4. Of these, six receive detailed attention in this thesis.

Of the four PKO’s I have chosen as case studies, the MINUCI mission in Cote d’Ivoire represents one of the many Observer Missions Irish officers have served in since 1958. In addition, reference is made to the work of Irish officers in UNTSO in the Middle East, UNPROFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina, and OMiFRY in Serbia and Montenegro. The UNIFIL mission in Lebanon represents a traditional UN peacekeeping mission. The KFOR mission in Kosovo was chosen to represent a NATO peace-enforcement mission and EUFOR Chad/CAR mission to represent an EU peace-enforcement mission. These missions were

chosen in order to compare and contrast the operation of Irish defence force peacekeepers in diverse PKO’s.

The ‘Case Study’ approach can be particularly appropriate for individual researchers because it provides an opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be studied in some depth. All organisations and individuals have their common and their unique features. Case study researchers aim to identify such features, to identify or attempt to identify the various interactive processes at work, to show how they affect the implementation of systems and influence the way an organisation functions. These processes may remain hidden in a large-scale survey but could be crucial to the success or failure of systems or organisations.\(^{18}\)

I decided an in-depth studies of particular operations would be the optimum way to provide insight into the way in which the Irish Defence Forces conduct and experience peacekeeping missions. But this thesis embodies case study work in the different sense that the totality of Irish experience embodies a case study of post war peacekeeping in general. My hope is that as well as addressing and answering the research questions identified in the introductory chapter this thesis will also make a more generally useful contribution. By its conclusion it should add insights that can be drawn from the Irish case that might add to our general understanding of why countries undertake peacekeeping.

However, a final methodological consideration arises from the use of the case study approach in this respect. In brief, it concerns the extent to which a focus on the Irish case can yield insights that have a generalisable applicability. This thesis makes a strong case that it can.

In summary, the Irish government committed troops to a UN peacekeeping mission in 1960 and Irish troops have served continuously in UN peacekeeping missions since then. From the 1960’s until the late 1980’s, Ireland, along with other European neutrals and middle power states such as Canada and Norway, provided a unique and invaluable service to the United Nations which would have otherwise been ineffectual due to the restraints of Cold-War politics. Through the peacekeeping turmoil of the 1990’s the Irish government maintained its commitment to the extremely problematic UNIFIL mission in Lebanon and in consequence, Irish peacekeeping troops were not available for deployment in Former Yugoslavia or other such missions. In response to the tragedies in Rwanda and Srebrenica, where UN

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peacekeepers failed to stop massacres of civilians, allegedly because they were not sufficiently vigorous, the UN embarked upon a series of reviews which consistently referred to the necessity of ‘robust’ peacekeeping forces. However, this concept of robust peacekeeping has sparked an intensive debate within the UN reflecting strong divergences of opinion on the meaning and implications of the concept. For the EU states and other Western states such as Canada, robustness has been a response to a lack of effectiveness of peace operations and aims to enable peacekeepers to properly protect themselves and to have the freedom of manoeuvre to implement a mandate. In the heat of debate however, an insistence of robust peacekeeping by Western states has been termed a new instrument of Western domination, bordering on neo-colonialism. Another significant bone of contention for NAM states is the fact that while Western states are the main financial contributors to the peacekeeping budget, they have been largely absent in terms of troop contributions since the mid 1990’s. So it seems that while Western states are strong on rhetoric about robust UN peacekeeping they are demonstrably weak on implementation.

Ireland is one notable exception. This thesis and the evidence from the case studies will show that the view of the Irish diplomatic delegation to the UN would be very much in line with mainstream EU thinking. However, from a NAM perspective, Ireland has a credibility that other EU states lack in that it is itself a post-colonial country with a history of championing decolonisation, it has steadfastly maintained its strong commitment to UN peacekeeping, and it is in the top ten countries in the world in relation to development aid contribution as a percentage of GDP. In contrast to other EU states since the millennium, Ireland has sent peacekeeping units to the sub-Saharan countries of Eritrea, Liberia and Chad, returned to Lebanon in 2011, and in 2013, when Austria and other countries pulled out of UNDOF because of the dangers to their peacekeepers caused by the Syrian civil war, Ireland shored up UNDOF by deploying a mechanised infantry company constituting the UNDOF rapid reaction force, and thus restoring confidence to the remaining TCC’s in UNDOF. At the same time Ireland has maintained its credibility amongst Western countries by providing a significant contribution to the NATO PfP force in Kosovo and the EU peacekeeping force in Chad, maintains its commitment to the EU’s Nordic Battle-group, and reconcile all this with the fact that it remains militarily neutral. For these reasons this focus on Irish peacekeeping has a relevant applicability in relation to the general literature on peacekeeping. Furthermore, the choice of case studies has been selected in order to furnish a thorough examination of Irish peacekeeping in a variety of UN and Regional Organisation contexts.
2.12 Conclusion.

In summary then, this research is directed at exploring the impact of international doctrinal developments in Irish peacekeeping policy and practice. It will first engage with a substantial documentary base in order to trace the impact of international strategic re-conceptions on official Irish views regarding the purpose and methods of Irish deployments in this arena. This material also yields insights into the tensions arising from confliction between contemporary conceptions of peacekeeping with Irish military traditions, as well as historic predispositions in Irish foreign policy, particularly in the context of neutrality. Training manuals produced for specific missions permit further insights into how general strategic approaches are interpreted operationally. My own professional experience and deployment in three of the four countries that supply the case studies reviewed in this thesis provide a detailed set of recollections of the experience of peacekeeping in different arenas at different times and supply a rich seam of experiential evidence that may illuminate the ways in which peacekeeping practices within the Irish defence forces have either changed or maintain continuities with earlier approaches. The risk that my own experience and the perceptions which arise from it may be either atypical or distorted by bias or faulty memory is tempered by the objective diligence with which the interviews with colleagues who have served in each of the theatres under review and who have worked at different levels were conducted. Their testimony is of paramount importance in establishing the extent to which doctrinal shifts have impacted upon the kinds of tactical decision-making on the day-to-day basis that officers undertake in the field.
Chapter 3: International Peacekeeping

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to explain the meaning of peacekeeping, the ways in which it evolved, and the doctrines of peacekeeping before, during, and after the Cold War. The chapter begins with a brief history of international peacekeeping, tracing it from the early ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions which interposed lightly armed neutral troops between international armies through to peace enforcement in intra-state conflicts. It goes on to chart the slow and contentious evolution of peacekeeping operations as the international community attempted to respond to the humanitarian outrages of the 1990’s. It then discusses the concept and role of ‘Regional Organisations’ in peacekeeping operations. This chapter further examines many of the internal aspects of peacekeeping, including the role of civilian police and gender issues in peacekeeping, and the evolution of civilian-military cooperation in peacekeeping operations. I also review my own experiences as a United Nations Military Observer in Sarajevo in 1992 and Chief of Administration and Finance in the OSCE peace-building mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY) in 2001-2002.

3.2 The Evolution of Peacekeeping

The United Nations was established as the successor to the League of Nations after World War II. At that time, the victorious wartime allies, USA, Soviet Union, UK and France saw themselves as the future policemen of the international order. China was also included and, in keeping with the precedents set in the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations, these five ‘great powers’ were given the special status of permanent membership of the Security Council with the right of veto. The purpose of the veto was to ensure greater power participation, as the absence of the United States of America was seen as the single greatest fault-line in the League of Nations:

For all its problems, this combination of special rights and responsibilities, and the guarantee that the UN could never act against the interests of the great powers,
ensured their continued participation in the new organisation and helped it survive the global chill of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{19}

The architects of the Charter of the United Nations had envisioned the UN being involved in collective security which would be enforced by a UN standing army. This was written into Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter and The United States was initially very enthusiastic about the concept of a standing army and pledged considerable resources to it. However, the Soviet Union was suspicious of US intentions and the UN standing army never materialised.

In response to the failure of collective security to materialise, the UN had to develop alternative ways to contribute to international peace and security. Thus, in 1947, the UN deployed a monitoring mission on the Yugoslav-Greece border, and observers were deployed in Kashmir and Palestine in 1948.

The primary aims of the UN are set out at the beginning of its Charter, Article 1(1). This states that one of the organisation’s central purposes is ‘to maintain international peace and security, and to that end take collective effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace’. However, the Charter also inherits certain ambiguities in terms of the priority it affords to state sovereignty and human rights. On the one hand, the preamble and Article 1(3) states that one of the purposes of the UN is to encourage respect for human rights but Article 2(7) is frequently cited as precluding the UN from involvement in the internal affairs of its members.

Whilst there is a universal preference in the international community for peacekeeping as an alternative to war, there is far less consensus about the manner in which such peace operations should be implemented in global politics. There are two main schools of thought. Firstly adherence to the Westphalian concept of sovereign autonomy and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and therefore believe that peace operations should be confined to assisting in the resolution of disputes between states. Secondly, adherence to the post-Westphalian concept which contends that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens against genocide, war-crimes and ethnic cleansing, and that failure to do so may result in the international community intervening to impose peace and security with a view to assisting in establishing political institutional, social and economic reconstruction within these states. This fault line persists in the UN to this day with liberal democratic states

favouring the Post-Westphalian interpretation whilst more conservative states and autocratic states tend to favour the Westphalian approach.

The architects of the United Nations Charter also originally intended that a system of collective security would protect succeeding generations from the scourge of war, whilst the Cold War is cited as being responsible for preventing the collective security mechanisms envisioned by the UN Charter from being implemented. The concept of collective security is very desirable, especially after the horrors of a great war when there is an understandable, almost euphoric fervour to place collective security high on the international agenda, but in practice, as Stanley Baldwin observed in 1936:

There is usually no country except the aggressor country which is ready for war and if collective action is to be a reality it implies that not only is every country to be ready for war but must be ready to go to war at once.²⁰

This of course is politically and economically impossible. The majority of stable, peaceful countries allocates between 1% to 2% of their GNP to military spending, whereas Israel, for example, which maintains a high level of military vigilance, allocates 7.6% of its GNP²¹. The cost of effective collective action is simply a price which countries at peace are not prepared to pay. In response to this security vacuum the UN developed alternative ways of contributing to international peace and security and almost by accident, the concept of peacekeeping was born. The United Nation’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) simply identified Peacekeeping as just one of five ‘peace and security activities’:

1. Conflict Prevention including structural and diplomatic measures to prevent disputes from developing into violent conflict
2. Peace-making the use of diplomatic measures to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement
3. Peacekeeping the use of military and other measures to enforce the will of the Security Council
4. Peace-enforcing the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force

²⁰ British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, after Italian invasion of Ethiopia, in Time Magazine Nov 24 1936.
²¹ CIA The World Factbook
5. Peace-building ‘a range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict (DPKO2007: 10-11)

Initially peacekeeping was a purely military affair and was conducted within the Chapter VI framework of the UN Charter which required the consent of the belligerent parties. UN peacekeeping operations are often referred to as ‘Chapter VI operations’. However, where consent of the belligerents is not forthcoming and the Security Council deemsthat a threat to or a breach of international peace and security has occurred Chapter VII is invoked. This enables the Security Council to order enforcement measures against a state or entities within a state. These operations are usually referred to as ‘Chapter VII operations’.

3.3 Traditional Peacekeeping: 1st Generation - Chapter VI

The conceptual roots of Traditional Peacekeeping lie in the Cold War and the UN’s attempt to develop a role for itself in the pursuit of international peace and security. The post-war euphoria and consensus which facilitated the founding of the United Nations soon faltered as the United States of America and the Soviet Union distanced themselves ever further from each other. This so-called ‘Iron Curtain’ divided the European continent into the liberal, democratic west and the autocratic, communist east. The initial UN forays into peacekeeping were military observer missions on the Yugoslavia-Greece border in 1947 and in Kashmir and Palestine in 1948. The first troop deployment was in Egypt in 1956, into what became known as the Suez Crisis. This mission was called the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The Suez Crisis was the last military adventure of the Colonial Era. The withdrawal of funding by the USA and the UK from the Aswan Dam project propelled the Egyptian President Nasser into nationalising the Suez Canal. This enraged Britain and France who sought to regain the canal through force in an ill-conceived plan for Israel to invade Egypt, and for France and Britain to issue an edict for Israel and Egypt to pull back 10 miles from the canal or face the consequences. Israel duly invaded and the UK and France issued their ultimatum and began bombing Egyptian military targets. Almost immediately Anglo-French paratroopers landed and seized the Canal Zone. However, this subterfuge was so flimsy that it was transparent. The USA’s President Eisenhower was furious and he demanded an immediate withdrawal of the invaders. The crisis gifted an opportunity for the United Nations to develop a role for itself in the pursuit of international peace and security. The Security
Council was deadlocked by the UK and France so the USA and Soviets bypassed it and referred the issue to the General Assembly. The Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson (later to become Prime Minister) took the initiative which eventually led to the establishment of what became known as UNEF:

The modus operandi of Peacekeeping operations now commonplace, was then (Suez Crisis 1956) a first experiment, a complete innovation. We were asking soldiers, against all tradition and training, to take part in non-violent operation in a critical situation, operations, moreover, which were not under the control of their own governments. The new peacekeeping operations touched on the most delicate issues of military psychology, national sovereignty, international politics, and national and international law. 22

As the UN’s first military force UNEF represented a significant development in the organisations approach to peacekeeping. In fact, the mission proved so successful that it became a template for what was to become known as Traditional Peacekeeping Missions. UNEF quickly deployed as an interposition force between the opposing forces, monitored the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, set up observation posts, and patrolled its area of operations.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter is entitled ‘The Pacific Settlement of Disputes’. The provisions of this chapter make absolutely no reference to military operations, but many analysts insist that observation and traditional peacekeeping missions fall under Chapter VI because of broad clauses in Articles 33-38 which refer to action taken through ‘other peaceful means’. The terms ‘first generation’ and ‘traditional peacekeeping’ originated in academic studies of the first UN peacekeeping missions instantiated under the legal framework of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. First generation missions were very much of the Westphalian tradition in that they were concerned with inter-state conflict and the restoration of international peace and security. Peacekeeping troops were not and are not designed, equipped or constituted to restore order or prevent fighting between rival enemies; rather, they are deployed only following a ceasefire agreement by the protagonists. The basic tenets of Chapter VI peacekeeping missions include consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. Peacekeeping tasks range from observation and fact finding to monitoring compliance with the conditions of ceasefires. Peacekeepers monitor borders, help establish and patrol buffer zones separating opposing forces, and verify the various aspects of demilitarization.

Traditional Peacekeeping is designed to take place in the period between a ceasefire and a political settlement and is intended to cultivate the degree of confidence between belligerents necessary to establish a process of political dialogue. In practice this means non-coercive, consent-based activities which support a peace process or interim ceasefire, and help to prevent the resumption or escalation of violence:

The real strength of Peacekeeping Operations lies not in its capacity to use force, but precisely in not using force and thereby remaining above the conflict and preserving its unique position and prestige. The moment a peacekeeping force starts killing people it becomes a part of the conflict it is supposed to be controlling and therefore a part of the problem. It loses the one quality which distinguishes it from and sets it above, the people its dealing with.23

Chapter VI First Generation or Traditional Peacekeeping missions are authorised to use force only in self-defence. They deploy to interpose between protagonists, forming a buffer between hostile forces, patrolling the deployment area, searching for violations of the ceasefire agreement, preventing dangerous shooting incidents that might escalate hostilities, attempting to resolve conflicts and acting as a conciliator between the hostile parties. They facilitate weapons decommissioning, verify troop withdrawals, maintain law and order, and perform policing tasks such as patrolling the streets and countryside to deter criminal and other hostile activities:

The weapons of peacekeeping are presence, consensus, the defusing of tensions and non-violence. 24

Traditional peacekeeping forces are required to maintain a neutral posture and behaviours commensurate with their neutral composition. Peacekeepers were traditionally drawn from non-aligned or middle power states. Middle power is defined as a state which has the capability to deploy a well-equipped peacekeeping force but which would not be construed as to be powerful enough to constitute a threat to the parties in conflict. This posture is sometimes difficult to maintain, as the following recollection suggests:

UNIFIL’s ‘Col Jean Servon of the French parachute battalion gave us a briefing…Col Servon spoke of “the enemy” in relation to both Maj Haddad and the PLO. After the

23 Ibid pp 178
24 Ibid Pp342
briefing I took him aside and pointed out that our peacekeeping forces had no “enemies” just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients.  

Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’. Unfortunately, history has shown that these operations have not always been ‘pacific’. Over 500 soldiers have been killed in traditional UN peacekeeping missions and 40 in observer missions. Observer missions make up the majority of UN military operations. They consist of no more than a few hundred usually unarmed United Nations Military Observers (UNMO’s). They are very occasionally equipped with side-arms if necessary. In Namibia in 1989, for example, UNMO’s were permitted to carry side-arms as protection against wild animals. UNMO’s are composite groups of commissioned officers recruited from member states, predominantly chosen from ‘neutral’ countries to comprise an equitable geographical balance and to reinforce the appearance of impartiality. The UN Military Observers (UNMO’s) attempt to monitor situations with the consent of the parties concerned and report their findings to the UN. They are usually deployed following a ceasefire agreement in order to provide an impartial international presence to monitor compliance. They can also be deployed within a country to investigate allegations of criminal activity, humanitarian problems, or external interference in domestic politics.

The ‘Golden Age’ of Traditional Peacekeeping (also termed Chapter VI Missions and First Generation Peacekeeping) dated from the first Observer mission in 1947 until the end of the Cold War symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During this period the politics of the Cold War determined which conflicts merited United Nations interventions and the great powers vetoed attempts to involve the UN in conflicts which were perceived as being east-west ideological conflicts. Between 1945 and 1990 a total of 238 vetoes were used by the Security Council where in the following twelve years between 1990 and 2002 only 12 vetoes were exercised.

3.4 Wider Peacekeeping: 2nd Generation - Chapter VI 1/2

During the Cold War the two superpowers the USA and the Soviet Union dominated the political and security landscape of the world. The presence of nuclear weapons and its

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25 Ibid pp 203
26 Bellamy, Alex. J and Williams, Paul. D. Understanding Peacekeeping, Chapter 8. Pps 95
consequential ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ prevented these hegemons from going to war. A bi-polar power impasse existed with each of the hegemons controlling their respective areas of influence. Several proxy wars were allowed to rage and the UN was prevented from intervening by superpower vetoes exercised in the Security Council. Meanwhile, a myriad of local disputes over ethnicity, nationalism, tribalism, religion, and local power politics were suppressed by the superpower hegemons. With the end of the Cold War the hegemons no longer needed to bear the burden of policing these ‘wayward’ areas and previously suppressed disputes emerged. As these local conflicts did not now impinge upon the ‘national interests’ of the hegemons the five permanent members of the Security Council did not exercise their vetoes and the United Nations was finally allowed unfettered access to restoring peace and security to the world. In a new spirit of cooperation the Security Council established larger and more complex peacekeeping missions and the five permanent members began to participate and contribute troops, President Bush (Snr.) spoke of a ‘new world order’. In 1990, the UN had some 10,000 personnel in eight observation and traditional peacekeeping missions. By 1993, it had grown to some 80,000 troops in 18 different missions. 27

However, many of the new missions were intra-state operations which posed a dilemma for the UN which until this time had been involved in what academics classified as Westphalian inter-state peacekeeping operations. The UN was now being asked to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. This marked a new departure, and in many cases there was no peace to keep. In the vacuum created by the withdrawal of superpower intervention, internal strife and civil wars erupted throughout the world. It became increasingly obvious that something had to be done and the international community looked to the UN for solutions. However, this was thenew situation and there were no precedents to guide the international body. On the one hand the UN was being asked to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in violation of Chapter 1 Paragraph 7 of the Charter, and on the other, there were major humanitarian outrages being perpetrated on the innocent civilian populations caught up in the zones of conflict. Civilians were being subjected to famine, ethnic cleansing, genocide and wholesale rape and murder. Ultimately the UN was obliged to intervene to comply with the obligations which are set out in the preamble of the UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

27 In February 2015 there were 123,560 military and civilian personnel working in sixteen peacekeeping missions worldwide. UN Peacekeeping Factsheet 28 February 2015
…to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,\textsuperscript{28}

…recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.\textsuperscript{29}

The UN now embarked upon Post-Westphalian intra-state peacekeeping operations, which course of action became known as ‘Second Generation Peacekeeping’ or ‘Wider Peacekeeping’. These missions were altogether different from their traditional missions. The new missions were far more complex and comprehensive, with the UN attempting a near-simultaneous management of political, societal, economic, humanitarian, electoral, diplomatic, and military initiatives, within troubled states. They were also predominantly intra-state, whereas, traditional peacekeeping was usually inter-state, and in most cases the peacekeepers found that there was no peace for them to keep. Another term for these missions was ‘Chapter VI ½\textsuperscript{30}, a term used to describe the fact that Wider Peacekeeping fell between the two pillars of the Chapter VI pacific resolution of disputes and Chapter VII enforcement measures. However, the use of such a term is arguably nonsensical and dangerous. The unfortunate use of the term ‘Peace’ in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement can lead to assumptions that these activities are compatible, or that one is an extension of the other. Nothing could be further from the truth. The basic the tenets of peacekeeping are consent, impartiality and minimum force. The basic tenet of effective peace-enforcement is overwhelming military power. Both first and second generation peacekeeping operations are firmly rooted in the Chapter VI ethos, operating within the principles of consent, impartiality and minimum force. Second generation peacekeeping is also carried out with the consent of the belligerents, but differs from first generation in that it usually occurs within the context of on-going violence in which the belligerents tend to be undisciplined, ceasefires are frequently ineffective, and armed opposition to the UN is not uncommon.

The second generation missions also brought the peacekeepers into contact with a myriad of NGO organisations following the exponential growth of NGO’s in the 1990’s. Despite being fiercely protective of their independence and resenting any attempt by the peacekeepers to

\textsuperscript{28}Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations
\textsuperscript{29}Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
\textsuperscript{30}Bellamy, Alex. J and Williams, Paul. D. Understanding Peacekeeping, Chapter 8. Pps 193-213
limit their actions, the NGO’s expected the peacekeepers to ensure their freedom of movement and guarantee their security.

The second generation peacekeepers also found that they frequently had to operate in the absence of civil authority and had to deal with large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. They had to assume new responsibilities and perform such tasks as disarming warring parties, organising and supervising elections, operating airports, delivering humanitarian aid, and ensuring freedom of movement for aid agencies and civilians. They were tasked with host country capacity building and enforcing no-fly zones. It soon became apparent that second generation peacekeepers did not have the means to accomplish the desired ends.

Within two months of assuming office in 1992, the new UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, set up the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, appointing Kofi Annan as its head. In June 1992, he published the report *An Agenda for Peace*, in which sought to respond to the new challenges and create a blueprint for future peacekeeping missions to adapt and meet the demand for more complex operations. It recommended strengthening the UN for penetrative deployment, peace-making and peacekeeping, additional training, pre-positioning stocks to permit rapid deployment, It further stated that it was imperative that new mandates for large and more complex operations be supported with the requisite resources. The report was optimistic that the basic principles of UN peacekeeping operations were sound and only needed adaptation, but the new Secretary General sounded the warning that giving the UN more tasks without the logistical resources and political support needed to fulfil them was a recipe for disaster. He noted that a ‘chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this organisation and the financial means entrusted to it’. Between 1988 and 1993, the UN took on twenty new complex operations, more than in its previous forty years combined. The early successes in Central America, Namibia and Cambodia seemed to endorse this policy. However, the expansion of PKO’s without a requisite growth in the UN’s institutional capacity overstretched the organisation. In Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO’s) were despatched without appropriate mandates, information, political support, or adequate troop resources or guidance. These shortcomings were swiftly and cruelly exposed.
3.4.1 Sarajevo: a personal reflection

In April 1992, I was a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) serving in the Sinai Desert. One day, on returning to the HQ in Cairo following a week in an observation post in the desert, I was asked if I would like to volunteer for temporary duty in Sarajevo. Without giving it much thought I agreed. That evening I was told to pack my gear as three of us were departing at 0600 hours. The following morning, I, along with a Soviet Spetsnaz and French Foreign Legionnaire departed for Sarajevo via Jerusalem, Budapest and Belgrade. In total thirty UNMO’s from the United Nations Truce Supervising Organisation (UNTSO) assembled in Jerusalem and departed for Budapest. There we met thirty more UNMO’s from the UN mission in Kuwait. Together we went to Belgrade for three days of briefings and collection of flak jackets, helmets, radios and Peugeot 404 cars and then departed for Sarajevo escorted by the Yugoslavia National Army (JNA).

The journey took about 10 hours and was initially uneventful. But when we crossed a bridge and began to enter the mountainous area of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) we began to witness burnt-out houses, and the further we drove the more numerous the burnt-out ruins became. We began to hear the rumbling of thunder in the distance, although the weather was sunny. As we drove on, we noticed the rumblings were constant and getting louder. As darkness approached our convoy drove into a military barracks on the outskirts of Sarajevo. Our JNA escort left us saying they could go no further. The sound of thunder of course was artillery and now it was continuous and deafening. We made contact with the UN HQ in the city centre on our radios and an UNMO with a New Zealand accent told us to stay put as they were unable to organise a ceasefire to get us into the city. We settled down for the night and slept in our cars. The beautiful new 404s now seemed to us to be very flimsy for what we were about to embark upon. At 0530 our radios came to life and the New Zealander told us he had arranged a 90 minute ceasefire starting at 0700. On the dot of 0700 a silence descended and our convoy headed for the city. The journey, although only a short distance as the crow flies was torturous, as we wound our way through laneways, down the runway of the airport and across fields in order to avoid roadblocks and minefields. We had just entered the UN HQ, a high rise office block originally owned by the Yugoslav Telephone Company (PTT), when the artillery resumed. This time instead of thunder it was a roar, as we were now at its epicentre.
On the 27 May 1992 a bomb exploded in the midst of a number of people who were in a bread-queue in Vasra Miskina Street, Sarajevo. The television scenes of dozens of people blownto shreds of which sixteen died outraged international public opinion. The Bosnian-Serb forces were immediately blamed for the outrage. They protested their innocence and claimed the Bosnian government bombed their own people in order to provoke an international response. UNPROFOR sent an officer to examine the scene. The equipment he had at his disposal was primitive but his report gave some credence to the Bosnian-Serb claim. Although, Sector Sarajevo HQ had its suspicions, it had insufficient proof to definitively pronounce who was responsible. Meanwhile, at a meeting of EC ambassadors which took place shortly afterwards to discuss sanctions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) the Bosnian-Serbs were informed that regardless of who was responsible for the bread-line massacre, it was indisputable proof that they were shelling a civilian city and therefore bore responsibility for the inevitable casualties. Subsequently, the Bosnian-Serbs and the Bosnian Government agreed to a plan which entailed opening up Sarajevo airport for a humanitarian airlift of food and medicine. In the plan the Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian government agreed to have their guns concentrated into designated gun-sites at which UNMO’s were to be located to monitor the use of the guns.

For the first two days the newly arrived UNMO’s were briefed and informed that the mission was to reopen the airport for a humanitarian relief airlift and to escort the UNHCR vehicles carrying the supplies from the airport to aid distribution points throughout the city. Over the next few days UNMO’s were sent to the Serb and Muslim gun positions throughout the city and its mountainous surrounds. They were tasked with monitoring the guns to ensure that neither side fired onto the airport. They found themselves in the bizarre position that they were on site witnesses to artillery pieces firing into an occupied European city and their job was to monitor and report the activities of the gunners. The UNMO’s lived in the houses of the gunners and ate their meals with their families.

As a native English speaker, I was appointed the Deputy Operations Officer in the UNHQ. I worked closely with the UN commander, a Canadian officer named Maj Gen Louis Mackenzie. In the evenings after long and event-filled days, the General and his staff would recount the day’s activities and we realised that this was no place for a peacekeeping mission as there was no peace for us to keep. This was a full blown civil war and it was only getting
started. We realised that what was required was a peace-enforcement mission to impose a cessation of activities on the belligerents in order to get them talking to each other.

My job was to organise the 24/7 shifts in the ops room, supervise the duty officers, write the daily reports, and brief the morning conference which was attended by the Sector Commander. I also visited the gun-sites regularly. A the behest of both sides UNPFOFOR negotiated local cease-fires to restore damaged essential services such as water, gas, electricity, and so on, and recovered wounded and dead from no-man’s land. I travelled on several of these patrols. There was considerable of movement of UN personnel between the PTT and the airport which came under sporadic sniper fire. I organised a scheduled APC run from the PTT and the airport and back to enable UN personnel to commute safely. This run became popular with the international media and TV crews who travelled in convoy with the scheduled run for safety. In the ops room we coordinated the humanitarian convoys from the airport to reception areas, initially throughout the city, and later, throughout the country. We coordinated the visits of visitors to the city including President Mitterrand and the UK Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. The unarmed UNMO’s drove throughout the city and its hinterland amongst shelling and sniper fire in their Peugeot 404’s.

When I arrived in Sarajevo there were less than 100 UN personnel in the city. By the time I left there were over 3000. We had succeeded in opening the airport and the biggest airlift in aviation history was underway. Peacekeepers from Egypt, Canada, France and the Ukraine escorted the convoys from the airport, initially to the distribution points throughout the city, and later to the beleaguered towns and cities throughout BiH. In theory we had successfully completed our mission, but of course, a full blown civil war was underway. Over the next five years over one hundred thousand people were killed and two million more were displaced. Our Chapter VI, Peacekeeping mission was quite simply, not fit for purpose. The mission was later upgraded to a Chapter VII Peace-enforcement mission but was never allocated sufficient resources to do the job. It finally took the massacre of 7,000 men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995 to galvanise the international community into action. A political solution was imposed and a NATO peace-enforcement mission was deployed to stop the war and ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords.
3.5 Peace-enforcement: 3rd Generation Peacekeeping - Chapter VII

The optimism which resulted in the exponential growth of peacekeeping operations in the early 1990’s was cruelly dispelled when the limitations of PKO’s were exposed in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. The international community committed peacekeeping forces to missions without resourcing them adequately. The limitations of Chapter VI missions were exposed and the UN realised that in many cases they were not robust enough to perform the tasks required. The Security Council then began to authorise use of Chapter VII missions. Between 1946 and 1989, the Security Council authorised twenty-four, Chapter VII missions, whereas between 1990 and 1999, one-hundred and sixty-six Chapter VII missions were authorised. However, peace-enforcement missions were and are politically problematic for the UN. Westphalian enforcement measures were designed to protect a pluralist society of states, to guard against imperialism, and to reduce the use of force between states. Post-Westphalian enforcement operations have been criticized as constituting a form of neo-imperialism because they impose Western preferences about the organisation of polities, societies and economies through the use of force.

When Yugoslavia began to disintegrate the international community initially tasked the OSCE with resolving the problem but its diplomatic modus operandi proved to be ineffectual. The EU was next into the fray, fresh from its Maastricht Treaty in which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was launched. The EU believed that the CFSP provided the solution to the type of issues which were emerging in Yugoslavia. However, the EU’s security apparatus proved to be ineffectual, and the limitations of the CFSP including poor command control and communication infrastructure, and gaping holes in military inventories were soon brought to light.

The UN was therefore called upon for its extensive experience in peacekeeping. It was entrusted with the task but when its traditional peacekeeping model ultimately failed the UN responded by upgrading the UNPROFOR mandate to Chapter VII status but did not allocate sufficient resources to it. Following the massacre of Srebrenica, the necessity for credible intervention became painfully obvious and Chapter VIII, the outsourcing to the regional

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31 Bellamy: P215.
32 Ibid P:228
organisation, became the next option. NATO had the resources and political will to successfully mount a Chapter VII operation and implement enforcement:

Peacekeepers must never again be told that they must use their peacekeeping tools—lightly armed soldiers in scattered positions—to impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of the belligerents by military means. If the necessary resources are not provided—and the necessary political, military and moral judgements are not made—then the job simply cannot be done.  

It is imperative to understand that the concept of Chapter VII is completely antithetical to Chapter VI, in that it was explicitly devised to provide a political, strategic, and operational framework for UN military operations. The provisions in Chapter VII delineate a logical sequence of events: Article 39 permits the Security Council to identify a threat to international peace and security; Article 40 permits it to call upon the parties to the conflict to voluntarily comply with suggested ‘provisional measures’; in the event that this is not successful, the Security Council is authorised to impose the economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions set out in Article 41; if that too fails, it can thereafter take military action through ‘air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’ as prescribed in Article 42. These forces can be provided by the member-states of the UN through agreements concluded under the provisions of Article 43.

Enforcement forces have to be prepared to resort to the use of arms against the belligerents. Therefore, Chapter VII operations must deploy with sufficient military strength to achieve the objectives laid down by the politicians. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement requires a full range of military capabilities to overwhelm the belligerents. The reason for the deployment of overwhelming military force is to deter belligerents from further conflict, but the planners must assume that the use of force may be necessary to restore peace. However, it is imperative to note that Chapter VII operations are not war. Enforcement operations are more constrained by political factors, and they are designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table. The mission statement of wartime operations usually uses phrases like, ‘seize and hold the objective’ or ‘destroy the enemy’. The mission statement of Chapter VII operations should read, ‘Create a peaceful environment to facilitate dialogue’.

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33Kofi Annan: 1995
3.6 United Nations Peacekeeping Reform

Within the United Nations the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated an expanded role for the United Nations in peacekeeping and security. In 1992 he produced An Agenda for Peace document which advocated for an expanded role for UN peacekeeping. However, many countries were unhappy with this redefinition of peacekeeping and the potential risks to their personnel.

Events came to a head in Somalia, when in 1993 24 Pakistani UN peacekeepers were killed, and soon afterwards 18 American troops were killed in Mogadishu. This led to an American withdrawal and ultimately the withdrawal of the UN mission. These casualties served to reinforce the reservations of those previously sceptical states and they largely withdrew support for peacekeeping. One effect of this disengagement was the failure to offer troops in response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Doctrine on the role of peacekeeping duly shifted in line with UN member states' reservations and the later 1995 edition (02/01/1995) of BroutrosGhali’s paper, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, which duly redefined peacekeeping, and now highlighted the importance of the consent of the parties to the presence and mandate of a mission as a prerequisite for its success. This was effectively a return to the more restricted, traditional definition.

However, it was patently obvious that the global situation in relation to international security and peacekeeping was inherently unsatisfactory. Thus in 2000, the UN initiated a major analyses of its peacekeeping experience, with a view to introducing a series of reforms to strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain field operations.

3.6.1 The Brahimi Report 2000

In March 2000 the Secretary General set up the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to conduct a comprehensive review in order to identify the principle weaknesses in UN peace operations and make practical recommendations to overcome those weaknesses. The panel was chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister, Lakhdar Brahimi. The Brahimi Report was officially launched at the UN’s Millennium Summit in September 2000. It’s most contentious recommendation was that the military component of a peacekeeping operation should be robust enough to defend itself effectively and confront any lingering forces of war.
with the ability to defeat them. In addition, Brahimi recommended improving decision-making at UN HQ, as he contended that the UN’s failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda was partly caused by a breakdown in communication between the peacekeepers in the field and decision makers in New York. He also recommended more consultation between the permanent five (P5) and the troop contributing countries (TCC’s), personnel to be recruited exclusively on the basis of expertise rather than on the basis of national quotas, the UN to create a best practice unit, and an integrated mission task-force to include the UN agencies of DPKO, DPA, OCHA, and the UN’s development and humanitarian agencies. In relation to mandating and resources, he recommended that: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should give realistic advice to the Secretary General (SC) for future mandates to be clearly worded and realisable, that PKO’s should not be authorised until they have the means to accomplish the goals. He further recommended that the system of financing PKO’s be reformed. In relation to Rapid and Effective Deployment, Brahimi recommended that the UN should have the ability to generate forces through the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) thereby enabling UN to deploy forward elements within days of mandate approval.

### 3.6.2 Reactions to the Brahimi Report

The reaction to the Brahimi Report was mixed. The Security Council welcomed the report but the General Assembly, especially the troop contributing countries (TCC’s) from the non-aligned movement (NAM) had reservations. They saw the concept of robust peacekeeping as being post-Westphalian with a western ideological bias. They expressed doubts about the legitimacy of ‘Robustness’ maintaining it constituted a departure from the tenets of traditional peacekeeping, such as consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force.

A special committee of the General Assembly was set up to consider the report in 2001 which ultimately adopted a more cautious and traditional position than that taken by the Brahimi panel. Although the Brahimi Report sought to be holistic in its approach to PKO’s it never received the necessary political traction, the political aspects were side-lined, and UN officials reported that the least progress was on decision-making and strategic issues.

The general consensus that emerged in the subsequent reviews of peacekeeping doctrine and practice was that UN peacekeeping was insufficiently robust and the majority of peacekeeping mandates since then have authorised peacekeepers to ‘use all necessary
means ‘to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. However, many of the peacekeeping operations were not given the political support or the military means to effect these instructions.

Since 2000 the concept of robust peacekeeping has been hampered by weak political support, the erratic availability and quality of peacekeeping troops, and resistance of the troop contributing countries that provide the bulk of peacekeepers to embrace this peacekeeping approach. Since the Brahimi report there has been a series of initiatives to reform UN peacekeeping and several policy documents. These include the 2008 ‘Capstone Doctrine’ which outlined the most important principles and guidelines for UN peacekeepers in the field, and the 2009 ‘The New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’, followed by its Progress Reports No.1 (2010) and No.2 (2011). These assessed the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping at that time and into the future. They saw peacekeeping not as a stand-alone solution but as part of a political solution that must be engaged in as in concert with an active political policy and it sought to broaden the principles and guidelines of robust peacekeeping.

Increasingly, a clear definition of what robust peacekeeping was and was not began to emerge. However, as any definition has yet to be endorsed by the member states, they are not official United Nations policy and the very concept of robust peacekeeping remains oblique and contentious. In 2010 the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) pitted the EU group’s emphasis on the importance of the responsibility to protect concept against the NAM TCC’s, who condemn robust peacekeeping as being tantamount to neocolonialism. Even so, the NAM countries remain the major contributors to UN peacekeeping operations whereas EU states are virtually absent. In 2014 the NAM countries were 27 of the top 28 TCC’s in terms of numbers of troops participating in UN Peacekeeping operations with China being fifteenth. In 2014 the top five contributing countries each contribute more peacekeepers than the entire European Union.
3.7 Regional Arrangements Chapter VIII

When the architects of the UN were drafting the Charter in 1946, they assumed that the UN would maintain some form of standing army. Initially the US was enthusiastic and pledged considerable assets to the force but the Soviet Union was suspicious of US intentions and blocked the plan from coming to fruition. An Agenda for Peace (2000) made several references to the idea, again to no avail. However, there have been some minor advances in the realising the concept. For example, in 1995, France, the UK and the Netherlands formed a rapid reaction force within UNPROFOR in Bosnia which engaged Serbian forces near Sarajevo which was instrumental in bringing the protagonists to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio. However, in the main, the Westphalian philosophy of state sovereignty prevails and there member states show an underlying reluctance to see a transfer of military power to the UN; indeed a similar reluctance is discernible amongst the 28 members of the EU towards ceding sovereign powers to Brussels.

While there is general agreement that the UN does Chapter VI, Westphalian peacekeeping well, the disasters of the 1990s highlighted the need for more robust measures when there is no peace to keep and intervention is required to deter gross humanitarian violations. The UN’s record in Chapter VII, peace-enforcement has been problematic due to the fact that the member states have consistently failed to properly resource the UN to perform these complex tasks and the UN lacks the command and communications infrastructure which is necessary to manage complex military operations. There is a strong body of opinion within the international community that regional organisations are in a better position to resolve disputes. European troops in Africa often evoke the scars of colonisation which can exacerbate old resentments of the host nation. Conversely, the sight of African UNPROFOR troops in Yugoslavia was greeted with racist abhorrence by many Yugoslav nationals. In addition to locational and cultural compatibility many of the regional organisations are far better configured and have the requisite military infrastructure to tackle peace-enforcement operations than the UN. Chapter VIII of the Charter recognises this and makes provision for regional arrangements:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.  

Between 1945 and 1990, Security Council resolutions contained only three references to regional organisations. However, from 1991, onwards there are numerous references to regional organisations in Security Council Resolutions. Prior to 1975 regional organisations conducted an average of two mediations in regional conflict management activities. Yet since that time regional organisations have been involved in an average of 20 mediations per year.

3.7.1 Regional Arrangements

There are several regional organisations throughout the globe, the main ones being as follows:

EUROPE:
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
- Western European Union (WEU)
- Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

ASIA:
- Association of South East Asian Nations, (ASEAN), Asian Regional Forum (ARF)

MIDDLE EAST:
- Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

AFRICA:
- African Union (AU)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (EMCOCAS)

AMERICA:
- Organisation of American States (OAS)

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34 UN Charter: Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements
3.7.2 The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The European Union became actively involved in peace-building activities for various reasons, not least as a response to terrorist attacks in EU states, such as the 2007 Madrid and London rail bombings. As the EU Commission President noted at the time:

The enlarged European Union has the power and the capacity to shape global order. During the last fifty years, we built a peaceful Europe based on freedom and solidarity. In the future, to guarantee and reinforce such achievements we need to influence and to shape the world around us...we will not live in peace if we do not face the external threat to our security and the instability in regions close to Europe.  

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, (CFSP) attempts to enable the EU to develop the international crisis management capacities required to achieve the five key objectives of; safeguarding the EU’s common values and fundamental interests, strengthening the security of the EU, preserving peace and international security in accordance with the UN Charter, promoting international cooperation, and advancing democracy and the rule of law including human rights. The EU uses the principles of the Petersberg Tasks as the template for its peace operations. These are a list of security, defence and peace-making tasks, originally set out by the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992 which form an integral part of the European Union’s Common security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) provides for the Petersberg tasks to include a post-conflict-stabilisation-programme and the fight against terrorism. The template for peacekeeping operations is directed by EU’s Political and Security Committee, a body created by the Treaty of Nice. There must be unanimity in the Council for the EU to undertake any one of the Petersberg tasks. To date, the EU has undertaken four missions: Macedonia in 2003; Bosnia 2004 to present; Democratic Republic of Congo 2006; and Chad/Central African Republic 2008-2009. In addition to direct troop deployment the EU plays a supporting role to the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in many of their missions, such as Darfur and Cote d’Ivoire. The EU military deployment in Chad was in response to a UN request.

37EU Commission President, José Manuel Barroso
3.7.3 European Union Peacekeeping Reform Process

The European Union is not a unitary actor and despite the wishes of some for the EU to take a more proactive role in international peacekeeping the EU has consistently displayed an expectation-capability gap. In 1954 the then six members of the EEC signed the European Defence Community (EDC) but the French Senate failed to ratify it and it never came into effect. This marked the beginning of the difficulties which the members of the EEC/EC/EU experienced in establishing structures to deal with foreign policy and security. The machinations of the European Union’s peacekeeping process are dealt with in some detail in the Chapter 8 Chad case study which focuses on the EU’s peace-enforcement mission EUFOR Chad/CAR.

3.7.4 NATO (PfP)

NATO is a mutual defence organisation established in 1948 during the height of the Cold War with a remit to coordinate the American and European defence against the threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union and its allies. Most European countries are members of NATO but there are some notable exceptions. Switzerland and Sweden, traditional European neutrals, chose to remain outside NATO, while Finland and Austria are obliged to be neutrals as a condition of Soviet withdrawal from their territories following the realignment of borders after World War II. Ireland also decided to remain neutral during the Second World War. When invited to join NATO the Irish government tried to link Irish reunification to NATO membership. When this was rejected, Ireland decided not to join NATO and remained neutral. Following the endof the Cold War, the role of NATO was reassessed and one of the results of this evaluation was the formation of ‘Partnership for Peace (PfP). This is a mechanism which allows non-NATO countries to pick and choose which NATO peacekeeping activities they wish to participate in. It allows partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. The Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps identify develop and evaluate forces and capabilities which might be made available for NATO multinational training, exercises and operations. It also provides a framework for partners to develop effective, affordable and

39 See Keating in Chapter 4.5.1
sustainable armed forces, as well as promoting wider defence and security sector reform efforts. PARP is open to all partner countries on a voluntary basis. Under PARP, planning targets are negotiated with each country and regular reviews measure progress.

Ireland joined NATO’s PfP in December 1996 and deployed a transport company to Kosovo in 1997, which was upgraded to a mechanised infantry group in 2003. Since then Ireland has continued its commitment to KFOR, and in addition Irish staff officers have served in Afghanistan in the NATO PfP mission. The KFOR mission is dealt with in detail in the Kosovo case study. The importance of Irish membership of PfP in relation to inter-operability and capability development was recognised in the *Irish Defence White Paper 2015*

### 3.7.5 OSCE

The OSCE traces its origins to the Cold War détente of the early 1970’s when the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue between East and West. With 56 States from Europe, Central Asia and North America, the OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization spanning the northern hemisphere from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

#### 2.7.5.1 Personal Experience – OMiFRY

From November 2001, to November 2002 I worked as Chief of Administration and Finance in the OSCE Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY). It was a classic post-conflict peace-building mission which was set up with its headquarters in Belgrade in 2001, following the democratic elections which ousted Slobodan Milošević. At that stage only Serbia and Montenegro remained in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and OMiFRY was heavily involved in the negotiations which resulted in a peaceful constitutional referendum which enabled the citizens of Montenegro to decide whether to cede from, or remain in the FRY. At that time in Serbia, President Vojislav Koštunica,whilst undeniably anti-communist, was nonetheless regarded as an old style nationalist who favoured the traditional Serbian association with Russia, while the Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić, was a young, suave, Kennedy-style politician of pronounced western orientation who favoured Serbian membership of the European Union. I was seconded to the OSCE and served in a civilian capacity; indeed, I was the only member of the mission with a military background.
The Head of Mission was an Italian diplomat and his deputy was an American State Department political advisor.

The largest department with the biggest budget was Law Enforcement and its Chief was a senior Norwegian police officer. The members of his staff were seconded police officers from OSCE member states but were mainly from the UK, USA, and former Soviet Republics. This department was tasked with implementing the recommendations of the OSCE Study on Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Richard Monk. This involved helping the police forces in Serbia and Montenegro through the transition from the communist ideology of the security of the state to the western ideology of the rule of law and the rights of each citizen. Law Enforcement programmes included, anti-trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, prison and police reform, customs reform, and training technical branches and senior police officers. The priority for the Law Enforcement Department was the total restructuring of the police services in the Preševo Valley, as this very sensitive mission was one on which the future of OMiFRY depended.

The Preševo Valley is in Southern Serbia near the autonomous province of Kosovo, which was then being administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and protected by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). While the Preševo Valley is in Serbia proper as opposed to Kosovo, the majority of the population were and still are ethnic Albanian. In 2001, as a follow-up to the Kosovo War, there were reported clashes between Yugoslav security forces and ethnic Albanian guerrillas linked to the KLA. The aim of the movement was to take full control of Preševo Valley and hold it until such time as the adjacent lands, Kosovo and Western Macedonia, also came under Albanian control. Geographically, the Preševo Valley is part of the Morava/Vardar North-South route across the Balkans. This route carries a pan-European corridor with the European road E75 which links northern Europe to Greece. The importance of this route to Serbia was paramount since 1999, when the main alternative route through Pristina became severely compromised by the events in Kosovo. The OSCE took the view that the Preševo Valley was part of Serbia and would not be allowed to join Kosovo, but in return the Serbian state would have adopt an inclusive multi-ethnic policy in relation to the region. OMiFRY acted as an honest broker between the Serb government and the ethnic Albanian inhabitants of the area. Fortunately the Đinđić

40 http://www.osce.org/spmu/16296.
government was very pro-active and anxious to demonstrate its commitment to the reform process. OMiFRY organised a census of the population and secured ethnic-Albanian and local Serb compliance and participation. Next, local elections were held under OSCE supervision and were deemed to be free and fair. Two of the three municipalities in the Preševo Valley returned ethnic-Albanian majorities and OMiFRY supervised the peaceful transfer of power. The police force in the Preševo Valley had been comprised entirely of Serbs until that time. OMiFRY set up a multi-ethnic police force comprising of Albanians, Serbs and Roma which involved establishing a police training school which used international police trainers to run courses for the multi-ethnic students. OMiFRY ran the police service with international police management and a system of joint multi-ethnic police patrols operated throughout the region.

The other departments in OMiFRY were the Democratisation Department headed by a German which ran training courses for parliamentarians and senior civil servants. The Human Rights section of the Department of Democratisation which was headed by an American lawyer monitored the situation in relation to the minorities, prisoners and other traditionally disadvantaged persons and ran courses for the re-education of officials. The Media Department which was headed by an Italian worked with print, TV and radio editors, broadcasters and journalists to encourage investigative journalism and freedom of speech. The Environment Department which was led by a Serb initiated programmes to highlight environmental issues and citizen’s personal responsibility in relation to such issues as litter and recycling, pollution control, recycling domestic and industrial waste, clean water programmes, and anti-litter awareness programmes. The Rule of Law Department led by an American lawyer assisted the Serbian authorities to redraft legislation in accordance with the modernisation programme.

My role as Chief of Administration and Finance was to provide administrative and logistical support to the various departments of the mission and to supervise the spending of the €19 million budget. The international community additionally financed many state-building activities, such as rule of law reform, security services reform, environment awareness education, election monitoring, and anti-personating programmes in national and regional elections. The finances for these activities were supervised by OMiFRY, and the funding which amounted to several million Euro, came under the heading of ‘Voluntary Contributions’ and was managed and disbursed through the OMiFRY account.
The individual departments in OMiFRY worked in isolation from each other, and in many ways I was the conduit between them. I was required to supervise the budget expenditure. As such, I worked with the head of each department in preparing the budget submission for the forthcoming year. I then consolidated the budget submission for OMiFRY and submitted it to the OSCE HQ in Vienna. I was then required to defend the submission line by line. In addition to the OMiFRY budget, I helped organise donations from OSCE member states for various projects undertaken by OMiFRY. This entailed meeting with senior personnel in the embassies of various OSCE member states in Belgrade and apprising them of our activities and making submissions to them for funding. I also coordinated the temporary recruitment of international personnel from various NGO’s in Belgrade to supervise the census of population in the Preševo Valley. I worked closely with the international police trainers in the Preševo Valley and helped to establish the OMiFRY office in Montenegro which monitored the political situation and the referendum on membership of the FRY. In addition, my department also included the following sections for which I was responsible; Human Resources, Transport, IT, Communication, Procurement, Logistics, Administration, Finance, and Security.

In 2001 OMiFRY was a start-up mission and we were required to hit the ground running. My experience in Belgrade with the OSCE was very different that my experience in Sarajevo as a United Nations Military Observer. The war in Sarajevo was just beginning and whilst we in UNPROFOR were able to be of some assistance in alleviating suffering, we were unable to end the war and the hundreds of thousands of casualties that followed. At that stage in 1992 there was no political consensus amongst the belligerents or the international community. OMiFRY, on the other hand, was a post-conflict peace-building mission. By 2002 Slobodan Milošević had been deposed and was arraigned before The International Court in The Hague. The Yugoslav authoritarian regime was in the process of being replaced and the international community authorised the OSCE to establish OMiFRY to assist the Yugoslav institutions in their transformation to democratic norms and the tenets of good governance.

From a personal perspective, working in OMiFRY was more rewarding that working in UNPROFOR in that the political consensus enabled us to be effective. In Sarajevo we were able to bring some level of assistance to alleviate the suffering, but as it took five years to arrive at a political consensus. In 2002 UNPROFOR was not only a dangerous place to work but it was incredibly stressful and disheartening.
In OMiFRY morale was high and there was a sense of steady progress. The personnel in the Yugoslav institutions enthusiastically embraced the tide of change and relationships between OMiFRY and their Yugoslav interlocutors were, in the main, excellent. But there were problems. Organised crime was endemic and its tentacles had reached the legal apparatus. In fact, it was not until the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić that the Yugoslav government mounted a concerted effort to tackle organised crime. It also took a while to cull the Milošević factions that were deeply embedded in the Yugoslav institutions. In addition, there were racial legacies which had to be sorted out, and OMiFRY played a crucial role in assisting the authorities in Belgrade to resolve the ethnic issues in the Preševo Valley.

I worked in a civilian capacity in OMiFRY but my experiences in the Middle East and Sarajevo served me well in Belgrade and enabled me to establish a good rapport with Yugoslav army and police personnel. It also enabled me to have some empathy with the international police personnel which they had not experienced with previous civilian administrators.

This second experience in this region contrasted significantly with my former appointment in Sarajevo as a military observer. Here, the work I was doing was in a civilian capacity and was very much within the ethos of post-conflict peace building which recognises the need for resources, and which because of its association with a narrower transnational body than the United Nations was more specifically targeted.

### 3.8 Humanitarian Intervention

During the Cold War there was a general consensus throughout the international community that peacekeeping operations should be confined to inter-state conflicts and post-colonial disputes. This view was very much in keeping with the Realist, Westphalian orthodoxy of the time. Realism regarded the ‘international’ as an anarchic realm and realism held sway. This orthodoxy was not seriously challenged until after the Cold War when a neo-liberal, post-Westphalian view emerged. The classical realist argument that internal workings and practices of states are of no concern to non-citizens was replaced by a new UN remit to safeguard economic and social justice and establish new forms of justice. The UN sought to construct a cosmopolitan moral community where all individuals, regardless of nationality,
held inviolable political and civil rights, and a consensus emerged which demonstrated a
greater concern for the promotion of human rights, rescuing failing states, and disbursing
humanitarian assistance. The former concepts of collective security and state sovereignty
were increasingly challenged by a ‘new interventionism’ which was predicated on the
evidence of a decline of inter-state wars and a rise of civil wars. This led to demands that
‘something must be done’. A further consensus now emerged which argued for international
military intervention to end civil wars, prevent mass human rights abuses, counter-terrorism
and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

During the Cold War the majority of military interventions were in keeping with the precepts
of the Realist paradigm. The Cold War had spheres of influence and the superpowers were
determined to ensure that the ideology of the other superpower was not allowed to transgress
into its sphere of influence. Many of these interventions were seen as the hegemons merely
protecting their sphere of influence, such as the Soviet interventions in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and the US interventions in the Dominican Republic,
Grenada and Panama. Any other forms of intervention, including humanitarian interventions,
were frowned upon and discouraged. For example, in the bi-polar world of the late 1970’s,
reaction to the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda and Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia
were conditioned by Cold War geopolitics. The reluctance of the society of states to
legitimise humanitarian intervention at that time reflected fears of setting precedents which
could erode the non-intervention principle. Despite the humanitarian advantages of these
interventions, the fundamental role of early peacekeeping was that of regulator of the state-
based international system.

Following the Cold War consensus emerged about the need for the UN to become more
involved in peacekeeping operations, but nevertheless Westphalian orthodoxy remained
dominant and the missions conducted under Chapter VI mandates. The delimiting constraints
of Chapter VI had become all too obvious by the difficulties experienced by peacekeepers in
Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. However, the UN was slow to respond as was
typified in the context of Srebrenica. When the beleaguered UN commander requested the
assistance from the NATO jets overhead he was refused on at least three occasions. 41 During
the Rwanda crisis the UN Secretary General also pleaded with the international community

41 Bellamy and Williams 2010 P 117
for extra resources. The US Clinton Administration, however, incomprehensibly cut funding, which resulted in the downsizing of the mission in the midst of the genocide. Rwanda and Srebrenica changed everything when the international community, somewhat paradoxically, began to lose confidence in the UN and its ability to perform in complex operations while at the same time conveniently ignoring the fact that the same international community had starved the UN of the necessary resources. The Chapter VIII option was explored and regional organisations were considered to be better configured and equipped for enforcement and were thus tasked with conducting the interventions.

As a result of this debate a set of criteria was proposed as a condition of intervention which included; the threat or occurrence of grave and large scale violations of human rights, clear and objective evidence of such a threat occurring, the government of the state being unwilling or unable to take remedial action, clear urgency, use of force a last resort, and the purpose of which being clearly explained to the general public and the international community. The Centre for Strategic Studies in New Zealand published a set of Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention which states that; its purpose is limited to stopping human rights abuses, the action is supported by those to whom it is intended, support of Regional States, high probability of success, a mapped out transition to post-conflict peace-building, use of force should be proportionate to achieving these goals, and international law on the conduct of war should be observed.

Since the end of the Cold War there have been a series of international military interventions, ostensibly for humanitarian motives. Most of these interventions were conducted with the approval of the Security Council but there have been times when the Security Council has failed to reach agreement and interventions have proceeded regardless. The first such intervention was Kosovo in 1999, where Serb security forces were involved in suppressing an Albanian armed revolt. NATO countries led by the USA and the UK took the view that the actions being carried out by Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian regime constituted a gross violation of human rights. Therefore without the authority of the Security Council NATO commenced a bombing campaign against Serb forces in Kosovo and against military and civilian targets throughout Serbia and Montenegro. Other countries such as Russia supported its traditional Slav ally which highlighted the dangerous precedent of interfering in the internal affairs of a UN member state and the dangers of encouraging the secession of a province or region from a country without that country’s agreement. The 2003 intervention in Iraq also
did irreparable damage to the case for intervention in that it was again conducted without a
Security Council resolution. On this occasion the existence of weapons of mass destruction
was cited as the main justification for the intervention. The action resulted in unprecedented
opposition throughout the world and when no weapons of mass destruction were actually
found and Iraq descended into the depthsof an horrific civil war despite the presence of
hundreds of thousands of foreign troops, the case for intervention took a very severe setback.

3.8.1 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The debate about state sovereignty and the legality of intervention continued into the twenty-
first century. The international community was quick to criticise the United Nations for their
failures but the same members consistently frustrated the UN attempts to take the necessary
action to resolve the issues of the day. It became clear that international agreement was a
perquisite for any mechanism which would allow the UN to respond to emergencies in a
timely fashion. Building on the fin-de-siècle goodwill and consensus which led to the
Millennium Headline Goals, in September 2000 the Canadian government took the initiative
and established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
The commission was conscious of the failure to reacha consensus between the Westphalian
and post-Westphalian schools of thought and it sought to bridge this gap. The ICISS report,
published in December 2001 was entitled, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, which was soon
abbreviated to the catchier R2P. The basic tenet of R2P is that sovereignty is not a privilege
but a responsibility and to this end it focused on preventing and halting the four crimes of
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. R2P’s central
preposition was that if a state was perpetrating any of these four crimes or manifestly failing
to protect its citizens from them, the international community had the responsibility to
intervene militarily as a last resort. In the case of military intervention the report stated that
military intervention initiated under the premise of R2P must fulfil six criteria; just cause,
right intention, final resort, legitimate authority, proportional means, and reasonable prospect
of success. The report was widely discussed but it was derided by many as a tool for western
countries to justify violations of sovereignty of other countries. It was not until the World
Summit in 2005 that Member States were able to discuss it, at which time R2P was included
in the outcome document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and 139:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

In April 2006, the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution (S/RES/1674). In 2009 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’. It argued for the implementation of R2P and outlined three pillars under which it should proceed. Pillar One stressed that states had the responsibility to protect its citizens against the four aforementioned crimes. Pillar Two stressed the commitment of the international community to provide assistance to States in building capacity to protect their populations from the four crimes and to assisting those which are under stress before crisis and conflict break out. Pillar Three focused on the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive action to prevent or halt the four crimes if States were manifestly failing to protect its populations. This report led to a debate in which the General Assembly (October 2009) discussed R2P for the first time since 2005. The debate emphasised the need for Regional Organisations to play a strong role in implementing R2P. The outcome of the debate was disappointing for R2P advocates in that the GA adopted the Resolution (A/RES/63/308) which merely confirmed that the international community has taken note of the debate and remained mindful of R2P. However, in March 2011, with a vote of 10 for 0 against and 5 abstentions, the SC adopted Resolution 1973 which authorise ‘all necessary means to…protect civilians,’ in Libya. This was then used by NATO in relation to its bombing campaign in support of the Libyan rebels. However, many were sceptical, believing that the NATO action was about the West settling old scores with Colonel Gadhafi and forcing a regime change, citing the lack of support for the protesters in Bahrain and Syria. There are many critics of R2P who, whilst in favour of its ideals, question the motives, particularly in respect of western countries. In his article, R2P: Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, the author stated that, “The report was drafted to reconcile international human rights with state sovereignty but it failed to address the need for substantive reform of the Security Council, the legitimacy of unilateral humanitarian intervention and the threshold for intervention.”^42

^42Hehir: International Relations June 24, 2010 P 218-239
3.9 Civilian Policing

In the era of Traditional peacekeeping, the role of civilian police was very much of secondary importance to that of the military. Peacekeeping was perceived of as an inter-state activity concerned with facilitating the disengagement of protagonists and in this scenario policing was seen as the preserve of the host countries. However, as the peacekeepers became involved in complex intra-state peace-building the need for international police personnel became apparent. For example, a UN review illustrates that despite the considerable resources spent on Development Aid there was only negligible impact on economic growth in the target areas. This was attributed to corruption, criminal behaviour and civil disorder and it is now widely acknowledged that economic development can succeed only if it is accompanied by measures to improve security. In short, economic development is widely held to require a basic degree of law and order which can only be achieved with external assistance.\(^{43}\) Modern PKO’s contain multidimensional policing contingents tasked with assisting in the provision of public security and building the capacity of the indigenous police service. Since 2001, all UN peace operations have been explicitly authorised to engage in rule of law or policing activities.\(^{44}\)

While there have been considerable advancements in the role and responsibilities given to UN police, this has not been matched by supporting infrastructure and resources. Due to the constant domestic demands placed on national police services most countries have little spare capacity for international police deployments. This has created an almost permanent shortfall and has resulted in some countries sending unqualified, inexperienced and/or underperforming officers on international missions. The UN has responded by setting up best practice guidelines and minimum skill-set requirements. However, in Sierra Leone, a UN review found that the local police had more experience and professional competence than the UN police who were supposed to be advising them.\(^{45}\) In one of the best resourced missions, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), it took 10 months to agree a common code of practice for the international police, and in the meantime individual police contingents had resorted to their own legal codes, some of which were highly authoritarian and involved practices

\(^{43}\) Hurwitz, A. *Civil War and the Rule of Law* 2008 Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner. P 6-7


commonly labelled in Europe as human rights abuses. For example, when the author served in Kosovo in 2007, there was a protest march in Pristina which developed into a mini riot. The UNMIK police fired rubber directly into the faces of some of the protestors which resulting in two being killed.

In trying to respond to police recruitment problems the UN has come up with several different solutions, one being the recruitment of Formed Police Units rather than individually recruited police personnel. The advantage of Formed Police Units is that they are capable of performing specific special tasks such as dealing with riots and organised criminal elements, they are more cost effective than individually recruited officers, they can improve a mission’s coherence because they have trained and operated together before deployment, and they deploy more quickly than individually recruited officers. By 2007, there were 35 FPU’s, accounting for some 4,000 officers equating to half the entire UNPOL effort. In the USA all international policing is subcontracted through a private company called DynCorp. Australia established an International Deployment Group which has 1,200 police officers on their books. In 2006, the UN set up a standing police capacity to improve mission planning and accelerated deployment times. This conferred policing operations with the same status as military operations within the DPKO, and in 2007 the term ‘CivPol’ (Civilian Police) was changed to UNPOL (UN Police). As of 31 August 2015 there were 13,500 police personnel serving in 16 UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world.

3.10 Gender Issues in Peacekeeping

Peace-building has developed into a multidiscipline activity in which peacekeepers are tasked with providing a safe and secure environment for other peace-building disciplines to operate. As such, peacekeeping has ceased to be a standalone activity and developed into an element, albeit an important one, of an overall peace-building operation. Peace-building operations require peacekeepers to work in provisional environments and the peacekeepers are required to interact with civilians, police, NGO’s, human rights activists, politicians, civil administrations, and private organisations. This new environment brings with it a new set of challenges for peacekeepers, not the least of which is gender perspectives.

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47 Smith et al. 2007 P 2
The UN set out to construct peace-building operations to help ensure that that all local
civilians are more secure, and also that they are designed in such a way as to understand and
positively influence gender dynamics within the society in question. Traditional
Peacekeeping operations and enforcement operations clearly require a military presence but
military personnel are not trained, equipped or sufficiently organised to conduct these broader
tasks of Peace-building. This has called for greater numbers of civilians, both male and
female, to participate in peace operations and for the mainstreaming of what the UN terms a
gender perspective in all of its operations as well as its approach to peace and security issues
more generally.49

Gender perspectives have been to the forefront of UN strategy and planning for several years
as the UN endeavours to be a world leader in this respect and strives to champion gender
equality both by word and action. Since its inception the UN has championed human rights
and it strives to engender cultural, religious, racial and gender tolerance and equality amongst
its own civilian and military staff, and by so doing give examples and encouragement to its
member states. The exploitation of women in peace-building operations is anathema to the
UN as it violates the very principle of Human Rights, one of the tenets on which the
organisation is built. The UN has recognised that it has to be proactive and champion the
drive to eradicate gender inequality and its institutional response has included the 1998,
‘Code of Personal Conduct’ issued to Blue Beret troops, followed in September 2000 by the
Brahimi report. This was again followed in October 2000 by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1325. In addition, in 2003, the Secretary General issued a Bulletin to
give further direction to UN staff in relation to gender issues, and in 2004 the Gender
Resource Package was issued.

Since 2005 the UN sets up Conduct and Discipline offices in the HQ of all UN peacekeeping
missions. They are staffed by senior-level experts on personnel conduct issues and tasked
with dealing with all issues in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse. These Units liaise
with the TCC commanders and report to the Force Commander of the missions. The UN has
succeeded in introducing a cultural change in relation to the gender issues outlined above, but
to date full gender equality has still not been attained as some TCC’s citing cultural mores

have been slow to adapt. The UN strives to remain proactive and vigilant in its efforts to achieve gender equality. It is cognisant that women should not be viewed solely as victims and urges international actors to recognise and support the positive roles that women’s organisations play in peace processes by helping to empower traditionally disempowered groups.

In September 2000, the Brahimi Report confronted the need for equitable gender representation in UN peace operations and on 31 October 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325. This included clauses to promote the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes, integrate gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping, protect women in armed conflicts, and mainstream gender issues in UN reporting systems and programmes related to conflict and peace-building. UNSCR 1325 also calls on all parties to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates with implications for member states and the entities of the United Nations system. In addition, in 2003, a Secretary General’s bulletin focused on special measures for protection against sexual exploitation and abuse. Among other things, it ‘strongly discouraged sexual relationships between UN staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on unequal power dynamics and undermine the integrity and credibility of the UN’. The UN also forbade any of its personnel to have sex with anyone under the age of eighteen.

Following a series of articles in the international media about inappropriate behaviour by UN peacekeepers ranging from fraternisation to prostitution the conduct of UN peacekeepers came under scrutiny. The Secretary-General imposed a zero tolerance policy following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in host countries. At the request of the Secretary-General, the then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, produced a sweeping strategy known as the Zeid Report. It recommended engaging troop and police contributors, other Member States and the wider UN system in a new conduct and disciplining architecture for peacekeeping, and in 2008, the UN-wide strategy for assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel was adopted by the General Assembly.
Despite the best intentions of the planners and senior management in New York the influx of a large number of peacekeepers into a country can have ‘unintended consequences’. This term refers to any developments directly generated by the operation that were not intended by those who planned it. Some unintended consequences can be foreseen and anticipated while others are more difficult to predict. However, such side effects are not necessarily negative, as they can also generate politically neutral or positive outcomes. While the negative consequences such as Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) cases or alleged rises in HIV infection rates have captured the media headlines, less sensational activities conducted outside of the formal mandate, such as peacekeepers donating blood to local hospitals, or helping to build schools and children’s play areas have generally been deemed less newsworthy.  

The UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) which took place between March 1992, and September 1993, was perhaps the first peacekeeping mission to highlight the effects of ‘unintended consequences’ of a UN mission. UNTAC had an establishment of 22,000 military and civilian personnel with a budget of $1.62 Billion. The large influx of expatriates into the impoverished country who earned exorbitant salaries by Cambodian standards had a detrimental effect on the economy of the country. Food and accommodation prices soared as the market altered to meet the needs of the wealthy expatriates while the resultant exponential inflation had a devastating effect on the lives of the local Cambodians. Another, and far more embarrassing effect for the UN, was the explosion in the growth of prostitution in Cambodia during the UNTAC presence. The Cambodian Women’s Development Association estimated that the number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose from about 6,000 in 1992 to about 25,000 at the height of the mission, and unsurprisingly, they correlate these figure to a rise in HIV/AIDS. The problem for the UN was compounded when the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Yasuchi Akashi, dismissed the UNTAC’s misdemeanours as ‘boys being boys’. 

The problem of unintended consequences did not end in Cambodia. It continued in the DRC and Liberia and it became obvious that when large peace operations are deployed into impoverished conflict zones a corollary peacekeeping economy is established. In such

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50 Bellamy and Williams 2010 P 364
51 Whitworth, S Men Militarism and UN Peacekeeping. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 2004 P 67
52 Ibid 68
environments peacekeepers are likely to be offered sexual favours in return for money, jobs or food. Peace operations also create a demand for goods supplied through organised crime such as pirated DVDs, smuggled cigarettes, and most notably, commercial sex.\textsuperscript{53} This highlighted that while peace operations are clearly intended to help make local populations more secure sometimes they have had the opposite effect. In particular, they have been accused of having a damaging influence on local economies, of stimulating increased levels of prostitution, human trafficking and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and even being a significant vector of HIV/AIDS. The nexus of war formed by displacement, poverty and corruption force many women into survival sex, but the massively unequal pay levels evident between foreign peacekeepers and their local hosts exacerbates the problem. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo the United Nations Military Observers (UNMO’s) earned between 500-1000 times the average per capita income of the local population,\textsuperscript{54} and there is little doubt that a significant number of both military and civilian male peacekeepers have used their disproportionate spending power to procure the sexual services of local women. This was an intolerable situation, especially for the UN who were charged with ensuring that the conduct of its peacekeepers in the field did not bring the organisation into disrepute and, more importantly, did not further threaten the victims of armed conflict. “A central challenge for today’s peacekeepers lies in improving their gender sensitivity and ensuring that members of peace operations do not engage in the sexual exploitation of and abuse of local populations.”\textsuperscript{55} Statements such as these generated calls for international society to do more to protect women and girls from sexual violence. One of the first responses from the UN was in 1998, when the UN issued uniformed personnel with pocket cards containing a Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets.

\subsection*{3.11 Non-kinetic Assets in Peacekeeping}

During war and peacekeeping operations, military commanders attempt to take cognisance of the totality of the situation in the area in which they operate. Military commanders do not have the luxury of concentrating exclusively on the military aspects of their mission, but are required to take a holistic view of their Areas of Operation (AO). In military jargon the term

\textsuperscript{53}Cockayne, J and Pfister, D. \textit{Peace Operations and Organised Crime} 2008 P 26 Quoted in Bellamy and Williams
\textsuperscript{55}Bellamy and Williams 2010 P 259
is ‘the total battle space’. ‘Kinetic Assets’ is a term used by the military for weapons and ammunition systems. However, in addition to these, non-kinetic assets are important tools which the military commander avails of to enable him to achieve his mission. The commander has many such assets, some of which will be explained in this section with particular attention being paid to Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The similarity of CIMIC with humanitarian aid and the blurring of the line between both has been a source of great concern to humanitarian agencies as will be specifically discussed in this section.

The non-kinetic assets that may be available to the force Commander include; information operations (Info Ops), liaison teams, CIMIC, and a Political and Civil Affairs office. Info Ops are the branch tasked with communicating with the civilian population and keeping them informed of what the peacekeeping force is trying to achieve and how its sets about trying to do this. Info Ops uses TV, radio and print media to get its message across to the target audience. Liaison teams are the system of liaison officers who are tasked with liaising with the various military actors in the Area of Operations. The role of Military Liaison Teams is described in detail in the Kosovo Case Study, Section 7.8.6.

A considerable non-kinetic asset which is available to military commanders is Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and although military organisations have always had some form of coordination and cooperation with civil society, the modern CIMIC concept emerged in part from peacekeeping experiences in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. CIMIC is now an integrated element in all military HQ’s. The NATO manual on CIMIC doctrine (AJP 9), defines CIMIC as:

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.  

NATO has been to the fore in conceptualising and developing the idea of CIMIC. It places great importance on it, produced a comprehensive manual, AJP 9, and has developed a system of training for officers to take up posts in various NATO HQ’s as dedicated CIMIC officers:

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56 AJP 9. 102.1, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (June 2003)
NATO conducts CIMIC in support of the military mission. CIMIC enables a commander to interface with civil aspects of the environment within which he operates and to absorb fully civil factors into his planning. 57

NATO has led the way in the development and implementation of CIMIC. However, CIMIC as NATO conceives it, has its detractors. The humanitarian agencies are very uncomfortable with the use of humanitarian aid as a ‘military tool’ and humanitarian agencies reproach NATO for violating the very tenet of humanitarian aid which is impartiality and neutrality. 58 The UN humanitarian agencies believe that ‘humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.’ These aspects of using aid for intelligence or force protection are frowned upon by many of the military’s potential CIMIC partners as humanitarian agencies subscribe to the tenet that humanitarian aid must be disbursed in accordance with need and must never be conditional. Many NGO’s believe that these military activities create ‘a general blurring of the distinctions between ‘military’ and ‘humanitarian’ activities. 59 Slim (2002) posits that such blurring renders the belligerent incapable of distinguishing the NGO from the military, thus endangering the former. 60 Eriksson (2000) argues against military participation in these activities because of failures to adhere to the humanitarian principle, the creation of an inappropriate and unsustainable assistance, and the brevity of military tours. 61

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) recognises the benefits of CIMIC and encourages CIMIC in its peacekeeping operations. However, DPKO has developed its own definition and principles for the application of CIMIC in peace support operations. The basic difference between the UN and the NATO concept of CIMIC is the UN believes that the humanitarian agencies should be the prime providers of humanitarian assistance and the military and UN police should confine themselves to their core activity of security. Thus CIMIC should be limited to providing aid as a last resort and in a timely manner when the humanitarian agencies are unable to do so for whatever reason. In doing so

57 AJP 9, 202.1, Principles Governing the Military Direction of CIMIC, Mission Primacy.
58 UN-OCHA, 2003:3
however, the DPKO CIMIC Policy Document (2002), states …peacekeeping personnel should be mindful that humanitarian agencies have agreed at the strategic level that they will normally only request or accept support from military or civilian police elements based on the following: …the capability cannot be provided in a timely manner by civilians the use of military and civilian police is a last resort.62

Although there are guidelines, such as the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines, United Nations, 1994), which set out occasions when the military should engage in humanitarian action, these guidelines are, in fact, rarely observed63, as the author’s experience can confirm. For example, UNIFIL has an extensive CIMIC programme in operation. This programme is well-funded by the TCC’s, and in the case of Korea, Spain, Italy, and to a lesser extent France, they have large budgets which are disbursed generally in accordance with NATO principles. Many of the UNIFIL senior officers have extensive NATO experience but have limited UN peacekeeping experience and are consequently inclined to adopt NATO principles of CIMIC operations. UNIFIL had grown from less than 2,000 peacekeepers between 2000 and 2006 to an establishment of 15,000 after the 2006 war. What distinguished UNIFIL post 2006 from pre 2006, was a new robust mandate and the presence of Spain and Italy in the mission. These countries, along with France, upgraded UNIFIL from a traditional peacekeeping mission to a mission resembling a NATO operation. Although UNIFIL is a Chapter VI Mission, its demeanour, deployment, equipment, modus operandi, and CIMIC operation is very NATO-like in character.

There are several reasons for conducting CIMIC operations on peace support operations and whilst CIMIC has now become orthodox in military operations, different Troop Contributing Countries (TCC’s) attach various levels of importance to its use. Analysts have suggested that militaries have embraced CIMIC a variety of reasons. ‘There are many reasons why military forces should wish to undertake humanitarian tasks, ranging from external altruistic and evangelist motivations to the more internal institutional and operational ones.’64 The external factors influencing CIMIC applications include considerations that some of the less

62 DPKO CIMIC Policy 2002
affluent TCC’s have limited resources and peacekeeping is a source of foreign exchange income to the country. These TCC’s do not have the financial resources to finance elaborate CIMIC programmes for their peacekeepers. Some wealthier countries fund CIMIC for altruistic reasons, in that CIMIC coincides with the values, morals and national attributes of the wider society. This permeates their military ethos and leads their military to engage in what has been called ‘military humanitarianism.’

Another external factor is evangelism, where governments require their militaries to do CIMIC so they might spread the values of liberal democracy. The internal factors suggested by analysts include, hegemonic strategy, in which the military conducts CIMIC to continue its role as a dominant element in Western imperialism, and substitution theory which asserts that since the end of the Cold War militaries are looking for something to do in order to avoid defence cuts. (Be relevant or become redundant). Legal obligations are intrinsic to modern peacekeeping operations as there is a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the peacekeepers now have an obligation to establish good governance. Domestic legitimacy means that the army wants to look good to those at home, while maintenance of morale allows CIMIC activities to generate a feel good factor to the troops and helps them to feel they are doing something worthwhile and also provides a welcome break from routine or boring military duties. Operational reasons provide force protection as ‘feeding hands do not get bitten.’

Info Ops and CIMIC combine to help the commander ‘Shape the environment’ and fulfil the mission by harnessing a wide variety of approaches.

CIMIC is still very much a work in progress and many militaries believe that the NATO policy is the still the best option Therefore, it is necessary for NATO to revise its AJP 9 and to acknowledge that in relation to CIMIC there is a need for greater differentiation between wartime operations and peacekeeping operations. The prominence of CIMIC in peacekeeping operations is such that CIMIC is a recurring theme throughout this thesis and is dealt with further in the Lebanon case study, the Kosovo case study in section 7.8.7 and the Chad case study in sections 8.5.8 and 8.6.5.

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65 ibid
3.12 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to explain what peacekeeping has become. It has dealt with the evolution of peacekeeping in the twentieth century from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War. It describes the concept of international peacekeeping, firstly, by outlining the evolution of international peacekeeping in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries through the stages: ‘Traditional’, ‘Robust’ and ‘Enforcement’. It has shown how the exponential growth of peacekeeping operations after the Cold War required a transformation to include peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, peace-making, peace-building and preventative deployment. Particular attention has been paid to the controversy surrounding ‘Robust’ peacekeeping and some of the author’s personal experience as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) in Sarajevo in 1992, have served as examples of the kind of events which occurred in missions during this period of transition from traditional to robust peacekeeping. The chapter has explained the concept of peace-enforcement and how it fundamentally differs from the concept of both traditional and robust peacekeeping. It has dealt with Regional Organisations and how they are used to conduct peacekeeping operations in addition to the United Nations. The author’s personal experience in the OSCE mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY) has provided an illustration of the activities of an OSCE post-conflict peace-building mission and this experience was compared to the his experiences in Sarajevo. The issue of humanitarian intervention and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) concept has been reviewed as well as other issues contiguous to peacekeeping, such as civilian policing, gender issues, and some of the unintended aspects of peacekeeping. The final section has addressed and explained the military term ‘Non-Kinetic’ assets.
Chapter 4: Irish Peacekeeping Policy and the Irish Defence Forces

4.1 Introduction

The first section of this chapter examines the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy since Ireland joined the United Nations and charts the influence of factors such as EU membership, Irish neutrality and the changing nature of international peacekeeping. The second section of the chapter examines the Irish defence force which is the main actor in the implementation of Irish peacekeeping policy. It explores the evolution of the defence forces and describes how this former predominantly internal security force responded to the challenges of international peacekeeping.

4.2 The Place of Peacekeeping in Irish Foreign Policy

Ireland is a small post-colonial country which depends for its survival on a regulated international environment in which the rights and interests of even the smallest are guaranteed and protected. Peacekeeping represents a major element of Irish foreign policy and Irish Peacekeeping forces represent a significant and tangible contribution of the people of Ireland to this regulation of the international environment.

In the early decades of the new state Irish foreign policy was preoccupied with establishing its independence and defining the state’s status within the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations. The decision to remain neutral during World War II was as much to prove that the new Irish state was not British as it was for domestic political reasons. Neutrality spared Ireland the destruction of its cities but it resulted in international isolation and economic stagnation during the boom of post-war reconstruction. The new Fianna Fail party leader, Sean Lemass, who succeeded Éamon de Valera in 1959, determined to change the economic policy of his predecessor from self-sufficiency to free market interdependency. He therefore instigated liberal economic policies such as a Free Trade agreement with the

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United Kingdom and pursued Irish membership of the European Economic Community. Meanwhile, Minister of External Affairs, Frank Aiken, established a prominent role for Ireland in the United Nations by supporting Chinese membership of the UN and in particular, under Aiken, Ireland supported other small countries such as Hungary following the Soviet invasion and Tibet following the Chinese invasion. Ireland advocated nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and decolonisation.

However, the Irish government was also keen to participate in more than just diplomatic initiatives, so when the UN needed neutral peacekeepers, the Irish government embraced the opportunity to provide tangible evidence of its commitment to the ideals of international cooperation and security. When, on 17 July 1960, the request to send troops to the Congo came from the UN Secretary General, the Irish government responded with alacrity. In fact, the Bill amending the Defence Act to enable Irish troops to serve overseas was introduced to parliament on 20 July and was brought into immediate effect on 26 July. For this reason wholly unprepared Irish troops departed Ireland for the first time in their history on the following day of 27 July 1960. The then DF Chief of staff observed:

The request was quite staggering…[However,] the emergency of the Second World War was long over: we were living from hand-to-mouth, from day-to-day and week-to-week, running courses and trying to keep our officers abreast of things. It was the sense of lack of purpose in our minds at the time that prompted us to say ‘yes’ to a battalion.  

67 The Irish troops departed for the Congo poorly equipped and with no training for tropical climates. However, they were well trained in infantry tactics and had significant experience in internal security operations. Consequently, they acquitted themselves surprisingly well. As their reputation grew as peacekeepers, so too did the prestige gained by the Irish government on the international stage. In addition, the early casualties sustained by the Irish troops paradoxically proved beneficial to the Irish army. The funeral of the nine Irish soldiers killed in the Niemba ambush in November 1960 was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourners, and the Irish commitment to peacekeeping began to establish itself as a patriotic narrative integral to national conceptions of Ireland’s international role. The profile and status

of the army amongst the Irish public was raised to unprecedented levels and the government responded by increasing spending on equipment for peacekeeping operations:

Ireland’s “motivation to engage in peacekeeping operations is primarily based on idealism and internationalism flowing from Ireland’s commitment to the United Nations and the consistent desire to sustain the organisation's status. However, Ireland’s positive and for the most part enthusiastic support for peacekeeping has also been underpinned by a shrewd appreciation of the resulting national benefits. Ireland’s direct contribution to important UN missions has materially raised its international profile and reinforced its foreign-policy influences.”

Almost by accident Ireland found itself providing an invaluable service to the United Nations insofar as the Cold War had paralysed the collective security function of the UN with the superpowers being mutually suspicious of each other’s intentions. The use of neutral countries was a compromise which was acceptable to the superpowers. Thus Ireland, along with other European neutrals and ‘Middle Power’ countries such as Canada, Norway, and India, found itself fulfilling a crucial role for the UN. Ireland subsequently reaped diplomatic benefits out of all proportion to its size.

The type of peacekeeping missions conducted by the United Nations between 1956 and the end of the Cold War in 1999 became known as ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping missions. However, the inter-state conflicts of that period were replaced by intra-state conflicts and civil wars thereafter and the ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping model quickly proved not fit for purpose. Despite this, recommendations for more robust peacekeeping action have not received universal support from the member states. In general, the EU and the US are in favour of a more robust approach but many of the major troops contributing countries, predominantly from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have serious reservations. Following American criticism of the UN’s Somali operations in 1994 a number of influential countries questioned the UN’s ability to tackle complex peacekeeping missions. It was felt that the UN did not have the infrastructure to mount effective peace-enforcement missions. Consequently, the international community increasingly turned to ‘Regional

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Organisations’ such as NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the African Union, and the Economic Community for West African States, amongst others, to resolve disputes regionally.  

For Ireland to contribute to the new peacekeeping operations a two-pronged approach was required. Firstly, a political decision had to be taken and the vocal left-wing neutrality lobby had to be faced down to enable the necessary legislation had to be processed through parliament. Secondly the Irish defence forces had to be made fit for purpose. In January 1994 the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, referred to the significance of Ireland’s further commitment to regional security and regional peacekeeping, stating:

In the same way as we contribute to the United Nations in promoting international peace and security, we must, and will, contribute the future security of Europe, taking account of the radical redefinition of needs which history has imposed on all of us.

In 1996, the Irish government published its first White Paper on Foreign Policy which asserted that Ireland’s involvement in Petersberg Tasks “would be in keeping with Ireland’s commitment to international peace; it would constitute a concrete contribution to European security; and would be a sign of solidarity with our European partners and neighbours in the search for a more secure and stable security order in Europe”. On matters of security and defence the White Paper insisted that Ireland supported the principle of a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy and was willing to consider proposals in that regard. In May 1997 the leader of the Labour Party and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, announced a proposal in the Dáil to dispatch a military police unit from the Irish Defence Forces to the NATO PfP mission in SFOR, arguing that:

Non-involvement in SFOR would risk marginalising Ireland from developments in conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Europe under UN and OSCE auspices.

Eventually, Fianna Fail who opposed membership of PfP when in opposition changed its position when in government and the Taoiseach, Bertie Aherne, clarified:

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72 Taoiseach Albert Reynolds quoted in the Irish Times 20 January 1994

73 White Paper on Foreign Policy in 1996

74 Dáil Debates 479 (514-526) 14 May 1997
I see no valid argument in terms of national interest as to why we should continue to remain out of line with other European neutrals on the PfP, or become more neutral than the neutrals themselves.\textsuperscript{75}

As shall be seen Ireland upgraded its peacekeeping capabilities and has participated in regional peacekeeping operations such as the NATO PfP mission in Kosovo KFOR as will be discussed in Chapter, and the EU mission in Chad EUFOR Chad/Car as will be discussed in Chapter 8.

4.3 Irish Peacekeeping Policy Documents

The legal instruments that enabled Irish peacekeeping activity were the First and Second Amendments to the Defence Act in 1960 which legalised Irish troop participation in international peacekeeping operations of a policing nature with the United Nations, the Third Amendment to the Defence Act 1993 expanded on this to enable Ireland to participate in peace-enforcement operations with the UN and Regional Organisations, while the 2006 Defence Amendment Act authorised the dispatch of contingents or members of the Permanent Defence Forces for service outside the state to conduct or participate in training with UN, EU, OSCE or any Regional arrangement or agency mandated by the UN.

4.3.1 Foreign Affairs White Papers

The 1996 White Paper on Irish Foreign Policy was the first time the Irish Government had published a foreign policy white paper. It recognised that many foreign affairs issues could only be effectively addressed at a regional or global level, and committed Ireland to participation in international organisations in order to reflect both the commitments to international co-operation enshrined in the Constitution and the will of Irish people.

Chapter 4 of the White Paper which dealt with International Security specified that the central elements of Ireland's security policy over many years included a policy of military neutrality, the promotion of the rule of international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes, a willingness to participate in peace-keeping and humanitarian operations throughout the world, and participation in the construction of the European Union and commitment to regional co-operation, especially in Europe. It emphasised Ireland’s involvement with the United Nations, the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the

\textsuperscript{75}Opening address by the Taoiseach, Bertie Aherne, at a European Movement National Conference. Dublin, 29 March 1999

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Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP).

Chapter 7 of the White Paper dealt with Peacekeeping and traced the evolution of Peacekeeping, its progression from traditional peacekeeping to Peace-enforcing and the outsourcing of peace support operations to Regional Organisations. It outlined the Irish Defence Forces history of Peacekeeping from 1958 onwards and it reiterated the Government’s commitment to sustaining the overall level of Ireland's contribution to peacekeeping for Chapter VI, VII and VIII missions on condition that they are mandated by the Security Council.

The 2015 White Paper, “The Global Island, Ireland’s Foreign Policy for a Changing World” confirms that Ireland will remain a committed contributor to UN and UN-mandated peacekeeping operations and affirmed that Ireland accepts its obligations to make assistance and facilities available in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security available to the Security Council armed forces under the UN Charter. It proclaimed that Ireland’s participation in peacekeeping has evolved pragmatically in response to changes in the international security environment and must continue to do so. In relation to Regional Organisations, it noted that the UN Secretary General has called on the EU and other organisations to play a greater role in meeting the growing demand for peacekeeping and that consequently Ireland advocates a strong EU contribution to UN peacekeeping. It declared that participation by the Defence Forces in such missions in accordance with relevant legislation is greatly valued and will remain a key part of Ireland’s foreign policy. It acknowledges that Ireland’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and cooperation with the European Defence Agency supports the development of the Defence Forces capabilities and improves the inter-operability essential to Ireland’s effective participation in peacekeeping operations.

4.3.2 Defence White Papers 2000 and 2015

The 2000 White Paper on Defence detailed the Government’s medium-term strategy for Defence covering the period from 2000 to 2010. It described the post-Cold War defence and security environment and the challenges facing the International Community including the EU’s response to this new environment. It emphasised that Ireland’s defence policy was to continue to have a conventionally organised Defence Forces capable of operating alongside
military forces from other countries in a peace support role and responding to the uncertainties and challenges of the changing environment.

Chapter 2 of the White Paper declared how important it is for a small country like Ireland to maintain a policy of operating as part of a wider interdependent international grouping, especially in the context of the EUs Common Foreign Security Policy. Chapter 3 dealt with Defence Policy and Programmes and role of the Defence Forces. This chapter stated that:

Ireland is a small country with a limited capacity to influence its external environment. We have a practical as well as a principled interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe and further afield. Our defence policy will seek to reflect this strategic interest (3.2.1).

However, mindful of the popularity of the concept of Irish neutrality, the White Paper pointed out that Irish involvement in European Security issues are in the context of peacekeeping whereas mutual defence commitments are the preserve of NATO of which Ireland is not a member:

The current challenges facing the EU relate essentially to peacekeeping and crisis management and not the hard defence commitments which for certain member states remain the preserve of NATO (3.3.9).

In relation to Ireland’s membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) the White Paper stated:

Ireland joined Partnership for Peace (PfP) on 1`December 1996. PfP provides a framework for co-operation between countries on a range of security, defence, humanitarian and other initiatives. The overall objectives of PfP are consistent with Ireland’s approach to international peace and European security. It involves voluntary and non-binding co-operation through a bi-lateral agreement with NATO (6.4.5).

Chapter 4 reaffirmed that only a conventional military force would have the capability to provide on-island security and respond to the peacekeeping challenges inherent in peace support operations. It committed to enhancing the conventional military capability of the defence forces and maintaining them at a level consistent with threats and roles, stating that once lost it cannot be easily regained:

A force other than a conventionally trained and appropriately equipped military force would not have the operational or technical expertise, deployability, readiness and capacity to discharge modern peace support type operations (4.3.6).
Chapter 4 also stated that overseas peacekeeping was the single biggest operational tasking for the Irish defence forces:

Overseas peace support and other operations, largely on UN authorised missions …are the Defence Forces single biggest operation tasking. By any international standard, Ireland is proportionately a very large contributor…Overseas operations have been an important dimension of meeting Ireland’s international obligations…and enhance the country’s standing on the international stage (4.4.1).

The second White Paper on Defence was published in August 2015. This White Paper reflected the wider Defence and Security Policy framework, and the increasingly complex nature of worldwide security threats and the need for a full-spectrum comprehensive response. It delineated the roles that the Irish government assigned to the Defence Forces and considered associated capability requirements. In addition, it set out decisions on the replacement of major equipment platforms for the following decade and other priorities for the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service:

In the international sphere, a more diverse range of issues are now recognised as posing security threats. The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the EU Heads of State and Government in 2003 identified that at that time the EU faced security threats “which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable”. These threats included: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.76

The key objectives for Defence that the 2015 White Paper laid out were; to give appropriate underpinning to Ireland’s engagement in international bodies particularly the United Nations and the European Union, to underpin the development of required civil and military capabilities with an appropriate multi-annual resource commitment; and to ensure defence policy contributes in a congruent way with wider social and economic policy.

4.4 The Conduct of Irish Foreign Policy

The accession to membership of the EEC in 1972 was a seminal turning point in Ireland’s foreign policy and it has had a profound effect on how Irish diplomats conduct the business of diplomacy.77 Since accession to the EC Irish foreign policy has been perceptibly Europeanized. Involvement in EU foreign policy co-operation has given Irish diplomats a broader perspective and provided them with more extensive and better analytical tools, which

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76 Defence White Paper 2015 Paragraph 1.2
77 Tonra, Ben. The Europeanization of Irish Foreign Affairs, Irish Centre for European Studies 2002
in turn has facilitated more in-depth analysis and strengthened the impact of national foreign policies. It has resulted in common work practices and structures, the sharing of information and the establishment of a common agenda through which a large proportion of ‘Irish’ foreign policy is being formulated. Foreign policy makers now frequently develop national positions within a European context:

Today, this European dimension permeates every field of Irish foreign policy. It is the "...central framework within which we pursue our foreign policy objectives." 78

Europeanization of foreign policy is hardly unique to Ireland. It has had a profound effect on all EU member states. The pooling of resources and sharing of information has given all states, but especially the smaller states, access to far greater resources and helped them to make more informed decisions. Member states now consider the European dimension of issues before formulating a national position and great efforts are made to arrive at a European consensus before national decisions are taken. ‘Irish policy makers speak about Ireland’s ‘voice’, ‘impact’ and ‘weight’ having been augmented. They are also conscious that their position within the EU gives them access to policymakers in third countries and to other international institutions that would not otherwise be open to them’. 79

For example, the Danes and the Germans traditionally supported Israel, but they gradually moved toward the ECP position, which was more sensitive to Arab views... Similarly, Ireland had few direct interests here before joining the EU... Yet the Irish learned to develop their positions towards the Middle East within the context of ECP. 80

The resources for pursuing an exclusive Irish foreign policy are limited for a country of Ireland’s size. However, it is unique in that there is a significant Irish Diaspora dispersed throughout the English-speaking world which maintains an affinity with Ireland and has ensured that the Irish opinion has influence. The Europeanization is not without its critics. Some people argue that it has resulted in an erosion of national sovereignty and Ireland is in danger of losing its distinctive voice in the international community.


79 Tonra, Ben. The Europeanization of Irish Foreign Affairs, Centre for European Studies, 2002

Membership of the EEC broadened the scope of Ireland’s foreign policies. By being a member of a regional organisation, Ireland is able to tackle broader political issues, including international ones in the Dáil and in international forums. However, the down side is a diminution of Ireland’s active individualism as a neutral power.

4.4.1 The Bahrain Declaration

Following the 1973 October War between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the subsequent oil shortages in Europe, the nine members of the EEC developed a political stance which was more accommodating towards Arab states. Statements of the European Council in June 1977 supported the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to their homeland, and claimed that the representatives of the Palestinian people should take part in the negotiations. During the period when Frank Aiken was Minister for External Affairs, Ireland maintained a neutral stance on the Middle East issue. However, the Irish position after it became a member of the EEC turned clearly to the pro-Arab side which was the European norm. Ireland’s pro-Arab policy peaked in February 1980, when on a visit to Bahrain the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Brian Lenihan, issued the ‘Bahrain Declaration’ which asserted that the Palestinian people “had the right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state in Palestine…All parties, including the PLO, should play a full role in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement…Ireland recognised the role of the PLO in representing the Palestinian people.”

4.4.2: Unintended Consequences of the Bahrain Declaration:

On 31 March 1980, a few weeks after the ‘Bahrain Declaration’, a group of high ranking Israeli officers were refused entry to the Lebanese village of At-Tiri by Irish peacekeepers. On 6 April a confrontation began when the Israeli-backed Lebanese Christian militia (De Facto Forces (DFF)) were denied access to At-Tiri by Irish peacekeepers. The confrontation lasted a week during which a DFF militiaman, an Irish peacekeeper and a Fijian peacekeeper were killed. In the weeks that followed the DFF escalated the conflict by shelling the UN HQ in Lebanon causing several casualties and kidnapping several UN soldiers. In one of the kidnappings three Irish soldiers were shot by DFF forces, two died and one was severely wounded. It later emerged that an Israeli intelligence officer was present at the shooting. An

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acrimonious row broke out between the Irish and Israeli authorities during which the Israelis accused the Irish of a lack of impartiality and therefore unsuitability for UN deployment in the region:

It is essential that a principle of impartiality should be strictly maintained not only in operational areas by peacekeepers but also in the foreign policy of the contributing governments towards the regions where their contingents are deployed.  

The ‘Bahrain Declaration’ was a departure from the neutral stance which had been the hallmark of Irish foreign policy up until that time and it represented a significant Europeanization of Irish foreign policy. The Israeli government considered the declaration to be partisan, and as a consequence the six-hundred Irish peacekeeping troops serving in the region with the UN were compromised. Whether or not the ‘Bahrain Declaration’ was responsible for the deaths of the Irish peacekeepers is debatable however, as the area in which the Irish operated was extremely volatile with frequent clashes between the protagonists.

4.4.3 Hezbollah and the EU’s Terrorist List

In July 2013, EU policy was changed following a UK initiative to have Hezbollah placed on the EU’s list of terrorist organisations. This proposal was supported by Germany and France. However, Ireland and Austria, amongst others, declined to support it. The initial reason given by the British government for the initiative was reports of Hezbollah’s involvement in the 2012 bombing of a bus in Bulgaria that had killed five Israeli tourists and a local bus driver. However the Bulgarian socialist-led government which was elected in May 2013 distanced itself from the claims of the previous administration that Hezbollah was involved:

It is important that the [EU] decision be based not only on the bombing because I think the evidence that we have is not explicit.”

Throughout the summer of 2013 evidence of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war in support of the government of Bashar al-Assad emerged and this swayed many EU member states to support the UK initiative. Austria changed its mind and its original opposition to the UK initiative, having coincidentally withdrawn its troops from UNDOF in Syria where they had been deployed for the previous thirty-nine years, citing that Austrian troops faced an

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83 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Kristian Vigenin. Reported in Irish Times 23 July 2013 ‘European Union to Blacklist Hezbollah’s Military Wing’ By Suzanne Lynch and Mark Weiss
“uncontrollable and direct threat”\textsuperscript{84} to its peacekeepers as its reason. Ireland, who has four hundred peacekeepers deployed with UNIFIL in a volatile Shia area and who replaced the Austrians in Syria with one hundred and fifty peacekeepers, continued to resist the UK proposal claiming it would destabilise Lebanon where Hezbollah were in government. EU policy makers modified the proposal, confining it to Hezbollah’s military wing and recommitted to continuing support to Lebanese institutions. The proposal required unanimity to be adopted and by 22 July only Ireland and Malta opposed it. With twenty-six countries in favour, after intense diplomatic pressure Ireland and Malta finally relented, and on 23 July 2013 Hezbollah’s military wing was placed on the EU’s terrorist list.

4.5 Neutrality

4.5.1 Introduction

Ireland chose to remain neutral during World War II and since then successive Irish governments have retained the policy of military neutrality as an integral tenet of Irish Foreign Policy.

Ireland is an EU member-state but it retains commitment to military neutrality. Neutrality is central to Irish foreign policy and owes its origins to an attempt by the British Government to introduce conscription in Ireland during World War I, specifically in 1917. Opposition to this became a popular political platform for the Irish Republican movement and since then the concept of neutrality has acquired a mythical status that has grown to become a symbol of Irish sovereignty and more specifically, independence from Britain. During World War II, the Irish people viewed their government’s policy of neutrality as a pragmatic decision which spared the country from the horrors of war, but was additionally seen as a display of sovereign independence and proof that Ireland was no longer a British satellite state. The vast majority of the Irish people continue to favour neutrality, even if many do not fully apprehend its implications. The Fifth and Thirteenth Hague Conventions of 1907 directly engaged with issues of neutrality:

Belligerent states have to respect the integrity of a neutral state, while that state must fulfil certain obligations: prevention of the use of its territory or jurisdiction,

\textsuperscript{84} Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann quoted in Irish Times \textit{Irish Troops need backing and clarity in UNDOF role. by Edward Burke}
abstention from giving support to any belligerent state, and acquiescence in the acts of belligerent states.\textsuperscript{85}

In fact, Ireland did not fulfil these requirements. It failed to invest enough in its defence forces to provide a credible deterrence to would be aggressors and during World War II, it made several concessions to the United Kingdom which included over-flight permission for allied aircraft in Donegal, repatriation of internees and intelligence cooperation. However, despite this many Irish citizens continue to view neutrality somewhat as a symbol of national identity:

The neutrality reservation has been deeply embedded in national political culture throughout this century. For the Irish nationalist movement neutrality was synonymous with an anti-imperialist (and specifically anti-British) worldview.\textsuperscript{86}

Popular opinion in Ireland has displayed antipathy towards defence alliances, which they see as mechanisms with the potential of propelling people into wars against their wishes. The Irish public were overwhelmingly opposed to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the 1993 war in Iraq, and a vociferous minority continually oppose the use of Shannon Airport by US military aircraft. The Irish Government’s ambivalence to neutrality continues, and as the \textit{1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy}, points out:

In the strict sense of international law and practice, neutrality and its attendant rights and duties do not exist in peacetime. They arise only during a state of war. Neutrality represents an attitude of impartiality adopted by a state towards the participants in a conflict and is recognised as such by the belligerents. Such an attitude creates certain rights and duties between the neutral state and the belligerents, which commence at the outbreak of war and end with its cessation.\textsuperscript{87}

When the Irish Government was offered membership of NATO at its inception in 1948, it declined, not on grounds of traditional neutrality, but because the Irish Government claimed it could not join NATO while Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{88} In 1949 the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Sean McBride, stated that the reason for non-

\textsuperscript{86}Keatinge, Patrick. \textit{European Security, Irelands Choices}. Pg 111
\textsuperscript{87}White Paper, Foreign Policy, 1996. Para 4.5. Government Publication Office Dublin
\textsuperscript{88}Keatinge, Patrick. \textit{European Security: Irelands Choices} The Institute of European Affairs. Dublin 1996. Pg 111
membership of NATO was partition and that Ireland would join once it had ended. In 1961, when Ireland applied to join the EEC, Sean Lemass said:

We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservations as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence.

However, there is an embedded public perception in Ireland that the State has a constitutional commitment to neutrality, a perception that received quasi-constitutional status when Ireland ratified the Single European Act in 1987, which was accompanied by a national declaration asserting the status of military neutrality in the explicit terms which had hitherto been avoided. In the 1990s, successive Irish Governments gave commitments that any change on the policy of neutrality would be submitted to a referendum and this was strengthened during the second referendum on the Nice Treaty which was held on 19th October 2002, with the addition of a new provision, Article 29.4.9, guaranteeing that the state would not enter an EU mutual defence pact. The concept of neutrality remains very precious to the Irish electorate, so much so, that none of the political parties in the Irish Parliament advocated membership of NATO, the WEU, or any military alliance, which contained a mutual defence clause. Indeed, the fear of covert entry by Ireland into a military alliance was one of the main reasons attributed to the rejection of the Nice Treaty by the Irish electorate on 7 June 2000, and to ensure a ‘yes’ vote in the second referendum it was felt necessary to add Article 29.4.9. Again, the issue of loss of neutral status and the fear of conscription into a European army was attributed to being one of the major factors which contributed to the Irish electorate rejecting the Lisbon Treaty on 12 June 2008, when in a turnout of 53.1%, the treaty was rejected 53.4% to 46.6%. The political parties were again accused of running an inept, lacklustre campaign against the more impassioned ‘No’ campaign. In what has now become the inevitable follow-up referendum on 02 October 2009, in which the political parties, civil society groups and prominent European politicians united to campaign for Lisbon and issued assurances which included Irish neutrality and fiscal independence, the referendum was carried by 67.1% for, to 32.9% against, in an overall turnout of 59%.

91Keatinge,. 1996 Pg 112
92Irish Constitution 29.4.9: The State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Article 1.2 of the Treaty referred to in subsection 7 of this section where that common defence would include the State. 29.4.7: The State may ratify the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related Acts signed at Nice on the 26th day of February, 2001.
Military neutrality in the Cold War period centred on the non-membership of the collective defence alliances that prevailed in the bi-polar Cold War system. This policy may now be considered redundant in the uni-polar system where the USA is perceived to be the sole superpower. At the beginning of the century, the possibility of a major European or global conflict was seen as somewhat remote and the Irish Government’s *2000 White Paper on Defence*, was sufficiently confident to state that:

Ireland enjoys a very benign external security environment…Ireland faces virtually no risk of externally instigated conflict in the immediate region and any change in this position is likely to be preceded by a significant warning time of some years.  

### 4.5.2 Ireland’s Commitment to Peacekeeping

Despite the neutralist stance taken by the Irish State since its foundation it has never been isolationist. Ireland joined the UN in 1956 and has been actively involved in peacekeeping since 1958. Since then, Irish troops have been continuously overseas and have carried out in excess of 50,000 tours of peacekeeping duty. In 1989, An Garda Síochána began participation in the civilian police aspects of peacekeeping operations. Prior to making Ireland’s European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) commitments to the EU Capability Commitment Conference in November 2000, the then Irish Foreign Minister, Brian Cowen, wrote that, “Peacekeeping is an integral element of how we see ourselves in the world.”

The Irish Government has committed to providing 850 troops at any one time to peacekeeping missions throughout the world and since 1999 Irish troops have served with NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the UN. Following the 2011 financial crisis the maximum strength of the Irish Defence Forces is 9,500 personnel. The Naval Service and the Air Corps combined currently account for approximately 2000 personnel and the strength of the army is below 7,500 troops. Thus the figure of 850 troops represents 11% of the Irish army serving overseas at any given time. As most tours of duty are of six months duration and there are two tours per year, this can result in up to 22% of the army serving overseas in a typical year. The six months tour of duty is preceded by three months pre-deployment training and with post deployment leave of one month and de-briefing, administrative and logistical issues.

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94Cowen, Brian. TD, Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Irish Times 18-11-2000
taking up to another month, this results in a tour of duty taking a soldier away from his unit for up to eleven months. The average soldier can expect to serve three years in his home unit and one tour of duty with an overseas unit every four years. This is an immense commitment from the Irish army by any international criteria.

At the end of the 1990’s the Irish government conducted a major security review, the results of which were published in the 2000 White Paper on Defence. The White Paper assessed the defence and security environment as benign, and said that the external security challenges do not contain any specific threat to the overall security of the state. In relation to internal security it stated that the on-island security environment is being transformed through processes under the Good Friday Agreement, which provides the basis for a lasting peace. However, the White Paper acknowledged that there were broader security challenges in the European context which impact on Ireland as a member of the European Union including humanitarian and other crisis for which international resources are required. The White Paper further stated that the European Union treaties do not provide Mutual Defence Guarantees. However, it is clear that security interests of member states are increasingly interdependent. The White Paper noted that the EU countries are adapting themselves to new realities and are engaging in detailed cooperation and that “it is in Irelends and Europe’s interest to continue to develop the architecture and structures which will continue to improve structures in the European and international domain.” The White Paper further acknowledged that the EU is involved in increasingly proactive and preventative approaches, which entail a range of coordinated techniques, such as, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, policing and military, in the form of regional peacekeeping and crisis management. These are seen as necessary to ensure stability and to defend against threats to security in the European sphere. The White Paper also committed the Government to initiating a planning process to examine how personnel might be drawn together in a more integrated way for service abroad.

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96 Ibid Para 2.2.4
97 Ibid Para 6.3.6
98 Ibid. Para 3.2.11
4.6 The Irish Defence Forces

There has not been a day in the last four decades when an Irish peacekeeper has not been somewhere on duty as a sentinel for peace in a distant part of the world.

President William J. Clinton 1998

4.6.1 Introduction

The Irish Defence Forces came into existence with the birth of the state. It was a baptism of fire as within weeks of the first recruits receiving the most rudimentary of training they found themselves embroiled in a Civil War. Within its first year of existence 600 soldiers were killed in action, including its Commander in Chief, Michael Collins. In the wake of the Civil War the defence forces were seriously downsized and despite the fact that its preeminent role was defined as protection against external attack, the state did not provide the resources necessary to do so, and the army was kept just strong enough to deter the internal threat of the IRA. As a result of this the defence forces were in a poor condition at the outbreak of the war in 1939. However, World War II saw the defence forces built up to 55,000 personnel tasked with defending Ireland’s neutrality.

Between 1945 and 1969 the defence forces were once again radically downsized and again starved of equipment. The outbreak of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland resulted in the need to reinvigorate the defence forces in order to assist the unarmed Gardaí in their fight against IRA aggression. In addition, in 1960, the army was given the new role of international peacekeeping and this has been the lifeline which has sustained the defence forces since that time.

4.6.2 The Origins of the Irish Defence Forces

The origin of the Irish defence forces can be traced back to the formation of the Irish Volunteers (Óglaigh na hÉireann) on 25 November 1913. They were founded to safeguard Home Rule in response to the 1912 founding of the Ulster Volunteers who had formed to oppose it. At the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, many of both the Ulster Volunteers and the Irish Volunteers joined and fought in the British Army. However, not all the Irish Volunteers took that course of action and a minority of them rebelled against British rule

during Easter Week 1916. The summary execution of the rebellion’s leaders led to a transformation in the political mood in Ireland. In the General Election of 1918, Sinn Fein won 73 seats and the Unionists won 23 seats, mainly in the North. The first shots of the ‘War of Independence’ were fired in Soloheadbeg, Co. Tipperary, on 21 January 1919, when Irish Volunteers, now known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) shot and killed two policemen. So began a guerrilla war which lasted until July 1921. The Irish delegation to the peace negotiations which were held in London had plenipotentiary powers but they were ambiguous in that they were directed to refer to Dublin before signing a treaty. On 6 December 1921, Lloyd George presented an ultimatum to sign the treaty and the Irish delegation acquiesced. When the delegates returned to Dublin, the Dáil split into pro and anti-treaty sides. On 7 January 1922, ‘The Treaty’ was ratified by the Dáil with 64 votes for and 57 against but the anti-treaty group could not accept the decision and staged a walk-out. On 14 January 1922, a Provisional Government was established by those who remained to administer the twenty-six counties in the interregnum before the instantiation of the ‘Irish Free State’:

In December 1921, in accordance with the terms of the ‘Treaty’, the British forces began an immediate withdrawal of the twenty-six counties and left in their wake a state of chaos. ‘No regular police force; no system of justice; no security; trade and commerce at a standstill; a divided country; a split army’. The Provisional Government’s implementation of the treaty resulted in confrontation with the anti-treaty side. This was the atmosphere in which the regular army of the new Irish Free State (Saorstat na hÉireann) began to develop. On the political front a general election was held on 18 June 1922 and pro-treaty candidates received a mandate to implement the terms of the treaty, having received an overwhelming 78.42% of the vote. However, those who were opposed to the treaty refused to accept the majority decision, initially of the Dáil, and then the electorate and the country descended into civil war.

4.6.3 The Civil War

The political party Sinn Fein split and its military wing the IRA also split with former comrades by taking opposite sides on the issue of the Treaty. The anti-treaty side did not recognise the authenticity of the Provisional Government and on 12 April anti-treaty gunmen seized and occupied the Four-Courts and other prominent buildings in Dublin. On 27 June

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1922 the new government began a campaign to establish its authority and the Free State army confronted the anti-treaty forces occupying the Four Courts using artillery. The Civil-War had begun and its effects linger in the Irish body-politic to this day. It lasted 11 months and by the time it ended with a ceasefire on 24 May 1923, 4000 people had been killed.

4.6.4 Post-Civil War - The Emergency

During the Civil War the Free State army had grown to 55,000 all ranks. However, notwithstanding the need for an army, one of the first items on the agenda of the government after the civil war was to reduce the army to a peacetime establishment, and by 1932 the army had been reduced to 6,700 all ranks. The government asserted civilian control of the army and consequently the Departments of Defence and Finance were given extraordinary powers over the army.

4.6.5 The Emergency 1939 – 1945

Ireland did not enter World War II and was fortunate to remain neutral throughout, in what it called ‘The Emergency’. In opting to stay out, Ireland did no more than every other small state sought to do. In fact, twenty-seven European countries elected to avoid war in September 1939, though only five maintained their neutrality unscathed. However, Irish neutrality was pragmatic and was described as neutral in favour of the Allies. With de Valera’s permission the army’s intelligence section G2, established a close relationship with British and American intelligence agencies, and served as ‘a key instrument of Irish-Allied diplomacy.’

4.6.6 1945 to 1999

Following the war the defence forces were again reduced to a peace time establishment just strong enough to keep the IRA in check. The civil service reasserted itself and a strict system of austerity and excessive administrative control was implemented. By the outbreak of ‘The Troubles’ in 1969, army numbers were low with no occupied military posts north of the Dublin – Mullingar – Galway line. New battalions were therefore formed, over a dozen new military posts were established in the border region, and the army embarked upon a period in

which it concentrated on ‘Aid to the Civil Power’ This entailed assisting the Gardaí through the policing functions of patrolling border areas, escorting cash in transit, searching unoccupied premises throughout the country for arms dumps and IRA training areas, and guarding vital installations and prisons where convicted IRA personnel were incarcerated. As a consequence, over this thirty year period the members of the Irish army gained extensive experience in operating in a policing role amongst the civilian population, which experience influenced their modus operandi in international peacekeeping operations.

4.6.6.1 The Ballinamore Episode

One event that influenced the Irish army’s modus operandi took place in Ballinamore in 1983 when a British supermarket executive, Mr Don Tidy, was kidnapped by an IRA unit on 24 November. A ransom was demanded which the Irish government rejected and a nationwide manhunt was initiated by the security forces. In early December the manhunt concentrated on the Ballinamore area of County Leitrim. Hundreds of troops and Gardaí deployed there and on 16 December soldiers and police approached Derrada Woods, having no reason to believe that this day would be any different to the previous days of fruitless searching. However, unknown to the searchers Derrada Woods was the location of the ‘hide’ and as the searchers drew near, the kidnappers armed with assault rifles took aim. One of the kidnappers pulled a balaclava helmet over Don Tidy, to make him indistinguishable from his captors, and when the searchers approached the wood the kidnappers opened fire, killing Pte Patrick Kelly and Garda Recruit Garry Sheehan. Confusion reigned and the kidnappers made good their escape but Don Tidy managed to slip away from them in the confusion of the engagement to reach the soldiers. Although the kidnappers had made their escape the Gardaí did not know this and believed they were still holed up in the area, so a cordon was thrown up around the area and dozens of roadblocks were set up on the periphery. The soldiers manning the roadblocks were told the kidnappers were trapped inside the cordon and under no circumstances were they to be allowed to break out. That night a car containing a local couple who, frustrated at being stopped at interminable roadblocks drove through a checkpoint. The soldiers opened fire and the car crashed to a halt, the driver having sustained gunshot wounds was removed to hospital. The Gardaí at the scene informed the soldiers that the incident would necessitate an official investigation and they advised the soldiers to get legal advice before making their statements. The soldiers requested the assistance of the army legal service. However, it quickly emerged that such facilities would not be made available to them. The soldiers privately engaged legal advice before they made their statements to the investigating officers.
When the file was sent to the relevant authorities a ‘nolle prosequi’ decision of dismissal was made. However, following the Ballinamore incidents soldiers became very circumspect about opening fire and this culture was brought on peacekeeping missions.

4.6.7 1999-2016

In 2000, three years after the Northern Irish peace agreement was signed, the government published a White Paper on Defence which laid out a strategic plan for the DF for the following ten years. It recommended that the army concentrate on becoming a light infantry force equipped for overseas peacekeeping operations. Over the following ten years the DF training, and procurement programmes were geared for overseas service. As Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Jim Sreenan noted:

> From 1969 until 2000 out main customer was the Department of Justice to whom we provided aid to the civil power. Now out main customer is the Department of Foreign Affairs under whose auspices we send peacekeepers overseas.\(^{103}\)

The White Paper on Defence 2000 reduced the strength of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) from 11,500 to 10,500 as the level necessary to fulfil Government policy. The banking collapse in 2007 resulted in a revised strength ceiling of 10,000 PDF personnel was agreed with the Department of Finance in October 2010. However, the actual numbers serving continued to fall below that level. Following the Comprehensive Review of Expenditure in 2011, the Government stabilised the strength ceiling of the PDF at 9,500 personnel. The Minister for Defence initiated a reorganisation of the Defence Forces. In July, 2012, the Minister announced a reduction in the establishment to two Brigades. Other key aspects of this reorganisation included the consolidation of under-strength Units, the disestablishment of certain units, and a reduction in the number of headquarters. There are now four barracks in each of the two brigades, a reduction from over thirty barracks and posts at the height of the northern troubles in the 1970’s.

Since 2000 the defence forces have endured a level of rationalisation and expenditure cuts out of all proportion to other government departments. During the boom period of the ‘Celtic

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\(^{103}\)Sreenan, Jim. Irish defence forces Chief Of Staff in talk to senior officers in the Military College 2007, at which the author was present.
Tiger’ when other government departments were experiencing unprecedented growth the
defence forces were being downsized:

In 2010 average defence expenditure across EU States, as a percentage of (GDP), was
1.6%, whilst Ireland’s rate of defence expenditure was 0.6%. This was second lowest
within the EU with only Luxembourg recording a lower percentage at 0.5%. Defence
provision includes the cost of developing and maintaining capability as well as the
direct cost of participation in overseas peace support operations.\footnote{Irish Government’s Green Paper Defence 2013 Para 4.3.1 \textit{Economic Resources}}

The immediate future of the defence forces promises further cutbacks as equipment degrades
with use and age and there seems little prospect of replacing old equipment or investing in
modernisation:

The funding provided for Defence has been reduced in recent years as part of the
programme of correction in the national finances. Within this reduced resource
envelope, resourcing the defence forces’ front line operational capability has been
prioritised. In this context, the Defence Forces entered the current period of economic
austerity with modern equipment. However, equipment and platforms will depreciate
in the normal manner and stocks will be consumed.\footnote{Ibid}

The spending on defence continues to decline year on year as government revenues collapsed
due to the economic crisis:

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Table 4.1 Irish Defence Budgets 2008 - 2015

There was no room for more stringent cuts as a percentage of GDP as the government gave a
commitment to maintain the strength of the defence forces at 9,500 with pay and pensions
accounting for over 80% of the budget. Capital spending is focused on ship purchase with
three ships needing to be purchased at an average cost of €50 million each, in order to
maintain the national fleet at 8 ships.

\footnote{http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2015/EstimateStatement.aspx}
\footnote{CIA Factbook 2015}
Table 4.2 Organisation Chart of the Irish Defence Forces 2015

4.6.8 Peacekeeping and the Irish defence forces

The main role of the DF in overseas operations is the provision of infantry units for peacekeeping operations. The first deployment of Irish troops on a peacekeeping
mission was to the Congo in 1960. Since then, ‘International peacekeeping has been a lifeline for the defence forces’.  

Aside from financial resources peacekeeping has helped to provide operational experience and rewarding work for serving personnel as well as creating ‘a better public image of the army’. 

Following the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ in 1995 political commentators called for a peace dividend similar to the international reduction in defence spending following the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the Defence budget was targeted for savings, notwithstanding the fact that the Irish spend on defence throughout and despite the ‘Northern Troubles’ was one of the lowest in the European Union. The generals realised that if the role of the defence forces was not redefined the DF faced the prospect of its very existence being brought into question. Mulqueen suggests that the general staff identified international pressure on the government for Irish participation in complex peacekeeping missions:

The generals ‘got political’ in this regard during the frosty rationalisation negotiations in 1999-2000. They tailored their bargaining positions to growing internationalised political pressures on the government for Irish participation in higher-tempo peace enforcement missions and deeper integration in EU foreign policy structures. They had moved on from their forbearers’ dream of a conventional home based defence. They signed up to a ‘light infantry force and negotiated to maximise its capabilities for a modest (but steady) spend. 

Following the publication of the 2000 White Paper on Defence the main focus of the defence forces has been international peacekeeping with the UN and regional organisations such as the EU, NATO’s PfP and the OSCE:

The Petersberg Tasks are the main drivers of Irish defence policy and planning and the defence forces are being re-equipped, re-trained and re-orientated accordingly. 

They (the defence forces) had become an important arm of (Irish) Foreign Policy in a manner which no one had expected, and the public had grown used to idea that through army involvement in UN service the state could make a meaningful contribution to the enhancement of security and the promotion of peace in different parts of the world. 

111 O’ Halpin, 2002, p. 55
As noted above, in 1960 the first contingent of Irish troops departed for the Congo. These troops were poorly equipped and were not trained for tropical conditions but the army learned fast, and when a section of Irish troops were overrun and massacred by Baluba tribesmen in 1960 the subsequent inquiry found that a contributing factor was that the Irish troops standard weapon was a bolt action, single shot rifle. As peacekeeping had now become a Foreign Policy priority, the Department of Finance was directed to sanction a programme of equipment renewal and the army was permitted to purchased modern semi-automatic rifles and crew-served support weapons.

When the era of Traditional Peacekeeping came to an end, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the Irish defence forces had a major commitment to what then seemed as an intractable problem in South-Lebanon (1978-2000), such that it was not in a position to make a meaningful contribution to any of the intra-state conflicts which erupted in the 1990’s. However, officers of the defence forces served as observers and staff officers in many of these new missions and they saw at first hand the unsuitability of traditional peacekeeping methods to deal with the more complex intra-state conflicts. They identified the necessity for peace-enforcement missions and realised that the UN did not have infrastructure to mount such operations. These officers reported to Dublin that when the UNIFIL commitment ended, the Irish defence forces as they were then configured, would not be in a position to participate in any of the missions being conducted by the regional organisations. As a Chief of Staff noted:

Our reticence was based on our lack of proper equipment for peace operations at the heavy end of the spectrum.¹¹³

From 1988 until 1991 Ireland provided 117 of the 400 UNIMOG personnel involved in supervising the disengagement of Iranian and Iraqi forces. From 1993 to 1994 Ireland contributed a transport company to the UN’s Chapter 7 mission in Somalia, and a further transport company was sent to NATO’s Kosovo Force in 1999. Following the purchase of modern APC’s, the commitment to KFOR was upgraded from 2003-2010 to a mechanised infantry contingent. In addition, Irish military police served in Bosnia from 1997 with NATO’s SFOR and from 2005 until the time of writing with EUFOR. In 1999 a platoon of Special Forces were sent to East Timor and in total 9 such contingents served there. In

2001/2 an Irish infantry force of 221 all ranks guarded the UN headquarters in Eritrea. From 2003 to 2007 an Irish mechanised battalion was the Rapid Reaction Force for the UN mission in Liberia. In 2007 Irish troops played a significant role in the EU’s bridging force in Chad and remained on to serve in the follow-on UN force until 2009. In 2011 a mechanised infantry battalion went back to UNIFIL where it remains until present (2016), and in 2013 an Irish mechanised infantry company became the rapid reaction force for UNDOF in Syria.

In order to be able to participate in these missions the defence forces had to undergo a major modernisation programme which saw over €100 million invested in the purchase of armoured personnel carriers (APC’s). These procurements were financed during a period of severe defence financial cutbacks by the sale of military property and savings accrued by the downsizing of the army.

Membership of the UN and the subsequent peacekeeping missions undertaken by the Irish Defence Forces proved to be most beneficial to the well-being of the Defence Forces. In the period following the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ many questioned the need for a defence force in Ireland especially in the relaxed post-Cold War security environment of Western-Europe.

The Foreign Policy decision to participate in collective security conducted by the United Nations and the Regional Organisations has resulted in peacekeeping being now the primary de facto function of the Irish Defence Forces.

4.6.8.1 The Irish defence forces Commitments to ESDP

At the European Union’s Capabilities Commitment Conference November 2000, Mr. Shamus Brennan TD, pledged a total of 850 troops to the ERRF from Ireland. In 2006, the Irish Government also pledged 100 troops to the Nordic Brigade of the EU Battle Groups which required legislation to be passed in the Dáil\(^\text{114}\) to legalise the training of Irish troops in foreign jurisdictions. The first group trained in Sweden in 2007 and has been on-going since then. The Nordic Battle Group which includes between 100/150 Irish troops remains on standby to the EU. In 2007, Ireland undertook to provide 400 troops to the EU peacekeeping mission in Chad and to provide the Commander and senior staff officers to the operational HQ in a mission that lasted two years.

\(^{114}\) The Defence Amendment Act 2006
4.6.8.2 Preferences: UN or Regional Organisation’s PKO’s?

As we have seen the Irish defence forces participate in peacekeeping operations (PKO’s) with several international organisations including the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). In Ireland there is generally more public support for UN PKO’s than Regional Organisations PKO’s.

With ‘costs’ being a decisive factor in their decision-making processes, the Departments of Finance and Defence tend to favour UN PKO’s, as the UN reimburses the Irish exchequer for costs incurred in UN PKO’s whereas in NATO and EU PKO’s a ‘costs lie where they fall’ system operates, so that the troop contributing countries (TCC’s) incur the full cost of deploying their peacekeepers.

The Irish defence forces deploy as directed by the Irish government. However, amongst senior Irish DF officers, and in contrast to public opinion preferences, there is a predisposition for participation with Regional Organisations because they are perceived to have better capabilities and capacities than UN PKO’s. Regional Organisations are better resourced, have better command structures, have more emphasis on inter-operability between the TCC’s, show greater awareness of the importance of intelligence gathering which in turn, creates greater theatre awareness. This affords greater force security and provides their forces with the ability to respond to a changing operational environment:

In terms of the military aspects, Ireland’s participation in the PfP would manifestly contribute to the enhancement of the Irish defence forces at many points: correction of the defects in the defence structure, improvement of equipment and officers’ skills in decision-making and general leadership, and more compatible training system with other European partners.\footnote{Katsumi Ishizuka, \textit{Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000: A Study of Irish Motivation}. London 2005, P155}

There are many advantages for having the United Nations conduct peacekeeping operations. The UN was established following World War II. UN PKO’s have legitimacy in international law and all member states are required to support and facilitate their deployment. However, UN deployments in the 1990’s proved to be problematic, specifically those in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, where the UN PKO’s were deemed to have been costly failures. In recent years senior Irish officers have tended to favour participation in PKO’s conducted by
Regional Organisations as they believe the professionalism of the defence forces has been enhanced by participation in NATOPfP and the experience of operating as a high-tech mobile force rather than a low-tech static force is more beneficial and suitable to the capabilities of the restructured Irish defence forces. The United Nations also benefits as it now actively seeks TCC’s that can be a force multiplier in UN peacekeeping missions:

The contemporary challenge confronting the UN is not simply of attracting the right number of uniformed peacekeepers. Indeed UN officials report that they are often able to recruit sufficient numbers of basic infantry soldiers for their missions. The challenge lies in recruiting the right sort of personnel and force multiplier capabilities.\(^{116}\)

Since 2003 Ireland has been in a position to provide hi-tempo rapid reaction forces to UN peace-enforcement missions, beginning with UNMIL (Liberia) in November 2003 and MINURCAT in Chad in 2009. The peacekeeping deployments by the defence forces in UNIFIL since 2011 and UNDOF since 2013 are also mechanised mobile forces. In 2015 Irish deployment to UN missions was the fifth largest of the EU member states in real terms and the largest in terms of percentage of GDP and size of the army.\(^{117}\)

### 4.6.9 Irish Peacekeeping Modus Operandi

#### 4.6.9.1 Introduction

The Irish army has been continuously involved in international peacekeeping since 1960. In that time the Irish have developed a unique style of peacekeeping that is a product of several factors: Ireland is a neutral country and has never fought in an international war; although Ireland is now a relatively wealthy European country it is unique in that it is post-colonial and Irish soldiers have consistently demonstrated an empathy with the populations of newly emerging states; the Irish police force is unarmed and the Irish army, although established and trained along conventional military lines, has been primarily deployed in ‘Aid to the Civil Power,’ a role traditionally conducted by gendarme type organisations on the European mainland. This operational experience is good preparation for peacekeeping. As the


operational language of most UN EU and NATO peacekeeping missions is English, Irish peacekeepers have a distinct linguistic advantage, especially in multi-national HQ’s where there is always a demand for staff officers with English written and oral communication skills.

4.6.9.2 Conduct and Discipline

In the mid 2000’s the issue of fraternisation and exploitation of women who are engaged with survival sex in conflict and post-conflict societies was highlighted to the United Nations and the UN has taken strong measures to ensure that peacekeepers abide by a strict code of conduct. The Irish Army encountered issues in this area particularly during the Eritrea mission where reports emerged of Irish peacekeepers frequenting a local hostelry, a barely disguised brothel where local women engaged in survival sex were allegedly exploited by Irish peacekeepers. When the reports arrived in Dublin strong measures were taken by DFHQ to address the issue including confining off-duty soldiers to camps during their tour of duty.

4.6.9.3 Irish defence forces and CIMIC

The Irish defence forces have continuously sent peacekeeping forces overseas since 1960. However, wherever Irish peacekeepers went they found that the local populations asked for aid and assistance and successive Irish commanders reacted positively. The assistance usually took one of two forms. The first was the use of ‘organic assets’ in which the Irish used their equipment and human resource assets to perform such tasks a supplying medical assistance to the sick and injured, and provided transport to carry sick and injured people to hospitals. Irish officers taught English in local schools, engineer assets were used to repair roads, provide water, and build latrines etc. Irish troops raised funds to improve schools, medical centres, improve school yards, build playgrounds and assist in the running of orphanages. All of these were common activities undertaken by Irish peacekeepers before the concept of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) was developed. In the 1990’s Irish units received funding, initially from the Department of Defence and latterly Irish Aid, to fund ‘micro projects’ of a development nature in their areas of operations. These micro funds of usually around €25,000 per unit are subject to strict criteria, require an amount of administration to access, and are usually very slow in arriving. Consequently, they represent a significant sum but less than 50% of the money spent by successive Irish contingents. The balance has traditionally been

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118 See Chapter 3.10.4 CIMIC
obtained by fundraising activities by the peacekeepers in theatre and at home. In 2005, the DF in Liberia received a grant of €30,000 from Irish Aid, but spent over €85,000, on aid projects. The deficit was made up by the fundraising efforts of the Irish troops [who] generated an additional €55,000.\textsuperscript{119} In 2006, the defence forces made a submission to the 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid outlining the assistance to civilians undertaken by successive Irish contingents in the areas where they operated. The submission sought to have these contributions acknowledged in the White Paper and to have some form of commitment to the funding of projects by Irish peace support missions in the future. The submission was successful in that the White Paper stated:

In the countries and communities where they work, Irish peacekeepers often also undertake projects to contribute directly to local development. Where, appropriate, we will provide financial support for these activities.\textsuperscript{120}

However, contact between Irish Aid and the defence forces is only conducted at a strategic level, unlike the UK where the Department for International Aid (DfID) has taken coordination with its military beyond this strategic level and has developed closer links at the operational and tactical levels. In Afghanistan, for example, a very close working relationship exists between the military contingent and civilian members from the Foreign Office and DfID.\textsuperscript{121} However, the military and civilian authorities in Ireland prefer to keep the relationship between Irish Aid and the DF at the strategic level with politicians, civil servants and senior military officers holding the opinion that extra funding to the Defence Forces would undoubtedly enhance standards but it would ‘require a level of auditing and evaluation that would be an unnecessary burden on the military at the tactical level.’\textsuperscript{122} The doctrine of CIMIC which the Irish defence forces has adopted mirrors the NATO doctrine, the reason for this being that the main impetus for drafting the doctrine came from Irish officers serving in Kosovo when they sent home the clear message that Irish officers were deficient in the formal training and doctrine of CIMIC. Recognising the requirement to train officers for CIMIC appointments at International Force HQ level senior Irish officers considered that NATO CIMIC doctrine was the most appropriate for the DF because they took the view that at that time NATO was the only organisation which had a comprehensive doctrine and

\textsuperscript{120} White Paper for Irish Aid 2006. P 57
\textsuperscript{121} Mc Carthy, Kevin. p9
\textsuperscript{122} ibid. P 22
training programme. Consequently, the NATO doctrine was adopted as the DF CIMIC doctrine.\textsuperscript{123} However, NATO doctrine is ‘boldly and aggressively mission orientated,’\textsuperscript{124} whereas the practice of assisting local communities by successive Irish peacekeeping units is much more in keeping with the UN concept of CIMIC.\textsuperscript{125}

4.7 Conclusion

The evidence in this chapter helps to answer the two key central research questions of this thesis. With respect to the first question, regarding the impact of doctrinal changes on Irish peacekeeping policy and practice, it demonstratessaw that duringthe 1950’s the Irish government changed its policy direction from self-sufficiency to free market interdependency and consequently it was in Ireland’s national interest to engage with the international community to ensure a regulated international environment in which the rights and interests of even the smallest states are guaranteed and protected. To that end Ireland placed great importance on international diplomacy in the United Nations and when the UN requested that Ireland provide peacekeeping troops in1960 Ireland saw peacekeeping as a logical extension of its diplomatic policy. Between 1960 and 1989 Ireland played a significant role in international peacekeeping operations with the United Nations. However, the end of the Cold War resulted in a seismic change in the international security environment and the traditional peacekeeping formula was found to be wanting. A series of initiatives were undertaken by the UN in addition to traditional peacekeeping, including robust peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and the United Nations also outsourced peace-enforcing to Regional Organisations. Meanwhile Ireland was heavily committed to the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between1978 until 2000.

However, it is apparent that from a policy perspective the ground work was laid to enable Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations, and the Defence Act was amended in 1993 and 2006 to make legislative provision for Irish military participation in peace-enforcement operations with the United Nations and Regional Organisations. The Foreign Affairs White Papers in 1996 and 2015 made further policy provision for Irish military

\textsuperscript{124} Goulding in Keyes. P 17
\textsuperscript{125} The NATO and UN concepts of CIMIC are discussed in Chapter 3.11
participation in peace-enforcement operations with the United Nations and Regional Organisations.

The *2000 Defence White Paper* enunciated the government’s strategy on defence and international peacekeeping and committed to upgrading the military capacity of the defence forces to discharge modern peace-support operations. Whilst aid to the civil power remains a significant function of day-to-day defence forces operations, the overseas commitment has become the major function of the Irish defence forces. As was shown in Chapter 3.7.4 membership of NATO’s PfP was instrumental in enhancing the Irish defence forces capabilities, ensuring the Irish defence forces compatibility and inter-operability with NATO forces. This in turn has enhanced the desirability of Irish peacekeepers for United Nations peacekeeping operations which now requires European troop contributing countries to provide forces with force-multiplier capabilities.

The *2015 Defence White Paper* reflected the wider security and defence framework and the increasingly complex nature of security threats in the world and the need for a full-spectrum comprehensive response. It also acknowledged the associate capability requirement but unfortunately did not specify them or commit to providing them. It is clear that whilst policy realignment rapidly emulated shifts in global peacekeeping doctrine, translating such shifts into appropriate equipment, organisation and deployment of Irish soldiers took far longer. Thus while military professionals support engagement in peace enforcement with all its operational implications, public opinion and domestic political predispositions remain in line with the limited and obsolete conceptions of peacekeeping that are easier to align with historical conceptions of Irish neutrality.

With respect to the second question dealing with Ireland’s continued commitment to international peacekeeping and the effect of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy on Irish peacekeeping this chapter offered some key insights. It revealed that membership of the European Union gave Irish diplomats access to extensive diplomatic resources which led to Irish foreign policy being inextricably framed within a European context, and by which Irish contributions to EU initiated peacekeeping may have helped to expand Ireland’s foreign policy influence and leverage. The 1990’s were a period of seismic change in the field of international security. By this stage the Irish defence forces were fully engaged in internal security operations at home and as will be discussed see in the Chapter 5 Lebanon case study,
over six-hundred Irish troops were also committed to a very difficult and dangerous peacekeeping mission in south Lebanon.

Due to the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy Irish diplomats were au fait with developments in the evolving international security situation. As early as 1993 legislative provision was enacted for the participation of Irish troops in peace-enforcing operations, even though the Chapter 7 Kosovo case study will show, the defence forces had not been given the necessary capabilities and capacity to deploy a mechanised unit to a peace-enforcement mission until 2003. The 1996 Foreign Affairs White Paper prepared the policy groundwork for Irish peace-enforcement deployments and while Irish troops did not participate in peace-enforcement operations in the 1990’s, Irish military officers served in observer and liaison roles in peace-enforcement operations and kept defence forces headquarters in Dublin abreast of the developments in international security operations. For the army, the operational requirements of peace-enforcement necessitated an upgrade of resources and equipment, offering a “lifeline” to a scenario in which following the end of the Northern Irish “Troubles”, the army’s raison d’être was more open to question.

The advantage of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy was tempered by unintended consequences as the Bahrain declaration showed and it is clear that Irish diplomats were conscious of this when Ireland opposed the UK initiative to proscribe Hezbollah in 2013. Thus this chapter has demonstrated that Irish peacekeeping policies evolved in response to the new direction taken by international peacekeeping in the 1990’s. However, Irish policymakers could not disregard the issue of Irish neutrality and whilst there is recognition of new peace-enforcing tasks and engagement with regional organisations, Irish policy documents do not fully acknowledge the degree to which the Irish defence forces require equipment and an organisation that can enable it to perform peace-enforcement effectively as will become evident in the following chapters.
Chapter 5: Lebanon - A Case Study

1.1 Introduction

Lebanon has become the seminal peacekeeping experience of the Irish defence forces. It is the greatest commitment to a peacekeeping mission ever undertaken by Ireland in terms of longevity, casualties, and international operational experience. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was originally conceived, mandated, and deployed as a traditional peacekeeping mission but this did not prove to be the case. The longevity of the UNIFIL mission is such that it transcends the Cold War and post-Cold war period and consequently serves as a roadmap to chart the progression of Irish peacekeeping practice. From 1978 until 2006 the UNIFIL deployment operated under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 which embraced the traditional Cold War concept of peacekeeping, whereas operating under the new Resolution 1701 from 2006 onwards, UNIFIL adopted the more dynamic concept of robust peacekeeping.

This case study is organised in three sections; a Lebanese background, an overview of UNIFIL's development between 1978 and 2016, and the Irish UNIFIL experience. The Lebanese background provides a brief topographical description along with a synopsis of the history of Lebanon. The overview of UNIFIL's operations divided into four distinct periods will then follow. The first period, 1978 to 1982, reveals how UNIFIL was set up as a Chapter 6, traditional peacekeeping mission but from its outset was hampered by lack of support from the Security Council. The second period, 1982 to 1985 concerns the Israeli invasion and occupation and the growth of Lebanese resistance to the Israeli occupation. The third period, 1985 to 2000, focuses on Israeli ambivalence towards UNIFIL, in that while it openly supported the DFF it nonetheless provided essential operational facilities to UNIFIL. It also charts the growth of the Shiite resistance movement. The fourth period deals with the aftermath of the 2006 war and the strong Mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

The final substantive part of this chapter describes the Irish UNIFIL experience. The political and operational situation in Lebanon changed dramatically between 1978 and 2016 and this section of the case study is again divided into four sections. 1978 – 1982 is first the period, when the main protagonists were the PLO, the IDF, and its surrogate DFF. As will become clear the peacekeepers had to operate in very difficult circumstances in which the
prerequisites for successful peacekeeping were not present and UNIFIL was left to its own devices as political support from the Security Council was absent. In relation to the Irish Battalion (Irish Batt), the lessons of previous overseas missions had been learned and were applied but the learning curve was not complete. Logistical support to Irish Batt from Ireland was deficient and some of the tactical decisions proved to be problematic. The second, period 1982 to 1985, saw the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and this section will show how the Irish Batt operated providing by humanitarian assistance and curtailing the excesses of the surrogate Israeli proxy militias. The third period, 1985 to 2000 was the era of Shiite resistance to the IDF/DFF occupation of the ‘Enclave’. This was a particularly problematic period for Irish Batt and a period in which it incurred significant casualties. By 2000, when the Israeli Defence Forces finally withdrew to Israeli territory the Irish military authorities were anxious to pull out of Lebanon and take advantage of the opportunities presented by the exponential growth of peacekeeping operations throughout the world since 1990. Irish troops returned briefly to Lebanon in 2006 to help establish the newly mandated so-called UNIFIL 2. In 2011 Irish Batt returned to Lebanon as there was no Irish contingent overseas following the closure of the UN mission in Chad and the Irish authorities accepted an invitation to return to UNIFIL 2 in 2011. The Irish Battalion that returned to Lebanon in 2011 was very different from the 1978 to 2000 units as the Irish defence forces had been radically overhauled and transformed from a garrison force to a mobile force with state of the art mechanised resources. Thus the fourth period 2011 to 2016 explores the Irish battalion’s return to Lebanon in 2011 until time of writing in 2016 demonstrating how Irish peacekeeping battalion’s have been radically transformed and have embraced the concept of robust peacekeeping which they practiced in Kosovo (2003–2010) Liberia (2003–2007) and Chad (2008–2010)

The conclusion summarises the insights this case study has contributed towards addressing the key research question and its subset of related questions.

## 5.2 Brief History of Lebanon

Bordered to the west by the Mediterranean Sea, Syria to its north and East and Israel to its South., Lebanon is at the periphery of the Arab World and it has trading links with Europe, Asia and Africa. These links have helped to foster a unique cultural identity which encompasses religious and ethnic diversity.
The end of World War I in 1918 also signalled the end of 400 years of Ottoman rule, when Syria, of which Lebanon was then a province, was mandated to France by the League of Nations. France had had a long established interest in Lebanon through its 19th century diplomatic support of the Maronite community in its rivalries with the British-backed Druze, a local Islamic sect. In 1920, France formed the state of Greater Lebanon, a predominately Christian entity, but also incorporating many Muslims including Druze. In 1926, France created the Lebanese Republic, and in 1942, Lebanon established a unique political system known as confessionalism, a power sharing mechanism based on the religious communities predicated on the data of 1932 census. The Lebanese Republic was created when the French expanded the borders of Mount Lebanon to include the areas which is now the country of Lebanon. This expansionism meant that large numbers of Sunni and Shia Muslims now found themselves living in the country of Lebanon. The confessional system was intended to
deter sectarian conflict and attempts to fairly represent the demographic distribution of the religious groups in government. Therefore the President has to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi’a Muslim. In 1943, in the midst of World War II, when much of France was occupied by the Germans, Lebanon held a general election after which Lebanon became an independent republic and a parliamentary democracy with seats being divided between the Christian and Muslim communities.

![Figure 5.2 Distribution of Religious Groups in Lebanon and Population density.](https://www.theodora.com/maps)

5.3 The Zu’ama

The historical fluctuation in the stability of the state of Lebanon has led many scholars to explore the reasons why Lebanon is intact during certain periods and fragmented during others. It is argued that a unique duality of a power monopoly which the Maronites and Druze had acquired over their own constituencies during the early stages of Lebanon’s establishment has made it difficult to institute a centralised and legitimate state authority.
This absence of such authority in the presence of relatively powerful communal leaders gave rise to the political concept referred to ‘Zu’ama, which has impacted heavily on Lebanon’s political life. Zu’ama were identified by Albert Hourani as being feudal, populist or urban bosses\textsuperscript{126} who provided assistance to the poor as well as mediating in disputes.\textsuperscript{127} They organised sophisticated political machinery to recruit and control a cliental of supporters.\textsuperscript{128} As a result of the weak character of the state, government employees are consistently influenced by the Zu’ama and undertake tasks of representing and assisting members of their communities. Therefore, some sectors of the Lebanese political system operated like a patriarchal ‘mafia’ with the Zu’ama acting as godfathers to their clientele. However, the Lebanese state emerged from the efforts of two outstanding Zu’ama, Beshara Khoury and Riad Solh, who ratified their agreement with an unwritten National Pact based on the principle of conciliation of the communities. The National Pact meant that the Christians accepted the end of French rule, while the Muslims renounced their goal of becoming a part of a greater Arab state with Syria.\textsuperscript{129} However, the pragmatic arrangement between the Zu’ama who represented Lebanon’s two largest religious communities, failed to satisfy the political aspirations of all the leaders of Lebanon’s religious communities.\textsuperscript{130}

5.4 National and Regional Conflicts.

5.4.1 1948 Arab-Israeli War

In May 1948, Lebanon politically supported its Arab neighbours against Israel but did not take part militarily. As a consequence of the war some 100,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon and Israel would not allow them return. Because of the delicate confessional political balance Lebanon did not grant citizenship to the Palestinians or their descendants and to this day they are subject to institutional discrimination being forbidden to work in many professions. At present there are more than 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who


\textsuperscript{129}Ibid


\textsuperscript{130}Goria (1985) pp. 11
remain in a political limbo, and live mainly in camps. When the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was expelled from Jordan in 1970, it based itself in these camps and functioned as a separate state within the state of Lebanon. The PLO set about intensifying its attacks against Israel using south Lebanon as a base. In addition, the delicate confessional balance in Lebanon was compromised by the influx of large numbers of Sunni Palestinians. PLO fighters also added dramatically to the weight of the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition of Muslims, Arab nationalists and leftists, who opposed the rightist Maronite-dominated government. These clashing developments helped precipitate the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war.

5.4.2 Civil War

By 1975 the two main coalitions confronting each other in Lebanon were the Lebanese Forces (LF), an alliance of different Christian groups dominated by the Phalange party led by Bashir Gemayel. The LF favoured the continuation of the confessional system and the ending of Palestinian extra-territorial rights. The opposing coalition was the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), comprising Sunni, Shia, Druze, and other disparate Muslim groups. The LNM demanded the end of the confessional system and sympathised with the Palestinian cause.

The incident believed to have ignited the Lebanese civil war took place in April 1975 when gunmen in a speeding car fired at a church in an east Beirut suburb where Christian leader Pierre Gemayel was attending service. The shooting killed 4 people, including two of Gemayel’s body guards. Just hours later, Christian militia men stopped a bus and killed 27 Palestinian passengers. By that evening clashes had erupted throughout Beirut, and over the next few months minor skirmishes developed into all-out fighting between the militias. Strongholds began to emerge with the Christians dominating east Beirut and the PLO and Muslim militias dominating west Beirut. Over the next several years the fragile coalitions fractured and were reformed, often with former enemies, and would then split again. In March 1977, the leader of the Druze, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated, and in 1978 the leader of Amal, Imam Musa al Sadr, disappeared on a trip to Libya. In addition, between 1976 and 1982 the conflict between the PLO and Israel also continued and intensified.
5.4.3 The 1978 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

The Lebanese Government preoccupied and weakened by the civil war effectively abandoned the south, thereby giving the PLO free reign. On 11 March 1978, eleven PLO fighters landed on a beach in northern Israel and hijacked two buses full of passengers on the Haifa to Tel-Aviv road, shooting at passing vehicles. They killed 37 Israelis before being killed in a shoot-out with the Israeli forces. The Israeli army invaded Lebanon four days later and advanced as far as the Litani River but avoided the heavily occupied PLO controlled city of Tyre. The UN Security Council met in an emergency sitting and passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which it charged with supervising the Israeli withdrawal and maintaining peace in its area of operations. The Israeli forces executed a partial withdrawal later in 1978, but Israel retained control of a 12-mile (19 km) wide ‘security zone’ along the border. To hold this zone Israel installed, equipped, and paid a Christian-Shia proxy militia which they called the South Lebanese Army (SLA) under the leadership of former Lebanese Army Major, Saad Haddad. UNIFIL never recognised the legitimacy of this force and referred to it as the ‘De Facto Forces’ (DFF). Violent exchanges soon erupted between the PLO, Israel, and the DFF, with the PLO attacking DFF positions and firing rockets into northern Israel. Israel conducted air raids against PLO positions, and the DFF continued its efforts to consolidate power in the border region. The Chapter 6 Peacekeeping mission was neither mandated nor equipped to intervene in such a conflict and the Peacekeepers were confined to a role of observing and reporting on the activities of the protagonists. UNIFIL forces caught in the middle were subjected to continuous attacks from all sides and its peacekeepers were killed and wounded by members of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the PLO, The DFF, and various Lebanese Muslim militias.

5.4.4 Second Israeli Invasion, June 1982

In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time. On this incursion the Israeli army advanced to the suburbs of Beirut purportedly to destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon.

131Chapter 6 of the Charter of the United Nations is deemed to enable the UN Security Council to dispatch an international peacekeeping mission to facilitate the peaceful disengagement of protagonists. Chapter 6 Peacekeeping Missions are traditionally lightly armed for self-protection and are not authorised or equipped to intervene in the conflict.
Additional objectives included curbing the Syrian influence in Lebanon and an attempt to bolster the influence of the LF. The primary aim of the invasion succeeded in so far as the PLO was forced to withdraw from Beirut in 1982. However, the strengthening of the LF was dealt a severe blow in September 1982 when Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated and the LF responded by massacring hundreds of Palestinians in refugee camps under the control of the IDF. The resulting international outrage was severely embarrassing for Israel and by the time Israeli forces eventually withdrew back to their ‘security zone’ in south Lebanon in 1985 Syrian influence throughout Lebanon had become stronger than ever.

5.4.5 End of Civil War

The mid 1980s saw a further deterioration of the security situation with intra-sectarian conflict amongst the Muslims and Christians. The Shia militia, Amal, assumed control of West Beirut and soon a full-scale war broke out between Amal and the Palestinians in what became known as the “War of the Camps” which ultimately led to the occupation of Beirut by the Syrians in 1987. By 1990, Amal was replaced as the major force in West Beirut by the more radical Hezbollah. In East Beirut the Christian forces fragmented as a result of internecine conflict between various prominent families. In October 1990 Syrian forces invaded east Beirut and effectively ended the civil war. By then it had run its course; fifteen years of hostilities, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and still no one group was able to establish dominance over others. However, Syria emerged as the hegemon in Lebanon for the next fifteen years. The Lebanese leaders met in the Saudi town of Taif in 1989 and the Taif Agreement was signed. The agreement reaffirmed the confessional system of government but redistributed power by giving an equal number of seats in parliament to Christian and Muslim groups and reduced the power of the President in favour of the Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament. All the militias were disarmed in 1991, with the exception of Hezbollah

5.5 Hezbollah

Whilst the Israeli invasion was a significant stimulus to the inception of Hezbollah, the key factor was Iranian expansionism. Iran first made overtures to Amal, the Lebanese Shiite Political party backed by its own armed militia, in 1982. However, the secular leadership of Amal was reluctant to engage. Thus Iran set about creating Hezbollah (The Party of God). Hezbollah has always received generous financial support from Iran, which by 2014 it was believed to be in excess of US $200 million per year. As well as its military wing, Hezbollah
is a successful political party with a popular social agenda supplying social services to the poorest in Shiite society. Hezbollah’s administration is better paid than the Lebanese civil service. Hezbollah fighters are well trained, disciplined and highly motivated and they mounted a sustained campaign of assaults on IDF/DFF positions in the 12 Km buffer zone in southern Lebanon from its inception in 1982 until the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. As a result, Hezbollah’s role in forcing the Israeli withdrawal was acknowledged by all sectors of Lebanese society including Christians. Following the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, all the confessional militias disarmed and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the gendarmerie called the Internal Security Force (ISF) were tasked with protecting the population. However, Hezbollah did not disarm, using the pretext of its continuing resistance against the Israeli occupation.

5.6 Additional Israeli-Lebanese conflicts

The occupation by Israel of the 12 km ‘buffer zone’ enabled Hezbollah to justify its exemption from the disarmament of the militias and it continued its attacks on DFF and Israeli installations in the buffer zone and occasionally into Northern Israel. In 2000, Israel eventually withdrew behind a line agreed with UNIFIL which became known as the Blue Line. Relative peace arrived in South Lebanon, UNIFIL reported an almost total cessation of hostilities and therefore downsized from 6000 troops to 2000 troops. But the refusal or inability of the Lebanese security forces to mount a significant deployment south of the Litani River, left a security vacuum which was filled by Hezbollah. Their forces had free reign in the area, deployed right up the Blue Line, and frequently taunted the IDF.

In July 2006, Hezbollah launched rockets into Northern Israel and soon after fired anti-tank missiles at an Israeli patrol on the Israeli side of the Blue Line. Of the seven Israeli soldiers in the two vehicles, two were wounded and five were killed. Israel responded with massive air and artillery fire into Lebanon and then launched a ground invasion into Southern Lebanon. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the IDF in Guerrilla warfare. The war lasted 34 days and over 1000 people, mainly Lebanese civilians, were killed. The IDF suffered 121 dead and 628 wounded\textsuperscript{132} and failed to destroy Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

\textsuperscript{132}Winograd Commission Report, page 353. Based on Northern Command medical census of November 9, 2006
The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006. The resolution enabled the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy in force in southern Lebanon up to the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon. It also provided for a greatly enhanced UNIFIL both in terms of manpower, military equipment, and additional use of force powers tasked to support the LAF in enforcing the authority of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon.

5.7 Lebanon since the Civil War

During the relatively peaceful 1990s tremendous strides were made rebuilding Lebanon’s physical infrastructure. The standard of living of most Lebanese improved as the economy stabilised and inward investment grew. However, the old political and confessional divisions remained and for many, the continued presence of the Syrian forces remained a contentious issue. However, Hezbollah, the Shia community and some Christians supported the Syrian presence. In October 2004 Prime Minister Hariri resigned and was replaced by the pro-Syrian, Omar Karami. Four months later on 14 February 2005, Hariri was assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb which killed 21 people. Over the next few weeks several massive pro and anti-Syrian protests took place in Beirut, and on 26 April 2005 Syrian armed forces finally withdrew from Lebanon.

A multitude of political parties remained in the Lebanese parliament however, falling into two main political groupings. The first is the 14 March Group which is comprised of Sunni, Christian, and Druze members and is predominately opposed to Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs. The second group is the 8 March Group which consists of Shia, and Christian members and is predominately pro-Syrian. The Druze groupings are fickle and can move from one group to another as political expedience determines. In July 2009, the March 14 Group won the general election but it took until November 2009 before a national unity government led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri was formed with fifteen cabinet seats allocated to the March 14 alliance, 10 to the opposition March 8 Alliance and 5 to nominations of President Suliman. (11 Cabinet votes are required to veto legislation). Since 2010 Lebanon has experienced a period of political stalemate which came to a head in 2014 when the parliament failed to elect a President. This has had the knock on effect of stalling the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015. Meanwhile, the Syrian Civil War which
began in March 2011 has resulted in 1.3 million refugees seeking refuge in Lebanon and this has placed a major strain on the Lebanese infrastructure, as Lebanon already hosted over 400,000 Palestinian refugees in camps. Refugees have access to most basic services through public institutions, where the authorities continue to play an active role in facilitating response coordination and planning. The international community funds and runs the camps. However, funding shortfalls were reported in 2015.

5.8 UNIFIL

On 17 March 1978, the Lebanese government brought the matter of the Israeli invasion of 14/15 March 1978 before the United Nations Security Council. Regional considerations shaped the council’s reaction. The Camp David negotiations, which the United States was sponsoring between Egypt and Israel, had reached a critical stage and it was thought that if the Council took no action on Lebanon, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt would not continue negotiations. The United States therefore pressed hard for a UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. Political pressure from the United States overrode the secretariat’s reservations and UNSC Resolution 425 established UNIFIL on 19 March 1978. As was noted by a senior United Nations official:

Overall in March 1978, southern Lebanon constituted what might well become a UN peacekeepers’ nightmare…Such precautionary views were unwelcome to the influential members of the Security Council who were demanding immediate action. (It was only 28 years later; in 2006 that UNIFIL acquired at least some of the essential features that were lacking in its original set-up).  

UNIFIL was hampered from its inception, was unable to implement its weak mandate, and was prohibited from acquiring the equipment to robustly implement peace. Despite this, UNIFIL represented the only significant legitimate force for law and order south of the Litani River. Its soldiers deployed into the towns and villages of the region. It manned road checkpoints to stem the flow of arms into the area. It conducted constant mobile and foot patrols throughout its streets and deployed listening posts to monitor movement. It helped to arrange local ceasefires for the planting and harvesting of crops. It provided aid and assistance in the form of medical aid, water supplies and equipment to schools and clinics.

UNIFIL’s purpose was to:

133 Urquhart, Brian. The Origins of UNIFIL al–jonoub, UNIFIL Magazine’s special 30 year edition P6, 7 June 2008
- Confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon
- Restore international peace and security
- Assist the Lebanese government in restoring its effective authority in the area

From 1978 to 1982, UNIFIL established itself south of the Litani River and attempted to implement its mandate. Whilst it did bring stability which facilitated the return of most of its population it was unable to implement all its assigned tasks. The concept of its operations had to be adjusted between 1982 and 1985 during which the UNIFIL positions were overrun and occupied by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). However, the decision was taken to leave the force in-situ during the Israeli occupation in order to provide humanitarian assistance and to monitor and report on the situation in the area. Following the Israeli partial withdrawal in 1985, UNIFIL resumed its Resolution 425 and 426 functions until the Israeli withdrew behind the internationally recognised border in 2000. Following this UNIFIL was radically downsized but continued to operate under the 1978 mandate. However, the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war once again impelled the Security Council to significantly enhance UNIFIL and Resolution 1701 was issued to expand its original mandate.

![UNIFIL Deployment 1978](Source UN)
5.8.1 1978 to 1982

Many of the operational problems that beset UNIFIL arose from the failure to define its area of operations in south-Lebanon at the outset. On its northern front the Israeli invasion avoided the city of Tyre and the area of Nabatiya owing to their large Palestinian populations. Israel pressed for UNIFIL to occupy both these areas but the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) insisted that UNIFIL’s deployment should be confined to areas vacated by the withdrawing Israelis. In addition, the PLO claimed freedom of movement in south-Lebanon citing the 1969 Cairo Agreement to which Lebanon was a signatory. On the southern front Major Haddad’s Christian militia, which the Israeli’s referred to as the South Lebanese Army (SLA) and which UNIFIL called the De Facto Forces (DFF), occupied a twelve kilometre enclave. Israel argued that UNIFIL should not deploy in this enclave as the IDF had never occupied it. The pitfalls of such an imprecise AO became all too evident when French UNIFIL troops tried to deploy in the Tyre area which was then a PLO stronghold. The PLO put up strong resistance to the French presence in the area and was diplomatically supported in New York by the Arab states.

UNIFIL therefore found itself sandwiched between the PLO to the north and the IDF and its surrogate Lebanese force the DFF to the south. In this position UNIFIL troops were continuously subjected to shelling and harassment.\footnote{Parker, James. Lt Gen (R) \textit{UNIFIL and Peacekeeping, The Irish Defence Forces Experience}. Royal Irish Academy’s, Journal Irish Studies in International Affairs (1986) P 67}
UNIFIL had a central unified command structure with its headquarters located in Naqoura on the coast about six kilometres from the Israeli border. The Force Commander (FC), a major-general, reported to the Secretary General in New York. From 1978 until 2000 the size of the force ranged between 5,000 and 6,000 troops with battalions from eight countries operating in their assigned areas of responsibility. The civilian staff consisted of a political adviser and a chief administrative officer headed the civilian branch which included permanent staff members from New York. A 'Field Service' also provides logistical support, particularly
accommodation, transport, computers and communications, and a significant number of Lebanese civilians were also employed to maintain the camp facilities in UNIFIL HQ.\textsuperscript{135}

In addition to the peacekeepers, there were about seventy UN military observers (UNMO’s) from the UN Truce Supervisory Organisation which is headquartered in Jerusalem. They are called Observer Group Lebanon (OGL and were under the operational control of UNIFIL’s Force Commander.\textsuperscript{136}

For the first four years the UNIFIL AO was in a state of semi-war with both sides maintaining a ceaseless bombardment of each other’s positions with artillery, mortar, tank, and rocket fire. Haddad’s militia was particularly culpable of assaults on UNIFIL. The PLO also clashed with UNIFIL, and although direct negotiations with Yasser Arafat led to a modest degree of cooperation with UNIFIL, incidents continued to cause UNIFIL fatalities. UNIFIL attempted to restore the authority of the Lebanese government in the south by facilitating the deployment of Lebanese Army units in the UNIFIL AO. However, these efforts were frustrated by Major Haddad’s DFF who heavily shelled any concentration of Lebanese forces.\textsuperscript{137}

5.8.2 1982 to 1985

In 1982 Israel launched a massive air and armoured attack into Lebanon, ostensibly with the intention of putting northern-Israel beyond the range of PLO rockets. However, it soon became apparent that there were also political motivations which included efforts to drive the PLO out of Lebanon, removing the PLO’s political support for the Palestinian political movement in the West Bank and Gaza, and facilitating the establishment of a pro-Israeli government in Beirut.\textsuperscript{138}

The UNIFIL contention backed by the record, was that it had been so successful in countering infiltration and had been prepared to accept many casualties in the process that the PLO were forced to resort to long-range fire from north of the UNIFIL area. Infiltration could not therefore, be adducted as a pretext for launching the 1982 invasion. The Israelis assessed UNIFIL’s AO to June 1982 as “quiet.”\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid P67
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid P67
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid p 67
\textsuperscript{138} Unit History 51 Irish Batt UNIFIL, Irish Military Archives.
\textsuperscript{139} Parker P68
The invasion heralded a traumatic period for UNIFIL as it was swept aside by the massive Israeli invasion and had to co-exist with an occupying force for the next three years. Needless to say, UNIFIL was subjected to criticisms for failure to resist and prevent this massive Israeli invasion, but Brian Urquhart dismissed such censure:

> The force in south-Lebanon was not put in to repel the Israeli or any other army engaged in a massive military operation.\(^{140}\)

In the event UNIFIL remained in position and lodged protests, and new arrangements and procedures were devised which enabled UNIFIL to coexist with the occupying force. The civilian population in the UNIFIL area which had increased by over 200,000 in the previous four years was now swollen by an additional 150,000 refugees. UNIFIL responded by increasing its humanitarian facilities to aid the civilian population.\(^ {141}\)

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\(^{141}\) Parker. P 70
The activities of the Israeli occupying forces resulted in a noticeable increase in resistance by the Lebanese population to the Israeli occupation. The Lebanese militias planted roadside bombs and set ambushes resulting in mounting IDF and SLA casualties. The Israeli conscript troops resorted to ‘reconnaissance by fire’ effectively continuous indiscriminate firing.

Initially the local Lebanese had welcomed the IDF invasion as there was no love lost between them and the PLO, but the activities of the IDF soldiers helped to create a much more dangerous enemy than the PLO had ever been.\(^{142}\)

The IDF and its militias resorted to intimidation, beatings, torture, killings, and demolishing the houses of Lebanese citizens. UNIFIL monitored and reported the IDF activities and atrocities, and at times intervened. This international presence had an inhibiting effect on IDF activities. Inevitably UNIFIL became the target of accusations by all sides; the IDF accused it of obstructing and impeding its counter-terrorism operations, while the Lebanese complained that UNIFIL was not providing adequate protection and was collaborating with the IDF by diffusing roadside bombs. By 1985 the IDF had succeeded in expelling the PLO from Lebanon but its efforts to pacify the country and install a pro-Israeli government was a dismal failure. Beset by mounting casualties and international condemnation the IDF withdrew to its twelve kilometre enclave but this time it had set up over twenty new positions in the UNIFIL area of operations. These positions were to become a focal point for Lebanese resistance attacks for the next fifteen years.

**5.8.3 1985 to 2000**

Israel maintained a seemingly ambivalent attitude to UNIFIL. On the one hand it maintained the twelve kilometre buffer zone and it supported the SLA/DFF despite its questionable activities. On the other hand UNIFIL could not have survived without Israeli support. UNIFIL relied heavily on Israel for communications and hospital services and Israel supported UNIFIL by facilitating resupply through the Israeli ports which UNIFIL was forced to use after militias took over Beirut’s port. Israeli airports also allowed free access to Israel by UNIFIL personnel. The UNIFIL civilian staff stationed in the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura almost entirely lived in the northern Israeli town of Nahariya. The period 1985 until 2000 saw an incremental intensification of the resistance by Lebanese Shiite militias on the Israeli occupation of the so-called ‘enclave’. During this period UNIFIL had neither the

\(^{142}\) Parker P 70
mandate nor resources to intervene in this internecine war and was restricted to merely observing and reporting the activities of both sides. This restraint was heavily criticised by both the Israelis and the Lebanese.

5.8.4 2000 to 2014

In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces to the ‘Blue Line’\textsuperscript{143} and the DFF was disbanded. The situation in the area of UNIFIL operation remained quiet but there was still no agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Consequently, the Lebanese authorities did not properly assert their authority south of the Litani River establishing only a token number of checkpoints in the vacated area. UNIFIL down sized from some 6,000 to less than 2,500 peacekeepers, monitored the Blue Line on a daily basis, patrolled the area, and supported humanitarian assistance. The governance vacuum was filled by Hezbollah and its military roamed the area freely. An uneasy peace lasted for six years until a Hezbollah attack into Israel in 2006 resulted in the devastating 2006 war.

This Hezbollah/Israeli war of 2006 ended with a political solution in which the Lebanese government agreed to assume control of the area south of the Litani up to the Blue Line. The agreement resulted in a greatly expanded role for UNIFIL which now operated under a new robust mandate, augmented with well-armed troops and sailors, drawn partly from NATO countries. This new UNIFIL force facilitated the redeployment of Lebanese forces into the south and the reintroduction of Lebanese government systems.

On 11 August 2006, following intense negotiations, the Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 which significantly enhanced UNIFIL (from about 2,000 troops just before the war to a new level of 15,000 military personnel) and expanded its original mandate to:

- Monitor the cessation of hostilities
- Accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) throughout the South, as Israel withdraws its armed forces
- Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access and the voluntary return of refugees

\textsuperscript{143}The ‘Line of Withdrawal’ or ‘Blue Line’ as it is commonly known was established by the UN in 2000, to verify the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.
• Assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River, an area free of any other armed personnel
• Assist the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders

Today UNIFIL remains a Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission but is a well-equipped robust force with significant participation from NATO countries. Its main achievement is that it has enabled the Lebanese authorities to reassert their authority in South Lebanon after a hiatus of over thirty years. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has deployed three brigades south of the Litani River who operate an extensive network of checkpoints throughout the area. Hezbollah maintains an extensive political, administrative and social presence in south Lebanon but has to date abided by the UNSC resolution 1701 and has redeployed its overt military assets north of the Litani River. The main function of UNIFIL is to enable the LAF to uphold the rule of law and Lebanese government authority throughout the region. UNIFIL achieves this by close coordination with LAF and extensive patrolling in the area, Blue Line marking, and managing the Tri-partite mechanism which facilitates dialogue between the LAF and the IDF.

From an operational perspective, the successful deployment of the LAF and the ISF in south Lebanon arguably suggests a downsizing of UNIFIL. However, from a political perspective a downsizing of UNIFIL might be misconstrued as a reduction of support for Lebanon by the international community at a time when Lebanon is under threat of being drawn into the Syrian civil war and its institutions are struggling to cope with the influx of 1.2 million Syrian refugees. It is therefore unlikely that a decision on the future of UNIFIL will be taken before the situation in Syria is resolved.
The Irish defence forces have been inextricably linked to UNIFIL since it was established in 1978 up until the time of writing in 2016. Irish domestic commitments to internal security effectively dictated that the role of the garrison army in Ireland was that of a gendarmerie. It was the UNIFIL experience that actually gave generations of Irish soldiers’ exposure to military deployments and enabled them to call themselves soldiers. Hence, the UNIFIL experience has had a formative influence on the doctrine, tactics, and logistical configuration of the Irish defence forces.
By 1978 the Irish defence forces had been absent from overseas peacekeeping for four years following the withdrawal of troops from UNEF 2 (United Nations Emergency Force) in Egypt, a decision caused redeployment problems for UNEF. It was reported that Ireland’s diplomatic standing in New York had also been damaged as a result and the Irish authorities were therefore keen to get back into international peacekeeping for diplomatic and military reasons. The Congo deployment had been a full infantry battalion of over 600 troops, and at one stage two battalions were in the Congo. This was equivalent to over 1000 troops posted overseas from a standing force of less than 7,000. However, the later Cyprus and Sinai missions were mainly infantry groups of around 300 all ranks. This meant that overseas service was a rare occurrence in the career of Irish soldiers.

When the 43 Irish Batt arrived in Lebanon in 1978 many of its personnel were on their first overseas tour and had limited experience. The 43rd Irish Batt had been informed that they were embarking on a Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission, essentially a policing role in which they would enjoy freedom of movement, and that all parties to the conflict had agreed to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426.

The officers and men of the 43rd Irish Batt were unaware that the UN Secretary General had been advised that the conditions were not suitable for the successful deployment of a peacekeeping force. They also had no idea that the Israelis had no intention of complying with UN Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 and that they would try to prevent UNIFIL from deploying to the international border. Moreover:

All efforts to include in the mandate the means to deal strongly with illegitimate ‘military incursions or activities in the UNIFIL area were rejected in the interests of speedy action as being too controversial. The generalities on UNIFIL’s original mandate papered over very real disagreements among the members of the Security Council. They had little relation to the real and rugged problems that would face the peacekeepers.  

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144 On 17 May 1974 a series of coordinated car bombs exploded in Dublin and in Monaghan. The Irish government withdrew Irish peacekeepers from UNEF 2 to bolster internal security.

145 Urquhart, Brian. The Origins of UNIFIL, for al –Jonoub, UNIFIL Magazine’s special 30 year edition. P6,7 June 2008
At that time the organisation of an ‘Operational’ Irish infantry battalion envisioned a battalion HQ, a headquarters company, three rifle companies and a support company. In all, a total of 768 all ranks. This strength was deemed unacceptable by the UN as the size of the UNIFIL force was limited by its mandate. The planners in New York advised that the battalion be not more than 600 all ranks, while paradoxically also advising that the contingents be as self-sufficient as possible in every respect.

The processing and training of the volunteers for overseas deployment was and is conducted in four stages. Stage one in the home unit. Each volunteer had to pass an ‘overseas medical’, have successfully fired the annual range practice, and successfully completed the annual physical training tests. The volunteers are then subjected to a battery of administrative requirements including the making of a will. During stage two the rifle companies concentrate with their platoons in a central location in their respective brigades. Here training consisted of range practices both on personal and crew-served weapons, physical training, voice procedure wherein soldiers learn the UN voice procedures for radio, check-point and observation-post duties, night operations, patrols and anti-ambush drills, mine and explosive training, and so on. For stage three all the personnel are introduced to battle inoculation exercises and a mission readiness exercise is conducted. This is devised and supervised by staff from DFHQ and the Military College. Phase four is on-going training conducted in the mission area. The battalion then parades and is inspected by the Minister of Defence prior to departure to the mission area. The Irish battalions to UNIFIL flew out in three Chalks (groups) over two weeks.

Armed with what they perceived as strong terms of reference, which related to freedom of movement, communications and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks, the 43rd trained, armed and deployed, on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council. They were assured that the Secretary General would keep the Security Council informed of developments regarding the functioning of the force.

In May 1978 the 43rd Battalion and all its equipment (the best equipped battalion in the force)\textsuperscript{146} was flown to Tel Aviv by the US Air Force. Most of the members of the battalion

\textsuperscript{146} Doyle, E.D., 1978 In the Beginning P45
were on their first international peacekeeping tour of duty, while some had served in the Sinai and Cyprus, and a small minority had served in the Congo. However, it had been four years since Ireland had sent a peacekeeping force overseas and certain aspects of the deployment, particularly logistics, were unsatisfactory. The troops arrived to find that there was no transport available to bring them to Lebanon and had wait for many hours in the blazing sun. Much of the mountain of stores remained on the ground in Tel Aviv for several weeks.  

The transport supplied by the Irish defence forces proved to be inadequate for the task, and by the time the author arrived two years later; most of the Irish transport had been scrapped and had been replaced.

![Figure 5.7 UNIFIL Deployment 1978 (Source UN)](image)

The area from the Litani River to the international border in the south has a fertile lowland coastal strip about five kilometres wide where bananas and oranges are grown. Heading east from the coastal strip the land rises and the area is crisscrossed by fairly steep valleys called Wadies. In the late 1970’s approximately, 400,000 people lived south of the Litani River, the majority of 70-80% being Shiite Moslem. Sunni Moslems, Druze and Christians were concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the area.

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147 Doyle, E.D., 1978 In the Beginning P45
In the first months, the 43rd Battalion eventually sited its headquarters in the town of Tibnin and the rifle companies moved out to the surrounding countryside and the towns of Majdal Silim, Shaqra and Braachit. They thought these would be temporary sites pending the move to the international border following the Israeli withdrawal. 13 June 1978 was set as the day of the IDF withdrawal and Irish Batt got orders from UNIFIL HQ to be prepared to move forward to the international border. The Battalion second in charge (2 I/C) and the three rifle company commanders attended a meeting with Major Haddad and Major Chidial of the DFF to discuss and coordinate the UNIFIL deployment:

IDF mechanised units assembled and withdrew across the border…a meeting with Haddad and Chidial at the DFF HQ was such a crowded affair that the company commanders could not be accommodated. It soon became evident that UNIFIL was not to gain access to the Lebanon/Israel frontier. Saff al Howa would mark the northern limit of the ‘enclave’ and so was recorded on the map…There was much shouting and brandishing of weapons. No one sought to define the status of the area north of the area of Saff al Howa to Bayt Yahoon and it is doubtful, if raised that clarification would have been forthcoming…

14 June to 30 June 1978:
The events of 13 June had clarified some markers for UNIFIL. Whereas, the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon was confirmed it was also evident that UNIFIL was not to gain access to the Lebanon/Israel frontier. Haddad’s forces controlled entry to the enclave…the agreement of the DFF to allow UNIFIL to occupy designated positions in the enclave was a positive step which in time might be expanded upon. However, there was no clear answer in UNIFIL or New York as to the status of Haddad’s force. Theoretically, they were members of the Lebanese army and as such paid by the Beirut Government. In practice, Haddad’s force was equipped and supplied by Israel. If recognised as a legitimate element of the Lebanese Army, then UNIFIL was not empowered to disarm them.

The status of the DFF was at the heart of the dilemma faced by the UNIFIL peacekeepers. The Irish peacekeepers were very experienced in ‘Aid to the civil power,’ operations at home in Ireland and hence were reluctant to open or even return fire. They knew from experience that if they shot a Lebanese citizen they would become part of the problem. More worryingly and confusingly for UNIFIL, the Lebanese government initially recognised the legitimacy of the DFF and gave them the status of being part of the Lebanese army. This meant that UNIFIL had no legal basis to curb the excesses of the DFF in the initial stages. In hindsight they also made the mistake of thinking that occupying designated positions in the enclave

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148 Unit History 43rd Infantry Battalion P17
149 Ibid P 17
was a positive step. They could not have known that the occupants of these designated sites would soon effectively become hostages.

14 June:
DFF denied Irish Batt access to Mahibeb and Jabel As Saff and Saff al Howa.¹⁵⁰

17 June:
UNTSO OP’s Ras and Mar occupied by Irish Batt¹⁵¹
On 22 June the DFF raided and looted Tibnin, maltreated residents and burned a house. The terrified people appealed for help. B Company was ordered to establish an immediate presence and deny DFF access. When the DFF returned they were denied entry.¹⁵²

The raid on Tibnin and the behaviour by the DFF was too much for the Irish to ignore and despite the legal status of the DFF the Irish took a firm stand to prevent a recurrence of DFF excesses:

22 June 1978:
Irish Batt received orders from UNIFIL HQ to establish a permanent UN position in the village of Rshaf by 1500 hrs on 23 June. (Rshaf was a destroyed and abandoned Muslim village 4 km west of Tibnin)...On the afternoon of the 23 June (a patrol from) HQ Coy occupied Rshaf with 2 APC’s. At 2000 hrs (they) came under machine gun fire from the south 100 rounds were fired and struck the ground close to the patrol. (The Patrol Commander)¹⁵³ was ordered to extract his patrol and he did so without having to return fire.¹⁵⁴

Again despite extreme provocation by the DFF in preventing the Irish from performing their duty, the status of the DFF as part of the Lebanese Army obliged UNIFIL commanders to back down and avoid confrontation. It was a full year later, 28 July 1979 before the Irish peacekeepers of the 45th Battalion were able to establish the permanent UN post in Rshaf:

27 June 12:
shots struck the post at At Tiri; Irish Batt troops told to withdraw by the DFF and refused.¹⁵⁵

The village of At Tiri was a UNIFIL salient protruding out into the area controlled by the DFF. On the 27 June 1978 they began their campaign of harassment and intimidation to force

¹⁵⁰ Ibid P18
¹⁵¹ Ibid P 18
¹⁵² Ibid P19
¹⁵³ The Unit History names the patrol commander which has been removed by the author.
¹⁵⁴ 43 Irish Batt Unit History P 19
¹⁵⁵ Ibid P21
the Irish to withdraw. This was to continue in a desultory fashion until 6 April 1980 when the DFF made a concerted effort to dislodge the Irish.

In addition to the military activities of peacekeeping the Irish peacekeepers responded to requests for humanitarian aid from the local population. The medics provided treatment for sick civilians, the engineers provided essential services to the Tibnin hospital, and an orphanage was founded and was supported by the Irish peacekeepers. This orphanage continues to operate and be supported by the Irish defence forces at the time of writing, 2016.  

On 12 July the company commander of B Company met with Major Chidial the commander of the southern DFF sector from Bint Jubayl to the sea. He reported that he found Major Chidial who had served in the French army to be a reasonable man who admitted that, because of the ill-disciplined nature of the DFF, he was not fully in control. However, the meeting went well and was conducted in a cordial manner. Maj Chidial assured the Irish commander that he would do his utmost to ensure cooperation with UNIFIL. As a result the Irish entered into a period of relative calm with the DFF which lasted until 3 October 1978.

Resolutions 425 and 426 had called for UNIFIL to:
- Confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon
- Restore international peace and security
- Assist the Lebanese government in restoring effective authority in the area

By the end of July UNIFIL was still unable to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli’s from southern Lebanon and the lack of support from the protagonists prevented the restoration of international peace and security. Therefore UNIFIL set about trying to restore the Lebanese government effective authority in the area and arrangements were made for the Lebanese army to deploy alongside UNIFIL on 31 July 1978:

Plan for Lebanese Army to deploy in Tibnin area…700 troops, armoured cars and artillery. Stopped in Kaukaba by DFF who subjected them to artillery, mortar and tank fire from Marjuyaun area over a period of three days… Lebanese battalion suffered 1 killed and 9 wounded and were forced to withdraw to the north…During

\[156\] Ibid P24
the period all UNIFIL elements were placed on maximum alert in anticipation of orders to move to support the Lebanese. No such order was received.\textsuperscript{157}

The officers of the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Irish Batt were certain that they would be required to go to the assistance of the beleaguered Lebanese army. They were astonished that no such orders were forthcoming from UNIFIL HQ and strongly suspected that this reluctance to take action had its roots in New York. One positive outcome from the Kaukaba debacle was that on 5 September 1978 the Lebanese government withdrew recognition of Maj Haddad and his force. Unfortunately, the die had been cast however, and the DFF knew that they were unlikely to be held to account for their thuggish and murderous behaviour:

5 August:
Irish Batt found the bodies of a 40 year old male and a 12 year old boy shot through the neck and chest while tending their goats by DFF a short distance from At Tiri.\textsuperscript{158}

Kunin 18 September 1978:
The UN position in At Tiri reported unusual activity in Kunin. Irish Batt dispatched an armoured patrol to the area and found a party of 12 DFF and an IDF officer in firing positions. After some time in discussion it was agreed by both parties that each would refrain from entering the village until the matter was sorted out at a higher level.\textsuperscript{159}

The 43\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion never physically occupied Kunin which was mid way down a wadi and therefore exposed to fire from higher ground. The result was that Kunin was effectively ceded to the DFF. However, having spoken to members of the 43\textsuperscript{rd} on this issue, they asserted that decision not to occupy Kunin it was not deliberate. Rather, the Irish planners assumed that their initial deployment was of a temporary nature pending deployment up to the international border. At worst they believed this would take a matter month: no one envisioned it would take twenty-two years.

It was some time before Irish Batt realised that the situation they found themselves in had effectively changed the mandate, and that their supposedly temporary locations, which in the main were under canvas, would assume the mantle of more permanent deployments. In response the UN initially rented accommodation to house the peacekeepers and it was several

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid P 25
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid P 27
\textsuperscript{159} Unit History 43 Irish Batt P 27
years before more fortified positions were erected on the outskirts of tactically important towns. Meanwhile, the conflict continued unabated:

The latter half of September saw considerable artillery exchanges between PLO north of the Litani and Haddad’s forces...3 October, the period of calm with DFF ended, 7 rounds struck At Tiri post.\textsuperscript{160}

23 September:
18 rounds of 120 mm mortar fired by DFF close to Braachit...25 October Drunk armed men entered OP Ras 1 Corporal and 1 Private in occupation were assaulted and the private was stabbed...29 October DFF half-track with 10 armed men denied access to Braachit...30 X 120mm mortar rounds fired in retaliation. 64 year old woman killed, several houses damaged.\textsuperscript{161}

3 November:
9 X 120’s fired into Haddata...9 November 5 artillery shells 100 metres from Shaqra camp.\textsuperscript{162}

In November 1978 the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion returned to Ireland and were replaced by the 44\textsuperscript{th}. In forming up for the deployment the officers and men of the 44\textsuperscript{th} were now fully aware that they were preparing to deploy into a very difficult mission. In the forward to the Unit History Commanding Officer Lt Col Vincent Safino wrote:

…the mission given UNIFIL is unfulfillable and this itself is a major frustration. Future battalions will have to live with this problem…\textsuperscript{163}

When 44\textsuperscript{th} Bn took over there were 8 battalions from as many countries deployed in the UNIFIL AO. As the incoming Irish Batt recognised that there would be no move to the border area in the foreseeable future they deployed with a view to occupy their present location. The Battalion HQ and HQ Company which included a Battalion Support Group were located in houses in the Tibnin area. The Rifle companies were located in Braachit, As Sultaniyah and Shaqra, with each company rotating every two months.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid P 28 \\
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid P31 \\
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid P 32 \\
\textsuperscript{163} Unit History 44 Irish Batt P2
The Braachit Company had its HQ in Braachit camp on the outskirts of the village with the rest of the company deployed in Bayt Yahooon, At Tiri, Braachit Square, Braachit water tank, and Braachit High Road.

The As Sultaniyah Company had its HQ and a Platoon in As Sultaniyah. The remainder of the company were deployed in Bir As Sanasil, Majdal Silim and Tibnin South-West.

The Shaqra Company occupied 8 operational posts, three within the area of operations and a further five within the DFF enclave. Those inside the enclave were very unpopular postings as the peacekeepers saw no military logic in their location and the soldiers instructed to occupy them were keenly aware that should the situation deteriorated they would in all likelihood be taken hostage. However, the Irish Batt, or UNIFIL could do to prevent this:

These posts were a continuous bone of contention for the battalion. They were not military posts…they could not be abandoned as New York considered that they indicated the extension of UNIFIL area into the De Facto enclave. They were not military posts they were political posts with no military mission. The men who
manned them were effective hostages for De Facto Forces and were constantly used as bargaining points between the DFF and the UN.\textsuperscript{164}

On 16 April 1979 a second attempt to deploy the Lebanese army into the UNIFIL AO was again foiled by the relentless shelling of the DFF which killed eight civilians.\textsuperscript{165}

On 9 May 1979 during the rotation of the 44\textsuperscript{th} and 45\textsuperscript{th} Battalions the PLO launched an attack on the village of Ramin in Israel. In retaliation, the IDF mounted an incursion into Lebanon which was stopped by C Coy 44\textsuperscript{th} Irish Batt, 400 metres from Shaqra camp. This resolute action was particularly notable because C Coy was reduced to 31 all ranks as the rest of the Company was on its way to Beirut rotating back to Dublin. The IDF force ranged against them consisted of 7 land rovers, 20 armoured cars and 8 tanks. C Company blocked the IDF force from advancing long enough for UNIFIL reinforcements from other contingents to flood into the area. Eventually, the Israeli’s were placated and returned to Israel.

The 45\textsuperscript{th} Battalion commanded by Lt Col Tom Quinlan had the summer tour in 1979 and they experienced the same turmoil as their two predecessors. However, Maj Haddad tried the new tactic of demanding joint DFF/UNIFIL patrols of villages in the Irish AO, and in order to legitimise this, he additionally demanded a referendum of these villages to allow them to express their view on joint patrols. Col Quinlan ignored Haddad’s request as he was aware of the major’s campaign of systematic intimidation by threatening to shell the Irish AO villages if the inhabitants did not comply with his dictates.

On 21 July 1979 the DFF entered the village of Beit Yahoun with 1 tank, 1 truck, and 2 Land rovers and proceeded to set up two positions. The first was at the cross roads at the south of the village and the other to the north of the village overlooking the Tibnin valley into Tibnin, Braachit, Haddata and Aaita Ez Zott. Beit Yahoun was within the Irish Batt AO but as it was on a ridge-line it was the forward edge of the Irish line of deployment. The Irish were criticised for not deploying forward of this ridge line into the wadi below, as in not doing so they were accused of effectively conceded the area to the DFF including Kunin and R’shaf. The Irish were further criticised for not preventing the DFF incursion into Beit Yahoun, the village having previously been controlled exclusively by them.\textsuperscript{166} The deployment by the

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid P4
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid P 38
\textsuperscript{166} Mc Donald, F. in the Irish Times, 23/4/80 and Murphy, R. The Battle of At Tiri: A Personal Assessment P69
DFF into Bayt Yahoon gave them sight of the fertile Tibnin valley and they were now in a position to use their direct fire weapons into the villages of the Tibnin valley and the Irish HQ in Tibnin village itself. On 27 July five IDF officers were observed in Beit Yahoun having discussions with DFF personnel and on 30 July a DFF half-track, 2 Land Rovers and 3 trucks reinforced the DFF position in Beit Yahoun with barbed wire and mines:

> Because of the strategy adopted by the Irish in negotiating with the militias instead of shooting at them, the battalion had ceded control of two villages which used to be in the Irish area—Kunin and R’shaf in another village, Bayt Yahoon, Irish soldiers and militia coexist side by side.¹⁶⁷

On 28 July 1988 Irish Batt set up a permanent post in Rshaf. On 31 July the DFF threatened to storm the new UN post in Rshaf but the Irish refused to withdraw. On 1 August the DFF positioned a tank near the Irish position in Rshaf and on 6 August the DFF located a second Sherman tank in Rshaf. The DFF continued to test the Irish defences in At Tiri. On the 8 August 1979 a DFF land rover with 3 passengers were refused entry into At Tiri and on 12 August a DFF member in a civilian car was denied entry into At Tiri. On 2 October IDF personnel were again denied entry into At Tiri. Meanwhile PLO activities continued in the area:

> 06 September: AE’s¹⁶⁸ attacked DFF in Bayt Yahoon with rockets and small arms fire from a position 1000 metres to the north-west and on 18 September two large groups of AE’s were observed in Braachit village.¹⁶⁹

In November 1979 the 46th Infantry Battalion commanded by Lt Col Jack Kissane arrived. This battalion differed from its predecessors in that it had been augmented by a Reconnaissance Company which provided the battalion strike force and a second line reserve was drawn from within HQ Company. The 46th experienced many of the same provocations as their predecessors. However, events in Bahrain on 10 February 1980 would have a profound knock-on effect on them some weeks later. Echoing an earlier EEC statement, on a visit to Bahrain the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a joint communiqué on Palestinian rights and Euro-Arab relations. This political development brought Ireland into line with EEC foreign policy in relation to Middle Eastern affairs and had an immediate

¹⁶⁷McDonald, F. in the Irish Times, 23/4/80
¹⁶⁸AE’s: (Armed Elements) a term used by UNIFIL to describe both PLO and Lebanese Shiite militias
¹⁶⁹Unit History 45 Battalion P 44
effect on the situation on the ground in south Lebanon for the Irish peacekeepers. The 46th Battalion Unit History records:

Bahrain statement by Irish Foreign Minister reported in Jerusalem post and Voice of Hope radio station in Lebanon. In 13 February Maj Haddad began verbal harassment of Irish Batt calling into question their impartiality and suitability for peacekeeping.  

Seven weeks later the DFF targeted Irish Batt and launched an assault the intensity of which was unprecedented in both the Irish Batt’s and UNIFIL’s experience. Over the next week, from Easter Sunday 1980 the DFF made a concerted effort to storm At Tiri. They were vigorously opposed by the C Company troops stationed there and the 46th Battalion strike force and reserve were swiftly deployed to the area. On Monday 7th April Pte Stephen Griffin of the Irish Batt reserve was fatally wounded, and in addition 9 persons of the Irish Batt reserve drawn from HQ Coy were taken hostage and taken to a house in Saff al Howa. On Tuesday 8th April, three of the nine hostages were released but two other peacekeepers were injured when the Landover in which they were travelling was fired upon. When the C Coy Commander realised that the DFF were trying to encircle his position he gave the order to return controlled fire. The DFF immediately ceased attempts to surround him and all shooting stopped shortly afterwards. Later that evening the remaining six hostages were released. On Wednesday 9th the situation in At Tiri de-escalated but four Israeli M113’s (Armoured cars), five half-tracks and approximately 80 personnel moved into the Kunin-Saff Al Howa area. On Friday 11 April a vehicle carrying UNIFIL staff officers came under fire on the way to At Tiri. At Bayt Yahun, A Coy came under pressure when young people threw stones at UN troops and attempted to set fire to a Ghanaian APC. A Coy personnel could clearly see unidentified personnel forcing the young people towards the UN troops. On Saturday 12 April, UNIFIL expelled the DFF from At Tiri. C Coy, supported by a Fijian platoon, a platoon from HQ Coy, and the Recce section combined to neutralise the half-track at the entrance to the village and expel the DFF personnel. An intensive fire-fight developed and an Irish Batt Armoured Car fired four rounds into the half-track. The DFF withdrew leaving one of their members dead and one Fijian peacekeeper, Pte Sonanavalu mortally wounded. On Sunday 13 April, four B Coy personnel taken by the DFF from the Blida enclave were released at At Tiri in exchange for two DFF prisoners taken during Saturday’s fighting. At Tiri was initially important because:

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170 Unit History 46 Irish Battalion P 31
a. It was under UNIFIL control and jutted southwards into the area controlled by the DFF.

b. It had a significant population.

c. It controlled the only road leading north into Hill 880. As the highest point in the Irish area of operations, this hill overlooked Haddata village and the fertile Tibnin valley. From Hill 880 the town of Tibnin, HQ of Irish Batt, Harris, HQ of Dutch Batt and the road network between them could easily be dominated by direct fire. The taking of Hill 880 would give the DFF a further buffer against AE’s (PLO) attacks from the north and further expand their own area.

Six days after the end of hostilities in At Tiri three Irish soldiers were abducted in the enclave by DFF personnel, in addition to two unarmed UN Military Observers. The three Irish peacekeepers were separated from the others. Private John O’Mahoney was shot twice by a DFF member and the other two ran for their lives. The wounded Pte O’Mahoney crawled to another room were a man whom he believed to be an IDF officer held a gun to his head but did not fire. Instead he went and fetched the American Major who carried him upstairs and into a car which brought him to the Irish post at Bayt Yahoun. From there he was transferred to UNIFIL HQ where he underwent surgery for his wounds. His two comrades, Pte Thomas Barrett and Pte Derek Smallhorne had attempted to escape from the building when he was shot but were recaptured and forced into a Peugeot car which was driven away to a place near Saff Al Howa. In an isolated spot they were both shot in the head and their bodies left until that evening when OGL officers were brought to the location.

The cold-blooded murders of the Irish peacekeepers by the DFF shocked the Irish government and international opinion. The Irish government took a diplomatic initiative and called a meeting at ministerial level of other troop contributing countries. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the adequacy of the measures taken by the Security Council in ensuring the effectiveness of UNIFIL and the safety of its personnel. However, despite the recent deaths of the peacekeepers, three Irish and one Fijian, and the fact that south Lebanon over the previous two years proved to have little of the criteria deemed necessary for the success of a peacekeeping mission, the Irish government had no intention for calling for a more robust mandate or peace-enforcement measures. The stance it took was for the UN to exert political and diplomatic pressure to ensure the cessation of harassment and attacks on
UNIFIL forces by the DFF. The Irish government was wedded to the concept of traditional peacekeeping and did not contemplate any form of robust peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. It was not until the third amendment to the Defence Act in 1993 which legislated for participation in peace-enforcement that consideration was given to Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations with the United Nations and ‘Regional Organisations’. The TCC meeting held in Dublin was attended by eleven countries. No major decisions were taken. It ruled out peace-enforcement, but there was absolute unanimity on peacekeeping however, and spoke about “the viability of the mission being brought into question “…unless rapid progress is made in the creation of conditions in which the force can operate more effectively…”\textsuperscript{171}

The Secretary General expressed his shock and outrage with a strongly worded UN statement made following the murder of the two Irish peacekeepers. However, Israel was not mentioned by name\textsuperscript{172} and Irish-Israeli relations reached an all-time low.

The Security Council debated the situation and adopted Resolution 467 (1980) which commended UNIFIL for its great restraint in very adverse circumstances, and strongly rebuked the deplorable military intervention of Israel in Lebanon and the provision of assistance to the so-called De Facto Forces. However, the United States abstained from voting on Resolution 467. After a brief flurry of diplomatic indignation and bluster nothing was actually done. UNIFIL was left to fend for itself as best it could and south Lebanon reverted to its miserable status quo.

The 46\textsuperscript{th} Battalion rotated in April 1980 with the 47\textsuperscript{th} Battalion with whom the author served. His platoon was sent into At Tiri to relieve Galway colleagues from the 46\textsuperscript{th} Batt. They served eight tense weeks there and although the DFF did not repeat their ground incursions they subjected the town to random mortar and machine gun fire. On 6 June the DFF sited 81mm mortars near Saff al Howa and began to bomb the Irish Batt area. In accordance with the standard operational procedures, all members of the platoon in At Tiri took cover in the bunkers, except the sentry on the roof and the post commander. Both could clearly see the outgoing mortar bombs being fired from Saff al Howa which were landing in the Irish Batt area behind them. The author called in each mortar launch on the radio and this gave Irish

\textsuperscript{171}Communiqué. Document S/13921, para 5 Quoted in Murphy, Ray. Captain. \textit{Background to the Battle of At Tiri: A Personal Assessment}\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{172} Document S/13900 f 18/4/80 AND SCOR 2217 Mtg Para 15, 18/4/80 Quoted in Murphy
Batt some 20 to 30 seconds notice before detonation. Then the mortars began to fall onto the UN position in At Tiri, one of which landed beside the author blew him off his feet, but miraculously caused only minor abrasions as he hit the ground. Becoming irritated he sought permission to return fire with support weapons as the DFF mortars were within range. Permission was denied. He then asked permission to fire smoke or illumination shells over the DFF mortars as warning shots. Permission was again denied. It was many years later that the author eventually discovered that permission had been denied at the highest level:

It is interesting to note that the secretariat in New York became quite alarmed by this (The use of crew served weapons by Irish Batt in At Tiri on the 16 April 1980) and after the At Tiri incident the rules regarding such weapons became more restrictive.  

At the time the author was frustrated but not entirely surprised that Irish Batt was obliged to passively absorb these attacks, as he reasoned that who other than the UN would decide to situate its HQ behind ‘enemy’ lines. UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura was located in the enclave completely cut off from the UNIFIL area of operations and was periodically subjected to shelling by the DFF. The UNIFIL HQ consisted mainly of prefabricated buildings. On 19 April 1979 it was shelled and eight peacekeepers were wounded. This vulnerability must have weighed heavily on the minds of UNIFIL commanders when they received requests to return fire from units in the AO:

UNIFIL’s ‘Col Jean Servon of the French parachute battalion gave us a briefing…Col Servon spoke of “the enemy” in relation to both Maj Haddad and the PLO. After the briefing I took him aside and pointed out that our peacekeeping forces had no “enemies” just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients.

Following the events at At Tiri, the author’s platoon was sent to secure the former Lebanese army barracks in Tyre to prevent it falling into PLO hands. The PLO dominated the city and had they occupied the barracks it would have been destroyed by the IDF. Whilst in Tyre the Irish established cordial relations with the PLO as without their cooperation the UN occupation of Tyre barracks would not have been possible. It was a surreal experience. During the day the Irish peacekeepers and member of the PLO frequently swam and played beach volleyball on the beach behind the barracks, while by night the peacekeepers often had to take shelter in the bunkers from the IDF shelling of the PLO positions near the barracks.

174 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War.  P 138
The final rotation was to Bayt Yahooun where they were co-located with the DFF. This was a tense area and frequent scuffles often erupted with DFF personnel but fortunately it never developed beyond fist fights.

Throughout the tour the Bahrain Declaration, the At Tiri incident and the murder of the two Irish soldiers by DFF personnel soured the 47th Irish Batt relations with the DFF and the Irish were forbidden from entering the enclave by UNIFIL HQ. This meant that they were cut off from the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura. All resupply to Irish Batt had to be conducted by other UNIFIL contingents, mainly by the French logistics company, and all visits by Irish personnel to Naqoura had to be conducted by helicopter. The 47th was fortunate in that it did not suffer any personnel killed in action (KIA). In October 1980 they rotated with the 48th Irish Batt.

On the 27 April 1981 during the rotation of the 48th and 49th Battalions, two young privates, one from each battalion were sent out onto a listening post outside the village of Dyar Ntar. The area was a suspected infiltration route used by the PLO as they made their way towards the enclave. A PLO group overran their post, and Pte Hugh Doherty who had just turned 20, was shot three times in the back and killed. According to UN intelligence reports Pte Kevin Joyce was abducted and taken to a Palestinian refugee camp in Tyre. It is believed that he was shot a few weeks later as a retaliation following a gun battle between Palestinians and Fijian peacekeepers in which several Palestinians were killed.176 At the time of writing his remains have not been found.

On 13 November 1981 at 1500 hrs a group of 14 DFF personnel using a Sherman tank and a M113 moved north-west from Kunin onto Hill 880 and remained there. The Battalion commander of the 50th Irish Batt ordered the C Company commander to encircle the DFF position. The C company troops duly surrounded the DFF position but were careful not to open fire, indeed many were armed with only hurling sticks. A tense stand-off ensued. The DFF troops were cut off from resupply and the C company personnel assumed the strategy of starving them into withdrawing. However, when staff officers arrived from UNIFIL HQ the following morning and assessed the situation Irish Batt was directed to provide the surrounded DFF with food and supplies.177 Before long the DFF negotiated a sustainable resupply arrangement. At the time, this was exceedingly frustrating for the Irish

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176 McDonald, Henry. Ireland Editor, Observer. Sunday 6 May 2001
177 Author, conversation with the 2 i/c C Company 50 Irish Batt.
peacekeepers as the DFF had clearly managed to establish a fortified strongpoint dominating the surrounding countryside. However, in hindsight, perhaps UNIFIL were more prudent to diffuse the situation, as two years later following the Israeli invasion, the IDF and DFF sighted strongpoint’s wherever they choose.

5.9.2 1982 to 1985

On 6 June 1982 Israel launched a massive armoured and mechanised invasion of Lebanon involving tens of thousands of troops and total air supremacy. The UNIFIL peacekeepers were swept aside. It would take four years for the Israelis to extricate themselves from this venture.

The raison d’être for UNIFIL had now been removed and serious consideration was given to terminating the mission. However, as the weeks and months passed by, the security situation in Israeli-occupied Lebanon began to deteriorate. The Shia population had initially been ambivalent towards the Israeli invasion as they by no means supported the predominately Sunni Palestinians who they believed had appropriated south Lebanon and who were not adverse to bullying Lebanese civilians. However, the Israeli army did not take advantage of this ambivalence. Indeed, the Israeli soldiers had no experience of a long, drawn-out occupation of a hostile population. Israeli conscripts failed to distinguish between Palestinian Arabs and Lebanese Arabs. They adopted a tactic of advance by fire, a tactic that resulted in massive civilian casualties. The Lebanese began a campaign of civil disobedience and Shia militias began to plant roadside bombs. In response, the Israeli’s attempted to set up puppet administrations to impose security restrictions and tax the local population. This met with fierce resistance from the local Lebanese and soon there was a huge influx of civilians into the UNIFIL area. It was in the UNIFIL area that the civil resistance to Israeli domination was most effective.

The Unit history of 51st Irish Batt shows that when it arrived in April 1982 the Battalion performed patrolling tasks similar to its predecessors. By May they began to suspect something significant was about happen. The unit history of the 51st reports:

During the period ending 31 May 1982 Increased IDF activity was observed in the enclave. On the 18 May 1982 a group of approximately 35 armed men were seen
undergoing a briefing in the Kunin area. Also during the period a new asphalt road was
nearing completion from Rashaf to Dibil south of Irish Batt. 178

The operational units of the IDF quickly passed through the UNIFIL AO but they were
followed by sinister elements of the Israeli security services that were to become the
occupying force. The Israelis, in addition to the DFF, organised another even more sinister
irregular militia comprised of some very dubious Lebanese individuals. The Irish Batt
commander took the pragmatic view that there was nothing he could do about the IDF but
decided to frustrate the activities of this new militia and the DFF to the best of his ability. The
Unit History of the 51 Irish Batt records:

Shortly after their invasion the IDF established an irregular militia to which they gave
uniforms and arms. (Lebanese Armed and Uniformed by the IDF, (LAUI’s)). These were
located at Tibnin, Braachit, Jumay Jimay, Aaita Ez Zott and Haddata and consisted of
many irresponsible and dangerous men. Our battalion prevented them from patrolling and
within weeks had succeeded in disarming all but the Braachit force. 179

26 June:  
LAUI’s prevented from patrolling Tibnin, Aaita Ez Zott

30 June:  
LAUI’s prevented from patrolling Tibnin, Aaita Ez Zott

4 July:  
LAUI’s prevented from patrolling Haddata. 180

In addition, the Irish decided to thwart the activities of the DFF as much as possible in order
to prevent them moving into the new territories captured by the IDF. This was a successful
tactic as the DFF were prevented from moving beyond their old AO unless they were
accompanied by the IDF. It was a relatively minor achievement by UNIFIL but it hugely
frustrated the DFF as it denied them freedom of movement and meant the IDF had to be
present and were thus held responsible for any excesses of DFF activity.

The relative safety afforded by UNIFIL presence resulted in a very large influx of Lebanese
civilians from the area north of the Litani River. This placed a humanitarian burden on the
peacekeepers to which they responded as best they could. Tents and bedding were provided

178 Unit History 51 Irish Batt P4
179 Ibid Chapter 12 Page 5
180 Ibid P 6

156
for the homeless and water and electrical power was made available in so far as the battalion resources permitted. Medical assistance was continually available: 181

Lebanese army, 60 – 80 housed in Camp Shamrock because of Israeli intimidation and harassment. 182

On 27 October 1982 disaster beset the 51st Irish Batt when 1 NCO and 2 Privates were gunned down and killed at Tibnin Bridge. The fourth member of the checkpoint Pte McAleavey was found to be in a very distressed state. However, the forensic evidence did not support his version of events, and he was subsequently found guilty by a General Court Martial of the murder of his three colleagues.

The 52nd Battalion who assumed operational control in October 1992 witnessed Israeli attempts to establish a puppet administration in the area named the ‘Assembly of the Unified South.’ Initially the Israelis tried to cajole and persuade the Lebanese to accept this administration, but eventually they resorted to intimidation and violence. However, despite committing considerable resources the Assembly failed, due in no small measure to the presence of UNIFIL which observed and reported the activities of the Israelis and sometimes intervened to curb their excesses:

The 52nd Irish Batt was to witness Israeli consolidation of the south Lebanon area up to the Awaji River. Initially, the Israeli’s relied on the Shiite Amal organisation but soon lost that support. The Israeli’s then turned to using paid agents which they established as feudal lords who extracted homage and taxes and controlled the area by a militia controlled and paid by Israel. Following the bad publicity received by this, more especially when it was exposed that many of these ‘Feudal lords’ were criminals and murderers, the Israeli’s set about formalising their ‘de facto’ control by establishing an alternative administration known as ‘The Assembly of the Unified South’. 183

The English translation of the Muktars, Mayors, Heads of Families and local nobles’ petition which appears in an annex in the Unit History of the 52nd Irish Batt shows that the Lebanese population was opposed to the proposed Israeli ‘Assembly of the Unified South’ but were being subjected to severe intimidation by the Israeli authorities to accept and implement it. However, the presence of UNIFIL shone a spotlight on the activities of the Israeli authorities.

181 Ibid Chapter 15 P 6
182 Ibid Chapter 16 P 6
183 Unit History 52 Irish Batt P 9
which severely restricted their campaign of intimidation and enabled the Lebanese population to highlight their plight and voice their opposition.  

The unit histories of the subsequent Irish Battalions who served during the Israeli occupation show an escalation of Lebanese resistance and more frantically repressive measures being implemented by the Israeli authorities. Eventually, with the international outcry against the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, the collapse of the Lebanese Christian support, and mounting casualties from IEDs, the Israeli government decided to withdraw.

5.9.3 1985 to 2000

With the withdrawal of the IDF from Beirut to their self-proclaimed enclave, UNIFIL entered a new and third stage of deployment. This period saw a lessening of tension between the DFF and UNIFIL as prior to their withdrawal the IDF had built a comprehensive lattice of fortifications on hilltops throughout the enclave, and some in locations which had formerly been in the UNIFIL area. However, these fortifications failed to provide security. The PLO had been driven from Lebanon but a far more formidable enemy had emerged in the form of the Shiite resistance: Amal and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Thus, from 1985 until the Israelis finally withdrew behind the internationally recognised border in 2000 the Shia resistance groups launched a sustained campaign of assaults on the IDF/DFF positions in the Lebanese enclave. Meanwhile, UNIFIL occupied the same space as the Shia militias and whilst neither the Shia nor Israeli groups specifically set out to target UNIFIL, the peacekeeping force found itself in the theatre of this unrelenting conflict, and consequently incurred on-going casualties. Inevitably, the Israeli groupings expressed frustration and dissatisfaction with UNIFIL’s inability to curb ‘terrorist’ activities while the Shiite resistance accused UNIFIL of interfering with their attempts to free their land of foreign occupation. As will become apparent, Irish Batt incurred fatalities from radical Shiite groups who objected to their activities, especially the clearing of roadside bombs targeted at the IDF/DFF. Some Shiite groupings specifically targeted Irish peacekeepers with deadly effect. The DFF and IDF suffered mounting casualties and their personnel also targeted Irish peacekeepers because of their perceived failure to control ‘terrorist activities’. Irish Batt was now about to

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184 Annex to 52 Irish Batt Unit History
enter into the bloodiest period of its UNIFIL deployment in which it would incur twice as many killed in action (KIA) at the other three periods combined.

Although the IDF had officially withdrawn from the Lebanon they had not gone fully away, and continued to support the DFF campaigns against the Lebanese population. These were becoming more brutal and frantic as the following report from the archived 58 Battalion’s unit history indicates:

Eye witness IDF/DFF arrests, searches, interrogation of civilians in Shaqra…(Lt Col Z (Israeli)), present…Men women assemble in school. IDF fired 10 rounds over the heads of UN troops. 1130 (Lt X (Irish)) brought water to the school. 1230 (Lt X) negotiated the release of women and children and escorted them back home and witnessed some of the IDF searches of homes. They entered using small arms fire and grenades to break down the doors. When inside the houses they ransacked and looted them. Money and items of value were taken…(Lt X) returned to the school and heard the screams of the men coming from the school as if somebody was being tortured.  

On the one hand the, UNIFIL had to contend with a DFF which had been presented with new and improved defensive positions in an expanded enclave by the IDF, and on the other, an intensive military campaign being waged against the occupation of the enclave which was now being spearheaded by Hezbollah.

It was a dangerous period for the peacekeepers as the conflict intensified and Irish Batt incurred wounded and killed in action by the IDF, DFF, Amal and Hezbollah. On 21/8/1986 Lt. Aengus Murphy (59th Irish Batt), was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) whilst leading an Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR) team on the road between the villages of Haddathah and At-Tiri. The IED was laid by, or at the direction of Jawad Kasfi, an Amal explosives expert:

Lieutenant Murphy was targeted and killed because of the valour and persistence with which he sought out and incapacitated IEDs planted by the Lebanese resistance. Like many of his confederates and Muslim fellow countrymen, Kasfi considered it was no part of the business of the Irish or any other battalion of UNIFIL, to seek out,

185 Unit History, ‘A’ Company, 58th Irish Batt Paragraphs 14 to 19 (Names of Israeli Lt Col and Irish Lt removed by the author)
incapacitate and remove improvised explosive devices that were targeted not at UNIFIL, but at the Israeli Defence Forces, or the De Facto Forces.\(^\text{186}\)

The 60\(^\text{th}\) Irish Batt (Oct 1986 – April 1987) had a particularly gruelling tour of duty. Pte William O’Brien was also fatally wounded when his check-point in Braachit came under fire from the DFF. As the unit history reports:

On 6 December 1986 Pte W O’ Brien of C Company was on checkpoint duty near Braachit was killed apparently by HMG fire from DFF Charlie Compound. January 1987 was the busiest month for the battalion since taking over operational control in October 1986. Hostile actions by AE’s and IDF/DFF occurred continuously during the month resulting in a high level of tension in the area. On 2 January 1987 a force of about 40 Hezbollah captured the IDF/DFF Charlie compound killing 6 DFF and capturing a M113. The capture resulted in a dramatic drop in morale amongst DFF troops and twice during the month they abandoned their compound.\(^\text{187}\)

On 10 January 1987 Cpl McLoughlin of C Coy was killed in his post in Braachit village when an IDF Merkava tank fired into the UN building. He was unpacking his bags having just returned from home leave. The building was destroyed and the post closed down\(^\text{188}\)

The author served in the Irish Component in UNIFIL HQ Naqoura from October 1987 until April 1988 during which the Australian, Capt Peter McCarthy of OGL was killed by a landmine on 12 January 1988, and the American Lt Col Rich Higgins, Chief of OGL, was kidnapped by Hezbollah on 17 February 1988, and later killed. When serving with Observer Group Beirut, the author was present at the identification of his body which was recovered from a Beirut Street in December 1991.

The 64\(^\text{th}\) Irish Batt (Oct 1988 Apr 1989) had a similarly distressing rough tour of duty:

On the morning of 24 February 1989, militia men of the South Lebanon army opened fire from the Haddathah compound on the Irish position 6-38 A at Haddathah. Private Michael McNeela of A” Coy, who was from Dundalk, was standing on checkpoint duty inside the fortified structure, and was struck in the chest and killed.\(^\text{189}\)

\(^\text{186}\)INDEPENDENT REVIEW into matters relevant to the deaths of Corporal Fintan Heneghan, Private Mannix Armstrong and Private Thomas Walsh on 21st March 1989, while serving with „C“ Coy, 64th Infantry Battalion, United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL). Frank Callanan SC. 15 September 2011. www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/interview P 16

\(^\text{187}\)Unit History 60 Irish Batt Paragraph 3.7.3

\(^\text{188}\)Ibid. Paragraph 3.7.4

\(^\text{189}\)Independent Review. Frank Callanan P 39/40
On 21 March 1989 a routine maintenance group was sent out in a truck to collect stones from a field to build gabions (wire cages filled with stones which are used for fortifications). On their return with the truck full of stones one of the wheels ran over a mine set by a Shiite resistance group. This detonated a series of mines which destroyed the truck and killed the three Irish peacekeepers, Cpl. Fintan Heneghan, Pte. Thomas Walsh, and Pte. Mannix Armstrong.

The use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) by the Shiite resistance became a very effective tool in inflicting casualties on the IDF/DF, and as the years passed such IED’s became more numerous and sophisticated. They therefore became a serious issue for UNIFIL force protection. At a time when the risk to UNIFIL personnel from Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) was growing exponentially the French Government decided to withdraw its Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team from UNIFIL. The Secretary General contacted other Troop Contributing Countries (TCC’s) about a replacement but none was forthcoming. He then requested that the governments of UNIFIL TCC’s strengthen the capacity of their units to deal with explosives, since mines, unexploded ammunition, and other explosives, continued to endanger UNIFIL personnel and civilians in the area.

On 22 October the Department of Foreign Affairs sent an excerpt of a minute from the Irish delegation to the United Nations of a meeting between the UNIFIL TCC’s and the Under-Secretary General, Marrack Goulding, which addressed the issue of the departed French EOD detachment, to the Secretary of the Department of Defence, It stated that, “individual TCC’s would be forced with coping with bomb disposal on a self-help basis. As a result the Force Commander Maj Gen Hagglund has requested that in future all new contingents are to have some specialist capacity in mines and unexploded ammunition. Expertise in radio controlled booby traps would also be welcome.” A copy of this letter was sent to the Director of Operations in DFHQ, Col Noel Bergin, dated 23 October 1987, to inquire, “Will our present EOD capability meet the requirements of Irish Batt or is it proposed to recommend any increase in future contingents in the absence of the French unit?” On 30 October 1987 Col Bergin replied advising that “the composition of the ordnance section of the overseas battalion was being reviewed with a view to determine what changes would be necessary to give the Overseas Battalion an adequate EOD capability”.190

190 Ibid P 24
On 2 February 1988 Col Bergin wrote to the Director of Ordnance advising him that the Chief of Staff Lt Gen Tadhg O’Neill had decided “to make no changes in the capacity of the Ordnance Section IRISHBATT.” In the course of the Independent Inquiry into the deaths of the three soldiers which was conducted in 2011, Lt Gen Noel Bergin (Retired) informed Mr Frank Callanan SC that:

EOD in the first instant was a matter for UNIFIL and for the Force Commander. He emphasised that the Chief of Staff was acutely conscious of the necessity of avoiding taking over the EOD role for UNIFIL as this would be overwhelming. There was a significant resource requirement in patrolling the border with Northern Ireland and providing an EOD capacity to the 64th Battalion has significant resource implications.\(^{191}\)

Meanwhile the threat to Irish Batt from IED’s continued to increase. On 31 March 1988 the Ordnance Officer 63rd Irish Batt Comdt Larry Devaney uncovered a sophisticated IED designed to cause significant initial damage, while a nearby secondary device was set nearby to cause catastrophic damage to a rescue party. Comdt Devaney attempted to neutralise the devices when he was surrounded by a group of armed Shiite resistance personnel and he was directed by UNIFIL HQ to allow them to remove the devices.\(^{192}\)

On 12 November the Ordnance officer of the 64th Irish Batt Comdt Ray Lane found another sophisticated device near Haddatha. Again it was set to cause initial damage with a secondary device set to target the rescue party. Comdt Lane was adamant that this device was set to target Irish UNIFIL personnel.\(^{193}\)

On 15 December 1988 Jawas Kadfi, the man responsible for the killing Lt Aongus Murphy, was abducted along with three other Lebanese men from a location in the Irish Batt area by an Israeli undercover unit which exited through an Irish Batt checkpoint. Radical elements of the Shia resistance were convinced that the Irish contingent were complicit and facilitated the kidnappings as an act of retribution for the killing of Lt Aongus Murphy. The following day three Irish peacekeepers were abducted by Shiite gunmen from a checkpoint. Fortunately, Amal secured their release the following day. However, tensions remained high and on 21

\(^{191}\) Ibid P 24
\(^{192}\) Ibid P 25
\(^{193}\) Ibid P25-30
March 1989 a sophisticated IED targeted and killed the three Irish peacekeepers, Cpl. Fintan Heneghan, Pte. Thomas Walsh, and Pte. Mannix Armstrong, who were on a routine logistical operation.

Subsequent to the death by IED of the three Irish peacekeepers the Chief of Staff found the resources to equip the 65th Irish Batt and subsequent battalions with an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team from the Ordnance Corps tasked with demolishing/neutralising explosive devices in the Irish area, and an Engineer Special Search Team (ESST) which was tasked to conduct searches in the Irish Batt area for mines and explosives and to conduct training of similar teams from other UNIFIL contingents in Tibnin. This capacity build required an increase of nine personnel in the Irish Batt strength. In 2011, following the publication of Mr Frank Callanan’s Independent Review, the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, Lieutenant General Sean McCann, admitted, “that the Defence Forces systems in place at that time to counter the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat were not robust enough to prevent this tragedy.”

In November 1991 another Irish soldier Cpl Michael McCarthy was killed in action in At Tiri and another was wounded by the DFF. On 29 September 1992 Corporal Peter Ward was also shot and killed by Hezbollah gunmen after he were stopped at an Irish checkpoint and denied access to the UNIFIL controlled area following an incident in the buffer zone stretching down to the Israeli border.

In 1997 the casualty rate of DFF and IDF personnel in the enclave prompted the Israeli political establishment to reconsider their position in Lebanon and Israel declared their intention to withdraw. This statement emboldened Hezbollah who redoubled their military activities in the form of IED’s on roadsides and renewed attacks on DFF positions. Meanwhile UNIFIL was caught in the middle and being accused by the Lebanese militias of protecting the ‘illegal’ Israeli compounds, and by the Israelis of not doing enough to counteract terrorism. From 1997 up to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 successive Irish Battalions witnessed a continuous escalation of military activity by the Lebanese militias, particularly Hezbollah, and subsequent retaliation by the DFF and the IDF. The author served

194 Sligo Champion 21 Sept 2011
195 Minister of State at the Department of Defence (Mr. D. Ahern). Dáil Éireann - Volume 413 - 19 November, 1991
as the company commander of C Company 83 Irish Batt from April to October 1998. Hezbollah attacks on DFF compounds were frequent and retaliation by the DFF and IDF in the form of artillery, mortar, heavy machine guns, and air attacks, were swift and ferocious. Meanwhile C Company personnel patrolled the villages and wadies, organised cease-fires for agricultural activity, fought bush-fires, and taught English in the schools.

One year later, however, luck ran out for C Company 85th Irish Batt, when on 31 May 1999, Pte William Kedian was killed when a DFF mortar landed inside the UN post in which he was serving. Two of his colleagues were also seriously wounded in the incident. In May 2000 the Israelis unilaterally pulled out of Lebanon behind the international border. The DFF collapsed with its members fleeing to Israel or surrendering to the Lebanese authorities.

5.9.3.1 Hezbollah in Braachit: A Personal Reflection

On assuming command of C Company 93rd Irish Batt, UNIFIL the author’s predecessor introduced him to the ‘contacts’ in the area of operations (AO). They included local politicians, teachers, doctors, local government officials, and militia leaders. At the time the official Lebanese security forces were not deployed locally. In Braachit, the Hezbollah leader would not talk to any UN officer. This was unfortunate, as relations between UNIFIL and Hezbollah in Braachit were particularly problematic. Of the three villages located in the C Company AO, Majl Silm, Chaqra and Braachit, Braachit was the most turbulent. Hezbollah was extremely active and frequently launched attacks on IDF/DFF outposts. The resultant retaliation by the IDF/DFF rained down on Braachit and its hinterland where three Irish UN posts were located.

The Hezbollah leader in Chaqra spoke excellent English and although a target of Israeli assassination attempts he maintained a cheerful disposition and was always ready to talk to the author. In consequence, they managed to resolve many issues. During one of their meetings when the author asked for a meeting with Hezbollah leader in Braachit, the Chaqra leader replied, “I am afraid that is not possible. He refuses to talk to anyone in UNIFIL because he is of the opinion that UNIFIL collaborates with Israel”.
One Sunday morning the author drove through Braachit and heard a bell ringing from a Maronite church announcing Sunday mass. He drove up the side street to the church and went in. As soon as he was spotted he was ushered up to one of the front seats. After mass the small congregation went for breakfast in one of the parishioners houses and the author was invited. There he met many of the Christian community in Braachit. From then on he frequently attended weekly mass in the Braachit Maronite church.

Some while later the author got a telephone call from the Lebanese interpreter in Battalion HQ who informed him that the Hezbollah leader in Braachit wanted to meet the author. The interpreter expressed amazement, as despite his repeated attempts to set up such a meeting over several years he had not succeeded. The first meeting took place in a house in Braachit. It was very formal and pleasantries were observed as is the custom in Arab households. Not much was achieved then but a line of communication was established. Over the next several months the author attended several meetings which were frequently tense. However, many issues were resolved and relations between Irish peacekeepers and Hezbollah activists in Braachit improved and tensions decreased.

At one of the meeting the author expressed surprise that the Christian church in Braachit was so active and that Christians were tolerated and allowed to practice their religion openly in such a Hezbollah stronghold. The Hezbollah leader replied that the Christians in Braachit were free to practice their religion throughout the 1,500 years of Muslim rule in the area and asked why should the author be surprised. He replied that he was of the opinion that Islam was intolerant of Christian practice and Christians were considered as infidels. The Hezbollah leader replied, “On the contrary, Christians and Moslems believe in the one god. Why do you think I agreed to meet with you?” The author shook his head saying “I don’t know.” The Hezbollah leader replied. “It was brought to my attention that you were a regular worshiper at the church. My Christian friends tell me you come to pray. You ask nothing in return and they enjoy your company at breakfast after church. So I decided that as you are a believer you are a man I can trust and do business with.”

As will be seen from this personal memoir Irish peacekeepers lived among the Shia population and shared the brunt of the Israeli retaliation over a protracted period and consequently had empathy for the plight of the local population. To work effectively as a peacekeeper it is essential to have contacts with the local community leaders, including the
leadership of the resistance who were of the community and were leaders and potential leaders in the community. The author gained unique access to the local Christian community which became an entirely unexpected conduit to the Hezbollah leadership in the Braachit hotspot. As Hezbollah is a political-military-religious organisation the Braachit commander was deeply suspicious of anyone he considered to be of a secular or atheistic disposition.

5.9.4 2000 to 2011

The Irish authorities gave a commitment to Lebanon and UNIFIL which it had honoured for twenty-two years under the most trying of circumstances. With the Israeli withdrawal behind its international borders the Irish authorities, especially the military were keen to move on to newer peacekeeping pastures. Since the end of the Cold War there was an explosion of peacekeeping missions. The Irish defence forces commitment to UNIFIL and internal security obligations were precluded from participating in a significant way in these new peacekeeping missions. New terms such as peace-enforcement, peace-building, humanitarian intervention, and the outsourcing of peacekeeping operations to ‘Regional Forces’ were now commonplace. Ireland had participated in these missions, contributing staff officers, observers, liaison officers, and combat support units, but it had never sent an infantry unit to any of these missions. Therefore following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon UNIFIL was downsized and the Irish peacekeepers withdrew from UNIFIL. The two Irish units which departed UNIFIL in 2001 consisted of the Battalion which had over six hundred personnel and the Irish Component in UNIFIL HQ which had over100 personnel. However, at UNIFIL’s request four officers and four NCO’s remained in staff appointments.

In 2006, war broke out between Hezbollah and the IDF following which UNIFIL was reorganised and given the robust mandate Resolution 1701 (2006) which saw the establishment increase in size to 15,000 peacekeepers. However, it still remained a Chapter 6 mission. The Irish defence forces returned to UNIFIL with a mechanised infantry company of 165 Irish troops. Their role was to provide perimeter protection for a Finnish Army engineering unit. All hostilities had ceased and Hezbollah honoured the political agreement and withdrew its fighters north of the Litani River. After 12 months, the 1st Finnish/Irish Battalion ceased operations and was stood down.
5.9.5 2011 to 2015

In 2010 the Italian government informed the United Nations that it was going to withdraw one of its two battalions from UNIFIL and redeploy it to Afghanistan. The Irish authorities were therefore approached by the UN and asked to replace them. Having recently returned from Chad the Irish had no unit overseas and the defence force chiefs wanted an Irish unit overseas. Having spent so much time in UNIFIL the Irish military chiefs would have preferred another mission but in 2010 the only other option was the Congo. The military chiefs considered UNIFIL because of the presence of NATO troops from Italy, France and Spain. They concluded that this UNIFIL operating under the robust Resolution 1701 made it a more attractive deployment. The political office in UNIFIL was very supportive of the Irish return as it had received representations from Lebanese civil society groups who were perturbed with the robust posture of the new UNIFIL. They had become accustomed to the modus operandi of the previous UNIFIL which emphasised the policing and humanitarian role. The political officer was keen to deploy the Irish in the Bint Jubayl area where the robust stance adopted by the French troops was antagonising the local population. The political officer felt that the Irish would be more acceptable to the locals because of the rapport they had built up. Also, in 2010 a deputation of local dignitaries from Tibnin met with the Force Commander to make representations for the Irish to be deployed.

\[196\] Chapter 9 refers.
When Irish Batt returned to Lebanon in May 2011 with 480 troops it was to a composite Irish/Finnish battalion. Building on the experience of the Finnish/Irish battalion in 2006 it was agreed between these two neutral-EU member states that Ireland would ‘take the lead’ in 2011 and provide the bulk of the composite battalion and that the two countries would rotate the ‘lead’ in future years.

Consequently, the Irish contribution was reduced to approximately 330 troops in May 2013, and to 180 troops in November 2013 as Finland progressively took the ‘lead’. By 2015 Ireland resumed the lead role and increased its troop numbers. Meanwhile, Ireland sent a mechanised infantry company to Syria in September 2013 to provide the rapid reaction force to UNDOF deployed between the Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. This sudden deployment was necessary as Austria, Japan and Croatia all pulled out when the Syrian Civil War arrived on the Golan Heights and Syrian rebels targeted UNDOF peacekeepers. The UN

The Force Commander sent for the senior Irish officer to see if the Irish were using political pressure to influence his decision on where to deploy the Irish contingent. He was assured by the senior Irish officer that Ireland had no knowledge of the activities of local Lebanese politicians. (Author was the senior Irish officer at the time.)
appealed for a troop-contributing country to fill the void. Ireland was the only European country to respond and dispatched an infantry company to provide UNDOF with its mechanised rapid reaction force.

The deployment of the Irish/Finnish battalion bore little resemblance to the old Irish Batt. The Irish predecessors were light infantry with a ground-holding role and were deployed in over twenty posts throughout their assigned area. The new Irish/Finnish mechanised infantry battalion also had a ground-holding role but the approach had changed, and now based in one large camp they operated over the large area by means of mobile patrols. These were frequently joint patrols with the LAF. The main difference the veterans noticed was the forceful nature of the UNIFIL 2 deployment which had the more robust mandate in UN SC Resolution 1701(2006). In addition, the strength of UNIFIL 2 was 15,000 whereas the UNIFIL 1 it was 6,000. UNIFIL 2 was also a mechanised infantry force whereas UNIFIL 1 was a light infantry force. However, the most significant difference the veterans of UNIFIL 1 found related to the rules of engagement. UNIFIL 1 allowed for opening fire only in self-defence. One of the main drawbacks of this policy was that peacekeepers were prevented from intervening when they witnessed human rights abuses. Whereas with UNIFIL 2 not only were peacekeepers permitted to intervene in order to prevent human rights abuses, they were duty bound to intervene.¹⁹⁸

Irish peacekeepers were now briefed that:

“DF personnel on peace support operations have legal obligations under the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights to act to prevent violations of human rights, to react against violations of human rights and to act to rebuild human rights when violated.”¹⁹⁹

The Lebanese army had deployed three brigades between the Litani River and the Blue Line, and they, along with the Lebanese gendarmerie and the local police force were now responsible for security, law and order throughout the area. Top quality schools thrived and

¹⁹⁹ Defence Forces Human Rights Soldiers Card issued by the Chief of Staff, by direction of the Minister of Defence, and published for the general information and guidance of members of the Defence Forces.
contented children went to and from school, happily oblivious to the thirty years of horror that had gone before. The IDF, the DFF, the PLO and the Shia militias of Amal and Hezbollah had all departed.

Hezbollah fighters were no longer to be seen south of the Litani River. However, Hezbollah had grown to be a formidable force trained and armed by Iran. They were equipped with long-range missiles, 40,000 of which are deployed north of the Litani River and are believed to be capable of reaching targets throughout Israel. The Lebanese parliament has not properly functioned since 2010 and there is deep division and suspicion between the Shia and Sunni groupings with the Christian and Druze groupings aligning themselves tactically with both sides. South Lebanon, once the epicentre of the storm, is a relative sea of calm in a volatile region at the time of writing (2016). The annual UNIFIL budget of $600 million is seen as good value for money from a purely cost benefit analysis:

Expenditure on peacekeeping strongly and significantly reduces the risk that a post-conflict situation will revert to civil war. We estimate that an annual expenditure of $100 million on peacekeepers reduces the cumulative ten year risk of reversion to conflict very substantially from 38% to 17%...More generally each percentage point reduction in the risk of civil war is worth around $200 million. Recall that peacekeeping at the level of $100 million per year sustained over the post conflict decade reduces the risk of civil war by 21 percentage points. So the value of benefits is around $4.2 billion. Since the peacekeepers are there for a decade their total cost is $1 billion. We are at last ready for the punch-line number: the ratio of benefits to cost is better that 4:1. Peacekeeping looks to be very good value.

The modus operandi of the new Irish peacekeepers is radically different from their predecessors. Most of the Spanish, Italian and French commanders and staff officers had little or no prior experience of UN peacekeeping operations, their background being NATO. The posture demanded by the Sector commanders was forged in KFOR, Kosovo and ISAF, and Afghanistan. ISAF in particular was a dangerous mission and force security measures were rigorously enforced. This culture of force security was applied to the new UNIFIL. To the amazement of the Irish UNIFIL veterans, Irish patrols wore helmets and body armour. All travel between Beirut and the AO had to be conducted in armoured vehicles, whereas, in the ‘old days’ soft-skin vehicles were the norm. There are severe curtailments on shopping trips to local villages and Tyre was placed out of bounds. The veterans were astounded and

\[200\] Information briefing which the author attended whilst serving in UNIFIL in 2010.
perplexed, as the area was thriving in the peaceful and tranquil environment but the UNIFIL troops are confined to barracks and move on high alert in vehicles. Gone are the foot patrols who called into locals houses to drink chai and coffee.

The NATO culture of this new UNIFIL is not the only reason for this high level of force security. Irish commanding officers are under tremendous pressure from home to absolutely minimise exposure to risk. In the first 22 years of UNIFIL deployment forty-seven Irish soldiers lost their lives, although less than twenty were killed in action. Most UNIFIL veterans comment that given the intensity of the conflict it is a miracle that more were not killed, and this is attributed to training, equipment and luck. However, in some of the cases where Irish peacekeepers were killed in action, their relatives took to the Irish courts to seek redress and compensation and others mounted political campaigns, alleging cover-ups by the Irish military authorities. As we saw in September 2011 a report commissioned by the Irish Minister of Defence on the deaths of three Irish peacekeepers that were killed by a roadside bomb in March 1989 found there was a deficient assessment of the threat to Irish peacekeepers from bombs and landmines. Consequently, force security is foremost in the minds of commanders of Irish peacekeeping forces.

The fact that the once volatile south Lebanon is now peaceful and prosperous is due to the political agreement which was signed up to by the Israeli authorities, the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Shia militias, particularly Hezbollah. This has facilitated the return of the Lebanese security forces to the south and the resumption of normal commerce and trade. In addition, the success is due to the commitment by the international community to fund and locate a credible peacekeeping force in the area which continues to ensure that the parties to the political agreement are held to their commitments.

5.10 Summary

In 1978 the Irish political, diplomatic and military authorities were delighted to have the opportunity to get back into international peacekeeping. The Irish military embraced the challenge enthusiastically. However, on their arrival in Lebanon it quickly became apparent to the 43rd Irish Batt that the political prerequisites for successful peacekeeping were not

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present. The cooperation of the parties was not forthcoming, freedom of movement was denied, and the Security Council did not support the mission either politically, diplomatically or militarily. In addition, it soon became apparent that staff officers in DFHQ were somewhat over-optimistic in their assessment of the capacity and capabilities of the Irish defence forces as logistical deficiencies were quickly exposed.

Despite these serious shortcomings the 43rd Irish Batt deployed successfully and established a system of patrolling, manned checkpoints, and listening posts from which they observed and reported. They were frustrated in their efforts to deploy to the international border and they were severely harassed in the performance of their duty. They deployed as best they could along conventional military lines; that is, their forward positions were sited on high-ground roughly along a ridge line, with the exception of At Tiri, a sizable village forward of the ridgeline which was assessed as being essential to occupy. (This decision was to result in the death of ten UNIFIL peacekeepers over the next thirty years, six of whom were Irish). At Tiri thus formed a salient forward of the rest of the Irish deployment line. Irish Batt policy was to do their utmost to ensure that there was no escalation of violence during periods of harassment by the DFF. This policy had its critics. The criticisms included not deploying as far forward as possible, negotiating instead of shooting, and thus conceding the villages of Kunin R’shaf and Bayt Yahoona to the DFF. However, had the tactics of the critics been adopted and resulted in Irish Batt casualties there is a strong possibility that the inevitable follow-up inquiries would have highlighted and been critical of the departure from standard military deployment tactics. UNIFIL HQ decided not to authorise Irish Batt to confront the DFF in Kunin. As Kunin was on a reverse slope the DFF decided not to occupy it either. Bayt Yahoona in 1979 and Hill 880 in 1981 were occupied jointly by Irish Batt and the DFF. In both cases Irish Batt were forbidden to respond robustly against the DFF personnel when interposed. This gave the DFF a tactical advantage at the cost of Irish Batt pride, but by 1982 as a result of the IDF invasion, the DFF were free to deploy wherever they desired. In hindsight, had Irish Batt decided to respond robustly for short-time tactical gain, any loss of life would probably have been in vain.

The 46th Irish Batt was the fourth Irish unit to serve in UNIFIL and it was towards the end of their tour when the At Tiri incident occurred. The previous three units had operated in very

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203 McDonald, F. in the *Irish Times*, 23/4/80; and Murphy, R. *The Battle of At Tiri: A Personal Assessment* P69
difficult circumstances and were fortunate not to have incurred any killed in action (KIA’s), but it is worth noting that within two months of the Bahrain Declaration three Irish peacekeepers were dead. As discussed in Chapter 3 the Bahrain Declaration was a strategic act, the result of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy which in this case made the task of peacekeeping more difficult for the Irish peacekeepers at the tactical level. At Tiri being a salient was always a volatile location for Irish peacekeepers and the DFF would probably have attempted to occupy it at some stage. The Bahrain Declaration cannot be seen as wholly responsible for the At Tiri incident in April 1980 but it certainly did not help the situation for the Irish peacekeepers, and provided the DFF and the Israeli authorities with ammunition to apportion the blame:

It is essential that a principle of impartiality should be strictly maintained not only in operational areas by peacekeepers but also in the foreign policy of the contributing governments towards the regions where their contingents are deployed.  

Due cognisance should be given to the effects that changes in Irish foreign policy strategy may have on Irish peacekeepers on the ground in volatile environments. The Europeanization of Irish foreign policy sometimes places Irish peacekeepers at risk as illustrated by the Bahrain Declaration. In July 2013 Hezbollah’s military wing was proscribed by the EU on foot of a British proposal. The initiative was initially opposed by Ireland who has peacekeepers in Lebanon and Syria but Ireland strategically acquiesced when it found itself isolated in the European Council. The At Tiri incident did not change Irish peacekeeping policy as some commentators have suggested:

The defence of At Tiri marked a significant Change in the policy of Irish UN troops towards DFF incursions…

The tactics adopted by Irish Batt in At Tiri was the result of a unique set of circumstances and was personality driven. The composite nature of Irish peacekeeping battalions can lead to a lack of cohesion. In the At Tiri case the platoon commander and his men were drawn from the 1st Infantry Battalion which is stationed in Galway. It is an Irish speaking battalion (An Chead Chath) a small closely knit unit, one of the oldest in the Irish army, and fiercely proud

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204 Ishizuka, Katsumi. Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000 P115

205 See Chapter 4 Irish Peacekeeping Policy P 17/18

206 Murphy, R. The Battle of At Tiri: A Personal Assessment P61
of its history. In the At Tiri incident this Galway platoon was one of the three platoons of C Company, 46th Infantry Battalion. In addition to the platoon commander being from the Galway barracks, by coincidence the company commander was also from the Galway barracks, as was the battalion commander. All three men in the chain of command knew, respected and trusted each other and all three had well-earned reputations for being strong resolute characters. The author contends that this cohesion in the chain of command was the main reason for the robust defence of At Tiri in April 1980.207

Fourteen Irish peacekeepers lost their lives between 1978 when Irish Batt first deployed and the Israeli invasion in 1982 and of these five were killed in action, (KIA). When one considers the state of lawlessness that prevailed in south Lebanon at that time five KIA is light and reflects well on the training of Irish soldiers at that time. However, if the procedures and practices that now pertain in the twenty-first century were to be used to review the circumstances surrounding these five KIAs, disturbing aspects might emerge, for instance, in the case of the first KIA, Pte Stephen Griffin who was mortally wounded on Monday 7 April 1980 in At Tiri. Pte Griffin was a carpenter in the engineer platoon of HQ Company 46th Battalion. He was in At Tiri as a member of the Battalion Reserve which was drawn from within HQ Company and it was sent to At Tiri to reinforce the C Company personnel. A battalion reserve typically consists of technicians and clerks from HQ Company and it is usually held as a last resort, traditionally committed during a last ditch defence when a unit is about to be overrun. The decision to commit a battalion reserve consisting of technicians and clerks into At Tiri so early in the conflict is questionable and the fact that Pte Griffin was fatally wounded and nine members of that reserve were taken prisoner by the DFF raises questions about the suitability of committing the reserve in what is essentially the role of a rapid reaction force.

In relation to the abduction of three Irish soldiers by the DFF and the outrage that resulted in the murders to Pte Derek Smallhorne, Pte Thomas Barrett and the wounding of Pte John O’Mahoney, a 21st century investigation might question the wisdom of sending three Irish soldiers into the enclave escorting UNMO’s so soon after the At Tiri incident.

207: The author was also a member of An Chéad Chath and a colleague of the three men in question.
In October 1981, the two young soldiers Pte Hugh Doherty and Pte Kevin Joyce were sent out onto an unfortified listening post in a suspected PLO infiltration route where they lost their lives. Again, a 21st century investigation might question the decision-making which exposed the young soldiers to such danger as it was highly unorthodox to send out a party without an NCO in charge. The practice of operating listening posts continued to be Irish Batt policy for several subsequent years.

The Israeli invasion in 1982 and the subsequent occupation of the UNIFIL AO by the IDF and its surrogates fundamentally changed the role of UNIFIL between 1982 and 1985 and brought into question the viability of the mission. However, it transpired that the presence of UNIFIL served a very important function. UNIFIL provided humanitarian aid to the civilian population, but more importantly the fact that UNIFIL stood fast and did not withdraw meant that the UNIFIL AO became a safe haven for more than half a million people while the international presence served to curtail the excesses of the occupation forces.

The 2011 ‘Independent Review’ into the deaths of the three soldiers in 1988 found systemic failures by both UNIFIL and Irish Batt to respond to the increased threat of IED’s from Islamic elements. It is unfortunate that the then Chief of Staff ignored the requests from UNIFIL to provide the 64th Irish Batt with an EOD capability despite briefings by UN HQ as to UNIFIL deficiencies resulting from the French government’s decision to withdraw the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assets when the threat of IED’s was increasing. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence flagged UNIFIL’s EOD deficiency but it took the death of three Irish peacekeepers for the Chief of Staff to find the resources for an ordnance EOD team and an Engineer Special Search Team (ESST). A hard lesson was learned from this incident and it marked a turning point in the attitude of Dublin to force security for Irish peacekeepers and paved the way for significant investment in peacekeeping capabilities and capacities.

In 2000 with the downsizing of UNIFIL following the Israeli withdrawal to internationally recognised Israeli territory, the Irish units departed Lebanon leaving behind only a handful of staff officers and NCO’s in the UNIFIL HQ. In 2011 Irish Batt returned. The Irish defence forces had undergone a radical overhaul since the millennium and the army was much smaller but much better equipped. Since 2000 Irish peacekeepers had gained experience in peace-enforcement missions with the United Nations in Liberia and Chad, with NATO in the
Balkans, and with the EU in the Balkans and Chad. Involvement in this new revamped UNIFIL allowed Irish Batt to deploy alongside the NATO countries, in addition to traditional UN peacekeeping forces. At time of writing the UNIFIL AO is an oasis of calm, despite the regional upheavals and the political instability in Lebanon. Irish Batt implements the doctrine, policies, and procedures of a modern peacekeeping force whilst a little further south on the Golan Heights other Irish peacekeepers implement the same doctrine, policies, and procedures in the more hostile environment of the Syrian Civil War.

The UNIFIL mission has become the peacekeeping odyssey of the Irish defence forces. It was established in 1978 during the height of the Cold War and it continues until the time of writing (2016). This case study has shown that several generations of Irish soldiers learnt their trade as soldiers and peacekeepers in UNIFIL. The Irish Defence forces learned hard lessons in Lebanon and these lessons are seminal to Irish peacekeeping policies and practices. It is clear that the personnel of the 43rd Irish Batt were the vanguard of this Irish peacekeeping odyssey. This case study shows that UNIFIL was politically motivated, being set up, not so much to address the problems in Lebanon, as to keep the Camp David, Egyptian-Israeli peace talks on track. The Camp David talks were a Carter Administration’s legacy initiative that was tantalisingly close to a peace-treaty between Israel and Egypt but the Egyptians had threatened to withdraw from the talks because the Israeli army had invaded Lebanon. As a result, the US rushed the UNIFIL concept through a sceptical Security Council. Brian Urquart later wrote:

> The generalities on UNIFIL’s original mandate papered over the very real disagreements amongst the members of the Security Council. They had little relation to the real and rugged problems that would face the peacekeepers.\(^1\)

Irish Peacekeepers deployed into this cauldron in 1978 and despite severe provocation they stuck to the doctrines and principles of traditional peacekeeping. Even following the deaths of three Irish peacekeepers in April 1980 the Irish government specifically dismissed any consideration of peace-enforcement operations and between 1978 and 2000 despite persistent provocation and significant loss of life amongst its peacekeepers the Irish authorities adhered to the principles of traditional peacekeeping in UNIFIL.

However, elsewhere, whilst the Irish peacekeepers were embroiled in Lebanon, there were major developments in the international peacekeeping environment. The debacle of Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda, and the horrors of the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, all highlighted the need for radical reforms of the concept of peacekeeping. Since the end of the Cold War a raft of initiatives including, Partnership for Peace, the Brahimi Report, Responsibility to Protect and the Petersberg Tasks sought to redefine peacekeeping and paved the way for alternate peacekeeping options such as peace-enforcement missions to be conducted by the United Nations and Regional Organisations. These will be explored more fully in Chapters, 7 Kosovo and 8 Chad. As is revealed in this case study when Irish Batt returned to UNIFIL in 2011 the changes in international peacekeeping policy and practice were such that this UNIFIL ‘2’ was a very different outfit from its predecessors with the Irish peacekeepers themselves influenced by their experiences in Kosovo, Liberia and Chad. Irish Batt was now a mechanised unit whereas their predecessors were light infantry, and as such a culture of force protection was very much to the fore in which the tactics of mechanised infantry had the effect of changing many of the aspects and culture of Irish peacekeeping.

5.11 Conclusion

How does the evidence in this chapter help to answer the two key research questions?

From this case we see that the Irish authorities were committed exclusively to the traditional model of peacekeeping in UNIFIL up until 2000. The first Irish peacekeeping battalion, 43rd Irish Batt, sent to Lebanon, expected UNIFIL to be a traditional peacekeeping force that would supervise and facilitate an orderly disengagement and withdrawal of the Israeli security forces and support the restoration of Lebanese authority. Consequently, the 43rd Irish Batt was equipped for a traditional peacekeeping operation. It was only when they were deployed on the ground that they discovered that there was no political agreement amongst the protagonists and none had given their consent to UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. Yet, despite this, Irish Batt continued to operate within the bounds of traditional peacekeeping doctrine. The Commanding Officers of the relieving 44th Irish Batt and succeeding battalions were under no illusion as to the difficulties that were facing them. Yet, they configured and deployed in the traditional peacekeeping mode. It is evident that despite the At Tiri episode in April 1980, the Irish government not only restated its commitment to
the traditional peacekeeping model but specifically excluded any form of peace-enforcement operations.

The disasters of Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda forced the UN and other international organisations to consider more robust peacekeeping options. The Irish authorities began to respond to this change in the international peacekeeping environment and in 1993 amended the Defence Act. The White Paper on Foreign Affairs 1996 committed to Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations with the UN and ‘Regional Organisations’. However, Irish Batt in UNIFIL continued to practice the traditional peacekeeping model until 2000.

In relation to humanitarian aid, we saw that Irish peacekeepers invariably responded to requests for support from the communities in which they operated. This tradition was well established before the concept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) was ever conceived. From 1978 to 2000 Irish peacekeepers in UNIFIL very much adhered to the concept and practice of traditional peacekeeping despite extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Whilst this policy had its critics the peacekeeping model proved to be very resilient especially when compared to the ill-fated Multi National Task Force in Beirut in 1982. When the Irish peacekeeping contingent departed Lebanon in 2000 the Irish defence forces embarked on a series of peace-enforcement missions with the UN, the EU, and NATO’s (PfP). The Irish unit that deployed to UNIFIL in 2011 was very different from the 1978 to 2000 units in that it was a mechanised infantry unit whereas its predecessors were light infantry. However UNIFIL 2 is not a peace-enforcement mission but remains a chapter 6 peacekeeping mission, albeit with a robust mandate incorporating the principles of ‘Responsibility to Protect.

In relation to the ‘neutrality’ issue, Irelands’ membership of the United Nations entails duties and responsibilities which impose on a nation’s neutral status. In Lebanon Ireland is seen as a European nation, one that since 1978 has stood by Lebanon unlike so many other European nations. In 2010 the Irish Honorary Consul General in Lebanon was a retired Lebanese ambassador. He informed the author that when approached by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs about the position he felt as a retired Lebanese diplomat he needed to get permission from the Lebanese authorities. In a private interview, the President of Lebanon informed him that for a retired diplomat to be an Honorary Consul General for a foreign country was highly irregular but in the case of Ireland he had no hesitation in agreeing as Ireland had never wavered in its commitment to Lebanon.
In relation to the effects of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy on Irish peacekeeping, the UNIFIL deployment offered some key insights. As we saw, the Europeanization of the foreign policies of not only Ireland but all the EU states has beneficial effects but it has also had some negative consequences. The Bahrain Declaration which was issued by the Irish Foreign Minister in February 1980 marked a strategic change in Irish Foreign Policy towards Arab states bringing it into line with European Economic Community policy. This had adverse consequences for Irish Batt in UNIFIL. Maj Haddad began a verbal harassment of Irish Batt calling into question their impartiality and suitability for peacekeeping. Seven weeks later three Irish peacekeepers were killed by the DFF and in the diplomatic furore that followed, Israel called into question the impartiality and suitability for peacekeeping of Irish troops. There is no doubt that this Europeanization of Irish Foreign Policy caused difficulties for Irish peacekeepers in the field. Again, in 2013 Ireland found itself isolated in the EU when it opposed the placing of Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations. The fact that Irish peacekeepers were deployed in south Lebanon, a Hezbollah stronghold strongly influenced the Irish stance. However, finding itself isolated in the Council, Ireland relented and made the strategic decision to vote in favour of the EU proposal.

Although Irish participation in Lebanon missions has been militarily costly Ireland has been keen to maintain its Lebanese presence and it seems very likely that institutional and corporate will from the army command has been an important ingredient in maintaining this presence. As we have seen, when choices were available between engagements in other missions and returning to Lebanon, army commanders opted for continuing their commitment to Lebanon. After all, in many ways, participation in Lebanese missions has been such an important rite of passage for so many Irish career officers. Maintaining the peace specifically in Lebanon has become woven into the Defence Force’s mainstream development over the last thirty years which is why these operations have so worthy of detailed described here.

Finally, from this chapter, it is manifest that Irish commitment to peacekeeping in this region reflects a strong belief among politicians that such effort helps to consolidate Irish international standing. The army has been substantially reconfigured since 2000 so that it can perform this role, a development which has certainly helped to ensure continued public investments in its equipment and training.
Chapter 6 Côte d'Ivoire

6.1 Introduction

Previous chapters have discussed peacekeeping in the context of UN, EU and NATO peacekeeping missions in which Irish troops have participated. This chapter discusses peacekeeping in the context of a particular observer mission. As has been shown Ireland participated in only seven observer missions in the years 1958-1988 due to Cold War politics. However, in the following fifteen years, 1989-2004, there was an exponential increase in the number of observer type missions throughout the world and the Irish defence forces were extremely pro-active in supporting these missions. Irish military personnel served in Observer/Liaison appointments with the United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE and NATO. Observer missions are flexible, cost-effective, low-maintenance, and require only minimal logistical support. The military observers provide independent, timely, and accurate information to the decision-makers of their organisations which enable them to make informed choices.

A classic military observer mandate includes monitoring an armistice, implementing peace agreements, negotiating between the parties involved, and preventing dangerous escalations of conflicts. Military observers patrol, observe, talk to protagonists on both sides of the cease-fire line, and report to the headquarters of organisations such as the UN HQ in New York, the EU in Brussels, and the OSCE in Vienna. In addition to observing, military officers also serve as liaison officers and staff officers in HQ’s. They need to be multi-skilled and flexible as they are tasked with a wide variety of jobs including monitoring various agreements on cease-fires, withdrawals, and demilitarisation, and also patrol both sides of conflict zones. They help resolve local difficulties by mediating with all sides of the conflict, and investigate allegations of cease-fire violations. They also organise and supervise disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation programmes (DDR), and assist in supervising elections and arms control programmes, military reform, border management, combating terrorism, and conflict prevention and resolution.
This case study focuses the UN MINUCI political mission established in Côte d’Ivoire in 2003, which included a military liaison section. Irish defence force officers played a key role in establishing the military liaison section of this mission. Of the four case studies examined in this thesis this observer type mission. It was chosen as a representative example of the fifty or so observer missions in which Irish military observers have deployed, and illustrates how such observer missions are conducted and how they differ from peacekeeping missions.

However, in addition to this chapter dealing with the role of Irish liaison officers with the UN political mission in Côte d’Ivoire, this thesis reference also refers to other missions in which the author served in observer / liaison / logistical and administrative positions with UNTSO in Observer Group Beirut, Observer Group Egypt, Observer Group Golan (Tiberius), UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, the OSCE Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY), and with UNIFIL in the office of the Political Advisor in Beirut.

This case study explains how the situation in Cote d’Ivoire deteriorated to such an extent as to require the deployment of a UN mission. It begins by depicting the so-called Cote d’Ivoire’s ‘miracle’, of almost unique African economic prosperity following prolonged colonisation, and will go on to describe the economic collapse and decent into military coups and civil war. The chapter will continue a brief geographic overview of the country and a discussion of the ethnic groups. The political situation is strongly influenced by ethnic loyalties and the results of the Presidential and National Assembly elections are discussed and the influences they had on the security situation throughout the country will also be explored. Details of the various peace processes which MINUCI was sent to monitor following the civil war will also be reviewed. The case study then provides a brief description of the operations of observer/liaison missions, and then focuses on the deployment of MINUCI to explain the role of the military liaison section and the way in which it established a comprehensive liaison network with the military actors throughout Cote d’Ivoire including the government force, Forces Armees Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), the rebel force, Forces Nouvelles (FN) and the peacekeeping forces, French Forces in Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI) and the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI). The case study finally describes the role played by Irish officers in setting up MINUCI.
6.2 Observer Type Missions

Observer type missions are very popular with individual army officers and government authorities. Individual officers get the opportunity to expand their career experiences and it is usually financially lucrative as in addition to an overseas allowances received from the home authorities a mission subsistence allowance (MSA) is also paid by the mission. This allowance is calculated to cover living expenses incurred by individuals during the mission such as accommodation, and food. However, observers usually share accommodation and eat as economically as possible in order to save a percentage of the MSA. Furthermore, some observer missions allow the observers to be accompanied by their families. This is very popular amongst military families as it addresses the perennial problem of soldiers being absent from home and also affords families a unique travel experience. There can also be a tax opportunity to buy a car duty-free in the mission area and import it home when the tour of duty ends.

Observer mission are equally popular with the authorities, particularly the political establishment and the departments of Foreign Affairs and Finance, as they reap the diplomatic benefits of being seen to respond to high profile international issues. They offer relatively low-cost opportunities for governments and diplomatic circles to underscore their response to highly visible international incidents, whether they be they natural disasters, such as a volcano, tsunami or earthquake, or man-made disasters such as genocide, famine, war or terrorist atrocities. Military officers can be dispatched quickly and cost-effectively to serve as observers, liaison officers, administrators, logisticians, medics, engineers, election supervisors, DDR supervisor’s, military trainers, and so on.

The average observer mission has a small HQ in which there is a chief of station, deputy chief and staff officers comprising the standard military staff of G1-Administration, G2-Information/intelligence, G3-operations, and G4-logistics. Some stations also have a G5-planning section. Observers are paid a mission subsistence allowance (MSA), a daily allowance payable by their organization to observers for living expenses incurred in the field as observers are required to make their own accommodation and eating arrangements. Uniforms, flak jackets and helmets are brought with them from their home nation. The logistical support provided by the organisation is confined to office facilities, transport, and communication equipment. In almost all cases military observers are unarmed. The first
month of the mission the MSA is paid at a higher rate to facilitate living in a hotel whilst searching for self-catering accommodation in the mission area.

The Irish defence forces first involvement in international peacekeeping was in 1958 when a group of army officers deployed as United Nations Military Observers (UNMO’s) in Beirut. At the time of writing (2016) Irish defence forces officers are serving in 9 observer missions throughout the world.

Throughout this thesis, various examples confirm that Irish army officers served as military observers and were deployed between opposing forces during ceasefires to manage disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, negotiate ceasefires, repair essential utility services, and collect the dead and wounded from no man’s land. Irish military observers have served in missions as diverse as disputes between the Indian and Pakistani forces regarding Kashmir, and Middle East hostilities between Israeli and Arab forces. In Beirut they played a role in the release of the western hostages in 1991, served throughout former Yugoslavia as military observers, and also served in administrative and logistical appointments when the OSCE found it difficult to recruit civilians to work in unstable countries. They have served in Asia, Central America, and Africa, and Irish military personnel have also been seconded to Irish NGO’s such as Trócaire, Concern and GOAL to assist them in their response to major international emergencies.

Chapter Three describes the authors experience as a UN military observer in Sarajevo in 1992, when the mission reopened the airport in the besieged city to facilitate the largest airlift in aviation history which enabled UN food and medicine to be brought in and distributed throughout the city and countryside. Chapter 3 also included a personal account of the author’s experiences as chief of administration and finance in the post-conflict peace-building mission in Belgrade OMiFRY (the OSCE mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

Usually an observer mission which is conducted by unarmed personnel requires political consensus amongst the parties to the conflict which enables unarmed observers to deploy amongst the protagonists in order to facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. At its inception MINUCI had the ingredients for success. The French government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had taken the diplomatic initiative

http://www.military.ie/overseas/current-missions/
and had deployed significant military resources in Côte d’Ivoire to facilitate the implementation of the Linus Marcuse’s Agreement. MINUCI was a political mission with a military liaison component which was established by the UN Security Council to monitor and assist the parties to the agreement. However, as we will see MINUCI reported that the Linus Marcuse’s Agreement was not being implemented. The Ivorian political parties had adopted a zero-sum game and neither government nor rebels were prepared to enact the compromises that the Linus Marcuse’s Agreement required. The ECOWAS military mission ECOMICI never achieved the required strength and its EU financial backers began to withdraw funding. The deployment of 4,000 French troops constituted a considerable financial and military burden on France which was only sustainable over the short term. It became obvious that the Ivorian situation was not going to be resolved in the immediate future, so France, ECOWAS, and the EU backers of ECOMICI, lobbied the United Nations to assume the burden of peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire. MINUCI was in a position to provide the Secretary General with accurate and timely intelligence which enabled the Security Council to make an informed decision. The UN therefore established the Chapter 7 peace-enforcement mission ONUCI. In addition, the French government maintained a scaled down FFCI which undertook to support ONUCI when required.

6.3 The Côte D’Ivoire ‘Miracle’

Côte d’Ivoire officially became a French colony in 1893, but was not finally “pacified” until 1915. Its post-colonial history is closely associated with President Felix Houphouet Boigny who became Côte d’Ivoire’s first Prime Minister in 1959 and its first President in 1960 when Côte D’Ivoire attained independence. He held this position until his death in December 1993. Unlike the leaders of his neighbouring postcolonial countries, President Boigny embraced the colonial legacy and actively encouraged French investment in Côte d’Ivoire. By 1980, 50,000 French expatriates lived in Côte d’Ivoire, a five-fold increase since independence, and an arrangement was made with France to station six hundred French soldiers in Abidjan to guarantee Côte d’Ivoire’s external security, which enabled the country to avoid the ruinous policy of military expenditure adopted by its neighbours. From a French perspective these soldiers also protected French interests and ensured the safety of French nationals. In addition, French civil servants were placed in key decision making roles in every government ministry.
For two decades the economy showed an annual growth rate of between 7% and 8%. The one crop economy was diversified and palm oil production increased seven fold, coffee production tripled, and Côte d'Ivoire became Africa’s leading exporter of pineapples, bananas, rubber, sugar-cane, and the world’s largest producer of cacao. Per capita income rose from $70 per year in 1965 to $1000 in 1982. This record of economic achievement produced a political stability that was unique in sub-Saharan Africa. By avoiding crippling military expenditure and sustained with the receipts of a booming economy, Boigny’s government invested strategically in infrastructures such as ports, communications, roads, and electricity. It also invested 20% of its budget in education which resulted in school attendance rising from 22% to 55% of the population. At 60% literacy was at the highest level in Africa and twice the continental average.

However corruption was widespread under Boigny’s reign. The gap between rich and poor was enormous and the country was dependent on foreign labour, foreign investment, foreign technicians, and foreign markets for its crops. The core of its growth strategy rested on immigrants who were welcome to come and cultivate cocoa on unused land. This produced a tidal wave of immigration from Burkina Faso and by 1980, 40% of the labour force was immigrant. As a result, the private sector was dominated by immigrants whilst the public service was overwhelmingly Ivorian. The downturn in world economy in the 1980s had a devastating effect on the Ivorian economy which was exposed to the arbitrary fluctuations of the international market. The world price of cocoa and coffee collapsed while the price of imported oil rocketed. Boigny’s government borrowed externally to keep the economy going and signed an IMF restructuring programme resulting in a massive external debt and a heavy debt service burden. The surge in interest rates in the early 1990s exacerbated the debt burden and by 1994 the external debt was 231% of GDP. Even with massive borrowing average incomes collapsed by around a third and poverty soared. The GDP per capita which increased by an average annual rate of 3.9% between 1960 and 1978, fell by an average annual rate of 3.7% between 1978 and 1993. Structural adjustments, which had been

212 The World Bank. 2007. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C
213 Collier, 157
intended as a temporary solution to an economic crisis, were now instituted as long-term policy.  

Following Boigny’s death in 1994 the 50% devaluation of the CFA helped return Côte d’Ivoire to rapid economic growth and annual GDP growth rates once again stabilised at 6% –7% between 1994-98. However, this resulted in a massive redistribution of wealth. The biggest losers were the public servants who were predominantly Ivorian, whilst as in any devaluation the exporters are the main beneficiaries, which in the case of Côte d’Ivoire meant the immigrant cocoa farmers. The government used the growth to service the foreign debt and by 1996 domestic arrears were eliminated. This was achieved by a low inflation policy which also necessitated tight control on public sector pay and recruitment. These austerity measures imposed on the Ivorian public had a devastating political impact fuelling anti-immigrant sentiment, which resulted in a military coup in 1999. It was led by disgruntled soldiers incensed by their poor pay and conditions in what seemed to be a land of plenty.

Côte d’Ivoire is a tropical country located 2-8 degrees West; 5-10 degrees North. It is roughly the size of Germany and has a population of 16.3 million people including 5 million African immigrants, 130,000 Lebanese and 20,000 French. The communications infrastructure is sophisticated by African standards. There are over 12,000 kilometres of paved roads, and excellent telecommunications including cell phone infrastructure. There are two active seaports; one in San Pedro in the west, and Abidjan in the east which is the most up-to-date in West Africa and the largest port between Casablanca and Cape Town. Its international airports are amongst the best in Africa. It also has an extensive network of domestic airports. Over sixty ethnic groups exist in Côte d’Ivoire which are divided into five principal ethnic-linguistic groups. They are; The Akan, the Krou, the Southern Mande, the Voltic group, and the Northern Mande (See Figure 6.1). The population can also be divided into three main religious groups. 35%-40% are Muslims who are located mainly in the north due to the Arab influences which arrived along the land routes, with and 25%-40%

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214 Klaas, Brian. *From Miracle to Nightmare: An Institutional Analysis of Development Failures in Côte d'Ivoire*. *Africa Today* Volume 55, Number 1, Fall 2008 Pp 114

Indigenous peoples. The 20%-30% Christian population are mainly located in the south due to European influence which arrived by sea.

Figure 6.1 Location of main linguistic groups and tribal areas throughout Côte D'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire was a single party state with The Côte d'Ivoire Democratic Party (PDCI) from its inception in 1960 until 1990. When the political process was liberalised in September 1990 there was an explosion of political enthusiasm and more than twenty-five official parties were established. However, the four main parties are The Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo, the Rally for Republicans (RDR) led by Alassane Ouattara, The Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) led by Henri Konan Bédié, and the Ivorian Workers Party (PIT) led by Francis Wodié. Politics are very fractious in Côte d'Ivoire and the political
parties tend to follow ethnic or tribal loyalties. The (FPI) is supported by the Bete people who are Kru speakers, The PDCI is supported by the Baule who speak Akan, whilst the RDR are supported by the northern Voltac speaking people.

Felix Houphouet Boigny won the first contested Presidential Elections in 1990 but following his death in December 1993, Dr. Henri Konan Bédié became the second president. He was a former IMF executive and adopted an ambitious programme to revitalise the Ivorian economy. His 50% devaluation of the CFA yielded impressive initial results. He sought an electoral mandate in the 1995 Presidential elections but he excluded his main rival Alassane Ouattara by introducing a policy of ‘Ivoirite’ which required both parents to be born in Côte d’Ivoire. This resulted in widespread inter-ethnic violence throughout the country. Laurent Gbagbo was convinced that Bédié was not interested in a free and fair election so he withdrew from the race leaving only Francis Wodié to challenge the president. The political instability that triggered the coup and the fraudulent elections that followed were predictable consequences of the poor leadership of the ousted president Henri Konan Bédié.  

On 22 December 1999 the army staged a mutiny over the non-payment of salaries. Within two days the mutiny had escalated to a fully fledged coup d’état. The leader of the coup was General Robert Guei, a former army chief of staff who was sacked by Bédié following the 1995 election. He formed a government of national unity and promised open elections. A new constitution was drafted and ratified in the summer of 2000. However, it retained irredentist clauses which perpetuated the north-south, Muslim-Christian divide that had been growing since Boigny’s death. When Guei’s handpicked Supreme Court disqualified fourteen of the nineteen candidates including the RDR’s Ouattara and the PDCI’s former President Bédié, western observers and funding were withdrawn. The RDR called for a boycott ensuring a low election turnout in a competition between Guei and Gbagbo. Eventually Gbagbo emerged as the winner but there was massive discontent at the election gerrymandering which excluded so many from participating. The next presidential election was scheduled for 2005 but for a variety of spurious reasons it was not held until 2011.

The north south divide was also reflected in the army and on the 19 September 2002 soldiers stationed in Bouake and Korhogo rebelled and seized the bulk of the FANCI equipment located there. The Administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, would also have fallen to the rebels.

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had it not been for the intervention of French Marines from Abidjan. Several hundred people were killed in the fighting which continued until 17 October when the Senegalese Foreign Minister, Cheikh Gadio, brokered a truce. During this period the rebels unveiled a political party ‘Mouvement Patriotique de Cote D’Ivoire’ (MPCI) with Guillaume Soro, a former student leader, emerging as its General Secretary. By late May the country was partitioned, with rebel forces controlling the north and government forces controlling the south. French troops set up a ‘Zone of Confidence’ to separate the sides and prevent a resumption of the civil war.

Figure 6.2 Zone of Confidence, Cote d'Ivoire 2003
6.4 The Peace Process

The first successful peace initiative to end the civil war was brokered by the Senegalese foreign minister, Cheikh Gadio, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He negotiated a truce which was signed by the rebels on 17 October 2002 and was accepted by the government. This truce was followed by talks in Lome, Togo, which were chaired by the Togolese President, Gnassingbe Eyadema, head of the contact group set up by ECOWAS to help resolve the Ivorian crisis. The first accord was signed on the 31 October. Both sides agreed to respect the ceasefire and to refrain from the recruitment and use of mercenaries, enrolment of children, and violations of the accord on cessation of hostilities. Further progress was made on 1 November when the government agreed to submit a draft amnesty law to parliament. But following that the talks foundered when the MPCI demanded the resignation of President Gbagbo and new elections, and the government demanded that the rebels disarm.

6.4.1 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

The French Forces in Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI) agreed to monitor the 17 Oct ceasefire line until the deployment of a proposed ECOWAS force of 1300 troops. However, ECOWAS experienced difficulties and delays in deployment. With the Lome talks stalled and renewed fighting in the west in which FFCI troops were becoming embroiled, the efforts of French diplomacy produced a second ceasefire on 13 January 2003 and convened renewed peace talks in Linas-Marcoussis, Paris. On 25 January 2003 the government and rebels signed the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement.
Figure 6.3 Deployment of FANCI, FN, ECOWAS and French forces, March 2003

The Linas-Marcoussis agreement outlined a nine point programme on disarmament, security sector reform, human rights violations, and media incitement to xenophobia and violence, the
organisation and supervision of elections, and measures to end divisive politics on national identification citizenship, foreign nationals, land tenure, and eligibility for the presidency. It produced a framework of reconciliation for a new government made up of delegates from each of the political parties who attended the conference under the chairmanship of a consensus Prime Minister. The government of reconciliation was to have executive powers and was charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring administration and public services, and generally rebuilding the country. It was tasked with implementing legislative reform of the laws of:

- Citizenship and nationality
- Electoral procedures
- Eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic
- Land inheritance
- Media
- Rights and freedoms of the individual
- DDR
- Electoral timetable for credible transparent elections
- Rebuilding the army
- Release and amnesty for all military personnel held on charges of threatening state security to include soldiers living in exile
- Freedom of movement

However, the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord was greeted with four days of rioting in Abidjan, mainly by the ‘Young Patriots’ FPI para-military support group. Political activity remained at a stalemate as the war continued in the west where both the rebels and government forces used opposing Liberian factions to fight a proxy war on their behalf. In April international pressure culminated in the meeting between President Charles Taylor and President Laurent Gbagbo in Togo and soon after the war ended.

The Government of Reconciliation was convened under the chairmanship of the consensus Prime Minister, Seydou Elimane Diarra. All the main political parties were represented. However, in August 2003 the rebel group now calling themselves Forces Nouvelles (FN), (an umbrella name for three rebel political parties) ceased participation in the Government of Reconciliation citing procedural difficulties and expressing their frustration with President Gbagbo for obstructing the operation of government. President Gbagbo’s supporters
countered by complaining that the FN were members of a government despite never having been elected, that they consistently imposed preconditions, that their demands for amnesty has been complied with, as were their demands for the appointment of the ministers of Defence and Internal Security, and that the FN zone remained under the control of an ill-disciplined militia which had effectively partitioned the country and prevented the return of governance to the area.

6.4.2 Accra Arrangements

Following the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement there were riots in the streets of Abidjan. The main points of contention were the allocation of portfolios in the new government of reconciliation and the fact that the portfolios of Defence and Internal Security had been allocated to the rebel forces. In addition, the clause calling for disarmament included the legitimate forces, FANCI, police and gendarmerie. To resolve the situation a meeting was held in Accra, Ghana, where the initial portfolios were allocated, and it was there agreed that a fifteen person National Security Council representing all the major actors would sit and reach a consensus on a list of names to be submitted to President Gbagbo from which he would appoint the ministers. The Accra Arrangements were agreed on 3 March 2003.

6.4.3 July Declaration

In a solemn ceremony on the 4 July 2003, in the presence of President Gbagbo at the Presidential Palace of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the Government of Reconciliation and the Diplomatic Community, a Joint Declaration of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles declared the war to have ended and undertook to:

- Support the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the Accra Arrangements
- Affirmed that they are subordinate to the President of the Republic and the Government of Reconciliation
- Confirmed that they are determined to work together to avoid any hint of resumption of hostilities
- Reaffirm the national programme of DDR
• Support activities aimed at securing a return to normal administrative economic and social relations

The 4 July declaration by both militaries illustrated the sense of frustration they experienced at the stalemate in the political process and the inability of the political process to make any progress.

6.4.4 Accra III

October/November 2003, saw intense diplomatic activity in an attempt to resolve the political stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire. President Gbagbo visited Ghana and Nigeria for talks on the impasse, while the rebel leader Guillaume Soro undertook a tour of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. Ivorian opposition leader Alassane Ouattara and former president Henri Konan Bédié were also involved in diplomatic activity. In addition, a major initiative was undertaken by Ghanaian President, John Kufuor, in his capacity as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, the regional superpower. The leaders persuaded Ivorian President Gbagbo to attend a meeting in Accra on 10 and 11 November 2003, billed by the press as ‘Accra III’. The meeting was also attended by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the presidents of Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin and Niger. President Kufuor of Ghana and President Obasanjo of Nigeria wanted to persuade President Gbagbo to address three key concerns of the rebels:

• A reform of the constitution which would permit Ivorians with a foreign parent to occupy senior government positions, including the presidency
• A revision of Côte d'Ivoire's nationality law to make it more straightforward for immigrants from other West African countries and their children to obtain full Ivorian nationality
• An enactment of new laws on land ownership to make it more straightforward for immigrants who have occupied and cultivated land for several years with the consent of the local community to be given full legal title to the property

However, the meeting was deemed a failure when none of the above issues were resolved. The final communiqué stated that Togo and Niger had agreed to provide an extra 80 gendarmes to act as bodyguards to ministers in the government of national reconciliation. The communiqué also recommended moves to moderate inflammatory statements in the Ivorian
media, and confirmed that the heads of state had considered proposals that the West African peacekeeping force in Côte d'Ivoire should be expanded and given a full UN mandate.

At a press conference in Abidjan on 13 November, the chairman of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, confirmed that he had spoken by telephone to Ghanaian President, John Kufuor, who had hosted the West African summit (Accra III). But Mr. Prodi said both he and President Kufuor agreed that Accra III had been a failure. He went on to say that the European Union would continue to withhold €400 million of aid earmarked for Côte d'Ivoire until progress was made in restoring peace and stability.

6.5 Military Actors in Côte d’Ivoire

There were four military actors operating in Côte d’Ivoire; The Ivorian forces, FANCI and Forces Nouvelles, and the impartial international forces, FFCI and ECOMICI.

6.5.1 Forces Armees Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI)

In the thirteen-month period up to January 2001, FANCI members launched six coup attempts, and the final coup in September 2002 led to a civil war and division of the country. Under the Boigny regime the small army was loyal and apolitical. However, the national reaction to the irredentist policy adopted by President Bédié was reflected in FANCI, and this coupled with Bédié’s application of rigorous macro-economic policies with its tight control on salary increases and the size of the public service resulted in poor conditions of service and pay for soldiers. The civil war divided the army along roughly ethnic grounds with the northerners joining the rebels and the southerners remaining in FANCI. The rebels appropriated as much as 40% of FANCI’s military inventory. Since the beginning of 2003, FANCI embarked upon a comprehensive re-equipping programme. Purchases for the Air force included; fixed wing Mig 23s, SU 25s and pilot-less drones, MI 24s, MI 35s, MI 8s helicopters and Puma’s. The military hardware purchased included obsolete armour, heavy, medium and light infantry weapons, anti-aircraft and anti-armour weapons, and ammunition for all the above. Although the timing of the purchases was politically questionable there is no doubt that FANCI’s inventory needed upgrading.

Cooperation between FANCI and the impartial forces including MINUCI were excellent. MINUCI staff officers and MLO teams enjoyed full freedom of movement in the FANCI
controlled areas and enjoyed very cordial relationships with FANCI senior officers and troops on the ground.

However, there were problems in FANCI. Humanitarian agencies produced ample documentary evidence to indict members of FANCI for gross human right abuses conducted during the fighting in Abidjan and the west, included torture, rape, and the summary execution of civilians. In addition little was done to tackle the corruption and extortion practices which were endemic to FANCI and there was ample evidence to suggest that FANCI members trained and logistically supported the pro-Gbagbo militia, The Young Patriots. In October 2004 the FANCI air force broke the ceasefire and launched air raids into the FN controlled north. During one of these raids nine FFCI soldiers were killed. In retaliation FFCI destroyed the bulk of the FANCI air force.

6.5.2 Forces Nouvelles (FN)

Forces Nouvelles (FN) is the umbrella name adopted by the rebels and includes the political parties of MPCI, MJP and MPIGO. At the outset of the war the rebel’s military performance was impressive. They were initially a group of around 800 or so FANCI mutineers. Their numbers grew as the war progressed and they were joined by Dozo tribesmen (traditional hunters) and young people from the villages in the north. In addition there were reports of support from Mali and Burkina Faso, and mercenaries from Liberia and Sierra Leon. Human rights investigators reported that initially the rebels were well-disciplined and assisted the civilian populations in the areas that they ‘liberated’. However, when reports of FANCI and gendarme abuses reached the rebels, reprisals began. After the war when the initial funding of Forces Nouvelles began to run out, money became scarce and discipline began to deteriorate. As FN had no revenue-raising capability the soldiers did not receive salaries so they resorted to extorting cash at checkpoints and food from villagers. As the months passed there were increasing reports of uncontrolled FN elements looting and beating villagers throughout the north and moving south into the zone of confidence.

The difficulty experienced by the leadership of Forces Nouvelles in maintaining a cohesive organisation became more apparent throughout 2003. MINUCI MLOs experienced open hostility towards the Bouake leadership from the FN leaders in Man and the airport in Bouake. There were also press reports of hostility towards the Bouake leadership in Korhogo. FN admitted that there were uncontrolled elements operating in the area of Kossou.
Lake who were accused of banditry and extortion of the civilian population. They were also responsible for the killing of two FFCI soldiers on 25 August 2003.

The bank robbery in Bouake by members of FN which took place in August 2003, resulted in the deaths of twenty-three of their number in squabbles over the division of the spoils and the FN leadership had to request the deployment of FFCI to restore law and order. In October 2003, a partially successful bank robbery was conducted in Man by an uncontrolled FN faction, resulting in further deployment of FFCI troops at the request of the FN leadership.

6.5.3. French Forces in Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI)

Côte d’Ivoire signed a Mutual Defence Accord with France in 1961, which provided for the stationing of French troops in Abidjan to protect Côte d’Ivoire from external aggression. Since then 600 French Marines had been stationed in Port Bouet adjacent to Abidjan airport. When the coup took place in 1999, FFCI did not intervene, as a coup did not constitute an act of external aggression. However, France did provide refuge for the deposed President Bédié and during the civil war FFCI became involved to a limited extent. FFCI did prevent the rebels from capturing Yamoussoukro and following the first ceasefire on 17 October 2002, they agreed to monitor the ceasefire line until the deployment of the ECOWAS force, and to then act in support of this force. The FFCI also became embroiled in the war in the west in December 2002 and early 2003, when it clashed with rebel forces. However, the presence of FFCI which had been strengthened to four thousand elite troops and enjoyed excellent logistical support was instrumental in containing the war. FFCI was a very effective peacekeeping mission. Its presence in the zone of confidence ensured that FN did not drag its difficulties into the south, and conversely ensured that FANCI could not exploit FN difficulties by attempting to retake the north. In August 2003 the French forces which were deployed in the south-west in the San Pedro area redeployed northwards into the west of the zone of confidence. The considerable French armoured and mechanised presence in this area had a very positive effect on stabilising the region.

The activities of FFCI, whatever their altruistic intent, was consistently exposed to charges of self-interest and neo-colonialism. Despite FFCIs peacekeeping effectiveness, the French authorities realised that France’s interests in Côte d’Ivoire meant that FFCI could never be regarded as truly impartial and as a result its commanders, although operating from February 2003 with UN Security Councils authority for robust Chapter 7 rules of engagement, were
careful not to exacerbate the situation. In October 2004 nine FFCI soldiers were killed during a FANCI air raid in the north. In retaliation FFCI destroyed the bulk of the FANCI air-force. This resulted in anti-French riots in Abidjan and led to the departure of some 9000 French expatriates.

6.5.4 ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI)

ECOMICI was conceived at the negotiations which followed the first ceasefire on 17 Oct 2002 and was the contribution of the regional states to try to help restore peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire. The force consisted of some 1,300 troops from the regional countries of Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Benin. The ECOMICI HQ was located in Abidjan with an operational HQ in Zambakro near Yamoussoukro. Politically, ECOMICI troops enjoyed more credibility than FFCI, although ECOMICI had limited manpower and logistical support and was therefore stretched to perform its assigned tasks in the ‘Zone of Confidence’ (ZoC). On 5 March 2003, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission recommended an increase in the size of ECOMICI to 3,411, including 300 security personnel to protect the new government. However, the donor’s conference which took place in Paris in July 2003 failed to generate the additional funding required and provided just enough funds to maintain its strength at 1300. When ONUCI was established on 4 May 2004 the 1300 troops of ECOMICI were incorporated into ONUCI.

6.6 MINUCI

On the 13 May 2003 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1479 which decided to establish a United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The resolution approved the establishment of a small staff to support the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on political, legal, civil affairs, civilian police, elections, media and public relations, humanitarian and human rights issues, and the establishment of a military liaison group whose tasks included:

- Providing advice to the SRSG on military matters
- Monitoring the military situation, including the security of Liberian refugees and reporting to the SRSG thereon
• Establishing liaison with the French and ECOWAS forces for the purpose of advising the SRSG on military and related developments
• Establishing also liaison with FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles, in order to build confidence and trust between the armed groups, in cooperation with the French and ECOWAS forces, in particular concerning helicopters and combat aircraft
• Providing input into forward planning on disengagement, disarmament and demobilisation and identifying future tasks, in order to advise the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and support the French and ECOWAS forces
• Reporting to the SRSG on the above issues

The deployment of the MLO teams is treated in Para 6.7 The civilian component of MINUCI confined its activities to the Abidjan area and focused on monitoring the human rights situation, the media, and on working within the framework of the monitoring committee to facilitate the peace process. The MINUCI public information unit maintained an active dialogue with the Ivorian media to promote objective reporting of the Linus-Marcoussis Agreement and MINUCI. In August it deployed an electoral advisor to plan for the 2005 elections. However, MINUCI was of the opinion that without the unification of Côte d’Ivoire elections would not be feasible.

The first report by the Secretary General to the Security Council was optimistic that the peace process was progressing well with the formation of the government of national reconciliation under the agreed Prime Minister Seydou Diarra. The Forces Nouvelles ministers did boycott the first three scheduled meetings but eventually took up their positions on 3 April. On 28 May the Government of National Reconciliation published its draft programme for the implementation of the Linus-Marcoussis Agreement with proposals to address the issues of:

• Citizenship
• National Identity
• Status of Foreign Nationals
• Electoral System
• Eligibility for Election to the Presidency
• Land Tenure Laws
• Media Rights
• Freedom of the Individual
• Economic Recovery
• Social Cohesion
• DDR

However, as the months passed it became obvious that the ruling political party of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) were opposed to many of the proposals and actively conducted a
campaign of obstruction. Furthermore, the ECOMICI had neither the financial or logistical resources to fulfil its mandate. On 10 October 2003 President Gbagbo requested that MINUCI be transformed into a full UN peacekeeping mission and on 24 November 2003 ECOWAS requested the UN to initiate peacekeeping operations to fast-track the Ivorian peace process.  

In February 2004 the UN Security Council was deeply concerned by the deteriorating economic and political situation in Côte d’Ivoire and its serious impact on the entire West-African sub-region. It therefore decided to establish a Chapter 7 Peace-enforcement mission in Côte d’Ivoire and UN Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004) established ONUCI which came into operation in April 2004. As this background indicates, the case study discussed in the remainder of this chapter is the year-long observer mission that preceded it.

6.7 MINUCI Military Liaison Officers

In May 2003 when the author was stationed in Dublin he received a phone call from the Brigade Adjutant who informed him that the UN were planning to open a new mission in Côte d’Ivoire with appointments available for a Lt Col and a Commandant. The author expressed an interest, and somewhat to his surprise was informed just two days later that he was departing in ten days. A frenetic period ensued in which he had to undergo a rigorous medical, receive a battery of inoculations, and begin taking malaria prophylactic. He was then issued with tropical uniforms, flak jacket, helmet, binoculars, mosquito net, and other items of personal equipment. He then attended a series of briefings in DFHQ. The administrative brief dealt with the making of a will, photographs, overseas pay and allowances, personal banking details, air tickets, service passports and a variety of other administrative issues which had to be finalised prior to departure on a mission.

The operational brief was limited as it was a new mission. He was merely informed that MINUCI was a political mission to which a military liaison section would be attached, and that the author’s appointment was to that of the military information officer, (UN parlance for intelligence officer). The intelligence brief was far more detailed. A military intelligence analyst from the West African desk briefed him on Côte d’Ivoire and the situation pertaining at that time, with specific reference to the military actors on the ground. He was briefed on

the occurrences during the short-lived civil war and the details of the Linus Marcuse’s peace agreement. Relatively little was known about the new political mission MINUCI other than the details contained in the UN SC Resolution that had established it. The attachment of MLO’s to a political mission was a new experience for the Irish DF and the intelligence branch was very keen to keep abreast of the situation.

In June 2003 the author arrived in Abidjan the capital city of Côte d’Ivoire. He was the first Military Liaison Officer (MLO) to report to the MINUCI HQ which had been established only a few weeks earlier and was operating out of a temporary location in Abidjan. By then about a dozen UN civilian administrative and logistical staff were in location including the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), the Chief of Technical Services (CTS), the Finance Officer, and other staff from UN HQ in New York who were temporarily assigned to help set up the mission. The author introduced himself to the CAO and informed him that six months earlier he had held a similar position to his as Chief of Administration and Finance in the OSCE Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY) which was also a newly established mission. Consequently, he had a very good understanding of the issues facing the CAO and he offered to assist him in any way possible. The author was particularly interested in setting up a good working relationship between the UN civilian staff and the military, an area which is traditionally problematic in peace missions.

Several UN Peacekeeping missions are beset with antagonistic relationships between the military and civilian component. The military resent the perceived high pay and preferential treatment which UN civilians enjoy and are critical of the level of administrative and logistical support provided by these civilians. On the other hand the civilians frequently find the military to be dogmatic, inflexible, and hidebound by archaic practices and traditions:

The UN civilian bureaucracy in support of peacekeeping has created a relatively comfortable niche for itself, frequently at the expense of the soldiers who do most of the dirty work. There are many dedicated and competent civilian employees involved with peacekeeping, but there are also some who look upon the military component as an inconvenience at best. This was to create a major morale problem in our force, as highly paid civilian staff members demonstrated their inability to provide the most
basic services to the military component…It created unnecessary tension in our mission and detracted from our operational efficiency.\textsuperscript{218} 

The author had shared these military perceptions of UN civilians in previous missions he had served on, but as Chief of Administration and Finance for OMiFRY he began to see the bigger picture as he had to deal with relentless requests from police trainers and human rights staff that were performing difficult tasks in demanding situations. However, the author had to work within a strict budget and was constrained by an insistence on the strict application of rules and regulations and was subjected to frequent audits from external auditors who had little empathy for the complexities of peacekeeping. Thus, from the beginning the author was keen to bring his experience to bear and ensure a smooth and productive relationship between the UN civilian staff and the military component. He worked with the CAO and CTS in the following weeks and found that they were highly motivated and extremely busy, frequently working up to eighteen hours a day to set up the mission. This included securing a suitable building for the MINUCI HQ in Abidjan, a storage depot for transport, office supplies, furniture, communication equipment, radios, computers, and so on. An already impressive volume of supplies had arrived from the United Nations logistic base in Brindisi in Italy, and several dozen 4X4 vehicles were being fitted out with HF and VHF radios.

The second military person to arrive was the Senior Military Liaison Officer, a Brigadier General from Bangladesh. He had been informed that the MLO’s would undergo deployment training in the UN HQ in Freetown, Sierra Leone from the 16 to the 22 June before being deployed to MINUCI on 23 June. The SLO went to Freetown for the pre-deployment training. However, the CTS requested that the author remain in Abidjan to assist him in making preparations for the arrival of the MLO’s including, arranging hotel accommodation, organising MLO offices, and preparing an in-country induction course for them on their arrival. When the twenty-five MLO’s arrived, including the other Irish officer, Commandant Brian Fitzsimons, the author met them at the airport, checked them through customs, emigration, and security, and brought them to their hotel. The induction course began that evening and continued for ten days. It involved lectures on Côte d’Ivoire, the Mission, the role of the MLO’s, and briefings on the military situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Visits were arranged to FFCI, FANCI and ECOMICI HQ’s in Abidjan, as were familiarisation tours of

Abidjan and the surrounding areas. The MLO’s also had to take driving competency tests. All passed and were issued MINUCI driving licences.

The initial plan for the MINUCI Military Liaison Officer (MLO) section was to establish MLO team-sites with the HQ’s of the Côte d’Ivoire national army (FANCI), the ECOWAS military mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), and the French Forces in Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI). As these HQ’s were all located in Abidjan, the security and logistical issues were minimal and these MINUCI MLO team-sites set up and were fully operational within a week.

The next stage was to deploy into the country. As we were new to the country we had no real appreciation of the security situation outside Abidjan. We therefore asked FFCI for assistance and they immediately agreed to facilitate us. A recce party led by the chief MLO, Brig Gen Abdul Hafiz, therefore flew in FFCI helicopters to Yamoussoukro and met with the senior FANCI officer, Lt Col Philip Mango. He was very charming and exuded confidence. I was struck by the incongruity of the fact that FANCI HQ in Abidjan had a Lt Gen, two Maj Gen’s, and several Brig Gens and Colonels seemingly busily employed, despite their having less than 1000 troops in the Abidjan area, while in the Zone of Confidence over 80% of FANCI troops were located under the single command of Lt Col Mango. The next occasion on which the author met Lt Col Mango was when President Gbagbo visited Yamoussoukro to announce the major peace initiative which ultimately came to nothing. Some months later Lt Col Mango, who was of the same tribe as President Gbagbo, was promoted to the rank of Lt General and became Chief of Staff of FANCI. Meanwhile, he was very cooperative with MINUCI and not only facilitated the establishment of a MINUCI MLO team-site in his HQ in Yamoussoukro but arranged for us to set up MLO team-sites in all the FANCI battalion HQ’s along and south of the Zone of Confidence.

We were then flown by FFCI to Bouake where we met the commander of Forces Nouvelles (FN) Col Suleiman Bakayoko. Once again, he was most charming and readily agreed to the establishment of a MINUCI MLO team-site in his HQ in Bouake. However, he admitted to us that FN was not the cohesive force he would have liked it to be. Over the following months we discovered that FN was a loose coalition of various rebel groupings in which individual commanders enjoyed considerable autonomy. Consequently, the deployment of MINUCI MLO teams in the FN area was problematic due mainly to concerns for the unarmed MLO’s:
The military component of the Forces Nouvelle remains a loosely knit outfit led by non-commissioned officers who operated in a semi-autonomous manner. In Man, Korhogo, Odienné, Bouna, and Séguela the officers enjoy a particularly dangerous degree of autonomy, which appears to indicate the lack of an effective command, control and communications network within the force.\textsuperscript{219}

MINUCI developed a plan to deploy nine team sites: the one at Bouaké was to be upgraded to have ten MLO’s; Abidjan to have eight MLO’s; Yamoussoukro to have six MLO’s with oversight responsibility for Daoukro, Bouaflé and Mbahiakre; and Duékoué to have six MLO’s who were to have oversight responsibility for Guiglo and Toulépleu. The plan was to set up new MLO team-sites in Korhogo with six MLO’s who would have oversight responsibility for Ouangolo and Ferké; Bondoukou with four MLO’s and oversight responsibility for Bouna; Daloa with four MLO’s and oversight responsibility for Vavoua and Séguela; Man with six MLO’s and oversight responsibility for Odienne and Guiglo, and San Pedro with four MLO’s. However, whilst the deployment in the FANCI controlled area went according to schedule the deployment in the Forces Nouvelles controlled area was very slow. The one deployment in Bouake was found to be so dangerous that the team was increased in size to ten MLO’s.

By 9 July MINUCI had established a MLO team-site in Yamoussoukro initially manned with two MLO’s and another MLO team-site in Bouaké manned with four MLO’s. On 24 July another MLO team-site was set up in Duékoué with two MLO’s:

Military Liaison Officers will be deployed progressively as needed and when security conditions permit. It is envisaged the pace of the deployment will be determined mainly by the volume of the activities related to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, (DDR) as well as monitoring and liaison requirements in western and northern Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{220}

Over the next weeks and months, and accompanied by the CTS, the author visited several towns and cities throughout Côte d’Ivoire prioritising the most volatile and contentious areas which were mainly in the west and north of the country. These visits were undertaken with a view to setting up MLO team sites, initially to liaise with and monitor the military actors and NGO’s in the area, but eventually to become the focal points from which to manage the DDR process which was to begin as soon as political agreement could be achieved. The format of

\textsuperscript{219} Report by the Secretary General to the Security Council S/2003/1068 Pp 9
these visits was initially to meet the local commander and inform him of what we proposed to do in his area of operations. Depending on the size of the area, the level of military activity and remoteness, the MLO team would consist of between two and six MLO’s. Having elicited a promise of cooperation from the commander the next stage was to view property in the area with a view to renting accommodation for the MLO office. Communications were then checked to ensure radio, internet, and telephone connectivity. The next stage was to plan for medical facilities and set up a contract for treatment. Many of towns had hospitals or clinics nearby but those who did not were checked for landing sites for medical evacuation by helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. When the MLO’s arrived they were accompanied by the technical support personnel who installed the radios, computers, satellite phones, office furniture, heating, air-conditioning, and so on. In some cases the MLO’s lived in the Team-Site office, especially if the area was deemed to be dangerous. In other cases the MLO’s hired accommodation in the vicinity of the team-site office.

By late October 2003 the deployment of MLO team-sites south of the ZOC in the FANCI controlled area had gone to plan but the deployment in the Forces Nouvelles area was disappointingly dragging on. We had planned to visit Man on 25 October 2003 with a view to setting up a MLO team-site as soon as possible. The intelligence officer in FFCI cautioned the author not to go to Man as the situation there was unstable due to a power struggle between the appointed FN commander and his second-in-command, an alleged gangster who was suspected of involved in illegal logging, drugs, prostitution, rape, and murder.

The author took heed of the French intelligence officer’s advice but was frustrated at the lack of progress in establishing MLO team-sites in the FN controlled area. The plan had been to deploy in several towns and cities in the FN area but to date Bouake was the only one established. This had been extremely problematic as FN had robbed the bank there and then engaging in a fire fight over the spoils that had degenerated into a blood-bath in which twenty-three people were killed. The author’s problem was that French intelligence reports cautioned against deploying in all our proposed team-sites in the FN controlled area. As Man was the closest town to the ZOC he decided to visit there first. He informed and received permission from Col Bakayoko to visit Man on 25 October 2003.

Seven MINUCI personnel travelled to Man in two vehicles that day. The author drove the second vehicle and as we entered Man the first vehicle drove into a demonstration, while the
second vehicle stopped several hundred metres behind, and monitored the situation. Fortunately, the demonstration was well-organised and the demonstrators, though noisy were well-behaved. They were protesting about educational issues such as failure to hold second level state exams in the FN controlled area.

We continued on to the FN HQ in Man and met the FN commander and some of his staff. The meeting went well and they agreed to cooperate with and facilitate the establishment of a MINUCI team-site in Man. After this meeting we visited properties in town to choose a team-site location. We then visited the local hospital which was run by Medicines Sans Frontiers. The local staff had abandoned the hospital during the civil war and had not returned to date as most chose to live in the FANCI controlled area. Finally, we drove to a down-town patisserie where we had arranged to meet the FN commander for coffee.

We sat on the veranda of the patisserie with the FN commander and two of his officers and ordered coffee. He stationed two guards armed with AK 47’s at the steps leading up to the veranda. Whilst we were drinking coffee and discussing matters a number of ‘Technical’s’ (4 wheel-drive vehicles capable of carrying up to ten-people and armed with a heavy machine-gun mounted in the rear) pulled up outside the patisserie. A man got out and walked towards us. In his hand he held a revolver. He staggered as he walked and the author assumed he was drunk. He snapped open the chamber of the revolver and proceeded to load it with bullets dropping some of them on the ground. To the authors surprise he walked past the two sentries who made no attempt to stop him. He began what seemed to the author to be a tirade of abuse at the top of his voice but the author had no idea what he was saying as he was not even sure what language the gunman was speaking. The gunman snapped the chamber closed and headed straight for the author and stuck the barrel onto the side of his head. For the first time in years the author prayed that he would have the strength of character to remain calm so as not to exacerbate the situation. The FN commander did not move but he seemed to be pleading with the gunman. The gunman finally removed the barrel from the author’s temple and walked over to another MINUCI man and put it to the side of his head, and then he repeated this with another MINUCI man. Eventually, the gunman descended the steps and joined his colleagues all the while continuing his verbal tirade. They formed up in a line in front of us, cocked their rifles and pointed them at us like a firing squad. On a command from their leader they fired but at the last second aimed up and fired over our heads. He then returned up the steps brandishing his revolver and herded us onto the street. The author
assumed the MINUCI Personnel were going to be abducted and brought out of town. Then seemingly out of no-where a tall man appeared and began to remonstrate with the gunmen. Again, the author had no idea what language they spoke, but he seemed to be an authority figure of some kind as the gunmen became less agitated and even cowered. After a while the gunman and his troops mounted their ‘Technical’s’ and departed. The author instructed the MINUCI personnel to mount their vehicles and get out of town as quickly as possible before our ‘friend’ changed his mind.

Later that day the author organised a post-traumatic stress debrief for the MINUCI group in the safety of a hotel in Daloa town south of the ZOC. Each person was encouraged to relate in his own words what had happened. One of the MLO’s who was from Senegal spoke the local language and he relayed what had happened. The leader of the armed group was the FN second in command in Man and he berated the FN commander saying that MINUCI were French spies, that he would not allow MINUCI into Man and he was going to send out a message to that effect. He had planned to bring us out into the forest to kill us, but at that time a mystic arrived (a holy man or a witch doctor). He berated the gunmen telling them that we were good men who had come from far off lands to help the people of Côte d’Ivoire to end the war and if any of us were harmed the gunmen would be burned in fire before the sun set that day. The gunmen seemed to fear the mystic. They hurled abuse at us but got into their vehicles and left. This incident was internationally condemned, the FN leadership political and military were embarrassed, and over the following months MINUCI successfully established MLO team sites throughout the FN controlled area.
Figure 6.4 Deployment of military forces in Côte d'Ivoire 2003, including MINUCI, FFCI, FANCI and Forces Nouvelle (UN Unrestricted)
Team sites usually consisted of bungalow-type buildings and they were equipped with office furniture, HF and VHF radios, phones, satellite phones, and computers with internet access. Team’s 4X4 vehicles were also equipped with HF and VHF radios. MINUCI made provision in each team site for level 1 medical treatment and medical evacuation protocols were put in place and rehearsed. Meanwhile, back in the MLO HQ in Abidjan the operations officer and the logistics officer were engaged in writing standard operational procedures (SOP’s), reporting procedures, and analysis systems. This ensured that the SLO was equipped to give timely and accurate reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on the changing security situation throughout Côte d’Ivoire. Commandant Brian Fitz Simons was the deputy operations officer and his extensive UN experience was an invaluable asset in the headquarters, particularly as many of the MLO’s were on their first United Nations missions and the others were only on their second.

When the civil war ended an uneasy truce had been imposed by FFCI who had separated the sides into the north and south. In between they had created an area which they called the Zone of Confidence (ZOC). This stretched from the Liberian border in the west, across the country to the Ghanaian border in the east, between 10 and 15 kilometres wide, and was patrolled by some 3,000 FFCI troops and 1,500 ECOMICI troops. The civil war had ended but the country was far from stable as our violent experience in Man had shown. Despite the on-going peace-conferences and agreements the country was politically and militarily very volatile. Political parties squabbled and jockeyed for power, while lawlessness and criminality thrived. In the south FANCIsupported President Gbagbo and the situation for non-Gbagbo supporters, migrant workers, and members of tribes other than Gbagbo’s ‘Bébé’ tribe was precarious. A fascist organisation ‘The Young Patriots’ controlled by Ble Goudi, a Gbagbo supporter and a fellow member of the Bébé tribe, often paraded militaristically through the streets of Abidjan. They terrorised non-Gbagbo supporters and migrant workers, and not only did FANCI turn a blind eye and allow them to parade freely in military style formations, they also ignored when they went on the rampage.
MINUCI had reliable information that members of FANCI were involved in the training of the Young Patriots. This was first brought to our attention by foreign journalists and when we raised the question with senior FANCI officers they did not outright admit it, but their answers were evasive. The author had lunch with Ble Goudi on one occasion during which he discovered he spoke excellent English and claimed to have been a MA student in a university in Manchester, saying that as a result he was a Manchester City supporter. The author put it to him that the activities of the Young Patriots were similar to that of the Nazi Brown Shirts. Ble Goudi defended their activities and said they were a group of young patriotic Ivorians who were determined not to allow their country’s decent into chaos and anarchy, and that there were like-minded people in FANCI who agreed with them. MINUCI also received reports from other agencies of FANCI collaboration with the Young Patriots. During the hours of darkness FANCI were known to set up dozens of checkpoints throughout Abidjan and MINUCI also received several reports of widespread extortion by FANCI soldiers from motorists at these checkpoints. In the countryside there were consistent reports of lawlessness in which migrant workers were particularly vulnerable and were subjected to assault, robbery, rape, and murder.

In the rebel-held area MINUCI quickly learned that Forces Nouvelles was not a cohesive, disciplined force, but rather a loose coalition of disparate rebel groupings ruled by local warlords. Throughout the FN area lawlessness, extortion and human rights abuses abounded:

There has been a recent surge of violence by “uncontrolled” armed elements, and a general situation of lawlessness appears to be emerging. Unpaid soldiers of Forces Nouvelles survive by extracting money from the general population at checkpoints maintained throughout the north. There have also been recent reports of raids on villages by combatants in search of food and money.\footnote{Second Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire to the Security Council dated 4 November 2003. S/2003/1069 Para 13}

On 25 August uncontrolled elements of Forces Nouvelles opened fire on a French patrol boat in the Lake Kossou area and killed two French soldiers. On the 25 September the MLO’s in Bouaké reported that similar elements of Forces Nouvelles had raided a bank in the town and when a row broke out amongst them about the division of the spoils it developed into a gunfight which resulted in the death of twenty-three people. In October there were two other attempted bank robberies in Man and Lorhogo. The situation became so turbulent that FFCI
had to deploy into Bouaké to restore order upon being requested to do so by the leadership of Forces Nouvelles.

Travel for the unarmed MINUCI MLO’s was also precarious and they were constantly stopped at checkpoints by ill-disciplined and frequently inebriated soldiers. Of particular concern were boy soldiers who were so young they could barely hold their AK47 rifles, and in general had no idea of what the UN was or who these blue-beret wearing unarmed soldiers were:

In another very serious incident, on 25 October, soldiers of Forces Nouvelles detained and threatened to kill seven MINUCI military liaison officers who were on a reconnaissance mission in Man.222

FN soldiers were well armed with AK47 assault rifles and RPG7 anti-tank grenades but most were poorly trained and ill-disciplined. Drug abuse and drunkenness was common place and child soldiers were particularly volatile and dangerous. Doctors in the Medicines Sans Frontiers hospital in Bouaké informed the author that large numbers of Forces Nouvelles troops had to be treated for gunshot wounds mainly caused by accidental discharges. Despite the volatile environment MINUCI MLO teams continued to be established throughout the FN and FANCI controlled areas. The more MLO team-sites that were established the better the informed the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) became. Despite the rhetoric and propaganda that emanated from the disparate spin-doctors employed by the various factions, the SRSG provided UN New York with timely and accurate briefings on the changing situation throughout Côte d’Ivoire:

The tasks of the officers (MLO’s) so far consists of conducting liaison with all the military forces on the ground, monitoring the security situation on a 24-hour basis, building confidence between FANCI and Forces Nouvelles particularly through participation in the quadripartite meetings, assisting with their capabilities in investigating incidents of shooting and confrontations in the zone of confidence, and monitoring the security of Liberian refugees in the west and in Abidjan. In their contact with Forces Nouvelles, the military liaison officers have been encouraging the group to remain engaged in the peace process.223

222Ibid Para 14. The author was one of the seven MLO’s
The quadripartite meetings were held in or near to the zone of confidence and were chaired by ECOMICI and attended by FANCI, Forces Nouvelle and FFCI. MINUCI MLO’s attended in an observer role. These meeting did not try to resolve strategic issues such as reunification or political reform but were rather concerned with resolving issues at the tactical level such as keeping FANCI and FN forces apart. Typical issues arising were problems at checkpoints, shooting incidents, extortion, ill-discipline, child soldiers, and drug abuse. The ECOMICI and FFCI representatives used these meeting to highlight problems and to try to find solutions that were agreeable to all the parties. The MINUCI observer at these meetings was the local MLO team-site commander, and the author attended one of these meetings. The MLO team in Duékoué was specifically tasked to monitor the situation in relation to the Liberian refugees, as there was a large refugee camp located near their location. A MINUCI civilian human rights monitor co-located with the MLO team in Duékoué for security purposes and in order to avail of the communications facilities. This person was very active in monitoring the situation in the Liberian refugee camp.

On 6 January 2004 Forces Nouvelles, agreed to resume attendance at the Council of Ministers. The UN Secretary General welcomed this sign of goodwill and recommended (S/2004/3) that should the parties make progress the Security Council would consider authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. On 27 February 2004 the Secretary General informed the Security Council that the Ivorian parties had taken some significant steps in the right direction and the deployment of a peacekeeping mission would show “that the international community is determined to support this progress and to help ensure that there is no turning back.” The Security Council therefore adopted Resolution 15828 (2004) and established the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and transferred authority from MINUCI and EOCMICI to UNOCI on that date. The mandate of the 6,420 strong force in coordination with the French forces in Côte d’Ivoire included observing and monitoring the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003. It also referred to movement of armed groups, assistance in disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement, protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians, support for humanitarian assistance, implementation of the peace process, assistance in the field of human rights, public information, and law and order.

Ibid
The MINUCI MLO’s initially availed of FFCI support but once they were established they
worked quite separately from FFCI and ECOMICI. They did liaise with each other and
shared information. It had always been implied and assumed that if any of the MINUCI
MLO’s got into difficulties FFCI would come to their assistance. MINUCI personnel were
very much aware that they and FFCI had common concerns. However, the MINUCI
personnel were under no illusion that FFCI’s first priority was to protect French interests, and
as such, a conflict of interest could arise if MINUCI was too closely associated with FFCI.
MINUCI MLO’s monitored the FFCI activities throughout Côte d’Ivoire and visited FFCI
installations frequently. MINUCI raised concerns about the activities of French logging
companies throughout the country and expressed concerns that some of the FFCI bases were
co-located in French logging company’s facilities.

MINUCI began with 26 MLO’s drawn from eleven countries, with seven of the countries
including Ireland providing 2 MLO’s and twelve countries providing 1 MLO. Most of the
MLO’s were on their first UN mission, and the others, with the exception of the Irish MLO’s,
were on their second. The two Irish MLO’s had served in several peacekeeping missions in
command and staff positions. They were attached to the HQ of MINUCI and played an
important role in the rapid and successful establishment of the mission which despite the
precarious security situation deployed the unarmed MLO’s ahead of schedule. This in turn,
facilitated the rapid expansion of the MLO section of MINUCI throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The
author was the Mission Information Officer and as such he was tasked with ensuring that an
effective system for collection, evaluation, and dissemination, of information was in place.
He had to ensure that the MLO’s were kept up-to-date on the evolving situation on the
ground and to balance the need to deploy the MLO teams throughout the country with the
need to ensure the safety of these unarmed MLO’s. In addition, as shown above, he brought
his experience to bear in ensuring the speedy and effective establishment of the mission. The
second Irish office was the deputy operations officer for the mission. His superior had only
served on one previous UN mission whereas the Irish officer had considerable UN experience
having served on several UN missions in a variety of countries. The D/Ops officer was
responsible for running of the operations centre in MINUCI HQ. It was he who drafted the
duty roster, received the reports from the MLO team-sites throughout Côte d’Ivoire, and in
many cases, as a native English speaker, he edited them to ensure high quality reporting. He
was highly conversant with UN reporting procedures and he was able to ensure that the
MINUCI reports were clear, concise, and relevant.

6.8 UNOCI.

An Assessment Team led by Assistant Secretary General for Peace Keeping Operations, Mr. Hedi Annabi, visited Cote d’Ivoire between the 3 and 11 December 2003. The team recommended a major expansion of the MINUCI Mission from its establishment of 76 Officers to a Peace Keeping Force of 6,240 personnel deployed in two Brigade Sectors located in Bouake and Daloa.

MINUCI was a political mission set up by the UN Security Council to monitor and help facilitate the implementation of the Linus Marcuse’s peace agreement. However, MINUCI quickly discovered that whilst the political parties had agreed to the peace agreement, none had any serious intention of implementing it. The political parties were playing the zero sum game of ‘winner takes all:

Since Côte d’Ivoire’s transition to multiparty democracy in 1990, the electoral process has opened a Pandora’s box of rampant fear and greed among powerful Ivoirian politicos…Many PDCI barons who served under the one-party regime that (Félix Houphou Boigny) founded have organized opposition parties—a process that began a few years before his death in 1993. They are competing for ethnic loyalties, power, and authority, while leaving a path of death and destruction in their wake. Houphout’s carefully crafted ethnic balancing act has been dismantled, leaving primordial ethnic linkages up for grabs and disturbing fragile alliances among the urban middle class, as each group battles to protect the positions and advantages it gained during the First Republic.  

The French government took the initiative by intervening in the civil war and then attempted to find a solution by hosting the Linus Marcuse’s peace conference and deploying as many as 4,000 troops in Côte d’Ivoire. ECOMICI was supposed to internationalise the peace process but did not have the resources to conduct the operation. It fell far short of the number of troops it promised and European Union countries which were funding ECOMICI began to drastically curtail financial support. The United Nations had no option but to deploy a peace-enforcing mission.

As we have seen in Chapter 3 for a political mission like MINUCI or peacekeeping and observer missions to succeed they must have the support of all parties to the conflict but

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whilst MINUCI’s MLO were successful in deploying throughout Côte d’Ivoire there was no peace to monitor. Consequently, having determined that the situation in Cote d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and from 4 April 2004 UNOCI replaced the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI), the political mission set up by the council in May 2003.

The UNOCI Force HQ is located in Abidjan and the Operational HQ is located in Yamoussoukro. The Support Elements for the Force consists of an Engineer Battalion, Communications Company, Heavy Lift Transport Company, Aviation Support Company, and a Level III Medical Unit. The Missions tasks are to:

- Provide Election Support for the 2005 electoral process
- Border Security
- Supervise and Support the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reconciliation (DDR) Process including the collection and destruction of weapons/ammunition, the storage of heavy weapons and to provide security at Cantonment and DDR Sites
- Monitor the movement of Armed Groups
- Secure the Zone of Confidence
- Provide Security for UN and NGO Aid Agencies
- Monitor the security of Liberian Refugees
- To provide Police Training to be conducted by civilian police (CIVPOL), numbering 200 international policemen

There are two Brigades consisting of three Battalions each. The Western Sector has Battalions located in the towns of Danane/Guiglo, Man/Duekoue, Daloa/Seguela and a small Battalion of 300 located in the San Pedro/Tabou area. In the Eastern Sector has Battalions deployed in the towns of Bouake/Yamousskro, Daukro/Dabakala, Bondoukou/Bouna. The total number of Military Observers is 200.

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Troops, whowere deployed in the Zone of Confidence during the time of MINUCI, were incorporated into UNOCI.
FFCI (French Forces in Cote d’Ivoire) remain in Cote d'Ivoire but do not come under UN command. However, they do provide a backup to UNOCI and are based in Abidjan, Korogho and Yamousskro with helicopter, artillery and armoured Support.

6.9 Conclusion

In addition to the peacekeeping missions to which Irish contingents have deployed since 1960, thousands of Irish army officers have served in over fifty observation type missions from 1958 until the time of writing (2016). Observer missions are numerous and diverse requiring multiple skill sets, flexibility, and adaptability. This chapter has focused on the establishment of the military liaison section in the UN political mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) in which two Irish army officers served. The mission successfully established a comprehensive military liaison network with all the military actors throughout Côte d’Ivoire in spite of the precarious situation that prevailed at the time. This lay the groundwork for a fully-fledged UN peace-enforcement mission of over six-thousand peacekeepers, two-hundred of whom were military observers. At the time of writing (2016) the Irish Defence Forces continues to honour their commitment to Côte d’Ivoire.

How does the evidence in this chapter help to answer our two key research questions?

With respect to our first question regarding the impact of doctrinal changes on Irish peacekeeping policy and practice, this case study of the UN political mission in Côte d’Ivoire and the Irish contribution to it has been informative.

Ireland has embedded its security policy in a wider multilateral framework and there is no doubt that peacekeeping enhances Ireland’s international influence. In addition to military contingents, Ireland has sent military personnel to over fifty observer type missions throughout the world, of which MINUCI is but one example. Observer missions like the MINUCI mission are a particularly attractive option for Irish security and defence policy-makers as from political, diplomatic and financial perspectives they provide public evidence that the government is responding rapidly to high profile humanitarian or natural disasters. Military observers are very flexible and often are dispatched within days of a request from
the UN or regional organisation. In the era of peace-enforcement, Irish contributions to observer type missions have proliferated.

MINUCI was a political mission which was set up by the Security Council to monitor and assist the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. This was an intra-state conflict which had the potential to create regional destabilisation. The participation of Irish personnel in this mission demonstrated that the Irish authorities endorsed and were prepared to contribute to the post Cold-War departure for the United Nations from traditional peacekeeping. Of the nineteen countries that participated in MINUCI, only Austria, Poland and Ireland were members of the EU. None of the traditional ‘middle powers’ were present in MINUCI. The evidence in previous chapters has shown that the middle powers have more of less withdrawn from UN peacekeeping operations; whereas, the Irish commitment to peacekeeping operations being conducted by the UN and Regional Organisations has remained steadfast. It is evident that the Irish offices in MINUCI had considerable peacekeeping experience which they were able to bring to bearestablishing the mission. Most of the military officers in MINUCI were on their first UN peacekeeping mission and very few had served on more than one. Consequently, the Irish offices were in a position to make a significant contribution to the establishment of the mission.

In relation to the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy, the author found that this did not have any adverse effect, despite the suspicion of Ivorian actors to French intentions. On the contrary, the author found that as an Irishman he had access to many of the Ivorian actors who were as diverse as, Col Bakayoko, the leader of the rebels, who began their conversation by remarking at the similarity of the Irish and Ivorian national flags and went on to discuss Irish and Ivorian partition, with the author strongly advocating re-unification of Côte d’Ivoire. On the other extreme of Ivorian politics the author spoke with Ble Goudi, the leader of the government militants. Ble Goudi was deeply suspicious of French intentions and having studied in Manchester had a fair knowledge of Ireland and its post-colonial position. Indeed, he confided to the author that the only reason he agreed to the meeting was that he aware that it came from an Irishman whom he was confident was nota French puppet. Not many African actors are aware of Irish neutrality but there is a consciousness that Ireland is a post-colonial country and several Irish officers serving throughout the world have found that the fact of being Irish gains them access to areas that would be denied to other European soldiers.
The majority of UN missions at time of writing are deployed in intra-state conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. Irish military observers serve in several of these missions in an ongoing commitment by the Irish defence forces to UN peacekeeping. The MINUCI mission was chosen to represent such missions.

With respect to the second question dealing with Ireland’s continued commitment to international peacekeeping and the effect of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy on Irish peacekeeping the Kosovo deployment offered some key insights.

Observer mission are popular amongst Irish soldiers for a number of reasons including the longevity as observer missions vary from 6 to 12 to 18 to 24 months (the majority being 12 months), while peacekeeping missions range from 4 to 6 months. In peacekeeping missions one serves in a national environment whereas observer missions are truly international and observers usually live in rented civilian accommodation, frequently sharing with observers from other countries. Diversity is also a factor as returning observers relay stories of skiing to work in remote mountains in the Caucuses, living in tents in savannah grasslands, desert patrol and jungle patrols, patrolling the back streets of war torn cities, working in remote demobilisation, disarming rehabilitation (DDR) sites, refugee camps, attending diplomatic receptions, and managing multi-million Euro budgets. The potential for adventure is also present in the lure of travel and the chance to have new experiences and responsibilities compared to the routine of home service can be intoxicating. There are also considerable financial benefits which include the combination of tax-free overseas allowances for the Irish army. When combined with the mission subsistence allowance (MSA) from the international organisation it can result in doubling of salary for the duration of the tour.
Chapter 7: Case Study Kosovo

7.1 Introduction

By 1993 Irish foreign policy had evolved to an extent that participation in a NATO peace-enforcement mission was contemplated and legislative changes to the Defence Act that year had made provision for Irish troops to participate in peace-enforcement missions. In December 1996 Ireland joined NATO’s PfP. However, as late as 1999, the Irish defence forces did not have the capacity to deploy a combat unit with a peace-enforcement mission. Even so, the Irish government was keen to take its place in this new peace-building initiative in Kosovo. Ireland therefore pledged a transport company to the NATO PfP mission, ‘Kosovo Force’ (KFOR), which deployed in October 1999. The 2000 White Paper on Defence pledged to modernise, reorganise, and restructure the Irish defence forces and by 2003 the army had finally acquired sufficient resources to enable the Irish authorities to upgrade its commitment to KFOR from a logistical to a combat unit. In October 2003 Ireland consequently replaced the transport company with a mechanised infantry group.

Kosovo was selected as a case study because Ireland made a significant contribution to KFOR, the NATO (PfP) mission mandated by the UN Security Council. The Irish Government is consistently honoured its commitment to deploy up to 800 troops at any one time to peacekeeping missions throughout the world and has deployed troops to serve in UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO peacekeeping missions. This Kosovo case study charts the evolution of Irish peacekeeping from traditional peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. It examines Ireland’s contribution to the NATO (PfP) peace-enforcement mission KFOR and illustrates how this peace-enforcement mission conducted by the Regional Organisation, NATO, differed from UNIFIL, and the impact this had on Irish peacekeeping practice.

7.2 History of Kosovo

In the thirteenth century Kosovo was the centre of a prosperous Serbian kingdom, proof of which is evident today by the presence of the Serb Orthodox patrimonial sites. In addition, there is documentary evidence of an Albanian presence in the area at the same time. The Serbian kingdom suffered a severe setback when the expanding Turkish Empire fought the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. In 1453 the last Serb strongpoint fell to the Turks and
the Serb Kingdom came under Turkish rule. The Serbs continued to live in Kosovo in a subordinate role until the late seventeenth century when an invading Austrian army was supported by the indigenous Serbs. However, the Austrians were defeated and the 1680s saw a major exodus of Serbs fearing Turkish reprisals. This period also saw a major influx of Albanians into Kosovo colonising the vacated lands. In 1804, a Serb rebellion against the weakening Ottoman Empire began and by the 1830’s Serbia was granted limited autonomy marking the beginning of Serb expansion southwards. In 1912, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece waged war against Turkey and emerged victorious. The Serbian army entered Kosovo and proclaimed its liberation and reunification with Serbia. However, during the World War II the Nazis partitioned Serbia and declared Kosovo part of Albania. In 1945 the Soviet Army liberated Kosovo and reunited it to Serbia as its southern province. Serbia proper became a republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). From 1945 until 1966, the Albanian population suffered severe repression at the hands of the Serbs. However, in 1966, Marshal Tito, himself a Croat, intervened and replaced the Serb rulers with Albanian communists, effectively ending the Serb repression of the Kosovo-Albanians. In 1968, Kosovo was elevated to the status of an autonomous province of Serbia. In 1974, the new Yugoslav constitution made the autonomous Kosovo a de-facto member of the SFRY with its own member of state and party president. In 1981, student riots in Pristina called for the status of republic but they were crushed by the Kosovo-Albanian communist regime.

In 1989, Slobodan Milošević embraced the mantle of Serbian Nationalism and became head of the Communist Party of Serbia which encouraged and enflamed resurgent Serb nationalism. In 1990, Milošević abolished Kosovo’s autonomous status and repression of the Kosovo-Albanian community resumed with mass expulsions of Kosovo-Albanians from the public service including the schools, hospitals, and the security forces. In 1991, the Kosovo-Albanians set up a shadow parliament and began a campaign of parallel institutions setting up Kosovo-Albanian schools, hospitals, and health clinics. In 1993, following the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Kosovo’s shadow parliament proclaimed independence and elected the writer and leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Ibrahim Rugova, as shadow president.

The period from 1993 to 1997 remained relatively peaceful under Rugova’s leadership with his policy of non-violent parallel structures. Rugova promised the Kosovo-Albanians that the international community would resolve the problem of the Yugoslav disintegration and
would reward Kosovo for its non-violent policy. However, the 1995 Dayton Agreement was perceived by many Kosovars as rewarding the Bosnian-Serb belligerence whilst ignoring Kosovo’s non-violent struggle completely. This was a huge blow to Rugova’s prestige and emboldened the more extreme elements of Kosovo-Albanian society, especially the clans in the remote Drinica Valley who had established a lucrative trade in smuggling heroin and consumer items which were in short supply due to UN sanctions.

In 1997, the Albanian government fell following the collapse of a ‘Pyramid Scheme’. The public service in Albania ceased to exist and police and soldiers walked out of their barracks leaving the armouries open. Hundreds of thousands of small arms and millions of rounds of ammunition were looted and much of it found its way across the border into Kosovo and the hands of the Drinica Valley clans. The Kosovo Liberation Army, heretofore a relatively unheard of group, began a war of independence. The Serbian security forces reacted with extreme force, especially the State Police (MUP) who were particularly ill-disciplined. On 22 Feb 1998, the MUP engaged members of the KLA in the Drinica Valley and four MUP policemen were killed. The MUP resorted to reprisals and killed twenty-six Kosovo-Albanians. Two weeks later the MUP surrounded the compound of one of the most notorious clans in the Drinica Valley, the Jashari family. A pitched battle was fought and at the end, the leader of the clan, Adem Jashari, was left dead, along with fifty-eight other members of his family, including eighteen women and ten children under the age of ten.

Until now the KLA had confined to the remote Drinica Valley, but it now had a martyr, and its popularity soared and swept throughout Kosovo attracting recruits from all over the province. Throughout 1998 the KLA enjoyed an exponential growth in strength and popularity although militarily the MUP gained the upper hand. By the end of 1998, the MUP had driven the KLA from the Drinica Valley, but in the process they shot livestock, burned farms and villages, and there were persistent reports of massacres of up to thirty and forty civilians at different times. These MUP atrocities resulted in widespread international condemnation and following a personal invitation by Ibrahim Rugova, the US diplomat, Richard Holbrook, became involved and attempted to broker an agreement. At a meeting in Heathrow Airport on 8 October 1998 Holbrook threatened Milošević with NATO air-strikes. Milošević agreed to reduce his forces in Kosovo and permitted the OSCE to establish a monitoring mission, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). However, when the Serb
forces withdrew the KLA moved back into the Drinica valley and resumed their attacks on Serb forces:

The KLA were arming, they took very provocative steps in an effort to draw the West into the crisis that was ultimately successful. The Serbs were playing right into the KLA’s hands by committing atrocity after atrocity, way overreacting, wiping out entire villages, outrageous actions which had to be responded to.\(^{227}\)

On 8 January 1999, the KLA killed three Serbian policemen in a village near the town of Stimlje, south of the Drinica valley. They killed another policeman on 15 January and fighting broke out at the village of Račak also near Stimlje. After a few hours the KLA withdrew and Serb policemen entered the village, shooting was heard, and the next day KVM monitors discovered the bodies of forty five civilians dumped in a ditch. This incident and the fact that there were over one hundred thousand internally displaced persons (IDP’s) in Kosovo, galvanised the international community into action. Fearing another Srebrenica, the international community convened a conference in Rambouillet in Paris, and compelled the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to attend. An agreement was expected as the threat of NATO air-strikes was promised if the talks failed. After long and torturous negotiations the Kosovo Albanians agreed but the Serbs did not.

NATO bombing lasting seventy-seven days ensued. During the bombing operation the Serb forces instigated a brutal campaign on the Kosovo-Albanians, murdering civilians, and burning farms and houses. This triggered the mass exodus of over three quarters of a million Albanians from Kosovo. A cease fire was eventually negotiated by the Finnish President, Marti Ahtisaari, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin. Milošević agreed to an immediate cessation of repression and violence, withdrawal of the Yugoslav armed forces, acceptance of an international civil and military presence, and the right of return of all refugees. On 10 June 1999 UNSC Resolution 1244 came into effect. NATO and UNMIK moved in and Kosovo came under international administration. The transition of power was anything but smooth. On one hand, within three weeks of the Serb withdrawal 808,913 of the 848,100 Kosovo-Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo, while on the other, the Yugoslav Red Cross registered 247,791 Serbs and Roma refugees in Serbia fleeing Kosovo-Albanian

\(^{227}\) Holbrook, Richard. BBC Newsnight 20 Aug 1999
reprisals. It was a poor start for KFOR who were accused of being either incompetent or unwilling to intervene.

7.3 Yugoslav Demographics

Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia, itself the largest of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The other republics were Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Serbs were the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia comprising 36% of the total population. The leader of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1992 was Marshal Tito, a Croat and a committed communist. He was aware that the main threat to the cohesion of Yugoslavia was the irredentist nationalism of the various ethnic groups in the SFRY and that the most dangerous of these were the Serbs. In an attempt to curb this threat he created two autonomous provinces in Serbia, Vojvodina in northern Serbia which had a significant Hungarian minority, and Kosovo in the south which had an overwhelming Albanian majority.

![Ethnic Distribution Federal Republic Yugoslavia 1990](image)

Fig 7.1: Ethnic Distribution Federal Republic Yugoslavia 1990

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### Population of Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Yugoslav Census

### 7.4 The Patrimonial Clan System

The Albanian people of Kosovo are forged by a history in which they lived under Turkish, Hapsburg and Serb rule. Throughout the centuries of subjugation Albanian society evolved and developed systems which enabled it to survive, the remnants of which survive to this day. Kosovo-Albanian society developed a code of conduct known as the ‘Kanun of Lek Dukagjin’. It code has been developed throughout the centuries and governs such subjects as religion, the family, marriage, the house, cattle, property, work, loans, honour and damages, and so on. However, it is best known for its rules governing blood feuds, called after the tyrant Lek Dukagjin (1410-1481), who is believed to have codified it. The Kanun was believed to have been in operation from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century and survived repeated attempts by the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim faiths to abolish it. It was believed to have died out in the twentieth century, but there is evidence that it is very much in operation in Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro to this day. In addition to, and in the absence of a government representing its needs and interests, a Patrimonial Clan system also took root within the Albanian community. The Heads of Clans offered security and stability through, amongst other things, the disbursement of lands. The Ottomans and Hapsburgs attempted to establish property rights but failed to eradicate the clientilism of the Patrimonial system.

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229 Mangalakova, Tanya. The Kanun in Present day Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro International Centre for Intercultural Relations (IMIR) 2002
Throughout the years the clans dabbled in criminality. The Albanian people were indifferent to this, as the perceived the rule of law as a foreign imposition which was inherently antithetical to the needs and rights of Albanian society. The clans began smuggling essential goods without paying tariffs, and escalated into trafficking, protection rackets, and other criminal activities. During the Milošević era, UN sanctions spurred the trade in Turkish heroin and other goods across porous borders, boosting incomes in the area. The criminal economy was controlled by powerful clans and provided work for the Albanian community where none was available in the conventional context. Many goods and services not otherwise available were provided on the black market. This operated on similar principles to the free market where successful entrepreneurship depends just as much on social networks of assistance, protection, and competitive pricing. The black market in the dysfunctional economy of Kosovo provided an income, a social function, and underpinned the clan’s networks of clientilism and patrimony. Clan leaders became fabulously wealthy and their influence extended into every facet of Kosovo-Albanian society.

In 1995, following the failure of the Dayton Agreement to address Kosovo’s issues and the influx of arms after the collapse of the Pyramid schemes in Albania, a new physical force movement emerged in opposition to Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo’s (LDK) policy of non-violence and parallel structures. This movement became known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It sprang from the clans in the Drinica Valley and grew exponentially throughout Kosovo in response to the indiscriminate and savage reaction of the Serbian security forces. Under the leadership of Hashim Thaci the KLA grew and became not only a significant guerrilla force, but also an economic one, which controlled the labour market and provided black market goods to civilians.

7.5 The Political situation in Kosovo

Prior to November 2007, the Kosovo-Albanian electorate had evinced moderation and political maturity by turning out in large numbers to vote for the moderate Ibrahim Rugova and his LDK party, while the PDK which is the political wing of the KLA, had always struggled for a democratic mandate. However, during the first election in Kosovo following the Dayton Agreement of 1995, disillusionment reigned, the moderate LDK suffered a vote collapse, and only 44% of the electorate turned out. This was attributed to a combination of factors including the perceived Dayton betrayal and the first election fought by LDK since the death
of its revered leader, Ibrahim Rugova. The party had lost cohesion when Ramush Haradinah defected to form the LDD party and a general and pervasive apathy emerged amongst LDK supporters. The PDK led by the former leader of the KLA Hashim Thaci, emerged as the largest political party in the PISG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64%Turnout</td>
<td>51%Turnout</td>
<td>40.1%Turnout</td>
<td>47%Turnout</td>
<td>42%Turnout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>24.69%</td>
<td>25.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>32.11%</td>
<td>30.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAK</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>11.04%</td>
<td>9.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>7.29%</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetëvendosje</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.69%</td>
<td>13.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2 Kosovo Election results

The low turnout in the 2007 election favoured the PDK. It had a fanatical support base and the low poll resulted in a higher overall percentage of the vote for the PDK. In addition, the move to centralist politics had made the party more attractive to moderate Kosovo-Albanians. The LDK was in trouble with the loss of its charismatic leader and subsequent loss of party cohesion. This was coupled with the disillusionment of its supporters, the poor economy and resultant high unemployment, the apparent lack of support from western governments for the constitutional politics pursued by the LDK, and the perceived support for the radical policies of the PDK, especially from the USA and the UK. The 2014 elections again had a very poor turnout when compared to the 2001, 2004, and even the 2010 elections, showed increasing disillusionment with the democratic process in Kosovo. One point of note is the 12.69% support in 2010 and 13.59% support in 2014 for the Vetëvendosje party which advocated unity with Albania.
Following the general election in June 2014 an alliance of opposition political parties led by the LDK blocked the PDK from re-electing Hashim Thaci as prime minister due to accusations of corruption and criminal activity. A six month stalemate ensued which ended in November 2014, when a deal was struck between the LDK and PDK resulting in the LDK’s leader, Isa Mustafa, being elected prime minister, with Hashim Thaci becoming foreign minister. The LDK party got 8 ministries, the PDK got 7 ministries, with a further 2 going to other parties.

7.6 Peace-building in Kosovo

The concept of peace-building in post conflict countries and failed states is generally accepted as desirable. The real question is how well peace-building has been conducted by the international community. Kosovo is an excellent illustration of the difficulties which arise from contemporary international peace-building, military humanitarian intervention, and the reconstruction of war-torn societies.

In 1999, as a direct result of the NATO bombing campaign the Yugoslav government agreed to withdraw its security forces and administration from the Serbian province of Kosovo. On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1244, which authorised the establishment of an international administration to govern Kosovo. The international administration was to have the four pillars of:

- Civil Administration UNMIK
- Humanitarian Assistance UNHCR
- Institution Building OSCE
- Economic Reconstruction EU

In addition NATO was tasked with deploying troops to provide a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for the international agencies. This NATO force was named Kosovo Force (KFOR).

7.6.1 International Administration

UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) has been described as a contemporary manifestation of the old League of Nations contention that the administration and sovereignty of failed states and contested territories could be entrusted to international organisations and
powerful states acting on behalf of the international community. The successor to this idea was to be the United Nations Trusteeship System. However, the Trusteeship concept did not find favour and it was eventually abandoned during the decolonisation period of the 1960’s. At that time, it was perceived as condescending and paternalistic. However, the concept of International Administration, a form of trusteeship, resurfaced for Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Dayton agreement and later for Kosovo and East-Timor.231

The imposition of International Administration on a territory or country is by its very nature an infringement on the right to self-determination in so far as international administrations usurp the right of peoples to determine their own affairs. There are various reasons which impel the international community into undertaking such a radical step, such as poor governance, wherein the local administration shows itself to be unable or unwilling to maintain order, or legitimately govern with the consent of the population, or when there is a dispute over who has the right to exercise sovereignty over a given area. The theory is that an international community intervention to establish an international administration will initially fill the governance vacuum by providing basic security and restoring essential services, and then go on to restore local administration.

However, following the Cold War a review of the norms and the unqualified right to self-determination without a demonstrated capacity for self-government came under critical examination in the light of disastrous violations of human rights in several post-colonial states which had quickly degenerated into the category of failed states. Consequently the norms legitimising statehood in the post-Cold-War order changed from negative to positive sovereignty and the view was taken that newly emerging states had to demonstrate a capacity to establish democratic and humanitarian government. This new norm set the precondition that sovereignty should be exercised in a responsible way and cannot be a mechanism for misrule, anarchy, or the repression of minorities. UNMIK and its activities became an example of the new international normative framework which emerged after the end of the Cold-War and purported to assist in the rehabilitation of collapsed governance structures, with an emphasis on the importance of positive sovereignty.


231
7.6.2 UNMIK

With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244, the United Nations took over the administration of Kosovo:

Establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.\(^{232}\)

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established not only because of Serbian unwillingness to provide security and good governance, but also because it was determined that the Kosovo-Albanians (Kosovars) lacked the capacity to govern Kosovo. UNMIK was tasked with promoting the establishment of substantive autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, carrying out basic civilian administration, organising the establishment of democratic institutions, supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure, supporting provision of humanitarian aid, maintaining law and order, protecting and promoting human rights, and assuring the safe return of refugees. Entrusting such tasks UNMIK was a new departure for the UN as to all intents and purpose it meant that UNMIK was the de-facto government of Kosovo for an unspecified period. The peacekeeping duties were effectively outsourced to NATO and the overall strategy of UNMIK was to be divided into five stages:

- An interim civil administration controlled by UNMIK was to be established
- Such civil administration was to be gradually transferred to the Kosovo people
- Elections were to be held
- Provisional institutions were to be the established
- The status of Kosovo was to be resolved and a permanent civil administration was to be handed over to the people of Kosovo.

UNMIK got off to a slow start, several donor countries did not meet the pledges for the manning of UNMIK. For example, the UN Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL) reached a complement of less than 2,000 as opposed to the prerequisite figure of 4,750. As a consequence, the training of local police for the newly established Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was severely hampered. Meanwhile, the issue of sovereignty was foremost in the minds the UNMIK leadership who feared that others such as the Macedonian-Albanians or

\(^{232}\) UNSC Resolution 1244 on the establishment of UNMIK and KFOR, 10 June 1991.
the Bosnian-Serbs would use Kosovo sovereignty as a basis for their own secessionist ambitions. The UNMIK authorities were therefore slow to devolve powers to the Kosovar authorities and the Provisional Institution of Self Government (PISG).

In 2002, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Michael Steiner, introduced a policy of ‘Standards before Status’ in which he stated that a series of benchmarks needed to be achieved before any discussions could be launched in relation to status. The Kosovars complained that they were unable to achieve these benchmarks as UNMIK retained control over many of the areas which had to be addressed. This claim was substantiated when the ‘Transfer Council’ established in January 2003 to assess whether UNMIK had sufficiently handed over competencies, identified forty-four areas where UNMIK retained authority although they belonged to the PISG’s mandate. UNMIK responded by declaring that its readiness to hand over competencies would depend on the PISG working more seriously. This climate did not improve until after the March 2004 riots, which forced UNMIK to devolve more powers to the local institutions. Although progress was slow the first four of the stages were eventually achieved as a result of torturous negotiations and ultimately the leadership, commitment, and innovation, of the international administrators and local leadership in Kosovo. The fifth stage of final status was to prove more problematic; not for the 90% of the Kosovopopulation who desired full independence, but for the international community who could not arrive at a consensus in relation to the forcible break-up of a pre-existing state against the wishes of the sovereign authority. The issues of the stagefive ‘Final Status’ shall be explored further in section7.10

The successes of UNMIK can be measured by the fact that stages one to four were achieved, albeit somewhat belatedly. From the establishment of UNMIK to the time of writing (2016) Kosovo has enjoyed a period of unprecedented peace. The rule of law was re-established, and the KPS took over from UNCIVPOL and now runs an effective police service. The education system and health care system are comparable with any in the region and the Municipalities are vibrant and function effectively. Serious problems, however, still remain.

233 UN Charter: Chapter 2, Article 7: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of any state…” Helsinki Final Act 1975: Article1a: asserts that members “Consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.”
First and foremost, the economy of Kosovo was in a very poor condition, unemployment exceeded 40% nationally and over 70% in rural areas. The resultant living conditions for the majority of the population were harsh. The local electricity company (KEK) was unable to meet demand for electricity as it was only equipped to generate 750 megawatts of power whereas demand during the harsh winters exceeded 1200 MWs. KEK had to import the balance but this had to be paid for, and as large numbers of customers are unable or unwilling to pay their electricity bills, power cuts became the norm with many areas having as little as five hours electricity per day. Furthermore, organised crime is woven into the very fabric of Kosovo society through the clan system, and its tentacles reach into the political establishment, the KPS, and the public service.

In ousting the Serb administration and security apparatus, the international community did not succeed in establishing a multi-ethnic pluralist administration in its stead. The Albanian refugees returning to Kosovo on the heels of the NATO troops sought revenge on the Serb and Roma populations and subjected them to severe intimidation, including eviction from their homes, arson, and murder. The effect was that 247,000, Serbs and Roma fled to Serbia proper and the remainder withdrew to enclaves in northern Kosovo, north of the Ibar River, the town of Mitrovica and isolated enclaves in central Kosovo, the main one being around the patrimonial town of Gracanica just south of the capital city Pristina. The Serb and Roma populations did not enjoy a safe and secure environment or freedom of movement; they were confined to the enclaves where they were protected by KFOR troops.

7.6.3 The Philosophy of International Administration

UNMIK was governed by an economic liberalisation philosophy and in its constitutional framework had stipulated that Kosovo must adopt neo-liberal economy and that Kosovo’s economic welfare should be fostered through the development of a market economy. In keeping with this philosophy UNMIK attempted to privatise 500 state companies in Kosovo. This was opposed by the Kosovo Trade Unions and Belgrade, and as Kosovo was still technically a province of Serbia, the legal basis for selling off of state assets was


235 Member of ESB International in conversation with author in 2007 when the author was the commander of the Irish contingent in KFOR
problematical. The privatisation proceeded however, directly benefiting entrepreneurs but causing massive job losses, and thereby perpetuating the dependence of the poor on shadow economies and keeping the clans and war profiteers in business. The international community endorsed this neo-liberal philosophy. In Nov 2003, despite slackening growth, rising unemployment, and falling purchasing power, the IMF welcomed curbs on consumption power and advised further cutbacks on wages, social welfare, public sector employment, and the redundancy payments due to privatisation, stressing ‘Structural Adjustment’, with its attendant fiscal stringency and deflationary curbs on government expenditure. US Aid fostered policies of encouraging and rewarding investment. Working directly and intensively with businesses to ‘create a dynamic competitive and expanding private sector’, US aid invested $200 Million by 2002, but had only created 635 jobs by 2003.

Kosovo’s economy had already suffered under the Structural Adjustment period in the 1980s where under the tutelage of the IMF the Yugoslavian government adopted a policy of fiscal austerity and deflationary controls. Cutbacks in public spending resulted in reduced expenditure in schools, hospitals, public sector wages, and social welfare. As a result purchasing power fell by 30% between 1983 and 1985 and by 1990 unemployment had risen to 20%. This resulted in 60% of the population living below the poverty line. This economic state of affairs was a very significant factor in the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was historically amongst the poorest regions in Yugoslavia and was therefore heavily reliant on economic transfers from the wealthier regions, and suffered more proportionally as a result of the ‘Structural Adjustment’ policies. Compounding this decline, Kosovo suffered yet further under the Milošević regime, when the GDP contracted by a further 59% between 1989 and 1994.

The adoption of neo-liberal economic policies might work well in economies which are favourably placed geographically and politically to benefit from such economic reforms: for instance, Poland is often cited as such. However, despite the perceived merits of the neo-liberal economic model, this was not at all the case in Kosovo which had a post-communist economy and lacked infrastructure and industry. The province was consistently one of the

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most dependent areas in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and thus it was a questionable candidate for IMF style Structural Adjustments. Closing obsolete post-communist infrastructure such as factories, mines, and smelters, may have made economic and ecological sense. However, the energy and mining sectors in Kosovo were identified as key to future growth, as its abundant mineral deposits, such as premium quality, low ash lignite, held the potential for Kosovo to attract strategic foreign investors to export power to the region and to supply domestic demand. Developing this potential undoubtedly would have provided Kosovo with a predictable power supply, a substantial long-term source of income, and provide opportunities to boost trade links within Southeast Europe. However, despite this obvious asset, the required strategic foreign investment did not materialise due mainly to the uncertainty in relation to the ‘status’ question. Meanwhile, the human cost of unemployment, poverty, and lack of purchasing power and career prospects, were all but ignored by organisations purporting to be peace-builders. The policies of closing existing facilities in the absence of corresponding strategic foreign investment had a disastrous effect on the peace-building strategy resulting in the impoverished population being forced away from the very institutions the peace-builders had attempted to build and back to the black economy in order to survive economically. In Kosovo this meant the clans and organised crime. Unsurprisingly opinion polls at the time ranked unemployment and poverty amongst the greatest problems facing Kosovo.\(^{238}\)

Ironically, though the peace-building agencies were ideologically driven, they did not take these factors into serious consideration, but instead they blindly pursued neo-liberal policies without taking the historical, economic, political, and social factors pertaining in Kosovo into account.

### 7.7 KFOR

#### 7.7.1 Reasons for a NATO Force

The situation which led to the peace-enforcement deployment in Kosovo ensured that a NATO force would be used as opposed to a UN force. The UN mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) UNPROFOR had been perceived as a failure and NATO’s IFOR had

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been successfully deployed in BiH in 1995 following the Dayton Agreement. The common denominator between Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) had now become Slobodan Milošević.

When the civil war broke out in BiH the international community was unsure how to respond. The Clinton Administration, still reeling from the publicity backlash of ‘Black Hawk Down’\textsuperscript{239} in Somalia, was reluctant to get drawn into a conflict which, being in ‘Europe’s back-yard’, the US Administration regarded it as a European issue. The members of the European Community (EC) were divided about how to approach the situation. In fact, they actually exacerbated the problem by recognising the cessation of Slovenia and Croatia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) against the advice and recommendation of the EC’s Special Representative to the FRY, Lord Carrington, who had counselled the EC not to recognise cessation. However, Germany supported its wartime ally of the first and second world wars and cajoled the EC to recognise Croatia’s cessation, while Serbia’s wartime ally, the United Kingdom, under Prime Minister John Major’s government, overturned its support for Lord Carrington’s recommendation in return for UK derogations to the Maastricht Treaty.\textsuperscript{240} Thus with the cessation of Slovenia and Croatia the cessation of BiH became inevitable:

Their virtue was democracy their vice was selfishness. In their drive to separate from Yugoslavia they simply ignored the 22 million Yugoslavs who were not Slovenes. They bear considerable responsibility for the bloodbath that followed their cessation.\textsuperscript{241}

When Bosnian-Muslims and Bosnian-Croats formed a pact to outvote the 40% Bosnian-Serb population in the referendum on Cessation from the FRY, the Serbs simply boycotted the referendum they knew they could not win and a totally foreseeable civil war broke out. The Bosnian-Serbs opted to fight to maintain their connection with Serbia, and Milošević

\textsuperscript{239} An operation in Somalia (1993) in which 19 US soldiers were killed and 2 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali Militias.

\textsuperscript{240} Bell, Martin. \textit{In Harm’s Way: Reflections of a War Zone Thug}. Penguin, Middlesex England 1996

supported them with arms and supplies, resulting in initial massive military gains by the Bosnian-Serb forces:

I believe that Milošević and the Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had already decided to annex the majority of Bosnia by military force. The EC’s irresponsibility, the United States passivity and Izetbegović’s miscalculation made their job easier.242

The international community was at a loss to know what to do. The OSCE did not have the capability or capacity to resolve a situation of this magnitude and the EC deployed an unarmed monitoring force which failed and made a hasty retreat when threatened by the Bosnian-Serbs.243 The UN initially declined a request by President Izetbegovic to deploy a deterrent mission, and only reluctantly deployed a peacekeeping mission which succeeded in flying in and distributing humanitarian aid but failed to make any impact on the civil war and the outrages being perpetrated therein. Eventually the UN peacekeeping force UNPROFOR became discredited:

DPKO New York were micromanaging the situation while being removed from the actual theatre. UNPROFOR as a consequence was a sad place to serve in its final months.244

The United States eventually intervened as the UN and EU had proved such abject failures. The Dayton conference resulted in a political solution which was imposed by NATO’s IFOR using the peace-enforcement principle of overwhelming military force. Initial Bosnian-Serb resistance was totally suppressed and peace was quickly enforced:

IFOR, my god, was that an eye opener? To see IFOR coming in, to see what can be done when there is a determined force with a proper mandate and proper mission that it is prepared to implement. The resources that were put into it were quiet staggering.245

Buoyed up by the experience and success of IFOR in BiH the Clinton and Blaire administrations were convinced that appeasement would not work with Milošević when the Kosovo crisis erupted in 1999.

242 Zimmerman Pp17
244 Nash, Pat. Lt Gen, who served with the EUMM in the former Yugoslavia. In interview with author April 2015
245 Nash, Pat. Lt Gen, in interview with the author April 2015
In the early 1990’s the Kosovo-Albanian community had overwhelmingly supported the moderate LDK political party led by Ibrahim Rugova which had sought democratic means to resolve its issues with Serbia but had become frustrated at the lack of progress. This led to an outbreak of violence by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1995 which intensified in 1998. The political wing of the KLA was the PDK, led by the extremist Hashim Thaci. The response to the KLA escalation of violence in 1998 by the Serbian internal security force (MUP) led to a series on condemnations by the international community. A conference was called in Rambouillet France in March 1999 where a proposal was presented to the Kosovo-Albanian and Serbian sides. Eventually, the Kosovo-Albanians accepted the proposal but the Serbian delegation refused. Many commentators believed that the clause demanding rite of passage and bivouac rights in Serbia by NATO troops made it impossible for the Serbian delegation to agree.

Following the failure of the Rambouillet conference to reach an arrangement on the Kosovo situation, NATO began a campaign of bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which lasted from 24 March 1999 until the 10 June 1999. The bombing campaign was extensive, beginning with military targets throughout the FRY which included Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and even the autonomous province of Vojvodina, which was home to a large ethnic Hungarian population. However, Slobodan Milošević's government proved to be more resilient than western politicians and NATO military planners had anticipated and showed no sign of capitulating. The air campaign was therefore intensified to include civilian targets such as power stations, water treatment plants, fuel depots, communication networks, railways, TV infrastructure, and bridges. NATO, for instance, destroyed all the bridges over the river Danube in the ethnic Hungarian city of Novi Sad which is the capital of the autonomous province of Vojvodina. The destruction of these bridges blocked a trans-European waterway and severely disrupted central European commerce in the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria. An EU funded project took five years to remove the debris and replace the bridges.

Meanwhile, whilst the bombing campaign continued, NATO was assembling the ground forces which became known as Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Macedonia. The NATO military commanders were severely hampered by very short timeframe available to assemble the necessary forces, while their actual composition was problematic as the NATO military
planners were unclear about the type of force that would oppose them. The worst case scenario was that NATO would be opposed by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). In 1999 this was a formidable force, incorporating a reasonable air force which boasted 2 Mig 29 fighters. Its anti-aircraft assets were also formidable and during the bombing of the FRY it brought down sophisticated NATO aircraft, including an F-117A Stealth bomber which was claimed to be invisible.\textsuperscript{246} The JNA also had extensive Soviet era armoured and mechanised forces. All in all, a fight against the JNA on its own ground would have been costly. A less formidable but still daunting scenario was for the JNA to withdraw from Kosovo but leave its equipment to a Kosovo-Serb army. This had happened in 1992 when the JNA withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and left much of its equipment behind for the newly formed Bosnian–Serb army, thereby enabling the Bosnian-Serb minority to mount a military campaign and seize over 60\% of BiH. The arming of the Kosovo-Serbs was seen as a possible scenario in Kosovo. In addition, the Kosovo-Albanians already had their own force, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The NATO planners therefore set about designing a ground force that would be capable of neutralising and disarming any and all forces it might encounter in Kosovo and establishing a safe and secure environment in which the peace-building organisations could operate.

Eventually, having suffered eleven weeks of sustained bombing, the Milošević government capitulated and agreed to withdraw from Kosovo. The speed with which the Yugoslav forces withdrew caught the NATO planners by surprise. The JNA, the Para-military police (MUP) and the local police completely withdrew. In addition, the entire civil-administration collapsed. From 1991 to 1999 the Milošević regime had purged the Kosovo public service of Albanians and replaced them with Serbs. Thus along with the departure of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo so too did the public servants who left Kosovo schools, hospitals, post-offices, and most local government services closed. The NA did not arm the Kosovo Serbs however, which meant that particular threat did not materialise.

The speed and manner of the departure of the Yugoslav infrastructure caught the international community unawares. The UN the OSCE and NATO hesitated and a vacuum developed. One of the first to exploit the vacuum was the Russian army when 200 Russian troops departed Bosnia, where they had been serving as peacekeepers, and drove across Serbia through

\textsuperscript{246}The wreckage of that stealth bomber and an F 16 can be viewed in the aeronautical museum in Belgrade airport.
cheering crowds into Kosovo and took over the former JNA air-force base at Pristina airport. The move caused consternation in western capitals and the KFOR commander was ordered to eject the Russian forces. However, the British commander of KFOR adroitly sidestepped this knee-jerk instruction and thereby avoided a potential conflict between NATO and Russia.  

To reiterate, the speedy exit of the Yugoslav forces left a gap which the international community was slow to fill. Over a million Kosovo-Albanian refugees flooded back into Kosovo from adjoining Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and immediately set about exacting revenge, not only on the Kosovo-Serbs but also the Roma and Ashkali communities. KFOR failed to respond in a timely manner to this onslaught resulting in the exodus of 247,391 refugees from Kosovo into Serbia.  

By the time KFOR deployed in Kosovo, reconfigured and equipped for a peace-enforcement role, they found that their de facto mission was actually to disarm the KLA and protect the Serb, Roma, Ashkali, and other minorities, along with their property and patrimonial sites.

7.7.2 KFOR Deployment

In June 1999, the UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 authorised NATO to deploy a military force in Kosovo. The force was named Kosovo Force (KFOR), and its initial mandate was to deter renewed hostility against Kosovo by Yugoslav forces, demilitarise the KLA, establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and civil order, and to support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with and support the international civil presence. KFOR began in 1999 with 50,000 troops from 39 NATO and non-NATO nations. By January 2008 KFOR’s strength was approximately 16,000, troops from thirty-six countries, twenty-five from NATO and eleven from non-NATO countries. At this time KFOR was divided into five sectors called Multi-National Task Forces. Each Task Force had its own designated area of responsibility and reported to KFOR HQ in Pristina. The mandate had evolved to assisting with the return of displaced persons, reconstruction and de-mining, medical assistance, security, public order, security of ethnic minorities, protection of patrimonial sites, border security, interdiction of cross-border weapon smuggling, implementation of weapon amnesty programmes, weapons destruction, and support for civilian institutions.

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247 Confrontation over Pristina Airport BBC News 9 March 2000
248 Registered by the Yugoslav Red Cross by November 1999
Fig 7.2: KFOR Deployment 2008
7.8 The Irish Contribution to KFOR

The Irish political and diplomatic authorities were up-to-date and were aware of the changes in international peacekeeping policy and practice, and as early as 1993 they had taken legislative steps to enable Irish peacekeepers participate in peace-enforcement operations with Regional Organisations. As we have noted the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy reiterated this desire. However, the Irish army was then immersed in the intractable and dangerous deployment with UNIFIL in Lebanon, and at home internal security remained the domestic preoccupation of the defence forces. Despite the recommendations of the Price Waterhouse consultants (1994) and the Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan (1996) progress in restructuring and reorganising the defence forces was slow, and in 1999 the Irish army was not in a position to send a peace-enforcement unit to Kosovo. However, the Irish authorities were anxious for Ireland to be seen to play its part in this new peace-building initiative. The Irish Defence Forces' initial contribution to KFOR consisted of a transport company, which deployed in 1999. It had a fleet of articulated vehicles, DROPS vehicles, 4x4s, Nissan Patrols, and ancillary vehicles. The transport unit was based in Camp Clarke, Lipljan, 15km south of Pristina, and was situated in the Central Sector. Its mission was to provide equipment and material lift to military units in KFOR and to the humanitarian organisations working with the UN whenever necessary.

By October 2003, following the 2000 White Paper on Defence and a major investment in military hardware specifically armoured personnel carriers (APC’s), the Irish defence forces were finally in a position to change the commitment to KFOR and an Infantry Group, which had a mechanised infantry company supported by logistical company and an administrative HQ, replaced the 8th Irish Transport Company. The mechanised infantry company operated as part of Multi-National Task Force Centre (MNTF (C)) and was under operational command of the Task Force HQ. The Irish, Group HQ, the mechanised company and the logistics support company were all located in Camp Clarke. A number of Officers and NCOs had staff appointments in MNTF (C) HQ in Camp Ville in Lipljan and KFOR HQ in Pristina. In addition, Irish Military Police personnel were stationed with the Multi-National Military Police Company located in the Swedish HQ, Camp Victoria. An Irish administrative group, the National Support Element, consisting of one Officer and four NCOs, were located in Skopje, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
The Irish mechanised infantry company’s area of responsibility (AOR) covered 190 square kilometres and carried out its mission by way of vigorous and regular foot patrols and mobile patrols in Mowag APCs (Armoured Personnel Carriers) and light-skinned sports utility vehicles (SUV’s / Nissan Patrols). The eastern part of the Irish AOR which included the notorious Drinica Valley was mountainous and dotted with Albanian villages while the western part consisted of smaller hills and contained a Serb enclave. Some villages in the AOR had mixed populations.

In March 2004 serious civil disturbances broke out in Kosovo and the personnel of MNTF(C) deployed in anti-riot gear on the outskirts of the Serb enclave of Caglavica. For two days they fought a pitched battle with Albanian rioters who were trying to gain access to Caglavica to burn out the Serb community there. The Irish Defence Force personnel were highly commended by the Swedish general in charge of KFOR’s Multinational Brigade Centre for their bravery, tenacity, and military efficiency, during this period. The International Crisis Group’s report on the riots was scathing of the International community’s response, including KFOR, with the Multinational Brigade Centre being singled out as the exception:

The rampage left nineteen dead, nearly 900 injured, over 700 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes, up to ten public buildings and 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed, and roughly 4,500 people displaced. The riots were more spontaneous than organised, with extremist and criminal gangs taking advantage, particularly on day two.249

The two days of violence were a sad demonstration of limited determination by the security forces. KFOR stood revealed as a paper tiger, and will have difficulty redressing its credibility deficit. It really resisted only at Caglavica., KFOR did a creditable humanitarian job, but a terrible military one. Except at Caglavica, it was defeated.250

Among KFOR’s regional brigades, the strongest and most determined to hang on to its security primacy at all costs has been the European Scandinavian dominated Multinational Brigade Centre. The pitched battle it fought at Caglavica was testimony to this, as was its categorical refusal to call upon the KPC for assistance, which it rejected as a confession of weakness that would hand over security, probably irretrievably, to former KLA cells.251

The Irish mechanised company was fully committed to the anti-riot role adopted by the Swedish commander of Multi-National Task Force Centre and stood side by side with their

250 Ibid P 19
251 Ibid P 23
colleagues from Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In stark contrast to the other four multi-national task forces, this one, comprised predominantly non-NATO members held the line and prevented serious injury, damage, and destruction, to the besieged Serb minority.

Ireland continued its commitment to KFOR and the Multi-National Task Force Centre continued to safeguard the minority Serb community. In addition however, the Task Force worked in conjunction with the Kosovo security forces, by supporting and training them to assume full responsibility for internal security in Kosovo. In July 2007, the commitment of the Irish Government to KFOR was further upgraded when command of MNTF (C) for a twelve-month period, was assumed by the Irish Defence Forces. For the first time, an Irish Defence Forces General commanded a NATO formation. The NATO term for this role is ‘The Framework Nation’. The Framework Nation role entailed deploying a commander of Brigadier General Rank, additional staff officers and command, and control assets. The Irish General commanded over fifteen hundred troops drawn from six nations and was responsible for security in MNTF (C), an area which comprised 21% of the total area of Kosovo, including the capital Pristina. The area had a population of one million people, equating to 45% of the population.

The author was appointed Commanding Officer of the 35th Irish Infantry Group (35th Irish Inf Gp), which served in Kosovo from April until October 2007. This consisted of a mechanised infantry company, a logistics company, military police, liaison and staff personnel, serving in the various KFOR HQs. In 2007 the Irish Army had eight thousand personnel dispersed in over twenty instillations throughout Ireland. There were three light infantry brigades in the South, East and West, the DF HQ is in Dublin and the logistics and training establishments were located in the Curragh. The Naval Service, which has in excess of one thousand personnel, was located in Cork Harbour, and the Air Corps of almost a thousand personnel was located in Dublin. The responsibility for providing overseas units devolved to each of the three brigades in rotation with the providing Brigade designated as the Lead Brigade). The Lead Brigade raised and concentrated the overseas unit, drawing personnel from amongst its organic units. However, technical personnel were provided from Defence Force resources, which include the formations listed above. The author was Commanding Officer of 1 Infantry Battalion (Galway), a unit of 4 Western Brigade, when he was chosen to command the 35th Irish Infantry Group, KFOR. Consequently the First Battalion became the lead battalion for
the 35th Irish Infantry Group and provided accommodation, transport, training facilities, catering facilities, and administrative support, during the form-up period.

7.8.1 Training Circular for Overseas Units

All Irish DF units which serve overseas are issued with a Training Circular (TC), which is issued by the Director of Defence Forces Training (DDFT). The TC is divided into four phases as follows:

Phase 1:

Each Battalion in the lead Brigade raises and concentrates a platoon consisting of some thirty personnel. Each volunteer has to pass a series of tests such as firing his/her personnel weapon and achieved the qualifying score, successfully qualifying in their annual physical training tests, passing the overseas medical (certified fit for overseas service), receive appropriate inoculations and is provided with the additional uniforms required for overseas service. All this should be completed prior to reporting for Phase 2. The training in this phase concentrates on refreshing basic infantry skills such as firing personal weapons, field-craft, map reading, use of GPS navigation and survival techniques.

Phase 2:

Overseas volunteers depart their home units and report to a concentration area. In the case of 35th Irish Infantry Group the concentration area was Galway. At this stage the infantry platoons were amalgamated into companies with three to four platoons in each company. An infantry company is commanded by a Commandant, equivalent rank to Major in UK and US armies. Phase 2 lasts for four weeks and the platoons who come from light infantry battalions are now introduced to and trained in the use of Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC’s). Such training consisted of mechanised infantry tactics, offence/defence tactics, patrolling, ambush, anti-ambush drills, engineer search capabilities, public order drills and anti-riot training. All personnel also at this stage received detailed briefings on the country in which they are due to serve. These briefings included geography, climate, political, social, historical, religious and cultural practices, and medical precautions required i.e. malaria, rabies, snake, scorpion bites, and so on. Phase 2 training for the mechanised infantry company culminates with a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE), which is supervised by DFHQ personnel in order to
assess the competency of the unit. The logistics company also formed up for Phase 2 training. In the case of the 35th Irish Infantry Group this company formed up in the Curragh due to the availability of resources, as the Curragh is the logistical centre for the army. Phase 2 training for the logs company included many of the briefings the infantry company received but the bulk of the training concentrated on enhancing logistic specific competencies.

**Phase 3:** This phase was conducted immediately prior to departure for the mission area. All the personnel of the unit were concentrated in one location in order to finalise preparation. During this phase a battle inoculation exercise is conducted in the Glen Imaal in Wicklow. All personnel were placed in trenches and were exposed to controlled explosions and overhead fire for acclimatisation purposes. All personnel were briefed on Human Rights legislation, particularly the United Nations Charter pertaining to peacekeeping, duty of care, health and safety legislation, codes of conduct, standard operational procedures, (SOPs), rules of engagement, risk analysis, bulling and harassment complaints procedures, and best practice for dealing with post-traumatic stress incidents, and so on.

**Phase 4:** This phase was conducted in the mission area and included weapon zeroing, crew weapon familiarisation, firing the weapon systems in the APCs, sniper shooting and joint exercises with the other contingents in order to develop and facilitate multi-national interoperability. In the case of KFOR, great importance is placed on public order training, practicing drills, and procedures during anti-riot training, operating vehicle checkpoints, patrolling, and instillation guarding.

### 7.8.2 The Mechanised Infantry Company (Mech Inf Coy)

This Company was the main Irish contribution to KFOR, as all other groups served in a supporting role of one form or another. The Irish Mech Inf Coy was one of five international companies in MNTF (C) consisting of:

- A Coy: Finland
- B Coy: Sweden
- C Coy: Ireland
- D Coy: Czech Republic
- E Coy: Slovakia
C Coy had 120 all ranks, comprising 11 females and 109 males. They were divided into a Coy HQ with fifteen personnel commanded by a Commandant, a Captain second in command (2i/c) and three platoons with thirty-five personnel in each, commanded by a Lieutenant. The mission of C Coy was to carry out operations within designated boundaries in order to maintain a safe and secure environment, thereby ensuring freedom of movement with equal opportunities for all in the C Coy area of operations. Their tasks were; to provide security and freedom of movement for all ethnic groups, conduct operations in the MNTF (C) area of operations, provide freedom of movement to KFOR, UNMIK, UNMIK Police, OSCE and UNHCR. C Coy was also required to maintain a quick reaction force capability by having a squad-size force available to move at five minute’s notice, and a platoon-size force available to move at forty minute’s notice. In addition, it had to be prepared to provide another platoon specially trained to conduct engineer-type searches and mount cordon duties.
C Coy conducted between four to ten patrols every twenty-four hour period with one squad of one NCO and three Privates by day and two similar squads by night. These patrols worked with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) conducting joint patrols and mounting vehicle checkpoints. The vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) were very elaborate operations and entailed up to thirty Irish troops in Nissan SUV’s, Mowag Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), helicopters, KPS personnel and K9 (dog units) provided by either the Swedish or Czech contingents. These VCPs were mobile and they selected sites on main roads. Their modus operandi was to direct the first twelve vehicles into a search area and conduct a thorough search for weapons, drugs, or contraband, using the specially trained K9 dogs. The presence of female soldiers in VCPs was essential in order to conduct searches of female drivers and passengers as required. The VCP would then move to another area several kilometres away and repeat the operation. At that time Kosovo had an estimated quarter of a million illegally held AK47 assault rifles held by civilians and members of organised crime gangs. Whilst the VCPs were successful in interdicting weapons and narcotics, the main purpose of the VCPs was to act as a deterrent to the carrying of such weapons and drug trafficking.

KFOR HQ placed a high priority on anti-riot training as a result of the lessons learnt from the March 2004 riots. Great care was taken to have multi-national exercises in which the five nations of MNTF (C) could train together to achieve inter-operability. This was a difficult task as each nation has a different set of procedures for anti-riot training. There were ‘national caveats’ in operation and they had to be coordinated by the commander and his staff. Some countries did not allow the use of gas or rubber bullets. The Irish, for example, are prohibited by national caveat from firing gas had to be equipped with gas masks in case KFOR troops of another nationality used gas. These issues were ironed out by frequent multi-national anti-riot training exercises in order to perfect the drills. The main area of concern for the Irish troops in Kosovo was the isolated Serb villages in the C Coy area of operations. Some five thousand Serbs lived in four villages surrounded by hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians. The hatred and suspicion between both communities was palpable and KFOR’s presence was arguably the only reason the Serb communities manage to survive. KFOR had to provide constant patrols for the Serb villages and provide permanent guards on the Serb patrimonial sites (monasteries). Some of these were up to a thousand years old and would have been in danger of being destroyed as several others had been in 1999 and the

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252 The concept of national caveats is a NATO system which recognises that different TCC’s have different procedures, customs and practices and national caveats are a mechanism by which NATO accommodates these differences.
March 2004 riots had it not been for KFOR. C Coy 35th Irish Infantry Group was fortunate in that it had some of the most qualified snipers in the Irish Army in its ranks. This unique asset was used by MNTF(C) which deployed the snipers to mount covert surveillance operations on the ‘Administrative Boundary Line’ with Serbia in order to monitor suspected smuggling and trafficking activities. The snipers went into hides under the cover of darkness and remained in place undetected for two to five days observing and reporting. Throughout each deployment the snipers had to survive on cold rations. This was a demanding and potentially dangerous assignment requiring very high levels of military skill but there was never a shortage of volunteers from amongst the snipers.

The C Coy operations throughout the tour were demanding and arduous, requiring a high level of physical fitness, proficiency in modern infantry tactics, and mastery of sophisticated military equipment. Irish soldiers are exceptionally well-equipped by international standards. As noted above a modernisation and restructuring programme of the Irish Defence Forces began in 2000. As a result of the peace process the army, which had concentrated on internal security issues between 1969 and 1995 was downsized and barracks surplus to requirement were closed and sold. The savings accrued were then invested in a modernisation and re-equipment programme in line with a policy which prepared the army for peace support operations overseas. In Kosovo, C Coy had an enviable array of equipment. The weapon systems included Steyr assault rifles, light mortars, heavy, medium and light machine guns, sniper rifles and sophisticated associated surveillance kits, medium range anti-tank weapons, and disposable short range anti-tank systems. C Coy transport included nine Mowag armoured personnel carriers and fifteen Nissan SUV’s. The communications systems were also state-of-the-art as were the personal body armour, which was a source of admiration by the other contingents. Accommodation and food were of the highest standard, and leave, pay, and allowances, were amongst the best in NATO.

7.8.3 The Logistics Company

In NATO operations each national contingent must be self-contained, so it fell to the Irish Logs Company to sustain the entire Irish unit and its attachments whilst overseas. The logs company was required to plan, acquire, account for, and provide all equipment and services necessary to sustain the unit in the area of operations for the duration of tour of duty. It was based in Camp Clarke and its role was to support the mechanised infantry company, manage the group logistics, and oversee and operate the accounts. The logs company also identified,
vetted, and managed projects, maintained Camp Clarke which accommodated some two hundred personnel, administered VIP visits, and managed rotations. A Commandant commanded the logistic company which comprised a transport platoon with drivers, fitters, stores and administration personnel. The transport officer in the 35th Irish Infantry Group was a Captain of the Air Corps, a jet pilot whose previous appointment had been flying the Government jet. He was also a qualified accountant. The communications and information systems platoon was commanded by an electrical engineer and the other rank personnel included radio operators, radio and computer technicians, and aerial and satellite dish technicians. The engineer section maintained the camp and had generator technicians, plant operators, and tradesmen including plumbers, carpenters, electricians, and so on. The catering platoon consisted of cooks and the food store personnel. The medical section personnel were qualified paramedics. The ordnance section had armourers who maintained the weapons systems and managed the safe condition and storage of ammunition and explosives.

7.8.4 The National Support Element

This was a small group consisting of a Commandant and four Senior NCOs which was stationed in Skopje, Macedonia. They were responsible for the management of the financial accounts for the troops in Kosovo. The main reason for their location in Macedonia was to ensure they had access to a reliable banking system, which was not a viable option in Kosovo at that time. The NSE was the conduit between the unit in Kosovo, especially the Adjutant and the Logs Coy Commander, and the sub-head managers in Dublin. It came under the command of the Commanding Officer of the Irish contingent.

7.8.5 The Unit HQ

This was the small command and control centre, and had a Commanding Officer, Lt Col rank. The Commanding Officer was the commander of the unit and responsible for the performance of the unit. He/she ensured the unit is managed, equipped, trained, and supervised to ensure that it is capable of performing to the high standards demanded by NATO. The CO is responsible for the military discipline and has legal powers commensurate with that position. The COs also required to provide detailed weekly and monthly reports to DFHQ in Dublin. The Deputy Commanding Officer who was a senior Commandant was tasked with responsibility for coordinating the humanitarian activities, welfare issues, and monitoring and reporting on the political, security, and economic issues of the day in Kosovo.
He additionally assumed command of the unit in the absence of the CO. The Adjutant, also of Commandant rank, commanded the administrative platoon which was responsible for the administration of the unit, including record-keeping, pay, leave, travel arrangements, discipline, and troop welfare. The Chaplain was responsible for the spiritual welfare of the troops and also doubled as the unit travel officer. As such he was responsible for managing the travel arrangements of all the unit personnel. The 35th Irish Infantry Group also had attached Military Police personnel, Staff Officers and NCOs, and liaison personnel all of whom worked in higher HQ appointments but were attached to the 35th. This conforms to the legal requirement for Irish troops to serve under the command of an Irish Commanding Officer. This is common practice in most armies and it is facilitated by the technicality of being under command to a home country Commanding Officer but under operational control of a foreign national officer.

7.8.6 The Liaison Monitoring Teams

Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMT’s) is a concept which was established by KFOR HQ following the March 2004 riots, which caught KFOR completely off guard and highlighted severe deficiencies in KFOR’s intelligence network. The LMTs were, in effect, overt intelligence gathering teams, who provided a tripwire or early warning to the KFOR Commander by providing him with detailed situational awareness of the political, economic, and social temperature, amongst the Kosovo population. The LMT’s operated throughout Kosovo and were organised and located within the civilian municipalities in order to foster closer contact between KFOR and the Municipalities. Each municipality had one Liaison Monitoring Team who visited the schools and villages. The LMT’s attended village meetings and worked closely with the local police officers (KPS). They were responsible for liaison with all non-military organisations and became an integral link in the chain of overt information available to the KFOR commander. The LMT’s were a vital antenna for KFOR regarding the needs and behaviour of the Kosovo people.

There were two Irish LMTs in Kosovo. One Irish LMT worked in the Albanian municipality of Stimlje, which was located in the Drinica Valley, the home of the KLA, and the scene of a great deal of fighting and massacres during the war of independence 1998/9. Consequently this area suffered greatly under the Serb administration. As it was a district where many ethnic Albanian radicals and godfathers of organised crime or clan leaders, resided, monitoring the volatile situation in this district and the attitude of the population therein was
crucial to the KFOR commander. The Irish LMT had integrated exceptionally well into this problematic area. Along with their liaison duties the Irish LMT personnel brought their Celtic warmth, affability, and communication skills, to the once notorious Drinica Valley. The Irish soldiers became integrated into the community development committees where they advised and shared their experiences from similar committees at home with the Stimlje municipality. They organised football leagues for the locals, and Irish teams participated in the competitions, bringing an international flavour to the events. Stimlje now boasts a very successful summer musical festival of traditional Albanian music which bears an uncanny resemblance to an Irish Fleadh Ceoil. Irish army pipe bands and Irish army folk singers and musicians are regular acts at this festival. The LMT participated in youth activities and attended several diverse committees, such as the empowerment of women, group water schemes, and refuse recycling. Irish Aid funding was sourced to finance many community projects, such as refurbishing school classrooms, and building basketball courts and 5-a-side soccer pitches throughout the Municipalities.

In 2007 the Irish Government Chief Whip, Mr Tom Kitt, appeared in a colour photograph on the front page of the Irish Times surrounded by hundreds of ethnic Albanian primary school children when he announced Irish Aid funding for the refurbishment of a large primary school in Stimlje. The LMT had identified this project and the funding announced by Minister Kitt brought it to fruition. During his visit Mr Kitt was asked by the Mayor of Stimlje who, like Mr. Kitt, was an ex-primary school teacher, “What would be the reaction of the Irish Government to Kosovo declaring a unilateral declaration of independence?” The mayor praised the activities of the Irish soldiers saying: “not only had they brought peace to the area but they had integrated with the community and had become very popular with the people.” He went on to say that the Albanian people had seen soldiers from many countries tramp over their land throughout the centuries, but the current generation of school children were the first ever Albanian children in Kosovo not to fear foreign soldiers; and not only that, but to respect and be respected by these Irish KFOR soldiers. The mayor looked Mr Kitt in the eye and asked “will the Irish Government like the Irish soldiers stand with us in our hour of need or will they cut and run when we need you most?” Mr Kitt gave a diplomatic answer and said that he was better informed as a result of his visit and he would encourage the Irish Foreign Minister to make Kosovo a priority and visit Kosovo as soon as possible.253 The Irish Foreign minister, Mr Dermot Ahern T.D., did visit Kosovo in December 2007 and pledged Irish

253 Author present at the meeting.
Government support for Kosovo independence and announced that Irish troops would remain in Kosovo following a declaration of independence.

The second Irish LMT worked in the Kosovo-Serb Municipality of Gracanica, which is on the outskirts of the capital Pristina. The thirteenth century Gracanica monastery is one of the most important patrimonial sites of the Serb Orthodox Church, and as such it was guarded on a twenty-four hour basis by armed KFOR troops. Gracanica is a very vulnerable community which was attacked by rampaging Kosovo Albanian rioters in March 2004 and only saved by the determined stand of the Scandinavian-led Task Force Centre in which Irish troops played a prominent role. The presence of the Irish LMT in Gracanica was a very important barometer for KFOR HQ in assessing Kosovo-Serb opinion and keeping HQ informed on the Kosovo-Serbs fears and expectations. In turn, the LMT was a valuable source of communication for the Kosovo-Serb community with KFOR and was a source of reassurance of KFOR’s commitment to the safety and survival of the Kosovo-Serb community in Gracanica. On his visit to Kosovo Mr Kitt met the Kosovo Serb leaders in Gracanica in a meeting organised by the LMT at which time the Kosovo Serb leaders stated that they were satisfied with the Ahtisaari proposals\(^\text{254}\) as it gave an element of autonomy to the Gracanica Serb community. Mr Kitt's political antenna was quick to discern that this was at odds with what commonly believed to be mainstream Kosovo-Serb opinion. The Gracanica Leaders said the Kosovo Serbs north of the Ibar River held one view but those in the isolated communities in the South had to be more pragmatic and believed the Ahtisaari proposals safeguarded their rights.

### 7.8.7 CIMIC

The primary role of peacekeepers is to create a safe and secure environment for peace-builders to operate. Successful peacekeeping requires innovative responses to complex situations and Irish Defence Forces personnel have had to develop diverse skills to respond to these complex challenges. One of the recurring critical issues faced by DF personnel is the humanitarian consequence of conflict. In many cases DF personnel find themselves as the only international actor in the region, and the humanitarian situation is such that they feel that they have no option but to respond despite the fact that they are not specifically tasked with supplying humanitarian assistance. DF personnel have consistently responded to

\(^{254}\) See Chapter 7.10
humanitarian emergencies in every country in which they have served. Irish peacekeepers have military assets and skilled technical personnel at their disposal and have access to modest funding from Irish Aid, which is additionally supplemented by fundraising activities undertaken both by the soldiers in theatre and by their families at home. Irish peacekeepers are not unique, Scandinavian peacekeepers are also resourced by their governments to fund such humanitarian projects as water, waste disposal, education, and health care projects. In addition most NATO units have civil military cooperation cells (CIMIC) in their HQs.

The 35th Irish Infantry Group continued the humanitarian tradition, which is as old as Irish peacekeeping itself. In relation to the Irish Aid the funding criteria was ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ which included the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The project areas concentrated on education, health, community services, and the environment. In 2007 the 35th Irish Infantry Group used €85,000 Irish Aid funding to refurbish classrooms and toilets in three primary schools and build three, all-weather basketball /5-a-side soccer courts. These projects were undertaken in response to specific requests of community representatives from both the Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serb communities. The soldiers themselves raised additional finances through various fund-raising activities and this money was used for a variety of projects. In one particular project a Sergeant home on leave told his children who attended a primary school in Headford, Co Galway, about the condition of the primary school in the village for which he was responsible. His children told the teachers and pupils in their school. The Sergeant was asked to address the parents and the children to tell them of his experiences. The result was the Headford School adopted the Kosovo-Albanian School and raised almost €10,000 to refurbish the classrooms, buy desks and blackboards, and erect a perimeter fence to protect the children from passing traffic on the nearby road. Another project funded by the soldiers resulted in the building of four social houses for homeless families. This project was carried out in conjunction with the local municipality which identified the families in need and contributed 25% percent of the finance. The soldiers contributed the remaining 75% and the houses were built by a local contractor, thus creating employment in the local community. A further project paid for a sight-saving eye procedure, when a specialist was flown in from Germany to operate on a young local girl, the victim of a stray bullet during a crime-related shooting incident.
On one occasion the author was informed that there was an Irish civilian at the entrance to Camp Clarke who wanted to speak to the commanding officer. The author invited him in for lunch and the civilian informed the author that he worked for the EU Agency for Reconstruction. He was a member of the St. Vincent De Paul society in his hometown in Ireland and he had therefore joined the St Vincent De Paul conference in Pristina. He came to make representations on behalf of an Albanian Catholic village which was located in a remote rural area which he believed was in the Irish area, as he had heard reports of Irish troops patrolling the village during the summer. In the winter the village was so remote that it was usually cut off by snow. At one time Albanians were Roman Catholic but most had converted to Islam during the Ottoman period. Catholicism had only survived in the very remotest areas. The village school had no water supply and consequently the sanitary conditions were appalling. The author visited the village and met the village leaders and was subsequently able to secure funding for the instillation of water, toilets, and a kitchen in the school. All involved in the project were delighted to assist this fiercely resilient and proud community.

On a personal note, the author visited a remote communication post perched on the top of a mountain, which was guarded by Irish troops twice a week. Near the summit the author was frequently met a fourteen year old girl called Loretta who begged for food; she was the same age as the author's youngest daughter. He brought food each time from the kitchen in Camp Clarke. One day he arranged to have an Albanian interpreter with him. Loretta invited them to her home and they received a warm welcome from her father a man in his early forties who told them that he had been injured in a building site accident and was unable to work. His wife also in her early forties lay on the floor in a semi-comatose state. There were some threadbare carpets on the floor but no furniture. The author asked the man what was the problem with his wife. He stated she was sick and he had brought her to the hospital but he had no money so the doctors were not interested in treating her but he thought that the problem was her mind. The author arranged for a female medic from Camp Clarke accompanied by an interpreter to bring Loretta’s mother to a private civilian clinic in Pristina. The fee was €20 and she was diagnosed as suffering from epilepsy; the medication prescribed turned out to cost €12 per month, a trifle for an Irish person but to a family of seven on €70 per month it was prohibitive. The Irish contingent paid for the medication and within weeks she showed a vast improvement and Loretta was able to resume her schooling with her four other younger siblings. The Irish contingent prepaid for medication and medical supervision.
for twelve months and arranged for their successors to monitor the situation. However, the family remain poor. The children cannot hope to proceed beyond primary school and are condemned to a life of poverty. The Irish peacekeepers were able to bring some assistance to alleviate the plight of this family but they were unable to solve their problem. The plight of this family is a metaphor for the plight of Kosovo itself.

The 35th Irish Infantry Group returned to Ireland in October 2007. The implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, which they thought would be achieved during their tour of duty, did not take place due to disagreement in the UN Security Council. Kosovo declared independence in February 2008. Serbia, supported by Russia, mounted a furious media and political campaign, but fortunately war did not break out, and thanks in no short measure to the vigilance of KFOR, violence was confined to one small area and was short-lived. The then Irish Foreign Minister, Dermott Ahern, visited Kosovo in December 2007 and promised the continuation of the Irish troop commitment to KFOR. When Prime Minister Thaci declared the declaration of independence in February 2008 without the authority of the UN Security Council, Ireland was one of the first countries to recognise the new state.
7.9 Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Following the March 2004 riots, lessons were learned and remedial action was taken. UNMIK accelerated its transfer of power to the PISG, and NATO established the liaison monitoring teams. This served to give KFOR a better interface with both the Albanian and Serb civilian population in Kosovo and enabled KFOR commanders to be better informed on the situation throughout Kosovo. By 2005 Kosovo had become a relatively benign environment from a security perspective. The political situation remained fragile whilst powers were slowly being handed over from UNMIK to the PISG, but the ‘Final Status’ had not been resolved, and there was always the potential for a return to violence as the prospect of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) began to emerge. However, from a military perspective there were no serious security incidents. KFOR was respected and tolerated by the Albanian community as they credited NATO with ejecting the repressive Serbian security forces, whilst the Kosovo-Serb community relied on KFOR to protect their isolated communities. As a consequence, KFOR enjoyed acceptance and cooperation from both communities.

The legal basis for Irish participation in KFOR was the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). However, towards the end of 2007 there was a debate as to whether the Irish continuance in KFOR would be legal in the advent of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the PISG without a UNSC resolution. A triple lock is required for Irish Defence Forces participation in peacekeeping missions. This requires a UNSC resolution, authorisation by the Irish Government, and authorisation by the Irish Parliament. Some commentators contended that a UDI would invalidate UNSCR 1244 (1999). The Irish government received legal advice from the Attorney General that as UNSCR 1244 states:

“The international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise,”

It therefore followed that the continued presence of Irish troops would remain legal regardless of the actions of the Kosovo authorities, unless and until the Security Council decided to terminate KFOR’s presence.

Kosovo declared UDI in February 2008 and the Irish government recognised the UDI along with the majority of EU states. However, the EU did not unanimously support Kosovo’s UDI as several EU states had reservations about regions declaring UDI. Countries such as Spain
have issues in relation to the Basque region and Catalonia. Cyprus has the issue of the
Turkish occupied north. Rumania and Slovenia have large ethnic Hungarian populations a
legacy of the post-World War 1 Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, despite the wishes of the
overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo for independence, there was no
precedent in international law for such an action and many countries had concerns that
the Kosovo UDI would set a precedent.

7.10 The Final Status

The Irish Government’s policy on the issue of Kosovo was formulated within the framework
of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Ireland supported the EU’s
High Commissioner for CFSP, Mr. Javier Solana’s call for EU unanimity on the issue and
supported the ESDP Mission in Kosovo. However, in relation to recognition of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI), to date, (January 2016) unanimity has not been achieved
with 5 EU states still refusing to recognise Kosovo’s UDI. As of August 2014 a total of 110
states worldwide have recognised Kosovo (56% of UN Members) including the USA and 23
of the 28 members of the EU. However, Serbia, Russia, and China, are amongst those who
remain opposed on principle:

There is no doubt that after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Kosovo was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia.
Integral parts of sovereign states, under international law, do not have a right to
unilateral secession... while the principle of protection of territorial integrity is a
cornerstone of international legal order,255.

When adopting Resolution 1244 in June 1999, the Security Council left the delicate question
of Kosovo’s final status open. In November 2005, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan,
appointed Marti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish President, as Special Envoy for the Kosovo
status process in order to determine whether Kosovo should become independent or remain a
The new UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, endorsed the proposal as did the United States
and many other western governments. However, Serbia’s rejection of the proposals was
supported by Russia who threatened to veto the proposal if it came before the Security
Council. EU countries with large ethnic minorities, such as Spain, Romania, Slovakia and

255 Xie, Hanchin. China's legal representative statement to the International Court of Justice reported in Kosovo
Compromise Monday, December 07, 2009
Cyprus, also expressed grave misgivings. The issue fell to atroika created of the USA, Russia and the EU to attempt to find an agreement between the Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian representatives. The Troika reported failure in December 2007. In the absence of agreement the US and the EU held a common view that Kosovo should behave some degree of independence with supervised sovereignty. On 17 February 2008 the Kosovo parliament declared independence. The US and most EU states including Ireland recognised the new state. However, Serbia and Russia vehemently opposed it, calling into question the legality of the declaration. In October 2008 Serbia requested a judgment from the International Court of Justice. The court delivered its advisory opinion on 22 July 2010 and declared that “the declaration of independence of the 17th of February 2008 did not violate general international law because international law contains no ‘prohibition on declarations of independence’”. The court president, Hisashi Owada of Japan, added, “International law does not have an active provision that limits independence declarations; therefore Kosovo's declaration of independence is not in breach of international law.” Two months later Serbia submitted a new draft resolution on Kosovo to the UN General Assembly. The draft was harmonized with the EU and was adopted with an acclamation, “The Republic of Serbia does not and shall not recognize the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo,” Vuk Jeremić, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia declared, when introducing the text. Yet, if the text were adopted, it would help create an atmosphere conducive for creating peace between Serbs and Albanians. Only such an approach could produce legitimate and sustainable results, in line with United Nations principles.\(^\text{256}\) Belgrade and Priština started the negotiations under the EU auspices in March 2011 and since then a number of agreements have been reached.

### 7.11 Conclusion

This Kosovo case study examined the Irish role in KFOR which was the peace-enforcement constituent of the complex peace-building mission in Kosovo that involved several international organisations including the United Nations civil administration mission (UNMIK), the OSCE (OMIK) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).

Since the end of the Cold War, relatively straightforward peacekeeping operations involving lightly armed peacekeepers supervising post-conflict military disengagement processes have

\(^\text{256}\)UN General Assembly GA/10980, Sept 2010.
been replaced by complex peace-building operations of which military peacekeeping is but one constituent part. Kosovo was chosen as a case study because it was a complex peace-building mission which incorporated a Chapter VIII ‘Regional Organisation’ mission to which Ireland provided a peace-enforcing mechanised infantry unit. The lessons learned there, both operationally and logistically, were invaluable, and they become a template for the Irish peace-enforcement missions that followed. Kosovo was one of the most complex post-Cold War peace-building operations ever undertaken by the international community. NATO was considered to be the only military force that had the resources to conduct such a mission. KFOR was only one constituent of a complex multi-organisational response to this complex peace-building operation. Consequently, the part that Irish peacekeepers played in KFOR is particularly worthy of study.

The case study began with a brief history of Kosovo. It described the demographics of Yugoslavia in order to view the Kosovo situation in a regional context. The Kosovo patrimonial clan system was outlined to explain the clan influence in Kosovo-Albanian governance. The political situation was discussed to show the complexity of Kosovo politics and demonstrate the fact that Kosovo-Albanian politics are not homogenous. The case study addressed the issue of peace-building in Kosovo including the practice of international administration and the activities of UNMIL. It provided a critical review of the philosophy of international administration and described some of the detrimental effects the IMF sponsored ‘structural reforms’ had on Kosovo. The case study then focused on KFOR, giving background as to why NATO was chosen to conduct the peace-enforcement element of the peace-building operation. It then gave a brief chronology of the build up to the deployment of KFOR and outlined the structure of KFOR to show where the Irish peacekeepers were located within the KFOR organisation. The Irish contribution to KFOR was focused on the experiences of the 35th Irish infantry group in and drew upon the author own personal experience there. It dealt with the Training Circular for Overseas Units and described the activities of the Mechanised Infantry Company, the Logistics Company, the National Support Element, the Unit HQ, the Liaison Monitoring Teams and the CIMIC activities of the unit. The case study then dealt with the issue of the Final Status for Kosovo and the political and diplomatic implications for Ireland.

We saw in this case study that the deployment of Irish troops to KFOR was a significant step for the Irish Defence Forces in that it marked a willingness of the Irish Government to
participate in Regional peacekeeping operations as well as UN missions. As was shown in
Chapter 4 the principle of partaking in peace-enforcement missions was adopted by the Irish
government as early as 1993 when the third amendment to the Defence Act enabled Irish
troops to participate in peace-enforcement missions. Subsequently, specialist support units,
such as military police to SFOR in Bosnia, and transport companies to the UN peace-
enforcement mission in Somalia and KFOR were deployed. However, the deployment of the
mechanised infantry company to KFOR from 2003 to 2010 marked a readiness of the Irish
government to participate at the hard-end of peace-enforcement which was only made
possible by legislative change, the reorganisation of the DF, and a substantial investment in
military equipment.

From a defence forces perspective, the KFOR deployment was a very different experience
from previous UN deployments. Operationally, Irish troops were now deployed alongside
and had achieved inter-operability with some of the most sophisticated militaries in the
world. They participated in joint training exercises and operational deployments with these
units proved to be very informative and enhanced the professionalism of Irish troops
throughout all ranks. The KFOR troop deployment was supported by NATO artillery, armour
and air assets, including helicopter gunships, troop carrying helicopters, and medevac
helicopters. In addition, jet fighter and bomber support was on call. If the security situation
had deteriorated there were over the horizon forces on call ready to deploy into Kosovo
within 24 hours. KFOR had intelligence assets which no UN mission would even
contemplate deploying. These included the overt intelligence gathering liaison monitoring
teams and covert NATO intelligence assets, Special Forces surveillance, and satellite assets.
The command and control network of KFOR was fundamentally different to UN peacekeeping operations. The KFOR deployment followed conventional military lines with strategic HQ in Mons, Belgium, an operational HQ in Italy, and the tactical chain of command in Kosovo followed the conventional military lines of national battalions under command to a multi-national brigade HQ which reported to a multi-national Force HQ. This chain of command was operated by military personnel with civilian-political-diplomatic oversight operating at the strategic level, whereas the UN chain of command is civilian dominated down to the tactical level. This was a new experience for Irish officers and many were highly impressed and influenced by it.

From a logistical perspective the KFOR deployment was very different from UN deployments as much of the logistical infrastructure in UN missions is provided by the UN Field Service. Whilst NATO provided command, control and communication infrastructure, along with intelligence, air, naval and military combat support, the logistical support is left to each troop contributing country (TCC) in the NATO ‘Costs lie where they fall’ system. Consequently, Irish logisticians had to provide the complete logistical infrastructure to deploy and sustain a mechanised infantry unit in an overseas operational mission. The experience gained in KFOR proved to be invaluable for the deployments which were soon to come in Liberia and Chad.

Paradoxically, we saw in this chapter that despite the NATO military assets available to KFOR, the Irish infantry troops deployed in KFOR soon found themselves in a precarious situation when rioting broke out in March 2004. The troops from NATO member states proved themselves to be inadequate to the task and were roundly criticised by commentators. However, the PfP troops from predominantly neutral EU states rose to the occasion and prevented serious loss of life. NATO troops are trained and equipped for high intensity conflict and had little or no experience of containing civil disorder or low intensity conflict. Whereas, the EU neutral states had vast experience of UN peacekeeping and in the Irish case, along with peacekeeping its modus operandi in Ireland was ‘Aid to the Civil Power’. The Irish and EU neutrals had much more experience and were better equipped to deal with the type of civil disorders which were encountered in March 2004.

Although this was a peace-enforcement mission it is clear that Irish troops retained many of the attributes usually attributed to traditional peacekeeping. The CIMIC section illustrates that while the engagement by Irish peacekeepers in local community activities was somewhat
at variance with NATO CIMIC doctrine it was very much in keeping with the humanitarian traditions built up over four decades of traditional peacekeeping operations. Not only did Irish peacekeepers disburse funding from Irish Aid, but their own fundraising activities exceeded the Irish Aid contributions, and the majority of projects funded by the Irish peacekeepers were in conjunction with the local municipality authorities.

**How does the evidence in this chapter help to answer our two key research questions?**

With respect to our first question, regarding the impact of doctrinal changes on Irish peacekeeping policy and practice, the Kosovo deployment offers some key insights. As has been shown in previous chapters, Irish peacekeeping in the Congo 1960-1964, Cyprus 1964-1973, Sinai 1973-74, Lebanon 1978-2000, was very much in line with the traditional peacekeeping model, whereas the KFOR deployment of a mechanised infantry company marked the beginning of Irish participation into the hard end of peace-enforcement. The research for this chapter found no evidence that the Irish deployment with KFOR had any effect, adverse or otherwise on Ireland’s policy of military neutrality. However, it was apparent that during the riots in 2004, the peacekeepers from the neutral troop contributing countries (TCC’s) were internationally recognised as having been much more effective and efficient than the peacekeepers from the NATO TCC’s in dealing with the civil disturbances. This chapter demonstrates that the Irish doctrine, training, and equipment for KFOR, were focused on peace-enforcement. However, the modus operandi of the Irish peacekeepers was strongly influenced by the experiences of traditional peacekeeping, aid to the civil power operations in Ireland, and the fact that Irish soldiers do not live in garrisons. In the main they live amongst the civilian community and consequently they are heavily influenced by civilian norms such as community policing and the rule of law. We saw in the CIMIC chapter paragraph 4.6.9.3. that the CIMIC operated by the Irish contingent was much more in line with the UN concept of CIMIC than the NATO concept. This effectively means that Irish peacekeeping in Kosovo was a hybrid of traditional and post 1990 doctrines.

With respect to the second question dealing with Ireland’s continued commitment to international peacekeeping and the effect of the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy on Irish peacekeeping the Kosovo deployment offered some key insights.
As discussed in Chapter 4 Irish foreign policy has become Europeanized and consequently Ireland was one of the first countries to recognise Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. This decision was in line with mainstream EU policy. However, it was strongly influenced by the first-hand knowledge of Kosovo by Irish politicians and diplomats because of the presence of Irish troops in Kosovo.

In relation to the deployment, the mechanised infantry unit in KFOR was only possible because of the major investment in equipment (€100 million for Armoured Personnel Carriers alone) over the preceding years. In addition, the Irish KFOR deployment would not have been possible if the DF had not participated in several NATO resource development and training programmes which ensured compatibility and interoperability (see sections 3.7.4 and 4.6.8). In KFOR Irish troops worked alongside and learned from the most modern and sophisticated armies in the world. Irish diplomacy also benefited in that Irish involvement in PfP which has allowed Irish diplomatic and security agencies access to diplomatic, security, and intelligence assets, in the corridors of power which were previously denied to them. The evidence shows that the Irish military has benefited enormously from peacekeeping and underwent reorganisation and investment to enable it to participate in peace-enforcement operations with the UN and regional organisations. Paradoxically, defence spending in Ireland has steadily declined since 1995, and in 2015, at a mere 0.49% of GDP\textsuperscript{257} was the lowest in the EU. The equipment purchase for peacekeeping was funded by the sale of Defence assets such as land and barrack closures. The chapter has demonstrated that Irish participation in peacekeeping operations is conducted because it is in Ireland’s national interest:

Ireland depends for its survival on a regulated international environment in which the rights and interests of even the smallest are guaranteed and protected\textsuperscript{258}

Throughout the thesis there is evidence that the benefits from peacekeeping which accrue to the DF are a result of participation in international peacekeeping operations, though they are not the primary motivation for participation.

\textsuperscript{257} CIA Factbook 2014
\textsuperscript{258} Irish Government’s White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996 Para 2.37
Chapter 8: Chad

8. 1. Introduction

This chapter examines Ireland’s role in the EU’s security strategy and specifically the EU’s peacekeeping mission to Chad/Central African Republic where the Irish DF provided the operational commander and where the Irish contingent was second only to France in size and scope.

This chapter demonstrates that the policy changes and modernisation of the Irish defence forces enabled Ireland to play a major role in the extremely challenging EUFOR Chad/CAR mission. It begins with a review of the background to the conflict in the region, followed by a review of European security strategy which underpins the context of this EU mission. The next section gives a brief introduction to Chad and to the conflict. The chapter then continues to examine the EU’s political decisions which enabled the deployment, and goes on to then discuss the workings of the operational HQ in Paris and the management of the deployment. The section pertaining to the Irish argues that the Irish deployment in EUFOR Chad/CAR was the pinnacle of the evolution of Irish peace operations from traditional peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. It begins by outlining Irish involvement in the United Nations peace-enforcement mission in Liberia and the influence which this had on the tactics adopted by the Irish Battalion in EUFOR. Finally, this chapter details the activities of the Irish battalion in Chad and summarises the ‘lessons learned’ from Irish DF deployment there.

8.2 Background to the EUFOR Deployment

In 2007 the political situation in Chad became destabilised by the large influx of refugees from the war in neighbouring Darfur, Sudan. The United Nations therefore proposed to address the problems in Chad and CAR with a three pillar solution: Pillar 1, a civilian component which would address civil affairs; Pillar 2, an international police element to train Chadian police to operate in and around the refugee camps; and Pillar 3, a military element of over 10,000 troops to protect UN agencies and NGO’s. When it became apparent that
President Débe was opposed to a UN military presence\(^\text{259}\) it was agreed that Pillar 1 the civilian element would be provided by a combination of the UN, the EU Commission, and NGO’s, and the Pillar 2 police element would be provided by the UN. Pillar 3 continued to be contentious, but President Débe eventually agreed to a French-led mission, and the newly elected French President Nicholas Sarkozy made Chad a priority and lobbied European capitals.\(^\text{260}\) The resulting EUFOR Chad/CAR mission that emerged was the largest ever military operation ever undertaken in Africa by the EU.

The entire region including Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) is an area of cultural, religious and ethnic solidarities which transcend the arbitrary national boundaries inherited from colonialism.\(^\text{261}\) From as early as 2003, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) had waged a guerilla war against the Chadian government which had itself come to power by way of a coup d’état. On 25 September 2007 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1778, establishing the UN peacekeeping mission MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic in order to avoid a spill-over of the Darfur crisis into neighbouring areas. However, due to the remoteness and poor infrastructure of the region the UN estimated it would take at least a year to establish a mission there. Consequently, UN Resolution 1778 authorised the EU to establish a bridging-peacekeeping mission for 12 months before handing over to the UN. The French agreed to take the lead role in the EU force deployment as France had retained local strategic interests in its former colonial territory. However, many of the EU member states were less than enthusiastic. Germany and the United Kingdom made it clear that whilst they would not oppose the project they would not contribute troops or material. Nonetheless, when approached by President Sarkozy, the Irish government agreed to participate, and along with The Polish and French, supplied the three main national contingents in the force\(^\text{262}\)


\(^\text{260}\) Ibid P 9

\(^\text{261}\) Ibid Pp 6

\(^\text{262}\) Ibid Pp 24
8.3 European Security Strategy

In 1954 the then six members of the EEC signed the European Defence Community (EDC) agreement. However, the French Senate ultimately failed to ratify it and the EDC never came into effect, an ominous indication of the difficulties which the members of the EEC/EC/EU would continue to experience on matters of foreign policy and security. The Maastricht inter-governmental conference (February 1992) established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the tragedy of the events in the former Yugoslavia had exposed the many shortcomings of the CFSP, and dealt a severe blow to the EU’s foreign policy pretensions. The Amsterdam Treaty (December 1997) attempted to resolve the shortcomings of the CFSP, but was hampered by embedded divisions, which necessitated yet further compromise:

The EU cannot have a proper security strategy as long as decisions on the use of force rest in the hands of its member governments.263

Notwithstanding these issues, Amsterdam did embrace the Petersberg tasks (defined in June 1992 at the Hotel Petersberg, near Bonn in Germany) which include humanitarian peacekeeping and rescue and combat forces tasks. A breakthrough was achieved in Saint Malo in December 1998 where an Anglo-French Summit tackled the issue of European security for the first time, and it was decided that the EU be given the capacity for autonomous military action to respond to an international crisis.

A joint declaration on European defence by the United Kingdom and France was declared following the summit in Saint Malo in December 1998. For fifty years Britain had placed its trust in the Atlantic Alliance, but was now exasperated by the refusal of the US to engage in the 1991-1995 Yugoslav war. The battles between John Major’s government and the Clinton administration were so intense that even Major was forced to concede that some form of European solution had to be found.264 In 1998 Tony Blair was appalled when he was first briefed on Europe’s potential capacity to engage militarily in a hypothetical war in

Kosovo\textsuperscript{265}. The British reluctantly came to the conclusion that Europe needed an independent ability to project military force. A lesson had been learned from Yugoslavia: if Europe were to be a serious international actor, independent means were necessary.

The Cologne Summit of June 1999 extended the Saint Malo initiative by establishing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). To ensure that the EU could conduct Petersberg operations effectively the summit established a new set of institutions; a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The issue of military capabilities was further addressed at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 which committed to the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with a corps-level strength of 60,000 troops by 2003. However, it soon became apparent that the EU had a serious ‘expectation-capabilities gap\textsuperscript{266} as EU member states were either unable or unwilling to provide such a force. Instead, a series of European Battle-groups of 1,500 troops were to be provided by a single nation or by groups of nations. This became known as Headline Goal 2010. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty (2007) renamed ESDP to the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) and changed the way certain decisions are made in the EU. However, decisions on military or defence issues continue to require the unanimous support of all EU states.

Attempts by the EU to formulate a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have been an elusive quest. The twenty-eight EU member states jealously protect their individual foreign policies, which consequently poses major obstacles to the efficient functioning of the CFSP. Ambitious rhetoric from Brussels do not compensate for the absence of the military force projection required by the EU to support its peace-building efforts. However, the EU has occasionally acted as an independent peacekeeper and this chapter will therefore examine the largest peacekeeping operation ever undertaken by the European Union, namely, EUFOR Chad/CAR.

\textsuperscript{265}British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Cameron, Fraser. \textit{The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Past, Present and Future} Pg 32
8.4 Chad

8.4.1 Brief History

Chad was a French colony until 1960, and since independence has experienced incessant civil warfare. In 1990, the former helicopter pilot and chief of staff of the Chadian army, Idris Débe, attacked Chad from Sudan and overthrew the Habré regime which had been the product of an earlier coup d’état in 1982. Since 1975 Chad’s governments have become increasingly militarised, a consequence of successive civil wars in which northerners opposed the political predominance of the south. Débe proclaimed himself the head of state and dissolved the legislature. In 1994 Débe attempted to reconcile the rebel groups and reintroduced multi-party politics. Chadians approved a new constitution by referendum, and in 1996 Déby won a competitive presidential election and a second term five years later. However, a 1998 rebellion in northern Chad plunged the country back into civil war. In addition to its internal strife, the war in Darfur in western Sudan spilled over into Chad and resulted in the influx of several hundred thousand refugees. This also facilitated the new rebel groups who made frequent incursions into eastern Chad. In 2005 Débe unilaterally modified the constitution and removed the two-term limit on the presidency and in 2006 won a third mandate in elections which were boycotted by the opposition. In 2006 and 2008 rebel forces attempted to take the capital by force, but failed on both occasions. The 2008 attack happened just prior to the deployment of an EU peacekeeping force. The rebel group launched the attack from Sudan and reached the capital N’Djamena but they were beaten back by government forces helped by France. There has been no significant insurgent threat since then for a variety of factors which include the EU peacekeeping deployment in 2008 that developed into a UN peacekeeping mission in 2009. The most significant factor however, has been the oil revenues which have financed the upgrading of the government army and air force. Another significant factor was Chad’s rapprochement with Sudan in 2010 which has helped secure the Chad-Sudan border. In 2011 President Déby was re-elected to his fourth term in an election that international observers described as proceeding without incident.

8.4.2 Geography and Economy

Chad’s climate is tropical in the south and desert in the north. The terrain consists of arid plains in the centre, desert in the north, mountains in the northwest, and lowlands in the
south. Only 2.8% of the land is arable. Since the discovery of oil in 2000 the economy has been boosted by major foreign investment in the oil sector. However, Chad is primarily agricultural and at least 80% of Chad's population relies on farming. Chad’s economy is impeded by its landlocked position, high energy costs, and history of instability. Most significantly, Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for almost all public and private sector investment projects. Remittances are also an important source of income. Oil production came on stream in late 2003 and Chad began to export oil in 2004. Cotton, cattle, and gum-arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. At 43.1% of the GDP Chad’s public debt is relatively low by international standards. However, Chad is seventh from the bottom of the list of ‘Human Development’ (150/156) and is the fifth most corrupt country in the world according to ‘Transparency International’. Chad has a population of 10 million people, half of whom are under the age of fifteen, 35% of whom suffer from malnutrition. This is in a country where GDP growth is five times greater than China’s due to lucrative oil revenues.\footnote{Arteaga,Felix. Real Instituto Elcara. ARI 20/2008. Date: 10/3/2008 Area: Subsaharan Africa / Defence & Security. 10/03/2008 P 1.2.}
8.4.3 Ethnic Groups

Chad has more than 200 distinct ethnic groups and despite attempts to impose a national identity, for most Chadians local or regional considerations remain the most important influence outside the immediate family. Accordingly, Chad's peoples may be classified according to the geographical region in which they live. In the south sedentary where peoples such as the Sara, the nation's main ethnic group live, the essential social unit is lineage. In the Sahel sedentary peoples live side-by-side with nomadic peoples, such as the Arabs, who are Chad’s second major ethnic group. The north is inhabited by nomads, mostly Toubous. Due
to the important role played by itinerant Arab traders and settled merchants in local communities Chadian Arabic has become a lingua franca.

8.4.4 Opération Épervier

The French have had a military mission in Chad named Épervier (Sparrow Hawk) that was established in February 1986. Its stated goal was to contain a Libyan invasion which was threatening the capital. However, the Libyan invasion united the various Chadian groupings as never before and they, with the considerable assistance of Épervier, defeated and repulsed the Libyans. French troops as part of Épervier have remained in Chad since then and they have consistently supported the Déby regime and been instrumental in maintaining his presidency during several Chadian revolts mounted against him.

8.4.5 Rebel Offensive January 2008

In October 2007 the Chadian government was forced to declare a state of emergency due to clashes in the eastern border regions of Ouaddi and Wadi Fira. On 26 November 2007 the media announced that clashes had resumed between the Chadian forces and those of the Union of Forces for Development and Democracy (UFDD). These were led by the alliance of Mahamat Noure, a former Defence Minister in the Débe government, the Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) under Timane Erdimi, who was also Débe’s former Chief of Staff, and a UFDD spin-off led by Abdelwahid Aboud. The group’s cohesion was based on its opposition to Débe. The first two leaders left his government and its militant groups include Gorane and Zaghawa, which made it a completely inter-ethnic coalition. On 8 January the Chadian Air Force attacked rebels operating between the camps of Goker and Wadi Radi, about 30 km inside Sudan. As a result the fighting in this area intensified. On 31 January 2008 rebel forces attacked and advanced all the way to N’Djamena, but were canalised by the narrow city streets. They were met by Débe’s troops at prepared strong points which were reinforced by Soviet era T55 tanks and consequently exposed to fire from Débe’s helicopter gunships, turning the tide of battle in Débe’s favour.

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268 Harvey, Dan. Peace-Enforces: The EU Military Intervention in Chad. Book Republic Pp 44

269 Ibid Pp 47
As the rebels neared N’Djamena the French government sent 150 troops from Gabon to reinforce Operation Épervier and proceeded to evacuate 881 foreign nationals of 27 nationalities. Épervier provided intelligence information and logistical support to Débé’s forces, including ferrying ammunition for the T55 tanks from Libya. On the second day of the battle in N’Djamena, the rebels opened another front in the town of Adre, near the Sudanese border with Darfur. Only the swift arrival of the Zaghawa rebel forces of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from the Sudanese border managed to shore up President Débé’s military position. However his political position was now compromised as he could no longer continue to claim he had no links with Zaghawa rebel groups acting against the Sudan.  

8.5 EUFOR Chad/CAR

One of the consequences of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur was the exodus of approximately 250,000 refugees from Darfur into eastern Chad. The refugee problem was further exacerbated by the presence of 185,000 internally displaced persons (IDP’s), resulting from internal Chadian armed conflict and inter-ethnic violence. It was in this context that the UK and France asked the UN DPKO to start planning an international multidimensional presence, which it did during the autumn of 2006 and early 2007. In the UN’s initial plan, its peacekeeping force to be called ‘MINURCAT’ was to have 10,900 personnel tasked with creating a safe and secure environment in the area in which the camps were located. Their remit was to carry out humanitarian tasks and train local Chadian police to guarantee minimal security in the camps. These plans were at an advanced stage when President Débe vetoed the military aspect of the MINURCAT plan thereby stalling the proposed military phase. However, the planning of the civilian aspect of MINURCAT proceeded including the scheme to train Chadian police for deployment in the refugee and IDP camps.

8.5.1 EU Initiative

When Nicholas Sarkozy won the French presidential election in May 2007 he appointed Bernard Kouchner, the founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, as his foreign minister. Maximising the credibility of his impeccable human rights credentials he set about placing

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270 Ibid, Pp 51
Darfur and the refugee crisis in eastern Chad back on the EU foreign policy agenda and the initial proposal to engage the EU in Chad was made by the French foreign affairs ministry on 21 May 2007. Kouchner met President Débe on 10 June 2007 where they agreed in principle to the deployment of an EU force with France taking a leading role. When Portugal took over the presidency from Germany in 2007, EU intervention planning could proceed: prior to that the Germans had been reluctant to take action. The EU planners eventually settled on supporting the activities of MINURCAT in order to protect the refugees in eastern Chad. France volunteered to be ‘Framework Nation’, and committed to providing 40% of the troops. In addition, it offered its Paris based Operational HQ to the EU force while the position of operational commander was offered to an EU participant other than France.

8.5.2 Force Generation

From the outset, force generation was problematic for EUFOR Chad/CAR. The battle-groups on standby in the first half of 2008 were the Nordic battle-group with Sweden as ‘Framework Nation’ and the Spanish battle-group. The Spanish army had a large commitment to UNIFIL in Lebanon at the time so the French sponsors of EUFOR were hopeful that the Nordic battle-group would play a prominent role:

But after a visit to the region in early September, it appears that Bildt announced that Sweden would not contribute the Battle Group or accept the position of operational commander, as the mission was more challenging than expected.

Genera Nash informed the author that “Carl Bildt went to Chad and had a major fallout with President Débe over human rights issues. The net result was, first, President Débe didn’t want Sweden and would not have a Swedish Operational commander, and second, Carl Bildt went totally cold on providing troops.”

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272 Helly Damian. EUFOR Tchad/RSA: ESDP The first 10 Years, Chapter 20, The EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) EU Institute for Security Studies 2009 P 340
274 Hylke, Dijkstra P 399
275 Nash, Pat. Lt Gen. in interview with the author April 2015
When it became obvious that EU member states were reluctant to engage in the Chad project, the French responded with a trawl of European capitals seeking other EU nations who might be prepared to contribute to the EU force:

Following the Military Strategic Options and Sweden’s rejection of the position of operational commander, the EU organised an informal force generation conference on 24 September. It proved to be very disappointing. Apart from France, very few states were willing to contribute personnel, and President Sarkozy had to call his counterparts in Europe. The position of operational commander was offered to Ireland during an informal meeting of defence ministers on 28-9 September. Ireland had so far been absent from the debates.  

The Irish defence forces were initially surprised by the decision of their Government to send a mechanised battalion to a country as inaccessible as Chad. However, as soon as they were directed to do so, DFHQ began planning the deployment and Lt Gen Pat Nash was nominated as the Operational Commander.

8.5.3 Planning Issues

The strategy that the Operational HQ adopted was for a ‘Bridging Mission’ in which the EU would deploy a peacekeeping force for twelve months which would then be taken over by a UN force. The mandate was threefold: (i) to contribute to protecting civilians in danger; (ii) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; (iii) to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensuring their security and freedom of movement.  

8.5.4 Critical enablers

The main problems for the operational commander in generating the force was the shortage of logistic and air assets, the absence of which would potentially jeopardised the entire enterprise. The commitment of many of the member states to ISAF in Afghanistan was certainly a contributing factor but the main reason was the refusal of many EU countries to participate, the UK and Germany in particular, was arguably that they considered EUFOR

276 Hylke, Dijkstra P 400

Chad/CAR as “a pet project in support of Franafrique”. The author asked General Nash whether the problem was EU countries commitment to ISAF or a French colonial issue, to which General Nash replied, “ISAF was used as the excuse; French Colonial was primarily the background to it.” Four generating conferences failed to garner enough air assets and the viability of the mission was under threat. At the fifth and final generating conference France was forced to make up most of the shortfalls and Russia made four helicopters available. At short notice Ireland also hired two tactical helicopters from the Ukraine. Following these efforts, the operational commander Gen Nash authorised the deployment despite the fact that the resources being made available to the mission were far less than had been originally planned:

I had no strategic reserve. I looked for the Battle-Group and I was refused point blank. The UK and Germany blocked it completely.

The common costs of the mission which are borne by all the EU member states were kept to an absolute minimum and were carefully monitored by the UK and Germany. Consequently, about 80% of the estimated €1 billion cost of the mission was borne by France who also provided more than half the force. However, the troop contributing nations had to bear the cost of deploying their own personnel and the setup costs to the Irish exchequer came to €57 million with the further annual running cost running to €16 million. The budget for the common costs amounted to €140 million and was used by the operational commander:

For the Operational headquarters, the Force headquarters and other extraneous matters to run these and to build infrastructure that troop contributing countries need to be in place before they deploy, in order for them to build their camps etc. In my case water was the big one and preparation of airfields.

8.5.5 The Operational Headquarters (OHQ)

The operational headquarters for EUFOR Chad/CAR was located in Mont Velérien near Paris. The Operational Commander was Lt Gen Pat Nash from Ireland who had a multinational staff of 148 personnel, 12 of whom were also Irish. In October 2007 the
Operational Commander formally received his mission following on from the political process. The EU adopted a “Joint Action”, an EU action equivalent to a UN Security Council Resolution. The OHQ staff then began working on the military planning documents and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was adopted on 12 November 2007. The Operation Plan (OPLAN) issued on 28 January 2008. The CONOPS outlined four phases over which the mission would be conducted; (1) Orientation, (2) Deployment, (3) Execution, and (4) Handover and Recovery.

Col Con McNamara held the appointment of DACOS Ops J3 in the EUFOR Chad/CAR Operational HQ in Paris from Oct 2007 until April 2009. During an interview conducted in February 2014 when the author asked, “How was the Irish involvement with EUFOR perceived by other EU countries?”, Col McNamara he responded at length:

The impact was very significant at two levels. At a strategic, political level, the commander was Irish…In my opinion, when he was appointed the French were delighted because they assumed they would run the operation… However, the European Union in Brussels insisted it was their operation. General Nash from Ireland was the operational commander and of course it was he who had the responsibility for the operation…We were very fortunate in that we had a very small Irish crew who were in key positions in the Operational HQ… I remember saying to General Nash at the time… “All the EU wanted, was for us to deliver a successful EU operation in Chad, nothing more”…So focusing on delivering that was the challenge. The French began to realise that the less they were seen to be running everything the better for France; that it was European and then they began to realise that this headquarters was working extremely well, was very effective and efficient and everything was happening the way it should happen. The Irish staff officers understood the concept of strategic planning because we had studied it in our C&S School. The Irish officers working there were better educated than many of the NATO officers, some of whom were not familiar with the procedures of how an OHQ should operate. So the Irish had a very strong influence both on the operational side and on the planning side in the OHQ and we were more than capable of balancing the French influence. In fact, because a lot of the reports were in English, we wrote them… So the Irish team working in the headquarters were a very significant influence throughout the whole area.  

8.5.6 Phase 2: Deployment

The EUFOR deployment began in February 2008 with Special Forces and Logistical Units leading the way into the mission area. The Special Forces were deployed into the Area of Operations to provide an initial capability and to provide situational awareness in the theatre

284 McNamara, Con. Colonel DACOS Ops J3 in the EUFOR Chad/CAR Operational HQ in Paris in interview with author in February 2014
of operations. They provided security for the Logistical Units, and additionally operated as small highly mobile Task Units to build up an operational and intelligence profile while EUFOR’s logistical deployment was on-going. Airstrip validation, intelligence gathering, liaison with NGO’s and International Organisations as well as local actors, route assessment, and security assessment, were among the numerous tasks which were undertaken during the early stages of the operation. Chad was a relatively underdeveloped country with only 500 km of paved roads concentrated around the capital N’Djamena. The rest of the vast country had only dirt tracks which were impassable in the rainy season. There were no railways, and as it is a landlocked country, there were also no seaports. Only two of its airports had paved runways. The airports in the capital of N’Djamena had a reasonably sized paved runway, while the runway of the other airport in Abéché was comparatively short.

For these reasons the EUFOR deployment presented considerable logistical problems for the planners. Equipment had to be shipped from Europe to Douala port in Cameroon, a distance of some 4,000km which took 15 days by sea. Supplies were unloaded in Douala where the EUFOR logisticians were mindful of the limitations of the port facilities in order to properly share them with the NGO freight that was also using the port. The supplies were brought by train to the Chadian border and then by road to N’Djamena. This journey of 2000km took 25 days. Here the supplies had to be ‘sequenced,’ as the work on the ground was systemised with each task broken down and supplies necessary to each task itemised. Supply containers were packed accordingly and transported in sequence. In addition, a balance between force construction materials and security had to be struck. From N’Djamena to the mission area was a further distance of 800km which took another 10 days on the unpaved roads. The total journey was almost 7,000 km from the bases in Europe to the mission area which took as much as 50 days for the freight to complete. EUFOR moved a total of 2,400 containers through Cameroon during the deployment phase and constructed six camps, four of which accommodated 600 persons. One camp in Abéché (Stars Camp) was built to accommodate 2000 persons. The camps enabled EUFOR to establish and maintain a permanent footprint within the area of operations. In addition, the camps provided accommodation for the MINURSAT police trainers who were co-located with EUFOR.

\[\text{Ibid}\]
\[\text{Mc Keown, Gary. Commandant. Commander of the Irish advance party into Chad in interview with author July 2014}\]
\[\text{Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Brochure published by EUFOR OHQ 2009}\]
The rear HQ was located in N’Djamena in Europe Camp which accommodated 600 persons and also served as the main logistic base for EUFOR. From here the strategic airlift from Europe and the land convoys from the sea port in Cameroon were handled. Stars Camp in Abéché was the location of the Forward HQ (FHQ) and the logistics staging post for the onward supply throughout the area of operations (AO). Because of the shortage of facilities EUFOR built two concrete aprons in the airports in N’Djamena and Abéché. Three forward bases were constructed in eastern Chad. In the Multinational Battalion north (MNB) a 600 person base was built in Iriba for the Polish contingent and a Croatian detachment who were responsible for providing security for the refugee camps which were predominantly in this area. In MNB Centre, a 600 person camp was built near the airstrip in Forchana for the French contingent and a Slovenian detachment as this area was a major avenue of approach for rebel activities and there were also large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in the area. In MNB South another 600 person base was built near the airstrip in Goz Beida for the Irish contingent and a Dutch detachment. In the Central African Republic a base was built for a Multinational Detachment in Biaro. In all cases EUFOR contractors constructed the horizontal build which consisted of perimeter berms and sewage dugouts. The vertical build was the national responsibility and this usually consisted of tentage and containerised buildings.

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285 Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Brochure published by EUFOR OHQ 2009
286 McNamara, Con. Colonel in interview with author February 2014
8.5.7 Phase 3: Execution

EUFOR had to adopt a deterrent posture and approach so as to discourage any potential spoilers by the threat of overwhelming military retaliation...EUFOR put in place serious information gathering agencies and equipment whilst generating a force of highly trained manoeuvrable troops with the necessary organic combat support and service support to operate in such a vast area with maximum effect...Deterrence was a key concept underpinning the operation.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Based on UN map N° 3788 Rev. 7.
EUFOR brought hi-tech European military technology to the mission area. The EUFOR planners sought to establish and maintain a high-tempo operational profile throughout the area of operations. This was achieved through use of multiple elements including satellite imagery, air and ground reconnaissance, special operations forces, human intelligence, and geographical and civil-military teams. EUFOR had direct access and priority tasking of the European satellite Helios which passed every three days. It provided visibility 50km inside Sudan and 50 kilometres inside eastern Chad. The analysis of the material provided intelligence on the location of different groupings and militias. Helios provided the facility to look into militia bases to identify the build-up of any forces and whether weapon systems were armed or unarmed. Theatre awareness was critical to the success of the mission and enabled EUFOR to direct its capabilities and capacity such as pre-positioning troops into potential trouble spots. Such activities made this mission very different from a typical UN peace-keeping undertaking.

Ground operations consisted of vigorous patrolling supported by reserve air, armour, medical, and command structure. Where and when the patrols operated was based on detailed analyses of the vast area of operations and consequently resources were focused on what was termed ‘Designated Areas of Interest (DAI’s). Throughout the operation, a system of comprehensive liaison with all parties was maintained and extensive information campaigns were undertaken to keep all the actors informed of EUFOR’s activities and intentions. The air operations, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), continuously provided the Commander with invaluable visibility of the theatre. Airplanes and the helicopters provided by France, Poland, Russia and Ireland were a key enabler for the successful accomplishment of the mission, particularly during the rainy season when land mobility was severely restricted. France also supplied Mirage jets for reconnaissance and close air support. Transport aircraft were supplied by France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, for use within Chad. In addition, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, made air transport available to EUFOR for the lift from Europe to the Chad.

8.5.8 Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

As outlined in previous chapters, there has been a persistent issue of mistrust between civilian organisations and military peacekeepers and EUFOR Chad/CAR was no different. The

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292 McNamara, Con. Colonel in interview with author February 2014
293 Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Brochure published by EUFOR OHQ 2009
European Commission tried to ensure some coordination in Chad between EUFOR and EU aid packages. To this end, €30 million was annually allocated to humanitarian aid to Sudanese Refugees and Chadian IDPs, €10 million to police training, €10 million to reconstruction, €25 million to internal security reform, and €28 million on penitentiary and judicial reform. However, there were some questions regarding Chad’s absorption capacity and its political readiness to embrace these programmes of reform. In addition to the issues of mistrust between the military and the humanitarian NGO’s there were also issues in relation to the level of cooperation and mistrust between the EU Commission personnel in Chad and EUFOR:

… The cooperation between ESDP and the European Commission has been disappointingly sub-optimal because of a combination of unfortunate factors. The delegation of the Commission partly shared some of the humanitarian community’s concerns regarding the role of EUFOR and, while in charge on supporting internal political dialogue, viewed the military operation with some mistrust. The strained relationship between the Force Commander and the EC Head of Delegation, who only started to cooperate at the very end of EUFOR’s mandate, did not favour coherence either.

EUFOR placed great importance in establishing positive connections with the local population, and succeeded in establishing a working relationship with seventy-one of the seventy seven NGO, humanitarian agencies, and international organisations, that were active in the area. However, this was not achieved without some difficulties:

We established contact with the NGO’s... Some, such as the UN agencies were willing to cooperate with us but a lot of the others weren’t... They refused to speak to us at any level... but during a crisis or an attack they complained that we weren’t giving them the protection that they wanted even though they hadn’t agree to the evacuation plans because they refused to engage... On the one hand they wanted to be completely independent and then, when there was a crisis they wanted us to come and pick them up and take them out.

Eventually coordination and cooperation with most of the NGO’s was achieved through weekly meetings, the organisation of joint convoys, and strong information-sharing channels through enhanced CIMIC teams who were tasked to establish an understanding of the EUFOR modus operandiamongst the humanitarian community. Through continuous dialogue

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294 Helly, Damian. P 343
295 Ibid P 347
296 McNamara, Con. Colonel in interview with author February 2014
and cooperation determined efforts were made to bring about a mutual understanding and acceptance of both the culture and focus differences of EUFOR and the humanitarian actors. Formalised arrangements were established for evacuation in emergencies and for the provision of additional security for specific events. EUFOR’s reconnaissance reports, surveys, and mapping of villages, were shared and proved to be of great significance in assisting both NGO and IOs to have greater visibility in these societies:

EUFOR used CIMIC to “develop a positive working relationship and establish an understanding amongst the humanitarian community of the modus operandi of EUFOR... developed good will by continuous dialogue, building cooperation to establish confidence, leading to formalised arrangements.”

Another major undertaking for EUFOR was the disposal of unexploded ordnance. The area of operations was littered with unexploded bombs (UXBs), a legacy of the on-going civil war in the area. EUFOR bomb disposal teams removed 350 UXBs.

8.5.9 The Rebel Attack on Goz Beida

On 14 June 2008 rebel groups mounted an attack on the town of Goz Beida and a period of intense fighting took place between the rebel forces and Chadian government forces. Throughout the fighting EUFOR forces deployed between the combatants and the refugee camps and escorted over 300 NGO personnel into the EUFOR compound where they sheltered until the conflict receded. Whilst EUFOR returned fire when fired upon, it did not participate in the fighting and scrupulously maintained impartiality throughout the conflict. The EUFOR actions were not immune from criticism. President Débe’s denigrated the EUFOR for its failure to assist ‘government forces’, and at one stage a spokesperson for UNHCR criticised EUFOR for not stopping the rebels from ransacking of the UNHCR offices. However, that comment was later withdrawn.

8.5.10 Policing issues in Chad

One of the main criticisms levelled at EUFOR was in relation to the appalling level of violence being perpetrated against the refugees and IDP’s in the camps, which mainly targeted women and children. It seemed to observers, especially the NGOs, that EUFOR was

297 Nash, Pat. Lt Gen. EUFOR Operational Commander in a lecture to the Irish Institute of European Affairs on 10 September 2009.
298 Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Brochure published by EUFOR OHQ 2009
299 McDaniel, Pat. Colonel Commander of Irish battalion in Chad in interview with author December 2014
turning a blind eye to what was nothing short of blatant and untrammelled human rights violations:

Once this multidimensional presence moved into deployment phase, it soon became clear that the UN police mission MINURCAT was much slower in becoming operational than EFOR. The delay in the deployment of the Chadian gendarmerie units was consequently even bigger. Small-scale violence and banditry that needed to be tackled by police units rather than EFOR’s attack helicopters thus continued even when EFOR was in place.\textsuperscript{300}

The problem for EUFOR was that their mandate specifically prohibited entering the camps. EUFOR was charged with providing a safe and secure environment outside the camps, whilst MINURCAT was tasked with deploying police trainers to eastern Chad to train a local Chadian police force to administer the rule of law in the camps. However, MINURCAT had encountered the problem generic to all UN police missions as discussed in Chapter 3.9; namely, the recruitment of international police personnel. It therefore took until October 2008 for the first 29 local police officers to be deployed to the camps. Progress was slow and it was not until five months following EFOR departed that 667 local police officers out of the proposed 850 were actually deployed.\textsuperscript{301}

The delay experienced by MINURCAT in deploying the local police in the camps had serious repercussions which EFOR could not ignore. Thus despite being specifically proscribed from entering the camps, as the only credible security force in the area, it had to take action. Gen Nash fully supported the Force Commander’s decision to intervene:

UN police experienced serious delays... tasked with security within the camps. EUFOR was specifically excluded from within camps... Spoilers noticed this and broke into small groups, 2-4 people... commenced common banditry... EUFOR being the only credible security force in the region was morally bound to intervene and did so, even though it was neither mandated nor structured to do so.\textsuperscript{302}


\textsuperscript{301}Dijkstra, Hylke. P 401

\textsuperscript{302}Nash, Pat. Lt Gen. EUFOR Operational Commander, quoted in Harvey, Dan. Peace Enforcers: The EU Military Intervention in Chad. Book Republic, Ireland. 2010
8.5.11 Phase 4: Handover and Recovery

As the handover date approached in early 2009 there were serious doubts that the timetable would be met. The UN did not get the political go-ahead until November 2008 and its force generation process experienced difficulties as the response from donor countries was poor. UN planners floated a proposal for an extension to the EUFOR mandate but the EU took a view that for the credibility of future EU bridging missions it was essential that the timetable for the EUFOR handover to MINURCAT was met. ‘The handover was considered a nightmare.’

We set up structures between our operational HQ and DPKO at the strategic level… The plan was to handover the bases that we had built to the UN. In addition, we had to handover contracts to the UN and in some cases they were unable to take over these contracts. We had to hand over the operation and the procedures to the UN, so there was quite a lot of coordination to be done. I was in charge of one of the teams that went to New York for the planning and when we arrived I found that there was no one there to meet us. I went to three different floors, into several offices to see if I could find the people who were supposed to meet us and I was literally asked: “what are you doing here?”… Eventually, on the second day, in the afternoon we succeeded in getting a team of the relevant players that we needed around a table. They looked at us kind of stone faced, as much as to say, where did all this come from? So we encountered a very real disjoint and the lesson learned is that if the EU ever gets involved with the UN again, transition planning at the outset is imperative.

Eventually, the handover was able to proceed on schedule because many of the EUFOR contingents agreed to transfer to MINURCAT and EUFOR agreed to provide logistical support for several months after its departure date. On 15 March 2009 the operation was formally handed over to the UN. As such they inherited a fully operational peacekeeping mission with six developed and protected military camps in close proximity to the Refugee and IDP camps, as well as over two thousand well-armed and experienced troops who fully apprehended their role in the country.

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303 Hylke Dijkstra P 396
304 McNamara, Con. Colonel in interview with the author February 2014
8.6 The Irish Deployment

8.6.1 The Political Debates on Ireland’s Participation in EUFOR Chad/CAR

Two debates were held in the Dáil prior to the participation of the Irish defence forces in EUFOR Chad/CAR. The first held on 9 October 2007 concerned the proposal by the Minister of Defence, Willy O’Dea, to ratify the appointment of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) Maj Gen Pat Nash to the position of Operational Commander of EUFOR Chad/CAR. The second, held on 28 November 2007, concerned the Minster for Defence’s further motion for the despatch of defence force personnel to EUFOR Chad/CAR. In both debates there was overwhelming support for the Irish participation in the mission with the exception of Sinn Fein which was ideologically opposed to EU military interventions as they hold the position that such interventions should be the sole preserve of the United Nations. The issues which came to the fore in the debates were a statement by the Minister of Defence to the effect that this EU mission was wholly in keeping with the Irish foreign policy commitment to collective security. The Minister also included the endorsement given to the EU mission by the UN Secretary General and the former Irish President, Mary Robinson and stated that the investment in the DF enhanced capability now made it possible for Ireland to participate in such a complex mission. Several speakers took the opportunity to voice concerns about French neo-colonial intentions and hoped that Irish participation might assuage claims of such intentions. Some disquiet was also expressed by several speakers regarding the fact that so many EU states had opted out of this mission and the implications of this for the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy.305

8.6.2 The Operational Issues

The decision by the Irish government to send a mechanised battalion to Chad caught the Irish military planners off guard. However, the general staff were more than happy to take up the challenge. As detailed in Chapter 4, the army had undergone a radical reorganisation following the 1998 ‘Good Friday Agreement’. From being a sprawling garrison force whose primary function was internal security The Irish army was now a smaller mobile force, equipped and trained for its new de facto primary function of international peacekeeping. The unprecedented political decision to take a leading role in the EU mission to Chad precipitated

a scramble to send planners from the operations, intelligence, and logistical sections of
DFHQ to Chad on a reconnaissance mission as soon as possible. On their return they had a
very short timeline to plan and prepare for the deployment.

EUFOR Chad/CAR proved to be the most expensive peacekeeping operation ever undertaken
by the Irish military, because unlike a UN mission where the costs are borne by New York
and are then levied against all the member states in accordance with their means, with EU
missions the bulk of the costs are borne by the contributing nation using the system known as
‘Costs lie where they fall’.

Moreover, the failure of several force generation conferences to
raise the required amount of troops and equipment to mount the operation forced the
contributing countries to commit more resources to the mission than originally planned, with
the bulk of the commitment falling to France.

The Irish logisticians had never faced such a daunting task. The mission area was 4,500km
from Dublin and 2,000 m from the nearest seaport. This was a brand new mission with
absolutely no facilities in place so everything had to be built from the ground up. The Irish
logisticians had faced a similar experience when they deployed to Liberia in 2003, but
Monrovia, where the Irish camp was built, was a coastal city and the materials could be
brought in by sea.

In EUFOR Chad/CAR the operational area was 2000km from the coast. Chad is an inland
country, requiring supplies to land in the Cameroon, to be brought by rail to the Chadian
border, and from there brought by truck to the mission area in Goz Beida. The DF initially
sent out an engineer unit and logisticians to build the Irish camp who were protected by Irish
Special Forces (Army Ranger Wing). This deployment and much of the equipment was
supplied by air using several Ukrainian Antonov aircraft flights at in excess of €400,000 per
flight. The setup cost to the Irish exchequer was €57 million with a projected annual cost of
€16 million. Each Irish unit rotated every four months. A total of three Irish units served in
EUFOR, with subsequent Irish units serving in the follow on UN mission, MINURCAT.

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306 Hylke, Dijkstra. The military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy
Bad Politics. International Peacekeeping 2010, 17(3): 396
307 Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights18/Feb/2009
When the 97th Irish Battalion deployed with the EU mission (EUFOR Chad/CAR) in June 2008 many of its personnel had cut their peacekeeping teeth in Lebanon from 1978-2000. However, while the UNIFIL peacekeeping experience was valuable it was not as useful as the experience gained in the more recent UN peace-enforcement mission in Liberia, UNMIL (Nov 2003-May 2007). The Irish battalions in UNIFIL had been a series of static, ground-holding peacekeeping units, operating under a Chapter 6 mandate. They were deployed in a relatively small area of operations amongst other UN contingents located on either side of them, and they came to the assistance of each other when required. The Irish Battalion in UNMIL on the other hand, was a mobile mechanised infantry battalion operating under a Chapter 7 peace-enforcement mandate that patrolled in strength over wide areas. The tactic of patrolling in strength was conceived in the knowledge that the patrols by their very nature would be isolated and operating alone in a country ravaged by war and in which thousands of armed persons still roamed. Consequently, the patrols sent out by Irish Batt in UNMIL projected significant military prowess in order to instil confidence in the civilian population that this force had the capabilities and willingness to impose and maintain the peace, to deter potential aggressors, and be capable of fighting and surviving if attacked.

When the first Irish battalion to serve in UNMIL (90th Irish Batt) was formed up to conduct its pre-deployment training they received operational, intelligence, administration and logistical briefings in the Military College. One of the most enlightening briefings was from a British officer, a member of the Royal Irish Regiment, who had been invited to the Curragh to brief the officers of the 90 Irish Batt on the experiences of the British army in Sierra Leone. He described one occasion in 2000, when a patrol of eleven Royal Irish Rangers accompanied by a Sierra Leone Liaison Officer, visited a UN Jordanian unit. On their return they diverted to investigate reports that a rebel group called the ‘West Side Boys’ had begun to disarm. However, the patrol was seized by the West Side Boys and held captive. The British army initially negotiated the release of five of the hostages but when negotiations to release the remainder were deemed not to be making progress and the British authorities had reasons to believe that their lives were in danger, the British army mounted a successful rescue using Special Forces and Paratroopers. The rescue mission resulted in one Special Forces soldier being killed in action and initially there were reports of twenty-five ‘West Side Boys’ being killed. However, a book published in 2010 claimed that up to 200 of these rebels
may have been killed.\textsuperscript{308} The rescue raid resulted in the disintegration of the ‘West Side Boys’ and significantly contributed to ending the Sierra Leone civil war.

The commanding officer of the 90 Irish Batt, Col Paddy Moran, was very mindful of the Royal Irish Regiment officer’s briefing and was also conscious of the Irish army’s own experience in Niemba, Congo, where in November 1960 an eleven man patrol who were repairing a bridge allowed a large number of Baluba tribesmen approach them. The tribesmen overwhelmed the Irish peacekeepers and killed nine of them. Also in the Congo, in September 1961, a company of Irish peacekeepers were cut off and attacked in the town of Jadotville by Katangese mercenaries and despite fighting valiantly for several days they ran out of supplies and had to surrender. Col Moran embraced the challenge but wanted to ensure that his troops had the capabilities and capacity to deal with any situation in which they might find themselves. He therefore made the decision that all patrols emanating from his camp would be at full company strength, with as many as 10 APC’s in each:

I decided to go at company strength at the word go because I was aware from my studies over the years that in certain situations in Africa the opposition, if you like to call them that, or the rebels can muster quite a number of people very quickly and I didn’t want to be outgunned or outmanoeuvred at any stage. I felt that the minimum I wanted to use was company strength, a unit that was capable of defending itself and doing its job and would also show the opposition a clear message…that we meant business and I felt that it was important that we sent out that signal.\textsuperscript{309}

The 90\textsuperscript{th} Irish Batt arrived in Monrovia in November 2003. A US marine contingent had departed two weeks previously and the Irish were the vanguard of the new UNMIL mission. They deployed into one camp, in the grounds of a once luxurious hotel in Monrovia which had been destroyed in the civil war. The location was tactically suitable with a river on one side and the sea on the other. They immediately began building the accommodation, workshops, offices and stores, all of which consisted of various forms of canvas. Within a week they began their patrolling routine, initially in Monrovia:

Control Monrovia and you controlled the situation. There were thousands of fighters all over Monrovia. Monrovia had to be dealt with. So we had 2 patrols daily protecting Monrovia, 24/7…Because you must remember that Monrovia was

\textsuperscript{308}Butcher, Tim \textit{Chasing the Devil} Published by Chatto & Windus  2010

\textsuperscript{309}Moran, Pat. Colonel in interview with author December 2014.
terrorised by all these fighters…they saw themselves as freedom fighters…but there was a lot of lawlessness, it was complete chaos, so we had to enforce peace and to do that we had very strong rules of engagement.\textsuperscript{310}

In addition to the patrols in Monrovia itself, medium range patrols of up to three days duration were deployed to within a 3 hour range of Monrovia. Long range patrols headed for the borders of the Ivory Coast, up to Guinea, and back down the other side along the Sierra Leone border. These long range patrols were conducted in a number of ways. As there was no metalled roads the armour wound its way on dirt tracks and on the way mapped the country. Initially, they had no maps so they had to make their own and brought their own cartographer with them. In addition, they had access to air operations including MI 8’s and MI 24’s helicopters and a big Russian armour carrying helicopter that had the capacity to lift 2 Mowags, one housed inside and the other slung onto the undercarriage. This projection of armoured forces where it had never been used before instilled confidence in the Liberian population that UNMIL was serious about enforcing the peace in the war torn country. Two and a half months into the trip Irish Batt was joined by a Swedish contingent whowerevery well equipped with CV 90’s, (30 tonne tracked armoured vehicles which packed considerable firepower).

Despite being an EU mission, the Irish Batt in Chad was heavily influenced by the successful methods of the UNMIL experience and from the outset all patrols departing camp in Goz Beida closely resembled the UNMIL deployment. As such, they travelled in company strength with as many as ten armoured vehicles carrying in excess of seventy personnel. The rules of engagement for the troops in Chad differed radically from UNIFIL which was a Chapter 6 mission, and more closely resembled the rules of engagement in Liberia (UNMIL) which was a UN Chapter 7 peace-enforcement mission. Consequently, the 97\textsuperscript{th} Irish Batt based their training and adopted the SOP’s and Tactical Aide Memoires (TAM’as) for junior leaders from UNMIL:

The Rules of Engagement have moved on from the Chapter 6 UNIFIL. Before we went to Chad we had the Chapter 7 peace-enforcing mission in Liberia and that was a useful staging post. That was peace-enforcing, there were threats from all the militias in Liberia, threats of child soldiers, there were all sorts of threats there. So there was a certain robustness that had already come from the ROE’s in Liberia and that was reflected in our SOP’s etc…we took the SOP’s from Liberia with us and we built on

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid
them…because the ones from Liberia were quite good and it was a useful staging post.\textsuperscript{311}

### 8.6.4 The Tactical Deployment in Chad

An advance party of the 97\textsuperscript{th} Irish Batt comprising mainly of engineers and logisticians and protected by Irish Special Forces were sent out to build the Irish camp in Goz Beida. The horizontal build consisting of the earthenware berm around the camp and the subterranean piping and ducts were constructed by contractors paid from the EU common costs budget. The vertical build consisting of everything above ground was built by the Irish advance party and paid for by the Irish exchequer:

A lot of personnel (in the advance party) had been to UNMIL such as engineers and logisticians. They had experience in packing containers so that they arrived and were unloaded in a planned sequence. The experience gained in Liberia was reflected in the smooth deployment in Chad.\textsuperscript{312}

The main party of the 97\textsuperscript{th} Irish Batt arrived in May 2007 and operated from the single camp in Goz Beida. This Irish EUFOR battalion was different from its predecessors. What was most interesting was that the intelligence section (S2) was responsible for monitoring and staying apprised of the activities of the actors in the area, which included government forces, government and religious officials, rebel activity, NGOs, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and any other groupings which may have had an influence on the situation in the area of operations. It had access to EU intelligence assets such as the intelligence sections in higher HQ’s, air photographs, Helios satellite imagery, and ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) assets in the battalion. Members of this section briefed all patrols leaving camp and debriefed them on their return. The CIMIC group was co-located with the intelligence section.

\textsuperscript{311} Mc Daniel, Pat. Colonel Commanding Officer 97 Irish Batt in interview with author 2 December 2014

\textsuperscript{312} Mc Keown, Garry. Commandant. Second in charge (2i/c) 97 Irish Batt and Officer in charge of the Advance party in an interview with the author July 2014
The operations section (S3) was responsible for coordinating and monitoring the activities of the operational companies and the movement of the logistics personnel when operating outside camp. As there were significant air assets available to the battalion a tactical close air support team was also attached to the operations section.

The air liaison section which was located in S3 comprised of Air Corps Officers and NCO’s. One of this team travelled with every operational patrol that left camp, including the Dutch patrols. They coordinated tactical close air support for the patrol and were landing point commanders for re-supply and air ambulance. The air assets available in EUFOR included Mirage F1 fighters, Gazelle helicopter equipped with TOW (Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided) missiles, Puma helicopters, MI 8 helicopters and MI 17 helicopters (Upgraded MI 8). In addition the air liaison team managed the Goz Beida airfield for EUFOR fixed-wing aircraft.

The Irish mechanised infantry company had twelve Mowag APC’s. The variants included an armoured ambulance, a CIS Mowag, a Command car, and the infantry APC’s. The company strength patrols also included a Scania recovery truck operated by fitters from the logistics
platoon. This company provided security in the camp and to the airfield when used by EU air
craft. In addition, this company patrolled the town of Goz Beida on a regular basis as it was
the principle town in the area, the location of a large refugee camp, and the centre where most
of the NGO’s were based.

The Irish reconnaissance company in addition to many of the above vehicles had CRV’s
(Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicles) which were equipped with weapons systems including
heavy machine guns and 203 grenade launchers. In addition, they had ISTAR assets such as
infra-red and night vision equipment. An artillery troop travelled in this company and their
equipment included audio radars, computer interdiction equipment, and 81mm long barreled
mortars with a range of 5 kilometres. This company was used for the long range patrols. A
sniper section with its surveillance and concealment assets was available to both companies.

The Dutch marine company was equipped with Viking APC’s. A member of the Irish tactical
air support team accompanied them on patrol. When questioned by the author, one such
officer remarked that he was struck by the difference in how the Dutch operated in
comparison to the Irish. In his opinion, the Dutch patrolled covertly whereas the Irish
patrolled overtly. The Dutch marines were on a deployment prior to going to Afghanistan and
they adopted a covert posture. They observed and recorded and tended to avoid contact with
others. Whereas, the Irish patrols sought people out, stopped whenever possible, and engaged
in conversation with civilians, NGO personnel, government troops, rebels and anyone who
would talk to them. All patrols made extensive use of helicopters for troop carrying, medevac
and logistic resupply. During the rainy season the helicopters were invaluable as the dirt
tracks turned into mud and made movement by road extremely difficult.

The Mowag APC’s and the Vikings proved to be very effective traversing the ground in
Chad. They provided security for their occupants and their manoeuvrability and firepower
impressed the various military actors in the area.

In the interview with Col McDaniel, the author discussed the fact that there has not been an
Irish Batt peacekeeper killed in action since UNIFIL 1999 despite the fact that Irish
peacekeepers have participated in peace-enforcement missions with NATO in Kosovo, the
UN in Liberia and the EU in Chad. Col McDaniel was of the opinion that strong mandates,
robust deployments, and highly trained and well-equipped peacekeepers have been major
contributing factors to the success of the missions and lack of casualties:
We haven’t lost anyone killed in action since Lebanon (1999) and I think that is down to our training and our kit. I think the kit is much better. It is a force protection issue and force protection is not just armour, its doctrine, its drills, its training, its attitude, it’s the kit you have. For instance if you have a very large weapon on the weapon system, that’s force protection. That intimidates the others and keeps them away it’s a lot of things and I would think it’s because we have the kit and we really are much better trained now.\textsuperscript{313}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{Irish Army Mowag, Piranha APC (Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicle, Variant)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{313} Mc Daniel, Pat. Colonel. Commanding Officer 97 Irish Batt in interview with author 2 December 2014
In the Irish Batt EUFOR the monitoring of decisions relating to the degree of force needing to be used in any given situation was delegated to the commander on the ground. The battalion commander was conscious that his patrols were by their very nature so isolated, that it would be impossible of provide timely assistance to any patrol which encountered difficulties. They would have to fend for themselves:

The commander on the ground made the calls and that was it, there was no question of any other thing…one of the major difference with UNIFIL was, there you were all part of a network of other battalions etc. and so you had a reserve to call on, a force reserve, a battalion, other units very close to you and you could take these people in. We were on our own in Goz Beida there was no reserve, nobody was coming over the hill, and we were there by ourselves.  

When Irish Batt landed in Chad they were somewhat taken aback by what they found. They had been briefed that they were there to protect the Refugee and IDP camps in Chad from raids by Janjaweed and other groupings which came across the border from Sudan. However, by the time that Irish Batt had deployed in May 2008 these raids had stopped and the problems which confronted them were ones that they were not mandated to resolve:

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314 Ibid
The mandate was agreed in September 2007 it was set up because the difficulty at the time was the Janjaweed would raid refugee camps and IDP settlements and conduct killing, rape etc. and our mandate was put together to deal with this issue. We eventually took the ground in May 2008 which was eight or nine months later to find that the situation had changed in that the Janjaweed were no longer actually operating in the area and more of a threat came from bandits and from rebels. Now these bandits may be government soldiers who take off their uniform rob and pillage and put back on the uniform...We arrived out to a particular mission and the mandate wasn’t exactly what we expected and it was not totally suitable. So taking what we could from the mandate we then knew that it was to protect refugees and IDP’s …but also to protect all the actors in the area whether it be Chadian citizens and … NGO workers to ensure that they were also safe and that eventually developed to probably be the most important part and so that was the main mission which given the operational area we had etc. was a formidable task.315

Within a week of becoming operational there was a major rebel offensive in the Goz Beida area. EUFOR’s role was to protect the Refugee and IDP camps and as the rebels avoided these camps EUFOR remained impartial and did nothing to impede the rival government and rebel forces. President Débe was annoyed by this, but EUFOR’s impartial stance served to distinguish it from the French military mission (Épervier) which routinely went to Débe’s assistance.

8.6.5. Irish CIMIC

The CIMIC activities of Irish Batt in Chad were completely different from previous Irish overseas deployments. The main reason for this was that EUFOR was deployed to protect refugee and IDP camps from raids by armed groups. The fact that there were Refugee and IDP camps meant that there were large numbers of NGOs operation in the area and consequently, no need for Irish Batt to get involved in humanitarian activities. Indeed Irish Batt in EUFOR had no CIMIC budget whatsoever. Consequently, the CIMIC section within Irish Batt was tasked with establishing contact and liaising with the actors in the area, particularly the NGOs, and the civilian and religious leaders including the governor and the sultan. This role was very similar to that conducted by the Liaison Monitoring Teams in KFOR. The battalion commander adopted the traditional NATO view that CIMIC was a tool to assist him in carrying out his mission:

315 Ibid
To me the job of CIMIC is to support the mission. That’s it. If it’s not supporting the mission it a waste. The NGO’s were fiercely determined that the CIMIC would not come into their space. CIMIC was crucial because a lot of our information would come through CIMIC and our relationships were built through CIMIC. Again it’s about building relationships with all the actors in the region and CIMIC was the way we would do this.  

When they first deployed the Irish Batt patrols reported a reluctance from actors in the region to engage with them. It soon became apparent that the actors did not initially differentiate between EUFOR and the French Épervier troops. The fact that the largest contingent in EUFOR was French made this all the more difficult. It took some time for the Irish to build up a relationship with the various actors and to establish that EUFOR had a different strategy and aims to the French Épervier mission. The NGOs were deeply suspicious of EUFOR’s intentions and made it perfectly clear that they did not want EUFOR CIMIC units trespassing on their domain. They also fiercely resisted what they perceived as attempts by EUFOR to coordinate the NGO activities or control their movement:

We were viewed with deep suspicion by the NGO’s and most of the actors in the area. It didn’t take long before we found out why. They believed that we were just agents of the French and there was a deep distrust of the French and exactly what their motives were. So we were viewed very much with suspicion and it took sometime before we were accepted. We were well accepted by the end of it.

8.6.6 Helicopter Issue

Despite the experience of UNMIL the deployment to Chad proved an additional learning curve for the Irish logisticians and several lessons were learnt. One issue that received widespread media coverage related to the use of the tactical helicopters. Irish peacekeepers had never had the luxury of organic tactical air support as the chronically underfunded Irish Air Corps had never had the capacity to deploy tactical aircraft on peacekeeping missions. As such, the tactical aircraft which Irish peacekeepers use was usually provided by other countries. However, the failure of the force generation conferences for EUFOR Chad/CAR to provide the enablers required for the mission was particularly acute in relation to tactical air support:

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316 Ibid
317 McDaniel, Pat. Colonel
I had great difficulty getting helicopters and when I did I only had enough for logistical support and medi-vac. I had none for operational activity.\textsuperscript{318}

The Irish planners decided that tactical helicopters were essential to enable the Irish peacekeepers to perform their tasks, especially during the rainy season which renders Chad’s network of dirt roads impassable and would greatly limit the scope for long-range patrols in wheeled vehicles. The military planners in Dublin decided that Ireland had no choice but to hire ‘choppers’. The Department of Defence officials advised adherence to the long and torturously detailed tender process but the military logisticians, all of whom had peacekeeping experience, knew that the timeline for the tendering process would mean that the helicopters would not be available to the peacekeepers in time for the rainy season. The Antonov contract which brought the Irish equipment to Chad had been placed with a UK-based company, Air Partner Commercial Jets, following the normal tendering process. The military logisticians sourced the Mi-8T helicopters with the same company and the choppers became operational in July 2008.\textsuperscript{319} However, some of the Dutch peacekeepers that were co-deployed with the Irish were uncomfortable about using soviet era equipment and upon making enquiries about the contract, discovered that Air Partner Commercial Jets had provided civilian certification for the aircraft. Civilian certification requires that the seats face forward and must have a toilet on board. The MI-8T helicopters were configured militarily, and were therefore empty in the central area for the carriage of stores and equipment with seating around the sides for troops.\textsuperscript{320} The story was leaked to the press and a furore erupted in Dublin. The Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Dermot Earley, was forced to apologise to the Minister for Defence, Willie O'Dea, for placing him in a "difficult position" after it was discovered that the two helicopters hired for €2.4m in Chad to carry Irish troops, were not actually certified to ferry personnel. In a report sent to the minister, Lt Gen Early cited “miscommunication in the military chain of command” and an “excess of zeal” to procure the helicopters as the reasons for the oversight. He added that the need to ensure air transport was in place before the onset of the rainy season in Chad had added to the haste.\textsuperscript{321} The Minister of Defence addressed the Dáil in response to a grilling from the opposition:

“When we joined the EUFOR mission our understanding was that our partners in the EUFOR mission would supply the requisite air support, and we literally found

\textsuperscript{318} Nash, Pat. Lt Gen in interview with author in April 2015
\textsuperscript{319} Authors conversations with DFHQ staff officers 2008
\textsuperscript{320} Authors conversation with members of 90 Irish Battalion 2008
\textsuperscript{321} Reilly,Jerome. – Irish Independent 07 DECEMBER 2008
ourselves let down at the last minute. I am not saying things were done right because there was a rush, but this may explain the reason things were not done right. The people involved in this have put their hands up. The internal report conducted by my Department was reinforced by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report and found that there was fault in the way the contract was placed. We admit that and we regret it. The Chief of Staff wrote to me apologising for what happened…Pending the resolution of the matter, the helicopters were restricted to cargo transport only for a period of time. The certification matter was resolved when the company replaced the helicopters with two other helicopters, which were appropriately certified, at no additional cost to the Department. The new helicopters became operational in January 2009”.

8.7 Conclusion

When the Irish government responded positively in 2007 to the French diplomatic initiative to send an EU peacekeeping mission into Chad the Irish military authorities were somewhat taken by surprise but were pleased to accept the challenge and the opportunity it presented to test the effectiveness of the reorganised and newly equipped Irish army. Since the signing of ‘the Good Friday Agreement’ in 1998 the army had been extensively reconfigured and expensively re-equipped. Thus Chad, 4000km from Europe and 2000km from the coast would test the military planners, logisticians, and operational troops, as no previous peacekeeping mission ever had. The operational command was the most senior command ever undertaken by an Irish army officer and presented both he and his senior Irish staff officers with new and exigent opportunities at the highest international military level. The year 2007 was the pinnacle of the Celtic Tiger economy with revenues from the property bubble swelling the Irish exchequer. At that time therefore, prospects of the €57 million set up costs and the projected €16 annual running costs did not deter the Irish government.

In fact, the Irish government and its agencies enthusiastically embraced the French initiative to deploy an EU peacekeeping force into an area of Africa ravaged by war in order to alleviate the humanitarian disaster unfolding there. The Dáil reports show cross-party support with only Sinn Fein objecting. However, very few other European Union nations were prepared to participate and many of those who did provided mere token contributions. Conspicuous by their absence were the United Kingdom and Germany, and the viability of the much vaunted ‘EU Battle Groups’ was brought into question when the 2008 Battle Groups led by Spain and Sweden who were supposedly on standby, were not made available.

322 Dail Report 42329/09
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from November 2003 to May 2007 had marked a fundamental change in Irish peacekeeping policy and practice. The deployment and sustainment of an Irish peace-enforcement mechanised battalion into Africa posed difficult challenges to Irish logisticians and the operational posture adopted was the most robust ever by the Irish peacekeepers. As we saw in Chapter 8 Kosovo, KFOR was the first deployment of an Irish mechanised unit on a peace-enforcement mission and many valuable lessons were learnt in terms of command and control of a multi-national mechanised force, the deployment of mechanised unit, the logistical challenge of building, and maintaining a military facility, with the costs falling to the Irish exchequer in the NATO ‘Costs lie where they fall’ system. However, when this Irish unit arrived there, Kosovo was in a post-conflict stage and the mission did not expose the Irish peacekeepers to the dangers of peace-enforcement in a hostile environment. Liberia and UNMIL was potentially far more dangerous and challenging. The Irish peacekeepers were the rapid reaction force for UNMIL and had to be prepared to go to the assistance of any of the other contingents should trouble arise. In addition, they had to build a camp from the ground up, conduct 24/7 patrols in Monrovia, medium range patrols up-country lasting three days, and long range patrols throughout Liberia lasting six days. Meanwhile, the staff officers of the unit drafted the Standard Operational Procedures (SOP’s), Tactical Aid Memoirs (TAM’s), Routine Orders, and other written instructions which were adopted and improved upon by succeeding battalions. The success of the UNMIL mission was such that the Commanding officer of the first Irish Batt (97 Irish Batt) to deploy in EUFOR Chad/CAR adopted the UNMIL SOP’s and the tactic of patrolling in strength.

The deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR was a considerable achievement considering the lamentable response by EU member states at the five force generating conferences. It quickly emerged that EUFOR was not really an EU initiative, but rather a French matter with which most EU states declined to seriously engage. The deployment of EUFOR would have been impossible without the disproportionate French contribution and calls into the question the willingness of the EU to mount a credible peacekeeping mission without France as the framework nation and lead logistic nation.

From a diplomatic perspective, Ireland once again showed its willingness to play its role in regulating the international environment and responding to initiatives of both the United
Nations and Regional Organisations. EUFOR Chad/CAR would not have been possible without the substantial French commitment. However, the Irish operational commander, General Nash, also played a pivotal role in the deployment and success of the mission.

For the Irish contingent, the deployment could not have been possible prior to the restructuring of the defence forces. Kosovo was the first deployment by the Irish defence forces of a mechanised infantry unit and valuable lessons were learned and built upon. This experience was enhanced in Liberia where the logistical deployment and sustainment of a mechanised unit in West-Africa posed many challenges which were met. The success of the operational posture adopted in the Liberian peace-enforcement mission was such that it became a template for future peace-enforcement missions. The Chad mission proved to be an even greater logistical challenge as the area of operations was 4,000km from Europe and 2,000km from the coast. The reorganisation of the defence forces and the experiences gained in Kosovo and Liberia enabled the successful deployment of Irish peacekeepers into Chad.

Lessons were learned and in many aspects EUFOR Chad/CAR was a major success. It deployed on time and achieved its objectives, limited though they may have been. It provided a template as a bridging-mission for future international peacekeeping operations. The UN does not maintain a standby force and as a result of the EUFOR experience an EU bridging force has emerged as a viable option for launching a UN peacekeeping operation. In addition, rehatting EUFOR contingents also greatly assisted the generation of the follow-on United Nations peace-enforcement mission, MINURCAT. From a political perspective, the experience in Chad has shown that host government consent for the bridging-mission and the follow-on UN PKO is a prerequisite for deploying an EU operation. The political situation in Europe is such that for the deployment of an EU force, the exit strategy has to be based on the ‘End Date’ principle rather than the ‘End State’ principle which development and humanitarian actors would prefer. Many NGOs and commentators expressed disappointment that the political objectives of EUFOR Chad/CAR were solimited as they ideally sought an EU mission that could engage with such nation-building objectives as a change in governance structures, the delivery of public services, the distribution of wealth, and transparency in oil revenues. EUFOR’s ‘End-Date’ strategy excluded the above and Gen Nash ensured that

his public relations section managed expectations in order to avoid EUFOR being accused of having failed to meet overly ambitious political objectives:

> A safe and secure environment meant different things to different actors…EUFOR was challenged to be neutral in dealing with stakeholders and impartial in the conduct of the operation.\textsuperscript{324}

The CIMIC assets were used predominantly in a liaison-monitoring function and played a very important role in enabling EUFOR to perform its tasks in the mission area. Once again the military found it difficult to work with the humanitarian actors who by their very nature find the military ethos an anathema. It was felt that it would be more fruitful for future EU missions to engage more with development agencies than humanitarian agencies.\textsuperscript{325}

Despite its limitations EUFOR Chad /CAR proved to be highly instructive in the deployment of EU peacekeeping missions and has provided the UN with an alternative option for launching a peacekeeping operation. For the Irish military it proved to be a further valuable learning experience and its success is evident in the endorsement of the restructured strategy adopted by the Department of Defence and DFHQ. Prior to such restructuring and re-equipping the Irish army would not have had the resources necessary to participate in such a high-tech peacekeeping operation.

The lack of participation by most EU countries seriously questions the viability of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). There is a serious commitment-capabilities gap in the EU. The deficiencies were identified as far back as the Bosnian civil war and the Kosovo crisis. EU planners have recommended several initiatives starting with the European Rapid Reaction Force but its concept of having 60,000 troops ready to deploy in one month and sustain itself for up to one year proved to be too ambitious. The subsequent proposal for a scaled down ‘Battle-Group’ of 1,500 on standby to deploy for six months seemed far more achievable. However, a Battle-Group has yet to be deployed and the EU is finding it increasingly difficult to induce lead nations even to go on standby.

**How does the evidence in this chapter help to answer our two key research questions?**

\textsuperscript{324} Nash, Pat. Lt Gen. EUFOR Operational Commander in a lecture to the Irish Institute of European Affairs on 10 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{325} See EUFOR Chad /CAR Lessons Learned’ Appendix 3 attached.
With respect to our first question, regarding the impact of doctrinal changes on Irish peacekeeping policy and practice, the Chad case offers three key insights.

First, as was becoming increasingly evident in Kosovo, Irish peacekeeping has become organised around the peace-enforcement model and Irish peacekeepers have acquired the capabilities and material to participate in peace-enforcement operations. However, this case study illustrated that the psyche of Irish peacekeeping remains relatively unaltered, notwithstanding the technology of peace-enforcement. In UNMIL it is clear that despite the robust patrolling posture, the tradition of engaging with the local population in a humane way, and the provision of philanthropic assistance for altruistic reasons remained. In Chad the Irish peacekeepers did not provide humanitarian assistance as in this case such efforts were understood to be the preserve of the NGOs and the UN aid agencies. Nevertheless, the Irish CIMIC teams were instrumental in overcoming the initial suspicion and antipathy of the actors in Chad towards EUFOR. In other words, Irish peacekeeping strategies remain a hybrid of traditional and post 1990 doctrines.

Secondly, commitment, though, to a peace enforcement model has arguably been strengthened by the Irish engagement with the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). With respect to Chad, Ireland made a significant military, diplomatic, and financial contribution to the implementation of this policy. Despite the reluctance of many European states to participate in EUFOR Chad/CAR which they viewed as ‘Franafrique’, the Irish government demonstrated its willingness to join forces with the French, partly as a consequence of Irish political positioning alongside the French in EU politics, and, indeed, the conspicuous role Irish officers played at the command level brought legitimacy to a mission widely perceived to be French-led. The deployment of Irish peacekeepers in Chad represented a deepening of Irish commitment to CSDP. With the command of the Operational HQ in Paris, the extent of the deployment on the ground in Chad, and accepting a considerable financial burden, this commitment to EUFOR Chad/CAR showed that the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy had a significant effect on Irish peacekeeping policy and practice. Involvement in a European-Union sponsored undertaking also arguably enabled a level of material support for this mission, in terms of equipment and deployment and intelligence gathering, which permitted enforcement style ‘deterrence’ operations well beyond the scope of what is normally resourced in UN led peace missions.
That said, in this case study had shown that the policy and practices adopted by the Irish peacekeepers in EUFOR Chad/CAR were greatly influenced by those of UNMIL, the UN mission in Liberia. This case study further confirms that Irish peacekeepers adopt the same policies and practices for peacekeeping with the UN and Regional Organisations. Any differences between missions are dictated by the tactical situation on the ground rather than policy. Most significantly, it has also been shown that Irish peacekeepers serving in the EUFOR/ Chad operation were willing to change hats and continue their work under MINURCAT command.

Thirdly, with respect to the impact of doctrinal change on Irish peacekeeping, a case can be made that engagement in the Chad mission may represent a step away from the more strict norms of traditional Irish neutrality. It could be argued that the continued participation of Irish peacekeepers in international peacekeeping operations since 1960 is proof that despite being militarily neutral Ireland is far from isolationist. The scale and cost of the Irish deployment to EUFOR Chad/CAR provided further evidence of Ireland’s commitment to the regulation of the international environment. Ireland has participated in peacekeeping operations with the United Nations, NATO’s PfP, the European Union, and the Organisation for Peace and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Thus whilst Ireland maintains an ostensible policy of refusing to join organisations which have mutual defence pacts, it has never been isolationist and holds to a tradition of peacekeeping which was undertaken to ensure that the rights and interests of the least powerful are protected and guaranteed. But as was made very evident in the political debates that took place in Ireland in response to the government’s decision to support the Chad mission, this flexible understanding of the implications of Irish neutrality is not shared across the political spectrum. Moreover, several other European countries held back from an undertaking which they understood to be unduly shaped by French geo-strategic concerns. Arguably then, Irish involvement in Chad can be interpreted as arising from Irish foreign policy interests connected with its European diplomatic alignments. The chapter has cited several senior Irish officers who were quite ready to acknowledge the French geo-strategic preoccupations that prompted EUFOR Chad/CAR.

The Chad case study also helps us to understand why Ireland continues to commit itself to a strong presence in international peacekeeping, in contrast to the more general trend of disengagement from such undertakings by other Western countries. In this respect, there has
been an evident shift in the foreign policy embodied in peacekeeping since Katsumi Ishikuza’s overview.

Firstly, as the experiences recounted in this chapter underscore, the Irish military has benefited enormously from its participation in international peacekeeping operations, such as the Chad mission, a development that was beginning to be evident when Ishikuza undertook his exploration of Irish motivations in peacekeeping. Had it remained in-country and confined to a gendarmerie role of assisting the police it would not have the capabilities and capacities that were in evidence in the deployment to EUFOR Chad/CAR. Irish army officers are quite overt in their enthusiasm for such operations and indeed their preference for EU-led undertakings. Many of the Irish army officers interviewed in the course of the case studies, including General Nash, expressed a preference for participation in regional organisations as they believe them to be better structured, equipped, and managed, than their UN counterparts. They also contend that EU missions are less liable to political vagaries and being micromanaged by civilian bureaucrats.

The Irish army then, has an institutional or corporate interest in participation in peace enforcement. Indeed without such engagements it would long ago have been reduced to a very limited domestic range of functions relating to internal security and ceremonial occasions. However, as has been noted throughout this thesis, Ireland’s contribution to United Nations operations is a source of patriotic pride and generally politically popular. As was noticeable in the debates engendered at the time of Chad mission, the Irish public maintain a preference for UN peacekeeping operations as do the Departments of Finance and Defence, as unlike EU arrangements, the UN finances missions by levying the cost across all member states whereas the cost of missions conducted by regional organisations are born by the respective troop contributing countries. In effect, for a government which struggles to fund its defence establishment, UN peacekeeping supplies key resources as well as opportunities for operational experience for its soldiers.
Chapter 9: Conclusions

This thesis addresses two key questions:

*How have changes in doctrine since end of Cold War affected Irish peacekeeping policy and practice?*

*Why, in the light of more general disengagement by Western countries from peace keeping, has Ireland continued to commit to a strong presence in international peacekeeping?*

**Summary**

Peacekeeping has been an integral part of Irish foreign policy since Ireland joined the United Nations in 1955. To reiterate Brian Cowan quote from Chapter 4:

> Peacekeeping is an integral element of how we see ourselves in the world.

Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 clearly show that during the early decades of the new state, Irish foreign policy was preoccupied with establishing its independence from the United Kingdom and sought to define the status of the state within the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations and internationally articulate the state position in relation to the issue of partition.

For the following two decades Ireland became somewhat inward-looking focusing on issues of citizen protection and national well-being. This period also saw great infrastructural advances with the roll-out of electrification and slum clearance programmes. However, the protectionist economic policies adopted by successive Irish governments throughout this period resulted in industrial stagnation and an economic war with the United Kingdom which

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326 Cowen, Brian. TD. Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Irish Times 18-11-2000 Cited in Chapter 4 Irish Peacekeeping, Paragraph 4.6.3

was disastrous for the Irish economy and resulted in mass emigration. The decision to remain neutral in World War II which came just seventeen years after independence was a continuation of this inward-looking policy and was strongly influenced by an antipathy towards the United Kingdom. While remaining neutral during World War II spared Ireland from the horrors and destruction of war it nevertheless resulted in diplomatic isolation and economic stagnation as Ireland lost the opportunities afforded by the post-war reconstruction boom throughout Europe. This resulted in yet more mass emigration.

In 1955 Ireland joined the United Nations and this marked the beginning of a seismic change in Irish foreign policy as Ireland became more outward-looking and sought to be ‘global good-Samaritans’ and ‘an international good citizen.’ The then Irish Foreign Minister, Frank Aiken, seized the opportunity to create a distinct Irish foreign policy position in the world body. As discussed in Chapter 4, in this way Ireland carved out a niche for itself in foreign policies and was to the fore in such issues as de-colonisation, nuclear non-proliferation, and international peacekeeping.

As explained in Chapter 4, Ireland eagerly embraced the invitation to partake in United Nations peacekeeping operations and from 1960 until 1990 Ireland held an influential position disproportionate to its size and capabilities, as successive Secretaries General sought neutral, non-aligned, middle-powers to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Throughout this period Ireland was fully committed to the concept of ‘Traditional Peacekeeping’ operations as is evident from the Lebanon case study. Ireland steadfastly maintained this commitment to ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping despite the deaths of Irish peacekeepers in April 1980. At a conference of troop contributing countries held in Dublin after that outrage, Ireland still affirmed its confidence in the United Nations to take diplomatic action.

The Security Council condemns all those who share in the responsibility for this outrageous act. The council reaffirms its intention to take such determined action as

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the situation calls for, to enable UNIFIL take immediate and total control of its entire area of operations.\textsuperscript{329}

However, as was also clear from the Lebanon case study the United States of America did not support the intended ‘determined action’ and consequently the Security Council took no action. As a result, the peacekeepers of UNIFIL were left to fend for themselves.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 saw a realignment of the international security situation which resulted in an upsurge of ethnic, nationalist, religious, and other forms of identity conflict to which the United Nations attempted to respond. But by the end of the 1990s it had become painfully obvious that the United Nations model of ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping was no longer fit for purpose. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the turmoil and soul-searching as the United Nations sought to come to grips with the problems presenting themselves, beginning with the Secretary Generals ‘Agenda for Peace’ (1992) and followed by several other reviews including the ‘Brahimi Report’ (2000) and Responsibility to Protect (2001). This thesis has shown that political consensus proved to be elusive and that it was the ‘middle powers’ who emerged as the bulwark of ‘Traditional Peacekeeping’ during the Cold War period have more or less withdrawn from United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, Ireland has steadfastly maintained its commitment to the United Nations in addition to giving strong support to ‘Regional Organisations’.

Chapter 4 charted the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice from 1955 to 2016. It showed that membership of the European Union widened the scope and breath of Irish foreign policy resulting in a change of the policy for Irish peacekeeping, and with legislative change in 1993 paving the way for Irish peacekeepers to participate in peace-enforcement missions. This was followed in 1996 with the\textit{White Paper on Foreign Policy} establishing peace-enforcement with the UN and Regional Organisations as a policy position. The\textit{Defence White Paper 2000} made a commitment to provide the defence forces with the capabilities and capacities to participate in peace-enforcement operations and the\textit{Defence White Paper 2015} also commits to continuing this support for Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations by renewing and upgrading defence capabilities and capacities.

\textsuperscript{329} United Nations Document S/13900 f 18/4/80 AND SCOR 2217 Mtg Para 15, 18/4/80 Cited in Chapter 6 the Lebanon case study paragraph 6.9.1
This thesis has traced the evolution of Irish peacekeeping practice in the Lebanon case study which began as a Cold War ‘Traditional Peacekeeping’ mission in 1978. It discussed the ways in which the Irish peacekeepers coped with the fluctuating security situation in Lebanon over a protracted period. The Côte d’Ivoire case study provided an insight into observer missions which are compact and can be established quickly in post-Cold War situations. Ireland actively participates in observer missions and has contributed to over fifty observer missions since 1958. The Kosovo case study charted the move by the Irish defence forces into peace-enforcement operations with ‘Regional Organisations.’ The study showed that in 2003, Ireland was for the first time able to deploy the assets that are necessary for peace-enforcement operations. It also detailed how, paradoxically in Kosovo, the Irish peacekeepers amongst the other European neutrals Finland and Sweden, successfully tackled the civil riots in March 2004 when the NATO member states were adjudged to have been found wanting.

The Chad Case study provides tangible evidence that the reorganisation had provided the Irish defence forces with the capabilities and capacities to operate in hi-tempo peace-enforcement operations with the United Nations and Regional Organisations. It is clear that when in Liberia that the Irish peacekeepers in UNMIL deployed robustly and their assets provided such overwhelming firepower that spoilers were persuaded to desist from their previous activities. The Liberian deployment proved so successful that the commander of the first Irish contingent to deploy with EUFOR Chad/CAR adopted the tactics used in UNMIL and again, they were very successful in deterring spoilers. The most notable point of the Chad deployment was the ability of Irish logisticians to deploy and sustain a mechanised battalion into one of the most remote and inhospitable areas in the world. This was confirmation that the Irish defence forces had developed the capacity and capabilities to deploy and sustain such a mechanised infantry battalion anywhere in the world.

The transition of the Irish defence forces from a traditional peacekeeping posture to a peace-enforcement posture has enabled it to build capabilities that allow it to participate in peace-enforcement operations with ‘Regional Organisations’. This has not detracted from Ireland’s commitment to the United Nations; on the contrary, the United Nations now needscountries like Ireland who are willing and able to provide hi-tech peacekeepers to be force-multipliers in its peacekeeping missions:

The contemporary challenge confronting the UN is not simply attracting the right number of uniformed peacekeepers. Indeed, UN officials report that they are often
able to recruit sufficient numbers of basic infantry soldiers for their missions. The challenge lies in recruiting the right sort of personnel and force-multiplier capabilities.

Let me assure you that Ireland’s participation in EU military and civilian missions is fully compatible with its traditional support of the United Nations. This is not a zero-sum game in which more support for one institution means less for the other. We are in this together.

As was made clear from the Chad case study Ireland provided such a unit with force-multiplier capabilities to UNMIL in Liberia from 2003 to 2007, again to the EU in Chad 2008 to 2009, and to the UN force in Chad MINURCAT from 2009 to 2010. In Lebanon Ireland provided a mechanised infantry battalion to UNIFIL both in 2006 and again from 2011 to the time of writing (2016). In 2013 Ireland was the only European country willing to contribute to the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights between Syrian and Israeli forces.

This thesis has shown that changes in peacekeeping doctrine gradually affected Irish peacekeeping policy and practice over a protracted period of time. This slow change occurred despite widespread recognition among officers with peacekeeping experience that the traditional approach was not viable in many of the settings in which Irish solders were deployed. As previously noted, Ireland remained strongly committed to traditional peacekeeping approaches through the 1980s and this commitment would continue to shape deployment and behaviour in individual missions, such as Lebanon until 2000.

Legislative provision for Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations was enacted in 1993 when the Defence Act was amended to allow for Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations. The 1996 Foreign Affairs White Paper supplied further official backing to participation in peace enforcement and the Defence White Paper 2000 committed to providing the defence forces with the necessary capabilities and capacities. The deployment of mechanised infantry to Kosovo (2003) was the beginning of real Irish

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331 Ban Ki Moon. Secretary General United Nations, Address at Dublin Castle. 7 July 2009
332 Irish Times 10 July 2015. Edward Burke Rebooting Ireland’s commitment to UN peacekeeping
deployment on peace-enforcement operations. The Defence White Paper 2015 has also committed to maintaining and enhancing the peacekeeping capabilities and capacities.

Impetus for modernisation and re-equipping was partly diplomatic. By 1996 Irish governments favoured peacekeeping in regional organisations as well as the United Nations and in 1999 Ireland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). The Irish defence forces were now required to achieve a NATO standard of inter-operability in order to be eligible for deployment in a PfP mission. This standard was achieved through an equipment purchasing programme and participation in a mix of NATO PfP policies, programmes, and action plans and arrangements.

In the late 1990s and 2000s a key change affecting Irish commitment to peace-enforcement was a major shift in the functional rationale for Ireland maintaining any military force. Until the mid-1990s the key purpose served by the Irish defence force was to deter or deal with internal insurgency. After the Belfast Agreement, (1998) this purpose decreased in significance just at a time when the demands on countries supplying peacekeeping forces were intensifying. Post 2000, the Irish defence forces has become increasingly functionally oriented to the requirements of peacekeeping operations, or, to quote the then Chief of Staff Lt Gen Jim Sreenan, its ‘main customer’ was now the Department of Foreign Affairs, and to a lesser extent the departments of state associated with internal security.

The increased importance to the defence force of peacekeeping deployments came at a time when peacekeeping practices were themselves becoming more complex and more aligned with the operational procedures maintained by regional security blocs. Paradoxically, in the fresh contexts in which Irish soldiers have been playing a peace-enforcement role, traditional habits associated with the pre-enforcement era and deeply engrained amongst Irish soldiers as a consequence of their traditional role as an internal security force, has brought them tactical advantages in the field. These include the emphasis on a force doctrine which maintains that soldiers should live in and participate in community life, along with the associated skills of selecting and interpreting local intelligence. Traditional neutrality doctrines also arguably enabled Irish soldiers to address the civil conflicts which are characteristic of peace enforcement operations. Irish peacekeeping units, despite the ready embrace by their officers of enforcement methods, remain psychologically unconfigured for war and deploy in ways which facilitate interaction with civilians and aid to the civil power. Another subtlety in the
Irish experience arising from this are the occasions when shifts in officially embraced doctrine are not always or entirely carried over into practice, as is the case with the continuing implementation of CIMIC according to United Nations conventions despite training Irish officers receive in NATO style CIMIC approaches.

Hence, and notwithstanding doctrinal change, Irish peace-keeping remains a hybrid in which interpretation of the enforcement mandate remains conditioned by values and norms and organisational conventions that stretch back deeply into the force’s history. This thesis argues that this not a weakness, but a strength.

With this summary in mind attention can now be turned to the first of our two research questions:

**How have changes in doctrine since end of Cold War affected Irish peacekeeping policy and practice?**

In essence, Irish peacekeeping policy and practice has changed, but halting and incomplete. Chapter 4 showed that as early as 1993 legislative provision was enacted for the participation of Irish troops in peace-enforcing operations, even though as discussed in the case of Kosovo it was not until 2003 that the defence forces had been given the necessary capabilities and capacity to deploy a mechanised unit to a peace-enforcement mission. Irish peacekeeping policies evolved in response to the new direction that international peacekeeping took in the 1990s. However, Irish policy-makers could not disregard the issue of Irish neutrality and whilst there is recognition of new peace-enforcing tasks and engagement with regional organisations, Irish policy documents fail to acknowledge the extent to which the Irish defence forces require equipment and an organisation that can enable it to perform peace-enforcement effectively.

The 2011 ‘Independent Review’ into the deaths of the three soldiers in 1988 found systemic failures by both UNIFIL and Irish Batt’s response to the increased threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) from Islamic elements. From this remove it is hard to fathom why the then Chief Staff ignored the requests from UNIFIL to provide the 64th Irish Batt with an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability despite briefings by UN HQ as with UNIFIL deficiencies resulting from the French government’s decision to withdraw the EOD assets.
when the threat of IEDs was actually on the rise. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence flagged UNIFIL’s EOD deficiency but it unfortunately took the death of three Irish peacekeepers for the Chief of Staff to find the resources for an ordnance EOD team and an Engineer Special Search Team (ESST). A hard lesson was learned from this incident and it marked a turning point in the attitude of Dublin to Force security for Irish peacekeepers and paved the way for significant investment in peacekeeping capabilities and capacities.

Despite these policy shifts, the case studies herein consistently found that Irish peace-enforcement units have retained elements of traditional peacekeeping practice. In the Lebanon case study it is apparent that such a tradition was well established before the concept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) was ever conceived. From 1978 to 2000 Irish peacekeepers in UNIFIL strongly adhered to the concept and practice of traditional peacekeeping despite extraordinarily trying circumstances.

The disasters of Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda forced the UN and other international organisations to consider more robust peacekeeping options. Irish authorities also began to respond to this change in the international peacekeeping environment and in 1993 amended the Defence Act. *The White Paper on Foreign Affairs 1996* committed to Irish participation in peace-enforcement operations with the UN and ‘Regional Organisations’. However, in Lebanon the Irish Batt in UNIFIL continued to practice the traditional peacekeeping model until 2000, and the Irish authorities were committed exclusively to the traditional model of peacekeeping in UNIFIL until that time. In fact, the changes in international peacekeeping, policy, and practice since the Cold War have not affected the conduct of observer missions, which as they unarmed are not possible without the consent of the parties. Therefore observer missions are by their very nature traditional peacekeeping operations. MINUCI was a political mission whose military liaison section operated along the lines of a typical observer mission.

There has been significant reorganisation and re-equipment of the defence forces since 2000 and as a consequence the army since the millennium has become smaller but much better equipped. Since 2000 Irish peacekeepers have gained experience in peace-enforcement missions with the United Nations in Liberia and Chad, with NATO in the Balkans, and with the EU in the Balkans and Chad. Involvement in the new revamped UNIFIL since 2006 has
allowed the Irish Batt’s to deploy alongside the NATO countries, in addition to traditional UN peacekeeping forces. The 2015 Defence White Paper reflected the wider security and defence framework, the increasingly complex nature of security threats in the world, and the need for a full spectrum comprehensive response. It further considered the associated capability requirements but unfortunately did not specify them or commit to providing them.

As was argued in the Lebanese case study the Europeanization of Irish foreign policy sometimes places Irish peacekeepers at risk. This was illustrated by the Bahrain Declaration and again in July 2013 when Hezbollah’s military wing was proscribed by the EU following a British proposal. The initiative was initially opposed by Ireland who had peacekeepers in Lebanon and Syria but Ireland strategically acquiesced when it found itself isolated in the European Council. This thesis demonstrated that UNIFIL ‘2’ was a very different outfit from its predecessors and that the Irish peacekeepers themselves were influenced by their prior experiences in Kosovo, Liberia and Chad. Irish Batt’s in UNIFIL 2 are now mechanised units whereas their predecessors were light infantry. A culture of force protection is now very much to the fore and the tactics of mechanised infantry has had the effect of changing many of the aspects and culture of Irish peacekeeping. However, UNIFIL 2 is not a peace-enforcement mission but remains a chapter 6 peacekeeping mission, albeit with a robust mandate incorporating the principles of ‘Responsibility to Protect’.

Irish peacekeeping today is actually a hybrid of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Chapter 7 showed that the Irish unit in Kosovo was organised around the peace-enforcement model and that Irish peacekeepers have acquired the capabilities and material to participate in peace-enforcement operations. However, in this case study it also became apparent that the psyche of Irish peacekeeping remains relatively unaltered, notwithstanding the technology of peace-enforcement. In UNMIL it was evident that despite the robust patrolling posture, the tradition of engaging in a humane way with the local population and the provision of philanthropic assistance for altruistic reasons endured. The Irish peacekeepers did not provide humanitarian assistance in Chad as it was the specific preserve of the NGOs and the UN aid agencies in this case. However, the Irish CIMIC teams were instrumental in overcoming the initial suspicion and antipathy of the actors in Chad towards EUFOR. In other words, Irish peacekeeping strategies remain a hybrid of traditional and post 1990 doctrines.
The vexed question of whether Irish neutrality has been compromised as a result of peace-enforcement remains. There is no doubt that the Europeanization of Irish Foreign Policy has caused difficulties for Irish peacekeepers in the field. From the perspective of Irish neutrality, the author found that Irish neutrality had advantages. For instance, there was an underlying suspicion of French intentions by Ivorian actors because of France’s vested interests there, whereas being Irish enabled the author to gain access to Ivorian actors as diverse as Lt Col Mango of FANCI and Col Bakayoko the leader of the rebels, both of whom later became Chiefs of Staff of FANCI. On the extreme of Ivorian politics the author met with Ble Goudi the leader of the government militants. Ble Goudi was deeply suspicious of French intentions and having studied in Manchester had a fair knowledge of Ireland and its post-colonial position. Indeed, he confided to the author that the only reason he agreed to the meeting was that he was aware that it came from an Irishman whom he was confident was not a ‘French puppet’. Several Irish officers serving throughout the world have also confirmed that of being Irish nationality provides them with access to areas that would be denied to members of former colonial countries.

The deployment of Irish troops to KFOR was a significant step for the Irish Defence Forces in that it marked a willingness of the Irish Government to participate in Regional peacekeeping operations as well as UN missions. The KFOR deployment followed conventional military lines with strategic HQ in Mons, Belgium, an operational HQ in Italy, and the tactical chain of command in Kosovo followed the conventional military lines of national battalions under command to a multi-national brigade HQ which reported to a multi-national Force HQ. This chain of command was operated by military personnel with civilian-political-diplomatic oversight operating at the strategic level whereas the UN chain of command is civilian dominated down to the tactical level. This was a new experience for Irish officers and many were highly impressed and influenced by it.

With respect to Chad the Irish government and its agencies enthusiastically embraced the French initiative to deploy an EU peacekeeping force into an area of Africa ravaged by war in order to alleviate the humanitarian disaster unfolding there. The Dáil reports show cross-party support with only Sinn Fein objecting. However, very few other European Union nations were prepared to participate and many of those who did provided mere token contributions. Notably absent were the United Kingdom and Germany, and thus the viability of the much vaunted ‘EU Battle Groups’ was brought into question when the 2008 Battle Groups in
question led by Spain and Sweden, were not made available. This thesis therefore
demonstrated that EUFOR was not actually an EU initiative, but rather a French initiative to
which most EU states declined to seriously engage. The deployment of EUFOR would have
been impossible without the disproportionate French contribution and it brings into the
question the willingness of the EU to mount a credible peacekeeping mission without France
as the framework nation and lead logistic nation. A case can be made that engagement in the
Chad mission may represent a step away from the more strict norms of traditional Irish
neutrality. However, it can also be argued that the continued participation of Irish
peacekeepers in international peacekeeping operations since 1960 is proof that despite being
militarily neutral, Ireland is not isolationist.

Despite ‘Europeanization’ however, Irish peacekeeping retains a strong national characteristic
and this distinctiveness is an asset. NATO troops are arguably trained and equipped for high
intensity conflict and they have little or no experience of containing civil disorder or low
intensity conflict. On the other hand, the EU neutral states had accumulated vast experience
of UN peacekeeping, and in the Irish case, along with peacekeeping its modus operandi in
Ireland was ‘Aid to the Civil Power’. The Irish and EU neutrals had much more experience
and were better equipped to deal with the type of civil disorders which were encountered in
March 2004. Although this was a peace-enforcement mission we saw that Irish troops
retained many of the attributes usually attributed to traditional peacekeeping. We saw in the
CIMIC section the engagement by Irish peacekeepers in local community activities was
somewhat at variance with NATO CIMIC doctrine but very much in keeping with the
humanitarian traditions built up over four decades of traditional peacekeeping operations.

Irish foreign policy has become Europeanized and in consequence it is apparent that Ireland
was one of the first countries to recognise Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.
This decision was certainly in line with mainstream EU policy. However, it was also
strongly influenced by the first-hand knowledge of Kosovo by Irish politicians and diplomats
due of the presence of Irish troops in the area.

We now turn our attention to the second research question:
**Why, in the light of more general disengagement by Western countries from peace keeping, has Ireland continued to commit to a strong presence in international peacekeeping?**

There is a strong case that Irish participation in peacekeeping brings many positive benefits to its military, though this consideration does not necessarily shape policy decision-making. As noted in Chapter 4, ‘the overseas’ has become the major function of the Irish defence forces. It was also observed that membership of NATO’s PfP was instrumental in enhancing the Irish defence forces capabilities, and ensuring Irish defence forces compatibility and inter-operability with NATO forces. Somewhat paradoxically, this has in turn enhanced the desirability of Irish peacekeepers for United Nations peacekeeping operations which now requires European troop contributing countries to provide forces with force-multiplier capabilities. In Chapter 7 we saw that the mechanised infantry unit in KFOR was only made possible because of the major investment in equipment (€100 million for Armoured Personnel Carriers alone). In addition, the Irish KFOR deployment would not have been possible if the DF had not participated in several NATO resource development and training programmes which ensured compatibility and interoperability (See sections 3.7.4 and 4.6.8). In KFOR Irish troops worked alongside and learned from the most modern and sophisticated armies in the world. Irish diplomacy has also benefited in that Irish involvement in PfP has resulted in Irish diplomatic and security agencies gaining access to diplomatic, security and intelligence assets which were previously denied to them. The evidence shows that the Irish military has benefited enormously from peacekeeping and underwent substantive reorganisation and investment specifically to enable it to participate in peace-enforcement operations with the UN and regional organisations. Ironically, defence spending in Ireland has steadily declined since 1995 and standing at 0.49% of the GDP in 2015 was the lowest in the EU.

The Chad case study illustrated that involvement in a European-Union sponsored undertaking enabled a level of material support for this mission, with respect to equipment and deployment and intelligence gathering. This permitted enforcement style ‘deterrence’ operations well beyond the scope of what is normally resourced in UN led peace missions.

The question of whether Irish foreign policy interest is served by its support for peacekeeping continues to generate debate. It is certain that Irish commitment to peacekeeping in this
region reflects the embedded political conviction that such effort helps to consolidate Irish international standing. Additionally, the army has been substantially reconfigured since 2000 so that it can perform this role, a development which has certainly helped to ensure continued public investments in its equipment and training. This thesis also seeks to explain why, in the light of more general disengagement by western countries from peacekeeping, Ireland has continued to commit to a strong presence in international peacekeeping, and it has emphasised the fact that of the nineteen countries which participated in MINUCI only Austria, Poland, and Ireland, were members of the EU. None of the traditional ‘middle powers’ were present in MINUCI and there seems little doubt that they have very much disengaged from UN peacekeeping operations, whereas, the Irish commitment to peacekeeping operations being conducted by the UN and Regional Organisations has remained steadfast. Irish foreign policy is now very much framed within a European context and yet no EU state matches the comparative scale of Ireland’s commitment to international peacekeeping. Ireland continues this level of commitment because it is considered to be in the Irish national interest to have a well regulated international environment, and thus a central tenet of Irish foreign policy is for Ireland to maintain its commitment to peacekeeping. Such a position continues to have wide public support in Ireland.

The KFOR deployment was a very different experience from previous UN deployments. Operationally, Irish troops were now deployed alongside and had achieved inter-operability with some of the most sophisticated militaries in the world. Participation in joint training exercises and operational deployments with these units also proved to be very informative and enhanced the professionalism of Irish troops throughout all ranks. The KFOR troop deployment was supported by NATO artillery, armour, and air assets including helicopter gunships, troop carrying helicopters, and medevac helicopters. In addition, strategic air support was on call.

There may be other more emotional and sentimental considerations prompting Irish commitment. As Brian Cowan’s remark quoted at the start of this chapter suggests, Ireland’s peacekeeping role has become woven into its patriotic narrative and construction of national identity. As was made clear from the Lebanon case study Irish participation in peacekeeping operations has been described by governments as being a matter of justified public pride and an integral element of how Ireland sees itself in the world. Moreover, the years of economic prosperity during the Celtic Tiger boom helped to engender the kind of political confidence in
Ireland’s capabilities which helped to explain the then government’s commitment to the Chad deployment.

The experiences recounted in the case studies demonstrate that the Irish military has benefited enormously from its participation in international peacekeeping operations such as the Chad mission, a trend that was very much on the horizon when Ishikuza undertook his exploration of Irish motivations in peacekeeping.

Had the Irish army remained in-country, confining itself to agendarmerie role of assisting the police it would not have acquired the capabilities and capacities that were in evidence in the deployment to EUFOR Chad/CAR. Irish army officers are quite forthright about their enthusiasm for such operations and indeed their preference for EU-led undertakings. Many of the Irish army officers interviewed in the course of the case studies, including General Nash, expressed a preference for participation in regional organisations as they believe them to be better structured, equipped, and managed than UN operations. They are also seen as less vulnerable to political vagaries and micromanagement of civilian bureaucrats.

The Irish army arguably has an institutional or corporate interest in participation in peace enforcement. Indeed without such engagements it would have long ago been reduced to a very limited range of domestic functions relating with internal security and ceremonial activities. However, United Nations peacekeeping operations currently remains the core function of the Irish defence forces providing operational experience and career enhancement opportunities for DF personnel. Furthermore participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations remain a source of Irish patriotic pride and enjoys cross-party political support.
Appendix 1.1

Dear.

My name is Eamonn Colclough. I am a former army officer and at present I am a PhD student in the University of Limerick. The title of my thesis is 'The Evolution of Irish Peacekeeping'. I am conducting a series of interviews with people whom I consider instrumental in driving the reform of the Irish Defence Forces since the 1990's.

The background to the thesis is as follows: From 1956 until 1990, international peacekeeping was constrained by the ‘realmpolitik’ of the Cold War and in general confined itself to facilitating post-conflict inter-state disengagement. However, the end of the Cold War and the turmoil of the 1990’s necessitated a re-evaluation of international peacekeeping. This thesis is concerned with the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice in response to the changing international peacekeeping requirements.

The thesis is arranged as follows: One chapter explores the evolution of international peacekeeping, another chapter deals with Irish peacekeeping from an Irish political and diplomatic perspective, this is followed by a chapter which focuses on the Irish army and then there are four case studies of peacekeeping missions which Irish peacekeepers have participated in since 1990. The activities of the Irish peacekeepers in these diverse peace operations is compared and contrasted in order to draw conclusions on the evolution of Irish peacekeeping policy and practice.

I am conducting a series of interviews with officers who in my opinion were responsible for driving the change in the Irish Defence Forces both at home and abroad. I will be exploring
the reorganisation of the defence forces, and I will be asking questions about the equipment purchasing programme, changes in training practices, doctrinal changes, rules of engagement, and the use of force. I will be asking for their opinion on whether Ireland’s peacekeeping policy and practice in relation to the United Nations differs from its policy and practice with regard to regional organisations such as the European Union, the OSCE or NATO and if Irish peacekeeping between 1990 and 2014 has become increasingly organised around a peace enforcement model or is it a hybrid of traditional and post 1990 doctrines.

The interviews will be on a one-to-one basis and will last between one and two hours to complete. With the interviewees permission I intend to tape the interview. Should they choose not to have the interview taped, with their permission I will take notes during the course of the interview. The interview will take place at a time and place of their choosing. If I quote from the interview in my thesis I will notify the respondent and confirm consent for the quotation to be attributed.

I intend to place a copy of the thesis in the library of the military college so that it can be of assistance to students on military courses in understanding the evolution of international peacekeeping and the subsequent Irish response.

Interviewees who wish your contribution to remain anonymous nothing said beyond the public domain will be attributed. Interviewees will not be obliged to answer any question and no inference will be drawn from any refusal to answer any question. They are fully entitled to withdraw at any time from the interview and you have the right to contact the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee should they have any concerns about participating in the research the contact details are below.

Name and contact details of investigator and supervisor I alone will be conducting the interviews: Eamonn Colclough. Phone: 087 4112350. e-mail: eamonn.colclough@ul.ie.

My supervisor is Professor Tom Lodge. Phone: 061 202268, e-mail: tom.lodge@ul.ie

This research study has received Ethics Approval from the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (Approval number: 2014_02_08_AHSS). If you have any concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent authority, you may contact:

Chairperson Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
AHSS Faculty Office
University of Limerick
Tel: +353 61 202286 Email: FAHSSEthics@ul.ie
Appendix 1.2

FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
CONSENT FORM

Consent Section:
I, the undersigned, declare that I am willing to take part in research for the project entitled The Evolution of Irish Peacekeeping Policy and Practice.

39 I declare that I have been fully briefed on the nature of this study and my role in it and have been given the opportunity to ask questions before agreeing to participate.

40 The nature of my participation has been explained to me and I have full knowledge of how the information collected will be used.

41 I am also aware that my participation in this study may be recorded (video/audio) and I agree to this. However, should I feel uncomfortable at any time I can request that the recording equipment be switched off. I am entitled to copies of all recordings made and am fully informed as to what will happen to these recordings once the study is completed.

42 I fully understand that there is no obligation on me to participate in this study.

43 I fully understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without having to explain or give a reason.

44 I am also entitled to full confidentiality in terms of my participation and personal details.

45 I wish to remain anonymous for the duration of my participation
   [ ] Yes         [ ] No

____________________________________         __________________________
Signature of participant                                               Date
Appendices: Chapter 2

Appendix 2.1 UN Reform Initiatives

This report summarized seminars which were held around the world on UN peacekeeping in the previous five years, and was intended to complement the Brahimi report on UN peacekeeping reform.


2008: “Capstone Doctrine” Outlined the most important principles and guidelines for UN peacekeepers in the field. It was a DPKO/DFS guidance document that sought to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations usually deployed as part of a much broader international effort to build a sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict. Its concept was enabling peacekeepers with host country consent to implement their mandate by relying on their ‘robustness’ in posture, equipment, and their ability to resort to force at the tactical level to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities posed a threat to civilians or risked undermining the peace process. Capstone explains the basic principles that should guide their planning and conduct.

2009: ‘The New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’ and its Progress Reports No.1 (2010) and No.2 (2011) assessed the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping at the time and into the future. It saw peacekeeping not as a stand-alone solution but as part of a political solution that must be engaged in as an accompaniment to an active political policy. It sought to broaden the principles and guidelines of robust peacekeeping. It is now deemed to be essential for the credibility and success of an operation that robustness cannot be confined to the peacekeepers and their ability to use force in defence of their mandate but must include management. Robustness needs to be embedded in a broader framework that combines robust operational and political parameters. Ultimately the use of force may be necessary but as a means to the end that needs to be clearly identified.
2014: High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Appointed by the Secretary General. Its recommendations will be available for consideration by the General Assembly at its 2015 General Debate:

It will consider a broad range of issues facing peace operations, including the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good offices and peace-building challenges, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and protection of civilians, uniformed capabilities for peacekeeping operations and performance…The last major external review of peace operations was undertaken in 2000 and led by Mr. Lahkdar Brahimi. In addition, this will be the first such panel to examine both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.\(^{333}\)

The emerging policy is that robust peacekeeping should not be misinterpreted as a military issue alone since the use of force is complementary to the concept; it is a political and operational strategy.

All of the reports and documents listed above attempted to provide definitions of the term robustness, partly in response to confusion and lack of clarity about the operational implications of robustness. The documents help clarify what robust peacekeeping is and what it is not. However, none of the above has been endorsed by the member states and therefore they are not United Nations policy.

The very concept of robust peacekeeping remains contentious. The C 34 in 2010 pitted the EU group against the NAM TCC’s with the EU group emphasising the importance of the responsibility to protect concept whilst the NAM group described robust peacekeeping as being tantamount to neo-colonialism.

2008: Zeid Report
A series of disturbing reports about the behaviour of individual UN peacekeepers in several peacekeeping operations became a cause for concern and in 2008 the Secretary-General imposed a zero tolerance policy following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in host countries. At the request of the Secretary-General, the then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, produced a sweeping strategy, known as the Zeid Report. It recommended engaging troop and police contributors, other Member States and the wider UN system in a new conduct and
disciplining architecture for peacekeeping and in 2008, an UN-wide strategy for assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel was adopted by the General Assembly.
## Appendix 2.2: Security Sector Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO PfP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Gleeson Report on pay and conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>An Agenda for Peace</td>
<td>CFSP Maastricht Treaty</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace established</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Efficiency Audit Group Reports published</td>
<td>Supplement to An Agenda for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Price Waterhouse Cooper Review Of DF</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Defence Forces Review Implementation Panel (DFRIP) Reorganisation of DF</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty adopted Petersberg Tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>St Malo Anglo/French Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Cologne Summit ESDP Helsinki Headline Goal RRF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ireland Pledges 850 troops to RRF</td>
<td>Brahimi Report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White Paper Defence reduces strength to 10, 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>European Defence Agency (EDA) created</td>
<td>Berlin Plus EU access to NATO assets</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin Plus EU access to NATO assets</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change</td>
<td>Headline Goal 2010 RRF reformed to Battle Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ireland Pledges 100 troops to Nordic Battle Group</td>
<td>Peace Operations 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Review of Public Expenditure reduces strength to 10,000</td>
<td>Reorganisation into DPKO and D Field Support (DFS)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lisbon Treaty renames European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capstone Doctrine Zeid Report on Conduct and Discipline</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Partnership Agenda (New Horizon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Army restructured to 2 Brigades, strength reduced to 9,500</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU Defence Ministers adopt Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Smart Defence Programme Adopted</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2.3: Irish Observer Missions

The following is a list of observer mission in which Irish officers have served. The missions referred to in this thesis are indicated with an asterisk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>June 1958 – December 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*UNTSO</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1958 – Present day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>India/Pakistan</td>
<td>1965 – 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1973 – 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*UNIFIL</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1978 – Present Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>Iran/Iraq</td>
<td>1984 - 1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1988 – 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIMOG</td>
<td>Iran/Iraq</td>
<td>1988 - 1991</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1989 – 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>1989 – 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1991 – 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1991 – 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1991 – Present Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1991 -1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>*UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1992 – 1996</td>
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<td>OSGA</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1994 – 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1994 - 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMA</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1996 – 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1996 – 1999</td>
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<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1996 – 1999</td>
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<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>Slavonia</td>
<td>1996 – 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>UNSMA</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1997 – 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>*KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999 – 2010</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1999 – 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2001 – Present Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*MINUCI</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>*ONUCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2010 – 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2013 – Present Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2013 – Present Day</td>
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</table>

* Missions discussed in the case studies
Appendix 2.4: Irish Peacekeeping Missions

Ireland has sent troop contingents to the 11 peacekeeping missions listed below. Six of these are discussed in detail in the thesis and they are indicated with an asterisk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1960 – 1964</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964 – 1973</td>
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<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1973 – 1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOM II</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1993 - 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR/SFOR</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1997 – Present Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999 – 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMET</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2001 – 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>*UNMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003 – 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>*EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2007 - 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>*MINURCAT</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2008 – 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>*UNDOF</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2013 – Present Day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Missions discussed in the case studies
Appendix 3:

‘Lessons Learned’ from the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission

A seminar was held at the EU Institute for Security, EUISS Paris on 18 March 2010 to ascertain the ‘lessons Learned’ from the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission. The issues were emerged are summarised as follows:

United Nations: The UN does not have a standby force and it typically takes over six months to deploy a peacekeeping force to a trouble spot. EUFOR has emerged as a unique means for the UN to rapidly launch international operations. The rehatting of an EU bridging force has emerged as a very efficient way of implementing the transition from the bridging force to the UN peacekeeping mission and any future UNSC Resolutions providing a mandate to an EU operation should explicitly include a mandate for a follow on UN force.

Host Government Consent: Future EU operations should be dependent on strong evidence of and guarantees that the host government fully accepts and understands its rational and its purpose.

Non-EU Contributors: If the lack of political will with respect to force generation continues non-EU contributions will assume increased importance in the future.

Intelligence: Banditry and the sense of impunity in eastern Chad which are of an internal Chadian political nature were not properly identified in the planning process and consequently the planners focused primarily on medium and large scale rebel attacks. When the proposed UN trained police force failed to materialise, the Force Commander had to respond to the banditry and was obliged to adopt a course of action for which he was neither mandated not structured.

Exit strategy: In determining the exit strategy for an EU mission the ‘end-state’ method has emerged as politically preferable despite the ‘end-date’ method being militarily desirable:

The EU did not want to get bogged down in a long drawn out mission in Africa; also countries paying a large share of the common costs were not prepared to endorse the
mission unless an early end-date was visualised. Some NGOs sought to benchmark EUFOR’s success against the number of refugees/IDPs returned.\textsuperscript{334}

**Strategic Reserve:** The poor response at the force generation process resulted in Gen Nash having to deploy without a strategic reserve. This would constitute an unnecessary risk for the future EU deployments.

**CIMIC:** The endemic suspicion of humanitarian actors of military forces was present again in Chad. It was felt that humanitarian actors’ strict mandates prevent them from engaging in any sort of common approach with military force and it would probably be more fruitful for future EUFOR forces to engage with civilian actors from the development field. However, it was agreed that strong channels of communications with all NGOs, such as weekly security briefings to promote such interactive approaches are essential.

**Political Objectives:** There was a body of opinion that the EUFOR operational mandate lacked a minimal political component and the operation missed the opportunity to have a significant impact on essential issues. In Chad for example, this could have been a change in governance structures, the delivery of public services, the distribution of wealth or transparency in oil revenues. However, others were of the opinion that expectation management worked well and that by not setting the bar too high the EU had avoided failing to meet overly ambitious political objectives:

> Considerable time and effort had to be given to explaining to a raft of stakeholders the constraints placed upon the mission, whilst emphasising the pallet of objectives the force had set itself.\textsuperscript{335}

**EU Strategic Planning Structures:** The seminar was of the opinion that EU strategic planning requires more permanent staff and structures. EUFOR Chad/CAR was cited as an example of what permanent structured cooperation would look like in the future. However, the question was asked: Will any future EU African operation be ever lead by a country other than France?

\textsuperscript{334} Gen Pat Nash EUFOR Operational Commander, in Harvey, Dan. *Peace Enforcers: The EU Military Intervention in Chad.* Book Republic, Ireland. 2010

\textsuperscript{335} Ibid
**Lead logistic nation:** In his address to the IIEA Gen Nash highlighted the need for EU missions to have nations prepared to undertake the role of lead logistic nation for drafting of SOFA’s, and providing legal, financial and logistical leadership. He particularly emphasised the need for nations to maintain a military medical capability. At a time of financial restraints many countries are adopting a medical solution of one size fits all in which the domestic military medical care is incorporated into the civilian system in order to avoid duplication. However, domestic medical facilities do not have the capability’s to deploy overseas into combat zones and EU states loss of the ability to deploy medical capabilities with their troops could potentially jeopardise future operations.
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INTERVIEWS

Taped interviews were conducted with the following personnel:

Col Brian O’Keeffe, 11 February 2014
Col Con McNamara 20 February 2014
List of Authors Contacts

The following is a list of the author’s contacts and interlocutors in the various missions discussed in the case studies.

**Lebanon 1980:**
Brig Gen Eddie Heskin (Operations Officer, 47 Irish Batt 1980)
Lt Col Billy Comber (C Company Commander, 47 Irish Batt 1980)
Col Tom Ahern (Platoon Commander, Galway Platoon, At Tiri, Easter 1980)
Comdt Paddy Murphy (Second in Charge (2i/c) C Company, 47 Irish Batt 1980)

**Lebanon 1987/1978:**
Col Tom Ahern (Irish, Staff officer Operations, UNIFIL HQ, 1987)
Commander Pat O’Mahoney (Commanding Officer, Irish Component, Naqoura, 1988)
Lt Gen Gerry McMahon (Irish, Deputy Operations Officer UNIFIL HQ, 1987/1988)
Comdt Harry Nugent (Staff Officer, Irish Component, Naqoura, 1988)
Capt Andy Forrestal (Irish, Staff Officer, Logistics, UNIFIL HQ, 1987/1988)

**Middle East 1991/1993:**
Mr Giandomenico Picco (UN Hostage negotiator, Beirut, 1991)
Lt Col Timo Haapalainen (Finnish, Chief of OGB, 1991/1992)
Maj Jens Nielson (Danish, Deputy Chief OGB, 1990/1991)
Lt Col Brendan Geraghty (Irish, UNMO in UNTSO, 1991/1993)
Lt Col Ray Roach (Senior Irish UNMO in UNTSO, 1999/1992)

**Former Yugoslavia 1993:**
Maj Gen Lewis Mackenzie (Canadian, Commander Sector Sarajevo, 1992)
Brig Gen John Wilson (Australian, Chief UNMO, UNPROFOR, 1992)
Col Richard Grey (New Zealand, Chief Liaison Officer, Sector Sarajevo, 1992)
Lt Col Dan Murphy (Irish, Personal Staff Officer to Brig Gen John Wilson, 1992)
Mr Fabrizio Hochschild (UK, Head of UNHCR in Sarajevo, 1993)

**Lebanon 1998:**
Col Michael O’Dwyer (Commanding Officer, 83 Irish Batt, 1998)
Col Brian Monaghan (A Company Commander, 83 Irish Batt, 1998)
Col Tom Rigney (HQ Company Commander, 83 Irish Batt, 1998)
Comdt Dan O’Connor (Platoon commander, C Coy, 83 Irish Batt, 1998)

**Former Yugoslavia 2001/2002:**
Mr Salim Abado (Lebanese, Finance officer OMiFRY, 2001/2004)
Mr Arve Westgard (Norwegian, Police Head of OMiFRY Rule of Law Department, 2001/2002)
Ms Hannelore Valier (German, Head of the OMiFRY Democratization Department, 2001/2008)
Mr Richard Chambers (UK, Barrister, Democratization Department, OMiFRY, 2001/2)

**Cote d’Ivoire 2003:**
Lt Gen Soumala Bakayoko (Commander, Forces Nouvelle, (FN), Bouake, 1993)
Lt Gen Phillipa Mangou (Commander, FANCI Forces, Yamoussoukro, 1993)
Brig Gen Padraig O’Callaghan (Director of Operations, DFHQ, 2003/2004)
Brig Gen Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh, Chief Military Liaison Officer, MINUCI, 2003/4)
Col George Partington (Ghana, Plans Officer, MINUCI, 2003/2004)
Lt Col Sandeep Sing (India, Operations Officer, MINUCI, 2003/2004)
Lt Col Ghiren Gurung (Nepal, Deputy Plans Officer, MINUCI, 2003/3004)
Maj Papa Souleyman (Senegal, Deputy Information Officer, MINUCI, 2003/2004)
Lt Col Jerez Janas (Poland, Senior MINUCI MLO, Bouake,2003/2004)
Lt Col Danial Rodriguez (Uruguay, Senior MINUCI MLO, Yamoussoukro, 2003/2004)
Comdt Brian Fitzsimons (Ireland, Deputy Operations Officer, MINUCI 2003)
Mr Ble Goudi (Leader of the ‘Young Patriots’2002 - 2013)

**Kosovo 2007:**
Brig Gen Berndt Grundevik (Swedish, Commander, KFOR Sector Centre, 2006/2007)
Col Tom Ahern (Planning Officer, KFOR Sector Centre, 2007/2008)
Lt Col Pat Ryan (Deputy Commanding Officer, 35 Irish Infantry Group, KFOR, 2007)
Lt Col Dennis Harrington (Adjutant, 35 Irish Infantry Group, KFOR, 2007)

**Lebanon 2010:**
Mr Milos Struger (Serbia, Director Political and Civil Affairs, UNIFIL 2005-Present)
Mr Johnny Molloy(Ireland, Staff Officer, Office of the Political Advisor UNIFIL 2006 – 2015))
As Lebanon is technically still at war with Israel I am not in a position to name the many interlocutors I had in the Israeli or Lebanese security forces.

**Chad:**
Lt Gen Pat Nash.(EUFOR Operational Commander October 2007 - April 2009)
Col Con McNamara.(DACOS Ops J3 in the EUFOR Chad/CAR Operational HQ in Paris Oct 2007 - April 2009)
Col Paddy Mc Daniels (Commanding Officer, 97Irish Batt,EUFOR Chad/CAR March 2008 – July 2008)
Col Paddy Moran (Commanding Officer, 90 Irish Batt UNMIL Liberia), 2003/2004)
Col Peter Marley (Finance Officer, DFHQ, 2010-2013)
Comdt Garry McKeown (2i/c 97 Irish Batt EUFOR Chad/CAR March 2008 July 2008)
Capt Paul O’Beirne (Air Liaison Officer 99 Irish Batt EUFOR Chad/CAR July 2008 – December 2008))

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