The Ethics of Normative Power
Abstract

The question addressed by this research is; how can the concept of normative power be morally evaluated? In general terms, normative power is thought to be an ability or disposition, where A has normative power when it is able to diffuse through communicative acts a norm $n$ to B. However, prevailing theories also assume that all uses of normative power are justified, and that this is dependent on the norm promoted being defined as valid. This alters the definition of normative power slightly, where A now has normative power if and only if A is able to diffuse through communicative acts a valid norm $n$ to B. Chapter one argues that if normative power is a dispositional form of power, then it cannot be necessarily justified; rather, there are justifiable and unjustifiable uses of normative power. Chapter two argues that any moral evaluation of normative power that refers to norm content faces difficulties and it is inconsistent to evaluate normative power by reference to the content of the norms diffused. The only feasible way to evaluate normative power is to focus on the mechanisms of diffusion. Because the mechanisms of diffusion are communicative acts, a theory of deliberative democracy would be a useful theoretical standard for evaluating uses of normative power. Chapter three identifies and describes three requirements derived from deliberative democracy as suitable criteria for judging a use of normative power. First, that the communicative act(s) are non-coercive. Second, that A, in diffusing a norm $n$, demonstrates reflexivity. Third, that A is inclusive of B in the diffusion of a norm $n$, in other words, B is included in the deliberative process.
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**Introduction:**

The concept of normative power originated as a response to the perceived inadequacy of existing concepts of power in International Relations to understand the European Union (EU) and its use of norms and discourses in the international arena. Ian Manners, who coined the term ‘normative power’, argued that understanding the EU and its actions in world politics required an approach that includes “cognitive processes, with both substantive and symbolic components” (Manners, 2002: 239; Manners, 2000). Concepts such as military power\(^1\) and civilian power\(^2\), focus on the resources (be they military or economic) an actor has and uses in order to effect its desired outcome. Normative power on the other hand, is described as ‘ideational’, and characterized by common principles (Manners, 2002: 239, Manners & Whitman, 2003: 390), where the “emphasis is on the ability to use normative justification rather than on an ability to use material incentive or physical force (Manners, 2013: 310, see also Diez, 2005: 616). Normative power is intended as an “analytical concept that is applicable for [actors] across various historical eras and geographical locations” (De Zutter, 2010: 1115; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Diez, 2005: 616). Additionally, the concept is meant to augment, not replace, the discussion of an actor’s resources or material capabilities, be they civilian or military (Manners & Whitman, 2003: 390). The EU uses normative power by “restricting itself to diplomatic means of dialogue” which defends international law, and in doing so, “projects its core values beyond its borders” to other actors (Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007: 435, 42-3). Manners defines normative power as the ability of an actor, to employ persuasive communicative acts in order to “redefine what can be ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002: 253). The concept of normative power can be formally defined as; A has normative power when A is able to diffuse, through communicative acts, a norm \(n\) to B.

A recurrent criticism (e.g. Baldric, 2010; Bicchi, 2006; Biscop, 2004; Fisher Onar & Nicolaidis, 2013; Harpaz, 2007; Hyde-Price, 2006; 2008; Niedermann & De Wekker, 2010; Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007) of the normative power concept is that it remains largely limited to the EU and the norms being diffused are ones that are essentially European. This criticism can be broken down into two distinct problems: how to define normative power as a form of power and how to morally evaluate uses of normative power.

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\(^1\) Understood as the capacity to use force in the form of defense and security capabilities to effect a desired outcome (see Manners 2002: 236).

\(^2\) Understood as the capacity to use of economic means to achieve goals, primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems, and willingness to use legally binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress (Twitchett, 1976: 1-2; Mau, 1990: 2-3, in Manners 2002: 236-7).
The first pertains to a lack of conceptual clarity; what is normative power and is it necessarily justified.\(^3\) It is difficult to discern in the literature on normative power a definitive stance on what exactly the concept is supposed to refer to. It has alternatively been described as: an objective category - either as something that can be said of a distinct type of actor or of something that actor employs (Manners, 2002; 2013), and as a characterization of an ideal-type of actor (Manners, 2013; Forsberg, 2011; De Zutter, 2010). As an ideal-type, or a practice of discursive representation, the question is not whether an actor is a normative power but how it is constructed as one (e.g. Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002; Youngs, 2004; Bicchi, 2006; Diez, 2007; Fisher Onar & Nicolaidis, 2013). The ideal-type of ‘normative power Europe’ or ‘normative power China’ (e.g. De Zutter, 2010; Forsberg, 2011; Kavalski, 2013), can be contrasted against ideal-types of ‘great power’ or ‘civilian power’. Contributing to this problem is Manners himself, who in a recent article on the topic, writes that normative power refers to both the particular capacity of an actor and a kind of ideal-type actor (see Manners 2013).

In studying normative power, and what actors are successful in their ability to define what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, the interest is not only in what actors are able to exercise their normative power, but also in how a use of normative power might be potentially justifiable. The second problem arises out of this demand for justifiability, and the inadequacy of existing accounts to provide a convincing method for the moral evaluation of normative power. These accounts tend towards a construction of normative power as by definition justified (a ‘force for good’), especially when compared to other forms of power in international relations (Manners, 2002: 236). Normative power has been described as an approach to “delimit the sphere of permissible acts” (Tocci, 2008: 10). This suggests that the ability to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’ (Diez, 2005: 615) refers to an “ability to frame what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour” (Kavalski, 2013: 248; see also Manners, 2006b: 168). However, A can only refer to particular principles to designate acceptable behaviour; the content of the norms diffused and the kinds of communicative acts employed must refer to principles found in international law (Manners, 2011: 233; 2009). This is because those principles are argued to be, within the United Nations (UN) system, universally applicable. This construction of the normative power concept as being in some way necessarily justified has the effect of implying that the actor who diffuses norms through communicative acts (and thus can be said to have normative power) is making a claim that it possesses a higher (moral) rank as well (Merlingen, 2007: 443).

\(^3\) Answering these questions will also clarify whether the concept is applicable to actors other than the EU.
The questions addressed by this research are: what is normative power and how to morally evaluate uses of normative power. Normative power as an ability is the stance taken in this thesis. Without losing any of Manners’s intended meaning, everything that is said of normative power as a kind of actor and as an ideal-type can be said in terms of normative power as an ability. The construction of the normative power concept as an ability an actor possesses and chooses to exercise, brings clarity to the task of demonstrating a viable method for the moral evaluation of normative power. Thus, normative power refers to the ability of an actor to diffuse norms through communicative acts. So, A has normative power when it is able to diffuse, through communicative acts, a norm n to B. Often, normative power is described as if it is always a force for good (i.e. justified), such that diffusing inappropriate norms, or using inappropriate means to diffuse norms, do not qualify as instances of normative power. To put it another way, because it is a use of normative power, it is a justified action. In this thesis I argue against this view, and instead claim that if normative power really is a form of power, then we cannot assume that all use of normative power are by definition justified. This argument is developed in Chapter one, where I survey the existing literature on normative power and explore the implications of treating normative power as if it is really a form of power. Following Peter Morriss, I argue that power is a dispositional concept, since it refers to an ability. On this account, if normative power really is a form of power, then it must refer to the ability to diffuse norms. Consequently, normative power need not always be a ‘force for good’; rather, there are justifiable and unjustifiable uses of normative power.

In the remainder of this thesis, I argue that the diffusion of norms ought to be the subject of normative scrutiny, and that there are two plausible ways of doing this. On the one hand, we might evaluate the norms themselves that are diffused by actors using normative power. I argue in Chapter two that this approach is flawed, because it results in two kinds of interpretational ambiguity and fails to adequately account for the role of coercive communicative acts. One kind of interpretational ambiguity is the potential for the diffusion of mutually incompatible norms. The second kind of interpretational ambiguity results when norms cited as incompatible with normative power are only incompatible with a particular interpretation of those norms. The second kind of interpretational ambiguity results when norms cited as incompatible with normative power are only incompatible with a particular interpretation of those norms. On the other hand, we

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4 The concept of political legitimacy has been tied to discussions of normative power. However, rather than attempt to give a definitive stance on what uses of normative power are legitimate or illegitimate in the sense of having full, complete or authoritative political legitimacy, this thesis completes the more modest task of determining what might be a feasible method for evaluating uses of normative power - in other words, what constitutes justifiable and unjustifiable uses of normative power. In doing so, I argue that the application of criteria derived from theories of deliberative democracy provide a suitable evaluative framework. The commitment to deliberative criteria would mean that in an examination of the legitimacy of normative power, the ideal would aim for a form of democratic legitimacy. To be clear, this is not to say that if a use of normative power conforms to the evaluative criteria I propose - reciprocity, reflexivity and inclusiveness - then that use of normative power is democratically legitimate, only that, insofar as a use of normative power is potentially legitimate, it is necessarily an appeal to democratic legitimacy that is being made.
might instead evaluate the mechanisms by which norms are diffused. In Chapter three, I argue in support of this approach, and suggest three criteria - drawn from deliberative theories of democracy - that might be appropriate for evaluating the mechanisms of diffusion. First, the diffusion of a norm $n$ features reciprocity. Second, the diffusion of a norm $n$ demonstrates reflexivity. Third, the norm diffusion is inclusive in that $A$ includes $B$ in the deliberation about the norm $A$ diffuses to $B$.

The final section of this chapter consists of a brief consideration of two issues. One is an explanation of how justified uses of normative power that appeal to principles of deliberative democracy relate to the distinction made by both Morris and Lukes between power and influence. The other asserts that future analysis of normative power ought to be expanded. There should not be an exclusive focus on evaluating how normative power has been used by actors. What is also of interest, following the distinction Morriss makes between ability and ableness, is what actors are more able to exercise their normative power in the international arena. In other words, what is of normative concern should not be confined to how $A$ has used normative power to diffuse a norm $n$ to $B$ but also whether conditions are such that $A$ is more able than $C$ to diffuse a norm $n$ to $B$.

Overall, this thesis argues that if normative power really is a form of power, then it is not always justifiable, that we ought to evaluate the diffusion of norms by focussing on the means by which diffusion occurs through the application of principles of deliberative democracy as a guide for determining justifiable uses of normative.
Chapter One: What is Normative Power?

A has normative power when A is able to diffuse, through communicative acts, a norm \( n \) to B. Although normative power is often celebrated as a force for good, this understanding is inconsistent with treating normative power as a genuine form of power. If normative power really is a kind of power, then it must refer to the *ability* to diffuse norms, regardless of the content of those norms or the manner in which those norms were diffused. In this chapter I will do two things. On the one hand, I will define normative power, drawing on and criticizing existing analyses. On the other hand, I will also argue against the (commonplace) view that normative power itself is by definition justified.

Sections one and two argue that if normative power is a form of power, making it a dispositional concept, then it cannot be justified by definition; rather, there are better and worse uses of normative power. By dispositional concept, I mean that normative power as a form of power is a “relatively enduring capac[ity] of” an actor (Morris, 2002: 14), an “unchanging underlying condition” (idem.). Section one applies Morris’s account of power as a dispositional concept to normative power. It defends the view that if normative power is a form of power, then it must refer to an ability, and a particular kind of ‘power-to’. Section two reviews how and why existing conceptualisations of normative power construct it as necessarily justified, and then proceeds to argue against this view. Sections three through five survey the existing literature on normative power, and in doing so describe the essential features of normative power and examine controversial aspects of these features. Given the conclusions of sections one and two, I show how these issues can be resolved. Section three defines norms within the framework of social constructivist theory that is given by proponents of the normative power concept. Section four pertains to impact, where successful norm diffusion is manifested through changes to institutions or inclusion in the range of contested norms. Section five concerns the mechanisms of norm diffusion, using a review of the typology given by Manners to frame the examination, making it clear that for normative power, only communicative acts are the mechanisms by which a norm is diffused. Thus, the two necessary (and jointly sufficient) conditions for having normative power are: 1) A is able to get B to alter its practices so as to reflect the norm(s) that A wishes to promote, and 2) A is able to do so (at least in part) through the use of communicative acts.

1.1: Normative Power as Ability

A review of the characterisations of normative power found in the literature gives a definition of normative power as: A has normative power if it is able to diffuse a norm \( n \) to B (see Manners,
Instances of normative power are identified “by the impact [A] has on what is considered appropriate behaviour by other actors” (Diez, 2005: 615). Thus, an actor who has normative power has the “ability to frame what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour” (Kavalski, 2013: 248) in reference to another actor or state of affairs. The purpose of this section is to describe what is meant by normative power as a dispositional concept (ability). In addition, it clarifies two conceptual issues; what kind of actor can wield normative power, and whether an actor must diffuse its norm rather than a norm.

Manners describes normative power as an ability (Manners 2008b: 59-60, 2009a: 4, 2009b: 792, 800, 2011: 230, 2013: 309). This corresponds to another thesis that has also been canvassed about power itself, by authors such as Stephen Lukes (2005: 12) and Peter Morriss (2002: 13). Though Lukes and Morriss disagree about many things, they both argue that power is a dispositional concept, and that it refers to an ability or capacity. For example, Morriss writes that “as a dispositional concept, [power] is neither a thing (resource or vehicle) nor an event (an exercise of power): it is a capacity” (Morriss, 2002: 19). Similarly, Lukes writes that power “identifies a capacity – power is a potentiality, not an actuality, indeed a potentiality that may never be actualised” (Lukes, 2005: 69). When the concept of power “is used in relation to social life, it refers to the capacities of social agents” (ibid. 71), and in studying ability, “we want to know if A would succeed in doing X if she chose, wanted, and tried to do X, [not] whether she would succeed (by accident) if she tried to do something else” (Morriss, 2005: 62). The ability to do something means that one can “do it if you want to or if you do the appropriate basic actions, and if certain manifestation conditions are met” (ibid. 70). If normative power is a form of power, then it is an ability an actor possesses, and its exercise is something that an actor chooses to do.

This understanding of power stands in contrast to definitions of power that commit either the ‘exercise fallacy’ or the ‘vehicle fallacy’. Both Morriss and Lukes note the tendency of theorists to commit either of these fallacies when talking about power. The exercise fallacy is to say that “power can only mean the causing of an observable sequence of events” (Lukes, 2005: 70), that “the power to do something is nothing more than the doing of it” (Morriss, 2002: 15). The vehicle fallacy is committed when the having of power is equated with resources, “that power must mean whatever goes into operation when power is activated” (Lukes, 2005: 70; Morriss, 2002: 18). Talking about power as a dispositional concept, and therefore normative power, can take the form of ‘power-over’ or ‘power-to’. ‘Power-over’ is understood as A having power over B and B’s actions (see Morriss 2002: 32-35). In the context of normative power, A has normative power over
B in that A has the ability of controlling B by dictating the norm $n$ that B is to adopt. ‘Power-to’ is understood as the ability to effect a specified outcome (idem.). On this interpretation, if A has normative power, it has the ability to diffuse a norm $n$ to B (the specified outcome).

There is evidence of both variants in Manners’ definition of the concept (see Manners 2002: 239 for normative power as ‘power-over’ and Manners 2013 for normative power as ‘power-to’). Rather than attempt to employ both variants throughout the chapter to describe the features of normative power, and given Manners’ claim that normative power as an ‘ability or form of power should also be understood as a conception of social power where ‘power to’ is prior to power over’” (Manners 2011: 230; Barnes 1993: 208), the position taken is that normative power is a form of ‘power-to’.

More importantly though, and as will be shown, there are conceptual reasons that make the ‘power-to’ variant preferable to ‘power-over’ when analysing normative power. Additionally, the relationship between the concepts of ‘power’ and ‘influence’ is contested and the position taken in regards to ‘power-to’ versus ‘power-over’ affects how to understand that relationship.

Normative power as ‘power-over’ experiences the same issues that normative power as ‘power-to’ does if the normative power concept is constructed as necessarily justified. While this interpretation of the normative power concept is potentially problematic in that it establishes the exercise of normative power as a hierarchical relationship between A and B, this relationship does not necessarily have to be one where A dominates B, the relationship can easily be a benign one, for example, the old Buddhist master and her student. There are however, issues with constructing normative power as ‘power-over’, which do make it preferable (but perhaps not necessary) to conceptualise normative power as ‘power-to’. The first issue is that it is more difficult to discuss normative power as ‘power-over’ in neutral terms than it is for normative power as power-to. The normative is harder to get rid of in the former. In other words, it is more difficult to maintain a neutral position in reference to normative even with specifying the criteria by which to ascertain legitimate and illegitimate exercises of the normative power of A over B. Another issue that arises is the difficulty in avoiding the exercise fallacy. If A has power over B, A exercises its normative power over B when A acts to diffuse (or diffuses) a norm $n$ to B. But if A has normative power over B, then one cannot make the assertion that evidence of this is found when we observe the diffusion of norm $n$ – that is the exercise fallacy – and if A acts to diffuse (but does not succeed) to diffuse a norm $n$ to B, that would entail the conclusion that A does not have normative power over B. Furthermore, saying that A has normative power over B seems to imply a sense of relative unimportance of studying whether or not a norm $n$ has been diffused, other than to point to whether

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5 In his more recent work on the subject of normative power (e.g. 2011; 2013), the position Manners appears to favor is that normative power is a form of ‘power-to’.
or not A has power (however benign) over B. Moreover, this implies an ongoing relationship in that what is not important is a specific norm being diffused or the process by which it is being diffused, but whether A has established or can establish power over B continuously. The assertion that normative power is to be thought of as (power-over) establishes an ongoing hierarchical relationship between actors A and B. If A exercises normative power over B then it can diffuse a norm $n$ to B; the diffusion of a norm $n$ therefore is only one indicator in determining whether A exercises normative power over B – this is keeping in mind not to commit the exercise fallacy. Even if we understand it as B willingly complies to A exercising normative power over B this would still be the case. Conceptualising normative power as ‘power-to’ does not run into these issues and for that reason is the preferable option of the two.\textsuperscript{6}

In regards to what kinds of actors can wield normative power, the existing literature has focussed on uses of normative power where the actors in question are nation-states and/or supranational institutions. Although prevailing theories of normative power do not employ examples where the actors in question are individuals, informal groups, or non-governmental institutions, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter as the features of normative power are examined in turn, there is no reason to suppose that these sorts of actors are unable to wield normative power. The examples given in this chapter and throughout the thesis are predominantly ones that have been taken from the published literature, and as such, will be examples where the actor wielding normative power is a nation state or supranational institution. It is enough to say that if normative power is the ability to diffuse a norm $n$ through communicative acts, then it is an ability that can be had by individuals, groups, and institutions.

If an actor has normative power, it is able to diffuse a norm to another actor. Normative power is a form of power and as such is a dispositional concept. The type of actor that can wield normative power can be an individual, group, or institution. Existing conceptualisations of normative power argue that normative power is necessarily justified. Yet if that were the case, it would contradict the assertion that normative power, as a form of power, it refers to an ability or capacity. Section two argues that if normative power is a form of power then it cannot be necessarily justified, rather, it is possible to conceive of both better and worse uses of normative power.

\textsuperscript{6} Another difficulty with conceptualising normative power as ‘power-over’ stems from my conclusion that the most feasible method for evaluating normative power is by judging the communicative acts A employs to diffuse a norm $n$ to B and justifiable uses of normative power are ones that feature deliberation. As I will show in Chapter three, section five, conceptualising normative power as ‘power-over’ would mean that justified uses of normative power are more properly understood in the language of influence. Normative power as ‘power-to’ does not have this difficulty.
1.2: Are all uses of normative power justified?

In the normative power literature, there is general agreement that normative power is by definition justified (i.e. a ‘force for good’) and the argument for what justifies uses of normative power has centred on the claim that the norm(s) being diffused must be universal or universalisable (see: De Zutter 2010; Diez 2005; Forsberg 2011; Laidi 2008; Lerch & Schwellnus 2006; Manners, 2002: 242-4, 2006b, 2008a, 2009, 2011; Merlingen, 2007: 437; Pace 2007; Sjursen 2006b, 2006c). This section first describes why existing conceptualisations of normative power thought it necessary to describe all uses of normative power as justified, and then goes on to argue that if normative power is a form of power, it is an ability, and therefore all uses of normative power are not necessarily justified.

Manners claims that the approach made to justify uses of normative power can be “located in the ability to normalise a more just, cosmopolitical world…‘trying to combine communitarianism with cosmopolitanism’… [where] communitarian, social rights of the self accommodate cosmopolitan, individual rights of others” (Manners 2008a: 47; see Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 1998). International law and principles act as the basis for this justification, as they are considered “generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable” (Manners, 2008a: 46) and represent the most universal and universalisable ‘normative boundary’” (Tocci 2008: 21). Standards and their application within the international arena cannot be simply defined and interpreted at will by the actor in question (Manners, 2006b: 170; see also Manners, 2011: 233), rather, the use of normative power is considered to be acting “in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way” (Manners, 2008a: 45). Moreover, it is “not enough to simply argue that [normative power] has to do with promoting norms and values and not only strategic interests in the international system” (Sjursen, 2006b: 241), an actor that possesses normative power as a capacity “would develop standards, mechanisms and policy instruments that might ensure its own policies are consistent with [common] principles” (Sjursen, 2006b: 248). Although this does presuppose that policies can be perceived as “legitimate and having a moral authority” (Harpaz, 2007: 96), the establishment of “institutions and rules for interaction that are mutually binding” constrains the “ability to promote particular interests” (Sjursen, 2006c: 90; Eriksen, 2006: 255), and provides the necessary “conceptual apparatus that allows us to distinguish what might be normatively acceptable, i.e. what might be a legitimate pursuit of norms” (Sjursen, 2006b: 242).

7 De Zutter diverges slightly from this view, writing, “the norms being diffused are not by definition universal” but goes on to say that this “does not ignore ethical considerations; rather the comparison of different forms of normative power offer the intellectual tools to recognise deviations from the ethical ideal-type of cosmopolitan normative power (2010: 1107-8)” and, “one of the preconditions of the norm-diffuser role is the construction of the normative power’s norms as universal” (ibid. 1112).
If normative power is essentially about trying to change conceptions of the ‘normal’ in the international arena (Manners 2002) and is intended to open up different perspectives in order to “change existing structures of power” (Manners, 2011: 233)\(^8\), then why argue for a ‘universal normative boundary’? The interpretation of ‘normal’ with an external reference point that is “strongly based on international law and institutions” (idem. see also, Pace, 2007: 1047) is intended to provide the “normative boundary within which codified norms can be interpreted and pursued” (Tocci, 2008: 8). Manners writes that an appropriate ‘normative’ viewpoint is to “want to change things – human conduct and international practice… not accept[ing] either the way world politics is, or theories that seek to maintain the status quo” (Manners, 2006d: 118). He stresses a ‘non-neutral’ (Tocci, 2008: 4) understanding of ‘normative’; a particular position is taken in ethical terms (ibid. 5) that is based on “set standards that are universally accepted… [and] require an ‘external reference point’ (op. cit., see also Manners, 2006b: 170-22).

The ‘external reference point’ to assess normativity is international law (Tocci with Manners, 2008: 302). This is in contrast to a ‘neutral’ interpretation where ‘normative’ is taken to mean what is considered ‘normal’ in the international arena (Tocci, 2008: 4). On the view of prevailing interpretations of normative power, an ethically ‘neutral’ interpretation is not able to make a distinction between uses of normative power that stem from the interests of an actor and uses of normative power that an actor undertakes in order to serve the interests of others as well as themselves. For it to constitute normative power, the interests of an actor cannot be seen as wholly strategic or self-regarding (Forsberg, 2011: 1192). A use of normative power is one where that actor “contributes to the reduction of cruelty in world politics and the promotion of global social justice… an expression of border-crossing solidarity with less fortunate people that is grounded not in self-interest but in normative convictions” (Merlingen, 2007: 435; also, Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007: 444). Appropriate interests must be ones that are ‘milieu goals’ (Tocci, 2008: 5-8; Johansson-Nogues, 2007: 182), although acknowledged as being “indirectly related” to the interests of an actor, they are viewed within the context of the wider environment of international relations.

The intention is to convey a sense of moral imperative (Tocci, 2008: 4)\(^9\), and it is for this reason they argue, that in order for the diffusion of a norm through the use of communicative acts to

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\(^8\) Looking at Manners’s various descriptions of normative power makes clear that the intention of normative power is not as some kind of ‘ethical foreign policy’ (Manners 2006d: 117 where he contrasts the concept of normative power to the “more absolutist nature of ethical foreign policy”) and that normative power is strongly based in the tradition of critical social theory (see Manners & Whitman 2003, Manners 2006b, 2008, 2013). This insistence on the fact that normative power should not be conflated with the idea of an ethical foreign policy (Manners, 2008: 46) although technically meant to distance the concept from an essentialist understanding, also implies that Manners does intend for the concept of normative power to be able to describe and analyse actual states of affairs in the international arena, and not just to act as a prescriptive for a particular moral behaviour in the international arena.

\(^9\) Tocci contrasts this with conveying a sense of standardisation or expectation of non-deviance.
constitute normative power, a certain kind of norm (specifically those based in international law) must be diffused. This provides the necessary framework with which to determine when the norms an actor seeks to diffuse are entirely (or even mostly) in their own interests; otherwise normative power would be indistinguishable from traditional forms of power in International Relations.

Existing conceptualisations which define normative power as necessarily legitimate argue that this force for good nature is a consequence of the norms diffused being based in international law and principles. This is because, as Eriksen argues, a robust criterion for judging whether an actor has normative power “can only be derived from the constraints set by ‘international law’ – the cosmopolitan law of the people which depicts a community based on certain universal principles” (Eriksen, 2006: 253). The task of normative power is to “domesticate the existing state of nature between countries by means of human rights, the transformation of international law into a law of global citizens” (ibid. 254). The condition that normative power is by definition legitimate, or rather, this ‘force for good’ connotation (Hyde-Price 2006, 2008; Pace, 2007: 1043, 1045; Johannson-Nogues, 2007: 184; Merlingen, 2007: 438; Sjursen 2006b) is a result of the non-neutral interpretation of ‘normal’ with its requirement that normative power only involves the diffusion of a certain kind of norm. Yet to make a distinction between interests that are normative and interests that are strategic or economic, and to cite this distinction as justification for normative power as necessarily legitimate, is not compatible with the construction of normative power as a dispositional concept. If normative power is a form of power then it is a dispositional concept, an ability or capacity, it therefore cannot be by definition a force for good. If I have the ability to jump over fences, it is not the ability itself that is praiseworthy or otherwise, but whether or not I choose to use my ability, or whether the structure of a social system is such that I am able to jump over a fence while another is arbitrarily barred from doing so. It is therefore possible to conceive of justifiable and unjustifiable uses of normative power.

The purpose of the next three sections is to identify and describe both the essential features of normative power and areas where a lack of clarity is present. This is in order to give as complete a picture as possible for what is normative power, and how the interpretation of normative power as an ability (i.e. disposition, capacity), specifically as a form of ‘power-to’, that I have just defended, can resolve these problems of clarity. An actor uses its normative power when it acts to diffuse expectations of proper behaviour concerning some state of affairs, by communicative acts, to another actor, resulting in either an acceptance of that norm as potentially valid or the

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10 For existing conceptualisations of normative power, it is thought necessary to the concept that its norms diffusion can be seen as not acting solely on the basis of strategic self-interest. How self-interest might be accounted for in justifiable uses of normative power is discussed in Chapter three, section two.
institutionalisation of the norm. As will be seen from the discussion in the remainder of this chapter, there is a tendency to emphasise the importance of international law acting as a normative boundary, and that this normative boundary has been directed towards evaluating the content of norms. The existing criteria and methods by which to morally evaluate uses of normative power is the subject of Chapter two.

1.3: The Role of Norms

Normative power involves the diffusion of norms, and norms are expectations about proper behaviour. This section examines the interpretation of ‘norm’ that is found in existing conceptualisations of normative power and describes some examples of norms. In the normative power literature, the definition of ‘norm’ is social constructivist theory-informed (Diez, 2005: 616; Manners, 2006b: 169; Manners & Whitman 2003; Whitman 2013). Social constructivism emphasises the socially constructed character of actors and institutions in international relations. It conceptualizes the interaction of actors in the international arena as being formed and altered by ongoing social processes (Finnemore 1996) and the interests that an actor has are constructed through social interaction. The actions of an individual or political entity are “structured by the meanings that particular groups of people develop to interpret and organise their identities, relationships, and environment” (Parsons, 2002: 89). The identity or identities of an actor are constructed through the use of language, the development of ideas, and the establishment of norms (Adler, 2005). These “shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what give the world structure, order, and stability” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 894).

Norms, by definition, “embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 892; see Merlingen, 2007: 439; Tocci, 2008: 4). Additionally, norms “channel and regularise behaviour” by limiting the range of choice and thereby constraining the actions of an actor (ibid. 894). Lastly, given the basis in social constructivism, norms are thought to be dynamic and contingent in nature, as opposed to fixed and essentialist (Manners & Whitman 2003; Diez 2005; Manners 2006b); norms are “not written in stone but change over time as [an actor] enacts them in changing circumstances” (De Zutter, 2010: 1110). As an example of a norm, consider the expectation that it is not acceptable for a person to jump the queue. This norm is sometimes enforced informally, through criticism and disapproval, and sometimes formally, through sanctions. In both cases, the effect of norm enforcement is to channel and regularise the behaviour of individuals. For social constructivists, the norm itself is a product of a given social environment: it is a construction and not a part of nature (Wendt, 1999: 1).
As such, the content of the norm, and the enforcement mechanisms attached to it, can change over time, and may vary between groups. Jumping a queue might be more acceptable in one context, or might attract stronger sanctions in another, or might admit to different kinds of exceptions (e.g. the elderly, or adults with children).

Although in social constructivism there are many different ways that norm construction, alteration, and/or diffusion could occur, for the concept of normative power, the object of analysis is whether an actor (agent) is able to diffuse a norm to another actor.\(^{11}\) The normative power literature follows and adapts Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s approach (Tocci with Manners, 2008: 324); in an “ideational international structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 894). Finnemore and Sikkink assume that actors can develop through the establishment of norms rather than only changing as a result of pressure or force. Norms are “actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community” (ibid. 896). These agents, or ‘norm entrepreneurs’,\(^{12}\) construct what Finnemore and Sikkink label ‘cognitive frames’, which are meant to “call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them” (ibid. 897) and the effort to promote a new norm takes place “within the standards of ‘appropriateness’ defined by prior norms” (op. cit.). Reusing the example of ‘not acceptable to jump a queue’ as the norm an actor (agent/’norm entrepreneur’) intends to diffuse, A uses its normative power in order for B to accept\(^{13}\) this norm; as a ‘new’ norm, a particular iteration of the norm, and/or a particular response to violators of the norm (e.g. the elderly do not have to adhere to the norm, that the appropriate response to a norm violator is a verbal reprimand, etc.).

Examples of norms found in the normative power literature are ones whose content can be clearly traced to existing international law\(^{14}\) (Tocci 2008; Makarychev 2008; Sjursen 2006a, 2006b; Womack 2008, Kaldor et. al. 2007; Manners 2002; Schiepers & Sicurelli 2007) and include:

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\(^{11}\) Although the use of normative power can occur within societies (domestically), in the same way that individuals, groups, and institutions can potentially wield normative power, I am only concerned with the use of normative power in the international arena.

\(^{12}\) Finnemore and Sikkink write, “[a] way to think about norm entrepreneurs is that they provide the information and publicity that provoke cognitive dissonance among norm violators” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 904).

\(^{13}\) Ideally, this would mean that B would agree to adhere to the norm but I do not think acceptance in the form of adherence is necessary in order for it to constitute normative power. B could recognise the norm as having some sort of merit – for example, B could recognise a norm where it is not acceptable to work on Saturdays – the norm has merit because those who adhere to it do so for religious reasons and B accepts the more generalised norm that it is acceptable behaviour to tolerate others religious practices. This discussion relates to identifying impact in normative power, in other words, what constitutes successful uses of normative power, and will be discussed in section 1.4.

\(^{14}\) The centrality of international law in determining the content of the norms of normative power, as well as providing the normative boundary for norms (and by extension, for normative power), has to do with the perceived need to make a distinction between normative interests and strategic interests. These issues will be described and examined in sections five and six.
adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights and other fundamental freedoms, and the centrality of peace (Manners, 2002: 241, 2006b, 2008; see also, Forsberg 2011; Lerch & Schwellnus 2006; Pace 2007; Tocci 2008). The social constructivist basis means that these norms, as “all-encompassing values… can be interpreted in a myriad different ways by different actors at different points in time” (Tocci, 2008: 6), which necessitates the establishment of a ‘normative boundary’ (ibid.). In the existing literature the normative boundary is provided by the requirements of international law, with the knowledge that pursuit of international regularisation binds the actions and behaviour of all parties, including the actor using its normative power (ibid. 8). An actor would “create the norm, articulating it within the confines of international law then contribute to spreading the norm through their international relations as well as transnational networks (Tocci with Manners, 2008: 324). This “ultimately leads to a ‘cascade’ of norm compliance through successful socialization of other international actors” (idem.). Instances of normative power, although varied to some degree in regards to norm content or response to norm violators, all reflect an adherence to existing international law and a commitment to establishing increased international regularisation. The following examples of norms diffused by actors have all been taken from the normative power literature. The EU has taken the lead in negotiations on international accounting standards, making the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) EU law internally and calling for the IRFS to become the European international accounting norm, in direct competition with the American US-GAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) (Tocci, 2008: 325). In the case of EU-Russia trans-border cooperation in the north, “Russia has adopted EU acquis norms regulating air and water pollution, water purification, healthcare, civil servant training and financial regulations” (Tocci, 2008: 324; Makarychev 2008). China professes a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states (based on the norm ‘demonstrate respect for others’ [Womack, 2008]), which “underwrites the emphasis on ‘state sovereignty’” (Zhou 2004, in Kavalski, 2013: 256). This is a reflection of “China’s objection to the practices of international intervention (regardless of whether it is military or through demands for democratization), [this] erosion of sovereignty frustrates the development of the perceived ‘victim’, undermines the stability of neighbouring countries, and ultimately counteracts the objectives of the ‘perpetrator’” (Shih, 1990: 41, in Kavalski, 2013: 256-7; see also, Womack 2008, 2010).

Normative power does not explicitly require that an actor diffuse its norm to another actor as opposed to a norm. However, it does appear to be the assumption that A’s own adherence to the

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15 The normative boundary has been specifically applied to the content of the norms, not the mechanisms by which those norms are diffused; this will be examined in section five.

16 The extent of Russia’s adherence to each norm may not be equal across the board; the extent of Russia’s adherence pertains to impact, a topic which will be discussed in section four.
norm it aims to diffuse be an important factor in determining normative power, as evidenced by the belief that “how others perceive the relationships between the EU’s stated norms and its external practices forms the basis on which they confirm or question its claim to normative power” (De Zutter, 2010: 1113; see also, Bicchi 2006; Diez 2005; Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002: 769, 771-4; Lerch & Schwellnus 2006; Pace, 2007: 1056-7). Failure of A to adhere to the norms it aims to diffuse is often cast as being a shortcoming in terms of legitimacy. One author remarks how “the commitment to values are rather vague in the finalised [ENP] Action Plans…pledges for normative reform [in line with a set of normative principles] are kept in a very general language without specifying what exact measures in terms of democracy, human rights and liberties should be taken in order to obtain new privileges from the EU” (Johannson-Nogues, 2007: 189). Although if A diffuses its norm this would likely be an indication of greater sincerity on the part of A, which could make it more likely for the norm diffusion to occur, whether or not A is sincere does not seem to be necessary to describe what normative power is. Furthermore, sincerity is not easily measured, if it is a necessary condition that A diffuse its norms, some proof would be needed to demonstrate that A adheres to and believes the norms it aims to diffuse. For these reasons, it is not necessary for A to diffuse its norm when describing normative power.

When an actor uses its normative power, it is diffusing a norm to another actor. A norm is an expectation of acceptable behaviour concerning some state of affairs, and an actor could diffuse a ‘new’ norm, a particular interpretation of an existing norm, and/or a particular response to violators of a norm. The next section identifies impact, in other words what identifies A using its normative power to diffuse a norm \( n \) to B.

1.4: Identifying Uses of Normative Power

An actor with normative power “depicts itself as a multilateral actor in international relations who uses…diplomatic means and instruments to reach its objectives” (Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007: 444). Given that the ‘power’ part of normative power “implies the ability to achieve results” (Forsberg 2011: 1194), then if A has normative power, it must be able to do one of two things. Either A must be able to cause B to alter its behaviour so as to conform to norm \( n \), and this might take the form of institutional, policy, or legal change (see Tocci, 2008: 12). Or A must be able to cause B to accept norm \( n \) as potentially valid, by acknowledging it as part of the acceptable range of contested discourses. This section discusses the different ways that impact can be said to occur in normative power.
Returning to the example of queue-jumping, A has normative power in relation to B if it is able to get B to act in accordance with the norm ‘it is not acceptable to jump a queue’ or to recognise it as a potentially valid norm. In the first sense, although evidence of this could be B making it illegal to jump any queue, for any reason, violators being punished by a specified fine, impact in this sense could also take the form of B adhering to the content, but altering the response to norm violators. Evidence of diffusion in the latter sense could be B recognising the norm as potentially valid, it is for B one discourse amongst others as a way to evaluate proper human behaviour in public. Existing accounts of normative power have prioritised the formal aspect of this first sense of impact, arguing that the actions of an actor must result in the “effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment” (Tocci, 2008: 11). A ‘normative’ goal is one whose aim is to “shape the milieu by regulating it through international regimes, organizations, and law” (Tocci, 2008: 7) and “promote the rights and duties enshrined and specified in international law” (ibid. 12). The establishment of the rule of law and protection of human rights are “the best means of strengthening the international order” (Johannson-Nogues, 2007: 182). Essentially, this understands the aim of normative power as a project of normalisation that is achieved through international institution-building and legal codification. An example of this would be the US and its pursuit of the goal of establishing a predictable open international economic order with widely shared rules and procedures that can underpin a stable, non-discriminatory trading order. The procedure underscores the rule of law, affirms the principle that trade must be non-discriminatory, and makes trading systems more secure and predictable. The EU taking the lead on the institutionalisation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is another example. However, not all imagined instances of B acting in accordance with norm n seem to require that it result in the establishment of formal institutionalisation that helps to strengthen the international order. For example, a norm has been diffused by A if B now adheres to the practice of all men and women over a certain age fully covering their heads out in public for a religious reason, in response to the communicative acts of A, without the norm being made into law of public policy. Although the impact of uses of normative power can be the construction and strengthening of international law, it does not seem to be necessary to the concept of normative power. In general, formal institutional, policy, or legal change is response to the communicative acts of A would probably be considered evidence of a more sincere acceptance on the part of B or indicative of A having more normative power.

17 Part of the emphasis might have to do with the use of international law as the normative boundary for the content of the norms, but its use will be discussed in the next section (section five) and in section six I argue that international law should not act as the normative boundary/standard of legitimacy for the concept of normative power.
On the other hand, impact can be said to have occurred if B recognises A’s norm as being potentially valid, accepting and including it in the range of contested discourses. For example, the EU’s efforts to alter the norm on the death penalty, while not (yet) achieving a worldwide moratorium, is judged as successful because it has brought external pressure to bear on certain countries that have not yet abolished capital punishment. These countries have included the norm that capital punishment is an issue of human rights in the accepted range of discourses concerning the appropriate punishment of criminals. However, as a form of impact, the idea that if A is able to get B to recognise A’s norm, but is unable to get B to make an institutional or legal alteration in accordance with the norm, does seem to be more like influence than power as traditionally understood (see Forsberg, 2011: 1197). This issue will be examined in chapter three. For now, it is enough to say that the recognition of a norm as potentially valid is one way to identify uses of normative power.

How does an actor diffuse a norm, in other words, what are the mechanisms of diffusion for normative power? The next section describes the typology of norm diffusion given by Manners. The typology is examined and amended through the lens of Tuomas Forsberg’s 2011 analysis, highlighting three difficulties of the existing typology. In contrast to existing conceptualisations of normative power, the next section makes it clear that for something to constitute normative power, the mechanisms of norm diffusion must only be communicative acts.

1.5: How Are Norms Diffused?

This section describes the various mechanisms of norm diffusion, drawing on the analyses of Manners and Forsberg. Although Manners does not give a clear account of his typology (see: Forsberg, 2011: 1196; De Zutter 2010; Sjursen 2006b; Bicchi 2006), it will be used to frame the discussion. This is for two reasons. First, Manners, has made use of this typology throughout his work on the subject of normative power and can be found in one of his more recent articles (2013); as such, the typology has influence in the normative power literature. Second, and more importantly, this typology brings into focus three difficulties in the existing literature for determining mechanisms of normative power. All three difficulties stem from lack of definitional clarity in Manners’ typology and the analysis of that typology by other authors. Although it is not always clear in the literature on normative power, the mechanisms of norm diffusion are limited to the use of communicative acts rather than the use of material incentives or physical force (Manners, 2013: 310). The range of communicative acts includes dialogue and deliberation as well as the threat of force. This section does not make a normative distinction between the kinds of
communicative acts. Its purpose is only to demonstrate the centrality of communicative acts to the concept of normative power.

Normative power “relies on persuasion, argument, and shaming rather than action or structure to shape change… [and] is a discursive formation that relies on legitimacy, coherence, and voluntarism for its influence” (Manners, 2008b: 570; also, Manners 2007, 2009, 2013). Manners argues that what is significant about the mechanisms of diffusion is the “relative absence of physical force in the imposition of norms” (Manners, 2006b: 184; Manners, 2013: 310); rather, “civil activism, collective action, public sphere and reconciliation are part of a political sphere” (Manners, 2006b: 185) that informs uses of normative power. Others have also emphasised the centrality of deliberative communicative acts in distinguishing normative power from other forms of power, citing “socialisation, and persuasion (e.g. dialogue, debate, and argumentation)” (De Zutter 2010: 1114, 1118; also, Forsberg, 2011: 1196-8; Johansson-Nogues, 2007: 188-9), and the “better argument” (Sjursen 2006b: 174; Sjursen 2006a: 241-2) as the means of normative power.

Manners identifies six mechanisms of diffusion in normative power. These are: *transference, overt, procedural, contagion, cultural filter*, and *informational* (Manners, 2002: 244-5, 2006e 76-81, 2013: 314-9). An actor can deploy some or all of these mechanisms together in order to effect its desired outcome. All of the following examples are from the normative power literature. The diffusion of a norm by *transference* takes place when an actor exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means (ibid. 245). According to Manners, *transference* occurs “when the EU is involved in the transfer of material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and technical assistance [as well as] engagement and support, including dialogue on…ideas” (Manners, 2013: 317). *Overt* diffusion is a result of the physical presence of an actor in third states and international organizations (Manners, 2002: 245).

In defining ‘physical presence’ in his 2002 article, Manners is careful to characterize it in terms of diplomatic and advisory roles. An example of overt diffusion is the diffusion of electoral norms in countries with EU electoral observation missions. *Procedural* diffusion involves the

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18 This is in line with Finemore and Sikkink’s suggestion, taken from Kenneth Waltz, that ways socialisation might occur include: “emulation (of heroes), praise (for behaviour that conforms to group norms), and ridicule (for deviation)” (Waltz, 1979: 75-6, in Finemore & Sikkink 1998: 902). Emulation is found in the normative power literature (Manners 2002, 2013; De Zutter 2010; Forsberg 2011; Zielonka 2008); however, I have chosen not to include it as one possible way to understand the mechanisms of normative power. The way in which emulation has been described makes it something that B does, which although relevant in examining instances of normative power, is not a mechanism of normative power and therefore not part of the definition. Another reason is that Manners argues that normative power is distinct from the ideas of exceptionalism and building of hierarchical relationships (Manners 2006b: 173-4). He ties these two ideas to the concept of soft power, while also conceptually distanciing normative power from soft power, by associating the latter with US national interests and foreign policy debate (ibid. see, Manners 2002, 2010). An implicit connection is made between exceptionalism/emulation (that Manners explicitly labels ‘American’) (Manners 2006b: 174) and soft power (that he associates with the US debate) (Manners, 2010: 116).
institutionalization of a relationship between the actor exercising normative power and a third party and is described as: “inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an international organization, or enlargement” (ibid.). For Manners, examples of procedural diffusion are found in the association agreements the EU has with various neighbouring countries. They are institutionalised relationships that “include discussion and diffusion of human rights, the environment and core labour standards to varying degrees” (Manners, 2013: 317). Informational diffusion is a result of the range of strategic communications and includes policy initiatives and declaratory communications (Manners, 2002: 244), “including persuasive attraction and argumentative promotion of ideas” (Manners, 2013: 316). As an example, Manners cites the October 2003 Commission communication on ‘the choice of multilateralism’ as the “first conscious step after the March 2003 unilateral invasion of Iraq to convey [to other actors] the centrality of the UN system to the EU” (ibid.). Informational diffusion consists of speech acts backed by the presumption that any subsequent action would be in line with the norms being promoted in the communicatory action (Manners 2008a). The diffusion of a norm by Contagion has to do with the idea of leading by ‘virtuous example’ (Manners, 2002: 244). Examples include the exportation of “its [the EU] experiment in regional integration” to other regions, like with MERCOSUR in South America (Manners, 2013: 315). Cultural filter as a mechanism of diffusion affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations, leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms (ibid. 245; Manners, 2013: 318) and is “exemplified by the spread of democratic norms in China, human rights norms in Turkey, and environmental norms in Britain” (Forsberg, 2011: 1186).

A review of the literature on Manners’ typology of norm diffusion identifies three conceptual difficulties; one stems from lack of determinacy in distinguishing uses of normative power from civilian power and military power, the second is the uncertain connection between normative power and the use of threats and coercion, and the third arises when considering the mechanisms of cultural filter and contagion in the context of the concepts of ‘power’ and ‘influence’. Each difficulty will be examined in turn, and to frame the discussion, the four mechanisms that Forsberg (2011) suggests will be employed alongside Manners’ mechanisms of diffusion. These four mechanisms have been drawn from the existing normative power literature, correspond to the typology given by Manners (Forsberg, 2011: 196) and will more easily allow for a demonstration of the difficulties listed above. The labels and descriptions of Forsberg’s typology make it evident that the means of normative power are solely communicative acts. The mechanisms are: persuasion, invocation of norms, shaping the discourse, and the power of example (Forsberg, 2011: 1196-8).

**Persuasion** (which Forsberg compares to *informational diffusion*) “involves skills such as the use of rhetoric, personal or collective attraction, or capitalizing on relevant knowledge” (ibid. 1196).

**Invocation of norms** (compares to *procedural diffusion*) involves the “activation of commitments” (Parsons 1963, in Forsberg, 2011: 1197), which Forsberg describes as the shaming of actor B by actor A when B violates agreed upon ‘normative clauses’ (Forsberg, 2011: 1197). *Shaping the discourse of what is normal* (compares to *cultural filter*) is described as an indirect form of power (in contrast to persuasion), and can be an end in itself and a ‘vehicle of power’ (idem.). *The power of example* (compares to *contagion* ) is characterised as “a kind of socialisation or group pressure” (ibid. 1198).

The first difficulty is that the role of these mechanisms has been left unspecified in such a way that it seems some mechanisms “clash with the notion of normative power” (idem. see also: Bicchi 2006; De Zutter 2010; Diez 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Johannson-Nogues 2007; Nicolaidis 2004; Pace 2007). This is because some mechanisms as have been defined by Manners, seem to more accurately be understood in terms of civilian power or military power. Forsberg picks out *transference* and *overt* as the two mechanisms that have this difficulty. *Transference* “points to economic conditionality as a means of fostering norms and so might be better seen as a mechanism of economic [civilian] power” (Forsberg, 2011: 1196). To resolve this problem, *transference* can be amended to describe when A focuses its communicative acts on the exchange of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with B in order to diffuse a norm to B, in other words, the use of persuasion or argumentation of some form. For example, the EU Tacis programme, whose aim was to promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law, is cited by Manners as an example of *transference* (Manners, 2002: 245). The use of normative power is limited to the communicative acts between the EU and a partner state that led to the implementation of the programme. Actually exchanging goods, aid, technical assistance, and imposing sanctions are not communicative acts and are therefore not normative power, but civilian power. With *overt* diffusion, it is unclear how it occurring “as a result of physical presence actually works: the fact that it is based on missions on site does not indicate whether it is a different mechanism, or only a more effective way to convey information and persuade third parties” (Forsberg, 2011: 1196).

Furthermore, the US led military invasion of Iraq can easily be construed as an example of overt diffusion as well (Diez, 2005: 621-3). Diez argues; “it [the invasion] was driven by a particular worldview with strong ideas of how democracy should work… the invocation of norms and the commitment to spreading those norms, which are held to be universal, plays a central role” (ibid. 621). Although Manners (2006a: 183) does amend his earlier position by making it a requirement that military presence is only suitable when it is preceded by careful deliberation ('critical reflection') he remains vague on what might constitute careful deliberation, and this does not
resolve the difficulty brought up by Forsberg. Rather than attempt to argue how the physical presence of A in the territorial boundaries of B signifies a separate mechanism of norm diffusion, the more intuitive decision would be to assert that the physical presence of A, be it electoral, humanitarian, military, etc., can be (depending on the situation) a more or less effective way of conveying information through persuasion or invocation of norms. To be clear, for the concept of normative power, the mechanisms of diffusion are strictly communicative acts. If A places economic sanctions on B, or conducts a military assault on B, then those are instances of civilian power and military power respectively, not normative power. As previously stated, normative power is intended to augment, not replace the concepts of civilian power and military power (Manners 2002, 2013; Manners & Whitman, 2004).

The second conceptual difficulty is the lack of clarity concerning the connection between normative power and the use of coercive threats, which are typically thought of as being ‘hard’ instruments. Hard instruments are ones that feature the use of force or sanctions, whereas soft instruments are ones that attempt to effect the desired outcome through good behaviour and attraction. The general position found in the literature is that “normative power does not necessarily rely on ‘soft’ instruments to spread its norms; it can resort to coercive [means]”20 (Diez, 2005: 616; Diez & Manners, 2007: 176, in De Zutter, 2010: 1114). The communicative acts of normative power are “instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the confines of the law”21 (Tocci, 2008: 10; see also, Bicchi 2006; De Zutter 2010; Lerch & Schwellnus 2006; Martin & Owen 2010; Matlary 2008; Merlingen 2007; Sjursen 2006b). And, as Eriksen argues, there is an implied need for coercive means because “only with the threat of sanctions [economic or military] can the law compel compliance” (Eriksen, 2006: 252; Sjursen 2006a, 2006b: 245; Johannson-Nogues 2007: 191). Persuasion, which Manners refers to repeatedly in his most recent discussion on the mechanisms of norm diffusion (2013), can, “cover both manipulative moves and propaganda, public diplomacy and (dis)information campaigns, as well as the force of the better argument in an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Müller, 2004)” (Forsberg, 2011: 1196) and noting that there is an absence of physical force and material resources in the imposition of norms (Manners, 2006: 186) does imply that the imposition of a norm may or may not be allowed. The invocation of norms “refers to the fact that these normative clauses… can be invoked by one party when they are violated by another party” (Forsberg, 2011: 1197) and can be a form of shaming or argumentation that could be

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20 ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ instruments can be found in both military and civilian power; there is not a distinction between civilian power/soft instruments and military power/hard instruments. Moreover, as Sjursen comments; “civilian instruments, although often referred to as ‘soft’ instruments, are not necessarily benign and neither are they necessarily non-coercive…sanctions can cause harm, and what is more, their effects are often indiscriminate” (Sjursen 2006a: 239).

21 This goes back to the idea that international law provides the ‘normative boundary’ for determining norm content.
construed as contradictory (and coercive). As an example, according to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), EU relations with neighbouring are dependent on a “demonstrated ability to effectively implement EU-promoted political, economic and institutional reforms... [and] ‘concrete progress in demonstrating shared values’” (Commission 2003, in Johannson-Nogues, 2007: 182). Yet contradictions are “evident in the [ENP Action Plan] with Ukraine, compared to the ease that non-reformist Tunisia obtained a fairly far-reaching Action Plan without having to make any substantial concessions in the normative realm (e.g. neither in terms of free or fair elections or even easing restrictions on political opposition or civil society)” (Johansson-Nogues 2004, in Johannson-Nogues, 2007: 189; see also, Barbe & Johansson-Nogues 2008; Bicchi 2006; Nicolaidis & Howse 2002). The use of threats and coercion do seem to have some part in describing the communicative acts of normative power, although its nature and when it can be used has not been made very clear. Further complicating matters are the references to building ‘non-hierarchical relationships’ and the role of the ‘vanishing mediator’ (Diez 2005; Forsberg 2011; Manners 2002; 2006a; 2006b; 2006d; 2008; 2013), which suggests that an ideal use of normative power is one that is absent coercive force (Tocci, 2008: 2). The difficulty concerning the role of threats and coercion to normative power will be returned to again in Chapters two and three as it pertains to a framework for evaluating uses of normative power. For now, the purpose is only to point out that coercive threats are a communicative act by which norms can be diffused, and that existing accounts of normative power already accept that these kinds of communication fall within the domain of normative power. The acceptance of this point amongst normative power scholars lends support to my claim that normative power might not always be a force for good.

The third difficulty to consider has to do with the mechanisms of contagion and cultural filter as their (similar) definitions stand in regards to the concept of ‘power’ as generally understood. Manners describes cultural filter as the “interplay between the construction of knowledge and the...subjects of norm diffusion” (Manners, 2013: 318). The wording is problematic because it does not describe how A might diffuse a norm to B, but rather something B does. If normative power is a disposition, then how B responds to a norm is of interest in regards to impact, but cultural filter would not be a mechanism of normative power. Forsberg’s characterisation of cultural filter as being able to shape the discourse of what is normal helps to resolve this confusion, and would make the mechanism another form of persuasion. An example Forsberg gives is the “EU shaping the idea of regions, particularly in the case of the Mediterranean and its adoption of a regional identity” (Forsberg, 2011: 1197; Pace 2004, 2007). Another example is when the EU acted to reorder the language of international society, arguing that capital punishment should be understood in the language of human rights, rather than a sovereign issue of criminal justice.
Meanwhile, the mechanism of *contagion* Manners describes as being ‘unintentional’ (Manners, 2002: 244) and essentially leading by example (Manners, 2013: 315). Forsberg echoes this description with his fourth mechanism, the *power of example*,\(^{22}\) which “points to the idea that [an actor] has [normative] power when it simply stands as a model for others to follow” and has to do with “imitation that copies best practices” (Forsberg, 2011: 1197; Manners 2013: 315).\(^{23}\) This can mean the promotion of rights-based norms, it can also be understood as regional integration and structured cooperation (ibid. 1198). The imitation of the African Union (AU) of the EU model (Manners, 2013: 315; Manners, 2002: 244), and the EU’s adoption and promotion of the Kyoto Protocol (idem.) are cited as instances of this mechanism. However, if normative power is a disposition (ability, capacity), then the decision of A to manifest (or not) its normative power to diffuse a norm to B must be intentional and there must be a traceable path from the communicative acts of A to the adoption of the norm by B. To paraphrase Morriss, we are not just interested in the events themselves (e.g. that the AU institutional model imitates the EU model, or that other actors have observed the EU’s commitment to environmental norms and have decided to imitate the EU by adhering to those same norms), but in the capacity (of A) to produce events of these kinds (Morriss, 2002: 22). Therefore, all uses of normative power, i.e. the diffusion of a norm by A to B, are presumed to be intentional.

The mechanisms of diffusion in normative power are communicative acts such as persuasion, invocation of norms, argumentation, and shaming. It may refer to either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ instruments, though in what cases these can be used is not clear. The mechanisms are different ways to describe persuasion, argumentation, shaming, and deliberation in the diffusion of norms by A to B. In a use of normative power, A employs communicative acts to diffuse a norm n to B. The communicative acts are about the content of norm n and possibly, why B ought to be inclined to accept norm n in part or whole.

**Conclusion**

\(^{22}\) Forsberg notes that this mechanism seems to have more to do with ‘influence’ than ‘power’ as usually understood. The way normative power connects to the concepts of ‘influence’ and ‘power’ will be the focus of the third chapter. For now, the intention is only to demonstrate that this mechanism (as one of the mechanisms in Manners’ typology) is communicative in nature and is intentional. This connects to an assumption that appears throughout the normative power literature that A’s own adherence to the norm it aims to diffuse impacts B’s acceptance of the norm. This may or may not be the case, however, as a question of sincerity (see section one) it is relevant only insofar as it might indicate the likelihood of A diffusing the norm to B.  

\(^{23}\) This is the same as the problem with emulation being included in the mechanism of norm diffusion typology (see footnote 10).

26
This chapter has addressed two questions; what is normative power? Are all uses of normative power justified? Normative power is the ability of A to diffuse expectations of proper behaviour through communicative acts to B, as evidence by the institutionalisation of a norm/discourse or recognition of it as potentially valid. An actor uses its normative power when it acts to diffuse expectations of proper behaviour concerning some state of affairs, by communicative acts, to another actor, resulting in either an acceptance of that norm as potentially valid or the institutionalisation of the norm. Existing conceptualisations of normative power argue that normative power is by definition justified, i.e. necessarily a force for good. Yet if that were the case, it would contradict the assertion that normative power, as a form of power, is an ability that an actor can choose to exercise at will. If normative power is a form of power, then it is an ability of an actor. As such, all uses of normative power are not necessarily justified. Therefore, there are justifiable and unjustifiable uses of normative power.

The next chapter describes existing accounts for morally better uses of normative power. These approaches justify uses of normative power by arguing that good uses of normative power are ones where A diffuses a justifiable norm $n$ to B. I argue, in contrast to these existing approaches, that the preferable method of evaluation is one that focuses on the mechanisms of diffusion. In other words, did A employ justifiable communicative acts to diffuse a norm $n$ to B? Moreover, I argue that a neutral position ought to be taken in regards to the content of the norms diffused.
Chapter Two: Evaluating Uses of Normative Power

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and describe approaches for evaluating normative power. The need for a way to evaluate uses of normative power is, in the words of Manners, because a focus on “empirical truth claims is unsustainable – analysis needs to also account for how we judge and justify such claims, as well as engaging in critique” (Manners, 2011: 228). This chapter argues that in contrast to existing attempts found in the normative power literature, it is preferable to evaluate uses of normative power according to the mechanisms of diffusion (i.e. communicative acts). There are three possible approaches to judge a use of normative power: a) justification of a norm \( n \), b) justification of the means by which a norm \( n \) is diffused, or c) justification of both a norm \( n \) and the means of its diffusion. According to the first approach, better uses of normative power are ones where A diffuses to B a norm \( n \) whose content is justifiable. On the second approach, better uses of normative power are ones where A diffuses a norm \( n \) to B by employing justifiable mechanisms of diffusion (i.e. means). The third approach requires a better use of normative power to be one where A diffuses to B a norm \( n \) whose content is justifiable and does so by employing justifiable mechanisms of diffusion.

Manners attempts to establish the criteria by which normative power should be evaluated by explicitly employing the third approach. For a norm \( n \) to be justified, its content must be based in principles of international law. The principles of international law are justified by virtue of them being recognised as universally applicable. For the means, or actions by which a norm \( n \) is diffused to be justified, they must consist of persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame (Manners, 2011: 235). In other words, a use of normative power is justified if the content of the norm diffused conforms to principles derived from the international law of the United Nations (UN) system (see Manners, 2002; 2006; 2008a; 2011) and if the actions taken to diffuse a norm are part of a process characterised by critical reflection (Manners, 2006: 183).

However, in actuality, Manners’s argument puts the emphasis on establishing criteria for the justification of a norm \( n \) while the criteria by which to judge the means by which a norm \( n \) is diffused (communicative acts), are left vague. For organisational purposes, I am going to consider the arguments for the justifications of norm content and of means separately, but will give my objections to existing attempts together. Section one describes two approaches for the justification of norm content, noting the emphasis placed on the diffusion of ‘universal’ norms. The first approach is the one given by Manners, the second approach is one that has been developed by Sjursen (2006b, 2006c) and is described here because it both expands on the criteria given by Manners and helps to demonstrate the importance of deliberation to the concept of normative power. Section two describes how the means, or actions, of normative power are justified in the
normative power literature. In these accounts, actions of open dialogue and the absence of coercion appear to, at some times act as a communicative ideal for actors, and at other times, as an important condition for a justifiable use of normative power. Furthermore, the role of coercion and impositions, to what extent are they acceptable, remains vaguely defined. Section three argues against specified norm content as a criterion for evaluating uses of normative power. This is because of two difficulties. One is the interpretive ambiguity that results, and second is the ill-defined role of coercion and imposition that results in the possible diffusion of justified norms through unjustifiable means. Because of these difficulties, uses of normative power ought to be justified not by virtue of the content of the norm diffused, or by both the norm diffused and the communicative act deployed to diffuse that norm, but only by the communicative act(s) deployed in the diffusion of a norm. Therefore, for evaluating uses of normative power, a reference does not necessarily need to be made to the content of the norm $n$ diffused in order for a use of normative power to be justifiable. Rather, a moral evaluation of normative power ought to focus on the communicative acts (means, mechanisms) employed by A to diffuse a norm $n$ to B.

In the normative power literature, the properties of ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’ are often cited as useful for determining legitimate normative power. Coherence ensures that an actor is “not pragmatically promoting its own norms, but that the principles are part of more international commitments” (Manners, 2009: 39). Consistency is the concern that an actor “does not promote norms with which it does itself not comply” (idem.).$^{24}$ Manners argues that, because of these demands, an evaluation of normative power ought to include the requirement that the content of the norms diffused, as well as the mechanisms of diffusion, refer to principles of international law (Manners 2011: 233; see also Manners 2009). I do not want to focus on how an actor and its foreign policy can be seen as legitimate if it uses normative power but on how to judge and justify uses of normative power in general. For this reason, the demand for consistency and coherence, although not unimportant in assessing an actor and their foreign policy, is not in this context, appropriate as evaluative criteria. It being the case that the use of normative power is not necessarily justified, what are possible standards to apply in order to judge and justify uses of normative power? This is a separate and distinct issue from whether or not an actor who uses normative power (in its foreign policy) can be seen as legitimate. Additionally, rather than say that uses of normative power be either legitimate or illegitimate in the sense of having full, complete, or authoritative political legitimacy (if legitimacy is treated as a normative concept), I want to make a much more modest claim – what might be a useful theoretical standard of justification in evaluating

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$^{24}$ For articles that use these terms and definitions when on the topic of normative power, see also Bicchi 2006; Harpaz; 2007; Lerch and Schwellnus 2006; Schiepers and Sicurelli, 2007.
uses of normative power. In describing the existing approaches of justification found in the normative power literature, which do in some cases cite legitimacy, I hope to demonstrate that existing accounts are not convincing.

2.1: Evaluating Uses of Normative Power

A norm is justifiable if its content can said to be universal or universalisable (see: De Zutter 2010; Diez 2005; Eriksen, 2006: 253; Forsberg 2011; Laidi 2008; Lerch & Schwellnus 2006; Manners, 2002: 242-4, 2006b, 2008: 37, 2009, 2011; Merlingen, 2007: 437; Pace 2007; Sjursen 2006b, 2006c; Tocci 2008). The first view described in this section is an account given by Ian Manners. It asserts that uses of normative power are justified provided that only those norms that are already embodied in international law are promoted. The second view is an account given by Helene Sjursen. It asserts that uses of normative power are justified provided that the promoted norms satisfy Habermas’ principle of universalisation. However, Sjursen ends up retreating from this position and endorsing a hybrid position that largely incorporates Manners’ requirement that appropriate norm content is derived from principles of international law. Similar to both arguments is the emphasis on the diffusion of justifiable norms to justify uses of normative power.

One way to evaluate normative power is to ask whether the norms that are diffused are universal or universalisable. In this context, ‘universal’ could mean: universalism of scope, a norm $n$ applies to all; universalism of justification, a norm $n$ can be justified to all; or both (see Caney, 2005). If a thing (in this case, a norm $n$) is universal in scope, it is not necessarily universal by justification, and vice versa. Although not specified, Manners has used universal in both senses, implying that ‘universal’ is intended to mean both where uses of normative power are concerned. The EU (and presumably other actors who justifiably use their normative power) promote nine ‘substantive normative principles’ “that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable” (Manners, 2008: 46) (i.e. universalism of scope) but the demand to give a normative justification (Manners 2013) favours the argument that justifiable norms are those norms that can be justified to all (i.e. universalism of justification).

According to the account given by Manners, justifiable uses of normative power are ones where the norms promoted are already embodied in international law. According to the account given by Sjursen, justifiable uses of normative power are ones where the norm promoted satisfies Habermas’ principle of universalisation. Both views agree that the diffusion of norms should be morally evaluated by reference to the content of the norms themselves. The difference between them is that while Manners says that justifiable uses of normative power may only promote those norms that
have been ‘acknowledged’ as ‘universally applicable’ in the ‘United Nations system’, Sjursen implies that actors may permissibly promote those norms that are in principle consistent with Habermasian discourse ethics. On this view, a norm can be promoted if “[a]ll affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interest (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation” (Habermas 1990: 65). However, Sjursen ends up endorsing a position that incorporates both of these approaches, since she thinks that only those norms that are consistent with Habermas’ discourse ethics and what are embodied in international law should be promoted. I will present the two views as alternatives, and discuss Sjursen’s ‘hybrid’ after setting out each.

2.1.1: Established International Law as Criteria for Evaluation

For this approach, which Manners is the main proponent of, appropriate norm content must refer to principles or standards found in established international law. An appropriate use of normative power is considered to be acting “in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way” (Manners, 2008a: 45 emphasis mine; see also, Manners, 2006b: 118; Merlingen, 2007: 439).

Nine substantive principles in international law have been identified by Manners that act as the basis for the content of norms diffused in justifiable uses of normative power. They are: sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance (Manners, 2002: 243; 2006a: 185; 2008a: 46; 2011: 234, see also, Diez 2005: 630; Dunne, 2008: 13; Johansson-Nogues, 2007: 182; Merlingen, 2007: 439-40; Pace, 2007: 1045; Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007: 449). The nine principles derived from international law are “not exclusively European, but rather reflect post-Cold War practices of the international community” (Whitman, 2013: 175). These universal principles are internalised and adapted; each principle is given a reading, specific to the actor, before being promoted in relations with third parties (Whitman, 2013: 176). Principles based in international law acknowledge; “human beings have the right to develop [their] capabilities… meeting urgent needs is not charity or paternalism” (Kaldor et. al., 2007: 277). Although specific norms are “developed in a social and cultural context [and] rooted in practice – through socialization and internalization processes” (Sjursen, 2006b: 247), norms with appropriate content are ones based in international law and principles, as these principles “are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable” (Manners, 2008a: 46; see also Pace, 2007: 1047) and represent the most universal and universalisable ‘normative boundary’ (Tocci 2008: 21). Although Manners has at times referred to
the nine principles as ‘EU normative principles’ (see Manners 2002: 243, 2008: 47-54), he makes it clear that in arguing that the EU uses normative power in world politics, it does so by promoting a series of legitimate normative principles whose universal applicability is acknowledged within the UN system (Manners, 2008: 46, 56, 2011: 233; Whitman, 2013: 176).25

According to Manners, these principles are acknowledged by the UN and are a suitable evaluative standard for norm content in the following five ways. First, international law and the nine substantive principles are an “external source of legitimacy [by providing] clear and public objectives and benchmarks… key benchmarks should include the ratification and implementation of international commitments which demonstrate respect for shared values” (Manners, 2009: 38).

Second, principles of international law as an evaluative standard encourages directs engagement between actors by acting as a reference point in debates between actors (Manners, 2009: 38). Third, these principles contribute to the coherence and consistency of an actor using normative power to diffuse a norm (Manners, 2009: 39). Fourth, according to Manners, principles of international law as an evaluative standard serves to highlight the necessity of being “critically aware of the tensions between imposition and ownership” (Manners, 2009: 40; see also 2006a: 171-2). Lastly, an additional advantage of this approach is that both cosmopolitan rights and communitarian social preferences are accommodated while still maintaining a critical perspective “between culturally insensitive universalism and the reification of cultural relativism… seeking both to advocate and critique such aspects in order to change [foreign] policy” (Manners 2009: 36; 2006a: 170; 2008a: 47; see also Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 1998).27 For example, Manners cites the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The content of the norms the EU aims to diffuse to its regional partners have a clear historical context (Manners, 2002: 243), and these norms gain legitimacy in part from the previously established treaties, agreements and conventions between the EU and its regional partners (Manners, 2009: 38). This satisfies Manners’ demand for factoring in communitarian social preferences. Cosmopolitan individual rights are accommodated by the

25 Manners identifies four theoretical perspectives found in normative theory that can be employed to theorise and understand the norms of normative power. Manners believes that normative assumptions regarding theory selection are unavoidable (Manners, 2011: 227; 2013: 312; see Cochran, 1999) and the consequence of this is the need to consider more than one theoretical perspective when thinking about international norms (Manners, 2013: 312). The typology used is from the 2000 Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) working paper which categorises international norms according to a framework of: “positivism and the role of ‘utilitarian’ norms; interpretivism and the role of ‘social’ norms; critical theory and the role of ‘moral’ norms; and postmodern science and the role of ‘narrative’ norms” (Manners, 2011: 228: see also, Manners 1996: 35-50; 2000: 31-2; 2013: 312). The point Manners makes is that these nine principles found in international law could be justified by a variety of moral theories and it is not necessary to confine evaluating norm content to a specific perspective.

26 Although the demand for coherence and consistency do play a role in evaluating a use of normative power, neither a justification of norm content or of actions depend on the two.

27 Manners cites Craig Calhoun & Seyla Benhabib as advocates of this critical perspective to “aspects of universalism and relativism inherent in much normative theory” (Manners, 2009: 36).
references the ENP makes to “broader international sources of legitimacy within the UN system”, which includes “pre-existing commitments to non-EU organisations, treaties, conventions and agreements” (Manners, 2009: 38).

2.1.2: Discourse Ethics as Criteria for Evaluation

Helene Sjursen has argued that an exclusive focus on the abstract validity to legitimise norm content is problematic, and that a procedural standard should also be employed (Sjursen, 2006b: 241; see also Eriksen 2003, 2006; Merlingen, 2007: 340). Although the use of a principle of universalisation of norms can in some cases distinguish legitimate norm content from illegitimate, on its own, it is not a compelling account (see Sjursen: 2006c). A working concept of normative power must include a “conception of human agency that allows us to account for normative behaviour as a ‘rational’ choice” as well as ensuring “consistency in the application and pursuit of norms” (Sjursen 2006b: 242).

This approach stresses the importance of deliberation when it comes to deciding what norms ought to be diffused. Employing the communicative perspective from Habermas’ theory of communicative action as the procedural standard for justifying uses of normative power makes it possible to “theoretically account for social norms and institutions also being upheld because actors consider them valid regardless of the culture from which they emerge” (Sjursen, 2006c: 89). The theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984 [1981]) can be roughly defined in two parts. First, participants engage in open and informed discourse and freely agree that a particular goal, or set of goals, is both worthy and merits cooperation. The participants then coordinate their actions in order to achieve the agreed upon goal or goals. As it applies to the concept of normative power, an actor is considered rational when they are able to “justify and explain their actions” in relation to “norms that cannot be reasonably rejected in a rational debate” (Sjursen, 2006b: 242; 2006c: 90-1). Furthermore, this approach assumes that an actor is capable of criticising the norms that it is socialised under, and of being able to possibly choose actions different from what it is expected to and used to (Eriksen, 1999: 226 in Sjursen, 2006a). In using its normative power, an actor must diffuse a norm that refers to reasons that can be expected to gain approval in a free and open debate in which all those affected could be heard (Sjursen, 2006b: 243). An agreement is “maintained not only because of its ultimate ability to force actors to comply but because it is considered legitimate – it is considered to provide fair terms of co-operation for all the actors involved” (Sjursen, 2006a: 91). A particular norm is therefore considered valid when it “meets the condition that: ‘all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated for
everyone’s interests and the consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation” (Habermas, 1990: 65, in Sjursen, 2006b: 243 italics in original).

However, according to Sjursen, in regards to normative power, Habermasian discourse ethics does not legitimate simply any norm content, so long as it were subjected to a process of formal deliberation. Rather, it is only norms whose content is derived from the normative principles of international law that are acceptable. These principles “serve as the basis for ‘appropriate’ norms and it is reasonable to expect transcultural agreement on them” (Sjursen, 2006c: 93; Manners, 2008: 247; see also Eriksen & Weigard, 2003: 138). Uses of normative power are justified provided that the actor, in diffusing a norm, respects basic humanitarian principles and acts to strengthen international laws and institutions (Eriksen, 2006: 253; Sjursen, 2006c: 86). Mutually binding legal norms (Sjursen, 2006c: 91) are tied to social democratic values (Dunne 2008: 13), and refer to the “promotion and protection of liberal democracy, the democratic peace and multilateralist collaboration as its [normative power] basic purpose” (Pace, 2007: 1045, see also Eriksen, 2006: 253).

On this account of justifiable normative power, it is “not enough to simply argue that [normative power] has to do with promoting norms and values and not only strategic interests in the international system” (Sjursen, 2006b: 241). An actor that possesses normative power as a capacity must not only diffuse legitimate norms, but also, “develop standards, mechanisms and policy instruments that might ensure its own policies are consistent with [common] principles” (Sjursen, 2006b: 248). This is in order to “domesticate the existing state of nature between countries by means of human rights” and to strengthen international law through its transformation into a law of global citizens (Eriksen, 2006: 254, also Sjursen, 2006c: 94). Law is “considered to have a moral element that makes it possible to obey it based on a moral assessment about what is fair, what is in the interest of the common good” (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003 in, Sjursen, 2006c: 91). The establishment and strengthening of legal certainty acts to reduce arbitrariness and moral imperialism as well as to institutionalise the right to justification (Eriksen, 2003; see also Sjursen, 2006b: 244). Although this does presuppose that actors who diffuse legitimate norms (and are therefore justifiably using their normative power) can be perceived as “legitimate and having a moral authority” (Harpaz, 2007: 96), the establishment of mutually binding institutions and rules for interaction acts as a way to limit the promotion of particular interests (Sjursen, 2006c: 90; Eriksen, 2006: 255), as well as providing the necessary “conceptual apparatus that allows us to distinguish what might be normatively acceptable, i.e. what might be a legitimate pursuit of norms” (Sjursen, 2006b: 242). Furthermore, the idea that justifiable uses of normative power are actions that result in the “effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment” is found in
other theories of normative power, including Manners (Tocci 2008: 11; see also De Zutter, 2010: 1121; Manners 2008: 37).

A justified use of normative power would therefore be one where the actor adheres to legal principles; “the pursuit of norms would be legitimate in the sense that it would be consistent with agreed legal norms” (Sjursen, 2006b: 245). Given that the international system is still one in which legal procedures for protecting human rights are weak, whether or not a use of normative power is legitimate depends on to what extent the arguments an actor gives was “presented only with regard to particular actors or cases or whether they were also part of a broader effort to transform their legal status in international law” (Sjursen, 2006b: 248). For example, Sjursen cites the EU commitment to a universal moratorium on capital punishment. The desired impact was to change the valid rules of international law. The EU provided a coherent argument to justify its campaign and did so by reference to the universal nature of human rights and established international human rights law. Further examples cited are “the EU’s support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), the fact that a human rights clause has been standard content of all trade agreements with third countries since 1992, as well as the incorporation of the Charter in the Constitutional Treaty” (Menendez, 2004 in, Sjursen, 2006b: 248).

The purpose of this section was to describe two existing approaches for the justification of norm content found in the normative power literature. According to these accounts, if the content of the norm diffused is not derived from one of the nine normative principles based in international law, either because it does not satisfy the standards set by these principles, or because it would not be accepted in a free and open debate, then it is not a justified use of normative power. Although ‘open dialogue’ is the ideal, so long as A and B communicate (in other words, A is attempting to diffuse a norm $n$ to B; A gives a normative justification to B for the norm diffused; A is using its normative power), insofar as the communicative act is concerned, the task appears to be only identifying what mechanism is deployed by A to diffuse a norm $n$.

2.3: Against Specified Norm Content

There are two objections to be made in response to an approach that seeks to justify uses of normative power through a specification of norm content. The first objection has to do with the concern that the selection of principles from international law does not give much insight into evaluating uses of normative power. This is because of the issue of interpretive ambiguity. The first instance of interpretive ambiguity is one where it is possible to imagine the diffusion of mutually incompatible norms being permitted. There needs to be an adequate way to discriminate
between these norms and this has not been clearly accounted for in either of the approaches described in the previous sections. The second instance of interpretive ambiguity is where promoted norms that have been cited as incompatible with justifiable norm content could be a matter of interpretation. The second, and more significant objection, is that although attempts to establish criteria for evaluating uses of normative power have included the mandate that ‘open dialogue’ act as the communicative ideal, because these attempts fail to clarify the role of coercion and imposition, they potentially allow for the promotion of justified norms through unjustified means.

2.3.1: Objection 1 – Interpretive Ambiguity

The interpretive ambiguity stems from the use of critical social theory found in existing theories of normative power. Critical social theory characterises the relationship between human actions, social institutions, and social identity as “fluid, consisting of ongoing contestations of complex, multiple, relational identities” (Manners & Whitman, 2003: 394, 397). On this view, the content of a disseminated norm can be altered to be a better fit for particular cultural contexts without losing the essence of the norm, which presumably is its basis in principles of international law. The intention is to allow for an environment of open communication where norms do not necessarily have to possess a fixed, rigid character (see Diez, 2005; 2013; Diez & Manners, 2007; Manners, 2006a, 2011: 233; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Whitman, 2013); “the contingency and dynamism of norms thus defy the search for a fixed and ‘eternal’ set of norms” for normative power (De Zutter, 2010: 1110). Reflexivity is thought crucial to a concept of normative power (Manners, 2006b: 180) in that it “does not allow crystallisation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in world politics” (Whitman, 2013: 180, see also Manners, 2006b: 178). Reflexivity has alternatively been characterized as; consistency between internal and external planes (Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002; Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006), as ‘utopian normativity’ (Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002: 789), or as helping to recognize the complexities surrounding the post-national constellation while at the same time moving the discussion beyond the civilian/military dichotomy (Whitman, 2013: 180). These approaches all have a similar demand in that justified uses of normative power feature reflexivity, which be directed towards the degree to which a norm is subject to critical engagement and reflection, both internally and in the context of international society (Diez, 2005: 623).

28 C.f. Schiepers & Sicurelli 2007: 438-9, for an argument that the criterion of reflexivity is not useful in assessing normative power, in their case, the EU and its use of normative power.

29 The drawback of this characterization is the potential for an actor to fall into a position of ‘imperialistic subjectivity’ (Tocci, 2008).
As an example, one principle of international law recognised in the UN system is the principle of human rights. A justified use of normative power is one where the actor promotes a norm that is in compliance with one of the nine principles, in this case, human rights. The EU has interpreted this principle as “associative human rights” (Manners, 2008a: 51). It is associative because concern for both individual human rights (e.g. freedom of expression) and collective human rights (e.g. religious practices) are included (idem.). The associative interpretation of the principle of human rights has developed “since the 1973 Declaration on European Identity through the 1986 Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on Human Rights and the 1991 Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development” (Jurada, 2006 in, Manners, 2008: 51). As a norm, or expectation of a specific behaviour, the EU expects the actor to respect associative human rights, although the demands for in what way and to what extent is not made clear\(^30\). For evidence, Manners cites Article 6 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty;\(^31\) norms of associative human rights are promoted through the external actions of the EU, including, “interdependent external actions of trade and aid, humanitarian and migration issues” (Manners, 2008: 51).

The first instance of interpretive ambiguity is one where it is possible to imagine the diffusion of mutually incompatible norms being permitted. For instance, Denmark could possibly use its normative power to diffuse two norms to Greenland. One is an economic norm where the aim is to develop Greenland’s natural resources as a full partner in the global economy. This norm is based on the principle of sustainable development. The second is a human rights norm referring to the principle of freedom where individuals ought to be able to make autonomous decisions, which would include a traditional lifestyle. The traditional lifestyle justified by the principle of freedom is potentially incompatible with the development of natural resources justified by the principle of sustainable development. It is not clear from the existing approach whether norms derived from certain principles ought to be prioritised over norms derived from other principles, and if so, how. This can also be seen from the example of China’s application of a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs and support for existing governments in its relations with Cambodia from 1991 (Womack, 2008).\(^32\) Although China policy of non-interference in Cambodian internal affairs could be said to be based in the normative principle of ‘good governance’, it is referred to however as an unjustifiable use of normative power (Womack, 2008: 289). This has to do with the fact that China has not taken a greater interest and more “active normative approach” (idem.) in diffusing to

\(^30\) Although the author does not make it explicit in this article, I believe that the fact that demands for what B must do is not an oversight so much as it is acknowledging the requirement for reflexivity found in other theories of normative power.

\(^31\) The 2007 Lisbon Treaty Amending the Treaty in European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community. In the 2008 article, Manners identifies it as the ‘Reform Treaty’.

\(^32\) Because it is unjustified it is, according to the typology Womack applies, it is not a use of normative power.
Cambodia norms derived from other principles of international law, such as human rights. Therefore, although China could be understood to be diffusing a norm which is based in the principle of ‘good governance’, because it does not actively diffuse a norm based in the principle of ‘human rights’, the use of normative power is considered unjustified.

The second instance of interpretive ambiguity refers to the possibility that norms which have been cited as incompatible with justifiable norm content are incompatible because they do not adhere to a specific (European) interpretation of what constitutes justifiable norm content. This can be seen in two examples given for Russia’s use of normative power. Russia-EU trans-border cooperation is cited as a justified use of normative power by Russia primarily because of Russia’s identification with norms of democracy, human rights and the protection of minorities (Arutinov, 2000: 259, in Makarychev, 2008: 163), which were then pursued in cooperative trade agreements the EU and the establishment of legal frameworks. The content of these norms were “derived mainly from the [EU] acquis, [and were] used to varying degrees as both models and yardsticks” (Haukkala, 2005: 6, in Makarychev, 2008: 8). Yet in the case of energy policy, “Russia’s references to economic and financial norms are often considered as inherently political/imperial moves by the EU” (Makarychev, 2008: 16). In this instance, economic and financial norms that could conceivably be interpreted as referring to the principle of ‘sustainable development’ are argued not to be. Rather, they are seen as ‘possession goals’, “attempts to bolster Russian power and influence in the world [and] further Russian economic interests by capitalising on the rising economic value of its natural resources” (Makarychev, 2008: 16). However, China’s relationship with the Southeast Asian states is viewed as a justified use of normative power (Womack, 2008) primarily because of China’s support of and seeking through negotiation, an economic relationship with standards based on international normative principles.

In evaluating uses of normative power, the demand for reflexivity, when applied to norm content, produces two kinds of interpretive ambiguity. One is the possible diffusion of mutually incompatible norms, without a method to discriminate between such norms. Second is an inability to determine acceptable interpretations of principles of international law from unacceptable interpretations. Because of these issues, the selection of principles from international law, which are then tied to the promotion of specific norms, fails to give a compelling account of how to evaluate uses of normative power.

2.3.2: Objection 2 – Role of Coercive Communicative Acts
Manners argues that not only must an evaluation of normative power refer to ‘substantive normative principles’, but must also consider the way in which such principles are promoted (Manners, 2008: 55). For normative power, the mechanisms of norm diffusion are communicative acts. Appropriate actions for an actor using normative power are informed by “civil activism, collective action, public sphere, and reconciliation” (Manners, 2006a: 185). Normative power depends heavily on the interaction between means and the justification of those means, with critical reflection said to characterise the process (Manners, 2006a: 184; see also, Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006: 318). The centrality of rational persuasion and critical reflection as justifiable actions is clear, as evidenced by remarks such as “critical engagement and reflexive considerations being crucial to the concept of normative power” (Manners, 2006b: 180), and, “norms are expressed through language and the process of argumentation and debate can shape what is said” (Foot, 2000: 9, in Manners 2008: 57). An appropriate use of normative power is one where the aim is to “shape the milieu by regulating it through international regimes, organizations, and law” (Tocci, 2008: 7; see also Eriksen, 2006: 254; Sjursen, 2006b: 244, 2006c: 94). The establishment of mutually binding rules for interaction and institutions is believed to act as protection against the promotion of particular interests (Sjursen, 2006c: 90, also Eriksen, 2006: 255). The emphasis on the establishment of international law is thought necessary in order to remove any motives for “actors not to comply with common rules and to ensure collective action” (Sjursen, 2006c: 90-1). Furthermore, a supranational law-based order sanctions non-compliance and prevents violence, thereby making it possible for actors to “act in accordance with their own conscience, out of a sense of duty or justice” (Apel, 1998: 755 in, Eriksen, 2006: 256).

Yet there is a lack of clarity concerning the connection between normative power and the use of communicative acts such as coercion, imposition and threats, which are typically thought of as being ‘hard’ instruments. As noted earlier, the general position found in the normative power literature is that “normative power does not necessarily rely on ‘soft’ instruments to spread its norms; it can resort to coercive [means]” (Diez, 2005: 616; Diez & Manners, 2007: 176, in De Zutter, 2010: 1114). Although, the emphasis is on the use of persuasion and there is the implication that an ideal use of normative power is one that is absent coercive force (Tocci 2008: 2). Noting the

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33 See Chapter one, Section three.
34 To assess the actions (the communicative acts) of normative power, Manners employs normative ethics (see Manners, 2006; 2008a; 2011; 2013). One approach Manners uses is the deontological approach. It is noted here because Manners applies it to the actions, i.e. the mechanisms of diffusion. Manners describes this approach as relating to the “rationalisation of duties and rules and the establishment of law” (Manners, 2008: 57). For uses of normative power, an actor ought to reason rationalise its actions through a process of engagement and dialogue. Engagement entails “initiating and institutionalizing regular and transparent patterns of communication or partnership”, for example, the ENP, and dialogue “means engaging in two-way deliberation and discussion as part of reasoning the merits of external actions” (Manners, 2008: 57-8).
absence of physical force and material resources in the “imposition of norms” (Manners, 2006a: 186), does imply that the imposition of a justifiable norm is permitted. This is especially given the assumption made by Manners that “the prioritising of normative power may help ensure that any subsequent or parallel use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and utilised in a more justifiable way” (Manners, 2011: 231) and ‘reflexive depth in a critical tradition over any illusory claims of ethical foreign policy’ is encouraged (Manners, 2006b: 131). The communicative acts of normative power are ‘instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the confines of the law’ (Tocci, 2008: 10 see also Bicchi, 2006; De Zutter, 2010; Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006; Martin & Owen, 2010; Mallory, 2008; Merlingen, 2007; Sjursen, 2006b). For as Eriksen argues, there is an implied need for coercive means because “only with the threat of sanctions [economic or military] can the law compel compliance” (Eriksen, 2006: 252; Sjursen, 2006a, 2006b: 245; Johannson-Nogues, 2007: 191). Persuasion, which Manners refers to repeatedly in his most recent discussion on the mechanisms of norm diffusion (2013), can, “cover both manipulative moves and propaganda, public diplomacy and (dis)information campaigns, as well as the force of the better argument in an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Müller, 2004)” (Forsberg, 2011: 1196; see also, Manners, 2008: 59-60; 2009a: 4; 2009b: 792, 800; 2011: 230; 2013: 310).\(^{35}\) However, although ‘open dialogue’ is the ideal, so long as A and B communicate (in other words, A is attempting to diffuse a norm \(n\) to B; A gives a normative justification to B for the norm diffused; A is using its normative power), insofar as the communicative act is concerned, the task is only to identify what mechanism is being deployed by A to diffuse a norm \(n\).

The consequence is that the diffusion of a justifiable norm through unjustifiable means is possible. This can be seen from the example of the EU and its campaign for the UN moratorium on the death penalty, which is supposed to be an unproblematic use of normative power (Manners 2002). The suspension of capital punishment is based on the substantive principle of human rights found in established international conventions, and as such, is a justifiable norm. If the imposition of justifiable norms is permitted, then the EU has engaged in praiseworthy behaviour so long as it diffuses the norm ‘suspension of capital punishment’, regardless of the communicative act chosen. This would sanction a threat made by the EU against, for instance, Liberia, threatening the wholesale removal of EU aid should Liberia fail to accept the norm ‘suspension of capital punishment’. Even if the EU were to decide to engage Liberia in persuasion, the nature of rational persuasion is itself contested. This can be seen by an assertion made on the one hand, “if coercion were used, it would be so only in consistence with existing legal arrangements and in order to

\(^{35}\) As argued in Chapter one, the way in which Manners has constructed normative power suggests that he thinks of it as a ‘good’ form of ideational power, rather than as a form of ideational power that can be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on its exercise.
uphold the respect of such arrangements” (Sjursen, 2006b: 245) that is countered by the observation that, “persuasive authority may sometimes be nothing more than the power to impose norms without actually being seen to do so, by dictating the terms within which the deliberative argument will take place” (Epstein, 2008: 10).

The use of coercion, imposition, and threats does seem to have some place in a description of the mechanisms of diffusion for normative power, although their nature and when they can be used has not been made very clear. However, because threats and coercion are communicative acts of normative power, this supports the assertion made earlier in Chapter one that normative power is a form of power and as such is an ability an actor can possess and choose to exercise at will. But ultimately, the vague position in regards to coercive communicative acts makes it possible to conceive of the diffusion of a justifiable norm through unjustifiable means, thereby complicating any evaluation of uses of normative power as justified or unjustified.

**Conclusion:**

There are problems with an approach that evaluates uses of normative power according to the content of the norm diffused. One is the interpretational ambiguity that could lead to the diffusion of mutually incompatible norms. Second is given a demand for reflexivity, it is not clear to what extent the norm content can be altered and still be considered a justifiable norm. Lastly, the ill-defined framework with which to evaluate the means of normative power allows for the diffusion of justifiable norms through unjustifiable means. For these reasons, an evaluative approach that focuses on the justification of norm content is not compelling. The most feasible method for a moral evaluation of normative power is one that focuses on a justification of the means; the communicative acts employed to diffuse a norm. In contrast to existing accounts, the position taken is: it is preferable to evaluate uses of normative power solely according to the communicative acts employed by A in the diffusion of a norm n to B. To determine whether a use of normative power is praiseworthy (good), it is the communicative acts employed to diffuse a norm n that must be justifiable.

Therefore, to be able to evaluate a use of normative power requires taking a neutral position in regards to what norms ‘ought’ to be diffused. This is not to say that it is unnecessary for A to justify to B the content of the norm it aims to diffuse, it can however, be addressed without requiring that only certain kinds of norms be diffused as a requirement for a justifiable use of normative power. The next chapter argues that for evaluating uses of normative power, in order to justify the means (mechanisms) by which a norm n is diffused, a deliberative standard ought to be
applied. More specifically, suitable criteria are derived from theories of deliberative democracy. A deliberative standard applied to communicative acts allows the process of deliberation to resolve the issues of interpretational ambiguity. By relying on constraints implicit in the process of deliberation, most importantly that A must be able to demonstrate that there is some sort of worth, benefit or reason for B to adopt the norm \( n \). A diffuses, attends to the concern of imposition (‘cultural imperialism’) without having to stipulate as a necessary condition that only certain kinds of norms be diffused in order to constitute a justified use of normative power. A deliberative standard properly accounts for the centrality of deliberation, communicative rationality, the social constructivist nature of norms and the demand for reflexivity found in the normative power literature. Furthermore, criteria derived from theories of deliberative democracy provide a definitive position on the role of coercion and threats.
Chapter Three: What are Suitable Criteria for an Evaluation of Normative Power?

Introduction:

As defined in the first chapter, A has normative power if it is able to diffuse a norm n to B. I argued that if the concept of normative power is a form of power, it cannot be by definition justified. Rather, there are better and worse uses of normative power. In the second chapter I argued that any account that refers to norm content faces difficulties and it is inconsistent to evaluate normative power by reference to the content of the norms diffused. Consequently, the only feasible way to evaluate normative power is to focus on the mechanisms of diffusion, i.e. the communicative acts.

The purpose of this final chapter is to identify and describe suitable criteria for the moral evaluation of mechanisms of norm diffusion. I argue that because these are communicative acts, principles of deliberation found in contemporary theories of deliberative democracy are a useful theoretical standard for such criteria. A deliberative standard applied to communicative acts allows the process of deliberation to resolve the issues of interpretational ambiguity. By relying on constraints implicit in the process of deliberation, most importantly that A must be able to demonstrate that there is some sort of worth, benefit or reason for B to adopt the norm n A diffuses, attends to the concern of imposition (‘cultural imperialism’) without having to stipulate as a necessary condition that only certain kinds of norms be diffused in order to constitute a justified use of normative power. A deliberative standard properly accounts for the centrality of deliberation, communicative rationality, the social constructivist nature of norms and the demand for reflexivity found in the normative power literature. Furthermore, criteria derived from theories of deliberative democracy provide a definitive position on the role of coercion and threats.

In this chapter, I argue that ideally, norm diffusion ought to satisfy the criteria of reciprocity, reflexivity and inclusivity. Norm diffusion is reciprocal when A gives a justification of a norm n to B, in terms that B (who may or may not share a similar frame of reference) can accept. Norm diffusion is reflexive when A demonstrates a willingness to alter the content of a norm n to B in order to suit the local context of B. Norm diffusion is inclusive when A engages in deliberation with B on the norm n A proposes to diffuse. The chapter is organised as follows. Section one argues why a deliberative standard should be applied and describes the principles of deliberation. Section two describes and illustrates reciprocity. Section three describes and illustrates reflexivity. Section four describes and illustrates inclusiveness. The fifth section consists of a brief consideration of two issues. The first is how to relate justified uses of normative power to the

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36 If power is understood as a dispositional concept.
distinction made by both Morriss and Lukes between power and influence.\textsuperscript{37} The second concludes that what is of normative concern to the analyst of normative power is not only determining justifiable and unjustifiable uses of normative power but also whether some actors are more able than others to use their normative power.

### 3.1: For a Deliberative Standard

Given the presumption that normative power is a form of power, if A had normative power, it could diffuse a norm $n$ to B if it chose to. However, if A wanted to justify its use of normative power, it would do so by justifying the mechanisms of diffusion it employed - what kind of communicative acts were used to diffuse a norm $n$ to B. One way to do this is by specifying that the communicative acts be deliberative. If a use of normative power is to be justifiable, then the communicative acts employed by A are appropriately deliberative. Principles of deliberation constitute a deliberative ideal to which participants aspire. What follows is only a brief description of such principles, focussing only on that from which suitable evaluative criteria for normative power can be derived. When relevant, some of the controversies and differing views amongst deliberative democrats are noted throughout this chapter.

Deliberation is understood to be a “transformation of preferences through public and rational discussion” (Elster, [1986] 2006: 148; see also Chambers, 2003: 309; Young, 2000: 26). In deliberation, participants advance “considerations that are ‘compelling’ and ‘persuasive’ to others and that ‘can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them’” (Cohen, 1989: 1014; 1996: 100, 2; in Mansbridge et al., 2010: 67). It is more than the expression of individual preferences; participants must actively justify those preferences by giving reasons that others can accept (see Chambers 2003: 308) and are “amenable to changing their judgments, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions” (Dryzek, 2000: 1).\textsuperscript{38} In a deliberative process, deliberation ought to include all those affected by the decision, that “participants have an equal opportunity to

\textsuperscript{37} As opposed to a theory for the ethical use of power. This decision was also taken in part because of the insistence by Manners that normative power is not some kind of ‘ethical foreign policy’ (Manners, 2006d: 117, also, 2008: 46) and one intention is to ‘open up different perspectives in order to change existing structures of power’ (Manners, 2011: 233).

\textsuperscript{38} Dryzek conceives of deliberation as the “contestation of discourses” (Dryzek, 2000: 5) and argues that appropriate deliberation is thought to consist of participants attending to different identities and the different kinds of communication that accompany them. A discourse is a “set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities” (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008: 481). Essentially, specific discourses yield specific beliefs on the substance of, and approach to, a specific issue or issues. The contestation of different discourses amongst one another inspires reflection and perhaps reconstruction of preferences and this in turn enables interlocutors to agree upon and coordinate action.
influence process, and that those participants exhibit mutual respect and equal concern” for the other participants in the deliberative process (Mansbridge et al., 2010: 656; Benhabib, 1996: 70). Most contemporary theories of deliberative democracy have distanced themselves from the demand that the goal of deliberation is to attain full consensus where all participants agree to the same outcome for the same reasons. Rather, what has taken its place is a requirement for a “form of consistency where, although individuals might disagree, a strong consistency suggests that they have at least considered the relevant domain of issues, values, facts, etc., and constructed their positions accordingly” (Bachtiger et al., 2010: 46). Although how exactly consensus is to be interpreted is very much contested amongst deliberative democrats, for the purposes of the argument made in this thesis, the position taken is that consensus can be designed to seek a resolution to the issue at hand that is based on “reasoned disagreement, by striving to understand the cultural tradition and/or conceptual framework of the other participants... individuals can seek consensus on what is to be done while differing about why” (Dryzek, 2011:124; 2000: 49).  

From these principles of deliberation, three requirements can be identified as suitable criteria for a moral evaluation of normative power. The criteria are: A demonstrates reciprocity in the communicative acts employed, A shows reflexivity towards B, and lastly, A is inclusive of B to which a norm n is diffused. The criteria are all applied to evaluate the communicative acts employed by A for the diffusion of a norm n to B. These criteria provide an evaluative framework for determining good uses of normative power, specifically, how to justify the communicative acts an actor employs. In doing so, the objections that were raised in the previous chapter of interpretational ambiguity and the uncertain role of coercion, imposition and threats are addressed. Additionally, the application of deliberative criteria adheres to the demands for reflexivity, a communicative perspective and the basis in social constructivism. Given the view that the communicative acts used to diffuse a norm n should aim to be deliberative, the process of deliberation resolves issues of interpretational ambiguity. Norms can be altered to be a better fit for

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39 Consensus has not been selected as a criterion for a moral evaluation of normative power (although it would need to be part of a consideration about the legitimacy of normative power) because in a use of normative power, the aim of A is to diffuse a norm n to B, which is not the same as a demand for the aim to be the attainment of/orientation to consensus.

40 Habermas (Between Facts and Norms) has himself relaxed some of his earlier requirements for ideal deliberation; “one need not reach an actual consensus, so acceptable outcomes include legitimate bargains and compromises” (Bachtiger et al., 2010: 45).

41 “Definitions of deliberation and how to distinguish it from other forms of talk - for example, bargaining and rhetoric - vary a great deal among theorists” (Chambers, 2003: 309). This does not mean that these other forms of talk are necessarily illegitimate, rather, that participants “need to deliberate about and decide when and where bargaining is a fair and appropriate method of dispute resolution” (idem.). Chambers also notes that “gone, with only a few exceptions (Elster, 1998) is the highly rationalistic view of reason-giving that stresses a model of impartiality rising above all difference… most deliberative democratic theory has adopted a flexible and pluralistic idea of reason giving” (Bohman, 1995; Benhabib, 2002 in, Chambers, 2003: 321).
particular cultural contexts which is better suited to the understanding of normative power as ‘dynamic’ and ‘contingent’ (De Zutter, 2010: 1110; see also, Diez, 2005; 2013; Diez & Manners, 2007; Manners, 2006a; 2011; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Whitman, 2013). The use of principles of deliberation for evaluative criteria is supported by the previous use of the communicative perspective to “theoretically account for social norms and institutions also being upheld because actors consider them valid regardless of the culture from which they emerge” (Sjursen, 2006c: 89; see also Eriksen, 2006; 2007) and the emphasis that normative power is strong based in the tradition of critical social theory (Manners, 2006b; 2008; 2013; Manners and Whitman, 2003; Whitman, 2013). Ultimately, in regards to norm content, a commitment to a deliberative standard entails the commitment to rely, “as far as possible on mechanisms endogenous to deliberation itself to change views and beliefs in a benign direction – and also, in the language of social choice theory, to restrict domain and so make collective choice more tractable” (Dryzek, 2000: 169).

The application of criteria derived from the principles of deliberation to evaluate normative power effectively counters the objections raised in the previous chapter. A deliberative standard applied to communicative acts rules out the diffusion of unjustifiable norms as it allows the process of deliberation to resolve issues of interpretational ambiguity. Secondly, the application of a deliberative standard of justification to judge the communicative acts in a use of normative power is better equipped to account for the role of coercion, imposition and threats.

3.2. Reciprocity:

Given the conclusions of Chapter one, because the communicative acts of normative power could include “manipulative moves and propaganda… as well as the force of the better argument in an ‘ideal speech situation’” (Müller 2004, in Forsberg, 2011: 1196), A could employ coercive communicative acts to diffuse a norm n to B and this would still constitute a use of normative power. However, for it to be a justifiable use of normative power, the communicative act ought to be non-coercive. Reciprocity as a criterion of evaluation for normative power provides a way to distinguish what kind of communicative acts are coercive and therefore a worse use of normative power. Norm diffusion is reciprocal when A gives a justification of a norm n to B, in terms that B (who may or may not share a similar frame of reference) can accept.

Reciprocity is defined as “the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996: 52-3) and “addresses an aspect of the reason-giving process: the kind of reasons that should be given” (ibid. 52). According to Gutmann and Thompson, those who
are subject to a binding law or public policy are owed a justification of that law or public policy and those making the justification ought to justify their actions on the basis of principles that can be accepted by others (see Gutmann & Thompson, 2002: 156; Dryzek, 2000: 149). Such a justification involves not “merely offering reasons to other people, or even offering reasons that they happen to accept (for example, because they are in a weak bargaining position)” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2002: 156); the reasons provided must constitute a justification for the enactment of a binding law or public policy to those subject to them. Dryzek writes that reciprocity can be understood in terms of the distinction made between on the one hand, the imposition of one’s own discourse on the rest of the world, and on the other hand the serious engagement with the discourses of others (Dryzek, 1990: 140; 2000: 68; 2012: 34, 77). For the communicative acts in a use of normative power to be non-coercive, A must “endeavour to make arguments that are intelligible in the terms of partial views (such as religious doctrines) which they themselves do not share” (Dryzek, 2000: 17). In an evaluation of normative power, A adheres to the demand for reciprocity when it gives a justification of norm n to B. This justification consists of A “connecting the particular content and reasoning for that content with some more general principle” (see Dryzek, 1990: 140; 2000: 68). However, deliberation requires communicative equality (Fung, 2005: 398). Although A might be amenable towards engaging B in “the reciprocal exchange of reasons” in the justification of a norm n, A could “encounter [B] from very unequal professional, economic, political or cultural positions” (Fung, 2005: 406). Communicative acts may be coercive in that the actor using normative power is able to dictate the terms of the deliberative argument (see Epstein, 2008), or that A is able to their use normative power because they are more adept at a form of accepted argumentation in the international arena than B (Dryzek, 2001: 660; see also Bohman, 2003: 86).

As a use of normative power that demonstrates reciprocity, the India-Pakistan peace initiatives from 1998-2008 can be seen as a good use of normative power in that India focused on “five normative means to make peace with Pakistan: confidence-building measures (CBMs), arbitration, negotiation, trade, and security cooperation” (Kumar, 2008: 223). The norm diffusion was reciprocal because India, in seeking to establish institutions and procedures already found in the international arena, justified these norms to Pakistan by connecting these particular norms to established general principles in the international arena. As an example of coercive communicative acts, the EU attempted to diffuse to China the human rights norm for a moratorium on capital

[42] In response to this particular criticism (see also, for example, Young, 1996; Elstub, 2010), many deliberative democrats (e.g. Dryzek) have expanded the ideal of deliberative communication to include some or all types of communication as potentially deliberative, including rhetoric, emotion, storytelling, and gossip (Dryzek, 2000: 38). However, as can be seen from the majority of examples of normative power in this thesis, the kind of communicative act that does occur in uses of normative power is largely confined to formal argumentation.
punishment. Because the EU failed to give a justification for this norm in terms that China could accept, perhaps by seriously engaging with a Confucian discourse to argue that China should accept this norm, the EU has failed to use its normative power in a justifiable manner. The US and its pursuit of the goal of establishing a “predictable open international economic order” (Hamilton 2008) has been cited as a good use of normative power because it has diffused economic rights norms that “underscores the rule of law [and] affirms the principle that trade must be non-discriminatory” (idem.). However, it is not clear that the communicative acts establishing the WTO feature reciprocity as the US only offered a justification in the language of a liberal free market discourse, and it is not clear whether those who accepted this norm did so as a result of their bargaining position in relation to the US. The Eastern enlargement process of the EU can also be seen as a coercive use of normative power. Schimmelfennig found that supporters of enlargement justified their preferences by employing a “norm-based argument” in a strategic way, appealing to an ideal of a “pan-European community of liberal-democratic states” calculated to shame opponents into agreement (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 48). In their 2010 article, Bachtiger et al. specifically cite this study, noting that while the outcome of EU enlargement might be praiseworthy, it fails the test of reciprocity “if participants are virtually coerced into the outcome and adapt their positions in a purely strategic way, the criterion of voluntary agreement with no external or internal coercion is clearly violated” (Bachtiger et al., 2010: 52).

One issue in determining what constitutes coercion is the role of self-interest. Ideal discourses are discourses that are rational, which for Habermas means participants are sincere, and do not use arguments “in a purely opportunistic fashion to ‘dupe’ the audience but really ‘say what they mean and mean what they say” (Habermas, 1983: 132). In addition, a feature of reciprocity is the “difference between acting in one’s own self-interest [say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or lucky break] and acting fairly [following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt]” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996: 2). Furthermore, the issue of acting in one’s self-interest as non-justifiable normative power has also been brought up by normative power theorists. Hence the assertion, that in order for it to be a justified use of normative power, the interests of an actor cannot be seen as wholly strategic or self-regarding (Forsberg, 2011: 1192; see also, Merlingen, 2007: 435; Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007: 444). Or, that the establishment of mutually binding rules for interaction and institutions is believed to act as protection against the promotion of particular interests (Sjursen, 2006c: 90, also Eriksen, 2006: 255). A justifiable use of normative power is one where A can be said to have appropriate interests. Appropriate interests must be ones that are “milieu goals” (Tocci, 2008: 5-8; Johansson-Nogues, 2007: 182), although acknowledged as being “indirectly related” to the interests of an actor, they are viewed within the context of the wider environment of international relations. On this view of normative power, an ethically ‘neutral’
interpretation is not able to make a distinction between uses of normative power that stem from the interests of an actor and uses of normative power that an actor undertakes in order to serve the interests of others as well as themselves (Bicchi, 2006; De Zutter, 2010: 1121; Manners, 2006b: 170-22; 2006d: 118; 2008; Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007; Tocci with Manners, 2008: 302). 43

The demand for the communicative acts to be non-coercive does not necessarily mean that self-interest needs to be ruled out. Uses of normative power where A has some degree of self-interest in diffusing a norm n to B can still be justifiable if the arguments made by deliberative democrats in support of self-interest are taken into account. Mansbridge has argued that concern for self-interest can have a place in deliberation. She writes that to prevent self-interest from ever being a legitimate factor in deliberation has the effect of undermining the “normative goal of clarifying underlying interests in a way that undermines the deliberators’ capacity to achieve just ends through a legitimate procedure” (Mansbridge, 2006: 125). Not only can communicative acts which involve self-interest can adhere to the deliberative ideal specified by some contemporary deliberative democrats (see Mansbridge et al., 2010: 64), but that self-interest must be included to some extent “in order to recognize and celebrate in the ideal itself the diversity of free and equal human beings” (ibid. 69). Lastly, as other contemporary deliberative democrats point out, the motives for an argument a participant makes is not as important as the argument itself; “the key is that deliberators present their arguments in terms that are accessible to the relevant audience...and manifest an inclination to change their views or cooperate with opponents when appropriate” (Bachtiger et al., 2010: 44; see also Thompson, 2008: 504). This is relevant because ruling out self-interest entirely has the effect of identifying what are otherwise unproblematic uses of normative power as objectionable. Consider the case of Russia’s energy policy as a use of normative power. It is regarded as an unsuitable use of normative power in that “Russia’s references to economic and financial norms are often considered as inherently political/imperial moves by the EU” (Makarychev, 2008: 161). Although Russia gave a justification that referred to more general economic and financial norms, because its use of normative power was made in order to advance its own economic position, this is seen as an instance of self-interest and therefore an unjustifiable use of normative power. Another example can be seen in the maritime cooperation between India and Japan, although adhering to international law, is not seen as India justifiably using its normative power. Even if India employs reciprocal communicative acts in diffusing norms of maritime cooperation to Japan, it would be an objectionable use of normative power because its motives are self-interested; “widely viewed as predicated on their mutual distrust of China rather than a desire

43This also has to do with the concern that there is a need to differentiate normative power from concepts of power in International Relations that focus on the material resources of an actor and the notion that an actor only acts to further its own sovereign interests.
on the part of India to diffuse norms to Japan which embody principles of international law” (Kumar, 2008).

3.3 Reflexivity:

The second requirement is in its use of normative power, A must be reflexive in its orientation to B. This is an awareness of the socially constructed character of norms and context for actions. It is a demand to systematically reflect upon and evaluate interests and needs from the “point of view of generalizability [and be] open to persuasion by the ‘unforced force of the better argument’” (Habermas, 1983: 132; in Bachtiger et al., 2010: 37). For an evaluation of normative power, reflexivity is dependent on whether A is willing to alter the norm content to suit the local context of B.

Dryzek defines reflexivity as the “sensitivity to the degree to which actions themselves help create the contexts for action, that is, they are constitutive of the actor’s social situation (Tribe 1973, in Dryzek, 2006: 114). In characterising reflexivity, Dryzek draws from Foucault and Bourdieu; discourses structure our reality whilst still “recognising that reflective choice across discourses is indeed possible (and this is where deliberation comes in)... Bourdieu speaks of a ‘discursive field’ that actors can occupy... the structure of the field is itself a result of their actions, interactions and contestations” (Dryzek, 2001: 658-9). In being reflexive, an actor must acknowledge the existence of variety in political and cultural traditions and social conditions (Dryzek, 2000: 40) and demonstrate an awareness of the particular degree to which “key entities and actors, their shared interests and goals, the shared norms that constrain them... are themselves continually constituted and reshaped” (Berejikian & Dryzek, 2000 in, Dryzek, 2006: 114). To have a reflexive orientation, an actor is aware of and questions the forces of social control and not take for granted the nature and fixedness of these forces (Dryzek, 2010a).

This description of reflexivity is similar to the one described by Manners, in that “critical engagement and reflexive considerations [are] crucial to the concept of normative power” (Manners, 2006b: 180). Moreover, the reference Dryzek makes to ‘reflexive modernity’ as

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44 Reflexivity is one way to account for change in the preferences of an actor without having to attribute that change as stemming only from strategic interests.

45 In his discussion on toleration within a democratic society, Bohman argues that the ‘appeal to a free and open process of deliberation’ can be thought of in terms of a ‘reflexive deliberation, the basis of which is toleration of reasons and their justifying background principles’ (Bohman 2003: 89, 92) where actors must ‘permit challenges to its standards of justification (ibid. 91).
advanced by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens\textsuperscript{46} suggests that “choices across discourses becomes increasingly possible and likely with the de-traditionalisation of society” (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994 in Dryzek, 2001: 659) is also present in the normative power literature (see, for example, Diez, 2005: 623, 2013; Manners, 2006b; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Whitman, 2013). Theories of normative power make use of social theory to “understand the relationships between human actions, social institutions, and social identity” (Manners & Whitman, 2003: 394) as “fluid, consisting of ongoing contestations of complex, multiple, relational identities” (ibid. 397) and constructivism, which asserts the “dynamic, contingent, and culturally based condition of the social world...[it] sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being” (Adler, 2005: 10). As such, norms are “not written in stone but change over time as [an actor] enacts them in changing circumstances” (De Zutter, 2010: 1110).

An example of reflexivity can be taken from the EU and its proposal of internationally binding commitments and rules (and willingness to adhere to them) in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (beginning during negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol). This has been cited as a use of normative power (Schiepers & Sicurelli 2007) specifically because of the EU arguing by making reference to general principles of international law to support the particular content of the environmental norm. It is an instance of reflexivity not just because of the EU connecting its particular interpretation of an environmental norm - to reduce greenhouse emissions - to more general principles, but also because the EU demonstrated a willingness to alter the norm content to suit local contexts. It did so by allowing that non-industrialised nations did not immediately need to adhere to the same emissions as industrialised nations. Conversely, enlargement negotiations with accession countries, although are cited as a justified use of normative power (see Manners 2002: 244), do not demonstrate the reflexivity that is required in that membership is dependent on the acceptance of particular norm content. As a final example, given the human rights norm ‘freedom of expression’, the EU’s use of normative power in diffusing this norm to Turkey cannot be said to feature reflexivity. Although the EU has connected the particular norm (content) to more general principles (i.e. principles of international law), because EU membership is conditional on Turkey

\textsuperscript{46} Adler cites Giddens’s structuration theory as informing aspects of social constructivism. However, Adler goes on to write that the problem with this theory is that it co-reproduces agents and structures in a ‘vicious circle’ (Adler, 2005: 12), which is why he develops his own approach, cognitive evolution. Cognitive evolution is the “process of innovation and political selection, occurring mainly within and between institutional settings, which creates the ‘objective’ collective understandings that informs [interests]” (ibid. 75). It is an approach that requires “that new or changed ideas be communicated or diffused and that political stakes be created that political groups and institutions and interest groups may then help to maintain” (op. cit.). This thesis takes the view that as far as understanding the roles of agent and structure in regards to actors exercising normative power, cognitive evolution should be understood in conjunction with the strategic-relational approach. This approach assumes “a common (and generally unproblematic) understanding as structure as the context in which action occurs” (Hay, 2002: 121) and makes the distinction between structure and agency a purely analytical one, in that “their existence is relational (structure and agency are mutually constitutive) and dialectical (their interaction is not reducible to the sum of structural and agential factors treated separately)” (ibid. 127).
accepting this particular content, the EU fails to demonstrate reflexivity as it does not allow for the alteration of the norm to suit the local context of Turkey. Although the EU’s particular interpretation of the norm ‘freedom of expression’ may be in fact justifiable where Turkey’s suggested alteration may not (say, excepting the topic of religion from the set of subjects Turkish citizens are free to express their thoughts about), because the EU ties membership to the diffusion of a particular norm, it fails to acknowledge both the dynamic nature of norms (per the commitment to a social constructivist interpretation) as well as Turkey’s different interpretation of the norm ‘freedom of expression’ which may be the product of its different cultural and political traditions.

3.4: Inclusiveness:

The third criterion, inclusion, is intended as a demand for A to ensure the active participation of B. A ought to be willing to include those who are subject to the diffusion of a norm $n$. For a justifiable use of normative power, it must (at least in part) involve communication about preferences amongst those subject to the binding decision. The communicative acts can be said to be inclusive to the extent that A includes B in the deliberation about the norm $n$. However, as will be discussed at the end of this section, the demand for inclusiveness raises the difficulty of who must be included in order for a use of normative power to be considered justifiable.

For deliberative democrats, it is essential that deliberation about issues of common concern feature an equal and effective opportunity for all those subject to the outcome to be able to participate in the process by which that outcome is arrived at. An outcome is deliberative “if and only if [it] could be the object of free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen, 1989: 22, 1996: 100). Ideally, “no one with the competency to speak and act may be excluded” from the deliberative process; all those who are affected by a decision should “have the same chances to question and/or introduce any assertion whatever as well as express their attitudes, desires and needs” (Bachtiger et al., 2010: 36; see Habermas, 1992; Cohen, 1989). Generally, in thinking about what sort of conditions are required to ensure that relevant participants are included in the deliberative process and that their voices are empowered (Chambers, 2003: 322), the aim is to provide a “framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among equal[s]” (Cohen, 1996: 99), which it does through the provision of “favourable conditions for participation, association, and expression” (Cohen, 1996: 95).

Inclusion can mean either inclusion of participants, discourses or both. For normative power, if it is to be justifiable, the immediate concern is the inclusion by A of all relevant participants and possibly, the alternative discourses of those participants. Support for inclusiveness as a criterion of
evaluation, in other words, that actors using normative power should be inclusive of those that it is diffusing a norm \( n \) to, can be found in the normative power literature. Actors diffusing those norms should not “merely be seen as rational” in the sense that they form preferences and pursue them consistently, but also as entities having the “capacity of being reasonable” in the sense that they possess a notion of what is just and fair (Rawls, 1993: 49) and what is communicatively rational (Habermas, 1996: 5) (both in Eriksen, 2006: 258). Only on this basis can “one understand the international order as one made up of normative rules and mutually supportive behaviour of the actors… a delimited normative order” (idem.). Manners argues that actors who use normative power should ensure both engagement and dialogue. Engagement entails “initiating and institutionalizing regular and transparent patterns of communication or partnership”, and dialogue “means engaging in two-way deliberation and discussion as part of reasoning the merits of external actions” (Manners, 2008: 57-8).

The EU and its diffusion of the environmental norm ‘de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea’, has consisted in part of environmental training sessions. Although the content of the norm may be considered more or less unproblematic, the fact that the training sessions have failed to properly engage and involve the participation of the non-EU actors makes this a worse use of normative power. This is because the EU shows an ongoing lack of awareness of the specific needs and perspectives of those it diffuses the environmental norm to. As an example of inclusiveness in a use of normative power, China supported and sought through negotiation, the “peaceful expansion and intensification of multilateral organisations of sovereign members” (Womack, 2008: 278). In articulating a discourse that relationships and the proper behaviour of those in the relationship matter, and that respect for the other can be considered a cardinal virtue in action (see Womack, 2008: 275), China included ASEAN members in the decision-making process involved in instituting official ties between the nations.

When an actor exercises its normative power, it diffuses a norm \( n \). The examples above demonstrate what the criterion of inclusiveness would require for a good use of normative power. They are straightforward in that \( A \) ought to include \( B \) in the deliberation on the content of a norm \( n \). The actors involved are sovereign state (and state-like) actors, and those in government act as a representative of the citizens who make up that state.\(^{47}\) As can be seen from the examples cited throughout this thesis (which were taken from the normative power literature), the actors involved, other than the EU, are predominantly nation-states. For the purposes of answering the question

\(^{47}\) This assumption is in line with most theories of deliberative democracy in that, ‘deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to representative democracy [but] an expansion of representative democracy’ (Chambers 2003: 308).
'how can normative power be morally evaluated', it was enough to say that the actors involved in the actual deliberative process, can be said to act as representatives for its citizens. However, in ensuring the inclusion of B in the diffusion of a norm n, and presuming that there is some governmental body that formally agrees to this diffusion, is it problematic if the acceptance (or rejection) of said norm goes against the preferences of the citizens of B? Ideally, an outcome (i.e. the diffusion of a norm n) is the product of “reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation” (Dryzek, 2001: 651) and one condition is that the outcome be responsive to discourses found in the public sphere. Members of a governmental body are presumed to administrate according to the will of its citizens.48 Given a demand for legitimate outcomes to be ones that are responsive to the discourses found in the public sphere, a norm accepted or rejected that does not reflect the preferences of the people would fail to be a legitimate use of normative power even if B were to be included in authentic deliberation with A about a norm n. For instance, by not accepting the EU Association Agreement (AA), the Government of Ukraine failed to act in accordance with the preferences of its citizens. An account of legitimate normative power would need to consider this condition of legitimacy demanded by deliberative democrats. Also questionable would be cases in which the citizens of A, particularly marginalized groups and non-democratic states, do not have a say in the decision of what norm(s) to diffuse.

3.5: Justified normative power: influence and ableness

This thesis followed the interpretation of power as a dispositional concept and argued that normative power is a form of power. If normative power is a form of power, it is an ability an actor has and can choose to exercise at will (see Morriss, 2002: 62, 80). If A has normative power, it has the ability to diffuse a norm n to B, and A can exercise this ability if and when it decides to do so. Through its use of normative power, A has brought about its desired outcome; the diffusion of a norm n to B. Would a justified use of normative power still constitute a use of power or is it more properly understood as influence? Manners has in fact hinted at this interpretation through his emphasis that the ‘power’ in normative power is not meant as an imposition of norms or coercive authority (see Manners, 2011). This is echoed by Tocci who writes that normative power “undertake[s] the function of ‘taming’ and regulating power” (Tocci, 2008: 5). For Lukes, influence is power if the adaptation of B’s preferences by A take place in a non-autonomous way; conflict is a necessary condition for the exercise of power (Lukes, 2005: 118, 136). In other words, in order for it to qualify as an exercise of power (power-over), A has to get B to act against its own

interests. Following Lukes, justifiable uses of normative power would be a form of influence, as it is an instance of “cooperative activity, where individuals or groups significantly affect one another” (ibid. 35). Thus for Lukes, all justified uses of normative power are better understood as (benign) influence. Like Lukes, Morriss believes that influence is related to affecting, writing, “the capacity to affect is not power” (Morriss, 2002: 30). To have power is to bring about outcomes of one’s choosing. For an account of normative power this would mean that if A has only affected B’s perspective on a norm $n$, and not effected its desired outcome (i.e. diffused a norm $n$ to B) then this would be influence, not power. Yet because normative power has been conceptualised in this thesis as a form of ‘power-to’, a justified use of normative power is still power (and not influence) so long as A has effected its desired outcome. As described in chapter one of this thesis, this could take the form of either: A has caused B to alter its behaviour so as to conform to norm $n$, and this might take the form of institutional, policy, or legal change, or A has caused B to accept norm $n$ as potentially valid, by acknowledging it as part of the acceptable range of contested discourses. Although it might be a contentious issue as to distinguishing between effecting and affecting, the question of what makes a use of normative power justified is still a relevant one. If A wanted to justify its use of normative power, it requires “a morally appropriate vocabulary for describing these actions, and a set of moral beliefs for judging them” (Morriss, 2002: 22; see also: 39, 41). As I argued in this chapter, those moral beliefs are deliberative in nature - in diffusing a norm $n$ to B, A has engaged in deliberation with B and has persuaded B to accept norm $n$ (this does not require that B accept norm $n$ in a specific form).

As can be seen from the application of deliberative criteria, there are still obstacles facing an account of normative power. In a use of normative power, A selects the topic of deliberation (by proposing a norm $n$ to diffuse to B) and specifies the content of deliberation (A deliberates with B about norm $n$ and why B ought to accept it). Yet for theories of deliberative democracy, a persuasive argument has no content that can be specified in advance; “what constitutes a good reason or bad argument can only be judged from the point of view of the participants themselves” (Bachtiger et al., 2010: 40). Moreover, communicative acts that conform to the deliberative ideal are “unconstrained, non-coercive and non-distorted… [which] rules out domination via the exercise of power, manipulation [and] indoctrination…” (Dryzek, 2000: 2). Although as I have argued, there can be justifiable uses of normative power, and how those uses of normative power are justified ought to be determined according to the deliberative criteria I have suggested, for deliberative democrats, even justifiable uses of normative power are contentious. This in itself is
not necessarily problematic for an evaluation of normative power, but it does raise the question of whether deliberative democrats should care about normative power. One reason why deliberative democrats might be interested in normative power has to do with what Morriss refers to as the evaluative context of power (Morriss, 2002: 40). In the evaluative context, we are interested in the set of social arrangements; specifically how and to what degree is power distributed within a society. The concern is whether actors are powerless “because they live in a certain sort of society - that is, they would have more power if social arrangements were changed… a radical critique of a society requires us to evaluate that society, not distribute praise or blame to people” (ibid. 41-2 emphasis in original). As it applies to evaluating normative power, what actors are able to exercise their normative power (and what actors are powerless) in the international arena becomes the focus of analysis. Morris argues that ‘ability’ and ‘being able to’ are not the same thing. He employs the term ‘ableness’, describing it as referring to the actual conditions encountered by the actor in their attempts to satisfy their desired outcomes (ibid. 82). More specifically, ableness has to do with “things that people can do at certain stated or implied times; the claim is about what the person could do in the conditions that happen to obtain at those times” (ibid. 85). To demonstrate ableness, Morriss uses the example of what kinds of food people are able to eat. Although all individuals have the (masticatory) ability to eat champagne and caviar, because these foods are expensive, it is only those individuals who can afford to purchase champagne and caviar that are able to eat it. In the evaluative context, “if we are interested in the distribution of the good things of life… this environmental difference is something we should wish to take into account - particularly because it may not be due to differences in individual abilities” (ibid. 81, emphasis in original). Presuming that actors have the ability of normative power (the ability to employ communicative acts in order to diffuse a norm), it is of normative concern whether some actors are more able to exercise their normative power in the international arena. This would be of interest to deliberative democrats. A moral evaluation of normative power therefore ought to be expanded in order to identify and give an account of what conditions in the international arena mean for what actors are more able to exercise their normative power, in addition to determining justifiable and unjustifiable uses given deliberative criteria.

**Conclusion:**

49 Although it does make the task of determining what might constitute legitimate normative power a more difficult one.  
50 ‘Society’ as it applies to normative power would mean simply the international arena. Not society as defined by the English School.
The purpose of this chapter was to identify useful criteria for a moral evaluation of normative power. Because the most feasible method for such an evaluation is one that focuses solely on the mechanisms of diffusion, and given that the mechanisms of diffusion are communicative acts, I argued that principles of deliberation found in contemporary theories of deliberative democracy would be a useful theoretical standard for such criteria. Moreover, such criteria can successfully engage with issues of interpretational ambiguity and the place of communicative acts that are problematic, such as coercion or threats. In order for a use of normative power to be praiseworthy, the communicative acts that A employs to diffuse a norm \( n \) to B ought to be reciprocal, reflexive and inclusive. The criterion of reciprocity identifies what kind of communicative acts can be said to be coercive. A demonstrates reciprocity if the communicative acts of A consist of a justification to B of norm \( n \). This would mean that A demonstrates a willingness to justify a norm \( n \) in language that B, who may or may not do share A’s frame of reference, can accept. Evidence for this can be seen in the kind of reasons given and how they are given for particular norm content. Reflexivity satisfies the demand (and similar definition) for reflexivity found in existing theories of normative power and shows how the social constructivist basis can be maintained. A use of normative power is reflexive if A is willing to A shows reflexivity if it is willing to alter the particular content of the norm it aims to diffuse to better suit the local context of B. Reflexivity is to be understood as an awareness of the context in which particular discourses emerge. This is demonstrated by connecting the particular (the reasoning for the content of a norm \( n \)) to a more general point or principle and can be seen as the willingness by A to alter norm content to suit local context. Lastly, inclusion is meant as a demand for A to ensure the active participation of B. A ought to be willing to include those who are subject to the diffusion of a norm \( n \). In other words, the communicative acts can be said to be inclusive to the extent that A includes B in the deliberation about the norm \( n \). Inclusion addresses the concern of avoiding accusations of cultural imperialism. A is inclusive if relevant participants and possibly, their alternative norms, are allowed to take part in the diffusion of a norm \( n \). Attending to the demand for inclusion through the application of deliberative principles, shows how the idea that normative power be in some way a ‘vanishing mediator’ and non-hierarchical ‘power’ are possible. The application of criteria derived from theories of deliberative democracy means that ultimately, an ideal use of normative power is one that approximates an ideal deliberative process. In this case, in the diffusion of a norm \( n \) by A to B, the justification does not come from a singular “conception of the proper conduct of life” (Cohen, [1989] 2006: 165; see also Gutmann & Thompson, 1996: 52), but rather from the free and authentic deliberation amongst those subject to the norm (see Dryzek, 2000: 85).
Conclusion:

The questions addressed by this research were; what is normative power and how can it be morally evaluated? Normative power refers to the ability of an actor to diffuse norms through communicative acts. A has normative power when it is able to diffuse, through communicative acts, a norm \( n \) to B. Normative power has been described as necessarily a force for good, so the diffusion of inappropriate norms, or using inappropriate means to diffuse norms, do not qualify as instances of normative power. I argued against this interpretation and instead made the claim that if normative power really is a form of power, then we cannot assume that it is legitimate or praiseworthy by definition. Following Peter Morriss, I argued that power is a dispositional concept. On this account, if normative power really is a form of power, then it must refer to the ability to diffuse norms. Consequently, normative power is not necessarily a force for good; there are better and worse uses of normative power. In Chapters two and three, I argued that the diffusion of norms ought to be the subject of normative scrutiny, and that there are two plausible ways of doing this. One way is to evaluate the norms themselves that are diffused by actors using normative power. As shown in Chapter two, this approach is flawed, because it results in two kinds of interpretational ambiguity and fails to adequately account for the role of coercive communicative acts. One kind of interpretational ambiguity is the potential for the diffusion of mutually incompatible norms. The second kind of interpretational ambiguity results when norms cited as incompatible with normative power are only incompatible with a particular interpretation of those norms. Instead, an evaluation of normative power ought to focus on the mechanisms by which norms are diffused. In Chapter three, I argued in support of this approach, and suggested three criteria - drawn from deliberative theories of democracy - that might be appropriate for evaluating the mechanisms of diffusion. First, the diffusion of a norm \( n \) features reciprocity. Second, the diffusion of a norm \( n \) demonstrates reflexivity. Third, the norm diffusion is inclusive in that A includes B in the deliberation about the norm \( n \) A diffuses to B. Lastly, I suggested that a future avenue of research of normative power would be one where considerations about what actors are able to exercise their normative power in the international arena are taken into account.
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