On Institutional and Organisational Determinants of Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations in Foreign-owned Multinational Subsidiaries: A Comparative Analysis in Ireland and Spain Using a Quantitative Parallel Design

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis provides an in-depth comparative analysis of the factors influencing local autonomy over human resource management (HRM) and industrial relations (IR) in foreign-owned multinational companies (MNCs) located in Ireland and Spain. It employs data from two large scale parallel surveys and a total sample of 452 foreign-owned MNC subsidiaries across both host locations. It examines the extent and use of international HRM structures by these MNCs in their efforts to integrate practices across subsidiaries and it assesses the relative impact of subsidiary characteristics relating to the sector of operations, the age, the size, the mode of entry and the trajectory of new investments. The results point to the significant role of international HRM structures in the MNCs under investigation whereby the higher incidence of such structures results in the subsidiary enjoying less local autonomy over HRM practices. In addition, while IR practices are found to be autonomous of these international structures, their impact on the suite of the HRM practices measured in the analysis varies. Subsidiary characteristics prove significant. Specifically, both the mode of entry and the undertaking of new investments in the host country hold significant explanatory power in accounting for variations in the level of local autonomy over HRM and IR experienced by the subsidiaries under study. The results are discussed in the context of the broader literature and the implications of the lines of enquiry pursued are set down.
DECLARATION

This thesis is my own work and has not been submitted to any other university or higher education institution, or for any other academic award. Any contribution made to the research by others with whom I have worked is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that I have obtained copyright permission with regard to my published work and that proper citations to the journals and appropriate credit to the publishers are provided in the appendices. Citations of secondary works have been fully referenced.

María Jesús Belizón
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBVA</td>
<td>Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Confirmatory Factor Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>Comparative Fit Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPD</td>
<td>Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CME</td>
<td>Coordinated Market Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMV</td>
<td>Common Method Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCOO</td>
<td>Comisiones Obreras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-HRM</td>
<td>Electronic Human Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIRO</td>
<td>European Industrial Relations Observatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRI</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWC</td>
<td>European Works Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crises</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRIS</td>
<td>Human Resources Information Systems</td>
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<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRSSC</td>
<td>Human Resources Shared Service Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>International Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Industrial Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IESE</td>
<td>Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Empresa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>Incremental Fit Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTREPID</td>
<td>Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Industrial Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRCHSS</td>
<td>Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LME</td>
<td>Liberal Market Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>Labour Relations Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Business System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH.D.</td>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Revise and Resubmit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>Structural Equation Modelling</td>
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<tr>
<td>UGT</td>
<td>Union General de Trabajadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>Variety of Capitalisms</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction
This chapter sets out the context for the thesis and establishes a route map for the reader through the work. In so doing, it summarily outlines the rationale underpinning the overall research effort, and sets down the aims and the objectives established for the overall research programme reported in the thesis. The structure of the thesis and its constituent elements are also set out.

1.2. Rationale for the research
The issue of how multinational companies (MNCs) manage their human resources (HRM) and industrial relations (IR) practices and policies in their foreign-owned subsidiaries has been a long-standing debate within the academic and research community (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). The importance of MNCs as contributors to economic activity and precisely how they manage their operations across borders is well documented. Most notably over the last two decades, the rapid growth of globalisation and the role of MNCs in a variety of host economies have driven a growing interest in HRM and IR in MNCs (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998; Bélanger et al 2013). The United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated at the end of 2013 that approximately 70 million workers were employed by more than 80,000 MNCs worldwide. What has caught the attention of scholars, amongst other issues, is how these workers are managed across borders. Are MNCs alike in the way they think and manage their employees worldwide or do MNCs become different in different contexts? In this instance, Brewster and Mayrhofer (2012, p. 1) note that “the processes of managing people in a systematic and consistent way with the intention of ensuring their effective contribution to the success of the organisation – in other words: human resource management – utilises the same processes in every case: a workforce has to be recruited, deployed and assessed, trained, paid, all of this within conditions that allow motivation to develop and be sustained. The way that HRM and these processes are thought about and the way that they are practised, however, varies from context to context”. Similarities are indeed found in the way MNCs manage their workforce across their dispersed units, especially given the fact that HRM practices generally originate in the USA. Due to
their strong influence along with universities, business schools and consultancies that are using and implementing American teachings on HRM, MNCs from other countries seem to replicate them (DeFidelto and Slater 2001; Quintanilla et al 2008; Brewster and Mayrhofer 2012). These are some of the underlying arguments favouring the convergence of HRM and IR practices, which generally go hand in hand with the assumption of the American model being pursued by MNCs (Smith and Meiksins 1995; Brewster and Mayrhofer 2012).

However, “it seems unlikely that one set of HRM practices will work equally well no matter what context” (Gerhart 2005, p. 178). In the study of HRM and IR practices, there seem to be several factors influencing the way a set of practices is transferred from HQ to the host country. Chief among them is the impact of the institutional context. For instance, it is extensively documented that the different labour market legislation with which each country regulates its employment matters will shape HRM and IR practices in foreign-owned subsidiaries (Almond and Ferner 2006). National legislation on IR and employee voice, minimum wages, vocational training systems and diversity and equality matters of the home and the host country have proven to have a particular impact on how HRM and IR policies are configured (Ferner et al 2005; 2011). This divergence argument has been more prominent among scholars, arguing that MNCs will behave differently in different countries. Nonetheless, the divergence argument has built its foundations mainly on institutional theory. The focus has been placed on the impact of regulations, formal and informal norms, cultural schemas and language barriers, social and political aspects on how MNCs manage their foreign units (Almond and Ferner 2006; Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Kostova et al 2008; Harzing and Pudelko 2014).

While the strands of literature referred to above have been informative in furthering our understanding of the dynamics at play, two specific research gaps are evident and motivate this work:

- There has been an evident lack of research on the role that organisational factors play in how MNCs manage their workforce across borders. In particular, there is a research gap in the study of the influence of organisational factors on the extent of local autonomy that managers enjoy to formulate HRM and IR practices in the host country (Ferner et al 2011). Organisational factors, such as international HRM structures, size and age of the subsidiary or sector of operations have been generally overlooked in
past contributions (Almond and Ferner 2006; Ferner et al 2011; Marginson et al 2010). Studies on the impact of organisational factors on the level of local autonomy over HRM and IR in MNCs are still at an early stage (Ferner et al 2011). While institutional theory has facilitated an understanding of the topic under investigation, it fails to identify why differences arise from within MNCs as opposed to from the context wherein they operate. Some scholars are, therefore, calling for a shift in the study of HRM and IR in an effort to go beyond institutions (Morgan and Christensen 2006; Ferner et al 2011; 2012; Bélanger et al 2013).

- Most comparative analysis of HRM and IR in Europe has focused on the large ‘powerhouse’ economies such as Germany and the UK, with limited attention paid to more peripheral economies (Collinson and Rugman 2010). As Edwards et al (2013, p. 548) put it: “our understanding of how MNCs operate has many gaps and these arise from both empirical and conceptual shortcomings. Although the ways that MNCs develop HRM and IR policies for their operations across countries have been extensively studied, previous surveys of MNCs are either partial in coverage (because, for example, they are confined to certain sectors or particular countries of origin) or raise major doubts concerning their representativeness (Edwards et al 2008). Moreover, closely coordinated parallel surveys of MNCs in different countries are rare. Case study research has revealed how MNCs operate but has tended to focus on certain types of MNCs, especially large, U.S.-based firms (Collinson and Rugman 2010)”.

1.3. Research aim and objectives

This short section deals with the overarching research aim of this work and its respective research objectives.
The overall research aim is: “To conduct an in-depth comparative analysis of the institutional and organisational determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in foreign-owned multinational companies (MNCs) located in Ireland and Spain”.

Arising from this, three specific research objectives underpinning the work may be articulated as follows:

1. “To explore the relative influence of both institutional and organisational factors as determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR in MNC subsidiaries”.

2. “To examine the extent and use of international HRM structures by MNCs in their efforts at integrating practices across subsidiary units”.

3. “Drawing on novel survey data to provide a comprehensive empirical and comparative analysis focusing on two of the most peripheral European Union economies, namely, Ireland and Spain”.

The thesis is based on four peer-reviewed journal papers which have either been published or accepted for publication in international peer reviewed journals. The manner in which the articles address the research objectives set out above is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
**Figure 1.1 Thesis’ objectives and articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis’ objectives</th>
<th>Articles</th>
</tr>
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- Objective primarily addressed in the article
- Objective partially addressed in the article
1.4. Contribution to knowledge

This thesis makes a number of contributions to existing knowledge on HRM and IR in MNCs. In an effort to explicate the institutional and organisational determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices, these contributions can be categorised under the headings of conceptual and empirical contributions.

The conceptual contribution of this thesis is to unearth the relative influence of both institutional and organisational factors determining the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR in MNC subsidiaries, in particular, the influence of international HRM structures. Early work on the use of international HRM structures and the level of local autonomy in MNCs located in the UK suggests that further research is needed on this topic (Ferner et al 2011).

The empirical contribution is made by providing a comprehensive and comparative analysis focusing on two of the most peripheral European Union economies, namely, Ireland and Spain. In addition, this work constitutes a source of scientific and statistical support for previous contributions largely based on a qualitative methodology. The use of a multiple methodology through structural equation modelling and logistic regressions renders the findings robust and therefore these contributions more reliable.

1.5. Thesis structure

The programme of work takes the form of an “article based Ph.D. thesis”, a research reportage model adopted by the University of Limerick in March 2006. In contrast to the traditional method, this approach comprises a certain number of papers, either already published or accepted for publication. In order to identify the differences between the traditional and the article based models, it is relevant to reflect here what the University of Limerick’s guidelines present as requirements of both styles:

“Monograph style is the conventional style in which theses are presented, where the work is laid out as a series of chapters, typically having the following structure: introduction, literature review, method, results and conclusions. An article-based thesis refers to the format in which a number of research articles (usually between 3 and 5 articles), produced
by the Ph.D. candidate while a registered research student, are published or accepted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. It will usually comprise an introduction, including an explanation of the research question(s), the research subject, relevant literature and methodology and a concluding chapter, in which the results of the research are summarised and discussed, are included. Alternatively, this may also be included in the form of an overall introductory chapter”.

1.6. Outline of remainder of thesis

The remainder of the thesis is presented as follows: Chapter 2 situates the topic under investigation within the HRM and IR literature and defines broadly the concept of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Subsequently, it discusses the strands of the literature that this thesis aims to bring together, namely institutional derived arguments, along with organisational level determinants. Chapter 3 describes the nature of the comparative analysis using Ireland and Spain as research contexts and thereafter, it deals with the methodology which has been employed to address the research aims of this thesis. It refers to the compilation of the populations, the data collection and survey administration, the creation of the international database and the data analysis. Chapter 4 contains the four articles that constitute the substantive contributions of this work. This section is introduced by a brief explanation of how these four articles already published or accepted for publication in combination specifically address the research objectives. Chapter 5 discusses the findings in view of the research objectives of the work, with a particular emphasis on how the contributions of the present thesis inform the broader extant literature. In addition, this section presents the overall conclusions of the thesis and suggests a series of future lines of research. Finally, it presents the personal learning outcomes and skills acquired by the Ph.D. candidate during the research programme from conceptualisation and planning through to execution, analysis and publication.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

This chapter summarily reviews some of the main previous contributions on local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in MNCs. Firstly, it situates the topic under investigation within the HRM and IR literature, discussing the most critical advances to date. Secondly, it identifies two lines of enquiry in the literature that provide foundations to explain the institutional influence on local autonomy on the one hand, and the effect of organisational factors, on the other. Finally, it addresses some of the limitations found in these contributions with respect to their focus as well as their empirical underpinnings.

2.2. HRM and IR in MNCs

This thesis is situated within the broader study of HRM and IR in MNCs. Prominent scholars in this field have paid a great deal of attention to a range of topics that are relevant to both the academic and practitioner communities. Chief among these topics is the influence of cultural and institutional aspects as determinants of how MNCs manage their human resources across borders (Hofstede 1980; Brouthers and Brouthers 2001; Almond and Ferner 2006; Harzing and Pudelko 2007; 2014), variations in approaches to diversity management in MNCs (Syed and Özbilgin 2009), the management of international assignments (Edström and Galbraith 1977; Harzing 2001; Collings et al 2009) and the insights that may be garnered from comparative IR (Hyman 2009) among others.

A line of enquiry emerged with Pugh and collaborators in an effort to profile the explanatory power of context in local autonomy over management practices, including its influence on HRM and IR patterns and practices (i.e. Pugh et al 1969; Garnier 1982; Ferner 1997; Almond et al 2005; Almond and Ferner 2006; Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Ferner et al 2011; Bélanger et al 2013; Smale et al 2013). These studies were mainly of a qualitative nature, though more recent work has used quantitative methodologies (Ferner et al 2011; Bélanger et al 2013; Smale et al 2013). Despite the range of contributions in this field, the majority of the work has focused on institutional factors (Whitley 1999; Kostova and Roth 2002; Pudelko and Harzing 2007). A handful of scholars have, therefore, called for a shift in the study of local autonomy over HRM and IR, moving beyond institutions towards other factors that may hold
explanatory power, not least organisational level determinants (Ferner et al 2011, 2012; Bélanger et al 2013).

2.3. Local autonomy over HRM and IR practices

The debate on local autonomy over management practices in MNC subsidiaries has a long pedigree in international business research (i.e. Pugh et al 1969; Garnier 1982; Ferner 1997; Almond et al 2005; Almond and Ferner 2006). However, attempts to decipher differences and commonalities in how MNCs pursue their HRM and IR practices in different locations have been a more recent avenue of scholarly inquiry (Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Almond and Ferner 2006; Ferner et al 2011; Bélanger et al 2013; Smale et al 2013).

Local autonomy in MNC subsidiaries is crystallised through the flexibility to alter management practices ‘rolled out’ from HQ and motivated by the need to conform to social, cultural, economic, political and managerial practices prevalent within host environments (Almond et al 2005). Recent contributions emphasise the need for MNCs to develop the capacity to differentiate and adapt to local requirements (Edwards et al 2013). Much of this literature has focused on the impact of institutional factors on the extent of local autonomy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kostova and Roth 2002; Pudelko and Harzing 2007). However, more recent contributions identify other factors that may enhance or mitigate local autonomy in MNC subsidiaries, including organisational factors such as international HRM structures, size, age of the subsidiary, etc. (Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013). In an effort to go beyond the institutional strand in the study of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices, both institutional and organisational level determinants are considered here.

2.4. Institutional factors

Among the set of factors that potentially shape MNCs behaviour, institutional arrangements are found to hold particular power in explicating commonalities and differences around how MNCs transfer practices across borders (Edwards et al 2013). Institutional arrangements are defined broadly as the unique elements comprising the external environment: regulations, formal and informal norms, culture, language, social, economic and political factors (Kostova et al 2008). A half century ago, institutional scholars largely focused on the role and effect of country of origin and host country institutional context on how MNCs managed their operations in different international locations (i.e. Pugh et al 1969; Garnier 1982). Arguably,
institutional arrangements are a composite blend of social, political, legal and cultural aspects of economic activity to which MNCs have to adapt (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kostova and Roth 2002; Pudelko and Harzing 2007).

This section revisits the different classifications scholars have developed in their attempt to profile and analyse how different institutional environments shape MNCs’ behaviour and, in particular, how the institutional context informs the need for local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Both ‘national business system’ and the ‘variety of capitalisms’ approaches, the most commonly used by previous work, are examined.

2.4.1. Home and host country effects: National Business System approach

Broadly speaking, institutional arrangements have been operationalised in the literature as comprising ‘home’ and ‘host country’ effects. Country of origin or home country effects have been identified as one of the main factors influencing the extent to which MNCs tend toward the local adaptation of HRM and IR practices (Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). Research to date indicates that US MNCs seem to be the least locally adapted in this respect (Hamill 1984; Harzing 1999; Ferner et al 2004). As Almond et al (2005) observe, “the extensive literature has pointed to MNCs of American origin being more standardised, formalised, and centralised in international policy making, when compared with those of other nationalities” (p. 276). Recently, Ferner et al (2011) found that US-owned subsidiaries were more integrated internationally regarding their HRM and IR practices than MNCs from other countries. For instance, although Japanese MNCs have been found to usually rely on personal control through the use of expatriates on the subsidiary executive management team, these subsidiaries enjoy higher levels of local autonomy than their American counterparts (Chang and Taylor 1999; Chung et al 2006). Overall, therefore, the extant literature contains a deal of evidence to suggest that country of origin effects make a real difference in terms of approaches to international HRM and therefore, to local autonomy over HRM and IR (Edwards and Ferner 2002; Almond et al 2005).

Each nation state represents a unique or idiosyncratic institutional environment wherein MNCs are embedded to some extent and which shape their behaviour (Brewster et al 2008). This perspective suggests that MNCs operating within the same host country tend to assume similar characteristics (Kostova and Roth 2002). In light of these contributions, some scholars
argue that foreign-owned MNCs adopt approaches which are aligned with the formal and informal rules and behaviours that characterise the host environment where they operate (Almond et al 2005; Ferner and Almond 2006; Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Bélanger et al 2013). In so doing, these foreign-owned operations aim to achieve efficiency and legitimacy within the local institutional context. For instance, while scientific evidence indicates that US MNCs generally adopt an integrative HRM and IR approach globally (Ferner et al 2004), there is also evidence to argue that attempts by US MNCs to standardise diversity policies across their international operations have failed due to high levels of cultural and institutional resistance in some countries (Ferner et al 2005). The complexity that MNCs encounter in different national contexts, therefore, leads some scholars to postulate that a certain level of adaptation is inevitable thereby excluding total convergence, integration and standardisation regarding management policies, practices and processes (Quintanilla and Ferner 2003). In addition, research to date has shown that MNCs’ operations located in flexible and liberal labour markets will enjoy greater scope for the transfer of HRM and IR practices from HQ to subsidiaries (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011), while operations located in more regulated labour markets or coordinated economies will come under greater pressure to adapt to host country practices (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011).

There is an extensive literature on the impact of institutional arrangements of both the home and the host country on the MNC subsidiaries’ behaviour across borders (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Almond et al 2005; Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Ferner et al 2012; 2011). The array of possible pressures that foreign subsidiaries may encounter goes beyond the pure regulatory environment to include culture, social norms, national customs, economic history and evolution and labour market features. The combination of these institutional influences has been classified in different ways. Thus it relates to what Whitley (1990) modelled as ‘national business systems’ (NBS) and what other authors have classified into allied typologies such as the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003). These categorisations are rooted in the fact that “similar societies solved similar problems and challenges” and in so doing they institutionalised similar elements of their business systems (Mueller 1994, p. 407).

One of the main targets of the literature on national business systems (NBS) is to focus on the comparative and relational angle among different countries (Almond and Ferner 2006; Almond 2011). Whitley (1999) depicts NBS as a set of interconnecting structures and institutions within different domains of economic, legal, cultural and social life that, in
combination, defines a nationally distinctive pattern of economic and social organisation. NBS’ features have been identified as one of the main factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices (Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Ferner et al 2011). As Almond (2011, p. 258) notes that “this form of institutionalism implies that how firms coordinate human resources is likely to be shaped by a range of national institutional complexes in areas such as finance, training and education, industrial relations and arrangements governing inter-firm relations”.

2.4.2. A ‘variety of capitalism’ approach
Some scholars have classified home and host countries taking the lens of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) theories as the platform for their work (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable 2003). This approach focuses especially on the role of markets, firms, state ownership and regulation and their interactions. In terms of our focus on HRM and IR in MNCs, Hall and Soskice’s (2001) analysis suggests that MNCs that emanate from liberal market economies (LMEs) are less predisposed to the local adaptation of HRM and IR policies and practices across borders. Conversely, MNCs coming from coordinated market economies (CMEs) are more likely to adapt their HRM and IR practices locally and in so doing conform to legal requirements. The essential argument here is that since CMEs are characterised by high levels of regulation, inward investing MNCs are obliged to adopt approaches which conform to these local norms (Hall and Soskice 2001; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). This leads Ferner et al (2011) to suggest that foreign subsidiaries of MNCs originating in CMEs will have a stronger disposition to adapt HRM and IR practices locally compared to those coming from LMEs.

However, this theoretical approach has certain limitations. Although, the dichotomous differentiation between CMEs and LMEs simplifies any analysis and the application of the VoC approach to different areas such as HRM and IR, politics or sociology, it is only based on one dimension, namely coordination. Amable (2003) addresses this deficiency through including additional dimensions, namely product-market competition, labour market characteristics, financial sector and corporate governance, social protection and the education system. Amable’s classification is consequently more nuanced, differentiating between five types of capitalism: market-based capitalism (the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia), continental European capitalism (Germany, France, Belgium and Austria), social democratic
capitalism (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), Asian capitalism (Japan and Korea) and Mediterranean capitalism (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece). There are some ambiguous cases such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland which are generally located between market-based and continental capitalism, and Norway which is located between social-democratic and continental capitalism. While arguably this broader multi-archetype developed by Amable (2003) may hold power in explaining variations in international HRM (Collings et al 2015), its empirical efficacy as a determinant of commonality or difference in HRM and IR patterns remains unproven to date.

2.5. Organisational factors
Recent contributions also point to other factors that may constitute a source of influence in the level of local autonomy, most notably organisational factors. Organisational factors are viewed here as those factors belonging to the MNC’s level of analysis, including the use of international HRM structures and subsidiary characteristics such as the sector of operations, size and age of the subsidiary or the entry mode. The following sections outline how organisational factors may impact on levels of local autonomy over HRM and IR in MNC subsidiaries.

2.5.1. International HRM structures
An emergent line of research at organisational level focuses on the relationship between the sophistication of the HR function and the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices (Farndale and Paauwe 2005; Parry and Tyson 2011; Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013). Scientific evidence demonstrates that those HR functions that present high levels of sophistication, as manifested via the utilisation of international HRM structures, are more likely to be integrated globally (Ferner et al 2011). On the other hand, MNCs with less sophisticated HR functions (viz. lower utilisation of international HRM structures) are more likely to be locally adapted (Farndale and Paauwe 2005; Ferner et al 2011).

Scholars have shed some light on the role of international HRM structures in locally adapting the HR function across the globe. These international HRM structures have been variously termed ‘technologies of control’ and ‘international integration mechanisms for HRM’ (Ferner et al 2011, p. 485; Smale et al 2013, p. 232) and increasingly feature as organisational level
Determinants of HRM and IR policies and practices in MNCs. Four relevant international HRM structures have been identified in the literature, which are now discussed in turn.

Firstly, some authors posit that the transfer of HRM and IR practices from HQ to subsidiaries may be enabled by the presence of an international committee which acts as a conduit for HR policy development, dissemination and implementation across borders (Marginson et al 1995; Edwards et al 1999; Ferner et al 2011). Prominent scholars argue that particularly MNCs competing in global markets will be more likely to establish a set of international structures in order to link and coordinate their dispersed units in line with their global policies, HRM and IR policies inclusive (Marginson et al 1995; Edwards et al 1999). This earlier work, initially based on a case study methodology, emphasises the role of an international HRM committee or body that not only acts as a policy-making agent but also fosters other forms of coordination and control promoting frequent meetings of HR managers from different host countries, international assignments aimed at the implementation of new policies and more broadly the efficient communication and interaction of HR managers within the organisation. Although Ferner et al (2011) develop a solid theoretical rationale underpinning the relationship between the presence of an international HRM committee and the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices, their empirical analysis did not provide the expected scientific evidence. Further analysis is therefore needed in order to test this relationship, broadening the scope of the studies in both the number of MNCs included and host countries explored.

Secondly, the extant literature identifies the potential relevance of HR shared services centres (HRSSCs) that supply HR services to subsidiaries across the globe, and in the process treating them as internal customers (Farndale and Paauwe 2005; Cooke 2006; Ferner et al 2011). The provision of HR services worldwide offers MNCs the opportunity to take advantage of economies of scale within the HR function (Wächter et al 2006). The control and coordination of HR services from these types of centres are found to limit and confine local management control, allowing scope to facilitate the transfer of HRM and IR practices from HQ to different host locations (Farndale and Paauwe 2005). As Cooke (2006, p. 213) puts it, having “a small HR team at the corporate level to focus on high-level strategy, governance and policy” is greatly facilitated by the services provided by a HRSSC and its focus on centralising policy. The advantage of a HRSSC lies in its ability to engage in monitoring HRM and IR practices. The HR team at corporate level may employ HRSSCs to
keep HRM and IR practices in line with their corporate aims and strategies and to develop and disseminate best practices within the HRM and IR arena (Cooke 2006; Ferner et al 2011).

Thirdly, a good body of research has profiled HR information systems (HRIS) as one of the most effective tools to monitor practices internationally (Hannon et al 1996; Haines and Petit 1997; Strohmeier 2009; Parry and Tyson 2011; Ferner et al 2011). HRIS are viewed as particularly significant in providing the MNC with a means of operationalising corporate control aiming to integrate and standardise the collection and exchange of information among the global subsidiaries (Hannon et al 1996; Ferner et al 2011). As defined by Haines and Petit (1997, p. 261), a HRIS is:

“A system used to acquire, store, manipulate, analyse, retrieve and distribute pertinent information about an organisation’s human resources. Initially, such a system was used in human resource management to support transaction processing and maintain management control. Today, new information technology is used to improve decision-making and support competitiveness”.

In 2005, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) undertook a comprehensive study on the use of HRIS. They identified six reasons for introducing HRIS within HR functions, namely, enhancing the quality of the information available, reducing the administrative burden on the HR department, speeding up the exchange of information among different actors, improving the availability of information in decision-making and business planning, enhancing services for employees and developing HR metrics for employee performance and related pay (CIPD 2005). In a similar vein, Strohmeier (2009) termed the application of information systems to the HR function ‘e-HRM’ and argued that the expansion and development of the internet has greatly facilitated the use of e-HRM “for both networking and supporting actors in their shared performing of HR activities” (p. 528). Therefore, there appears to be a solid argument linking the use of HRIS and the control and coordination of HRM and IR practices across host locations. While Ferner et al (2011) did not find scientific evidence to support this argument; Parry and Tyson (2011) found a significant negative relationship between the employment of HRIS and levels of autonomy over HRM and IR practices.
Finally, the literature points to the existence of direct data reporting from subsidiaries to HQs. Ferner et al. (2011) contributed to the debate on the use of international HRM structures and the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices by unearthing an important link between low levels of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices and subsidiary obligation to report HR data to higher organisational levels. As they describe it: “such relationships provide a potential channel for top-down transmission of policy, for scrutiny of policy implementation, and for directive intervention if necessary” (p. 485). Hence, central control is also exerted via direct reporting of HR issues from subsidiaries to HQ. Through this direct reporting, HQ monitors HRM and IR practices which have been transferred from the corporate HR team to the host locations and based on the information reported, HQ might take the opportunity to intervene as deemed necessary.

2.5.2. Subsidiary characteristics

There is a range of subsidiary characteristics that have been relegated to the background in the studies of HRM and IR in MNCs. A number of prominent scholars have profiled some of these subsidiary characteristics, notably, sector, subsidiary age and size, mode of entry and trajectory of new investments as determinants of the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR (Garnier 1982; Butler et al. 2006; Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008; Ferner et al. 2011). This section presents a review of these characteristics in an attempt to explore their impact on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices.

A novel line of enquiry has emerged around the need for a deeper analysis of the impact of sector of operations in recent years (Marginson et al. 2010; Bechter et al. 2012). An arguably excessive focus on institutions over the years has overlooked the role of the sector of operations and other organisational factors in the study of HRM and IR practices (Bechter et al. 2012). Addressing this deficiency, Marginson et al. (2010) argue that new advances on the impact of sector might attenuate the well-established and supported home-country effect. They advocate that a greater focus be placed on sector of operations since different sectors generally imply a particular manner of doing things in terms of HRM and IR practice (Marginson et al. 2010; Bechter et al. 2012). For example, collective agreements and IR regulation are often developed at a sectoral level. There is already scientific evidence recognising a greater influence of the sector of operations over the country of origin effect in the study of employee representation and consultative voice in MNCs (Marginson et al. 2010).
Bechter et al (2012, p. 1999) note that “a sector focus may provide a better understanding of why transnational coordination and regulations develop more in some sectors than others”. The extant evidence suggests that the manufacturing sector shows a tendency towards lower levels of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices, while services present a broader scope for local adaptation due to their local nature in most cases (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). Concomitantly, HRM and IR practices of MNC subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector enjoy less local autonomy since there is some evidence to suggest that standardisation does more commonly occur in this sector, relative to others (Ferner et al 2011).

Age and size of the subsidiary have been widely linked to the extent of local autonomy of HRM and IR practices (Garnier 1982; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). Some of these authors posit that the greater the age of the subsidiary the higher the level of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. This argument springs from the fact that older subsidiaries are more likely to be acclimatised to the local scenario and to demonstrate an ability to more effectively replicate the practices deployed by local firms. However, Ferner et al (2011) demur, suggesting that potential ambiguity may exist with regard to the relationship between the period subsidiaries have operated within a particular host country and the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Indeed they suggest that the opposite (of local adaption) may plausibly occur – viz. the older the subsidiary the more likely it is to be embedded within the MNC’s home country management system and know-how – and hence, the more likely it is to be globally integrated, especially in the case of “acquired subsidiaries” (p. 494). However there seems to be little consensus on this issue and consequently further inquiry is required to help scholars advance knowledge on the way the age of the subsidiary might impact on local autonomy over HRM and IR practices.

Another subsidiary characteristic acknowledged in the literature as a potential determinant of the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices is subsidiary size (Garnier 1982; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). Size refers here to the size of the subsidiary in terms of number of employees. Garnier (1982) posits that larger subsidiaries will receive more attention from HQ and will be subjected to higher levels of control, limiting the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Concomitantly, scholars argue that HQ will not be as concerned about smaller subsidiaries thus increasing the probability of a greater degree of local autonomy (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011).
Finally, this section focuses on two comparatively novel subsidiary characteristics likely to impact on the degree of local autonomy, namely, mode of entry and the trajectory of new investments in the subsidiary.

Mode of entry has been the focus of some studies in recent years, particularly in relation to the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices (Almond and Ferner 2006; Meardi et al 2009). The establishment of new subsidiaries through greenfield mode has been found to allow little scope for local autonomy. This is generally related to the absence of a pre-established management style which, in turn, allows greater scope to transfer HRM and IR practices from HQ to the new subsidiary as there are few pre-existing ideational legacies related to embedded policies and practices that have to be dealt with (Meardi et al 2009). However, the establishment of subsidiaries through merger or acquisition provides HQs with quite a contrasting scenario. The new subsidiary in the case of merger/acquisition entails an existing and previous organisation with an established management style and organisational culture which may well serve to encourage local autonomy over HRM and IR practices rather than trying to meld the two previous entities and their idiosyncratic approaches (Almond and Ferner 2006; Gunnigle et al 2009; Meardi et al 2009).

Turning to the trajectory of new investment in the subsidiary, a quantum of research is found indicating a potential relationship between new investment and the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices (Gunnigle et al 2005; Tempel et al 2006; Gunnigle et al 2009). According to Tempel et al (2006), where subsidiaries attract new investment, either fully or partially funded by HQ, this will generally be associated with greater central control. Tempel and colleagues (2006) found that once these investments were made, the transfer of HRM and IR practices from HQ becomes inevitable. Recent studies on US subsidiaries located in Europe found that subsidiaries which had expanded via investing in new sites were also likely to experience a shift towards union avoidance within the new sites (Gunnigle et al 2009). Being hitherto fully unionised US MNCs; they did not follow a union approach in their new sites (Gunnigle et al 2005; Gunnigle et al 2009). Overall though, the relationship between the trajectory of new investments and the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices remains ambiguous and open to further analysis. In particular, greater investigation is needed on the extent of local autonomy over IR within these new investment undertakings (Gunnigle et al 2009).
2.6. Shortcomings in the extant research

Overall, evidence suggests that scholarly inquiry on the topic under investigation in this thesis has pinpointed a number of inadequacies in existing contributions examining the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Indeed a number of theoretical and empirical aspects that have been neglected or inadequately addressed in previous studies can be identified which, in turn, provide a rationale for the lines of inquiry pursued as follows:

- The study of the utilisation of international HRM structures, also termed ‘technologies of control’, is still at an embryonic stage and further advances are needed in order to profile their specific role as organisational determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices (Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013).

- Subsidiary characteristics have often been overlooked, neglecting their potential influence as determinants of the extent of subsidiary autonomy over HRM and IR policies and practices. This is the case, for example, concerning the sector of operations (Marginson et al 2010; Bechter et al 2012), the entry mode (Gunnigle 1995; Gunnigle et al 2001) and the trajectory of new investments (Gunnigle et al 2005; Tempel et al 2006).

- The extent of local autonomy across individual HRM practices coupled with the differential use of international HRM structures is a ‘road less travelled’ (Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013). Some case studies posit that some international HRM structures are less used to integrate certain HRM practices, such as training and development, employee involvement or IR practices, which are more likely to be locally adapted (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Martin and Beaumont 1999; Almond et al 2005). Hence, there is an absence of empirical work in this sphere and a call for more in-depth studies on the impact of international HRM structures on local autonomy across a suite of HRM and IR practices has been made (Smale et al 2013).

- The study of local autonomy over IR practices has been equally neglected on the grounds of a localisation argument (Bélanger et al 1999; Kvinge and Ulrichsen 2008). Since IR practices are generally viewed as having a greater disposition towards local adaption, studies on these topics have not linked the extent of subsidiary autonomy
over IR practices with potential organisational determinants such as the use of international HRM structures and subsidiary characteristics (Ferner et al 2011).

- Existing contributions on local autonomy over HRM and IR practices draw primarily from qualitative methodologies, particularly from case studies (Marginson et al 1995; Ferner 1997; Ferner et al 2004; Almond et al 2005; Edwards et al 2008). Consequently, there is a patent need for representative survey-based analysis on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices (cf. Ferner et al 2011).

- There is an equally evident lack of comparative research on this phenomenon. A comparative angle is always needed in order to properly study the impact of the institutional settings on how MNCs behave (Hyman 2009). Collinson and Rugman (2005) identify a lack of representativeness with regard to the existing contributions on MNCs. In fact, most contributions on the topic under investigation focus on either large, highly industrialised economies (e.g. the US, Germany, Japan, and the UK) or large emerging economies (e.g. Brazil, China, and India). There is a clear need to address this empirical challenge through expanding the scope of the studies on MNCs, specifically on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in territories other than the large advanced or emerging economies. Ireland and Spain have been largely neglected in comparative studies in international business and they offer two different institutional contexts in which to explore the phenomenon of interest.

2.7. Conclusions
This chapter has summarily reviewed the pertinent literature on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. It firstly described the predominant role of institutional arrangements in shaping the management practices and approaches pursued in MNCs. Secondly, it offered a synopsis of how institutional theory has provided different classifications of home and host country perspectives via ‘national business systems’ and ‘varieties of capitalism’ and their impact on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Thirdly, the chapter has summarised the recent but growing literature on the possible impact of international structures on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Finally, subsidiary characteristics – such as sector, age, size (employment numbers), mode of entry and trajectory of new investments – have been outlined in an attempt to evaluate their potential impact on levels of local autonomy over HRM and IR, as opposed to the traditional approach of treating them solely as control variables. In addressing
these dimensions of local autonomy the chapter has also identified substantial shortcomings in previous contributions, the combination of which offer opportunities for opening particular lines of enquiry.
CHAPTER 3: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the comparative analysis carried out using data from two locations in which MNCs involved in this study operate, namely, Ireland and Spain. It also describes the methodological approach used in this study. First, it outlines the research approach taken in the thesis. Next, it explains the listing of the populations in Ireland and Spain, sampling methods and response rate, questionnaire design and administration, the main stages of the fieldwork as well as the compilation of the national databases and the subsequent international integrated database. Finally, it describes how the data were analysed in each paper.

All of the articles presented in this thesis draw from the same database, namely INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database). The database is the result of a coordinated set of parallel, nationally representative surveys of employment practices in MNCs. INTREPID involves a number of international research teams studying employment practices in MNCs across different national contexts, namely Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Spain and the UK. The first international database was merged by the end of 2009 comprising data from four countries: the UK, Ireland, Canada and Spain. A second wave of countries commenced this project after 2007 (i.e. Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Mexico, Denmark and Norway). These countries are aiming to join the current database in the foreseeable future. Irish and Spanish data were employed for all the analyses offered in this thesis.

3.2. Comparative analysis

Cross-national comparison has a longstanding pedigree in the study of HRM and IR practices in multinational companies. As Hyman (2009, p. 3) states: “Comparison…. means the systematic cross-analysis of phenomena displaying both similarities and differences. It both contributes to, and is informed by, theory and generalisation. It is often considered the nearest functional equivalent in the social sciences to the laboratory experiment of the natural scientist: by examining a range of countries it is possible to hold some ‘variables’ constant while altering others”. Some prominent scholars have noted that social sciences are
comparative in nature, even if the focus only refers to a single country of analysis arguing that it would be foolish to study social science in an isolated manner (Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Hyman 2009).

The choice of a comparative focus is driven by the possibility of studying the impact of institutional arrangements on the local autonomy over HRM and IR practices pursued by MNC subsidiaries (Hyman 2009). Ireland and Spain have been largely neglected in comparative studies in international business (Barrios et al 2004). Most such studies focus on either large, highly industrialised economies (e.g. the US, Germany, Japan and the UK) or large emerging economies (e.g. Brazil, China and India). In addition, Ireland and Spain offer two distinctive scenarios for the implementation of employment practices. While both are late industrialised economies and have attracted large flows of FDI, their approach is quite different. Ireland is characterised by a highly proactive approach towards incentivising new FDI through low corporation tax and other incentives. The great majority of FDI in Ireland emanates from the US with the stock of American FDI in Ireland aggregating to more than the combined stock of US FDI in the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) combined (Quinlan 2011). This is quite a remarkable statistic given Ireland’s small size, low population and peripheral geographical location. While Spain is also a large recipient of inward FDI, this is principally due to its large population, geographical location and historical linkages to South America, proximate southern European markets and low operating costs. The Irish labour market is comparatively lightly regulated in terms of employment policies (Gunnigle et al 2011). In contrast, the Spanish context is highly regulated on labour and employment matters (Quintanilla et al 2009). The divergent nature of IR in both countries is of particular importance. While MNCs in Ireland do not encounter legal obligations to recognise and deal with trade unions (a ‘voluntarist system’), MNCs in Spain have to recognise trade unions where workers so desire (a ‘right-based system’).

Thus, there are a number of commonalities and differences between Ireland and Spain that make these two countries particularly suitable for cross-national comparison. As illustrated in Table 3.1, characteristics shared by Ireland and Spain include the fact that both economies are comparatively late industrialisers, have also experienced a high levels of inward and, more laterally, outward FDI flows (particularly during the 1990s) and finally that both are peripheral European economies.
Table 3.1: Commonalities and differences between Ireland and Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commonalities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
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<tr>
<td>European late industrialised economies</td>
<td>Basis for IR systems: ‘Voluntarist-based’ versus ‘right-based’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large growth of inward and outward FDI</td>
<td>Labour market regulations: Lightly-regulated versus highly-regulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European peripheral economies</td>
<td>Different strategies attracting FDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3. Research approach

“The social world exists externally and that its properties should be measured through objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition.”

(Easterby-Smith et al 2002, p. 28).

Chief among the approaches taken in social research is that of deductivism. Deductive theory, attending to the theoretical advances that social research has provided previously, deduces and formulates hypotheses on the grounds of those existing contributions in order to be tested empirically. Once the hypotheses are accepted or rejected, deductive researchers would turn to a revision of the theory (Bryman 2012). Figure 1 shows the process of deductivism.
The last stage of the deductive approach involves an element of inductivism. Inductivists develop theoretical contributions drawn from observed data and findings. The two approaches are different in nature but complementary to some extent. Deductivism entails a modicum of inductivism and vice versa (Bryman 2012). This thesis and, consequently, the four articles comprising the results chapter, follow a deductive approach. The main reason behind the election of this approach relates to our choice of quantitative analysis. Deductivism is the most common perspective for quantitative research which generally also entails the epistemological orientation of the natural sciences, termed positivism (Bryman 2012). Positivism in social research seeks the measurement of social facts and the relationships among them using the lens of the natural sciences, affirming that social factors are also subject to measurement. Therefore, positivism aims to measure a number of factors.
that are observable in order to draw theory as opposed to interpretivism which relies on the principle that ‘knowledge is constructed by human beings as they make sense of their environment” (Anderson 2004, p. 42).

This thesis attempts to unearth the relative influence of both institutional and organisational factors in the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in MNCs. By bringing existing theories together, a number of hypotheses are developed and formulated in each of the articles presented here in an effort to address the research objectives. The testing of those hypotheses and the resultant findings provide us with scope to add knowledge to the body of literature. However, robust quantitative analysis requires the appropriate identification of the population and sufficient numbers of cases to be able to serve the researcher with a useful instrument to generalise conclusions (Hair et al 2010). Hence, the remainder of this chapter will describe the listing of the populations in Ireland and Spain, the sampling process, the administration of research instruments and the construction of the comparative database.

3.4. Listing of the populations

INTREPID researchers limited their object of study by agreeing a particular definition of MNC according to its employment size (McDonnell et al 2007; Edwards et al 2013). On the grounds of their previous experience in qualitative analysis, they decided to narrow their populations of MNCs to large- and medium-size MNCs. The resultant definition is described as follows:

a. All foreign-owned MNCs operating in the host country, with 500 or more employees world-wide and 100 or more in their host operation.

b. All national-owned MNCs with 500 or more employees worldwide and at least 100 overseas.

However, national-owned MNCs are excluded in this study. The inclusion of national-owned MNCs in our study would have entailed the combination of two different units of analysis, namely, HQs and subsidiaries. For this reason, in order to avoid methodological confusion, this thesis focuses uniquely on data gathered from foreign-owned MNC subsidiaries operating in Ireland and Spain.
Establishing an accurate listing of the population of MNCs in individual countries proved to be a particularly arduous and tedious undertaking. INTREPID researchers in Ireland and Spain embarked on this process by searching existing databases where they could obtain MNCs information. However, they soon realised that there was no single source providing them with a comprehensive list of MNCs. As noted by Edwards et al (2013, p. 560) “no single database adequately covered all MNCs”. The option of using a single source was rejected since they found a number of inconsistencies and discrepancies between the available databases (Edwards et al 2013). On a country by country basis, the Irish and Spanish nodes of INTREPID undertook the compilation of the first database of MNCs operating in their countries of studies according to the definition of MNC agreed. INTREPID researchers agreed to compile a number of company features in order to compose the populations: country of origin, name of the MNC, name of the subsidiary, sector of operations, number of employees worldwide and number of employees in the host country. In addition, they agreed to identify a contact name in every company to be invited to participate in the study, preferably the HR manager.

A number of sources were consulted in an effort to decipher an accurate list of MNCs in each country. In the Spanish case, a first attempt was to examine four national and international databases: SABI, AMADEUS, HOOVERS and ORBIS. Yet, some companies were reported with a large amount of missing values and therefore the research team decided to widen the sources and access to local fonts of information: chambers of commerce, specialised magazines, national financial newspapers such as Actualidad Económica and Expansión and the Madrid stock market. The Irish case was significantly similar in acquiring a precise population list. The Irish INTREPID team collated the information desired from the Industrial Development Agency Ireland (IDA Ireland), which is the agency tasked with the coordination of overseas investments in Ireland, for a great majority of foreign-owned MNCs; Forfás which is the policy advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation in Ireland; Bill Moss Partnership, a private firm providing company database consultancy services; and Enterprise Ireland, the government organisation responsible for the development and growth of Irish enterprises in world markets, which proffered a list of mostly Irish-owned companies and some foreign-owned.
However, while these sources in combination proved useful and effective in order to garner most of the information needed, they also suffered from a number of deficiencies in providing certain company details:

- Duplicated information or double-counting issues. This was particularly problematic resulting in some companies appearing more than once in the list. This was tackled in order to avoid the probability that MNCs listed twice would be selected in the sampling process.
- Lack of completeness. Omission of certain companies was often found in the early stages of the construction of the population. This was particularly so in the case of Spanish/Irish-owned MNCs from the banking and insurance sectors. In the Irish case, there was a lack of comprehensiveness in relation to non-grant aided companies such as Aldi or Lidl.
- Imprecise MNC information. Many sources consulted in both countries were characterised by providing inaccurate information, particularly in relation to the size of the MNC and the subsidiary in terms of their number of employees. However, this information was also inexact regarding the country of origin in some cases. A lack of focus on indigenous MNCs was also found in Ireland (McDonnell et al 2007).

In both countries, information from all these sources was unified in order to create the populations. The list was edited and cleaned in an attempt to ensure that the resultant populations were as accurate as possible. This information search was completed through a last checking process, making use of the following secondary sources:

- Irish case: Kompass, Major Companies of Europe 2005, the Irish Times Top 1000 companies and company websites.
- Spanish case: Asociación Española de Banca, Dirección General de Seguros, Multinational Marketing List, the US Chamber of Commerce (Madrid) and company websites.

A final review was still needed to clarify instances where information was ambiguous. Those companies were contacted by email or telephone in both countries. The resultant population in Ireland amounted to 563 MNCs, of which 491 were foreign-owned and the remaining 72
MNCs were Irish-owned. The final population in Spain comprised 1,085 MNCs, of which 894 MNCs were foreign-owned and 191 MNCs were Spanish-owned.

3.5. Sampling and response rate

Ideally researchers would be inclined to include the total population as their sample of analysis. However, this is not practical due to the costs and time that this large data collection would entail. Anderson (2004) points out the fact that researchers should stick to specific criteria in selecting their sample. Firstly, the sample size should be large enough in order to be suitable for statistical analysis. Secondly, the selection process should be random and unbiased. The sampling methods employed in each country are as follows:

- **Irish data collection**: the method selected by the Irish team was stratified sampling, which belongs to a broader sampling method termed probability sampling, used generally for quantitative studies (Anderson 2004). Stratified sampling splits the data into different sub-populations or strata in order to generate a sample that is representative of the general population. This is particularly relevant when there are small sub-populations within the overall population that could get lost in the random sampling process. The resultant different sub-populations are approached randomly in an effort to create a random sample. The Irish sample was stratified by country of origin using five different categories (Ireland, the UK, the US, Rest of Europe and Rest of World), sector of operations (services, manufacturing) and employment size in the host country (100-199 employees, 200-499 employees and greater than 500 employees). The research team agreed to create a sample that would generate a response rate of at least 60% and hence, 414 companies were approached and contacted via phone/email randomly. The Irish response rate was 63%, with some 260 MNCs participating in the study (for detailed information, see Lavelle et al 2009).

- **Spanish data collection**: the Spanish team did not select the stratified sampling method, contacting equally the whole of the population. Stratification was not needed due to the sufficient population size (Edwards et al 2013). A first approach was carried out through postal letter. The total population was informed of the purpose and objectives of the research project as well as being asked to collaborate
and participate in the study. After six months, the postal letters were re-sent to those companies from which the research team did not obtain responses and some of them were also contacted by phone and email. The resultant Spanish sample was formed by 330 MNCs, of which 247 were foreign-owned and 83 were Spanish-owned. The Spanish response rate was 30.41% (for detailed information, see Quintanilla et al 2010).

After a final cleaning process, which entailed discarding cases with a large number of missing values, the sample employed in this work comprises 452 foreign-owned subsidiaries, 242 operating in Spain and 210 in Ireland.

3.6. Questionnaire

The design of the parallel survey was coordinated internationally by INTREPID researchers in order to articulate equivalent questionnaires with scope for comparative analysis (Edwards et al 2013). As Edwards et al (2013, p. 564) pointed out: “our comparative parallel design is an innovative way of carrying out bottom-up yet coordinated comparative research and it involved a high degree of collaboration and conceptual exchange in the construction of the questionnaire, a process that provided a way of integrating institutional variation into the concept of the instrument”. The Irish questionnaire was based on a variation of the British and Canadian instrument while the Spanish questionnaire was a quasi-identical replica of the British survey, with the necessary degree of adaptation to the Spanish context. Since English is the ‘official language’ of INTREPID, translation into Spanish was needed in the case of the Spanish questionnaire. As Edwards et al (2013, p. 563) note: “the translation into Spanish required rather more collaboration between national teams and one of the U.K. team members, Anthony Ferner, who is fluent in Spanish, helped the team through this process and checking the equivalence of terms” (see appendices A and B for a copy of both questionnaires).

The questionnaires were divided into six main areas: demographic information about the MNC and the subsidiary, the HR function, pay and performance management, training and development/organisational learning, employee representation and consultation and employee involvement and communication. INTREPID researchers played an important role on the design of the questionnaires; in particular, they spent a considerable amount of time adapting
the section on employee representation and consultation in order to suit the IR systems of each host country. Once INTREPID researchers felt that the questionnaires were ready to be used, they undertook a pilot stage. In the Irish case, the pilot stage entailed 5 interviews while in the Spanish case it consisted of 10 interviews. This phase was instrumental in order to identify a small number of minor issues with the questionnaires in both countries, which were subsequently corrected. After the pilot interviews and minor amendments, the questionnaires were ready to be administered. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the survey administration. The fieldwork stage took place from February 2006 to February 2007 in Ireland and from June 2006 to August 2008 in Spain.

Table 3.2: Main characteristics of the survey administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>50 min on average</td>
<td>75 min on average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method Chosen</td>
<td>Face-to-face paper-based survey administered by research team and interviewers from Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) (research team did 47% while ESRI did 53%)</td>
<td>Face-to-face paper-based survey administered by research team members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Rate</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Mainly HR Manager/HR Director</td>
<td>Mainly HR Manager/HR Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A great majority of the interviewees were the HR Manager/HR director of the subsidiary. A single respondent may lead the sample towards the common method variance (CMV) problem. However, INTREPID researchers solved this limitation collecting the data in two different stages (screening interviews by phone) and, more specifically, with the inclusion of Likert-scale variables in the questionnaire. As Edwards et al (2013, p. 561) explains:

“Seeking two or more respondents in each firm to answer a lengthy questionnaire would inevitably have significantly increased the cost and adversely affected the response rate […] The approach, however, can lead to the problem of common method variance (CMV), in which bias is introduced when key variables are derived from the same respondent (Chang et al 2010). As Podsakoff et al (2003) note, this is likely to be "particularly problematic in those situations in which respondents are
asked to provide retrospective accounts of their attitudes, perceptions and/or behaviours” (ibid, p. 881). We judge that CMV is unlikely to be a problem in this research, partly because the data were collected in two stages (and the variables derived both from the initial screening interviews or checks and from the main stage) and partly because the scales and anchors varied across our key variables. Both of these are steps recommended by Chang et al (2010) as ways of avoiding CMV. Perhaps even more important, most of the variables are derived from questions about contemporary aspects of the organisation, particularly its basic features, structures and certain HR policies and practices and are consequently not primarily retrospective, attitudinal, or perceptual measures”.

The surveys were conducted by research team members and interviewers from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in the Irish case and solely by research team members in the Spanish counterpart. As part of the Spanish team, I personally conducted approximately 180 interviews. As a matter of note, the Irish team provided a half-day training course in order to ensure that the ESRI interviewers were familiar with the survey prior to the administration of the questionnaire.

3.7. International database for cross-national comparison

Once the fieldwork phase was finalised in both countries, researchers proceeded to undertake a cleaning process to guarantee the reliability of the data contained within each database. This stage was particularly time-consuming and meticulous, however, it concerned the trustworthiness of the data and hence, it was indispensable to advance the data analysis. The cleaning process entailed primarily the checking of frequency tables for each variable of the questionnaire and particularly, of routed questions articulated on the questionnaire. For instance, each country developed a document including the routed questions and the manner in which these variables were linked. The construction of the database and its cleaning process were carried out through SPSS version 15. In addition, the cleaning process required the development of syntax files in SPSS programming language in order to ensure a careful neatening of the data.

Thereafter, each country had the dataset available for individual national analysis. However, the databases needed to be merged in order to be suitable for comparative analysis. The international coordination of the database integration involved a high degree of collaboration among INTREPID researchers. Prior work on the elaboration of the questionnaires helped
this stage undoubtedly; however, the international integration of the database was not straightforward. INTREPID researchers designated a working group in charge of the coordination of the database. As part of the Spanish team, I was personally and directly involved in the previous cleaning process and in the integration of the database. In order to merge the national databases into a unified file, we, firstly, identified identical and equivalent questions in the four countries. Secondly, we developed a code book for each of the sections of the questionnaire, “defining the SPSS transformations to be undertaken and wrote syntax that converted the original national variables into new comparative variables” when needed (Edwards et al 2013, p. 565). Each country carried out re-coding and transformation processes in their respective national databases before the merging. Next, a statistical expert based in the United Kingdom was appointed to integrate the national databases into a single database. A final checking process was still needed to guarantee the integrity and consistency of the comparative file and therefore, a cross-checking process variable-by-variable was carried out by the expert in the UK. Finally, the database was suitable and ready for comparative analysis by the end of 2009.

3.8. Data analysis

The international database provided this study with the opportunity to develop a single analysis in each paper that includes a dummy variable concerning the host country, in this case, Ireland and Spain. Given the research aim of this project, that is, to conduct and in-depth comparative analysis of the factors influencing local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in foreign-owned MNCs located in Ireland and Spain, an integrated approach appears to be more suitable than parallel analysis. As Edwards et al (2013, p. 567) put it: “A parallel analysis is more appropriate when examining national or local phenomena in MNCs across host countries, particularly where functionally equivalent variables are involved. Integrated analysis is better suited to transnational structures, policies and practices”.

The statistical analyses employed in each article include two different methods of analysis: regressions and structural equation modelling (SEM). Along with these two methodologies, the articles report a substantial amount of descriptive data. Firstly, descriptive analysis was needed in an attempt to provide a neater insight of the phenomenon studied. Some of this data has not been published before and therefore, the results are useful in themselves for the academic and practitioner community (Garavan 2001; Baker 2003). Secondly, the use of two
different methodological approaches offered us the possibility of studying the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR, viewing HRM as a whole as well as analysing some HRM and IR practices individually. The first article employs a structural equation modelling methodology in an attempt to study ‘the determinants of central control and subsidiary autonomy over HRM’. This article views HRM as a set of policies and practices and hence, central control and subsidiary autonomy over HRM is seen as a single construct or latent variable formed by a number of HRM practices. Structural equation modelling is particularly suitable for the study of causal relations among latent variables (Hair et al 2010) and hence, this was the selected methodological approach for the first article. The second article uses an ordinal regression analysis. This article aims to unearth the determinants of subsidiary autonomy over IR policies, specifically, over trade union engagement and employee consultation. Given the fact that these variables were measured through a 5-point Likert scale, ordinal regression results the most appropriate method of analysis in this case (Hair et al 2010). The third article deployed an ordinal regression methodology. This article aimed to explore the use of the international integration mechanisms of the HR function, also termed ‘international HRM structures’ or ‘technologies of control’. This paper has also a particular focus on studying the employment of these mechanisms across a suite of individual HRM practices. Finally, the fourth article constitutes a theoretical contribution around the topic of this study and therefore, this article did not require data analysis. A final factor of note concerning the data analysis is that correlations and multicollinearity tests were run showing satisfactory outputs in all cases. Further detail on the statistical analysis is provided within the individual methodological and result sections within each article.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the comparative and methodological approach employed in this study. It has outlined the research process that was chosen on the grounds of its suitability to obtain the data and the subsequent analysis according to the research aim of this work. The chapter provided comprehensive details regarding the listing of the populations, sampling process, questionnaire design and administration, international integration of the databases and data analysis. Finally, the chapter outlined the different methodological approaches employed in each article.
CHAPTER 4: ARTICLES

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the four published/accepted for publication peer-reviewed articles comprising the substantive contribution in the thesis. The first section of this chapter details the conceptual map that articulates how the articles address the research objectives of the thesis. The second section proffers a brief summary of each article with a particular emphasis on the contributions made in each of them. It also describes the publication process and provides details of the presentation of some of the articles in conferences and research seminars. Finally, each of the four articles is presented in sequence.

4.2. Conceptual map

Figure 4.1 illustrates how each article addresses directly or indirectly the research objectives of the overall thesis. The four articles constitute the primary body of knowledge of this work. The main research aim of this thesis is to conduct an in-depth comparative analysis of the institutional and organisational determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in foreign-owned MNCs located in Ireland and Spain, which is addressed by the four articles contained in this work. The four articles hold equal significance individually in advancing knowledge on the topic under investigation. However, in some instances, two or three articles might contribute to the same research objective in a particular way. For example, the first research objective of the thesis is “to explore the relative influence of both institutional and organisational factors as determinants of local autonomy over HRM in MNC subsidiaries”. This research objective is mainly addressed in article one – ‘Determinants of central control and subsidiary autonomy in human resource management: the case of foreign-owned multinationals in Spain’ –, by focusing on HRM practices viewed as a whole; but also in article two – ‘Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations in Ireland and Spain’, by investigating IR practices specifically, and in article three – ‘Modes of integration of human resource management practices in multinationals’, which partially addresses this research objective by focusing on the use of international HRM structures. The links between the four articles and the three research objectives are illustrated in Figure 4.1. The figure employs arrows whereby continuous arrows demonstrate a direct relationship between the article and the research objectives and broken arrows indicate that a particular article partially addresses
the research objective in question. Additionally, Figure 4.1 provides the sub-objectives of the four articles.
Research Aim
To conduct an in-depth comparative analysis of the institutional and organisational determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in foreign-owned MNCs located in Ireland and Spain

Research Objective 1
To explore the relative influence of both institutional and organisational factors as determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR in MN C subsidiaries

Research Objective 2
To examine the extent and use of international HRM structures by MNCs in their efforts at integrating practices across subsidiary units

Research Objective 3
Drawing on novel survey data to provide a comprehensive empirical and comparative analysis focusing on two of the most peripheral European Union economies, namely Ireland and Spain

First Article

Sub-objectives
- To identify those factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over HRM practices.
- To examine individual international HRM structures and their impact on the local autonomy over HRM.

Second Article
Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations in Ireland and Spain.

Sub-objective
- To identify and test a number of factors which account for variations in subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations.

Third Article
Modes of integration of human resource management practices in multinationals.

Sub-objective
- To offer a comprehensive and holistic analysis of the preferred modes of integration of human resource practices in multinationals.

Fourth Article
Advancing understanding on industrial relations in multinational companies: key research challenges and the INTREPID contribution.

Sub-objectives
- To provide some theoretical background on the key current research issues and challenges in regard to industrial relations in MNCs.
- To present a concise review of scholarship to date on industrial relations in MNCs using INTREPID data and future research agenda.

Objective primarily addressed in the article
Objective partially addressed in the article
4.3. Summary of the articles

This section provides a brief summary of the four articles. The summary details the title, the research objectives, the main findings and the journal where the article was published/accepted for publication. In addition, each of the summaries describes the author’s contribution to the articles.

First article – Determinants of central control and subsidiary autonomy in human resource management: the case of foreign-owned multinationals in Spain

This article was published in the *Human Resource Management Journal* in 2013. The main focus of this paper is to “to conduct an analysis of the factors influencing local autonomy over HRM practices in foreign-owned multinational companies (MNCs)”.

The research focus specifically entails two sub-objectives:

- To identify those factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over HRM practices.
- To examine individual international HRM structures and their impact on the local autonomy over HRM.

This paper profiles the determinant factors of HRM subsidiary autonomy within multinational companies (MNCs). It combines the institutional theory approach, theory on power interplays within the MNC, as well as an analysis of the impact of international HRM structures. This paper uses solely Spanish data. Subsidiary autonomy over HRM is seen as a latent variable, termed ‘global subsidiary autonomy over HRM’. The methodological analysis employed in this paper is that of structural equation modelling. The results point towards a number of determinants that hold explanatory power. Home and host country effects, operationalised through the variety of capitalisms by Amable (2003), prove to be significant in explicating variations in subsidiary autonomy levels. The role of the international HRM structures - such as the existence of an international policy-making body, HRIS, the use of HR shared service centres and direct reporting on HR matters - emerge as relevant in determining the level of subsidiary autonomy over HRM. This article is a co-authored piece, of which I was first author. As a first author I estimate my contribution to be of the order of 60 per cent.
Second article - Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations in Ireland and Spain

The second article, entitled ‘Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations in Ireland and Spain’ was accepted for publication in the *European Journal of Industrial Relations* in April 2013. The article was published in January 2014. This article, in addressing the extent of subsidiary autonomy over IR practices, offers a particular focus on trade union engagement and employee consultation. This manuscript directly addresses two of the research objectives of the thesis, namely, “to examine the extent and use of international HRM structures by MNCs in their efforts at integrating practices across subsidiary units” and “the provision of a comprehensive empirical and comparative analysis focusing on two of the most peripheral European Union economies, Ireland and Spain”. The paper specifically addresses the following sub-objective:

- To identify and test a number of factors which account for variations in subsidiary autonomy over IR.

Combining two threads of the literature - institutional and organisational determinants - the findings report the importance of institutional effects, as well as the mode of entry of the subsidiary and the trajectory of new investments. Finally, the results show that the level of subsidiary autonomy over IR practices proves to be detached from the use of international HRM/IR structures. An early version of this paper was presented at a research seminar in IESE Business School, University of Navarre (Madrid Campus), May 2013. As a first author I estimate my contribution to be of the order of 60 per cent.

Third article – Modes of integration of human resource management practices in multinationals

The third article has been accepted for publication in *Personnel Review* in March 2015. The main focus of this paper is on examining the extent and the use of international HRM structures by MNCs in order to integrate their practices across subsidiary units. Thus, this article particularly addresses the second research objective of the thesis. This paper specifically advances knowledge on the preferred modes of integration of HRM practices in multinationals. The article addresses the following sub-objective:

- To offer a comprehensive and holistic analysis of the preferred modes of integration of human resource practices in multinationals.
The findings show evidence to argue that a strong relationship exists between the centralisation-based mode and the other three modes of integration; namely, people-, information- and formalisation-based modes. Additionally, the findings also suggest that the use of personal-based integration mechanisms is generally uniform across individual HRM practices, while formalisation-based and information-based mechanisms hold explanatory power in relation to performance appraisal systems and compensation practices. An early version of this paper was presented at the 14th Annual Irish Academy of Management Conference, National College of Ireland, Dublin (Ireland) in September 2011. I had a substantial involvement in this article as a first author and I estimate my contribution to be of the order of 65 per cent in this particular case.

Fourth article – Advancing understanding on industrial relations in multinational companies: key research challenges and the INTREPID contribution

This paper has been published in the Journal of Industrial Relations in February 2015. This manuscript revisits some of the current debates on IR in MNCs, including the debate on local autonomy over IR practices. The article constitutes a synopsis of the scholarship that has been produced on IR in MNCs using INTREPID data and it lays out avenues for further research. This article aims to address the following sub-objectives:

- To provide some theoretical background on the key current research issues and challenges in regard to IR in MNCs.
- To present a concise review of scholarship to date on IR in MNCs using INTREPID data and future research agenda.

This article collects considerable advances garnered on the issue of local autonomy enjoyed by subsidiary managers in their dealings with trade unions and collective bargaining. While institutional effects are still relevant, this paper illustrates that the institutional effect is attenuated by organisational factors such as the mode of entry or the trajectory of new investments. However, the use of international HR structures seems to have little tangible impact on the extent of local autonomy over IR practices in MNCs. This article is a co-authored piece, of which I estimate my contribution to be of the order of 30 per cent.
4.4. Articles

The remainder of this chapter is an exposition of the four published/accepted for publication articles. Each article is presented in word format, preceded by an introductory table detailing the title of the article, journal name and date of publication, volume and pages. Appendix C provides proof of the publication of each article in the form of a scanned copy of the first page of the articles already published and in the form of an email of acceptance for publication in the case of the articles that have been accepted for publication but have not yet undergone final copyediting and printing in the journal.
## ARTICLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Determinants of central control and subsidiary autonomy in Human Resource Management: The Case of Foreign-owned multinational companies in Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journal</td>
<td><em>Human Resource Management Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Belizón, M.J., Gunnigle, P. and Morley, M.J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>23 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page number</td>
<td>262-278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract: This paper examines the factors affecting human resource management (HRM) subsidiary autonomy within multinational companies (MNCs). Drawing on institutional theory arguments, along with an analysis of the impact of international HRM structures, it attempts to identify the multiplicity of factors influencing subsidiary autonomy with regard to HRM. Using data gathered from a highly representative survey of foreign MNC subsidiaries located in Spain, the results identify a number of factors which hold explanatory power. Firstly, the distance between the home and the host country in terms of variety of capitalism is crucial in explaining variations in subsidiary autonomy. In addition, international HR structures, such as the existence of an international policy-making body and the use of HR shared service centres or HR data reporting mechanisms are also important in accounting for the degree of autonomy over HR issues experienced by the MNC subsidiaries in our study.

Keywords: Human Resource Management, Multinational Companies, Policy Transfer, Subsidiary Autonomy, Spain.
Introduction

There is little doubt that multinational companies (MNCs) are important drivers of globalisation (ILO 2012). Within this context, there is a significant debate in the international business literature on the extent to which MNCs transfer their human resource (HR) policies and practices. While we find evidence that MNCs attempt to transfer managerial policies from the home to host countries (Guillén 2001; Pudelko and Harzing 2007), the extent to which the same HR policies work equally effectively in diverse contexts and the likelihood of their gaining legitimacy therein is open to question (Almond et al 2005). Indeed it is precisely this conundrum that has encouraged MNCs to adapt managerial policies to the local context and thereby attempt to accommodate different national idiosyncrasies and distinctive organisational forms commonplace in the host locations in which they operate (Guillén 2001; Djelic and Quack 2003).

Studies examining the nature and extent to which HR policies and practices are transferred by MNCs have increased considerably in the last decade (Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Lavelle et al 2009; Ferner et al 2011). However, with a few exceptions, there remains a distinct lack of quantitative empirical research in this field due to the challenge of gathering such data directly from the specialist HR function among representative samples of MNCs (Ferner et al 2005). In taking up this challenge, our study is characterised by three distinguishing features.

Firstly, the manner in which home and host country differences are dimensionalised is an important feature of our research effort. We use the theoretical lens of varieties of capitalisms as explicated in detail by Amable (2003), in order to provide what can be considered a more nuanced perspective in observing and explaining the extent to which different labour market rigidities impact HRM subsidiary autonomy.

Secondly, there is dearth of research on the relationship between subsidiary autonomy over HRM and international HR structures (Ferner et al 2011). Where the impact of international HRM structures have been analysed, this has often involved combinations or groups of structures rather than unearthing the potentially differential impact of individual international HR structures (Ferner et al 2011). The present research addresses this weakness through
examining individual international HR structures separately and dissecting possible
differences they might have on HRM subsidiary autonomy.

Thirdly, the analysis of HR practices in foreign-owned MNCs in Spain has been the object of
few quantitative-based studies. While recent works present some insights on HRM in Spain
(Ferner et al 2001; Cabrera and Carretero 2005; Quintanilla et al 2008; 2010), we know little
of the factors impacting on the extent of subsidiary autonomy over HR issues in MNC
subsidiaries. This paper provides a rigorous analysis using data on HR practices collected
from foreign MNCs subsidiaries located in Spain.

Against this backdrop, the precise research gap which we address is the identification of
those factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over HR practices in foreign owned
MNCs in Spain.

**Central Control and Subsidiary Autonomy in MNCs**

The question of HR policies pursued by MNCs in their globally dispersed subsidiaries has
been extensively studied in recent years (Harzing and Pudelko 2007; Brewster et al 2008;
Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008). Authors from the institutional strand of the literature have
pointed to the ‘global-local’ tension, namely the countervailing pressures for standard,
centrally developed and managed policies versus the need to ensure HR policy and practice is
sensitive to and reflective of the norms and traditions of the host context (Brewster et al 2008;
Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008). In other words, there is potential for conflict between a desire
to maintain central control on the part of MNC HQ and the countervailing demand for
autonomy on the part of the subsidiary in certain domains of HRM policy and practice. In this
paper, autonomy can be viewed as the extent to which the subsidiary acts as a policy-making
“authority” (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). The extant literature identifies a
number of possible approaches. Some HQs do not accord subsidiaries any effective level of
local autonomy and these are therefore expected to implement policies set by HQ. At the
other extreme, some HQs allow subsidiaries full autonomy in setting HRM policy (Ferner et
al 2011). There clearly is room also for intermediary approaches whereby subsidiaries are
afforded some local autonomy to develop HR policies within certain guidelines or
frameworks set by the HQ or in certain domain HR areas approved by HQ (Harzing 1999;
Home and Host Country Effects on HRM Control

A ‘variety of capitalism’ approach

In an attempt to discern the impact of different home and host environments on management practice, some scholars have employed the lens of ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) as articulated by Hall and Soskice (2001). This focuses especially on the role of markets, firms, state ownership and regulation. Although, the dichotomous differentiation between CMES and LMEs simplifies analysis and the application of the VoC to different areas, such as HRM, it is only based on one dimension, namely market coordination, this theoretical approach has one important limitation however. Amable (2003) addresses this deficiency through including additional dimensions, namely product-market competition, labour market characteristics, the financial sector and corporate governance, social protection and the education system, all of which in combination are view as holding explanatory power. From our perspective, the particular advantage of Amable’s classification is that it is more nuanced, differentiating between five types of capitalism: market-based capitalism (the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia), continental European capitalism (Germany, France, Belgium and Austria), social democratic capitalism (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), Asian capitalism (Japan and Korea) and Mediterranean capitalism (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece). Of the five dimensions advanced by Amable (2003), labour market characteristics are arguably the most influential aspect in terms of HRM configuration and international integration. Table 1 shows the main differences among the five distinctive capitalsims based on the labour market features.
Table 1: Main differences among the distinctive capitalism based on the labour market features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology of Capitalism</th>
<th>Main Labour market Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Based</td>
<td>- Weak employment legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Flexible labour market</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wage flexibility, decentralisation of wage bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unions in defensive position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental European</td>
<td>- High employment protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflicting IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fairly strong unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordination of wage bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>- Moderate employment protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong union and high rate of union membership but co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordinate or centralised wage bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>- Limited labour flexibility. Employment protection in large companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Duality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Seniority based wage policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong unions but permissive IR system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>- High level of regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- High duality (temporary vs permanent work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Very conflicting IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Centralisation of wage bargaining</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amable (2003)

As Whitley (1999; 2003, p. 4) noted labour markets are “often governed” by employment regulations, organisation of employment representation as well as the “system of wage bargaining and employer-employee relations”. Therefore, labour market’s features can act as a driver or obstacle to attempts to transfer policies from the HQ to subsidiaries (Müller-Camen et al 2001). Researchers examining HRM in MNCs from suggest that MNCs that emanate from liberal market economies (LMEs) are predisposed to the centralisation of HR policies and practices across borders, while MNCs coming from coordinated market economies (CMEs) are more likely to adopt a more decentralised approach to HRM because of their recognition of constraining legal requirements that they view as important influences limiting or constraining their behaviour (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). This leads Ferner et al (2011) to suggest that foreign subsidiaries of MNCs originating in CMEs...
enjoy higher levels of subsidiary autonomy than those coming from LMEs. This seems to particularly characterise US MNCs where we find a large body of research pointing towards the centralisation of HR practices (Almond et al 2005; Ferner et al 2011). Flexible labour market features offer a scenario where indigenous MNCs easily might get used to “strategic freedom” and therefore, follow the same pattern wherever they operate. However, are US MNCs the only case where this “strategic freedom” is translated into centralisation or on the contrary, would it be also the case of MNCs originated in other liberal markets economies? On the other hand, rigid labour market features provide a constraining scenario where indigenous MNCs arguably become accustomed to limitations on their behaviour/practice and thus, they will follow this tendency towards local adaptation wherever they are (Ferner et al 2011). In the light of these contributions, our first hypothesis is as follows:

\textit{H1: MNCs originating in flexible labour market regimes will accord lower levels of HR autonomy to their subsidiaries than those MNCs originating in rigid labour markets.}

**Global mandates and the subsidiary responsibility**

Scholars have emphasised the relevance of subsidiaries’ mandate as a determining factor of the level of central control (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Martinez and Jarillo 1989), although there is no consensus on its impact. Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) suggest that subsidiaries with international responsibility accorded by global mandates from HQ are more likely to experience lower levels of autonomy. This means that the higher the level of subsidiary responsibility internationally, the higher the level of central control (Ambos and Schlegelmilch 2001), particularly subsidiary mandates regarding research and development (R&D). Although the creation of new knowledge requires freedom at an operational level, the transfer of this knowledge throughout the MNC demands well established control mechanisms. On the other hand, the literature on organisational power suggests something different. This posits that high levels of international responsibilities confer a high level of structural power on the subsidiary. We also find literature that relates subsidiary power in negotiations with HQ to the size of subsidiary (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000), whereby the larger the subsidiary, the greater its power level. In terms of decreasing HQ control, having a substantial R&D mandate places the subsidiary in a stronger power position \textit{vis a vis} HQ in setting HRM policies (Edwards et al 2002). In addition to the importance of the scope of the R&D mandate, power may also be stronger in situations where
the subsidiary mandate includes the development of international products, or where international exports are a significant portion of overall subsidiary sales (Edwards et al 2002). Based on this premise, several authors argue that the existence of critical resources located in the subsidiary is also a key factor impacting on the transfer of HR policies (Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1998; Edwards et al 1999; Ferner et al 2005). Therefore, having critical resources within the MNC can be an explanatory reason for the level of HR subsidiary autonomy. Overall therefore, it is plausible to suggest that responsibility for global mandates plays an important role in determining HR subsidiary autonomy and the higher the level of international responsibility in terms of global mandates of the MNC subsidiary, the higher the level of local autonomy enjoyed by the subsidiary. This interpretation is supported by Edwards et al (2002, p. 185) who state that “as a result of possessing such a mandate, the subsidiary gains access to parent expertise but retains a degree of managerial autonomy. This arrangement has the subsidiary playing a role much more like an equal partner of the MNC than a subordinate entity”. In order to further explicate and test this issue, we offer the following hypothesis:

\[ H2: \text{The higher the level of the subsidiary’s mandate on international R&D, international products and exports, the higher the level of subsidiary autonomy over HR practices.} \]

**International HR structures**

As noted above, we find very little research on the relationship between central control over HR practices and global HR structures. Harzing (1999) noted that HR practices, being a strategic issue, are often subjected to central control. Moreover, central control has been related to the existence of governance structures and also coordination and control mechanisms (Harzing 1999; Ferner et al 2011). Some evidence suggests that the use of international HR structures might be therefore a sign of greater monitoring and coordination of HR practices across borders (Harzing 1999; Ferner et al 2011).

To an extent, the way MNCs coordinate and control their subsidiaries reflects the extent of standardisation and formalisation of these HRM systems and procedures (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Martínez and Jarillo 1989; Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Harzing 1999; Ferner et al 2011). Building on Ferner et al (2011), we therefore identify a number of international HR structures related to HR subsidiary autonomy as follows: *the presence of the*
international HR policy-making body; HR data reporting; international HR information systems and an international HR shared services facility. While previous studies in this area have examined the impact of combinations of these international HR structures (Ferner et al 2011), we decided to investigate each structure individually. Firstly, the existence of an international HR body which determines, formulates and implements new global policies represents a potentially crucial factor impacting on the extent of central control over HRM issues. It would seem that where the HR policy-making body is present, we might expect HR subsidiary autonomy tends to be lower than otherwise. Secondly, Ferner et al (2011) argue that formal direct data reporting on HR issues from subsidiaries to HQ also helps explain variation in HR subsidiary autonomy, with low levels of subsidiary autonomy related to high levels of HR reporting to HQ. Thirdly, the use of international HR information systems such as SAP or PeopleSoft might also be expected to impact on subsidiary autonomy For example, Stiles et al (2006) found that several companies such as Oracle, Siemens, Samsung and Shell utilise a complete on-line database with specific systems for performance appraisal, ‘high potential’ pools and internal vacancies. This relationship argues that HR subsidiary is likely to be low in subsidiaries using an international HR information system. Finally, regarding international HR shared services, Farndale and Paauwe (2005) identify how MNCs such as IKEA provide global HR services for HR through such centres in order to enhance the control and coordination of global HRM. More recently, Ferner et al (2011) suggested that the use of these centres is related to lower levels of HR subsidiary autonomy. However, Ferner et al (2011) only supported that the direct reporting of HR issues is related to subsidiary autonomy. We posit that all of them are related to HR subsidiary autonomy. Based on these contributions we suggest the following hypotheses:

**H3a:** Subsidiaries will experience lower levels of HR autonomy where an international HR policy-making body is present within the MNC.

**H3b:** The higher the number of issues the subsidiary has to report to the HQ, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy.

**H3c:** HR subsidiary autonomy will be lower when the subsidiary utilises an international HR information system such as SAP or PeopleSoft.
**H3d:** HR subsidiary autonomy will be lower when the subsidiary uses the services provided by a HR shared service centre.

**Method**

This study draws on data from a large scale survey on HR policies and practices in foreign multinationals operating in Spain (See Quintanilla et al 2010). The survey data are the result of a multi-stage project which commenced with the establishment of a detailed database of the population of foreign owned MNCs in Spain. The identification of the population was no easy task. The lack of representativeness within MNCs studies has been remarked over many years, with critics identifying a sample bias towards large companies, US-owned, manufacturing, well-known companies (Collings and Rugman 2010). Based on other studies, such as Edwards et al (2008) and McDonnell et al (2007), the definition of foreign MNC adopted in this research was the following: foreign firms that employed at least 500 employees worldwide and at least 100 in Spain. The listing of the populations was drawn on SABI, AMADEUS, ORBIS and HOOVER. As occurred among parallel studies (Edwards et al 2008; McDonnell et al 2007), this task identified a number of difficulties, particularly the duplication of companies or the lack of reliable information on certain company details (e.g. employment numbers). Companies that had missing or inaccurate data within these databases were cross-checked via other sources (Williams 1997), such as the Chambers of Commerce, Madrid stock market, websites or specialised business magazines. The database resulting from this exercise was comprised of 894 foreign MNCs operating in Spain. The third step was the administration of the questionnaire. The population was contacted by post (100% of the population) and by e-mail and also by phone in a small number of cases (Quintanilla et al 2010). The response rate was 27.1%. A total of 242 foreign companies participated in the study. The survey was administered by the members of the research team between 2007 and 2009 (pilot stage inclusive). The duration of the interviews was from 1 hour to an hour and a half using a face-to-face administered questionnaire. The survey examined HR practice related three mutually exclusive groups of employees, namely the ‘largest occupational group’ (LOG), ‘managers’ and the ‘key group’. The LOG was defined as “the largest non-managerial occupational group among the workforce in the Spanish subsidiary”. Managers were classified as “employees who primarily manage the organisation, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organisation and whose main tasks consist of the direction and coordination of the organisation. It does not include those who simply oversee others, such as supervisors, even if their job title includes the word ‘manager’, such as office
manager”. The key group was classified as “those employees who can be identified as critical to the company’s core competence, such as research staff, product designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, etc. It did not necessarily have to be a sub group of management, though some of the group could have managerial responsibilities”.

**Measures**

*Dependent Variable: Global Subsidiary Autonomy over HR policies*

As noted earlier, the degree of autonomy afforded MNC subsidiaries in HR policy-making and implementation has been the focus of previous research. Certain authors have examined subsidiary autonomy as a binary issue (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008) while others have considered it as a gradual scale in their attempt to deepen our understanding of the concept (Ferner et al 2011). Our approach was to employ a standard Likert-scale (1-5) with three main anchor points as follows:

1 = The Spanish operations have no autonomy (must implement policy set by a higher level such as corporate or regional HQ)

3 = The Spanish operations have some autonomy (can develop policy within the guidelines/framework set by a higher organisational level)

5 = The Spanish operations have full autonomy (can set own policy)

The construction of the dependent variable was undertaken through a first and second order factor analysis as set out below resulting in a single construct i.e. Global Subsidiary Autonomy over HR policies.

*Subsidiary Autonomy over Pay and Rewards: Our measure consisted of four items, namely, the degree of subsidiary autonomy over relating its pay levels to market comparators, over*

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1 The present study does not include the degree of autonomy over employee representation and industrial relations (IR) policies within the dependent variable because IR practices are more prone “to vary significantly between countries than are other aspects of managing employees in the international context such as training and development” (Collings 2008, p. 174). IR issues are, generally speaking, much more decentralised than other HR policies (Bélanger et al 1999) because, as Kvinge and Ulrichsen (2008, p. 125) noted “there are difficulties in transferring labour relations because of differences in cultural codes and lack of basic common regulation”.

---
variable payments schemes for managers, the largest occupational group (LOG) and the key group. Reliability as measured by Cronbach’s alpha was .88.

Subsidiary Autonomy over Performance Appraisal Systems: this measure comprised three items, namely the degree of subsidiary autonomy over performance appraisals for the managers, for the key group and for the LOG. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient was .98.

Subsidiary Autonomy over Training and development: this is a composite construct formed by three different items: the degree of subsidiary autonomy over training and development policies, over succession planning policies and over the organisational learning policy. The Cronbach alpha coefficient was .75.

Subsidiary Autonomy over Employee Involvement: this construct was measured by three items, namely, the degree of subsidiary autonomy over attitude surveys and suggestion schemes, over provision of information to employees and employee involvement in the workplace in terms of team work and other forms of organisations. This measure yielded a Cronbach alpha of 0.59.

Independent variables
The diversity of capitalisms variable reflects the typology of capitalism of the home country following the five clusters described by Amable (2003): (1) Market Based Capitalism, (2) Social Democratic Capitalism, (3) Asian Capitalism, (4) Continental European Capitalism and (5) Mediterranean Capitalism. This variable is based on Amable's order of classification in terms of the underlying rigidity of the Labour Market. Thus, the variable measures from the most flexible labour market to the most rigid labour market. Our main reason for following this specific order is the fact that Spain belongs to the Mediterranean Capitalism which is the most rigid labour market system. As previously said, labour market regulations are probably the most relevant aspect in terms of HRM configuration and international integration.

The responsibility facing global mandates is a construct consisting of three items which strive to assess the degree of international responsibility of the subsidiary regarding three relevant issues. The first item refers to the international subsidiary responsibility for one or
more products or services on behalf of the worldwide company. The second item refers to the significant expertise in research and development within the worldwide company that is generated in the subsidiary. The third item refers to the percentage of revenues from sales abroad. The first 2 items follow a 1-5 Likert-scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The third item follows a scale 1 to 5 (1 = 0% to 20%; 2 = 21% to 40%; 3 = 41% to 60%; 4 = 61% to 80% and 5 = 81% to 100%). The Cronbach Alpha was .98.

**Direct reporting on HR issues** includes 9 items that were all measured through binary questions (1 = yes, 0 = no). The HR issues considered were the following: (1) managerial pay packages, (2) management career progression, (3) overall labour costs, (4) numbers employed (headcount), (5) staff turnover, (6) absenteeism, (7) productivity, (8) workforce composition by diversity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, disability, etc.) and (9) employee attitude and satisfaction.

The use of **an international IT system** for HR issues such as PeopleSoft or SAP HR was collected as a binary variable (1 = yes, 0 = no).

This was also the case of the existence of specific **global shared services for HR issues** and the existence of the **HR policy-making body** within the worldwide company, such as a committee of senior managers which develops HR policies that apply across countries. An only index has been created as result of the sum of the two of them (from 0 to 2).

**Moderator Variables**

A number of moderator variables were included based on the literature. The **sector of operations** (Katz and Darbishire 2000; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008) was asked as a simple dichotomous question (1 = manufacturing sector, 2 = services sector). The **size of the subsidiary** (Fenton O’Creevy at al 2008; Ferner et al 2011) was measured as the number of employees (1 = 100-499; 2 = 500-4,999; 3 = more than 5,000). The **age of the subsidiary** (Fenton O’Creevy et al 2008) was taken as a numeric variable comprising the exact number of years the subsidiary has operations within the host country.

**Results**

Before the analysis, we detail the main features of the sample. As previously stated, the sample comprised 242 foreign MNCs operating in Spain. Of these, 56.6% were in the services sector, with 43.4% being engaged in manufacturing. Regarding the size of the MNCs
measured by number of employees worldwide, roughly 200 companies (accounting for 83.9%) are large MNCs employing more than 5,000 employees globally. The medium size firms (from 1,000 to 4,999 worldwide employees) represent 12.4% of our sample. The remaining percentage, 3.7%, can be considered small MNCs (from 500 to 999 employees globally). Information on the countries of origin of the subsidiaries is presented in table 2 (See Table 2). In terms of accounting for FDI inflows into Spain, MNCs coming from Europe (56.9%) and the United States (37.6%) are the biggest players, with Japan accounting for another 4% approximately. European MNCs (non-Spanish) which operate in Spain are mainly from France (16.1%), Germany (13.2%) and the UK (10.2%).

Table 2: Country of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Country</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half of MNC subsidiaries in our sample originate from countries characterised as being market based capitalist economies (See Table 3). Firms from what are characterised as Continental European capitalist based economies account for a further 32.8%. Those originating from institutional systems classified as Social Democratic Capitalism account for 12.4% of the sample. Those coming from Asian capitalism institutional environments represent 4.1%.
Table 3: Typology of Capitalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology of Capitalism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Based Capitalism</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Capitalism</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Capitalism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental European Capitalism</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Capitalism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of subsidiary autonomy over the HR policies

The arithmetic average for the degree of subsidiary autonomy was calculated for all the HR policies, in order to explore the degree of centralisation. Based on our findings, levels of HR subsidiary autonomy in Spain are generally from medium levels to higher levels (from 3 to 5 within the 5-point Likert scale considered). The highest levels of subsidiary autonomy exist in the policy areas dealing with employee involvement (4.55), the provision of information to employees (4.44), training and development (4.17) and organisational learning (4.00). However, the level of subsidiary autonomy seems to be slightly more limited in policy domains relating pay levels to market comparators (3.87), attitude surveys and suggestion schemes (3.77) and succession planning for senior managers (3.45).

The remainder of the HR areas examined in this research project are more centralised at headquarter level. Thus, the policy areas that the MNC subsidiaries in Spain are least likely to have responsibility for are performance appraisals for the key group (3, 21), for the LOG (3, 07) and managers (3, 04) and on variable payments schemes for the key group (3, 32), the LOG (3, 08) and managers (3, 09). As referred to earlier, the literature describes how some companies tend to centralise more than others. Generally speaking, we see substantial differences between companies coming from one context or another. Table 4 shows the arithmetic averages with regard to the typology of capitalism from where the firms originate.
Table 4: Level of Subsidiary Autonomy over HR policy by type of capitalism of the homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Market Based</th>
<th>Social-Democratic</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Continental European</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over relating pay levels to market comparators</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over variable payments schemes for managers</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over variable payments schemes for the key group</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over variable payments schemes for the LOG</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over performance appraisals for managers</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over performance appraisals for the key group</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over performance appraisals for the LOG</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over overall policy on training and development</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over policy on organisational learning</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over policy on success in planning for senior managers</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over involvement of employees in work</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over attitude surveys and suggestion schemes</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy over provision of information to employees</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>4.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Determinants of Subsidiary Autonomy in HR: A Structural Equation Model (SEM)**

In order to establish the determinants of subsidiary autonomy over HR issues, a general structural equation model (SEM) (Hair et al 1999) following the two-step approach of Anderson and Gerbing (1988) was performed. This approach firstly estimates the measurement model through a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and secondly, validates the causal relations between variables within the structural model. SEM is the most appropriate and robust method in this case in order to contrast the factors which determine the subsidiary autonomy in HR issues, due to the type of questions that the survey contains: i.e. mostly Likert-scale based items. This allows us to develop several constructs regarding the dependent variable and the independent variables and to test the hypotheses outlined earlier.
Firstly, we created a construct for the dependent variable within the measurement model. We assessed item and scale reliability by examining the loadings of observable items on the corresponding underlying first order factors. The standardised factor loadings were all over 0.5, which is within the recommended limits with regard to social science analysis (Hair et al 1999). The significance of the factor analysis provides support for the convergent validity of the constructs, together with the composite reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha previously. Furthermore, all the average variances extracted are over 50% (Fornell and Larcker 1981). We established a second order factor analysis for the dependent variable in order to include as much information as we collected, following the same rules of thumb previously explained for the first order factor analysis. Secondly, we created another construct for the responsibility of the subsidiary facing global mandates. The standardised factor loadings were also all over 0.5 as well as the composite reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha previously reported. For this pair of final constructs, we estimated the discriminant validity through the correlations between them in order to validate that no construct is collecting redundant information (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Correlation equals to 0.064 between these two constructs. According to the structural model results, based on the recommended norms for good fit of $\chi^2/df < 3$, CFI and IFI > 0.9 and RMSEA < 0.08, the fit indices for our model can be determined to be good with $\chi^2/df = 1.092$, CFI= 0.990, IFI= 0.991 and RMSEA= 0.020. Table 5 shows the resultant standardised coefficients and the respective p-values.

**Table 5: Standardised Coefficients and p-values of the Structural Equation Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis and other causal relations</th>
<th>Standardised Coefficients</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← Typology of Capitalism</td>
<td>0.187***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← Global Mandates</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← HR Body</td>
<td>-0.157*</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← HR Data Reported</td>
<td>-0.266***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← IT System for HR</td>
<td>-0.106†</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← HR Shared Services</td>
<td>-0.105†</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← Age of the Subsidiary</td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← Sector of Operations</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.711</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR Subsidiary Autonomy ← Size of the Subsidiary</td>
<td>0.032</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Mandates ← Size of the Subsidiary</td>
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"†" p-value < 0.1; "*" p-value < 0.05; "**" p-value < 0.01; "***" p-value < 0.001
Observing the model, we can state that the typology of capitalism of the country of origin has a strong impact on the degree of HR subsidiary autonomy. The order followed in measuring the VoC variable lead us to suggest that the greater the flexibility of the labour market in the country of origin, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy over HR polices. At the same time, the higher the rigidity of the home country labour market, the higher the level of HR subsidiary autonomy. Thus, $H1$ is supported. Our $H2$ is not supported since the level of subsidiary responsibility facing global mandates does not seem to be significant in explaining variations in the degree of subsidiary autonomy. $H3a$ is also supported. The existence of an international policy-making body for HRM is directly related to lower levels of subsidiary autonomy. This is also the case of the direct reporting of HR data from the subsidiary to HQ. Thus $H3b$ is also supported. The use of an international HR information system such as PeopleSoft or SAP HR and the use of a HR shared services centre seem to be significant in explaining variations in the level of subsidiary autonomy, though only partially supported. $H3c$ and $H3d$ are then partly supported. Regarding the control variables, firstly, the results show that the age of the subsidiary may influence the degree of subsidiary autonomy, meaning that the older the subsidiary, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy. Secondly, the size of the subsidiary does not seem to be relevant in understanding variations in HR subsidiary autonomy (cf. Ferner et al 2011). Thirdly, the direct relationship between sector of operations and HR subsidiary autonomy is rejected.

**Conclusions**

The word “autonomy” comes from the Greek word “autonomos”, meaning self (auto) and law, custom (nomos). In other words, autonomy means independence or living by one's own laws. MNC subsidiary autonomy has been a growing line of inquiry in international business research, especially in recent years. Fenton O’Creery et al (2008, p. 162) analysed subsidiary autonomy from both the institutional and strategic perspective through an analysis of “the impact of national contexts in which subsidiaries are socially embedded and institutionally rooted”. Ferner et al (2011) also presented an analysis of subsidiary discretion including home country effect and the influence of HRM structures. Our research seeks to identify the factors influencing on the degree of autonomy over HR practices that MNC subsidiaries enjoy. We sketched a wide spectrum surrounding HR subsidiary autonomy in order to provide an appropriate operationalisation of the theory into our statistical model. Our contributions to the existing knowledge have been provided in three different angles: the way
we have dimensioned the country of origin; the individual analysis of international HR structures and providing insights on Spain as country object of study.

In so doing, we considered the country of origin as a likely determinant of the level of subsidiary autonomy over HR issues (Ferner 2005; Edwards et al 2007). However, the way in which home and host country are dimensioned in the present work is somewhat unique. We use the lens of varieties of capitalisms established by Amable (2003), which only has been previously applied within the HRM literature in relation to training and development policies (Geogen et al 2012). The present paper supports the influence of the home country, based on this typology of capitalisms. According to our findings, firstly, lower levels of HR subsidiary autonomy have been found in MNCs coming from countries with more flexible labour market regimes, that is, from countries very different from Spain where there is a highly regulated labour market comparatively. Secondly, higher levels of HR subsidiary autonomy have been found in the MNCs originating in countries more similar to Spain regulation wise. These results suggest that MNCs coming from flexible labour market traditions are more used to ‘strategic freedom’ in deploying their preferred HR approaches and are therefore likely to strive to do the same across borders. In addition, other reasons to considered among the causes of this centralisation is, for example, the fact that MNCs originated in flexible market economies have a highly skilled workforce in their home country in comparison with the workforce’s profile within their subsidiaries in the Mediterranean cluster (Amable 2003). Therefore, MNCs originated in flexible economies could ignore the labour market regulation to certain extent and place the decision-making process within the HQ. On the contrary, as the results support, the local side in the ‘global-local’ tension within the Spanish arena appears to be still the ‘strong player’. In addition, MNCs originating in more regulated labour markets are more accustomed to constraint and adapting themselves to the local environment and therefore tend to afford more HR autonomy to their subsidiaries in order to adapt to the local context. Our results totally support what Ferner et al (2011) found through Hall and Soskice categorisation i.e. that MNCs originating in CME countries are used to constraining legal conditions and therefore their subsidiaries have a tendency towards developing decentralised practices. Nonetheless, we are aware that our study only considers one host country (Spain). However, although we need to be careful in any generalisation of our results, the contribution of this paper considering Spain as host country provides us with some important insights. It not only allowed us to operationalise in a more explicit fashion
institutional theory on variety of capitalisms, but also to provide a unique contribution based on this country object of study.

The impact of the international responsibility of the subsidiary facing global mandates on HR subsidiary has not been supported. We explored both strands of the literature: some experts believe subsidiary mandates are a source of central control and some others posit that subsidiary mandates would confer subsidiaries a higher level of local autonomy based on the organisational power theory. The crucial point in the latter is that global mandates give certain power to the subsidiary in order to deal with HQ in the policy-making process (Edwards et al 2002). The fact that we do not support either strands may be related to limitations derived from the measurement of this construct. We consider global mandates on three aspects: R&D development, international product manufacturing and percentage of exports of the subsidiary (Edwards et al 2002). These three issues have been reflected within previous literature, however, these may not be covering the whole spectrum surrounding subsidiary mandates.

We also identified a lack of existing knowledge in regard to the relationship between HR subsidiary autonomy and the use of international HR structures. Our findings support some recent evidence from Ferner et al (2011), in terms of the direct data reporting on HR issues from the subsidiary to the HQ. In this sense high numbers of HR issues reported are related to low levels of subsidiary autonomy. However, contrary to what Ferner et al (2011) found, we find that other international HR structures are also related to subsidiary autonomy over HR issues, notably the presence of an international HRM policy-making body and its strong relationship with low levels of subsidiary autonomy. As Ferner et al (2011, p. 485) argued “HQ control may depend on the existence of central bodies for identifying HR policy requirements and driving policy development”. The use of HRM shared service centres and the use of HRIS are also partially related to low levels of subsidiary autonomy. The reason for the weaker relationship here may be related to the fact that the utilisation of these international HR structures are probably driven by the international HR policy-making body, which facilitates the development of these global mechanisms for the monitoring and surveillance of HR practices (Ferner et al 2011). This points to a need for deeper investigation of the relationship between the existence of a HR policy-making body and the use of other international HR structures. In any case, our contribution to the current literature
here has been to clearly identify these international HR structures as key potential explanatory factors of HR subsidiary autonomy.

Finally, future research on this topic can be focused on a detailed analysis of the nature of the policies related to the factors determining the degree of subsidiary HR autonomy. Subsidiary autonomy within HRM seems to differ from one HR policy to the other (Rosenzweigh and Nohria 1994). In this instance, mostly case study analyses show that pay and compensation systems, the recruitment policy and the communication policy appear more centralised than the rest of HR practices (Tayeb 1998; Ferner et al 2011). However, there is no specific research on the relationship between subsidiary autonomy and international HR structures by HR type of practice.

**Limitations**

We are aware of the fact that the present work has a number of limitations. Firstly, the questionnaire was administered only to a single respondent within every foreign subsidiary. It is well documented that such an approach can, on occasion, lead to common method variance (CMV), caused by single source bias. CMV is defined as the overlapping variability in key variables due to the use of a single respondent (Podsakoff et al 2003). We think CMV is not likely to be a problem in this research because of the use of different scales and anchors across our key variables and also because a high number of variables are about the existence of HR structures, therefore not related to perceptions (recommendations of Chang et al (2010) in order to avoid CMV).

Secondly, a particular concern arose in terms of not supporting H2. The aspects considered have been largely supported by the literature, namely subsidiary mandates on R&D development, international products and the extent of exports. However, some authors have considered these measures insufficient. Their attempt to complete this measure was the inclusion of the existence of an external source of power namely the power conferred by the type of relationship with customers and clients (Edwards et al 1996) and the inclusion of the power conferred by the reverse diffusion of practices from the subsidiaries to HQ (Edwards et al 2010). We think the fact that this variable is not supported in any way within our model might be given by an incomplete conception of subsidiary mandates.
Acknowledgements
This research received financial support from the Fundación BBVA and the Ministry of Science and Technology. The authors would like to acknowledge Professor Javier Quintanilla (IESE Business School) for facilitating access to the Spanish data used in this paper.
References


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SUBSIDIARY AUTONOMY OVER INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN IRELAND AND SPAIN

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Jonathan Lavelle

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Abstract: This article uses two parallel large-scale surveys in Ireland and Spain to test explanations of the variation in the autonomy of foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies over industrial relations policies, in particular regarding trade union engagement and employee consultation. We bring together three strands of literature: home- and host-country effects, organisational context and international human resources structures. Our results call attention to the significance of institutional effects, along with mode of entry of the subsidiary and the trajectory of new investments.

Keywords: Subsidiary autonomy, industrial relations, international human resource management, trade union engagement, employee consultation, Ireland, Spain.
Introduction
How much latitude have local managers in multinational companies (MNCs) to formulate their own employment practices? This has been an important line of enquiry in international business research for several decades. Our article contributes to this analysis by identifying and testing a number of factors which account for variations in autonomy over industrial relations policies among MNC subsidiaries. We examine how far the subsidiary is the de facto policy-making agent with respect to trade union engagement and employee consultation. Our aim is to bring together three strands of discussion: home- and host-country effects, organisational context and the use international human resources structures. We draw on data from a large sample of foreign-owned MNC subsidiaries operating in Ireland and Spain, to test whether, in combination, these factors hold explanatory power in accounting for variations in subsidiary autonomy.

Institutional effects
Two well established lines of enquiry within the institutional lens address country-of-origin and host-country effects. While MNCs may transfer practices grounded in their home-country regulatory and societal context to foreign subsidiaries, they also need to insure survival within the host business system (Bélanger et al 2013). Hence industrial relations policies may be transferred in whole or in part from the headquarters, or may be developed at local (subsidiary) level.

There is widespread evidence that the level of subsidiary autonomy over employment practices differs according to the home country of the MNC. Edwards et al (2006, p. 69) observe that ‘subsidiaries are often under pressure from the corporate centre to adopt practices from the home country, the so-called country of origin effect’; while Mueller (1994, p. 409) points to the very specific ‘institutional arrangements’ of the home country which shape ‘the structure and processes through which business is conducted’ elsewhere. This implies that MNCs from different countries are likely to exhibit variation in the extent to which they centralise decision-making and restrict subsidiary autonomy in their attempt to replicate home approaches and practices. It appears that MNCs from Europe allow greater subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations than those from the USA (Bomers and Peterson 1977; Hamill 1984). There is also evidence that many American MNCs adopt a union-avoidance approach (Almond et al 2005; Almond and Ferner 2006; Gunnigle et al 2009). Yet many others do deal with unions, considering this an issue for local management (Fenton-
O’Creevy et al 2008). Country-of-origin influence has also been identified in the context of the ‘Japanisation’ thesis (Quintanilla and Ferner 2003, p. 244), most especially in regard to the pursuit of new forms of work organisation and modes of employee involvement. Similarly, German MNCs abroad also demonstrate a country-of-origin effect (Tüsselman et al 2003). Conversely, British MNCs have tended towards adaptation and the pursuit of local practices (Müller 1998). On balance, as Almond et al (2005) have noted, the ‘country of origin effect’ shapes MNC behaviour in foreign subsidiaries.

The converse argument relates to the location of subsidiary operations. The host-country effect has been defined as the way management style and employment practices are influenced by the country of operation (Almond et al 2005; Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994). Institutional theory attributes this effect to differences in the legislative and regulatory context and also in cultural and social norms (Harzing and Pudelko 2007; Mueller 1994). Each nation represents a unique or idiosyncratic institutional environment to which MNCs must to some extent adapt their behaviour (Brewster et al 2008): complete transposition of home country approaches to the host environment is unlikely to be successful. Host-country effects are considered especially significant in the industrial relations domain, which is subject to national customs, local laws and conventions (Marginson et al 2010). In line with these considerations, Almond et al (2005) argue that highly regulated host countries will induce higher levels of subsidiary autonomy over employment practices than those countries where lighter regulation prevails.

Arising from these arguments, we posit that institutional factors will have explanatory power in accounting for variation in the levels of industrial relations autonomy afforded to MNC subsidiaries.

Specifically, our first set of hypotheses is as follows:

H1a: subsidiaries of US MNCs will enjoy lower levels of autonomy over industrial relations than subsidiaries of MNCs from other countries.

H2b: subsidiaries operating in Spain will enjoy a higher level of autonomy over industrial relations than those in Ireland.
Organisational context effects

Organisational context factors (Butler et al 2006) such as sector of operations, size of the subsidiary, age, mode of entry and the trajectory of corporate investment in the host country have proved important in the analysis of policy and practice transfer among MNCs.

Sector of operations has been found to be particularly influential as a determinant of subsidiary autonomy (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). Marginson et al (2010, p. 174) note that ‘broad industrial sector exercises a clear-cut and consistent influence on patterns of representation and channels of voice’. In particular, sector of operations may attenuate country-of-origin effects because of the regulation established by sectorial collective agreements in the host countries, while EU regulations related to industrial relations issues are often developed at sectorial levels. In line with these arguments, Bechter et al (2012) call for a shift in the analysis of comparative industrial relations away from its conventional focus on national contexts and towards recognition of the potentially greater influence of the sector. Fenton-O’Creevy et al (2008) posit that subsidiaries operating in the service sector will adapt their employment practices locally rather than apply those of headquarters, because service delivery tends to be localised rather than standardised globally. In contrast, manufacturing subsidiaries are more likely to be subject to central control regarding employment practices, largely as a result of the desire for standardisation in manufacturing processes (cf. Ferner et al 2011).

The age and the size of a subsidiary also affect the degree of subsidiary autonomy over employment practices. Fenton-O’Creevy et al (2008) argue that the older the subsidiary, the less the extent of control by the parent company, because older subsidiaries are more likely to have adapted to local practice and become more like indigenous firms. Ferner et al (2011) also identify age as a potential source of variation in the level of subsidiary autonomy, though they feel its impact remains ambiguous. In relation to subsidiary size, the classic literature argues that the larger the subsidiary the greater the control and bureaucratisation of processes (Garnier 1982). In line with this perspective, Fenton-O’Creevy et al (2008) argue that parent companies will not be too concerned about small subsidiaries abroad.

Two other important organisational factors are mode of entry and the incidence of new investments within the host country. Meardi et al (2009) argue that the transfer of practices from the parent company to the subsidiaries is easier in the case of greenfield sites, which
have no established management style or industrial relations legacy. Conversely, in the case of mergers and acquisitions, the ‘new’ parent company must integrate a pre-existing organisation and the transfer of employment practices is more difficult. An Irish study found a high level of union avoidance in greenfield sites, over 90 percent in one sample (Gunnigle et al 2001). Some authors identify a relationship between new investment in the host country and the level of subsidiary autonomy over employment practices: when subsidiaries are financially dependent on the parent company for new investment, the parent is more likely to exert control and to impose home-country practices once the investment has been made (Tempel et al 2006). Irish evidence points to extensive union avoidance in new investments by hitherto unionised American MNCs and to a related increase in management prerogative (Gunnigle et al 2009).

Hence our second set of hypotheses is as follows:

**H2a:** Subsidiaries operating in the service sector will enjoy greater autonomy over industrial relations than in manufacturing.

**H2b:** Subsidiaries that are longer established will enjoy greater autonomy over industrial relations.

**H2c:** Smaller subsidiaries will enjoy greater autonomy over industrial relations.

**H2d:** Subsidiaries established on greenfield sites will enjoy lower industrial relations autonomy than those established through merger or acquisition.

**H2e:** Subsidiaries that engage in new investments in the host country will enjoy lower autonomy over industrial relations than those which have not made new investments.

**International human resource and industrial relations structures**

The third strand of literature that we draw on relates to international structures in MNCs. Bélanger et al (2013, p. 313) argue that ‘at the level of the corporation, the firm has to devise structures and organisational networks to interact with a large number of subsidiaries located in different host contexts, seeking to coordinate efficiently’. These structures have been termed ‘technologies of control’ (Ferner et al 2011, p. 486). We consider a set of international
human resource and industrial relations (HR/IR) structures including European Works Councils EWCs. Such structures may serve as vehicles, not just for the transfer and control of HR/IR practices, but also for social learning and political interaction between the subsidiary and headquarters around employment issues (Bélanger et al 2013).

*Expatriates from headquarters in the subsidiary management team*

Harzing (2001) argues that the presence of expatriates in subsidiaries increases socialisation in corporate norms and fosters communication networks between headquarters and subsidiaries. A substantial number of such expatriates on the local top management team can also directly limit subsidiary autonomy. An example of this kind of ‘personal control’ is the manner in which Japanese MNCs have used expatriates in key positions abroad (Chung et al 2006). The rationale is that managers from headquarters provide direct and personal surveillance over the policies and practices of subsidiaries. It is therefore logical to posit that the higher the number of managerial positions occupied by expatriates, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations.

*The incidence of international HR structures*

Some literature suggests that the transfer of employment practices can only take place when sufficient supporting processes and structures are established (Taylor et al 1996). Ferner et al (2011) have identified various global HR structures which provide MNCs with the capacity to implement, coordinate and control policies within their subsidiaries and also to exert some degree of control over their operation. Hence the use of these international HR structures is likely to be associated with lower levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations.

One such structure identified in the literature is the presence of a body with responsibility for the formulation and implementation of HR policy globally, thereby acting as an international policy-making and coordinating agent and also as a mechanism for exerting control over policy implementation. Another is the use of HR information systems to monitor HR/IR issues (Ferner et al 2011). Stiles et al (2006) found that some MNCs have established an integrated online database dedicated to specific HR activities such as performance management and appraisal systems, talent and high potential management and internal recruitment. Such systems are also indicators of coordination and control and therefore associated with lower levels of subsidiary autonomy. A third structure identified in the literature is a shared services centre for the HR function. Farndale and Paauwe (2005) found
that such a shared service centre altered the role of local HR management, whereas the absence of such coordination was an indication of greater subsidiary autonomy.

**Presence of a European Work Council**

A final factor of note is the existence of international industrial relations structures such as EWCs. Recent work has highlighted their role in providing a platform for information and employee consultation at European level (Marginson et al 2013). An important question is whether the presence of a EWC limits subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations. Although the EWC Directive merely prescribes a body for providing information and consultation to employees at European level, not a negotiating body, management decisions at regional or national level are likely to be influenced by the discussions and outcomes of the EWC meetings. Marginson et al found variations in the management approach towards EWCs, as the Directive provides management with scope to deploy a ‘minimalist approach’ or ‘proactive approach’ (2013, p. 5). We therefore posit that the presence of a EWC will limit subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations.

In the light of these arguments, our final hypotheses are as follows:

- **H3a**: The greater the number of expatriates from HQ within the top management team, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy.
- **H3b**: The greater the incidence of international HR structures, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy.
- **H3c**: the presence of a EWC will lower the level of subsidiary autonomy.

**Research Context and Methods**

Despite the extensive literature examining subsidiary autonomy over a broad range of HR practices, there has been far less research with a specific focus on industrial relations’ matters. Previous contributions point to higher levels of autonomy being afforded to industrial relations issues in comparison with other HR domains. This is often attributed to the need to conform to institutional and regulatory requirements in the host location (Marginson et al 2010). In addressing this issue, our choice of Ireland and Spain was occasioned by a number of factors, chief among these being the contextual differences between the two systems which make them suited to comparative analysis. Both countries
have distinct national business systems: labour and employment policies are comparatively lightly regulated in Ireland but highly regulated in Spain (Almond and Ferner 2006).

The Irish system has traditionally operated along voluntarist principles, which allows firms considerable latitude in regulating the terms and conditions of employment. The Irish constitution provides an individual right to join associations or unions, but there is no legal compulsion for companies to recognise or bargain with unions. Thus the Irish industrial relations system is not primarily rights-based. For over two decades, collective bargaining was highly centralised, dominated by peak-level tripartite ‘partnership’ agreements on pay and other areas of social and economic policy. However, industry-wide collective bargaining occurs in only a small number of sectors. Since collective agreements are voluntary in nature, it is difficult to identify the extent of bargaining coverage, though Dobbins (2009) estimates it as approximately 44 percent of the workforce. Union density is currently 31 percent, but this has declined progressively since the early 1980s. This period also witnessed an increase in union avoidance by employers and a growth in the number of union recognition disputes. One pertinent factor is the preference for MNC subsidiaries, many of which are US-owned, to exclude unions (Gunnigle et al 2001).

Ireland had no statutory requirements for workplace representation until the implementation of the EU Information and Consultation Directive through the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act, 2006. This imposes no obligation on employers unless workers themselves ‘trigger’ the establishment of an information and consultation mechanism and the law seems to have had minimal impact.

The historical evolution of the Spanish economy significantly affects the current industrial relations system. Under the Franco dictatorship there was a single government-controlled trade union. The advent of democracy in 1975 brought independent trade unionism and voluntary collective bargaining, but workers still benefit from a highly regulated industrial relations system (Almond and Ferner 2006; Martínez Lucio 1998). The two main trade union confederations are the Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), which together represent more than 70 percent of union membership in Spain. Union density is 17 percent, significantly lower than in Ireland. Any trade union has the right to negotiate with employers, regardless of membership levels and collective agreements have legal status. Employees have the right to opt for
representation and collective bargaining in companies with more than ten workers. Bargaining can take place at national or provincial, sectorial or company level. National collective agreements cover roughly 25 percent of employees, while provincial sectorial agreements cover more than 50 percent of the workforce (Arasanz 2009).

Under the provisions of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute), first adopted in 1980, companies with 50 employees or more are legally obliged to recognise comités de empresa (works committees) or in smaller firms delegados (employee delegates), which tend to be union-dominated. The comités have the right, among other matters, to discuss job cuts, reduction of working hours, part-time shifts, training and development programmes, organisation of the work process and the analysis of productivity and job descriptions.

In addition to the insights that might accrue from comparative research in these distinct systems, Barrios et al (2004) have noted a lack of research on ‘peripheral’ European economies, especially in terms of the impact of MNCs. Significant spill overs from foreign direct investment (FDI) took place in both countries in the 1990s, with MNCs transferring not only technology but also other forms of knowledge. Spain is among the largest recipients of inward FDI worldwide (Chislett 2007) while Ireland has pursued over several decades a highly proactive approach to encourage new FDI through low corporation tax and other incentives (Buckley and Ruane 2006).

The lack of representativeness within MNCs studies has been highlighted by several researchers (Collinson and Rugman 2010): much of the empirical research has suffered from a sample bias, with large MNCs and American- or British-owned companies overrepresented. The data used in this article are the outcome of the most representative comparative project on HRM in MNCs and derive from two large-scale surveys of employment practice in MNCs in Spain and Ireland. These were part of the INTREPID project (Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database), which involves international research teams undertaking parallel surveys of employment practices in MNCs in ten national contexts. More details on the survey in Ireland are given by Lavelle et al (2009) and in Spain by Quintanilla et al (2010).

We define the target companies as foreign-owned firms employing at least 500 employees worldwide and at least 100 in Ireland or Spain. An initial task was to compile an accurate
listing of the population of MNCs in both countries. The resultant database comprised 414 foreign MNCs operating in Ireland and 894 in Spain. The next step was the administration of the questionnaire. In the Irish case, 213 companies participated, a response rate of 60 percent. In the Spanish case, 242 foreign companies participated, giving a response rate of 27.1 percent. The surveys were conducted face-to-face by members of the research team.

The questionnaire was designed to investigate key areas of employment practice implemented by MNCs in their subsidiaries abroad, as well as the level of subsidiary autonomy in each area. The issues covered were pay and performance, training and development, industrial relations, employee involvement and communication, the HR function and organisational learning. In addition, various background data were gathered on the company, such as employment numbers, organisation structure and market characteristics.

**Dependent Variables**

Our dependent variables, representing *subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations*, were measured through the extent to which local managers have autonomy over union engagement and over employee consultation in the subsidiary. Autonomy over union engagement is defined as the extent to which subsidiaries have discretion over whether and how they deal with trade unions. Autonomy over employee consultation is the extent to which they have discretion over consultation issues: that is, the capacity to establish a dialogue through which to inform and exchange views on topics relevant to both the employees and the company. The two items used in the present measure follow a standard Likert-scale, where 1 = no autonomy, 3 = ability to develop policy within a framework or guidelines set externally and 5 = full autonomy.

**Independent variables**

Institutional factors are represented by country of origin and host country:

*Country of origin* was identified and then grouped into the following categories: the USA, the UK, France, Germany, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world.

*Host country* was either Ireland or Spain.

Our organisational context variables were:

*Sector of operation* was a simple dichotomous question: 1 = manufacturing, 2 = services.
Size of the subsidiary measured as the number of employees in the host country.

Age of the subsidiary as the number of years since the MNC established its operations in the host country.

Mode of entry as a simple binary: 1 = merger or acquisition, 2 = greenfield).

New investments was a dichotomous question: 1 = new investment within the last five years, 0 = no new investment within the last five years.

In relation to control over HR/IR:

Expatriate presence on the top management team was measured by the number of expatriates coming from headquarters on the top five management positions of the subsidiary.

International HR structures were measured through three items. First, we asked whether there exists an international policy-making committee within the company, such as a committee of senior managers, which develops HR policies that apply across countries. This is a binary variable (1 = yes, 0 = no). Second, we asked whether the company has an international HR information system, such as People Soft or SAP HR; this is another binary variable (1 = yes, 0 = no). Third, the existence of an international shared services centre for HR issues was also a binary variable (1 = yes, 0 = no). These three variables were recoded into a 0 to 3 index, providing an overall indication of the use of international HRM structures.

Presence of a EWC was also measured through a dichotomous variable (1=yes; 0=no).

Sample and descriptive data

Our sample comprises 452 foreign-owned subsidiaries, 242 in Spain and 210 in Ireland. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample by home country.
Table 1. Sample by Country of Origin and host country

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
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<td>101</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>191 (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe a</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>79 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of world b</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24 (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Norway (1), Sweden (11), Denmark (4), Finland (3), Austria (3), Belgium (9), Switzerland (21), Spain (1), Italy (9) and the Netherlands (17).
b Japan (14), Australia (3) and Canada (7).

In terms of sector of operation, 53 percent are in services and 47 percent in manufacturing. In terms of size, 68 percent of the subsidiaries have between 100 and 999 employees, 25 percent between 1,000 and 4,999 and 4 percent more than 5,000. In relation to the mode of entry, 45.1 percent of MNCs have established their operations in the host country though greenfield sites while 54.2 percent through merger or acquisition. Just over half (51.5 percent) of MNCs have made new investments or opened new sites for expansion (there are missing values for the number of employees in the subsidiary in 3 percent of cases, for the number of employee worldwide in 6.4 percent, for the incidence of new investments in 0.2 percent and for the mode of entry in 0.7 percent).

Table 2 provides descriptive data for the two dependent variables, subsidiary autonomy over union engagement and over employee consultation. The overall average level of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement is 4.1, while over employee consultation it is 4.3 (out of 5). Some 84 percent foreign-owned subsidiaries present levels between considerable and full autonomy over employee consultation. We ran a t-test to evaluate if this difference was significant. The result was that the level of subsidiary autonomy over employee consultation is significantly higher than the over union engagement. We also ran a t-test by host countries. The level of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement is significantly higher in Spain than in Ireland. Subsidiary autonomy over employee consultation proves to be quite high in both countries. Hence, there is no host country effect in the case of autonomy over employee consultation.
Table 2. Descriptive data: subsidiary autonomy over union engagement and employee consultation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No autonomy</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union engagement</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee consultation</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little autonomy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some autonomy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considerable autonomy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full autonomy</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model Specification and Findings**

We used ordinal logistic regression in order to test our hypotheses. Table 3 provides the correlations for all the independent variables by the two dependent variables. As can be observed, correlations between the independent variables are low, as we expected, the highest figure reported being 0.39. In addition, we ran collinearity tests and the results were within the normal established limits.
Table 3. Correlations for subsidiary autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union engagement</th>
<th>Employee consultation</th>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Home country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Size of Subsidiary</th>
<th>Size of MNC</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mode of Entry</th>
<th>New investment</th>
<th>Expats</th>
<th>EWC</th>
<th>International HR structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union engagement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee consultation</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host country</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home country</td>
<td>-0.261</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary size</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of MNC</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of Entry</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New investment</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWC</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International HR structures</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 provides the output of the ordinal regressions for the dependent variables. In relation to the first dependent variable, subsidiary autonomy over union engagement, country of origin proves to be significant. The reference category taken in the analysis was US MNCs. Our findings report lower levels of subsidiary autonomy in American MNCs than in those headquartered in the rest of Europe, the United Kingdom and France. British and French MNCs seem to show the highest levels of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement. Thus, H1a is supported in the case of union engagement. Host-country effects yield explanatory power in our attempt to uncover the indicators of the degree of autonomy over union engagement. As predicted, MNCs operating in Spain show higher levels of subsidiary autonomy than those in Ireland. Therefore, H1b on home country effects is also supported.

Table 4. Ordinal regression results for subsidiary autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union engagement</th>
<th>Employee consultation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimates</td>
<td>Size effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>odds ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Country (ref. USA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) UK</td>
<td>1.050**</td>
<td>(2.858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) France</td>
<td>1.177**</td>
<td>(3.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Germany</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>(1.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Rest of Europe</td>
<td>1.035***</td>
<td>(2.815)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Rest of world</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (ref. Spain)</td>
<td>-0.893***</td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector (ref. services)</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
<td>(0.817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Subsidiary</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(1.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(1.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenfield (ref. merger or acquisition)</td>
<td>-0.652**</td>
<td>(0.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New investments (ref. none)</td>
<td>-0.582**</td>
<td>(1.790)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates</td>
<td>-0.164*</td>
<td>(0.849)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International HR structures</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>(1.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWC (ref. yes)</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>64.701***</td>
<td>43.985***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N is reduced because of missing values in some firms and mainly because of trade union avoidance approaches on some other firms.

The reference categories are the last category and it is in parentheses.

The regressions include the following control variables: level of subsidiary autonomy over HRM (Belizón et al 2013) and size of the MNC.

*** significant at the 1% level
**  significant at the 5% level
*    significant at the 10% level

The data report no significant relationship between some of the organisational context factors and subsidiary autonomy over union engagement: sector of operations, size and age of the subsidiary. However, this is not the case with regard to the relationship with mode of entry.
and new investments in the host country, which proves significant. In this sense, MNCs which established their operations on greenfield sites show lower levels of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement than those established through merger or acquisition. MNCs reporting recent new investments also afford lower levels of subsidiary autonomy than MNCs which did not undertake new investments in the host country. Within this second set of factors, H2d and H2e are supported.

Turning to international HR/IR structures, our findings show a strong relationship between the presence of expatriates from headquarters on the top management team and the level of autonomy over union engagement. H3a is thus supported. Our findings do not show a significant relationship between the use of international HR structures and subsidiary autonomy, hence, H3b is not supported. The existence of a EWC does not prove significant in explaining variation of the level of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement; therefore, H3c is not supported.

Looking at the size effect of each significant parameter through the odds ratios, we observe that country of origin proves most influential, followed by the undertaking of new investments, the presence of expatriates on the top management team, the mode of entry and the host country. Considering the three sets of indicators for subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations outlined in the present article, our finding points towards institutional and organisational context factors as holding most power in explaining variations in subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations.

Regarding our second dependent variable, subsidiary autonomy over employee consultation, we did not find significant relationships. On the basis of the t-test run to identify significant mean differences, we found that the level of subsidiary autonomy over employee consultation was significantly higher than that of union engagement. This leads us to infer that employee consultation might deal particularly with local issues. This is consistent with the relatively nationally confined approach to employee consultation in both countries. Employee consultation legislation in Ireland and Spain covers a small number of issues whose nature is primarily local, either at national or site level, such as contracts, part-time shifts, working hour’s schedules, redundancies and training and development programmes.
Discussion and conclusions

The purpose of this article was to identify the determinants of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations, moving beyond the institutional lens in explaining variations across MNCs. In reviewing previous contributions, we identified three sets of explanatory factors: institutions, organisational context and the use of international HR/IR structures. We defined subsidiary industrial relations autonomy as the extent to which they are the policy-making agent in regard to trade union engagement and employee consultation. Our results shed some light on explanations of variations in subsidiary autonomy over union engagement but substantially less so in the case of employee consultation.

According to our results, institutional factors do hold power in explaining subsidiary autonomy over union engagement, with home-country effects proving most significant. Policy in American MNCs is more centralised than in those headquartered in the UK, France and the rest of Europe. Even though this article brings together additional factors which determine the degree of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement, home-country effects still remain significant. Host-country effects also prove important. We expected foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Spain to enjoy higher levels of autonomy in this respect than those in Ireland, given the much stronger statutory support for union recognition and workplace consultation and our findings fully support this proposition. Spain’s more highly regulated system provides for mandatory mechanisms of workforce representation, whereas Ireland offers a more lightly regulated arena, providing MNCs with the option of dealing with or avoiding trade unions. Hence our findings suggest that if the industrial relations system in the host country constrains the subsidiary’s strategic options in engaging with unions, the parent company will be more likely to afford higher levels of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement; thus highly regulated industrial relation systems may induce MNCs to delegate the union engagement policy-making process to local management.

There is scope here to consider a potential language barrier (Welch and Welch 2008) that might additionally explain why MNC subsidiaries in Spain enjoy a higher degree of autonomy over union engagement. Headquarters might encounter language problems in communicating with subsidiaries abroad, causing a greater institutional distance (Kostova et al 2008); this might encourage them to leave the decision-making to the local management, for fear of misunderstanding local norms.
Further research will be needed in order to compare a wider number of host countries, voluntarist and rights-based. Has the older literature focused too much on institutional factors? Have other scholars exaggerated the role of home- and host-country effect? Previous studies of subsidiary autonomy over employment practices have supported institutional influence and our findings suggest that institutional factors remains an important source of differentiation in the extent to what MNCs leave their industrial relations decision-making to their subsidiaries.

Although most of the organisational context factors, such as sector, size and age of the subsidiary did not emerge as significant, the mode of entry and the incidence of new investments did as explanations for the level of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement. MNCs establishing their operations through greenfield sites are likely to afford lower level of subsidiary autonomy than those entering a country through merger or acquisition. This is in line with the arguments of Meardi et al (2009), who suggest that greenfield sites allow MNCs to implement their own management style while establishment in the host country through merger or acquisition will cause the coexistence of two management styles, that of the parent company and the former practice within the acquired subsidiary. Our findings also indicate that the incidence of recent new investments for expansion also shapes subsidiary autonomy over union engagement: those that have had new investments are more likely to enjoy lower levels of autonomy. These conclusions are in line with previous case studies which show that the incidence of union avoidance was high within new sites. Gunnigle et al (2009) found that although local management enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, they nevertheless chose to conform to corporate preferences. Similarly, Temple et al (2006) highlight the fact that when these new investments are funded by headquarters, the parent will accord lower levels of autonomy to the subsidiary, with a tendency to control and impose practices. Our findings suggest that this is also the case with regard to the level of autonomy over union engagement. This is one of the novelties of our article, to demonstrate that both mode of entry through greenfield and the undertaking of new investments induce lower levels of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement. However, what are the potential implications for unions and local management? One of its practical consequences is that local management will be more likely to follow corporate guidelines in their dealings with trade unions. This is perhaps a possible channel for union avoidance approaches, especially by US subsidiaries, as other
studies have shown. This might not be primarily because subsidiary autonomy is very low but because local management uses its discretion to please headquarters.

In terms of our third set of potential influences, corporate control structures, our study notes that expatriate presence on the top management team of the subsidiary also reduces subsidiary autonomy over union engagement. In this sense, personal control remains relevant in determining levels of subsidiary autonomy. The use of international HR structures does not significantly impact on union engagement subsidiary autonomy. Previous research has shown the existence of a relationship between such international HR structures and subsidiary autonomy. However, industrial relations practices were usually excluded in these studies or considered as part of a ‘HR whole’ (Collings 2008), perhaps because of a general decrease in the number of companies which deal with trade unions (Towers 2003). Neither the incidence of international HR structures nor the presence of a EWC emerges as indicators of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations. Arguably the critical question at this point is why we find no general relationship between international HR structures and the extent of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations. Ferner et al (2011) suggest that industrial relations policies are less shaped by corporate strategy and corporate structures than broader HR policies, since they deal with operational rather than strategic issues. In other words, industrial relations policies are more likely than other HR practices to be decentralised and therefore international structures are less likely to have an impact on them. The decentralisation of industrial relations policy would seem to go further than mere local adaptation to accommodate legal and regulatory protocols. It also infers a certain detachment from the modern global HR/IR structures. In striving to uncover the relationship between the technologies of control and subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations, future research could shed some light more specifically on the role HR structures have in the formulation, implementation and control of industrial relations policies within foreign subsidiaries.

Finally, our findings suggest significant differences between the degree of subsidiary autonomy over union engagement and over employee consultation: subsidiaries enjoy greater autonomy over employee consultation in both countries. This might indicate that employee consultation is meant to deal predominantly with local issues: what Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994, p. 245) call ‘rank-and-file’ industrial relations issues such as determination of working hours and wages, contracts and redundancies, which typically conform most closely to local norms. Our results point towards a certain detachment between the degree of subsidiary
autonomy over employee consultation and the effects of institutional and organisational context factors, as well as from the use of international HR/IR structures.

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**Acknowledgements**
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References


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<td><em>Personnel Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Belizón, M.J., Morley, M.J. and Gunnigle, P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Accepted for publication in March 2015</td>
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<td>Volume</td>
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MODES OF INTEGRATION OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN MULTINATIONALS

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Michael J. Morley
Patrick Gunnigle

Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick

Purpose: This paper examines variations in the use of international integration mechanisms across individual human resource management (HRM) practices in MNCs.

Methodology: Drawing upon data from a sample of over 450 MNC subsidiaries located in Ireland and Spain and an ordinal regression methodology, several models were tested.

Findings: Our findings provide evidence that people, information and formalised-based mechanisms are positively related to the use of centralisation-based integration processes. Our results also demonstrate that the use of personal-based integration mechanisms is uniform across the suite of individual HRM practices among those MNCs where an international HRM committee is present, while the deployment of expatriates does not prove to be particularly significant in achieving integration across the range of HRM practices examined in our model. Information- and formalisation-based mechanisms hold explanatory power in relation to performance appraisal systems and compensation practices.

Research Limitations: Broadening the scope of the analysis we offer here, drawn from just two institutional environments, to a broader set of locations may contribute to future research in this area. Further analysis using longitudinal and quantitative methodologies may also prove important in unearthing integration patterns in HRM domain areas.

Originality/value: This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the preferred modes of integration across HRM practices in MNC subsidiaries located in two different institutional environments. We reveal how modes of integration vary for different HR domain areas and we provide explanations for this variation.

Article classification: Research Paper

Keywords: International Human Resource Management; International Integration Mechanisms; Multinational Subsidiaries
Introduction

As multinational corporations (MNCs) and their international subsidiaries have become increasingly important players in the global economy, interest in and research on, the strategies and management practices of these firms has advanced apace. Within this literature, one significant line of enquiry relates to the capacity of the MNC to achieve international integration in its policies and practices (Kim et al 2003). Defined as the MNC response to the forces of globalisation in all its dimensions - political, economic, social, cultural and competitive (Porter 1986; Martinez and Jarillo 1991; Bélanger et al 2013) and located within bigger debates on convergence versus divergence and standardisation versus localisation arising from the complex network of institutional influences which govern the MNC’s capacity for action, international integration activities are focused on regulating the MNC activities in different geographic territories.

Referring specifically to the domain area of human resource management, international HRM researchers have, in relative terms, paid little attention to the mechanisms that foster the integration of MNCs activities. As Smale et al (2012, p. 181) note “what is lacking, however, is systematic research that combines multiple mechanisms of global HRM integration and explanations behind their reportedly differential usage”. Smale and colleagues’ work constitute a calling to undertake a specific examination of how different integration mechanisms are used across the range of HRM practices encompassing employee reward, development and relations. Building on Kim et al’s (2003) four way classification of modes of integration (centralisation, formalisation, information and people-based) and responding to the call by Smale et al, we offer an analysis of the differentiated use of these integration modes across a suite of different HRM practices (pay and rewards, performance appraisal systems, training and development, employee involvement and industrial relations). Smale et al (2013) operationalised Kim et al’s model to test the use of centralisation-, people- and formalisation-based integration modes across different HRM practices. However, their investigation did not explore information–based mechanisms and was conducted among a small sample size comprising 76 subsidiaries of European MNCs located in China. In seeking to build on this work, our main contribution is to offer a more comprehensive and holistic analysis of the preferred modes of integration of HRM practices in multinationals by (i) testing the four way taxonomy proposed by Kim et al (2003) and (ii) broadening the scope of analysis using a highly representative sample of over 450 foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in two different institutional locations (Edwards et al 2013). We do so on the basis
that the application of Kim et al.’s taxonomy of integration modes to the HR arena allows scholars to evaluate and compare their use within a single business function (Smale et al 2013). In addition, our work seeks to unearth the existence of a potential relationship between the centralisation-based mode and the other three modes of integration, namely, people-, information- and formalisation-based modes.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: firstly, we outline the main arguments inherent in the literature on international integration modes and we make the case for how insights from the ‘integration modes’ literature may be especially helpful to unpacking and understanding aspects of the institutionalisation of preferred approaches to HRM in MNCs operating in different locations. Arising from this, we advance three linked hypotheses on HR integration. Subsequently, we present the methodology, findings and conclusions.

**Theoretical Background and Hypotheses**

Scholarly emphasis on the topic of MNC integration modes dates back to the late 1960s and the Aston School (Pugh et al 1969). Early international business research pointed to the deployment of particular modes of international integration across borders as a response to globalisation forces (Cray 1984; Porter 1986; Martinez and Jarillo 1991).

Specifically in the HR domain, the debate on international integration and local adaptation of practices has attracted considerable attention, particularly in recent years (cf. Gunnigle et al 2002; Pudelko and Harzing 2007; Almond and Ferner 2006; Ferner et al 2011; Mayrhofer et al 2011; Festing et al 2012; Bélanger et al 2013; Smale et al 2012; 2013). Viewed as an attempt by MNCs “to control the HRM policies and practices of their subsidiaries and to ensure coordination of the policies and practices across their subsidiaries” (Smale et al 2013, p. 232), a deal of past work on this front has been framed as a duality between global-local tensions in management practices (Edwards et al 2013; Parry et al 2008). For years, international researchers have typified the integration and local adaptation of practices as existing on opposite ends of a spectrum, arguing that MNCs will typically favour one of these alternative approaches to managing in different host locations. More recent contributions argue that integration and local adaptation are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that there are scenarios where MNCs may simultaneously pursue both approaches, i.e. designedly seeking a degree of integration of HRM practices across borders on the one hand, coupled with a desire to differentiate and adapt to local requirements in order to acquire legitimacy in
the local institutional environment and be seen to conform to the host locations on the other (Edwards et al 2013). Cray (1984) postulated that international integration occurs through two distinct processes, namely control and coordination. Control and coordination are therefore seen as the two primary undertakings of global integration (Cray 1984; Martinez and Jarillo 1991; Kim et al 2003). Importantly, these two processes are rather different. Control is viewed as the process of regulating and defining MNC activities in order to align them with HQ’s expectations. Coordination, however, refers to the means by which control is achieved. Specifically, coordination is concerned with the establishment of suitable linkages among and between internationally dispersed units within the MNC. As Kim et al (2003, p. 329) note, “global integration becomes possible only through the use of organisational mechanisms for coordination and control”. Building on significant earlier contributions from the extant literature (e.g. Child 1972; Edstrom and Galbraith 1977; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Martinez and Jarillo 1991), Kim et al (2003) advanced a four-way classification of international integration used by MNCs, comprising centralisation, formalisation, people and information modes each of which we now discuss in turn (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Integration Modes

![Integration Modes Diagram](source: Kim et al., 2003)

Firstly, MNCs integrate their units through ‘centralising decision-making authority’ (Kim et al 2003; p. 330). Previously characterised by Child (1972, p. 163) as a ‘strategy of control’, it operates directly from HQ or from alternative high levels within the MNC hierarchy (e.g. regional HQ) where a more complete and global vision of the needs and goals of the business should exist (Kim et al 2003). In an organisation with a high level of centralisation, decision-
making is placed at HQ. Second, people-based integration refers to those modes involving international teams, international committees, the deployment of expatriates from the parent office to other national units and they broadly constitute what has been traditionally termed ‘personal control’ mechanisms. Such personal control is more likely to be used when information needs to be transmitted face to face since this integration mode has proved effective in such situations (Kim et al 2003). It has been argued that an organisation which is characterised by high people-based integration modes will report a greater sharing of values, mission, vision and norms and possibly, may leverage this approach to integration in the securing and building of trust among employees (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Kim et al 2003). Third, formalisation-based integration is typically related to formal standardised procedures, policies and manuals detailing codified rules for application across national boundaries. An organisation within which formalisation-based modes are extensively deployed will report higher levels of standardisation of procedures and bureaucracy with the result that subsidiaries might encounter some limitations on their scope for decision-making (Child 1972; Kim et al 2003). Finally, information-based integration concerns “the international flow of information through impersonal communication systems such as databases, electronic mail, internet, intranet and electronic data interchanges” (p. 330). This international integration mode is seen as particularly efficient when there is a need to communicate knowledge or provide information quickly. Information-based modes allow managers to rapidly transfer and analyse large volumes of information. An MNC in which information-based integration modes are effectively established will typically be characterised by greater levels of impersonal communication through which knowledge is transmitted and concomitantly, it will facilitate encountering points for employees sharing common goals and interests (Hanssen et al 1999; Kim et al 2003).

**International integration mechanisms: centralisation**

Building on the basic insights from the integration modes literature introduced above, we now turn specifically to the literature on integration mechanisms in the domain area of HRM. In so doing, we seek to build on the international integration modes categorised by Kim et al (2003), since international integration is a matter concerning the business as a whole, as well as having functional specific manifestation in each management domain area.

Centralisation-based mechanisms aim to place the locus of decision-making at the top levels in the chain of the command in MNCs, normally at HQ, divisional HQ or regional HQ level.
Such mechanisms foster the integration of HRM since enhanced centralisation usually affords subsidiaries less scope for local adaptation and translation (Scullion and Starkey 2000; Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013). In this instance, Ferner et al (2011) find evidence of a centralisation approach in MNCs where HRM practices are set at HQ as opposed to a decentralisation approach through which HQ afford subsidiaries full scope to formulate their HRM practices locally. Centralisation-based mechanisms may be seen to correspond with what has been referred to as a ‘strategy of control’ (Child, 1972; Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013) and hence, have customarily been related to situations where decision-making over HRM practice emanates from HQ rather than from the MNC subsidiary. The literature further illustrates that MNCs might take intermediate approaches within the centralisation and decentralisation spectrum. In such cases, HQ might set certain guidelines for the development of HRM practices while at the same time, allowing subsidiaries a degree of autonomy for local adaption within the broader parameters specified which must be adhered to. The extent of centralisation, therefore, relies on the degree of international integration of HRM practices to which a particular MNC aspires (Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013; Edwards et al 2013).

International integration through centralisation is configured at a strategic, corporate level (Child 1972; Kim et al 2003; Smale et al 2013) and consequently, the use of centralisation-based mechanisms may be positively related to the use of formalisation-, personal- and information-based mechanisms on the basis that a centralisation approach will be likely to be operationalised by the appropriate mechanisms that ensure control and coordination over the MNC activity. If HQ decides to take a centralisation-based approach within the HR function, it seems reasonable to expect a greater usage of people-, information- and formalisation-based mechanisms arising from that decision. Conversely, if subsidiaries are afforded a high level of decision-making discretion in regard to HRM, the MNC may be less inclined to make use of the broader suite of international integration mechanisms. Based on these contributions, our first hypothesis reads as follows:

**H1:** The use of people-, information- and formalisation-based integration mechanisms for HRM practices will be positively related to the employment of centralisation-based mechanisms within the HR function.
‘People’, ‘formalisation’ and ‘information-based’ mechanisms and their variation across HRM practices

People-based integration mechanisms for HRM practices have been profiled in a number of studies (Marginson et al 1995; Harzing 2001; Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2013; Smale et al 2013). In the nineties, case study-based research found that MNCs were establishing these committees acting as policy-making agents for the formulation and integration of HRM practices (Marginson et al 1995). Recent quantitative research corroborated this, discovering that over half of MNCs operating in the UK and Spain have established an HRM international committee (Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2013). This personal-based integration mechanism provides MNCs with a platform at which corporate HRM and HR managers from their foreign units get-together in order to formulate and disseminate policy across borders (Ferner et al 2011). In addition, research has identified the connection between international integration, control and the use of expatriates (Harzing 2001; Minbaeva and Michailova 2004) with their being evidence that control is extensively exerted through expatriation (Harzing 1999; Bonache and Dickmann 2008). Expatriates not only provide HQ with the opportunity to transmit the corporate mission and values face-to-face but also they constitute a vehicle for controlling the subsidiary activity and act as critical nodes in a MNCs network of activities (Edstrom and Galbraith 1977; Morley and Heraty 2004). In recent years several scholars have also emphasised the use of internal networks and other informal people-based mechanisms, facilitating not only the integration of HRM practices but also the transfer of knowledge, know-how and (best) practices across units (Sparrow et al 2004; Tregaskis et al 2005; Collings et al 2008; Evans et al 2011).

In relation to formalisation-based mechanisms for HRM practices, Harzing and Sorge (2003) observe that these are more impersonal and bureaucratic than other integration mechanisms incorporating, as they do, standardised procedures and rules for the transmission of information from subsidiaries to and from global HQ (Child 1972; Sparrow et al 2004; Ferner et al 2011). The direct reporting of HRM issues from subsidiaries to HQ has been found to exist in recent studies on international integration of HRM practices (Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2013). Through such reporting, HQ establishes a constant relationship by which HQ policy is transferred, checked and implemented, or indeed corrected as appropriate. Smale et al (2013, p. 235) note that formalisation-based mechanisms are “a way of realising behavioural and process control over how subsidiaries carry out appraisals”. In a similar vein, Harzing (1999) refers to formalised-based approaches as channels for information processing.
across the MNCs structure. In this instance, HR shared services centres (HRSSC) constitute a formalisation-based mechanism by which behavioural and bureaucratic processes are established. HR shared service centres which provide HR services to subsidiaries through treating them as internal customers, has been identified as an efficient integration mechanism within the HR function. The provision of HR services globally allows MNCs to take advantage of economies of scale in the international integration of HRM practices (Wächter et al 2006).

Finally, information-based mechanisms within the HRM arena have been the object of several studies (Hannon et al 1996; Sparrow et al 2004; Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2013) and encapsulate databases, employee intranet and other types of information systems for sharing data. Scholars identify HRIS as the most important information-based mechanism for international integration (e.g. use of IT like PeopleSoft or SAP) due to the possibility of standardising information collection and exchange among subsidiaries (cf. Hannon et al 1996; Haines and Petit 1997; Sparrow et al 2004). In terms of its role in integration, HRIS has been studied in two ways. In Kim et al’s (2003) analysis, HRIS is referred to as an information-based mechanism. Conversely, Smale et al (2003) viewed HRIS as a formalisation-based mechanism, arguing that it enables the greater prescription of HRM practices through integrated electronic systems. For our purpose here, HRIS will be treated as part of the information-based mechanisms spectrum since these systems are largely focused on the exchange of information.

*Variation of their usage across HRM practices*

An important question refers to how MNCs might deploy these different international integration mechanisms across individual HRM practices and whether their use might vary in different HRM areas. For example, are these international mechanisms used more extensively to foster greater integration of compensation systems than training and development practices? A handful of authors have provided evidence to suggest that some individual HRM practices are more prone to international integration, while others are more likely to be more context bound and therefore more locally adapted (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Morley et al 1996; Lu and Björkman 1997; Martin and Beaumont 1999; Tayeb 1998; Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013). Studies suggest that pay and benefit systems and performance appraisal systems appear more integrated than the other HRM practices and thus local management experiences less decision-making autonomy over these matters (Rosenzweig and Nohria...
1994; Martin and Beaumont 1999; Tayeb 1998; Almond et al 2005). Equally, Lu and Björkman (1997) found that financial compensation, performance assessment and promotion were the most integrated within the MNC, while Ferner et al (2011) found that issues related to performance management such as the performance appraisal systems, variable pay systems or succession plans are generally more likely to be integrated internationally and therefore, controlled by HQ, while training and development, employee involvement and industrial relations practices are normally adapted locally in order to conform to the host institutional environment. The logic behind the international integration of certain HR practices is governed by the extent to which they are perceived as having a greater impact on corporate performance and turnover.

Smale et al (2013) found no significant differences in the use of people-based mechanisms across HRM practices. However, other scholarship on international HRM has identified the deployment of person-based mechanisms in differentiated ways for particular HRM practices. Thus, there is evidence suggesting that international HR committees are employed to bring together HR managers from different countries in order to develop, disseminate and monitor HR policies (Marginson et al 1995; Edwards et al 1999; Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2013). Belizón et al (2013) found a strong positive relationship between the use of an international HRM committee and the centralisation of all HRM practices. As scholars have emphasised, personal and direct control is often exercised in an effort at centralising practices (Child 1972, 1973; Edström and Galbraith 1977). This especially appears the case with international HR committees and the use of expatriates, the later focused on direct surveillance of different aspects of the functioning of the subsidiary (Edström and Galbraith 1977). On the other hand, formalisation and information based mechanisms, such as direct data reporting, a functioning shared services centre and the use of HRIS have been identified as among those types of control that while indirect in nature aim to record, report and provide services and surveillance when needed (Edström and Galbraith 1977; Harzing and Sorge 2003). In line with these contributions, our second of hypothesis, therefore, is as follows:

\textit{H2: Person-based mechanisms aimed at achieving centralisation and control will be employed more uniformly across all HRM practices than formalisation and information based mechanisms.}
Smale et al (2013) did not examine information-based mechanisms in their study. Lengnick-Hall and Moritz (2003, p. 365) note that “human resource information systems (HRIS) increase administrative efficiency and produce reports that have the potential to improve decision-making”. Included in the broad area of eHRM, HRIS encompasses the use of technology that is designed and implemented to foster the goals of the HR function (Farndale et al 2009). In order to unearth possible variations in the use of HRM integration mechanisms across HRM practices, it is important to explicate the role of HRIS within the HR function. Beside anecdotal reports by companies or the CIPD, prominent scholars have shown evidence to argue that HRIS is extensively used for the storage of employee details, for the use of pay and compensation systems including pay-related information records and for training and development (Ball 2001; Lengnick-Hall and Moritz 2003; Strohmeier 2007). HRIS seem to be less likely used in other soft HR domains such as recruitment or industrial relations (Ball 2001). This work has also highlighted the deployment of information-based mechanisms as an international platform to manage performance appraisal and compensation systems (Lengnick-Hall and Moritz 2003; Strohmeier 2007; Parry and Tyson 2011). Drawing on the argument around different approaches governing the implementation of “hard” and “soft” aspects of HRM, our final hypothesis therefore reads:

**H3:** MNCs will be more inclined to use information-based mechanisms for the integration of hard HRM practices in the areas of compensation and performance appraisal systems than for the integration of soft HR practices in the areas of training and development, organisational learning, succession planning, employee involvement and employee representation.

**Methods**

In order to test our hypotheses, we use data from a large scale survey on HRM practices in MNCs undertaken in Spain and Ireland, which formed part of the INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database) project\(^2\). The study defined MNCs as follows: foreign-owned firms that employed at least 500 employees

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\(^2\) INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database) comprises a network of international scholars involved in parallel surveys of employment practices in multinational companies (MNCs) across different national contexts. These surveys were initially conducted in Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK and were the most representative investigations of their kind in these countries. Subsequent surveys were conducted Argentina Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Mexico and Norway. For a detailed overview of the methodology employed see McDonnell et al (2007) and Lavelle et al (2009) on Ireland and Quintanilla et al (2010) on Spain.
worldwide and at least 100 in the host country. These criteria were used in order to guarantee a critical mass for the viability of the study. In the first instance, compiling a precise listing of the population of MNCs in both countries was needed. The resultant database comprised 894 foreign MNCs operating in Spain and 414 foreign-owned MNCs operating in Ireland. In the Spanish case, the entire known population was invited to participate in the study. The response rate was 27.1% (242 MNCs) and data was collected through face-to-face structured questionnaires. In the Irish case, due to a large presence of US MNCs in the population, the Irish team carried out a sampling process by stratification in order to ensure the representativeness of the sample. Thus, the sample was stratified by home country (Ireland, the UK, the US, the EU and the rest of World), sector of operations (services, manufacturing) and employment size of the Irish operations (100-199 employees, 200-499 employees, greater than 500 employees). The sample selected was contacted by phone. The response rate was 60% (210 MNCs). Face-to-face structured questionnaires were also administered by a combination of Irish research team members and specialist personnel from the Economic and Social Research Institute (Ireland’s leading independent research agency in the social sciences). Stratification of the Spanish sample was not needed. As Edwards et al (2013, p. 561) note the Spanish research team “judged the population to be sufficiently large for it to be highly likely that the companies that took part in the survey contained reasonably high numbers in each of the categories”. In both cases, we checked for non-response bias by analysing the participant firms against two criteria (country of origin and sector) collated from the population development stage. Our analysis of the respondents from our sample, against the general population, showed no significant differences and close alignment with the MNE population. Respondents were the most senior HR practitioner at subsidiary level, namely, the HR manager/director in most cases.

The questionnaire was designed to investigate the key HR policies and practices used by MNCs in their subsidiaries abroad, as well as the level of centralisation over pay and performance, training and development, industrial relations, employee involvement and communication. The questionnaire drew extensively on dichotomous questions, although there were a small number of Likert-scales used to measure the extent of centralisation across HRM practices. This article uses only data related to the use of integration mechanisms of the HR function across individual HRM practices. For more detailed information on the research design utilised in the overall INTREPID study, scholars might consult Edwards et al (2013) while context specific information relating to the national studies in Ireland and Spain can be

Measures: Dependent variables
Given our focus on investigating the differential use of integration mechanisms across individual HRM practices, we build a statistical model per each individual HRM practice: (i) establishing pay levels relative to market comparators; (ii) performance appraisals for managers; (iii) training and development; (iv) succession planning; (v) employee involvement; and (vi) engagement with trade unions (See Table 1). The dependent variables are the extent of centralisation over these individual HRM practices, which follow a standard Likert-scale (1-5) and its three main anchor points were as follows:

1) the Spanish/Irish operations are fully centralised by HQ (must implement policy set by a higher level such as corporate or regional HQ).
2) …
3) the Spanish/Irish operations have some scope for local adaptation within a given framework (can develop policy within the guidelines set by HQ).
4) …
5) The Spanish/Irish operations are not centralised (local managers can set their own policy).

Table 1: Dependent variables (5-point Likert scales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The extent of centralisation over…</th>
<th>establishing pay levels relative to market comparators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>performance appraisals for managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>training and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>succession planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>employee involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engagement with trade unions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measures: Independent variables
Two items were used to measure people-based integration mechanisms for HRM: (i) the use of expatriates from HQ within the subsidiary (1= yes; 0=no) and (ii) the existence of an
international HR committee bringing together HR managers from the subsidiaries to develop HRM practices that apply across countries (1 = yes, 0 = no).

The *information-based integration mechanism* was measured using a single item: the utilisation of an international IT system for HR issues that provided a platform for the exchange of information and data relating to the firms international workforce such as PeopleSoft or SAP HR (1=yes; 0=no).

*Formalised-based integration mechanisms* were also represented in the survey. The items used in this case focused on (i) the existence of regular and frequent HR data reporting from subsidiary to HQ. An accumulated index was created encapsulating 9 items measured through binary questions (1 = yes, 0 = no). The HR issues included were the following: (1) managerial pay packages; (2) management career progression; (3) overall labour costs; (4) numbers employed (headcount); (5) staff turnover; (6) absenteeism; (7) productivity; (8) workforce composition by diversity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, disability, etc.); and (9) employee attitude and satisfaction. Finally, (ii) the presence of a global shared services centre for HR issues was measured though a dichotomous variable (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Table 2: Independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People-based</th>
<th>The use of expatriates from HQ (binary variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The presence of an international HR committee (binary variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-based</td>
<td>Utilisation of an international IT system for HR issues such as People soft or SAP HR (binary variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalised-based</td>
<td>• Accumulated index encapsulating 9 binary items:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- managerial pay packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- management career progression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- overall labour costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- numbers employed (headcount)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- staff turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- absenteeism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- workforce composition by diversity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, disability, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- employee attitude and satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the presence of a global shared services centre for HR (binary variable).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure the robustness of our statistical model and consistency with previous work on our topic, we have included several control variables based on the relevant literature. First,
country of origin is measured through a binary item (1 = US; 0 = non-US) (Ferner et al 2011). Second, we control for the sector of operations with a dichotomous question (1 = manufacturing, 2 = services) (Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008; Ferner et al 2011). Third, the size of the subsidiary is measured by number of employees (1 = 100-999; 2 = 1,000-4,999; 3 = more than 5,000) and the age of the subsidiary measured as a continuous variable (Garnier 1982; Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2008). Fourth, mode of entry as a binary item (1 = merger or acquisition, 2 = greenfield) (Gunnigle et al 2009). Finally, we include a variable measuring the host country (1 = Ireland; 2 = Spain) (Edwards et al 2013).

Sample and descriptive data
Our sample comprises of 452 foreign-owned subsidiaries, 242 in Spain and 210 in Ireland. In relation to the country of origin, some 42% of MNCs are from the US. In terms of sector of operation, 53% are located in the services while 47% are manufacturing. Regarding the size of the subsidiary, 68% of the subsidiaries have between 100 and 999 employees, 25% have between 1,000 and 4,999 employees and 4% have more than 5,000.³

Descriptive data on the use of the international integration mechanisms for HRM are presented here. Table 3 shows that the formalised-based mechanism (direct reporting from subsidiaries to HQ on HR issues) is the most popular mechanism within the MNCs object of study (92.3%) while only some 36.9% of the sample uses the services provided by a global HR shared services centre. Overall, personal-based mechanisms for HRM constitute the next most popular group of integration mechanisms, chief among them being the presence of an international HRM committee, policy-maker and coordinator of HRM practices across countries (65.9%). Some 56.9% of the subsidiaries reported the presence of expatriates.

Table 3: Employment of international integration mechanisms for HRM⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Integration mechanisms for HRM</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates from HQ</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International HRM committee</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRIS</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data reporting from subsidiary to HQ on HR issues</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR shared service centre</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ 3% of subsidiaries reported missing values for the number of employees.
⁴ Percentages are calculated based on the total sample, that is, 452 subsidiaries. However, some subsidiaries reported missing values.
Information-based mechanisms for HRM are represented here by the employment of a HR information system as a platform for the exchange of HRM information and contents. Respondents of some 58.2% subsidiaries confirmed the use of HRIS when asked for the incidence of such mechanism. Overall, most HRM practices reported means under 3.0 (see table 4). This suggests that HRM practices included in this study reported averages of medium and low centralisations levels. Within the medium levels of centralisation we find performance appraisal and succession planning. Within low levels of corporate centralisation the output points towards the establishment of pay levels in the subsidiary in relation to the local market, training and development policy, employee involvement practice and trade union engagement.

Table 4: Extent of centralisation (mean) across HRM practices (1-5 Likert Scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HRM Practices</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Centralisation</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay levels</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Appraisal Managers</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Development</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession Planning</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Involvement</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Representation</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* LOG: Large Occupational Group

**Results**

Firstly, we tested for correlations and collinearity tolerance for all the variables and the resultant outputs were all within normal limits (Hair et al 2010). The highest correlation obtained among the independent variables was 0.334 while the highest VIF was 1.187. Second, given the ordinal nature of our dependent variables, six ordinal regressions were run for each of the HRM practices (Hair et al 2010).

Turning to our hypotheses, our dependent variable is the extent of centralisation for the different HRM practices, representing the centralisation-based mechanisms employed by the MNC. Centralisation-based mechanisms for HRM proved to be significantly related to the use of other people-based mechanisms as well as highly associated with the employment of
information-based mechanisms (HRIS) and formalisation-based mechanisms (direct data reporting on HR issues from subsidiary to HQ and HRSSCs). Hence, overall, our $H1$ is supported. Table 5 reports the output of the six ordinal regressions. The results reveal that people-based mechanisms are employed most uniformly across the different HRM practices in the case of the international HRM committee. The findings do not report significant relationships between the use of expatriates and centralisation across HRM practices. Therefore, $H2$ is partially supported.
Table 5: Ordinal Regressions. Centralisation over the different HRM practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV/DV</th>
<th>Centralisation over pay levels</th>
<th>Centralisation over performance appraisal systems for managers</th>
<th>Centralisation over training and development</th>
<th>Centralisation over succession planning</th>
<th>Centralisation over employee involvement</th>
<th>Centralisation over union engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates from HQ</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International HRM committee</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.692***</td>
<td>-0.519***</td>
<td>-0.670**</td>
<td>-0.502**</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR shared service centre</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>-0.421***</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRIS</td>
<td>-0.450**</td>
<td>-0.634***</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data reporting on HR issues</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.166***</td>
<td>0.263***</td>
<td>0.186***</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin (Ref. non-US)</td>
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Notes: N is reduced because of missing values on some variables. The reference categories are in brackets.

***, ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
Our findings provide support for the argument that MNCs will be more inclined to use information-based mechanisms for the international integration of compensation and performance appraisal systems than for the integration of the rest of HRM practices. Thus, \( H3 \) is supported. Additionally, our model provides some useful findings on formalisation-based mechanisms that might offer a line of enquiry for future research. In particular, the use of direct data reporting from subsidiary to HQ appears related to the centralisation of all HRM practices and the use of HRSSCs is found to hold explanatory power in accounting for the centralisation of training and development practices.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

The ever-increasing complexity and uncertainty within which MNCs operate creates a unique set of organisational, co-ordination and managerial issues for the managers of MNCs. Not least of these is the management of employees on a global scale. The discussion on preferred approaches to HRM integration and the mechanisms by which it may be achieved goes straight to the heart of the debate about how MNCs operating in a variety of national environments deal with a “bewildering variety of cultural and institutional specificities that make managing in a multinational context especially complex” (Morley and Collings 2003, p. 489). In this paper we have presented a comprehensive analysis of the differential use of international mechanisms for the integration of management practices across a suite of HRM practices among MNC subsidiaries located in Spain and Ireland. Smale et al (2013) opened up an important research avenue on the differential use of three sets of international integration mechanisms in the HRM domain, a line of enquiry which we have sought to develop further in this paper, most especially around the differential use of information-based mechanisms and the relationship between centralisation and integration mechanisms which remained unanswered heretofore (Smale et al 2013). Against this backdrop, we have sought to provide a comprehensive analysis of preferred approaches to integration among a representative sample of over 450 foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in two different locations. Our study of foreign-owned MNCs in Ireland and Spain demonstrates that the use of people-, information- and formalisation-based mechanisms is positively related to the employment of centralisation-based mechanisms. Our conclusions suggest that centralisation-based mechanisms should perhaps be viewed at a strategic or corporate level (Child 1972), in that centralisation as a preferred approach may trigger the use of the other integration mechanisms for HRM practices. Ferner et al (2011) have previously hinted at the potential existence of a causal relationship between centralisation and the use of international
integration mechanisms in the HRM domain area, in which the pursuit of centralisation as the overarching preferred approach encourages the employment of such mechanisms. Our analysis suggests that this could be the case. However, since regression analysis does not measure causality (Hair et al 2010) further research is needed to deepen knowledge on causality.

Our empirical results support the notion that people-based integration mechanisms in the form of international HRM committees are used uniformly to foster the international integration of the different HRM practices. As Ferner et al (2011) argue the main purpose of the international HRM committee is to act as a policy-making agent for the formulation and dissemination of HRM policies across borders. International HRM committees are the venue at which HRM policies are created, discussed and integrated across subsidiaries. Future research might focus on different aspects in relation to the use of international HRM committees such as the extent of the attendance and participation of each subsidiary, frequency of the meetings and other implications for HR managers at subsidiary level. Our findings further suggest that the use of expatriates is not related to high levels of international integration in HRM. A possible explanation behind these findings is that MNCs are increasingly employing internal networks and informal people-based mechanisms in their integration of practices (Sparrow et al 2004; Tregaskis et al 2005; Collings et al 2007; Evans et al 2011) and these may have become a substitute for the deployment of conventional expatriate executives in some cases. An alternative rationale to explain why the use of expatriates might not be related to centralisation is the fact that the presence of expatriates in European and American MNCs across the globe is normally lower than the presence of expatriates in firms of other nationalities such as, for example, in Japanese firms (Tan and Mahoney 2006; Almond and Ferner 2006). Our sample here is primarily comprised of European and American owned firms. Previously, Harzing (2001) argued that the cost entailed in expatriation, along with the comparatively lower cost of non-person-based control and integration mechanisms, could explain a decrease in the deployment of expatriates to integrate managerial practices internationally. In addition, she noted that in some cases centralised decision-making at HQ as a modus operandi could substitute the use of expatriation.

As expected information-based mechanisms seem to be particularly associated with the international integration of performance appraisal systems and compensation practices and
appear much less common in the integration of training and development, organisational learning, succession planning, employee involvement and employee representation. This is partially aligned to the work of Strohmeier (2007) who found that the use of HRIS allow for scope to build databases and information sharing platforms where compensation and performance appraisal systems are established. Similarly, Ball (2001) highlights the more extensive use of HRIS for hard HRM practices than for soft HRM practices in order to serve as a means of analysis and as an aid to decision-making. This appeared most sophisticated in the case of performance appraisal systems.

In relation to formalisation-based mechanisms, direct reporting on HR issues from the subsidiary to HQ proves to be significant in the process of international integration used by MNC subsidiaries across all HRM practices explored. As Belizón et al (2013) pointed out in relation to the direct reporting on HR matters from subsidiary to HQ, oftentimes HQ demonstrate a desire to be informed about HR activity on a regular and on-going basis, regardless of the level of control exerted over the subsidiary. The usage of HR shared services is solely found to be significant in explaining the level of international integration of training and development. Recently, some scholars have warned that the use of a HR shared service might not be necessarily associated with the extent of integration of HRM practices since HR shared services generally operate following a ‘business within a business’ approach, which is not necessarily bound to broader corporate control (Meijerick and Bondarouk 2013, p. 489). Taking into account our findings and recent contributions on the use of HR shared service centres, it is plausible to suggest that this mechanism might be more inclined to integrate and transfer intellectual capital and wider knowledge than specific operational HR practices.

Limitations
A number of limitations should be acknowledged in the empirical analysis that we offer here. First, our study does not include selection practices. Additional analysis should be carried out to explore this in detail. Second, we believe that the use of a longitudinal and qualitative methodology would be helpful in providing more nuanced features of the integration mechanisms at play in the HR function. There is little doubt that additional perspectives on the use of such mechanisms for the integration and knowledge transfer of HRM would be beneficial. Third, a wider array of research contexts would assist in further explicating the impact of national and firm level drivers as sources of variation in preferred approaches.
Fourth, since our respondents were subsidiary level HR Directors/Managers, we are aware that these results are limited to the ‘subsidiary perception’. Thus, dyadic studies covering both subsidiaries and HQ responses would likely generate a more holistic overview of the utilisation of integration mechanisms of the HR function from the perspective of both stakeholders. Finally, the questionnaire was administered only to a single respondent in each subsidiary. This approach can, on occasion, lead to common method variance (CMV) which is caused by single source bias. However, arising from Chang et al (2010), we believe CMV is not likely to be problematic here because of the use of different scales for some variables and the presence of a high number of variables measuring the existence of international HRM mechanisms which are not related to personal perceptions.

Acknowledgement
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References


## ARTICLE 4

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ADVANCING UNDERSTANDING ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES: KEY RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND THE INTREPID CONTRIBUTION

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Karen Olsen, Norwegian School of Economics
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Abstract: This paper has three principal aims. It firstly provides some theoretical background on the key current research issues and challenges in regard to industrial relations in multinational companies (MNCs). It then presents a concise review of scholarship to date on industrial relations in MNCs using INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals' Employment Practices: an International Database) data. Finally, the paper identifies some of the main industrial relations issues that remain to be addressed, in effect charting a form of research agenda for future work using the INTREPID data, with particular focus on the potential contribution from ‘late joiners’ of the INTREPID project.

Key words: Industrial relations, multinational companies, institutionalism, employee voice, trade unions, autonomy, control
INTRODUCTION

The objectives of this paper are threefold. We initially review some of the key current debates regarding industrial relations in multinational companies (MNCs). We then consider the contribution of the so called INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database) study to these debates. INTREPID comprises a network of international scholars involved in coordinated surveys of employment practice in MNCs in different national contexts with the objective of providing an accurate and representative picture of employment practices in MNCs. The paper concludes by identifying a number of industrial relations issues that remain to be addressed or further investigated, thus charting a research agenda for future work using the INTREPID database, with particular focus on the potential contribution from ‘second wave’ countries, namely Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Mexico and the Nordic area (Denmark and Norway).

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES

Aside conviction that home and host-country factors influence management practice in industrial relations within MNC subsidiaries, recent literature - including some work based on the INTREPID project - identifies the influence of organisational and structural characteristics of MNCs themselves in impacting on management practice, including that affecting industrial relations. This reinforces the need to look beyond macro-institutional effects alone and include micro-organisational and MNC characteristics to develop an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the factors impacting on industrial relations practice and subsidiary level autonomy over industrial relations within MNCs. Furthermore, although qualitative research has been developed around management approaches to industrial relations on the one hand and employee representatives’ perception of those practices on the other (cf. Marginson et al 2004; Almond and Ferner 2006; Waddington 2010), in-depth quantitative analysis of factors shaping variation across subsidiary level is, to date, quite limited. The INTREPID database offers a unique opportunity to address these aspects. By drawing on an extensive international database, compiled from parallel surveys of employment practice in the operations of MNCs in ten countries, it offers the basis for a robust analysis and understanding of industrial relations and its determinants within MNCs subsidiaries across borders.

Two contrasting logics characterise much of the extant literature on MNCs and industrial relations. On the one hand, a long research tradition suggests that trade unions, employee
representation structures and conventions are deeply embedded in national political economies and that their institutions are so powerful that MNCs are forced to adapt to local traditions (e.g. collective bargaining, interaction with works councils) despite corporate preference to act otherwise for reasons related to perceived competitive advantage (Taylor et al 1996; Whitley 2001). On the other hand, the countervailing logic is that MNCs operate in a manner which is “exogenous to national path dependencies” (Lamare et al 2013, p. 695) and seek to deploy practices developed in different national contexts and/or utilise approaches which dilute the impact of local institutional pressures. Some empirical studies have shown how US MNCs in coordinated market economies manage to substantially insulate themselves from the influence of trade unions and sectorial bargaining (e.g. Royle 1998; 2000). This suggests that MNCs are increasingly seeking to adapt bargaining processes and structures to their own needs and to consider national and sectorial collective bargaining as less relevant to their own employment practices. Furthermore they may increasingly compare themselves with other subsidiaries of their own company in other countries, or in - domestic or foreign - competitors (Arrowsmith and Marginson 2006). One possible scenario is that in countries with multi-employer bargaining traditions and strong trade unions, MNCs will push for greater decentralisation of collective bargaining and the concomitant freedom to negotiate their own employment practices with local unions, independently of national and sectorial dynamics and to focus on the strengthening of their own competitiveness and adaptability (Marginson and Meardi 2009).

Drawing from these various studies, which clearly illustrate some degree of autonomy in the way local (host country) management in MNC subsidiaries engage with local unions and their systems of collective representation, this paper highlights the need for additional empirical investigation of the factors influencing local management discretion over employee representation and engagement. Of particular interest is the interaction between macro-institutional (e.g. country-of-origin effects, host-country characteristics) and organisational and structural firm-level factors (e.g. international human resource management [HRM] structure, management organisation, ownership and demographic factors). Specifically, we are interested in understanding how these two groups of features influence patterns of employee representation and the extent and form of engagement by local management in industrial relations in MNC subsidiaries.
Much of extant literature on industrial relations in MNCs has focused on employee voice (cf. Boxall and Purcell 2003). Lavelle et al (2010, p. 396) define employee voice as “any type of mechanisms, structure or practice, which provides an employee with an opportunity to express an opinion or participate in decision-making within their organisation”. Employee voice is usually operationalised into two broad categories, namely, direct voice and indirect voice. Direct voice is described as any communication mechanism acting as a vehicle for employees to improve their direct involvement in management decision-making. This classification refers mainly to participation, consultation and information sharing. Indirect voice encompasses any mechanisms that provide employees with the channel for expressing their views via “some form of collective employee representation such as trade unions or non-union structures of collective representation (e.g. via consultative committees or work councils)” (Lavelle et al 2010, p. 396). Since Freeman and Medoff (1984) profiled trade unions as key actors in the sphere of employee voice we find a lack of consensus on this theme. Important manifestations of a shift in focus from trade unions and collective bargaining to other forms of employee voice include the progressive decline in trade union density in countries with strong trade union traditions and increased union avoidance, often based on the principles of the welfare capitalism as developed in the US and often practised by US MNCs abroad (Jacoby 1997). Crucial questions remain as to the relative influence of macro- and micro-level effects on approaches to employee voice in MNC subsidiaries abroad.

Institutionalism and MNCs
Our starting point in investigating industrial relations within MNCs is a comparative institutionalism perspective which acknowledges that competitiveness in the international economic system is compatible with a wide range of national-institutional arrangements. Specifically, industrial and employment studies have centred on two contrasting propositions while examining the influence MNCs possess in shaping employment practices. Scholars drawing from the salience of different ‘national business systems’ (Whitley 1999), point to strong national effects on local employment policies and practices in MNCs. This thereby leads to systemic differences in the way national business systems organise their economic activity through the mechanisms governing the operation of capital, labour and product markets and their subsequent impact on MNC’s behaviour (Ferner et al 2005). Thus the primary assumption of the institutionalist approach is that MNCs will be influenced in their international operations by the structures, operating models and patterns of thoughts and
behaviour they have developed in response to the business context in which they originate (Whitley 2001). Specifically, it is claimed that country of origin effects influence MNC’s attitudes and approaches to unions and collective employee representation (Ferner and Quintanilla 2008). Accordingly, for example, German-owned multinationals tend to exhibit strong firm-based indirect representative forms of employee voice, contrasting with US-owned MNCs which appear to prefer direct engagement with employees (Ferner and Varul 1999). Specifically, studies of MNCs in Ireland suggest that many US MNCs engage in union avoidance in order to avoid having to take part in collective bargaining, among other reasons (Gunnigle 1995; Gunnigle et al 2005).

Nevertheless, some literature has noted that globalisation processes do not have simple homogenising effects: rather they are reshaped, resisted and redeployed by the socially embedded processes of the host location, emphasising country of operation-level distinctiveness (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998). More specifically it is argued that country of operation effects influence the application of MNCs’ employment policies and practices on the ground (Almond et al 2005). In particular, these studies show that even when MNCs apply ‘best’ employment practices globally, local adaptation of these practices remains necessary. Since employee representation systems are deeply embedded in national institutional arrangements, it would be difficult for foreign MNCs to simply transfer home-country approaches into different national contexts. Rather, as some researchers argue, it seems more plausible that MNC subsidiaries adapt their practices to accommodate local context, including national legislation concerning collective bargaining, employee representation structures and social rights of information and consultation (Whitley 2001). This work frequently draws a contrast between coordinated market economies (CMEs), which have higher levels of regulation and institutionalisation of employee representation structures and practices and liberal market economies (LMEs), characterised by lower levels of regulation regarding employee representation and works councils’ rights. The argument is that the range of employment practices open to firms is more controlled and therefore restricted in subsidiaries operating within CMEs than in LMEs.

Beyond national institutionalism

Home and host-country claims alone are insufficient to explain the development of industrial relations practices within MNCs, not least because of two main reasons reported in the literature. First, it is argued that depending on the ‘economic success’ of the country of
origin, MNCs from more ‘successful’ countries can more easily transfer their domestic management practices abroad (Royle 2006). This ‘economic dominance’ effect may be particularly relevant for national economies which are highly reliant on foreign investment (Geary and Roche 2001, Gunnigle et al 2009). Second, a primary concern of contemporary institutional accounts concerns isomorphism or hybridisation at country level. Also known as ‘dual institutional effect’, this concerns the ways in which MNCs strategically adapt their practices to take advantage of institutional distance and abandon practices prevalent in their home countries. There is evidence, for example, of German MNCs opting to operate in environments where they are not subjected to codetermination and works councils (Meardi et al 2009). On the other hand, MNCs from LMEs may more easily view their home practices as a source of competitive advantage and attempt to transfer these to host countries (Lamare et al 2013). Thereby, the ‘dual institutional effect’ approach reflects the formal regulatory structures and the manner in which the socialisation process is framed by nation-specific formal and informal patterns of behaviour.

From a comparative institutional perspective, social actors within MNCs are seen as operating between the competing institutional forces exerted by MNC head office at home (parent company) as it attempts to transfer policy to the subsidiary and those forces exerted by the host institutional context within which the MNC operates. In addition, Whitley (1999) argues that firms within different host institutional contexts may demonstrate different ways of dealing with employment and industrial relations institutional structures, such as systems of employee representation and collective bargaining, which often go beyond the traditional institutional contrast between CMEs and LMEs. More specifically, MNCs’ industrial relations practices may be influenced by the extent of organisational leeway enjoyed by local actors at subsidiary level. Hence, within the context of the home and host institutional factors, MNCs at local level develop their own strategy, using their discretion to pursue specific interests and locally negotiating in that respect. For example, Meardi et al (2009) found that country of origin and country of operation effects partly explained the transfer of employment practices in US and German multinationals’ subsidiaries in Central and Eastern European countries because of the ‘contested’ and ‘contingent’ nature of the process of transfer within MNCs. This is for different reasons. First of all, MNCs have to negotiate with powerful actors in the local environment, such as the unions and their existing structures of employee representation. Second, actors at different organisational levels may have different interests as well as different resources. From a power and interest perspective, the
mechanisms through which local managers attempt to exercise their autonomy at the subsidiary level can be diverse and reflect their organisational interests and local power resources (Ferner et al 2013). Sometimes local management can negotiate a path through various, sometimes contradictory, institutional pressures from the home and host environments. Power resources may derive from subsidiary’s success and consequent credibility within the wider firm and from the local actors’ ability to exploit the local institutional context. By acting as interpreters of the possibilities and limits of the local institutional environment, subsidiary actors may lever considerable freedom of action for themselves in the face of institutional pressures from headquarters and from the institutional forces of the parent-country business system (Ferner et al 2005). Williams and Geppert (2011) report that German management used the argument that works councils would not agree to certain measures in order to resist decisions made at corporate level, while preserving their autonomy and engaging with works councils to ‘fight for their plants’.

Hence, differential degrees of local management autonomy affect how industrial relations practices and policies are developed within MNCs. This is because macro-institutional forces may be variably used by local actors at subsidiary level to shape industrial relations policy and practice within MNCs. This further denotes the need to attribute particular relevance to the level of discretion local MNC actors have in shaping particular employment practices and identify the main factors explaining it and examine how they interact within MNCs.

THE INTREPID CONTRIBUTION
As noted earlier, INTREPID comprises a network of international scholars involved in parallel large scale surveys of employment practice in MNCs in different national contexts. The principal objective is to ensure an accurate, representative depiction of the activities of MNCs, especially in the areas of employment practice and industrial relations. The data collected are the outcome of the most representative comparative surveys of employment practice in MNCs located in the respective countries. The lack of representativeness in previous studies of MNCs has been noted by several observers over the years (Edwards at al 2007; McDonnell et al 2007; Collinson and Rugman 2010) with disquiet expressed regarding sample bias. This particularly relates to concern that much of the MNC literature is dominated by over-sampling/reliance on data from a small cohort of large, well known (brand named) US-owned manufacturing companies, such as Intel, GE and Microsoft (Collinson and Rugman 2010). This may also commonly lead to the exclusion of, or limited emphasis on,
indigenous MNCs who are often major employers in their home country (McDonnell et al 2014). In defining MNCs, the INTREPID methodology sought to address these shortfalls by initially distinguishing between foreign and domestic owned MNCs and then by establishing a size threshold as follows:

- **Foreign-owned MNCs** are wholly or majority foreign-owned organisations operating in the host country, with 500 or more employees worldwide and 100 or more employed in their host country operations.
- **Domestic-owned MNCs** are wholly or majority home country-owned organisations with 500 or more employees worldwide and at least 100 employed abroad.

The next phase involved identifying the relevant population of MNCs in each country. The compilation of an accurate and comprehensive listing of the population of MNCs proved to be a particularly painstaking task requiring a detailed review of various listings of MNCs provided by national agencies and organisations specialising in company databases. Full details on this process and our overall methodology are outlined in Edwards et al (2013).

The third (fieldwork) phase required the completion of structured face to face interviews with the most senior HR director or manager able to answer for all of the operations in the relevant host country. Respondents were asked to report on various aspects of organisational structure/characteristics and also on five aspects of employment practice – the HR function, pay and performance management, employee representation and consultation, employee involvement and communication, and training, development and organisation learning. In investigating these areas, information was sought in employment practice relating to three specific groups of employees, namely the “largest occupational group (LOG)”; “managers” and the “key group” defined immediately below. This approach reflects the idea that different ‘bundles’ of employment/HR practices may be deployed among different categories of employees (Lepak and Snell 1999).

- **LOG**: the largest non-managerial occupational group among the employees in the MNC’s operations in each country. For example, in a manufacturing business it might be semi-skilled operators or in an insurance company it might be call centre staff.
- **Managers**: employees who primarily manage the organisation, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organisation and whose main tasks consist of the direction and coordination of the functioning of the organisation. In other words, managers are those above the level of first-line supervision.
Key group: those employees whom MNCs might identify as critical to the firm’s organisational learning and core competence. These might be research staff, product designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, etc.

Surveys were completed in the ‘first wave’ countries (Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK) between 2006 and 2008. These are seen as the most representative and comprehensive investigations of employment practices in MNCs in their respective countries (Edwards et al 2013). Equivalent surveys in the ‘second wave’ countries (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Mexico and Norway) were undertaken between 2010 and 2013. The INTREPID project thus provides a unique and distinctive resource of original data on which to base empirical investigation of the multifaceted dimensions surrounding multinational firms as powerful economic, financial and socio-political actors within the international economy.

Since completion of the first wave country surveys, a body of published work using INTREPID data has emerged. Not all of this has focused on industrial relations though much has. Arguably the most significant industrial relations contribution from first wave INTREPID data was captured in the special issue of Industrial and Labour Relations Review entitled “Cross-National Perspectives on Multinational Companies and Employment Relations” (volume 66, number 3, 2013). In the following two sections we review the published literature on INTREPID data to date in the field and its contribution to enhancing our understanding of industrial relations in MNCs.

Employee Voice and MNCs

a) Institutional (macro) level effects on employee voice

In line with our earlier discussion, much of the relevant published work has placed particular emphasis on how institutional context in the country of origin informs MNC approaches to employee voice (cf. Lavelle 2008; Gunnigle et al 2009; Marginson et al 2010; Gooderham et al 2011; Minbaeva and Navrbjerg 2011, Edwards et al 2012; Marginson et al 2013; Sablok et al 2013). The use of direct and indirect employee voice along with the incidence of hybrid or dualistic systems has been investigated through an approach that uses and seeks to go beyond the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) lens (Lamare et al 2013). To some extent, the evidence has corroborated some expectations that a VoC approach generates, such as the ingrained tendency of US MNCs for union avoidance and the use of direct mechanisms of employee
voice in their Canadian, British and Irish subsidiaries. Similar findings were statistically supported by Lavelle et al (2010) in their study of employee voice in MNCs with operations in Ireland. Lamare et al (2013, p. 713), in exploring variations among MNCs based in Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, note that ‘within LME host environments, US subsidiaries differ in terms of trade union status when compared against those from other home countries, particularly, CMEs’. They found that union presence in German, Nordic, British and other European-owned MNCs operating in the three LME nations studied was higher than the levels of unionisation in US MNCs.

However, some of the expectations generated by a VoC approach were not supported. For instance, Nordic and Japanese-owned MNCs, despite their origins in quite different forms of capitalism, were not significantly different from their US counterparts (Marginson et al 2010; Lamare et al 2013). Moreover, double-breasting, defined as the simultaneous operation of unionised and non-unionised sites (Gunnigle et al 2009), was found to be especially characteristic of Nordic and US-owned MNC subsidiaries despite the marked differences in the institutions of the countries of origin (Lamare et al 2013). One interpretation of these findings is that they suggest that MNCs may be implementing employee voice arrangements similar to the ‘dominant’ group of US firms (Ferner and Varul 1999). The idea that ‘dominance’ effects are evident in MNCs’ approaches to employee voice appears to be particularly strong in countries that are heavily reliant on FDI inflows. Lamare et al (2013) highlight the particular case of US MNCs in Ireland, which account for over sixty per cent of FDI. In line with this, high levels of union avoidance were reported among MNCs operating in Ireland due largely to the disproportionate number of US MNCs there, but also possibly accentuated by Ireland’s comparatively permissive industrial relations system. Union avoidance was especially evident in new sites opened by MNC subsidiaries (Marginson et al 2010; Lamare et al 2013). These scholars note that union avoidance in US MNCs does not only imply a growing presence of direct employee voice but also an increase of non-union employee representation structures such as work councils or consultative committees.

b) Organisational (micro) effects on employee voice

A longstanding focus on institutional context has traditionally characterised the literature on employee voice in MNC subsidiaries with the consequence that scholars have often relegated micro-level effects to the background. Often treated as variables of control, the relevance of firm-specific characteristics is now gaining ground in explaining variation in industrial
relations (Marginson et al 2010; Bechter et al 2012) and employee voice in particular (Lavelle et al 2010; Marginson et al 2010; Edwards et al 2012; Lamare et al 2013). INTREPID scholars have been to the fore in moving beyond analyses of the impact of institutional factors and thus shedding light on other explanatory factors that may hold greater power in explaining differing approaches to employee voice in MNCs.

First, there seems to be a growing consensus on the influence of sector of operations. In this regard, MNCs in the manufacturing sector were more likely to adopt indirect voice approaches and were generally characterised by comparatively high levels of unionisation (Marginson et al 2010; Lamare et al 2013). In contrast, MNCs in the service sector were more likely to present hybrid or dualistic approaches, combining direct and indirect employee voice methods. Digging more deeply, MNCs operating in financial/professional services, retail, wholesale, distribution and hospitality appear more likely to adopt minimalistic approaches to employee voice, i.e. adopt none or very few employee voice channels. However, where some form of employee voice is adopted by MNCs in these sectors, hybrid or dualistic approaches appear most common (Lavelle et al 2010). Second, product diversification appears to be significant in explaining different approaches to employee voice, particularly in regard to double-breasting. MNCs characterised by a high level of product diversification are more likely to report union avoidance via double-breasting than MNCs with a more standardised product portfolio (Lamare et al 2013). Lamare et al (2013) show that double-breasting approaches are more common among diversified MNCs than among those with a single product. The interpretation of this seems to be that product diversification entails a variety of production lines and thus different employee groupings in each product line and that this in turn results in the adoption of different employee voice approaches within such MNCs as management deal with each group differently according to their employment characteristics and union status. Third, MNCs that had recently acquired (‘brownfield’) sites, were more likely to combine hybrid approaches than MNCs which had opened greenfield sites or had not recently engaged in new investments (Gunnigle et al 2009; Marginson et al 2010).

Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations
As we have seen above, scholarly inquiry on the latitude of subsidiary level management to articulate and develop their own employment practices is important for two primary reasons. First, exploration of subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations is a road comparatively less
travelled (Collings 2008). As Belizón et al (2014, p. 6) note “despite the extensive literature examining subsidiary autonomy over a broad range of HR practices, there has been far less research with a specific focus on industrial relations matters”. Second, the extent of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations is likely to be particularly sensitive to local institutional arrangements, probably more so than other employment practices such as performance management or training and development (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994). This makes comparative analysis across different national contexts particularly interesting. This gap in knowledge concerning variation in subsidiary autonomy has been identified by INTREPID scholars at a macro- and micro level of analysis.

a) Institutional (macro) factors shaping subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations

Drawing from past contributions on subsidiary autonomy over HRM practices, there appears to be a well-established pattern in US MNCs. Such firms normally allow limited scope for local managers in regard to HR practices (Almond et al 2005; Almond and Ferner 2006). In the industrial relations sphere, recent work using INTREPID data found that US MNCs afford subsidiaries located in Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK lower levels of autonomy when compared to their European and Asian counterparts (Ferner et al 2011; Ferner et al 2013; Bélanger et al 2013; Belizón et al 2014). Equally, host country effects remain an important factor in attempts to reveal how macro-settings in the country of operation impact on subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations (Almond and Ferner 2006). MNC subsidiaries operating in more highly regulated labour market regimes such as Mediterranean countries (e.g. Spain) report higher levels of subsidiary autonomy than subsidiaries operating in more permissive regimes such as the UK, Ireland and Canada, where wider institutional leeway is granted to MNCs (Ferner et al 2011; Bélanger et al 2013; Belizón et al 2014). Within more highly regulated regimes, this is normally attributed to the necessity to conform to specific local regulation and legal requirements (Marginson et al 2010), while in more permissive systems MNCs can exercise greater strategic freedom to adopt practices originating in the country of origin or which are considered to be ‘best practice’ internationally (Gunnigle et al 2009; Belizón et al 2014). These findings are more or less in line with what one would expect, but the INTREPID contribution has not only been to demonstrate these patterns but also to show how they are mediated by organisational level factors.
b) Organisational (micro) factors shaping subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations

Much of the research effort of INTREPID scholars has focused on the impact of organisational factors over subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations. At this micro-level, substantial contributions have been made on two fronts: subsidiary characteristics and the deployment of international HR/IR structures.

Regarding subsidiary characteristics, we earlier noted how sector of operations constitutes a valuable explanatory factor in accounting for variation in management approaches to employee voice. First, we find that manufacturing MNCs are more likely to afford higher levels of autonomy (Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2014). This is most likely related to the higher levels of unionisation in manufacturing and the related predisposition of such MNCs to rely on indirect employee voice approaches (Lamare et al 2013). Second, mode of entry appears to impact on MNCs’ capacity to implement managerial practices originated in the country of origin. MNCs that launch new operations through greenfield sites are unlikely to encounter pre-established workforce management traditions that might characterise brownfield sites (i.e. operations established via mergers or acquisitions). Consequently entry through greenfield operations greatly enhances managerial capacity to follow corporate preference in industrial relations. Accordingly, INTREPID scholars have identified a pronounced tendency towards union avoidance in subsidiaries established at greenfield sites (Gunnigle et al 2009). Third, a similar tendency was identified regarding the trajectory of new investments in the country of operation. INTREPID data provide evidence to suggest that establishment of new sites is significantly associated with lower levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations practices (Gunnigle et al 2009; Belizón et al 2014). Arguably, the rationale behind this relationship may spring from the fact that new investments are generally undertaken under corporate guidelines and financial support and thus are more exposed to central control (Tempel et al 2006). Fourth, the extent of product or service diversification also has practical consequences for subsidiary autonomy. It seems that the greater the extent of diversification, the greater the level of subsidiary autonomy (Ferner et al 2011). As argued in relation to employee voice above, diversification of products or services generally entails a more heterogeneous workforce (e.g. every product line could be served by a different profile of employee such as skilled, unskilled, etc.) which carries the need for MNCs to conform to both local regulatory requirements and the differing demands from different groups of employees. Diversified MNCs report, therefore, higher levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations, arguably granted to allow local managers
scope to deal with the needs of different groups of employees (Ferner et al 2011; Pulignano et al 2013).

A further micro-level factor that appears to be crucial in explaining variation in subsidiary autonomy is subsidiary capabilities. As Bélanger et al (2013) observe: “organisational capabilities are seen to be a key pillar for subsidiaries to gain space for decision-making within the MNC”. The influence of the power interplays between subsidiaries and HQ at a micro-level has been generally neglected in previous work and consequently studies of the effect of subsidiary capabilities on the level of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations constitute an important step forward in attempts to move beyond institutions in explaining variation in industrial relations in MNCs. Prominent scholars posit that subsidiaries do not necessarily occupy weak and vulnerable positions but rather may garner power in their dealings with HQ (Ferner et al 2012). Bélanger et al (2013) identify two different subsidiary capabilities that account for variation in the level of subsidiary autonomy, namely, internal management capabilities and the extent of embeddedness of MNC subsidiaries in the local economy. The former “reflects the ability of local managers to develop positive relationships with the employees to foster innovation and to represent favourably the subsidiary within the broader structures of the firm. Such social resources are likely to promote investment in the subsidiary and secure more strategic mandates from headquarters” (Bélanger et al 2013, p. 325). This work establishes a positive correlation between the strength of these subsidiary capabilities and higher levels of subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations. They also found that where MNCs were strongly embedded in the local economy then subsidiaries are more likely to enjoy a greater subsidiary autonomy. Subsidiary embeddedness within the local economy was measured through the extent subsidiaries engage with their local institutional arena by establishing alliances with, for example, universities to undertake relevant research or by using different public services such as funding for new investments offered by local entities (Murray et al 2014). Thus the ability of actors at subsidiary level to generate competencies from their immediate context outside the firm shapes their relations with managers at higher levels within the firm.

Also within the micro-sphere, INTREPID researchers have investigated the impact of international HR/IR structures on subsidiary autonomy (Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2014). While personal control exercised by expatriates from headquarters or third countries is related to low levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations (Belizón et al 2014), the
deployment of various international HR structures seems to have no discernible impact on the extent of autonomy enjoyed by local managers in MNCs (Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2014). In practical terms, this means that variations in the level of subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations appear detached from the use of international HR structures, such as the presence of an international committee acting as a policy-making body to develop and disseminate HRM practice across borders, the use of human resources information systems (HRIS), the incidence of direct and regular reporting from subsidiary to HQ on HR/IR issues and the use of a shared service centre for HR. These international structures have proven to limit the level of subsidiary autonomy over other HR practices (Ferner et al 2011; Belizón et al 2013). However, IR practices seem to follow their own path. Thus Ferner et al (2011) argue that industrial relations practices, because of their local nature, are not as dependent on corporate strategies and structures as other areas of HR practice.

CHARTING A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
As illustrated above, considerable insights have been gleaned on the autonomy enjoyed by subsidiary level management in MNCs in their interaction with local unions and systems of collective representation. The factors shaping subsidiary autonomy at both institutional (macro) and organisational micro-level have been widely identified by the INTREPID network. Yet much remains to be done, not least the need for more extensive and comparative analyses of the power interplays or interaction between institutional- (home and host county effects) and firm-level organisational and structural factors impacting subsidiary level autonomy.

Of particular interest is how organisational (micro) level features mediate the extent of subsidiary level management discretion over employee representative engagement within MNCs. We have seen above reference to initial INTREPID work in this sphere. There is clearly room for some replication using the broader spectrum of ‘wave two’ countries which also provide scope for a regional focus. For example, it should be possible to compare these effects and measure their relative influence in MNC subsidiaries in the six European countries involved, namely Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain and the UK. In so doing, scholars might assess the effects of the above factors (independent variables) on trade union status and engagement. This would help advance understanding on how a wide range of factors influence both employee representation status and the extent of management discretion over collective representation.
As noted earlier different types of MNCs operate in different institutional contexts and one way of categorising them is by country of origin or ownership. Again the addition of second wave countries provides the potential to explore variation amongst and within CME and LME market economies as identified by the VoC approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). The Nordic countries, categorised as CMEs and exemplified by Denmark and Norway in INTREPID, are arguably different from Germany, for instance, where the industrial relations system has a stronger legislative basis. Even within Nordic countries there may be differences between employment regimes, e.g. Denmark’s use of more liberal approaches such as of ‘flexicurity’ (Gooderham et al 2011; see also Gooderham et al 2014 in current issue).

Future research could further profile the impact of sub-national governance systems, such as geographical regions (e.g. federal states), which often split jurisdiction over industrial relations issues, thus potentially inducing within-country variations in labour market regulation. In this regard, INTREPID now incorporates ‘second wave’ countries with such a federal structure, such as Belgium. Recent work in this area has highlighted the importance of the sub-national level in shaping management practices within MNCs (cf. Almond 2011). However, most studies are qualitative and lack the capacity to assess the degree of variation (if any) on a sub-national level. Furthermore, a focus on within and across country variation will allow scholars to assess the extent to which factors that influence employee representation and local management discretion differ across diverse industrial relations systems. This is particularly relevant in the light of Hyman’s (2009, p. 10) observation regarding the inadequate way in which scholars have responded so far to the dilemma of comparative research. As we have seen, comparative analysis in industrial relations is fraught with difficulty since national business and industrial relations systems generally differ in key respects, rendering each quite contextually bound and, in many respects, unique (cf. Edwards et al 2013; Crouch 2005). As Hyman (2009, p. 9-10) argues, reducing complexity and variety by elaborating different typologies or models and thereby engaging in ‘typification’ carries the disadvantage of reducing “… diversity to a limited number of ‘models’ or ideal types and (supressing the) … more complex aspects of differentiation”. He also concedes that while this approach has the potential to effectively illustrate how economies can be shaped and operate according to different institutional logics, it also risks ‘over-simplification’ by identifying ideal-typical country groupings based on particular characteristics, which may be shared to a differential degree by countries so-categorised. This may prove a fruitful avenue for INTREPID scholars. In particular, because multiple determinants are at work, researchers
interested in understanding the dynamics affecting the development of industrial relations practices within MNCs need to move away from over simplification of national economy types and embrace the complex interface of power interplay between macro-institutional and micro-organisational effects within MNCs.

Two particular lines of inquiry deal with different dimensions of context. First is the impact of sector, discussed above. Here INTREPID scholars might take up the challenge identified by Bechter et al (2012, p. 185) that “industrial relations vary across sectors as deeply as they do across countries”. This might be achieved by more in-depth analysis of sector and sub-sector variation. Earlier we noted differences between manufacturing and service sector MNCs. However this is arguably too crude a level of analysis and more specific sectorial categorisations such as European industrial activity classification (NACE codes) might be used in future work. This may need to be done on a comparative (cross-country) basis to garner adequate numbers of MNCs in each sectorial cell. A second important but somewhat problematic focus of future inquiry is the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on MNCs and industrial relations therein. A key challenge relates to variation in the timing of surveys. In the ‘first wave’ countries surveys were undertaken between 2006 and 2008, while this work was undertaken in ‘second wave’ countries much later, mostly in the period 2010-2013. This is not unusual in comparative research of this nature (Edwards et al 2013), especially in surveys such as INTREPID which address phenomena that do not change quickly. Work to date on the impact of the GFC has been largely qualitative in nature (cf. Gunnigle et al 2013) and generally lacking in comparative focus, thus providing at least the possibility for greater quantitative analyses as might be undertaken using INTREPID data.

Of course the INTREPID data and scholarship thereon is not without limitations, as alluded to above. While this work facilitates advanced analysis of practice and behaviour in MNCs in differing contexts, it cannot shed substantive light on issues of process - effectively, the means by which MNCs deploy certain practices and their underlying motives. Case study based methodologies remain the favoured way of investigating such phenomena. Equally this work captures practice at a particular point in time and is therefore unable to provide a longitudinal perspective which might chart the development and evolution of employment practice in MNCs. The project also largely relies on survey data from developed economies and it would be beneficial if, in future, we might witness greater participation from emerging economies.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Introduction

Having provided an exposition of the four peer-reviewed published/accepted for publication articles, this final chapter now turns to the contributions inherent in the programme of work presented in the thesis. Firstly, it revisits the research aim and objectives and clarifies how they have been addressed. Secondly, it discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis. Thirdly, it calls attention to a number of limitations that are worth highlighting, along with outlining potential future research avenues on the topic under investigation. Finally, it describes the author’s personal learning and development that has been achieved during the programme of research and the Ph.D. journey.

5.2. Revisiting the research aim and research objectives

At this juncture, it is appropriate to revisit the research aim and research objectives that constituted the starting point as well as the motivation for this research. This thesis aimed to conduct an in-depth comparative analysis of the institutional and organisational determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices in foreign-owned MNCs located in Ireland and Spain. In an attempt to articulate this research aim into specific goals, three research sub-objectives were outlined:

1. To explore the relative influence of both institutional and organisational factors as determinants of local autonomy over HRM and IR in MNC subsidiaries.
2. To examine the extent and use of international HRM structures by MNCs in their efforts at integrating practices across subsidiary units.
3. Drawing on novel data survey, to provide a comprehensive empirical and comparative analysis focusing on two of the most peripheral European Union economies, namely, Ireland and Spain.

According to the Ph.D. by publications’ modus operandi, this thesis was expected to address each of the research objectives through at least one of the four peer-reviewed published/accepted for publication articles. As presented earlier in Chapter 4, the first research objective was primarily addressed in the first, second and third articles. The first
article represented an empirical analysis accounting for the factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over HRM. The second built on this and specifically focused on the factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over IR practices. The third article sought to profile the relative influence of the international HRM structures deployed in the MNC subsidiary. The first research objective was also partially addressed in the third article. The second research objective was explicated in the second and the third articles, both of which are empirical pieces, which focus on the extent and use of international HRM structures by MNCs to integrate their practices across subsidiary units. It was also partially addressed in the first and fourth article. The third research objective was predominantly addressed in the second and third articles. These two articles focus particularly on providing a comprehensive empirical and comparative analysis of two of the most peripheral European Union economies, namely, Ireland and Spain. This third objective was also partially tackled in the fourth article.

5.3. Contribution of the thesis

5.3.1. Conceptual contribution

This thesis makes a substantial conceptual contribution to the existing literature on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. In an effort to move beyond the institutional effect in explaining the extent of local autonomy in MNC subsidiaries, it comprehensively explores the relative influence of the institutional effect and organisational factors in the level of local autonomy enjoyed by MNC subsidiaries. Besides institutional theory, this work profiles those organisational factors that the literature has identified in relation to local autonomy, namely, the international HRM structures and the impact of subsidiary characteristics. A considerable number of scholars have called for a shift in the study of this topic, especially in relation to the inclusion of emerging literature on the role of international HRM structures and an examination of the political interplay within MNCs and between MNC units (Morgan and Kristensen 2006; Ferner et al. 2011, 2012; Bélanger et al 2013). A growing body of research on subsidiary characteristics has also pointed towards their importance in explicating phenomena within MNC companies, perhaps with a particular emphasis on their relevance in the study of IR (Marginson et al 2010; Bechter et al 2012). The specific theoretical contributions of this work may be articulated as follows:
This thesis has provided a more comprehensive framework for the analysis of the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices, including organisational level factors and in so doing has moved beyond purely institutional determinants.

This work has profiled the role of international HRM structures in determining the extent of international local autonomy over HRM and IR practices. Specifically, it has profiled the role of

a. International HRM committees that act as policy-making agents for the whole of the MNC.

b. HRM shared service centres offering services to the rest of the MNC.

c. Direct data reporting from the subsidiary to HQ on HRM matters.

d. Human resource information technology systems.

Among the theoretical contributions related to the role of international HRM structures, this work offers insights on the differential use of these structures across a suite of individual HRM and IR practices.

This thesis has profiled the impact of the entry mode and trajectory of new investments as subsidiary characteristics on the extent of local autonomy over IR practices.

This work offers a particular application of the theoretical framework being advanced to IR practices which are often overlooked in HRM studies, specifically to trade union engagement and employee consultation.

5.3.2. Empirical contribution

Previous studies on the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices draw from qualitative analysis, primarily from case studies (Marginson et al 1995; Ferner 1997; Ferner et al 2004; Almond et al 2005; Edwards et al 2008). Referring to the study of MNCs, Collinson and Rugman (2010) call attention to a considerable lack of representativeness within the samples employed in past contributions. As they put it: “in addition to the bias towards studying global and bi-regional firms we identify six other related types of case selection bias towards: US firms, large firms, manufacturing firms, firms that hold dominant positions in important industries, firms that have been in existence for a long time and firms with a strong, recognisable brand” (p. 442). This thesis constitutes an attempt to bring quantitative research methods more squarely into focus as a methodology of choice in
investigating this topic. Specifically, this work by any yardstick provides a substantial empirical contribution to this field by employing a sample of over 450 foreign-owned MNC subsidiaries in two distinct contexts. The findings provided by each of the four articles draw data from this representative database of foreign-owned subsidiaries. All MNCs in this sample were foreign-owned MNC subsidiaries operating in Ireland and Spain, with 500 or more employees world-wide and 100 or more in their host operation. This international database comprises data from the first representative survey on employment practices in MNCs in Ireland and Spain and therefore, the findings presented in each of the articles augment and inform previous debates within the international business literature by having been derived for this comprehensive comparative database. Apart from the fourth article which represents a purely theoretical contribution, the empirical contribution of each of the remaining articles may be summarised as follows:

i. **First article**: this article contains one of the first quantitative contributions on the extent of local autonomy over HRM in Spain. The paper uses a sample of 242 foreign-owned MNCs operating in Spain and provides the first published descriptive data and statistical analysis on this topic up to date in the Iberian country. Previous studies of local autonomy in Spain have been based mainly on a case study methodology (Quintanilla et al 2009).

ii. **Second article**: this work also has a significant empirical contribution offering a quantitative analysis through ordinal regressions of the determinants of the level of local autonomy over IR practices in Ireland and Spain. Employing a sample of 452 foreign-owned MNCs, we offer not only descriptive data on this topic but also a comprehensive analysis of how the use of modern international HRM structures seems to be detached from the transfer of IR practices from HQ to subsidiaries. Again, previous contributions on the level of local autonomy over IR practices have usually utilised a case study methodology (Gunnigle et al 2005; Gunnigle et al 2009).

iii. **Third article**: this article constitutes one of the first publications based on quantitative methods that analyses the preferred modes of integration of HRM, that is, the preferred use of international HRM structures to integrate the different HRM practices. Prominent scholars have called for the study of potential differences in the level of local autonomy over HRM practices such as compensation systems, performance appraisal systems, training and development, employee involvement or
IR (Ferner et al 2011; Smale et al 2013). This article empirically addresses this gap in the literature.

5.4. Limitations and future research avenues

There are a number of limitations that must be acknowledged in the overall research effort. Firstly, this thesis draws from data from a large scale survey that was completed by a single respondent. It is documented that this approach could lead to the so-called common method variance (CMV). CMV is described as the coinciding variability in key variables as a result of a single source bias (Podsakoff et al 2003). This potential limitation is unlikely to be problematic in this work due to the use of Likert-scaled variables across the key variables and particularly to the inclusion of a comprehensive number of variables that are not related to human perception such as the subsidiary characteristics and the existence of international HRM structures. The inclusion of variables unrelated to perceptions constitutes one of the main recommendations in the methodology/measurement literature in order to avoid problems with CMV (Chang et al 2010). In addition, this potential deficiency was addressed following the advice offered by Kochan et al (1986) to administer the survey to ‘key decision makers’. In this case, the respondent was the HR manager at subsidiary level in the majority of cases. This is also the approach taken by other studies to compensate for possible CMV issues, as in the case of Company Level Industrial Relations Survey (CLIRS – Marginson et al 1988; 1993), Work Employment Relations Survey (WERS – Bryson et al 2008) and CRANET (Lazarova et al 2008). Nonetheless, future research could be based on quantitative and qualitative data from different respondents from both subsidiaries and HQs.

Finally, some limitations arise in terms of how subsidiary characteristics were measured in this work. Despite the effort to consider subsidiary characteristics as an important determinant of the extent of local autonomy experienced in the unit, the measurement of these variables in our sample is not as comprehensive as other elements in the questionnaire. This is inherent in the argument of prominent scholars such as Marginson et al (2010) and Bechter et al (2012), who postulate that a deeper analysis of these variables, in particular, of the sector of operations would be a welcome addition in making methodological and empirical advances. They criticise the fact that for a long time ‘sector of operations’ has been measured though a binary question (services versus manufacturing). Hence, they propose the inclusion of a more complete classification of the sector of operations to provide researchers
with the scope to unearth, for instance, how the specific regulation of every sector impacts on employment matters. In this sense, some of the subsidiary characteristics such as the sector of operations and the size of the subsidiary could have been measured differently. Future research is needed here, not only in relation to the extent of local autonomy over HRM and IR practices and the best approach to its measurement and explication, but also in relation to broader debates in the HRM, IR and IB literature and how they may be most satisfactorily unearthed.

5.5. Personal learning and development

Pursuing a Ph.D. programme provides the candidate with the opportunity to develop professionally as well as personally. However, the journey is often unique for each candidate. In these final paragraphs I will illustrate briefly what this journey has entailed in my particular case. In order to give a structure to this section I will explain my personal and academic development in two distinct respects: development as a result of undertaking a Ph.D. by publications and development through the Ph.D. journey in general.

As a result of completing my Ph.D. ‘by articles’, I had the opportunity to gain experience through a process which, although becoming more popular, entails particular challenges. Taking this route involved a new approach to developing and completing the dissertation. Once the focus of my dissertation was decided upon and agreed with my supervisors, I needed to determine how many articles I would craft and submit for publication in order to fulfil the university requirements. In the University of Limerick, the Ph.D. candidate is expected to publish between three and five articles. After considering this carefully, I came to a joint agreement with my supervisors to develop four articles, each addressing different aspects of my research focus.

The process of completing the Ph.D. by publications is relatively new at the University of Limerick and indeed in many other institutions. However, I was in the fortunate position to be able to draw upon the experience of one lecturer in the faculty of the Department of Personnel and Employment Relations who himself had taken this route to completing his PhD some years previously and which I found extremely useful. In addition and no less relevant, both my two supervisors have had previous experience of supervising Ph.D.s by articles and this provided me with greater security when facing the unknown and the
uncertainty of embarking on this approach to completing the overall programme of research. They also provided me with documentation as well as constant access to their own experience.

I would like to deal now with the main disadvantages and advantages of pursuing a Ph.D. by articles. The main disadvantage is that the possibility of planning in a conventional fashion is limited. What I mean by this is that the Ph.D. by articles does not follow the same chronological time frame as that of a Ph.D. by monograph route within which the candidate is able to plan the writing of the literature review, methodology, fieldwork phase, writing up of results and conclusions in a reasonably sequential manner. The Ph.D. by articles’ route requires planning on an article-by-article basis, so that the planning comprises a number of shorter projects instead of an entire large project. At times, some of these projects were progressing simultaneously. Once I developed and submitted my first article, I faced the publication process for the first time and thereafter, I was able to start developing the second paper. This illustrates that in spite of its main disadvantage, the Ph.D. by publications offered me the opportunity to get to know the publication process from beginning to end. After going through ‘revise and re-submits’, ‘accepts’ and even one ‘rejection’ I can now say that I have gained substantial expertise and experience regarding publication of academic papers and greater than that of Ph.D. candidates who follow the traditional monograph route. I genuinely would recommend this route to anybody who wants to develop and build an academic career despite the inherent challenges relating to the timing and planning limitations and at times the possible discouragement caused by the amount of time required to improve the articles.

Finally, the decision around the election of four potentially suitable journals for the articles was a very important part of the process and this took time, thought and careful consideration. The fact that my two supervisors have extensive experience of publishing and dealing with a broad number of international journals made this challenge somewhat easier. Originally, we submitted the first article to a prestigious journal in the US and it was rejected. Along with the rejection, we got a good deal of comments on how to improve the manuscript. For the next three months, I tried to address these comments with the ongoing help of my supervisors. Finally, I submitted the article to a different journal. The decision-making process regarding the first article provided me with a ‘good system’ in my subsequent efforts
to find the most suitable journals for the remaining articles. This ‘system’ consisted of targeting prestigious journals from which in the worst case scenario we could draw invaluable feedback. These experiences illustrate how the Ph.D. candidate gets to know the publication process in all its stages and guises.

In relation to my learning and development through the Ph.D. journey in general, I had the opportunity to gain a number of skills and competencies that now form an important part of my overall academic armoury:

- **Conceptual development**: Especially at the beginning, a critical part of my Ph.D. studies lay in the identification of a suitable theoretical framework for the overall research programme. This phase not only entailed the development of the research aims, research questions and literature review, but the elaboration of a conceptual framework that could serve as a platform around which to unify the four articles. Once the deficiencies of previous contributions on the topic under investigation were identified and the research aims were outlined, they were ready to be addressed through the articles.

- **Methodological skills portfolio**: prior to my Ph.D. I had worked as a research assistant at a Spanish institution, which allowed me to undertake the fieldwork and data preparation of the Spanish node of the INTREPID project. As a result I had previous extensive experience in a number of methodological aspects such as the construction of the population, research instrument design, administering face-to-face interviews, data cleaning and data analysis. With this background, along with the challenges inherent in securing the publication of the four articles, I learnt two different analytical techniques that are employed in the articles: structural equation modelling and ordinal regressions. The statistical software packages used in this thesis are SPSS and AMOS for structural equation modelling. In some cases, programming in SPSS language was needed and this gave me the possibility to develop certain abilities in this regard. Through statistical courses and workshops at the University of Limerick and a degree of self instruction I was able to develop proficiency in these two methods of analysis.

- **Teamwork skills**: Ph.D.’s studies are often seen as a lonely journey in which students work mostly on their own. This has not been my experience. My two supervisors
have met me very regularly over these years of my Ph.D. and despite the fact that I do work independently with ease they have been following my advances very closely. The ‘Ph.D. by articles’ route along with having two supervisors has offered me the opportunity to develop the teamwork skills needed for my future academic career. In addition, the fact that I was the leading author of most of the papers has provided me with organisational skills as well as the expertise to take responsibility for leading and shaping the work.

- **Developing research networks:** I have a deep interest in comparative research and through my Ph.D. I have developed a number of research networks that has provided me with significant scope to engage in international collaborations. Among them, I would like to emphasise my involvement in INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International Database) project; Work, Knowledge and Employment Research Theme, Kemmy Business School (University of Limerick, Ireland) and a longstanding collaborative relationship with IRCO (International Research Centre on Organisations), IESE Business School (University of Navarre, Spain).

- **Publishing skills and knowledge:** following the ‘Ph.D. by publications’ system the work developed as part of this thesis has been published in peer-reviewed/indexed journals such as the *Human Resource Management Journal*, the *European Journal of Industrial Relations* or *Personnel Review*. This process has resulted in the acquisition of core skills related to the publication process such as patience in terms of time frames, how to deal with the editors of the journals and the necessary cordiality and clarity required in communicating with them. This is most apparent in relation to satisfactorily engaging with and responding to the comments made by the referees that typically demand a point-by-point reply.

- **Academic job applications:** over the past year or so I have applied for a small number of different job vacancies in academia. This experience and related process has helped hone my presentation skills and indeed advance my understanding of academia, particularly the research dimension thereof. I was shortlisted for the first role I applied for which was a lectureship in Management. The interview and evaluation process took place in the host University over the course of two days. On day one I was asked to give a presentation on one of my published academic papers to a group comprising the interview panel and other academics in the relevant
department. My presentation was followed by a question and answer session and a general discussion on the nature and contribution of my work. Some of the questions were quite searching and difficult to answer. However, this challenge proved greatly beneficial as it built my confidence in explaining and sometimes defending my work. I also found this helped me in subsequent presentations and I believe I have been incrementally improving my delivery and ability to deal with queries regarding my research. During this process I also talked to a number of early career academics in Ireland who were extremely helpful in sharing their own experiences. My supervisors’ experience on this was also very valuable, particularly in regard to course outlines and content for teaching. Later last year I applied for another academic post (Lectureship in HRM) and the interviews took place in November. On this occasion, my Ph.D. was more advanced and – as indicated above – I had garnered greater experience in presenting my work and partaking in academic discourse, more broadly. In this instance, the university involved asked me to present on my current and future research. I used this as an opportunity to describe my work and to also focus on explaining my research networks and the potential for future collaborative work which was apparently well received. This issue was also raised by the panel at the subsequent interview and I genuinely think it proved to be a crucial aspect of the interview as it not only indicated my ability to write high quality research papers but – more significantly I feel – demonstrated my potential to carry out future research activities and, in so doing, to broaden the research networks of the university. Thankfully, I was offered the post which I hope to take up later this year. Navigating the academic recruitment process has offered me the opportunity to sharpen presentation and interviewing skills as well as a substantial deal of confidence in my own work.

5.6. Conclusions

This last chapter revisited the aim and research objectives of the present thesis. In so doing, it outlined how the four articles have addressed the three research objectives and the manner in which they have been articulated. Thereafter, this chapter described the contributions made through this work under two different headings: (i) conceptual contributions and (ii) empirical and methodological contributions. The limitations of this project and future research avenues were presented in the second part of this chapter. Finally, the author
illustrated the personal learning and development acquired through the process of a Ph.D. by articles and through the doctoral programme in general, including conceptual development, methodological skill portfolio, teamwork skills, developing research networks, publishing skills and knowledge and interviewing skills and process.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: IRISH QUESTIONNAIRE

SURVEY OF HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

OVERSEAS-OWNED FIRMS

ID number □ □ □

Interviewer’s Name ____________________ Interviewer’s Number ____________________

Date of Interview: Day ____________      Month____________ Time Began (24 hour clock): ____:

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

READ OUT: Please note that when the terms ‘Ireland’ or ‘Irish’ are used, this refers to the Republic of Ireland only (excluding Northern Ireland).

A1. What is the name of the Irish company or operations that you work for?

__________________________________________________________

A2. What is the name of the ultimate controlling company?

__________________________________________________________

A3. In which country is the operational head quarters of your ultimate controlling company located?

__________________________________________________________

INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF THE ANSWER IS ANY OF THE NATIONALITIES ON LIST A BELOW, OR SEEMS TO BE THE COUNTRY OF REGISTRATION RATHER THAN ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP, PLEASE PROMPT FOR THE ‘OPERATIONAL HQ’ RATHER THAN THE REGISTERED OFFICE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caymans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guernsey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Antilles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A4. How many sites does [COMPANY NAME] have in Ireland?

INTERVIEWER NOTE IF NECESSARY: A site is where two or more staff are based permanently.

1 site only............. □ 1  ⇒ Go to INTERVIEWER NOTE, below
2-5 sites................. □ 2  ⇒ Go to A5a
6 or more sites .... □ 3  ⇒ Go to A5a

A5a. Are you able to answer questions relating to HR issues in?

All Irish operations ........................................... □ 1  ⇒ Go to INTERVIEWER NOTE, below
A part or division only ..................................... □ 2  ⇒ Go to A5b

A5b. By what name would you like to refer to this operating unit or division?

__________________________________________________________
A6. What is your job title? [Tick One Only. Do Not Read Out]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>HR/Personnel Director</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HR/Personnel Senior Manager/Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HR/Personnel Senior Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>HR/Personnel Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>HR/Personnel Executive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>HR/Personnel Assistant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A7. How long have you worked for the [NAME] in Ireland? ___________________________

A8. What is the total number of employees worldwide by headcount of the ultimate controlling company of which you are part?

__________ (number of employees worldwide)

[If respondent is having difficulties – Use Showcard 1 and tick one box below.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>100 – 499 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>500 – 999 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,000 – 4,999 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,000 – 29,999 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30,000 – 59,999 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>60,000+ employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A9a. Approximately how many employees by headcount does the ultimate controlling company have in the Republic of Ireland?

__________ (number of employees in Ireland)

[If respondent is having difficulties – Use Showcard 2 and tick one box below.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Employees (Ireland)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Up to 99 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>100 – 499 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>500 – 999 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,000 – 4,999 employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,000+ employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A9b. Approximately what percentage of employees in [NAME] in Ireland are .... ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A9c. Please estimate the approximate number of employees in [NAME] in Ireland in each of the following core functions. [If none, please mark 0 – Do Not Leave Blank]
A10. In which of the following sector(s) is the Irish company engaged?

[USE SHOWCARD 3: READ OUT: PLEASE STATE ALL THAT APPLY]

- Manufacturing – food & beverages, non-metallic minerals, paper, publishing and printing, clothing & footwear
- Manufacturing – engineering, computer, electrical & medical equipment
- Manufacturing – chemical & pharmaceuticals
- Services: financial & business
- Services: information & communication technology
- Construction
- Retail & wholesale
- Transport & utilities
- Other

A11a. When did the worldwide company first establish in Ireland? I want you to think of the first significant investment in the Republic of Ireland – ignoring minor sales presence.

[IF RESPONDENT IS UNSURE SEEK APPROXIMATE ANSWER]

______________ (year)  Don’t Know

A11b. Was this through…?

- A Greenfield investment
- A merger or acquisition
- Other (please specify)

A12a. Do any of the following levels or divisions of business organisation exist in your worldwide company? [READ OUT: Please state all that apply]

1. International product, service or brand based divisions
2. Regions (e.g. Europe or Asia-Pacific)
3. Global business functions (e.g. manufacturing, R&D, sales)
4. National subsidiary companies
5. Other (please specify)
6. None of the above
7. Don’t know

A12b. Is one of these levels or divisions more important than the others within your worldwide company? Please think about the level or division, which is most influential within your worldwide company’s organisational structure.

Yes  \( \square \)  \( \Rightarrow \) Go to A12c  No  \( \square \)  \( \Rightarrow \) Go to A12d  Don’t Know  \( \square \)  \( \Rightarrow \) Go to A12d

A12c. Which level or division is more important?
A12d. Do any of these levels or divisions have their HQ in Ireland?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>NA-division does not exist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION B: WORKFORCE COMPOSITION

Much of the rest of this interview focuses on your policy and practice in relation to three groups of staff. The three groups are on the card. [INTERVIEWER SHOW RESPONDENT SHOWCARD 5]

**USE SHOWCARD 5**

1. **Managers** - employees who primarily manage the organisation, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organisation and whose main tasks consist of the direction and coordination of the functioning of the organisation. In other words managers refer to those above the level of first-line supervision.

2. **The LOG** (largest occupational group) – the largest non-managerial occupational group among the employees in the ‘headcount’ in Ireland. For example, in a manufacturing business it might be semi-skilled operators, and in an insurance company it might be call centre staff.

3. **The Key Group** – those employees whom you might identify as critical to your firm’s organisational learning and core competence. These might be research staff, product designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, etc. We do not want you to think of a sub group of management.

Please note that not all of your staff will fit into one of these three groups and there may be some staff that can be categorised as both part of the LOG and Key Group.

Firstly I want to ask you about managers

**B1.** Approximately how many managers are there in the [NAME] in Ireland?

______________________________ (number of managers in Ireland)

[IF RESPONDENT IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES – USE SHOWCARD 6 AND TICK ONE BOX BELOW]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – 9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 99</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 – 199</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 – 249</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 – 299</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 – 399</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 – 499</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LOGIC CHECK:** FIGURE ENTERED MUST NOT EXCEED TOTAL NUMBER OF IRISH EMPLOYEES (AT A9A)

**B2.** The second group is your largest non-managerial occupational group among the employees in the ‘headcount’ in [NAME] in Ireland, which we refer to as the LOG.

What is the name of the LOG in [NAME] in Ireland?

______________________________
B3. What do the [LOG NAME] do? Please describe the type of work done in as much detail as possible.

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

B4. How many [LOG NAME] are there in [NAME] in Ireland?

__________________________ (number of LOG in Ireland)

[IF RESPONDENT IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES – USE SHOWCARD 7 AND TICK ONE BOX BELOW]

0 .......................... □ 1
1 – 9 ........................ □ 2
10 – 24 ...................... □ 3
25 – 49 ...................... □ 4
50 – 99 ...................... □ 5
100 – 249 ................... □ 6
250 – 499 ................... □ 7
500 – 749 ................... □ 8
750 – 999 ................... □ 9
1,000 – 2,999 .............. □ 10
3,000 – 4,999 .............. □ 11
5,000+ ....................... □ 12
Don’t Know .................. □ 12

LOGIC CHECK: FIGURE ENTERED MUST NOT EXCEED TOTAL NUMBER OF IRISH EMPLOYEES (AT A9A)

IF RESPONDENT HAS ALREADY STATED THAT THEY DO NOT RECOGNISE A KEY GROUP (THIS MIGHT HAPPEN WHEN SHOWN SHOWCARD 5), TICK 3 AT B5A, THEN MOVE TO C1]

B5a. The third group is the Key Group, which consists of those whom you might identify as critical to your company’s core competence. These might be research staff, product designers, major account handlers or developers of new markets. We do not want you to think of a sub-group of management.

Would you say that the company recognises any such specific group in the [NAME] in Ireland?

Yes – one specific group.............. □ 1 ⇒ B6
Yes – more than one group........... □ 2 ⇒ B5b
No........................................ □ 3 ⇒ C1
Don’t Know................. □ 4 ⇒ C1

B5b. Please focus on the group that is most unique in that they possess skills and capabilities that are difficult to obtain on the labour market. If it is not easy to distinguish between groups on this basis, please think about the largest group.

Can I check whether you are thinking about the group that is....?

Most unique group in terms of skills and capabilities.......................... □ 1
Largest group................................................. □ 2
Both................................................................. □ 3

B6. By what name is this group known?

____________________________________________________________________________
[INTERVIEWER: IF DON'T KNOW WHAT THE KEY GROUP IS CALLED PLEASE REFER TO AS 'KEY GROUP']

B7. Roughly how many employees are in this group across [NAME] in Ireland?

[IF RESPONDENT IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES – USE SHOWCARD 8 AND TICK ONE BOX BELOW]

0...........................................[ ]
1 – 9 ........................................[ ]
10 – 24 .....................................[ ]
25 – 49 ....................................[ ]
50 – 99 ....................................[ ]
100 – 249 .................................[ ]
250 – 499 .................................[ ]
500 – 749 .................................[ ]
750 – 999 .................................[ ]
1,000 – 2,999 ............................[ ]
3,000 – 4,999 ............................[ ]
5,000+ ....................................[ ]
Don't Know ................................[ ]

LOGIC CHECK: FIGURE ENTERED MUST NOT EXCEED TOTAL NUMBER OF IRISH EMPLOYEES (AT A9A)

SECTION C. THE HR FUNCTION

C1. Is the HR function for the [NAME] in Ireland separate from higher-level HR functions (e.g. regional or global HR), or integrated with higher-level HR functions?

Separate ........[ ]
Integrated ...[ ]
Partially integrated ......[ ]
Don’t Know ........[ ]

C2. How many managers, including you, spend the majority of their time on HR matters in [NAME] in Ireland?

______________(number) Don’t know ........[ ]

C3a. On which, if any, of the following issues is information on [NAME] in Ireland monitored by management outside of Ireland?

[READ OUT: Please state all that apply – USE SHOWCARD 9, TICK ALL THAT APPLY]

Managerial pay packages .................................................................[ ]
Management career progression ....................................................[ ]
Overall labour costs ......................................................................[ ]
Numbers employed (headcount) ....................................................[ ]
Staff turnover ...............................................................................[ ]
Absenteeism ..............................................................................[ ]
Labour productivity .....................................................................[ ]
Workforce composition by diversity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, disability etc.)[ ]
Employee attitude and satisfaction ..............................................[ ]
Other (please specify) ..................................................................[ ]
Don’t know ..................................................................................[ ]

C3b. Does the worldwide company utilise a HR Information System (such as PeopleSoft or SAP HR) that holds data relating to the firms international workforce?

Yes .................[ ]
No ......................[ ]
Don’t Know .........[ ]

C4a. Is there a body within the worldwide company, such as a committee of senior managers, that develops HR policies that apply across countries?

Yes.................[ ] Go to C4b
No......................[ ] Go to C5
Don’t Know ........[ ] Go to C5

C4b. Is there someone from Ireland on this body/committee?
C5. How frequently does contact between HR managers in different countries take place through any of the following mechanisms: [READ OUT SHOWCARD 10 – CODE ONLY ONE FOR EACH MECHANISM]  

Weekly  Monthly  Quarterly  Annually  Other  Ad hoc

Never  Don’t  Know
Regular meetings .................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
International Conferences ...................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Task Forces .......................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Virtual Groups e.g. conference calls ............................ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

C6. In [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland to what extent are any activities in each of the following HR areas outsourced to third party suppliers (such as consultants or trainers)? [READ OUT SHOWCARD 11. TICK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE]  

Are these HR areas outsourced...?  Not at all  A little  Somewhat  Quite a lot  Extensively  Don’t Know
Pay and performance management ................................ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Training, development and organisational learning ............... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Employee involvement and communication ....................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Employee representation and consultation ........................ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Staffing and workforce planning ................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

C7a. Does the HR function in Ireland make use of ‘shared services’ centres? By shared services we mean the provision of common HR services (e.g. payroll and recruitment) for a range of operating units or divisions.

Yes........ 1  ⇒ ASK C7b  No........ 2  ⇒ Go to C8a  Don’t Know........ 8  ⇒ Go to C8a

C7b. Do these centres service ... ? [TICK ONE BOX ONLY]

The Irish operations only .............................................. 1
The Irish operations and other countries within the region ........ 2
The worldwide company ............................................. 3
Don’t Know .................................................................. 9

C8a. How many of the top five management positions in [NAME] in Ireland are filled by individuals who previously worked for the company in [COUNTRY AT A3]?

1...... 1 2...... 2 3...... 3 4...... 4 5...... 5 None...... 6  Don’t Know.... 9

C8b. How many of the top five management positions in Ireland are filled by individuals from other parts of the world-wide company (i.e. outside of Ireland but not from the country of origin – these are sometimes known as ‘third country nationals’)?

1...... 1 2...... 2 3...... 3 4...... 4 5...... 5 None...... 6  Don’t Know.... 9

C9a. I would now like you to think about your company’s approach concerning its management of employees. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements. [READ OUT SHOWCARD 12. TICK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE]  

Strongly  Disagree  Neither  Agree  Strongly  N/A  Don’t  disagree

There is a worldwide approach covering all global operations ........................................ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
There is a regional approach covering all European operations ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
The development of a specific approach is left to international product, service or brand based divisions ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
The development of a specific approach is left to national operating companies ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
The approach is really a mix of the traditions of the different national operating companies ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
Traditions in the country of origin have an overriding influence on the approach to the management of employees ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9

C9b. What is the overall influence of each of the following levels on HR policy in [NAME] in Ireland?

[Read out showcard 13 – mark only one number per item]  

Overall Influence of ....

No Influence  Slight influence  Moderate influence  Strong influence  Very strong influence  N/A  Don't Know

a) Corporate headquarters ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
b) The regional headquarters (e.g. Europe or EMEA) ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
c) The headquarters of the international product or service based divisions ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9

[ONLY ASK ITEMS D & E IF MORE THAN ONE SITE (CODE 2 OR 3 AT A4)]
d) The Irish head office or subsidiary ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9
e) Individual sites of your Irish operations ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9

C9c. Over the last three years, to what extent has the discretion of your Irish operations in setting HR policy relative to higher levels of your worldwide company increased or decreased in the following HR areas?

[Read out showcard 14 – mark only one number per item]  

Discretion in key HR areas

Significantly Decreased  No  Increased  Significantly Don't

N/A  Decreased  Change  Increased  Know

Pay and performance management ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7
Training, development & organisational learning ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7
Employee involvement and communication ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7
Employee representation and consultation ................................................................. 1          2          3          4          5          6          7

C10. Are there any Irish nationals on the main board of the ultimate controlling company?

Yes........ 1   ⇒ How many? ____________   No........ 2   Don't Know........ 0

SECTION D. PAY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

D1. Thinking of policy in [NAME] in Ireland as a whole on pay levels in relation to market comparators, do [NAME] in Ireland aim to be...?

[Read out showcard 15 – code only one for each category]  

[Read out: Please include formal and informal policy]  

[Read if necessary: The median/midpoint is the middle value or 50th percentile i.e. if ‘the median’ is selected, the aim is to have pay levels at the centre/middle point in relation to market comparators.]

In the  In the  At the  Below the  N/A  Don't
Do [Name] aim to be …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For [LOG Name]</th>
<th>top quartile</th>
<th>second quartile</th>
<th>median/ midpoint</th>
<th>median/ midpoint</th>
<th>Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For [Key Group Name]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For managers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**D2a. Is there a system of regular formal appraisal for each of the following groups of employees in [NAME] in Ireland?**

[Interviewer: if multi-site and situation varies across sites, answer for largest site. Where practice varies within a group, please answer for the largest number of employees in the group. Code only one for each group]

- For [LOG Name] 
- For managers 
  - IF NEITHER STAFF GROUP IS CODED ‘YES’ => Go to D5
  - IF ONLY ONE CODED ‘YES’ => Go to D3
  - IF BOTH STAFF GROUPS ARE CODED ‘YES’ => Go to D2b

**D2b. Are the different staff groups covered by…?**

- A single integrated appraisal scheme …………………… Yes … No … Don’t Know
- Different appraisal schemes for different groups … …………
- Don’t Know …………………………………………..

**D3. Is a ‘forced distribution’ applied to the results of appraisals for the following employee groups in [NAME] in Ireland?**

[If necessary read out: “By forced distribution we mean a certain % of employees have to be in a particular performance category or rating, e.g. 10% are poor performers, 70% are reasonable performers, and 20% are top performers. The US MNC General Electric (GE) would be an example. Code one response for each group]  

- For [LOG Name]    Yes … No … Don’t Know
- For managers      Yes … No … Don’t Know

**D4. Is a formal system of periodic ‘upward’, ‘peer’ or ‘360-degree’ feedback used in evaluating performance of any of these groups of employees in [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland?**

[Code one for each group]

- For [LOG Name]    Yes … No … Don’t Know
- For managers      Yes … No … Don’t Know

**ASK ALL**

**D5. Does [NAME] in Ireland offer the following to any employees in each of these groups?**

**USE SHOWCARD 16**

1. **Approved employee share ownership scheme** is where the organisation establishes a trust which acquires shares on behalf of employees and provides employees with part ownership of the company.
2. **Profit sharing** refers to rewards given to employees in addition to normal salary and bonuses which are dependent on the levels of profit in the business.
3. **Share options** is where employees are given the option of buying company shares, often at a reduced rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee share ownership</th>
<th>Profit Sharing</th>
<th>Share Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For [LOG Name]</td>
<td>1   2   9</td>
<td>1   2   9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For [Key Group Name]</td>
<td>1   2   9</td>
<td>1   2   9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For managers</td>
<td>1   2   9</td>
<td>1   2   9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D6. Is there variable pay for the following groups in [NAME] in Ireland?

[IF NECESSARY READ OUT: “By variable pay we mean merit pay, performance related pay, performance related bonuses or payment by results”. INTERVIEWER NOTE: WHERE PRACTICE VARIES WITHIN A GROUP, PLEASE ANSWER FOR THE LARGEST NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE GROUP.]

[CODE ONE FOR EACH GROUP]

For [LOG Name] Yes ....1  No ....2  Don’t Know ....9

For [Key Group Name] Yes ....1  No ....2  Don’t Know ....9

For managers Yes ....1  No ....2  Don’t Know ....9

D7. To what extent do [NAME] in Ireland have discretion over the determination of the following aspects of pay and performance policy?

[USE SHOWCARD 17 – CODE ONE ONLY FOR EACH CATEGORY. INTERVIEWER NOTE IF NECESSARY: Where situation varies across sites or business units within Ireland, please answer for the largest site.]

Aspect of pay and performance policy Use codes 1-6 from N/A Don’t Know Showcard 17

a) Relating pay levels in [NAME] in Ireland to market comparators (e.g. aiming to be in top quartile) ________ □ 8 □ 9

[ONLY ASK: OPTION B) IF CODED ‘employee share ownership scheme’ (ESO) at d5; Otherwise Use code 8 (NA)

b) Employee share ownership schemes in [NAME] in Ireland ________ □ 8 □ 9

[ONLY ASK: OPTION C) IF CODED YES AT D2A (PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL) FOR GROUPS TICKED, OTHERWISE USE CODE 8 (NA)

c) Performance appraisal system: For managers ________ □ 8 □ 9

For [LOG Name] ________ □ 8 □ 9

[ONLY ASK: OPTION D) IF CODED YES AT D6 (VARIABLE PAY) FOR WHICHEVER GROUPS TICKED, OTHERWISE USE CODE 8 (NA)

d) Variable payments scheme: For managers ________ □ 8 □ 9

For [LOG Name] ________ □ 8 □ 9

SECTION E. EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AND CONSULTATION

[INTERVIEWER: CHECK NUMBER OF SITES IN IRELAND, AT A4, AND MAKE SURE ANSWERS BELOW ARE CONSISTENT]

E1a. In Ireland, are trade unions recognised for the purposes of collective employee representation at...? [READ OUT – AND CODE ONE ONLY]

No sites ....1  Some sites ....2  Most sites ....3  All sites ...........4

The company’s single Irish site .............5  Don’t Know .....9

[IF TRADE UNIONS RECOGNISED (CODED 2, 3, 4 OR 5 AT E1A) CONTINUE, OTHERWISE GO TO E2A]

E1b. How many trade unions are recognised for the purposes of collective employee representation in Ireland?

___________________ Don’t Know ........0

USE SHOWCARD 18, IF DIFFICULTY
[If Respondent is having difficulties – use showcard 18 and tick one box below]

One ...... 1  Two ....... 2  Three or more .............. 3  Don’t Know .... 9

E1c. What proportion of the total number of employees in [NAME] in Ireland are members of a trade union?

___________________ %  Don’t Know .... 999

[If Respondent is having difficulties – use showcard 19]

0% ................ 1  1 – 10%......... 2  11 – 25% ........ 3  26 – 50% .... 4
51 – 75% .... 5  76 – 100%.. 6  Don’t Know .... 9

ASK ALL

E2a. Are there any non-union based structure(s) of collective employee representation used?
[If necessary read out: An example of collective employee representation is a company council or works committee]

No .... 1  Yes at some sites.... 2  Yes, most sites .... 3  Yes, all sites ....... 4
Yes, at the company’s single Irish site ........ 5  Don’t Know........ 9

[Only ask E2b if Non-Union Representation (code 2, 3, 4 or 5 at E2a). Otherwise, go to E3]

E2b. Have any of these structures been established within the past 3 years?
[If company in Ireland less than 3 years (see A11a) put in appropriate figure above]

Yes ........... 1  No ........... 2  Don’t Know .... 9

[Only ask E3 if Trade Union recognised (coded 2, 3, 4 or 5 at E1a); otherwise go to E4a]

E3. Thinking about any new sites, which have been established in Ireland in the previous 5 years, have trade unions been recognised for the purposes of collective representation?
[Read out: ‘New sites’ does not refer to any sites gained through acquisitions. New sites are often referred to as “Greenfield” sites.]

1  Yes at each new site ..................... 1
2  Yes, at most new sites .................. 2
3  Yes, at some new sites .................. 3
4  No, at no new sites .................. 4
5  No new sites opened .................. 5
6  Don’t know............................... 9

[Only ask E4a if more than one site in Ireland - coded 2 or 3 at A4. Otherwise go to E5]

E4a. Has the worldwide company acquired any sites in Ireland over the previous 5 years?

Yes ...... 1  ⇒ How many? ________  No .... 2  ⇒ Go to E5a  Don’t Know .... 9  ⇒ Go to E5a
[Depending on the figure given at E4a ask either E4b or E4bb]

E4b. [If One site acquired] Was the acquired site unionised?

Yes .......... 1  No ........... 2  Don’t Know .... 9

E4bb. [If More than one site acquired] How many of the acquired sites were unionised?

__________  None........ 9  Don’t Know....... 9
E4c. Since the acquisition(s) has/have there been any changes in trade union recognition for the purpose of collective representation?

[TICK ALL THAT APPLY]
1. No changes..............................................................
2. New trade union recognition at 1 or more sites..........................
3. Trade union recognition withdrawn at one or more sites..............
4. Don’t know................................................................

E5a. IF TRADE UNION RECOGNISED (2, 3, 4 OR 5 IS CODED AT E1A) AND IF SOME EMPLOYEES UNIONISED (>0% IS CODED AT E1C). ⇒ Go to E5b. OTHERWISE ⇒ Go to E8a.

E5b. Approximately what percentage of the [LOG NAME] in [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland are covered by collective bargaining arrangements?

___________________%  Don’t Know..............

[IF RESPONDENT IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES – USE SHOWCARD 20 AND TICK ONE BOX BELOW]
0% ............. 1 – 10%....... 11 – 25% ........ 26 – 50% ....... 51 – 75% .... 76 – 100%.. Don’t Know......

E6. Thinking about trade unions in the [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland, what approach do the trade union representatives generally adopt?

[CODE ONE ONLY]
1. A cooperative approach..............................................
2. An adversarial approach............................................
3. It depends on the issue..............................................
4. Don’t Know................................................................

E7a. This card [SHOWCARD 21] shows agreements/procedures that may be used for the determination of pay increases. Which agreements / procedures are used in [NAME] in Ireland for … ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use Showcard 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National level collective bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry level collective bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Company/division, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Establishment / site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other (Please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Determination of pay increases
... For managers
... For [LOG Name]

N/A Don’t Know

[If Other, please specify ________________________________]

IF NATIONAL LEVEL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (CODE 1 AT E7A) FOR EITHER GROUP (LOG/MANAGER) ⇒ Go to E7b
OTHERWISE ⇒ Go to E9

E7b. Where national level collective bargaining agreements are used, has this company generally…?

[TICK ONE BOX IN EACH COLUMN. IF 1 IS NOT CODED AT E7A FOR THE GROUP, TICK ‘NA’]
3) Employee Consultation

2) Extent of union involvement in decision making

1) Trade union recognition

Discretion of operating companies outside Ireland may be an international business headquarters or a European headquarters based in Ireland...

E10. To what extent do [NAME] in Ireland have discretion over the determination of the following elements of policy?

[USE SHOWCARD 23 – CODE ONE ONLY FOR EACH CATEGORY. READ OUT: In some cases the higher level may be an international business headquarters or a European headquarters based in Ireland.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discretion of operating companies outside Ireland</th>
<th>Use codes 1-6 from Showcard 23</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Trade union recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Extent of union involvement in decision-making</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Employee Consultation</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[ONLY ASK ITEM 2 IF UNION RECOGNISED (CODED 2, 3, 4 OR 5 AT E1A)]
E.11 Thinking of the area of information and consultation, which of the following statements best describes the overall nature of the management approach in [NAME] in Ireland?

[TICK ONE BOX ONLY]

1. Management provides minimal information required for compliance, there is little or no dialogue with employee representatives over issues; and no impact on decision outcomes.
2. Management provides information slightly beyond that required for compliance.
3. Management provides information somewhat beyond that required for compliance; there is a substantive dialogue with employee representatives on a limited range of issues; and a limited impact on decision outcomes.
4. Management provides information considerably beyond that required for compliance.
5. Management provides information far beyond that required for compliance; there is substantive dialogue with employee representatives over a wide range of issues; and an extensive impact on decision outcomes.
6. Don’t Know.

E12. Over the past 3 years, has the EU Directive on Information and Consultation prompted any changes in arrangements for employee consultation in Ireland?

Yes ...........[ ]  No ............[ ]  Don’t Know ......[ ]

E13. Is there a European Works Council (EWC) or similar European-level structure which covers [NAME] in Ireland?

Yes ......[ ]  ⇒ Go to E15  No ......[ ]  ⇒ Go to E14  Don’t Know  ......[ ]  ⇒ Go to E14

E14. Do you anticipate a European Works Council being established in the future?

1. Yes – in the next two years ..........[ ]  ⇒ Go to Section F
2. Yes – in more than two years ..........[ ]  ⇒ Go to Section F
3. No........................................[ ]  ⇒ Go to Section F
4. Don’t Know................................[ ]  ⇒ Go to Section F

[ONLY ASK E15 IF ‘YES’ (CODE 1) AT E13]

E15. Which of the following statements best describes the overall nature of the European Works Council in [NAME] in Ireland?

1. Management provides minimal information required for compliance, there is little or no dialogue with employee representatives over issues; and no impact on decision outcomes.
2. Management provides information slightly beyond that required for compliance.
3. Management provides information somewhat beyond that required for compliance; there is a substantive dialogue with employee representatives on a limited range of issues; and a limited impact on decision outcomes.
4. Management provides information considerably beyond that required for compliance.
5 Management provides information far beyond that required for compliance; there is substantive dialogue with employee representatives over a wide range of issues; and an extensive impact on decision outcomes ................................................................. □ 5
6 Don’t Know ................................................................. □ 9

F. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND COMMUNICATION

I would now like to ask about policies on employee involvement and communication, starting with the involvement of employees in the work process.

F1. Could you tell me whether you use the following practices in relation to the [LOG NAME] in [NAME] in Ireland?
[USE SHOWCARD 26 – CODE ONE ONLY FOR EACH CATEGORY]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement mechanisms</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formally designated teams in which employees have responsibility for organising their work and carrying out a set of tasks</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td>□ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups where employees discuss issues of quality, production or service delivery such as problem-solving or continuous improvement groups</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td>□ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other practices designed to involve employees directly in work process (Please specify)</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td>□ 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[ONLY ASK F2 IF MULTIPLE SITES IN IRELAND (2 OR 3 IS CODED AT A4); OTHERWISE GO TO F4]

F2. Which of the following most closely corresponds to the pattern of employee involvement in [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland? [CODE ONE ONLY]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of employee involvement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An identical or similar pattern exists across all or most sites</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All or most sites have involvement systems, but they differ from site to site</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some sites have involvement systems while others do not</td>
<td>□ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable (1 site only in Ireland)</td>
<td>□ 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>□ 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F3. Does the [COMPANY NAME] regularly use project teams or task forces, embracing employees other than managers, that function across more than one operating unit in Ireland?

Yes .......... □ 1 | No .......... □ 2 | NA .......... □ 8 | Don’t Know .... □ 9

F4. Do project teams or task forces, embracing employees other than managers that function across more than one operating unit, operate elsewhere in the worldwide company?

Yes .......... □ 1 | No .......... □ 2 | NA .......... □ 8 | Don’t Know □ 9

F5a. Which of the following communication mechanisms are regularly used for the [LOG NAME] within [NAME] in Ireland?
[READ OUT SHOWCARD 27 – CODE ONE FOR EACH CATEGORY]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication mechanisms</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meetings between senior managers and the whole of the work force</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td>□ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings between line managers or supervisors and employees (sometimes called briefing groups)</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td>□ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude or opinion surveys</td>
<td>□ 1</td>
<td>□ 2</td>
<td>□ 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Suggestion schemes ................................................................. □ 1 □ 2 □ 3
5. Systematic use of management chain to cascade information ................................................................. □ 1 □ 2 □ 3
6. Newsletters or emails ................................................................. □ 1 □ 2 □ 3
7. A company intranet providing information to employees ................................................................. □ 1 □ 2 □ 3
8. Other (please specify) ................................................................. □ 1 □ 2 □ 3

[ONLY ASK F5b IF ‘YES’ CODED FOR MORE THAN ONE COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENT IN F5a]

F5b. Which is the most important mechanism? ________________ (enter number from F5a)

F6. Which of the following types of information is regularly provided to the [LOG NAME] within [NAME] in Ireland?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Information</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial position of the worldwide company</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial position of the [NAME] in Ireland</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment plan for the worldwide company</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment plan for the [NAME] in Ireland</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing plans for the worldwide company</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing plans for the [NAME] in Ireland</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F7. To what extent do the [NAME] in Ireland as a whole have discretion over the determination of the following aspects of employee involvement and communication policy ....?

[USE SHOWCARD 28 – CODE ONE ONLY FOR EACH CATEGORY. READ OUT: WHERE SITUATION VARIES ACROSS SITES OR BUSINESS UNITS IN IRELAND, PLEASE ASK RESPONDENT TO ANSWER FOR THE PRIMARY SITE OR UNIT.]

Use codes 1-6 from Showcard 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies relating to …</th>
<th>Enter one code only</th>
<th>Don’t</th>
<th>Know</th>
<th>Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Involvement of employees in work process, e.g. team work or problem-solving groups</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[ONLY ASK OPTIONS B AND C IF TICKED AT F5a. OTHERWISE TICK ‘NOT APPLICABLE’]

b) Attitude or opinion surveys ................................................................. □ 9 □ 8

c) Suggestion schemes ........................................................................ □ 9 □ 8

d) Provision of information to employees ................................................................. □ 9

G. TRAINING, DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING

G1. What percentage of the annual pay bill in [NAME] in Ireland was spent on training and development for all employees over the past 12 months?
Don’t Know………  999

IF RESPONDENT IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES - USE SHOWCARD 29 AND TICK ONE BELOW

0% ..........................................................  1
Up to 1%.........................................................  2
Over 1% and less than 4%................................  3
Over 4%.........................................................  4

G2a. Thinking of [NAME] in Ireland is there a formal system of succession planning for senior managers?
1  Yes in all operations ..........  1 ⇒ Go to G2b
2  Yes in some operations ....  2 ⇒ Go to G2b
3  No .........................................................  3 ⇒ Go to G3a
4  Don’t Know.........................................  4 ⇒ Go to G3a

G2b. In this system also used in other parts of the worldwide company?
Yes in all operations.....  1  Yes in some operations ....  2  No .......  3  Don’t Know .......  4

G3a. Do [NAME] in Ireland have a management development programme specifically aimed at developing its ‘high potentials’ or senior management potential?
1  Yes in all operations ..........  1 ⇒ Go to G3b
2  Yes in some operations ....  2 ⇒ Go to G3b
3  No .........................................................  3 ⇒ Go to G4
4  Don’t Know.........................................  4 ⇒ Go to G4

G3b. Is this system also used in other parts of the worldwide company? [TICK ONE BOX ONLY]
Yes in all operations.....  1  Yes in some operations ....  2  No .......  3  Don’t Know .......  4

G3c. How extensively are each of the following techniques used for the development of these managers in [NAME] in Ireland?
[USE SHOWCARD 30 – CODE ONE ONLY FOR EACH CATEGORY.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique …</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use Showcard 30</td>
<td>Use codes 1-5 from Showcard 30</td>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enter one code only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Short term International assignments (12 months or less) ..........................................................  9 ...............  8
Long term international assignments (more than 12 months) .................................................  9 ...............  8
Formal global management training ..........................................................  9 ...............  8
Assessment of performance against a set of global management competencies .................................................  9 ...............  8
Qualifications programme (e.g. MBA, professional qualifications) .................................................  9 ...............  8

ONLY ASK G4 IF KEY GROUP IDENTIFIED AT B6. OTHERWISE GO TO G5A

G4. Thinking of the [KEY GROUP] in [COMPANY NAME] in Ireland is there a specific development programme aimed at this group?
Yes in all operations..................□₁  Yes in some operations ....□₂  No........□₃  Don’t Know........□₄

G5a. How many expatriates are currently working on long-term assignments (i.e. more than 12 months) in [NAME] in Ireland? Please include all types of long-term assignments for any purpose.

IF NECESSARY: By ‘Third-country nationals’ we mean employees whose national origin is not the same as the parent company or the host country (in this case Ireland).

Parent country nationals...............................(number)  Don’t Know ........................□9999
Third country nationals...............................(number)  Don’t Know ........................□9999

G5b. How many expatriates from [NAME] in Ireland are currently working on long-term (i.e. more than 12 months) assignments overseas in...

The parent company headquarters............................(number)  □9999
Other parts of the worldwide company...........................(number)  □9999

READ OUT: “Now I want to ask you about the mechanisms you use for organisational learning on an international level, by this I mean mechanisms used to create new knowledge involving managers from different country operations, or to transfer knowledge across the international organisation”.

G6a. Thinking of [NAME], is there a formal policy on organisational learning?

Yes in all operations...........□₁ ⇒ Go to G6b
Yes in some operations ......□₂ ⇒ Go to G6b
No........................................□₃ ⇒ Go to G6c
Don’t Know..........................□₄ ⇒ Go to G6c

G6b. Is this system also used in other parts of the worldwide company?

Yes in all operations.....□₁  Yes in some operations ....□₂  No........□₃  Don’t Know........□₄

G6c. Thinking about managers, do [NAME] in Ireland use any of the following to facilitate international organisational learning ....

[PLEASE READ OUT. TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH ITEM]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Information</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expatriate assignments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International project groups or task forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International formal committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International informal networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondments to other organisations internationally (e.g. to suppliers, customers, universities, private R&amp;D facilities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[ONLY ASK G6D IF MORE THAN ONE ‘YES’ CODED IN G6C. OTHERWISE GO TO G7]

G6d. Which of these is the most important international organisational learning mechanism used by managers within [NAME] in Ireland?

[PLEASE READ OUT. TICK ONE BOX ONLY]

Expatriate assignments .....................................................................................□₁
International project groups or task forces ..................................................□₂
International formal committees .....................................................................□₃
International informal networks ........................................... 4
Secondments to other organisations internationally
(e.g. to suppliers, customers, universities, private R&D facilities) ....... 5
Don’t know ........................................................................... 6

G7. To what extent do [NAME] in Ireland as a whole have discretion over the determination of the following training and development policies?

READ OUT: Where the situation varies across sites or business units outside of Ireland, please answer for the most typical situation.

Policy …

A. Overall policy on training and development in [NAME] in Ireland ............. 9 8
[ONLY ASK B IF CODED ‘YES’ AT G6A I.E. THERE IS AN ORG. LEARNING POLICY].

B. Policy on organisational learning ...................................................... 9 8
[ONLY ASK C IF CODED ‘YES’ AT G2A I.E. THERE IS A SUCCESSION POLICY].

C. Policy on succession planning for senior managers in [NAME] in Ireland... ................................................................. 9 8

G8. How would you rate the following aspects of the workforce in [NAME] in Ireland?

READ OUT SHOWCARD 32. CODE ONE FOR EACH ITEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of workforce</th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability of university graduates ….……………………………………………………</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of university graduates in your employment ………………………………………</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of professional school and technical graduates in your employment ………….</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to learn new skills ………………………………………………………………</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to work with information technology …………………………………………..</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to work in teams ……………………………………………………………….</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work ethic ………………………………………………………………………………..</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION H: COMPANY BACKGROUND

H1. Has [NAME] in Ireland provided any new practices in the following areas that have been taken up elsewhere in the worldwide company:

READ OUT SHOWCARD 33. CODE ONE FOR EACH CATEGORY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay and performance management</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes, in Ireland</th>
<th>Yes, in major businesses</th>
<th>Yes, taken up globally</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training, development and organisational learning</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Use Showcard 31 |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1               | 2         | 3         | 4         | 5         | 6         |
| They have no discretion (must implement policy set by a higher organisational level such as corporate or regional HQ) | | | | | |
| They have a little discretion | | | | | |
| They have some discretion (can develop policy within the guidelines/framework set by a higher organisational level) | | | | | |
| They have quite a lot of discretion | | | | | |
| They have full discretion (can set own policy) | | | | | |
| There is no ‘typical’ situation: the level of discretion varies widely across different sites | | | | | |
Employee involvement and communication...........................................[1][2][3][4][5]
Employee representation and consultation...........................................[1][2][3][4][5]
Other (Please specify)...........................................................................[1][2][3][4][5]

H2. Over the past three years to what extent has the number of employees in [NAME] in Ireland changed?

*IF IN IRELAND LESS THAN 3 YEARS (SEE A11A) PUT IN APPROPRIATE FIGURE. USE SHOWCARD 34. CODE ONE ONLY*

1) Increased significantly (more than 10%) ........................................[1]
2) Increased slightly (up to 10%) .......................................................[2]
3) No change ....................................................................................[3]
4) Decreased slightly (down by 10%) .................................................[4]
5) Decreased significantly (down more than 10%) ..........................[5]
6) Don’t know ................................................................................[9]

H3a. Which of the following statements best describes the operations of [NAME] in Ireland?

*USE SHOWCARD 35. CODE ONE ONLY*

It produces...

1) A single product or service that accounts for more than 90% of sales............[1]
2) A number of products and services but one of these accounts for between 70% and 90% of sales.................................................................[2]
3) A number of products and services but no single one of these accounts for more than 70% of sales.........................................................[3]
4) A range of unrelated products and services ........................................[4]
5) Don’t know ....................................................................................[9]

H3b. Is the worldwide company’s most important product, service or brand (or group of products, services or brands) ....?*

*USE SHOWCARD 36. CODE ONE ONLY.*

Interviewer Note: If Respondent queries what ‘most important’ means, clarify that we want them to think of the product, service or brand that generates the most revenue.

1) Adapted significantly to national markets...........................................[1]
2) Adapted to different regions of the world but standardised within them ....[2]
3) Standardised globally ....................................................................[3]
4) Don’t know ....................................................................................[9]

H4a. Are any of the products or services of [NAME] in Ireland produced for operations outside of Ireland?

Yes in all operations ....[1] Yes in some operations ....[2] No ....[3] Don’t Know ....[4]

H4b. Do other parts of the worldwide company supply products or services to [NAME] in Ireland?

Yes ....[1] No ....[2] Don’t Know ....[9]

H5a. How important is [NAME] in Ireland to the global performance of the parent company?

1) Not at all important .................................................................[1]
2) Of little importance ...............................................................[2]
3) Somewhat important ..........................................................[3]
4) Important ...............................................................................[4]
5) Very important .......................................................................[5]
6) Don’t know .......................................................... 9

H5b. Has this level of importance changed over the past five years?  
[IF COMPANY IN IRELAND LESS THAN 5 YEARS (SEE A11A) PUT IN APPROPRIATE FIGURE ABOVE]

1) Significantly decreased.............................. 1
2) Slightly decreased .................................. 2
3) Stayed about the same............................... 3
4) Slightly increased...................................... 4
5) Significantly increased............................... 5
6) Don’t know ................................................. 9

H5c. Approximately what percentage of revenues of [NAME] in Ireland comes from sales abroad?

________ %  Don’t know ................. 999

IF ’DON’T KNOW’ USE SHOWCARD 39, AND TICK ONE BOX BELOW.

1) 0%......................................................... 1
2) 1-25%................................................... 2
3) 26-50%................................................ 3
4) 51-75%............................................... 4
5) 76-100%............................................... 5
6) Don’t know............................................. 9

H6 How many major competitors do you face for the main products or services of [NAME] in Ireland?

___________________ [RANGE 1-100]  Don’t know ....... 999

IF ‘DON’T KNOW’ USE SHOWCARD 40 AND TICK ONE BOX BELOW.

1) None .................................................... 1
2) 1 .......................................................... 2
3) 2-5......................................................... 3
4) 6-10...................................................... 4
5) 11-49.................................................... 5
6) 50+ ..................................................... 6
7) Don’t know ............................................. 9

H7a. Is the worldwide company state or partly state owned?

Yes .......... 1  No .......... 2  Don’t Know ...... 9

H7b. Are the shares of the company...?

Privately owned ................. 1  Publicly traded .......... 2

H8a. Has any part of the Irish operations joined the current worldwide parent company as the result of a merger or acquisition in the past 5 years?  
[IF COMPANY IN IRELAND LESS THAN 5 YEARS (SEE A11A) SUBSTITUTE APPROPRIATE FIGURE ABOVE]


H8b. Did any merger or acquisition result in a change in the nationality of ownership of the Irish operations?

Yes ....[1]⇒ Go to H8c  No ...........[2]⇒ Go to H9  Don’t Know.......[9]⇒ Go to H9

H8c. What was the nationality of the Irish operations previously?

____________________________________________________________________________________
H9. Over the past five years, have the Irish operations been involved in a significant investment in a new site or expansion of existing sites in Ireland? Please exclude any mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures or strategic alliances.

*IF COMPANY IN IRELAND LESS THAN 5 YEARS (SEE A11A) SUBSTITUTE APPROPRIATE FIGURE ABOVE*

Yes .............□1  No .............□2  Don't Know ......□9

H10. Over the past 5 years has any site been closed in Ireland?

*IF COMPANY IN IRELAND LESS THAN 5 YEARS (SEE A11A) SUBSTITUTE APPROPRIATE FIGURE ABOVE*

Yes – one site ....□1  Yes – more than one site ....□2  No ........□3  Don't Know ......□4

READ OUT: “Finally I would now like to ask you about the factors contributing or inhibiting decisions on new investments or new mandates in multinationals in Ireland”.

H11. Please rank the importance of the following factors in influencing decisions on new investments or new mandates for your Irish operations? With 1 being the most important factor and 7 the least important factor.

READ OUT SHOWCARD 41. ENTER ONLY ONE NUMBER IN EACH COLUMN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Availability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The industrial relations climate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General infrastructure (e.g. transportation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall operating costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The capacity of the Irish operations to innovate in the development of goods, services and processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial incentives (including the corporate tax rate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H12 Time Ended (24 hour clock): ____ : ____

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this study!
APPENDIX B: SPANISH QUESTIONNAIRE

ENCUESTA SOBRE PRÁCTICAS DE EMPLEO DE LAS MNCS QUE OPERAN EN ESPAÑA

PROPIEDAD EXTRANJERA

Fecha de la entrevista __________ Comienzo __________ Final __________

SECCIÓN S

S3. Su puesto en la empresa es ___________________________

S1a. ¿Cómo se denomina su puesto de trabajo? MARCAR UNO SOLO. NO LEER EN ALTO

1. Director de Recursos Humanos
2. Director Senior de Recursos humanos
3. Director Jefe de Recursos Humanos
4. Director de personal
5. Jefe de RRHH
6. Ejecutivo de RRHH
7. Asistente de RRHH
8. Otros (por favor especificar)

S6. Nacionalidad de la empresa o país de origen de la casa matriz
________________________

S4. ¿Puede confirmar que la propiedad de la empresa es en su totalidad o en su mayoría de propiedad extranjera?

S8a. Número de empleados TOTAL de la compañía: __________

1. Menos de 99 empleados
2. 100-499 empleados
3. 500-999 empleados
4. 1000-4999 empleados
5. más de 5000 empleados

S8c. Número de empleados en ESPAÑA: __________

6. Menos de 99 empleados
7. 100-499 empleados
8. 500-999 empleados
9. 1000-4999 empleados
10. más de 5000 empleados
SECCIÓN A: INTRODUCCIÓN

A1. Nombre de la Compañía

a. ¿Cómo se llama la subsidiaria española para la que usted trabaja? Por subsidiaria española nos referimos a todas las operaciones de la multinacional que se realizan en España.

SI NECESARIO: SI HAY MÁS DE UNA SUBSIDIARIA ESPAÑOLA, POR FAVOR PREGUNTAR POR LA MÁS GRANDE DE TODAS.

Nota al entrevistador: Por favor escriba el nombre de la subsidiaria ____________________________

b. ¿Podría comprobar que el nombre de la multinacional es………………………………..(Poner el nombre del SCREENING)?

Si.................................................................□
No.................................................................□

PREGUNTAR SI “NO” EN A1b O SI ESTA EN BLANCO
¿Cuál es el nombre de la multinacional?

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: POR FAVOR ESCRIBA EL NOMBRE DE LA MULTINACIONAL

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS

c. En cuanto a la multinacional en su conjunto, ¿hay un único HQ español que abarque todas las operaciones de la subsidiaria en España?

1. Sí, hay un único HQ español.................................................................□
2. No, las operaciones en España no están cubiertas por un único HQ ........□

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS

d. ¿Puede usted responder a preguntas referentes a las cuestiones de RRHH de toda España o sólo a las relativas a una parte o división de las operaciones de la subsidiaria en España?

1. Todas las unidades operativas de España ................□ → ir a A1e
2. Sólo una parte o división ................................................□ → ir a A1f

PREGUNTAR SI MARCA 1 (UNIDADES OPERATIVAS DE ESPAÑA) EN A1D:

e. ¿Podemos referirnos, para el resto de la entrevista, a Todas las unidades operativas de España como la ‘subsidiaria española’?

SI.................................................................□
NO.................................................................□

PREGUNTAR SI MARCA 2 EN A1D (SOLO UNA PARTE O DIVISION):

f. ¿Tendría algún inconveniente en que nos refiramos a esta unidad operativa o división como ‘subsidiaria española’?

SI.................................................................□
NO.................................................................□
A2. El Encuestado

a. ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva trabajando en la subsidiaria española? LEER EN ALTO:
POR FAVOR DAR UNA RESPUESTA DEL AÑO MÁS CERCANO [es decir, p.ej. si es 11 años y 9 meses, decir 12 años, o si es 2 años y 3 meses, decir 2 años, etc. Lo mismo en A4.]

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: POR FAVOR PIDA AL ENCUESTADO QUE SE APROXIME AL AÑO MÁS CERCANO
PONER LOS AÑOS__________ (MIN 1, MAX50)

A4. Tiempo en España

¿Desde hace cuantos años la subsidiaria forma parte de la casa matriz actual?

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: POR FAVOR PIDA AL ENCUESTADO QUE SE APROXIME AL AÑO MÁS CERCANO
PONER NUMERO DE AÑOS _________ (MIN 1, MAX 200)

A5a. Estructura de la compañía

¿Existe alguno de los siguientes niveles o divisiones en la multinacional?.

- División internacional de producto, de servicio o basada en una marca
- Regiones (ej. Europa o Asia- Pacífico)
- Funciones de negocio globales (ej. Producción, I+D, ventas)
- Compañías subsidiarias nacionales
- Otras (por favor especificar)

NINGUNA DE LAS DE ARRIBA
NO SABE

SI A5A ES MULTIRESPUESTA, PREGUNTAR A5B (OTRAS IR A LAS INSTRUCCIONES DE A5D)

b. ¿Es alguno de estos niveles o divisiones más importante que los demás dentro de la multinacional? Por favor piense en el nivel o división que sea más influyente dentro de la estructura organizativa de la multinacional.

Si
No
No sabe

SI “NO” O “NO SABE” EN A5B, IR A LA RUTA ANTERIOR A A5D

PREGUNTAR SI “SI” EN A5B:

c. ¿Cuál es la división más importante? ____________________________

PREGUNTAR SI MARCO 1 “DIVISIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE PRODUCTO O DE SERVICIO” EN A5A:
d. ¿Alguna de las divisiones internacionales de producto, servicio, o marca tienen su Hq en España?
J9. Cuando la casa matriz decidió la creación de una subsidiaria en España, ¿cómo se hizo ésta?

Mediante la creación de una nueva empresa .......................................................... □
Mediante la fusión o adquisición con una empresa ya existente en España .............. □

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI ES NECESARIO – Por ‘centro de trabajo’ entendemos cualquier emplazamiento físico DONDE CINCO O MÁS EMPLEADOS trabajan PERMANENTEMENTE

1. Sólo un centro de trabajo .......................................................... □
2. De 2-5 centros de trabajo ......................................................... □
3. 6 o más centros de trabajo ....................................................... □

A9. ¿A qué sector corresponde la subsidiaria española? _______________________

J10. En cuanto a la estructura de la multinacional, cual es el grado de autonomía de que goza la subsidiaria para las siguientes cuestiones? (pregunta a situar en apartado de la estructura de la MNC)

Puntúe de 1 a 5 (donde 1 es ninguna autonomía y 5 total autonomía) Se permite NS

- Función de producción o de generación del servicio ........................................... □
- Control financiero ................................................................................................. □
- Fijación de las políticas de RRHH .......................................................... □
- Control de la composición diversa de la plantilla desde la matriz .................. □

J11. ¿En qué grado posee la subsidiaria española recursos críticos para la MNC referentes a las siguientes áreas? Valore de 1 a 5 (pregunta a situar en apartado de estructura de la MNC)

1. Bajo grado de posesión
5. Alto grado de posesión
- Relaciones con clientes y proveedores .................................................. □
- Habilidad de generar beneficios .......................................................... □
- Control de determinadas habilidades .................................................. □
- Papel de intermediación con los grupos de poder en el entorno local .......... □
- Capacidad de crear prácticas innovadoras que luego se transmitan al resto de la MNC: tecnología, marketing, I+D .................................................. □

A11. Composición de la plantilla

En primer lugar queremos preguntarle acerca de los directivos.
NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO SE ACLARA CON LA DEFINICIÓN PUEDE SER UTIL LEER EN ALTO LO SIGUIENTE

Entendemos por **directivos** todos aquellos empleados que dirigen la organización, o un departamento, subdivisión o función o bien componentes de la organización cuya tarea principal consiste en la dirección y coordinación del funcionamiento de la organización. No queremos incluir aquellos que simplemente controlen a otros como supervisores, aunque el nombre de su cargo incluya la palabra “directivo”, como por ejemplo el director administrativo. En esta misma línea queremos incluir aquellos que encajen con la definición aunque en el nombre de su cargo no aparezca la palabra directivo.

a. ¿Podría comprobar que esto identifica a un grupo significativo en la subsidiaria?

- Si ..............................................................................................................
- No ...........................................................................................................

SI “NO” PREGUNTAR POR UNA BREVE DEFINICIÓN DE “DIRECTIVO” Y ESCRIBIRLA AQUÍ

b. Aproximadamente ¿cuántos directivos hay en la subsidiaria?

Nota al entrevistador: Si el entrevistado está teniendo dificultades, una estimación es aceptable. Si el entrevistado no es capaz de proporcionar una estimación, por favor marque ‘No sabe’ y acuda a los rangos.

Introducir cifra ___________ (MIN 1, MAX 10.000)

- NO SABE .....................................................................................................

SI NO SABE, IR A LOS RANGOS.

1-9 ........................................
10-24 .....................................
25-49 ......................................
50-99 ......................................
100-199 ...................................
200-249 ...................................
250-299 ...................................
300-399 ..................................
400-499 ..................................
500+ ........................................

- No sabe ..............................................

SI SE HA DADO UNA RESPUESTA NUMERICA EN A11B, PREGUNTAR:
A11BB.- ¿ES ESTO UNA ESTIMACIÓN?

- SI ...........................................................................................................
- NO ...........................................................................................................

c. El segundo grupo es el **mayor grupo de los empleados contratados** en la subsidiaria, al que nos referimos como MGE. Este incluye los que trabajen permanentemente y excluye los trabajadores temporales o casuales. Los empleados que procedan de ETT no serán incluidos (por ejemplo, en una industria manufacturera estos serían los peones especializados y en una empresa de seguros los que trabajan en un “call centre”). ¿Cuál es el MGE en la subsidiaria?
NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI EL ENTREVISTADO TIENE DIFICULTADES, POR FAVOR PÍDALE QUE PIENSE EN EL MAYOR GRUPO NO DIRECTIVO DE EMPLEADOS CUYOS TERMINOS Y CONDICIONES SEAN PARECIDOS. SI HAY DOS O MÁS GRUPOS GRANDES, DIRIGIR LA PREGUNTA HACIA SI ESTOS GRUPOS EN TERMINOS Y CONDICIONES SON SIMILARES. SI SON SIMILARES, TRATAR A AMBOS GRUPOS JUNTOS COMO MGE. SI SON DIFERENTES, ELEGIR EL GRUPO MÁS NUMEROSE COMO MGE

ESCRIBIR NOMBRE ____________________________

ENTREVISTADOR: SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO SABE CÓMO SE LLAMA EL MGE POR FAVOR LLAMARLE: MAYOR GRUPO DE EMPLEADOS. ESTE TÉRMINO SERÁ UTILIZADO PARA EL RESTO DEL CUESTIONARIO EN LAS PREGUNTAS REFERENTES AL MGE

d. ¿Qué hace el MGE?

ESCRIBIR AQUÍ _____________________________________________________

No sabe .............................................

e. ¿Esto se considera también el MGE en la multinacional?

1. SI .....................
2. No ......................
3. No sabe ................

SI “NO” ¿Cuál diría usted que es el MGE en la multinacional?

ESCRIBIR EL NOMBRE ____________________________

LEER EN ALTO: PARA EL RESTO DEL CUESTIONARIO CUANDO NOS REFIRAMOS AL MGE LE AGRADECERÍAMOS QUE PENSARA EN EL MAYOR GRUPO DE EMPLEADOS EN LA SUBSIDIARIA

f. ¿Cuántos empleados del Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) hay en la subsidiaria?

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI EL ENTREVISTADO TIENE DIFICULTADES, UNA ESTIMACION ES ACEPTABLE. SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO PUEDE HACER UNA ESTIMACIÓN O RESponde que no sabe, IR A LOS RANGOS.

Poner un número _____________ (MIN 1; MAX, 50.000)

1-9 ..........................................
10-24 ......................................
25-49 ......................................
50-99 ......................................
100-249 ...................................
250-499 ...................................
500-749 ...................................
750-999 ...................................
1000-2999 ................................
3000-4999 ................................
g. El **grupo clave** es aquél que se ha identificado como crítico para las competencias esenciales de su organización. Este puede ser el staff de investigación, los diseñadores de productos, los gerentes de grandes cuentas o desarrolladores de nuevos mercados. No queremos que piense en un subgrupo de los directivos aunque algún grupo de los que usted identifique pueda tener responsabilidades directivas. **¿Podría decir que la compañía reconoce algún grupo como Grupo clave de la subsidiaria?**

LEER EN ALTO SI ES NECESARIO: SI HAY MAS DE UN GRUPO CLAVE POR FAVOR CENTRESE EN EL GRUPO QUE POSEA MAS CAPACIDADES Y HABILIDADES QUE SON DIFICILES DE OBTENER EN EL MERCADO DE TRABAJO. SI NO ES FACIL DE DISTINGUIR ENTRE LOS GRUPOS DE ESTAS CARACTERÍSTICAS, POR FAVOR PIENSE EN EL MAS NUMEROSO.

1.  Si- un grupo específico        □
2.  Si.- más de un grupo          □
3.  No................................□
4.  No sabe..........................□

**PREGUNTAR SI MAS DE UN GRUPO EN A11g:**

**gg. Si hay más de un grupo, ¿puedo comprobar si usted está pensando en el grupo más cualificado o en el grupo más numeroso?**

1.  Grupo más cualificado        □
2.  Grupo más numeroso          □
3.  Ambos................................□

**SI "SI" EN G IR A H (OTROS IR A LAS SECCION C):**

**h. ¿Por qué nombre se conoce a este grupo?**

________________________________________

ENTREVISTADOR: SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO SABE CÓMO SE LLAMA EL GRUPO CLAVE POR FAVOR ESCRIBIR AQUÍ: GRUPO CLAVE. ESTE TÉRMINO SERÁ USADO PARA EL RESTO DEL CUESTIONARIO PARA LAS CUESTIONES REFERENTES AL GRUPO CLAVE.

i.  **Aproximadamente ¿cuántos empleados hay en este grupo en la subsidiaria?**

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI EL ENTREVISTADO TIENE DIFICULTADES, UNA ESTIMACIÓN ES ACEPTABLE. SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO ES CAPAZ DE HACER UNA ESTIMACIÓN IR A LOS RANGOS

5000+ ................................□
No sabe ................................□
Ninguno ................................□

SI SE HA INTRODUCIDO UNA RESPUESTA NUMERICA EN A11F, PREGUNTAR ¿**A11F ES UNA ESTIMACIÓN?**

1.  SI ............□
2.  NO ..........□
PONER NUMERO _______________ (MIN 1, MAX 50.000)

NO SABE .................................................. □

SI “NO SABE” IR A LOS RANGOS.

1-9 .......................................................... □
10-24 ....................................................... □
25-49 ........................................................ □
50-99 ........................................................ □
100-249 .................................................... □
250-499 ..................................................... □
500-749 ..................................................... □
750-999 ..................................................... □
1000-2999 .................................................. □
3000-4999 .................................................. □
5000+ ........................................................ □

No sabe ................................................... □
Ninguno .................................................... □

SI SE HA INTRODUCIDO UNA RESPUESTA NUMERICA EN AA11i POR FAVOR PREGUNTAR:
A11i ¿es una estimación?

1. SI ......................................................... □
2. NO ......................................................... □

A11K . ¿Hay alguna persona de este grupo con responsabilidades directivas?

1. Si- todo el grupo ......................................... □
2. Si- alguno del grupo .................................... □
3. No-ninguno de este grupo ............................. □

A11 L. ¿Podría decir si la multinacional tiene grupos clave en otros lugares del mundo donde esté operando?

1. Si .......................................................... □
2. No .......................................................... □
3. No sabe ................................................... □

SECCIÓN C: ESTRUCTURA DE LAFUNCIÓN DE RRHH

El siguiente grupo de preguntas se refiere a la función de RRHH en Sp.

C1. La función de RRHH en Sp

a. ¿Cuántos directivos, incluido usted, dedican la mayor parte de su tiempo a cuestiones de RRHH en la subsidiaria?

1. ESCRIBIR AQUÍ _____________________
2. NO SABE.................................................. □
C2. Recopilación de datos de RRHH

a. ¿Alguna de las siguientes cuestiones de la subsidiaria está controlada por la casa matriz o un Hq desde fuera de España?
MARCAR TODAS LAS QUE CORRESPONDAN

- Paquetes de retribución directiva
- Desarrollo de carreras directivas
- Costos laborales globales
- Numero de empleados en plantilla
- Rotación del personal
- Absentismo
- Productividad laboral
- Composición diversa de la plantilla (ej. Género, etnia, discapacidad, etc)
- Actitud y satisfacción de los empleados
- Otras (por favor especificar)
- Ninguna de estas

b. ¿Tiene la multinacional un sistema informático de RRHH (como ‘People soft’ o ‘SAP HR’) que contenga datos relacionados con el personal de la empresa internacional?

1. Si (OTRA ESPECIFICAR)
2. No
3. No sabe

C3. Formación de las políticas de RRHH a nivel internacional

a. ¿Hay algún órgano en la multinacional, como un comité de directivos senior que desarrolle las políticas de RRHH aplicables luego a los diferentes países?

1. Si
2. No
3. No sabe

b. ¿Hay alguien de la subsidiaria en este comité?

1. Si
2. No
3. No sabe

C4. Coordinación de los directores de RRHH entre los países

a. ¿Los directores de RRHH de los distintos países se reúnen de manera sistemática? Estamos pensando aquí en reuniones como conferencias o task forces
PERMITIR MULTIRESPUESTA A LAS OPCIONES 1 Y 2

1. Si- a nivel global
2. Si- a nivel regional
3. No
4. No sabe

b. ¿Cada cuánto tiempo, y a través de cuáles de los siguientes mecanismos entran en contacto los directores de RRHH de los diferentes países?
MARCAR UNO POR CADA MECANISMO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mecanismo</th>
<th>Semanalmente</th>
<th>Mensualmente</th>
<th>Trimestralmente</th>
<th>Anualmente</th>
<th>Ad Hoc</th>
<th>Otros (especificar)</th>
<th>No sabe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reuniones regulares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferencias internacionales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Task forces”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grupos virtuales ej.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Conference calls”</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C4bii) ¿Hay algún otro mecanismo de comunicación entre los directores de RRHH de los distintos países?

1. SI   2. NO

SI “SI” PREGUNTAR: ¿Y cuáles son esos mecanismos?

ESCRIBIR AQUÍ ______________________________

INSTRUCCIÓN AL ENTREVISTADOR: POR FAVOR PONER CADA MECANISMO EN UNA CASILLA SEPARADA PARA EL FILTRADO DE LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA

SI EL ENTREVISTADO MENCIONA MÁS DE TRES, PREGUNTARLE POR LOS TRES MECANISMOS MÁS IMPORTANTES

Otro Especificar 1
Otro Especificar 2
Otro Especificar 3
No

C4Biii) ¿Cada cuánto tiempo tienen contacto los directores de RRHH de los diferentes países según (el mecanismo Especificado en 1)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mecanismo</th>
<th>Semanalmente</th>
<th>Mensualmente</th>
<th>Trimestralmente</th>
<th>Anualmente</th>
<th>Ad Hoc</th>
<th>Otros (especificar)</th>
<th>No sabe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

INSTRUCCIÓN CAPI: Por favor repita esta pregunta para cada uno de los otros mecanismos mencionados en la pregunta C4bii

C6. Servicios compartidos en RRHH

a. La función de RRHH de la subsidiaria, ¿hace uso de centros de “servicios compartidos” que sean parte de la compañía a nivel global o regional?

Por centros de “servicios compartidos” queremos decir unidades especializadas que proporcionan servicios de RRHH para una gama de unidades operativas o divisiones

1. SI   2. NO   3. No sabe
CN1. ¿qué servicios compartidos? ________________________________

C7. Transferencia del personal entre los ‘centros de trabajo’

a. ¿Cuántas de las cinco posiciones directivas más altas de la subsidiaria están cubiertas por……………..? LEER EN ALTO

Individuos que previamente han trabajado para la compañía en EL PAÍS DE LA MATRIZ

1. Introducir cifra ___________ (MIN 1, MAX5)
2. Ninguno ........................................
3. No sabe ........................................

Individuos de otras partes de la multinacional (pej. De fuera de Sp pero no del país de origen- estos son conocidos a menudo como ‘nacionales de terceros países’)

1. Introducir cifra ___________ (MIN 1, MAX5)
2. Ninguno ........................................
3. No sabe ........................................

C8. Filosofía global acerca de la dirección de los empleados

a. Nos referimos ahora a la filosofía de la compañía en cuanto al estilo de dirección de sus empleados. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?, por favor use una escala de 1 a 5 donde 1 es que discrepa completamente y 5 es totalmente de acuerdo

GIRAR LAS AFIRMACIONES
1= discrepo completamente
5= Totalmente de acuerdo
No sabe

Hay una filosofía a nivel mundial que abarca todas las operaciones globales .............
Hay una filosofía a nivel regional que abarca las operaciones europeas (no responder si no corresponde) ............................................................
El desarrollo de la filosofía se delega en las divisiones internacionales de producto, de servicio o basadas en la marca (no responder si no corresponde) ............................................................
El desarrollo de la filosofía se delega en las compañías operativas nacionales ..............

PREGUNTAR B SI ALGUNA DE LAS PRIMERAS TRES OPCIONES HA RECIBIDO UNA PUNTUACION DE 4 O SUPERIOR:

B ¿Hasta qué punto son importantes las tradiciones de la casa matriz en la configuración de esta filosofía? ............................................................
1= No tiene ninguna importancia
5= Muy importante
No sabe

SECCIÓN D: DIRECCION DE DIVERSIDAD

Me gustaría hacerle unas preguntas acerca de las políticas de dirección de la diversidad (PDD). Entendemos por PDD, todas aquellas acciones directivas tendentes a lograr una eficaz dirección de una plantilla diversa (reflejo de la sociedad en que ésta está inmersa), evitando cualquier
discriminación de género, raza, edad, nación de origen, orientación sexual o discapacidad, en un intento de promover los efectos positivos que la diversidad puede tener para la empresa, así como reducir los negativos.

**J1. ¿Constituye la diversidad un valor corporativo en la multinacional donde usted trabaja?**

- Si ........................................ 
- No ........................................
- Parcialmente........................
- No sabe .........................

**J2. ¿Con cual de las siguientes afirmaciones está más de acuerdo con respecto al contenido de este valor corporativo?**

1. Hay un Reconocimiento de que la discriminación es injusta: promoción de la igualdad de oportunidades .................................................................................................................. □
2. Hay Reconocimiento del valor de la diversidad: la diversidad es positiva........... □
3. Hay una Promoción de la diversidad en la empresa por el potencial de la diversidad □

**J2b. ¿Existe una PDD configurada como tal a nivel corporativo?**

- Si ........................................ 
- No ........................................
- No sabe .........................

**J2c. ¿Desde la casa matriz se pretende que en la subsidiaria española se apliquen políticas de dirección de la diversidad?**

- Si ........................................ 
- No ........................................
- No sabe .........................

**J3. Con referencia a la transferencia de las políticas de dirección de la diversidad a la subsidiaria española, y con una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está más de acuerdo?**

1. Las operaciones en Sp deben implementar la política estandarizada, configurada por un nivel superior como la casa matriz o el hq regional .......................................................... □
2. .......................................................... □
3. Las operaciones en Sp pueden desarrollar la política dentro de unas reglas/marco establecido por el nivel organizativo superior con una mayor adaptación local .......................................................... □
4. .......................................................... □
5. Las operaciones en Sp configuran localmente la política........................................ □

**J3b. Indique por favor cuales de los siguientes aspectos integran la PDD transferida. Prácticas que integran la política:**

*PDD en reclutamiento:*
Búsqueda de grupos de reclutamiento diversos

Se publicitan candidaturas dirigidas a grupos específicos minoritarios

Esfuerzos de reclutamiento dirigidos a universidades con estudiantes diversos

**PDD en Retención:**
- Patrocinio a grupos de afinidad
- Programas equilibrio trabajo-familia e incentivos

**PDD en desarrollo profesional**
- Programas de formación en liderazgo
- Programas de mentoring

**PDD en patrocinio externo**
- Programas de diversidad para proveedores
- Servicio a la comunidad: ayuda a minorías

**PDD en comunicación**
- Programas de recompensa que implican un reconocimiento público de los logros en diversidad a directivos y empleados
- Revistas, sitio web en la Intranet de diversidad, pagina web
- **Meetings locales**, discursos de los líderes senior

**PDD en formación**
- Formación de concienciación en las iniciativas de diversidad de la empresa
- Formación preventiva (acoso sexual, hombres y mujeres como colegas)
- Formación impartida a equipos diversos y formación en procesos de grupo

**Existencia de un staff para PDD**
- Staff dedicado a la diversidad
- Consejos de diversidad

**Política de cuotas en PDD**

**Cuotas en selección:**
- Mujeres
- Minorías
- Minusválidos

**Cuotas en promoción**
- Mujeres
- Minorías
- Minusválidos

**J3c. Las orientaciones de la casa matriz o el nivel superior respecto a la implementación de la PDD ¿en qué consisten? Señale lo que proceda**
1. Establecen un marco amplio de política ................................................................. ☐
2. Proporcionan servicios de consulta ........................................................................... ☐
3. Promueven el benchmarking e intercambio de información ........................................ ☐

**J3d. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está más de acuerdo?**

1. La PDD es una política necesaria para la subsidiaria española ................................... ☐
2. La PDD es una política necesaria para la casa matriz .................................................. ☐
3. La PDD es sólo una declaración de intenciones ......................................................... ☐

**J4. ¿Qué porcentaje de minorías hay en la subsidiaria española para cada uno de los siguientes grupos?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Directivos</th>
<th>Grupos clave</th>
<th>MGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mujeres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorías raciales (inmigrantes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extranjeros</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minusválidos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**J4a. ¿Estos porcentajes están “impuestos” o aconsejados por la matriz?**

Sí ......................... ☐
No ................................ ☐

**J5a. ¿La subsidiaria española dispone de alguna partida presupuestaria destinada a la implementación de esta política?**

Sí, en cuantía suficiente ................................................................. ☐
Sí, en cuantía escasa ........................................................................... ☐
No ☐

No sabe .................................................................................................... ☐

**J5b. ¿Se reflejan las políticas de diversidad en la página web de la Multinacional?**

Sí, en todas las web (matriz y subsidiaria Española) ........................................... ☐
Sí, sólo en la matriz .................................................................................... ☐
Sí, en la Intranet de la empresa .................................................................... ☐
No ............................................................................................................. ☐

No sabe .................................................................................................... ☐
J5c. ¿Influye la aplicación de las políticas de diversidad en la evaluación y retribución del director de RRHH?

- Sí, siempre
- Sí, sólo en algunos casos
- No
- No sabe

J6. Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones. Valore de 1 a 5 (1 totalmente en desacuerdo, 5 totalmente de acuerdo).

- La PDD mejora la relación con los clientes/proveedores
- La PDD mejora la creatividad
- La PDD mejora la toma de decisiones
- La PDD mejora la adaptación al cambio (entorno)
- La PDD mejora la red de contactos
- La PDD crea una interrelación entre los directivos, como característica diferenciadora de la empresa
- La PDD propicia una complementariedad de las ideas (en la resolución de problemas) como característica diferenciadora
- La PDD propicia una forma de trabajar en equipo como característica diferenciadora de esta empresa
- La PDD proporciona una combinación de talento difícil de alcanzar, difícil de entender y difícil de replicar por la competencia
- Hay empresas externas dedicadas a desarrollar políticas de dirección de diversidad

J7. ¿Cuántos años se lleva aplicando la PDD en la subsidiaria?

INTRODUCIR UN NÚMERO ESCALA 1-15
SI NS ACUDIR A ESCALAS:

- Ninguno
- 1
- 2-5
- 6-10
- 10-15

J8. Pensando por un lado en el país de origen de la subsidiaria y por otro lado en España, díganos por favor hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones

1 = totalmente en desacuerdo 5 = totalmente de acuerdo, o No sabe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensión regladora</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Sp</th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hay un marco legal suficiente según el cual se protege la igualdad de las minorías ante la ley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La igualdad de oportunidades en el puesto de trabajo por razón de género, raza, edad, discapacidad u orientación sexual está regulada por ley suficientemente.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los convenios colectivos de empresa o sectoriales recogen de manera suficiente cláusulas en torno a la igualdad de oportunidades en el</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
empleo para las minorías

Hay ayudas suficientes por parte del gobierno, a la contratación de minorías

**Dimensión Cognitiva**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Sp</th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Hay una conciencia social acerca de la protección legal de las minorías |
|---|---|---|

| Las minorías conocen la protección legal de la que gozan |
|---|---|---|

| Las minorías conocen la protección sindical que tienen |
|---|---|---|

| Los empresarios conocen las ventajas legales de contratar minorías |
|---|---|---|

| Hay formación directiva en temas de diversidad (masters, etc..) |
|---|---|---|

| Cada vez se habla más de diversidad en revistas y publicaciones dirigidas a los directivos |
|---|---|---|

**Dimensión Normativa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Sp</th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Dada la realidad social del país tiene sentido aplicar Políticas de dirección de la diversidad |
|---|---|---|

| Contratar minorías es visto socialmente como una señal de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa |
|---|---|---|

| Las empresas anuncian sus políticas de diversidad en su web corporativa |
|---|---|---|

| Las empresas incorporan las prácticas de diversidad a su código de valores |
|---|---|---|

| Las instituciones sociales (sindicatos, fundaciones, organismos oficiales, partidos políticos) están influyendo en la concienciación social acerca de la necesidad de la aplicación de políticas de diversidad |
|---|---|---|

---

**SECCIÓN D: RETRIBUCIÓN Y EVALUACIÓN DIRECTIVA**

Me gustaría hacerle unas preguntas acerca de los sistemas de retribución y evaluación del desempeño.

**D1.** Pensando en la política que tiene la subsidiaria con respecto a los niveles de compensación y en relación a los referentes del mercado, ¿La subsidiaria tiene el objetivo de estar...?

Nota al entrevistador: Por favor incluir la política formal e informal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Para directivos</th>
<th>Nombre del Grupo clave</th>
<th>Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>En el cuartil más alto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre la mediana y el cuartil más alto</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>En la mediana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Debajo de la Mediana</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
D6. ¿Hay un sistema de evaluación del desempeño formal para cada uno de los grupos de empleados en la subsidiaria?

**Si es necesario**: (Por evaluación del desempeño se entiende un sistema que establezca un conjunto de objetivos de desempeño individuales y su seguimiento llevado a cabo anualmente o con más frecuencia). Si hay múltiples centros de trabajo y la situación varía en cada lugar, contestar para el centro de trabajo mayor o más importante. Marcar uno por cada categoría.

| Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) | ........ | Si | No | no sabe |........ |
| Directivos | ........ | Si | No | no sabe |........ |

SI ‘NO’ PARA LOS TRES GRUPOS DE EMPLEADOS IR A LA D10
PREGUNTAR D6C SI MAS DE UN GRUPO (MGE GRUPOS CLAVE DIRECTIVOS) HA MARCADO ‘SI’ EN D6:

D6c. ¿Los distintos grupos, como los directivos, el MGE, o el (nombre del grupo Clave) están cubiertos por...?:

**MARCAR SOLO UNO**

| Un sistema de evaluación integrado y único | ........ | Si | No | no sabe |........ |
| Diferentes esquemas de evaluación para los diferentes grupos | ........ | Si | No | no sabe |........ |

**NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR**: Por favor incluir políticas formales e informales

(SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO TIENE CLARO QUE ES “DISTRIBUCION FORZADA” LEER EN ALTO “Por “distribución forzada” queremos dar a entender que tiene que darse un determinado porcentaje de empleados para cada categoría particular de desempeño, pej en Cummins, la distribución es 10:80:10, es decir hay tres categorías en la evaluación del desempeño(A-la más alta, B, y C-la más baja): el 10% de los empleados tiene que estar en A, el 80% en B, y el 10% restante en C. POR FAVOR MARCAR UNO POR CADA GRUPO.
CONTESTAR SOLO PARA LOS GRUPOS MARCADOS CON UN SI EN D6

| DIRECTIVOS | ........ | Si | No |........ |
| (NOMBRE DEL GRUPO CLAVE) | ........ | Si | No |........ |
| MGE | ........ | Si | No |........ |

PREGUNTAR LA D8A PARA CADA GRUPO MARCADO COMO ‘SI’ EN D8:

MGE
(NOMBRE DEL GRUPO CLAVE)
DIRECTIVOS

D8a. ¿Cuál es el porcentaje más bajo de esta distribución forzada? __________

¿Cuál es el porcentaje más alto de esta distribución forzada? __________

NO SABE..........................
**PREGUNTAR SOLO PARA LOS GRUPOS MARCADOS CON UN ‘SI’ EN D6**

**D9. ¿Se utilizan los resultados de la evaluación del desempeño como inputs en las decisiones de despido o reubicación?**

**MARCAR TODAS LAS ELEGIDAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directivos</th>
<th>Para el (nombre del grupo Clave)</th>
<th>Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Si, como input formal en las decisiones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Si, como input informal en las decisiones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No aplicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No sabe</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:**

**D10. Pensando en los directivos de la subsidiaria, y con una escala de 1-5, ¿Hasta qué punto son importantes los siguientes tipos de evaluación del desempeño?**

MARCAR UNO PARA CADA CATEGORÍA.

(SI ES NECESARIO: CUANDO SE APLIQUEN DIFERENTES SISTEMAS EN DISTINTOS CENTROS DE TRABAJO O UNIDADES DE NEGOCIO, ELEGIR EL QUE CUBRA EL MAYOR GRUPO DE DIRECTIVOS)

1 = No tiene ninguna importancia  
5 = muy importante  
NO SABE

i. Objetivos CUANTITATIVOS de resultados individuales (ej. Financieros, numéricos)……………………………………. no sabe
ii. Objetivos CUALITATIVOS de resultados individuales (ej. Finalizar una tarea) …………………………………. no sabe
iii. Objetivos de resultado de grupo (ej. Para un centro de trabajo o unidad de negocio)……………………………………………………………….. no sabe
iv. “competencias” o habilidades individuales (ej. Liderazgo o habilidades innovadoras)……………………………………………………………….. no sabe
v. Comportamiento en relación con los valores corporativos ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………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Para Directivos.............................................. Si[ ]...... No[ ]...... no sabe[ ]

PREGUNTAR EN TODO LOS CASOS:
D12. ¿La subsidiaria ofrece lo siguiente a alguno de sus empleados para cada uno de estos grupos?

LEER EN ALTO Y MARCAR TODO LO QUE SE SEÑALE PARA CADA GRUPO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participación en acciones por parte de los empleados</th>
<th>Para Directivos</th>
<th>Para el (nombre del grupo clave)</th>
<th>Para el MGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participación en beneficios</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’Stock options’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninguna de las de arriba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No sabe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D13. ¿Hay retribución variable para los diferentes grupos de la subsidiaria?
ENTREVISTADOR: LEER EN ALTO SI NECESARIO. “Por retribución variable queremos decir retribución basada en el desempeño, bono basado en el desempeño o pago según resultados”

Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ...... Si[ ]...... No[ ]...... no sabe[ ]

Para el (nombre del grupo Clave)......................... Si[ ]...... No[ ]...... no sabe[ ]

Para Directivos.............................................. Si[ ]...... No[ ]...... no sabe[ ]

SI “SI” PARA MGE O GRUPO CLAVE EN D13, PREGUNTAR PARTE CORRESPONDIENTE DE D14, SI TODOS ‘NO’, IR A D16:

D14. Para aquellos que reciben retribución variable, ¿Qué importancia tienen cada uno de los siguientes factores en la determinación de la parte variable de la subsidiaria? POR FAVOR MARCAR UNO PARA CADA GRUPO

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: DONDE LA PRÁCTICA VARÍA DENTRO DE UN GRUPO, POR FAVOR CONTESTAR PARA EL GRUPO MÁS NUMEROSO DE EMPLEADOS DE ESE GRUPO.

1= no del todo importante
5= muy importante
NO SABE

Resultados Individuales

Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ......................[ ].............. no sabe[ ]

Para el (nombre del grupo Clave)........................................[ ].............. no sabe[ ]

Para Directivos.................................................................[ ].............. no sabe[ ]

Resultados de grupo (ej: resultados de equipo o departamentales)

Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ......................[ ].............. no sabe[ ]
Para el (nombre del grupo Clave) .............................................. no sabe

Para Directivos ............................................................... no sabe

Resultados de la organización (ej: centro de trabajo, región, resultados de la compañía)

Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ....................... no sabe

Para el (nombre del grupo Clave) ........................................ no sabe

Para Directivos ............................................................... no sabe

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:

D16. Usando esta escala ¿hasta qué punto la subsidiaria tiene discrecionalidad sobre los siguientes aspectos de la política de retribución y evaluación?

MARCAR UNO PARA CADA CATEGORÍA

LEER EN ALTO: DONDE LA SITUACIÓN VARIE ENTRE LAS UNIDADES DE NEGOCIO DENTRO DE SP, POR FAVOR PREGUNTAR AL ENCUESTADO QUE RESPONDA PARA EL PRINCIPAL EMPLAZAMIENTO O UNIDAD

EN ALGUNOS CASOS EL NIVEL MAS ALTO PUEDE SER UN HQ INTERNACIONAL O EL HQ EUROPEO QUE ESTÉ BASADO EN SP

1= Las operaciones en Sp no tienen capacidad de decisión (deben implementar la política configurada por un nivel superior como la casa matriz o el hq regional)

2...

3= Las operaciones en Sp tienen cierta capacidad de decisión (pueden desarrollar la política dentro de unas reglas/marco establecido por el nivel organizativo superior)

4...

5= Las operaciones en Sp tienen plena capacidad de decisión (configuran ellas mismas su propia política)

Relación entre los niveles de pago con los referentes de mercado de la subsidiaria
............................................................................................................... no sabe

Políticas según las que los empleados reciben paquetes de acciones de la empresa de la subsidiaria
............................................................................................................... no sabe

Sistema de evaluación del desempeño para:

Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ....................... no sabe

Para el (nombre del grupo Clave) ........................................ no sabe

Para Directivos ............................................................... no sabe

Esquemas de retribución variable:

Para el Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ....................... no sabe

Para el (nombre del grupo Clave) ........................................ no sabe

Para Directivos ............................................................... no sabe

SECCIÓN E: FORMACIÓN, DESARROLLO Y GESTIÓN DEL CONOCIMIENTO

Me gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre la formación, el desarrollo y la gestión del conocimiento.

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:
E2. ¿Qué porcentaje de la cifra de gastos anuales de la subsidiaria se gastó en la formación y desarrollo para todos los empleados en los últimos 12 meses? MARCAR UNO SOLAMENTE (NO SE HACE)

Porcentaje _____________ % ESCRIBIR EN NÚMEROS

Ninguno ___________________

No lo sabe ___________________

E3. ¿Qué porcentaje de la masa salarial de la subsidiaria se gastó en formación y desarrollo para todos los empleados en los últimos 12 meses? MARCAR UNO SOLAMENTE

Porcentaje _____________ % ESCRIBIR EN NÚMEROS

Ninguno ___________________

No lo sabe ___________________

E4. Pensando en la subsidiaria, ¿hay algún tipo de sistema formal para Planificar el ascenso de los directivos senior?

SI ........................................ → ir a 4i
NO O ‘NS’ ........................................ → ir a 4ii

i) ¿Esta misma sistema utiliza también en otras partes del mundo donde esté presente la multinacional?

i. SI ........................................
ii. NO ........................................

ii) ¿La multinacional tiene algún sistema formal para planificar el ascenso a los directivos senior que se aplique en la subsidiaria?

i. SI ........................................
ii. NO ........................................

E4a. ¿La subsidiaria tiene un programa de desarrollo directivo específicamente dedicado a desarrollar ‘las personas con alto potencial’?

SI ........................................ → ir a E4c
NO ........................................ → ir a E4ai
No Sabe ........................................ → ir a E5a

i) ¿La multinacional tiene algún tipo de programa de desarrollo directivo parecido, que se utilice para los empleados de la subsidiaria?

SI ........................................ → ir a E5A
NO ........................................ → ir a E5A
NS ........................................ → ir a E5A

E4c. ¿Este programa de desarrollo directivo es específico para la subsidiaria, o opera en otras partes del mundo donde esté la multinacional? MARCAR UNA SOLAMENTE

i. operaciones en España solamente .......................................................... 
ii. en otras partes del mundo donde esté la multinacional, bajo el mismo formato exactamente .......................................................... 
iii. en otras partes del mundo pero en un formato diferente .......................................................... 
iv. No sabe .......................................................................................... 

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E4b. ¿Hasta qué punto cada uno de los siguientes sistemas se utiliza para el desarrollo de estos directivos? MARCAR UNO POR CADA CATEGORÍA

1= nunca se utiliza  
5= se utiliza muy extensamente  
No sabe

i. Destinos o asignaciones internacionales a corto plazo (12 meses o menos) .............
ii. Destinos o asignaciones internacionales a largo plazo (más de 12 meses) ..........
iii. Formación internacional.................................................................
iv. Evaluación del desempeño basada en competencias directivas globales ..........
v. Programas con título (p.e: MBA, titulaciones profesionales) ........................

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS CUANDO TENGAN UN GRUPO CLAVE

E5a. Pensando en el (nombre del GRUPO CLAVE) en la subsidiaria, ¿hay algún programa específico de desarrollo dirigido a este grupo? MARCAR UNA SOLAMENTE

Si ........................................→ ir a E5c
No o No Sabe ................................→ ir a E6a

PREGUNTAR SI ‘SI’ EN E5A, SINO, IR A E6A:
E5c. ¿Este programa de desarrollo del (nombre del grupo clave) es específico para la subsidiaria, o también opera en otras partes donde esté presente la multinacional? MARCAR UNO SOLAMENTE

Especifico para la subsidiaria .........................................................
Otras partes donde está la multinacional........................................
No sabe.........................................................................................

E5b. ¿Hasta qué punto se utiliza cada una de las siguientes cuestiones para el desarrollo de los empleados del grupo clave en la subsidiaria?: MARCAR UNO PARA CADA CATEGORÍA

1= nunca se utiliza  
5= se utiliza muy extensamente  
No sabe

i. Destinos o asignaciones internacionales a corto plazo (12 meses o menos) .............
ii. Destinos o asignaciones internacionales a largo plazo (más de 12 meses) ..........
iii. Formación internacional.................................................................
iv. Evaluación del desempeño basada en competencias directivas globales ..........
v. Programas con título (p.e: MBA, titulaciones profesionales) ........................

EXPATRIADOS
PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:
E6a. ¿Hay algún expatriado procedente del país de la casa matriz, o nacionales de terceros países trabajando actualmente en destinos a largo plazo (p. más de 12 meses) en la subsidiaria? Por favor incluir todo tipo de tareas a largo plazo. 
Nota al entrevistador: Por ‘expatriado’ se entiende una persona que trabaja normalmente para la empresa internacional en el país de la casa matriz o en un tercer país y que está trabajando actualmente en éste país (España).
Si NECESARIO: Por ‘nacionales de terceros países’ nos referimos a empleados cuya nacionalidad no es ni la de la casa matriz ni la del país de destino (en este caso, España).

Si ........................................→ ir a E6aa
No o No Sabe ................................→ ir a E6ab

PREGUNTAR SI ‘SI’ EN E6A
E6aa. ¿Cuántos...? LEER

   i. Nacionales del país de la casa matriz ______________ No sabe .......................... □
   ii. Nacionales de terceros países ____________________ No sabe .......................... □

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:

E6ab. ¿Hay expatriados de la subsidiaria que actualmente trabajen en tareas a largo plazo (más de 12 meses) en el extranjero?

Si .................................................. □ → ir a E6b
No .................................................. □ → ir a E7
NS .................................................. □ → ir a E7

E6b. ¿Cuántos expatriados trabajan actualmente en destinos a largo plazo (más de 12 meses) en el extranjero, en el...? MARCAR UNA SOLAMENTE. LEER.

AÑADIR UNA OPCIÓN EN BLANCO

   i. Headquarters de la casa matriz _____________________ No sabe □
   ii. Otras partes donde esté la multinacional _______________ No sabe □

NINGUNO Y NO SABE CODE?

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:
E7a. Con respecto a su política/enfoque sobre formación y desarrollo para la subsidiaria, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con cada una de las afirmaciones siguientes?: MARCAR UNO SOLO CADA VEZ.

1= discrepo completamente
5= totalmente de acuerdo
No sabe

Para el MGE
El aprendizaje en el trabajo (experiencia que se adquiere en el mismo trabajo) se valora más que el desarrollo y la formación académica fuera del mismo.......................... □
Invertir en formación es fundamental tanto desarrollar o retener habilidades claves en esta empresa .......................................................... □

PARA DIRECTIVOS EN LA SUBSIDIARIA
Nuestra empresa favorece más la promoción interna que el reclutamiento externo de directivos □
La experiencia internacional es un criterio clave para la promoción hacia niveles senior .......................................................... □

GESTIÓN DEL CONOCIMIENTO
E8. Ahora le quiero preguntar sobre los mecanismos que se utilizan para promover la gestión del conocimiento a nivel internacional. Con esto me refiero a aquellos mecanismos que se utilizan para crear un nuevo conocimiento involucrando a directivos de diferentes países, o para difundir conocimiento de una parte a otra de la organización internacional.

E8a. ¿Hay alguna política formal en gestión del conocimiento para:
MARCAR UNA SOLA CADA VEZ

   a) la subsidiaria .................. Sí □ .............. No □ .............. No sabe □
   b) la multinacional ............. Sí □ ................ No □ .............. No sabe □

E8b. Pensando en los directivos, ¿La subsidiaria utiliza alguno de los siguientes procedimientos para facilitar la gestión del conocimiento?

POR FAVOR LEER. MARCAR UNO PARA CADA CATEGORÍA.

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E8d. ¿Cuál de éstos es el mecanismo de gestión del conocimiento internacional más utilizado por los directivos dentro de la subsidiaria? LEER Y MARCAR UNA SOLO.

CAPÍTULO VISUALIZA PUNTOS MOSTRADOS EN E8B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destinos para expatriados</th>
<th>Grupos de trabajo o task forces internacionales</th>
<th>Comités formales internacionales</th>
<th>Redes informales internacionales</th>
<th>Traslados internacionales a otras organizaciones (p.ej. proveedores, clientes, universidades, entidades privadas de I+D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Si</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No sabe</td>
<td>Si</td>
<td>No sabe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E8e. Pensando en [el mecanismo de gestión del conocimiento más importante – e8d], ¿Hasta qué punto es importante para las siguientes cuestiones?:

POR FAVOR MARCAR UNO SOLO PARA CADA CATEGORÍA

1= nada importante
5= muy importante

1. Desarrollo de políticas internacionales
2. Adaptación de políticas internacionales
3. Difusión internacional de las mejores prácticas
4. Desarrollo de las competencias organizativas esenciales a nivel internacional
5. Desarrollo de una cultura organizativa global
6. Generación internacional de nuevo conocimiento o del know-how
7. OTRO, especificar

E9a. Utilizando esta escala, ¿Hasta qué punto la subsidiaria, como conjunto, tiene discrecionalidad para determinar las siguientes políticas de desarrollo y formación?

MARCAR UNA PARA CADA CATEGORÍA

LEER SI NECESARIO: POR FAVOR PENSAR EN EL NIVEL DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN POR ENCIMA DE LAS OPERACIONES DE ESPAÑA EN SU CONJUNTO.

EN ALGUNOS CASOS EL NIVEL MÁS ALTO PUEDE SER UN HEADQUARTER DE UNA DIVISIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE LA COMPAÑÍA O DE UN NEGOCIO EUROPEO, QUE ESTÁ UBICADO EN ESPAÑA.

1= Las operaciones en Sp no tienen capacidad de decisión (deben implementar la política configurada por un nivel superior como la casa matriz o el hq regional)
2= Las operaciones en Sp tienen cierta capacidad de decisión (pueden desarrollar la política dentro de unas reglas/marco establecido por el nivel organizativo superior)
3= Las operaciones en Sp tienen completa capacidad de decisión (pueden desarrollar la política de acuerdo con sus necesidades)
4= Las operaciones en Sp tienen responsabilidad total de la política (tienen la facultad de desarrollar la política de forma independiente)

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5. Las operaciones en Sp tienen plena capacidad de decisión (configuran ellas mismas su propia política)

PREGUNTAR EN TODO LOS CASOS
i. El conjunto de políticas de formación y desarrollo en las operaciones en España ........... □

PREGUNTAR SI SI EN E8Aa
iv. Política en gestión del conocimiento en las operaciones españolas ......................... □

PREGUNTAR SI SI EN E4
v. Política en planificación del ascenso de los directivos senior en las operaciones de España □

No sabe ........................................................................................................................................ □

SECCIÓN F: PARTICIPACIÓN DE LOS EMPLEADOS Y COMUNICACIÓN

Me gustaría preguntarle ahora sobre las políticas de su empresa con respecto a la comunicación y participación de los empleados en la empresa, empezando por la participación de los empleados en el proceso de trabajo.

PREGUNTAR EN TODO LOS CASOS:

Participación e implicación

F1. ¿Podría decirme si utiliza las siguientes prácticas con respecto al MGE en la subsidiaria?
POR FAVOR MARCAR UNO POR CADA CATEGORÍA

- Equipos formalmente designados en los que los empleados tienen cierta responsabilidad para organizar su trabajo y llevar a cabo un conjunto de tareas .................................................. Si □ ................................ No □

- Grupos donde los empleados discuten sobre cuestiones de calidad, producción o servicio, como grupos de solución de problemas o de mejora continua .............................................. Si □ ................................ No □

- Cualquier otra práctica designada específicamente para implicar directamente a los empleados en el proceso de trabajo .......................................................... Si □ ................................ No □

SI ‘NO’ A TODAS, IR A F5; OTROS PREGUNTAR F2 Y F3

PREGUNTAR F2 SI CÓDIGOS 2 O 3 EN A5E (centros de trabajo) SOLAMENTE
F2. ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones es más exacta respecto al sistema de participación de los empleados de la subsidiaria? MARCAR UNO SOLO

Existe un sistema idéntico o similar en todos o casi todos los ‘centros de trabajo’ ................. □

Todos o casi todos los ‘centros de trabajo’ tienen algún sistema de participación, pero éste es diferente en cada sitio ............................................................................................................. □

Algunos ‘centros de trabajo’ tienen sistemas de participación, otros no ................................... □

No sabe ........................................................................................................................................ □

F3. ¿Qué importancia tiene cada uno de los siguientes casos como modelo que ha sido adoptado por la subsidiaria?
1= no tenido en cuenta para nada
5= fuente de casos muy importante
POR FAVOR MARCAR UNO POR CADA CATEGORÍA
i. Prácticas específicas de otro lugar del mundo donde esté operando la multinacional

No sabe

ii. Modelo formal de buena práctica codificado en otro lugar del mundo donde esté operando la multinacional

No sabe

iv. Casos llevados a cabo por otras firmas

No sabe

SOLO PREGUNTAR A LOS QUE CONTESTARON 3, 4 O 5 EN LA AFIRMACIÓN IV DE F3:
F3A. ¿Podría afirmar que los casos de participación que se han llevado a cabo por otras firmas proceden de su sector de negocio, de fuera de él, o desde ambos por igual? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Sector
2. Fuera del sector
3. Ambos casos por igual

PREGUNTAR F5 SI SE MARCAN 2 O 3 EN A5E (centros de trabajo) SOLO:
F5. ¿La subsidiaria utiliza regularmente equipos de proyecto o task forces en los que se involucran empleados no directivos, y que funcionen en más de una unidad operativa? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Si
2. No
3. No sabe

SI 'SI' EN F5, PREGUNTAR F5A; SINO, IR A F7:
F5A. ¿Estos equipos incluyen a miembros de su (nombre del grupo clave)? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Si
2. No
3. No sabe

F5C. ¿Tienen esquemas formales de formación para los empleados implicados en estas actividades? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Si
2. No
3. No sabe

F5E. ¿Estos grupos también involucran a empleados de sus clientes o de sus proveedores? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Si
2. No
3. No sabe

F5F. ¿Y estos grupos incluyen proyectos conjuntos con otras empresas que en otros temas son competencia? MARCAR UNO SOLO
SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO ESTÁ SEGURO, EXPLICÁRSELO PONIENDO, COMO EJEMPLO, EL CASO DE 2 FIRMAS DE INFORMÁTICA QUE ESTÁN TRABAJANDO JUNTAS EN UNA PIEZA CONCRETA DE SOFTWARE.

1. Si .................................................. □
2. No .................................................. □
3. No sabe ............................................. □

F6. ¿En España estos grupos también incluyen a empleados de fuera de España? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Si .................................................. □
2. No .................................................. □
3. No sabe ............................................. □

SI ‘Sí’ PREGUNTAR F6A; SI NO, IR A F7:

F6A. ¿Hasta qué punto es común la estructura trasnacional de estos equipos? MARCAR UNO SOLO
1= muy rara
5= muy común

.................................................. □

No sabe ............................................. □

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:

F7. ¿Los equipos de proyecto o Task forces operan en otros lugares del mundo donde está presente la multinacional? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. Si .................................................. □
2. No .................................................. □
3. No sabe ............................................. □

SI ‘Sí’, PREGUNTAR F7A; SINO IR A F8:

F7A. ¿Hasta qué punto están extendidas estas actividades? MARCAR UNO SOLO

1. De forma global .................................. □
2. En la mayoría de las regiones .............. □
3. En algunas regiones ................................. □
4. No sabe ............................................. □

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:
Ahora me gustaría preguntarle sobre las medidas adoptadas para establecer una comunicación con sus empleados.

F8. ¿Cuál de los siguientes mecanismos se utiliza regularmente para comunicarse con el MGE, dentro de la subsidiaria? MARCAR UNO DE CADA CATEGORÍA

Reuniones entre los directivos senior y todos los empleados
.................................................. Si □ .................................................. No □ .................................................. No sabe □

Reuniones entre los directores de línea o supervisores y empleados (a veces llamados briefing groups)
.................................................. Si □ .................................................. No □ .................................................. No sabe □
Encuestas de actitud

………………………………………Si□………………………… No□……………………………………No sabe□

Esquemas de sugerencia

………………………………………Si□………………………… No□……………………………………………………No sabe□

Esquema de puertas abiertas

………………………………………Si□………………………… No□……………………………………………………No sabe□

Uso sistemático de la cadena de mando para la información en cascada

………………………………………Si□………………………… No□……………………………………………………No sabe□

Revistas de empresa o emails

………………………………………Si□………………………… No□……………………………………………………No sabe□

La intranet de la empresa proporcionando información a los empleados

………………………………………Si□………………………… No□……………………………………………………No sabe□

Otros (POR FAVOR ESPECIFICAR) __________________________________________

PREGUNTAR F8A SI HAY MÁS DE UNA MENCIONADA; SI HAY SOLO UNA, IR A F8B. SI NO HAY NINGUNA MENCIONADA, IR A F9:

F8A. ¿La subsidiaria da particular importancia a cualquiera de estos mecanismos? MARCAR UNO SOLO

Si □
No □

SI ‘SI’ EN F8A:

F8ai ¿A qué mecanismo le da particular importancia la subsidiaria?

___________________________________________________

CAPI PARA VISUALIZAR MARCAS SI ‘SI’ EN F8

PREGUNTAR SI HAY RESPUESTA MÚLTIPLE EN A5E:

F8B. ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones corresponde más estrechamente al sistema de comunicación en la subsidiaria? MARCAR UNO SOLO

Existe un sistema idéntico o similar en todos o casi todos los ‘centros de trabajo’ □

Todos o casi todos los centros de trabajo tienen sistemas de comunicación, pero difieren entre uno y otro .......................................................... □

Algunos centros de trabajo tienen sistemas de comunicación mientras que otros no .................................. □

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS:

F9. ¿Cuál de la siguiente información interna de la subsidiaria se proporciona regularmente al MGE?

- La posición financiera de la empresa española ...........Si□........ No□.....No sabe□
- planes de inversión ......................................................... Si□...No□.....No sabe□
- planes de personal ......................................................... Si□...... No□.....No sabe□

F9b. ¿Cuál de la siguiente información sobre la multinacional se proporciona regularmente al MGE desde la subsidiaria?

- La posición financiera de la multinacional......Si□...... No□....No sabe□
- planes de inversión ......................................................... Si□...... No□....No sabe□
- planes de personal ......................................................... Si□...... No□....No sabe□
F10. Utilizando esta escala, ¿hasta qué punto tiene la subsidiaria en su conjunto discrecionalidad sobre los aspectos de participación de los empleados y la política de comunicación?
POR FAVOR MARCAR UNO POR CADA CATEGORÍA

LEER SI ES NECESARIO. POR FAVOR PENSAR EN UN NIVEL DE ORGANIZACIÓN POR ENCIMA DE LAS OPERACIONES EN ESPAÑA EN SU CONJUNTO.

EN ALGUNOS CASOS, EL NIVEL MÁS ALTO PUEDE SER UN HQ DE UNA DIVISIÓN DE NEGOCIOS INTERNACIONAL O UN HQ EUROPEO QUE ESTÉ UBICADO EN ESPAÑA.

1 = Las operaciones en Sp no tienen capacidad de decisión (deben implementar la política configurada por un nivel superior como la casa matriz o elhq regional)
2 = Las operaciones en Sp tienen cierta capacidad de decisión (pueden desarrollar la política dentro de unas reglas/marco establecido por el nivel organizativo superior)
4 = Las operaciones en Sp tienen plena capacidad de decisión (configuran ellas mismas su propia política)

AFIRMACIONES ROTATIVAS

Políticas referentes a:

- a) Implicación de los empleados en el proceso de trabajo, p. ej. un trabajo en equipo o grupos para resolver problemas .............................................................................................................................................
  □ N/A □ No sabe
- b) Encuestas de actitud y esquemas de sugerencias..........................................................................................................................................
  □ N/A □ No sabe
- c) Suministrar información a los empleados ..................................................................................................................................
  □ N/A □ No sabe

CUANDO LA SITUACIÓN VARÍE EN DIFERENTES CENTROS DE TRABAJO O UNIDADES DE NEGOCIO DENTRO DE ESPAÑA, POR FAVOR PREGUNTAR AL ENTREVISTADO PARA QUE CONTESTE POR EL LUGAR O UNIDAD MÁS IMPORTANTE.

SECCIÓN G: REPRESENTACIÓN Y CONSULTA DE LOS EMPLEADOS

Me gustaría preguntarle ahora algunas preguntas sobre la representación y la consulta de los empleados.

Representación de los trabajadores

GN1. ¿Existe algún tipo de representación legal de los trabajadores, como un Comité de Empresa, en su compañía?

  Si ........................................
  No ..................................

Si ‘sí’ en 1, preguntar:

G1. ¿En cuántos centros de trabajo existe dicha representación legal?

  en todos los centros de trabajo de la subsidiaria española........................................
  en alguno de los centros de trabajo de la subsidiaria española..............................
  en el único que tiene la multinacional en España .....................................................
  NO SABE ......................................................................................................................

GN24. ¿A qué grupos de trabajadores afecta dicha representación legal?

  a. Mayor Grupo de Empleados (MGE) ..........................................................
  b. Grupo clave ....................................................................................................
  c. Ambos ..............................................................................................................
Si ‘sí’ en 1, preguntar:

**GN2. ¿Los representantes de los trabajadores pertenecen a algún sindicato?**

- Sí ........................................
- No ........................................
- No sabe ...................................

**GN3. ¿Se ha llegado a formar alguna Sección Sindical en la empresa?**

- Sí ........................................
- No ........................................

Si ‘sí’ en 3.a, preguntar:

**GN4. ¿En cuántos centros de trabajo existe alguna Sección Sindical?**

- en todos los centros de trabajo de la subsidiaria española .................
- en alguno de los centros de trabajo de la subsidiaria española ............
- en el único que tiene la multinacional en España .............................
- NO SABE ....................................

Si ‘sí’ en 3.a, preguntar:

**G2a. Con vistas a entender la evolución de la actividad en su empresa, ¿alguna de estas secciones sindicales se ha establecido en los centros de trabajo ya existentes, en los últimos 4 años?**

- Sí ........................................
- No ........................................
- No sabe .................................

**GN5. ¿Se les confieren a las Secciones Sindicales más privilegios que los legalmente establecidos en el artículo 8.2 LOLS?**

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: las facultades que se reconocen a la sección sindical, sin perjuicio de los derechos adicionales, son: actividades de proselitismo sindical dentro de la empresa, derecho de reunión en la empresa o centro de trabajo, recaudar cuotas sindicales, derecho a contar con un local adecuado y un tablón de anuncios, derecho a la negociación colectiva, ejercicio del derecho de huelga, y competencias relativas a las elecciones para los órganos de representación unitaria.

- Sí ........................................
- No ........................................

Si contesta a) o b) en pregunta 1.1, preguntar:

**GN6. ¿Cómo se articula la representación a nivel de empresa en el caso en que existan varios centros de trabajo con su propio Comité de Empresa?**

- a. Creación de un Comité de Empresa conjunto .................................
- b. Creación de un Comité intercentros ..........................................
- c. Ninguno de los dos .................................................................

Nota al entrevistador: por ‘Comité de Empresa conjunto’ entendemos el tipo de comité que se crea en aquellas empresas que tengan en la misma provincia o en municipios limítrofes dos o más centros de trabajo que no alcancen los 50 trabajadores cada uno, pero que en su conjunto los sumen.

Por ‘comité intercentros’ entendemos aquel órgano representativo de segundo grado, cuyos miembros son elegidos por y entre los componentes de los distintos comités de empresa de dicha empresa.

**GN7. ¿Las competencias que se reconocen a dicha representación quedan indicadas en un convenio colectivo?**
Si ha contestado a) o b) en pregunta 1.1, y con vistas a entender la evolución de la actividad laboral en su empresa:

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS

5. ¿Se han establecido nuevos centros de trabajo en España en los últimos 4 años?
   Si .................. □
   No .................. □

GN9. ¿Cómo se han creado estos nuevos centros de trabajo?

   Por fusión o adquisición: BROWNFIELDS .............................................. □
   Por nueva creación: GREENFIELDS .................................................. □

Si responde 6.b (caso de ser nuevos centros GREENFIELDS), preguntar:

GN10. ¿En estos nuevos centros de trabajo existe algún tipo de representación legal de los trabajadores, como un Comité de Empresa?

   Si .................. □
   No .................. □

Si responde ‘sí’ en 6.b.1, preguntar:

GN11. ¿Los representantes de los trabajadores pertenecen a algún sindicato?

   Si .................. □
   No .................. □
   No sabe ........... □

Si responde ‘sí’ en 6.b.2, preguntar:

GN12. ¿Se les confieren más privilegios que los legalmente establecidos?

   Si .................. □
   No .................. □
   No sabe ........... □

Si responde ‘sí’ en 6.b.1, preguntar:

GN13. ¿Se ha llegado a crear alguna Sección Sindical en estos nuevos centros de trabajo?

   Si .................. □
   No .................. □
   No sabe ........... □

Si responde ‘sí’ en 6.b.2, preguntar:
GN14. ¿Se les confieren a estas Secciones Sindicales más privilegios que los legalmente establecidos en el artículo 8.2 LOLS (negociar convenios colectivos estatutarios, tablón de anuncios en la empresa, contar con un local cuando tengan más de 250 trabajadores)?

Si.......................... □
No ......................... □
No sabe ............... □

Si responde 6.a (caso de ser nuevos centros BROWNFIELDS), preguntar:

GN15. ¿En estos nuevos centros de trabajo existía ya algún tipo de representación legal de los trabajadores, como un Comité de Empresa?

Si.......................... □
No ......................... □
No sabe ............... □

Si responde ‘sí’ en 6.a.1, preguntar:

GN16. ¿Los representantes de los trabajadores pertenecían ya a algún sindicato?

Si.......................... □
No ......................... □
No sabe ............... □

Si responde ‘sí’ en 6.a.2, preguntar:

G6 ¿La nueva adquisición ha dado lugar a algún avance o mejora con respecto a la realidad sindical anterior?

MULTICODE
Si......................... □
No ....................... □

Negociación colectiva:

G9. ¿Existe negociación colectiva en su empresa?

Si □
No ........................................ □

Si contesta NO,

GN17. ¿Qué tipo de acuerdo afecta a su empresa?

convenio colectivo de sector ..................... □
ningún convenio colectivo ....................... □

Si contesta SI,

GN18. ¿De qué tipo de negociación colectiva se trata?

Convenio colectivo ................................ □
Pacto de empresa ................................. □

G10. ¿A cuántos trabajadores afecta el Convenio Colectivo (o pacto de empresa) en su empresa?

i. A la totalidad de los trabajadores .......................... □
ii. A un determinado porcentaje de trabajadores ............. □
iii. A determinados colectivos de trabajadores que estén bajo un convenio franja □

si contesta 7.3.ii, preguntar:
¿qué porcentaje es?

Escribir porcentaje: _______________

No sabe ................................

G11. ¿Las cuestiones que se han negociado son...?

  Iguales para todos los centros de trabajo de su empresa (principio de unidad de empresa) .................................................................

  Diferentes en cada centro de trabajo ................................

G13. ¿Hasta qué punto los directivos tienen plena independencia o dependen de la matriz de la multinacional a la hora de negociar con los sindicatos?

  NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI NECESARIO, EXPLICAR QUE 2 Y 4 SON POSIBILIDADES INTERMEDIAS ENTRE LOS PUNTOS 1, 3 Y 5, CON POSIBILIDAD ASÍ DE QUE EL ENCUESTADO PUEDA MATIZAR.

  1. No tienen autonomía (dependen por completo de la matriz de la multinacional) .................................................................

  2. .................................................................

  3. Tienen cierta autonomía (basándose siempre en unos criterios dictados por la matriz) .................................................................

  4. .................................................................

  5. Tienen plena independencia ................................

Información y consulta

G14. ¿Tienen lugar reuniones regulares entre directivos y representantes de los trabajadores a nivel nacional con el objetivo de proveer información y consulta?

  SI ES NECESARIO: nos referimos con ‘regular’ a más de una vez al año. Nos referimos ‘a nivel de la subsidiaria española’ a todas aquellas reuniones que afectan al CONJUNTO de los trabajadores de la subsidiaria en España.

  Sí .................

  No .................

  No sabe ........

Si contesta ‘sí’ en 8, preguntar:

G16. ¿A qué tipo de grupo afectan estas reuniones?

  Todos los empleados bajo un solo convenio .................................................................

  Un determinado porcentaje de empleados .................................................................

  Empleados que estén bajo un convenio franja .................................................................

G18d. ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones describe mejor la naturaleza de estas reuniones?

  NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI NECESARIO, EXPLICAR QUE LAS OPCIONES b Y d ESTÁN A MEDIO CAMINO ENTRE LAS OPCIONES a Y c, Y c Y e, RESPECTIVAMENTE, CON LA POSIBILIDAD ASÍ DE QUE EL ENCUESTADO PUEDA MATIZAR.

  1. La dirección no facilita más que la mínima información para respetar la normativa vigente .................................................................

  2. .................................................................

  3. La dirección proporciona información un poco más allá del mínimo legal .................................................................

  4. .................................................................
5. La dirección proporciona una información considerablemente superior a la mínima requerida. Se mantiene un diálogo importante con los representantes de los trabajadores.................................................................

Si contesta ‘no’ en 8, preguntar:

G20. ¿Prevé establecer una estructura de reuniones para los próximos 2 años?

   Sí. ....................... ☐
   No ..................... ☐
   No sabe .......... ☐

GN19. ¿Tienen lugar reuniones regulares entre directivos y representantes de los trabajadores a nivel inferior al nacional con el objetivo de proveer información y consulta?
   SI ES NECESARIO: nos referimos con ‘regular’ a más de una vez al año. Con ‘nivel inferior al nacional’ nos referimos a nivel del centro de trabajo y/o a aquellas reuniones que afectan a trabajadores de diversos centros de trabajo (p.e, una región o negocio), pero no a todos los lugares donde está presente la subsidiaria española.

   Sí. ....................... ☐
   No ..................... ☐
   No sabe .......... ☐

Si contesta ‘sí’ en 9, preguntar:

G21. ¿A qué tipo de grupo afectan estas reuniones?
   a. Todos los empleados bajo un solo convenio ........................................... ☐
   b. Un determinado porcentaje de empleados ........................................... ☐
   c. Empleados que estén bajo un convenio franja .................................... ☐

GN20. ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones describe mejor la naturaleza de estas reuniones?
   1. La dirección no facilita más que la mínima información para respetar la normativa vigente ........................................................................................................... ☐
   2. ................................................................................................................... ☐
   3. La dirección proporciona información un poco más allá del mínimo legal ☐
   4. ................................................................................................................... ☐
   5. La dirección proporciona una información considerablemente superior la mínima requerida. Se mantiene un diálogo importante con los representantes de los trabajadores.................................................................

Si contesta ‘no’ en 9, preguntar:

GN21. ¿Prevé establecer una estructura de reuniones para los próximos 2 años?
   i. Sí................................. ☐
   ii. No ................................... ☐
   iii. No sabe........................... ☐

G22. A raíz de la implementación en España de la Directiva Marco 11 de marzo de 2002, para impulsar y promover los derechos de información y consulta de los trabajadores en el ámbito comunitario, ¿su empresa ha sufrido algún cambio en cuanto a las disposiciones para la información y consulta de los empleados?

   SI ............................................. ☐
   NO ........................................... ☐
   NO SABE ............................... ☐

G23. ¿Cuáles de los siguientes cambios han tenido lugar, y en qué centros de trabajo?
   NO MARCAR MÁS DE UNO POR CATEGORÍA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>En todos los centros de trabajo</th>
<th>En alguno de los centros de trabajo de la subsidiaria española</th>
<th>En el único centro de trabajo que tiene la multinacional en España</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establecimiento de nuevas medidas de consulta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modificaciones a medidas de consulta ya existentes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GN23. ¿Existe algún otro tipo de cauces de información y consulta, a parte de los formales ya vistos?**

- Sí ..........................................
- No ..........................................
- No sabe ..................................

Si ‘sí’ en 11, preguntar:

**G26. ¿qué grado de importancia se les da?**

- i. Más que al régimen de información y consulta formal ..................................
- ii. Igual que al régimen de información y consulta formal ......................................
- iii. Menos que al régimen de información y consulta formal ..................................

**PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS**

**G27. Utilizando la siguiente escala, ¿hasta qué punto los mandos directivos tienen autonomía a la hora de facilitar información y consulta a los empleados en la subsidiaria española en su conjunto?**

1. no tienen capacidad de decisión (deben implementar la política configurada por un nivel superior como la casa matriz o el HQ regional) .............................................................
2… ..................................................................................................................
3. tienen cierta capacidad de decisión (pueden desarrollar la política dentro de unas reglas/marco establecido por el nivel organizativo superior) ..............................................
4… ..................................................................................................................
5. tienen plena capacidad de decisión (configuran ellos mismos su propia política) ..................................

Si NECESARIO: por favor pensar en un nivel de la organización que sea superior al de las operaciones en España en su conjunto. En algunos casos, el nivel superior puede ser el HQ de un negocio internacional o un HQ europeo que esté basado en España.

**UNIÓN EUROPEA**

**G28. ¿Existe un Comité de Empresa Europeo (CEE) u otra estructura similar de información y consulta a nivel europeo en su empresa?**

- Sí ..........................................
- No ..........................................
- No sabe ..................................

**G30. ¿Participa usted o cualquier otro directivo de la subsidiaria española en las reuniones del CEE?**

- Si – atiende regularmente ..................................
- Si – atiende esporádicamente ..................................
- No ..........................................................................................................
- No sabe ..................................................................................................
G31. ¿Comparte experiencias de las prácticas del CEE con otras empresas que también tengan estructuras similares?

- Sí, con empresas del mismo sector ................................
- Sí, con empresas de otros sectores ................................
- No ...........................................................................
- No sabe ......................................................................

Si ‘no’ en 14, preguntar:

G32. ¿Recibe información sobre las actividades y reuniones del CEE...

- i. Sistemáticamente al mismo tiempo que las reuniones del CEE .............
- ii. Periódicamente, según se establezca en cada caso si se considera necesario o no ........................................
- iii. Poca o ninguna información sobre el CEE ...........................................

Si ‘sí’ en 13, preguntar:

G34d. ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones describe mejor la naturaleza del CEE?

NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: SI NECESARIO, EXPLICAR QUE LAS OPCIONES 2 Y 4 ESTÁN A MEDIO CAMINO ENTRE LAS OPCIONES 1 Y 3, Y 3 Y 5, RESPECTIVAMENTE, CON LA POSIBILIDAD ASÍ DE QUE EL ENCUESTADO PUEDA MATIZAR.

1. La dirección no facilita más que la mínima información que se requiere para respetar la normativa/legislación vigente; no hay o hay muy poco diálogo con los representantes de los empleados sobre los temas, y los representantes no tienen ningún peso en la toma de decisiones.
2. ...
3. La dirección proporciona información un poco más allá del mínimo requerido para respetar la normativa/legislación vigente; existe un cierto diálogo con los representantes de los empleados para un determinado tipo de cuestiones, y estos tienen un peso limitado en la toma de decisiones.
4. ...
5. La dirección proporciona una información considerablemente superior a la mínima requerida; se da un diálogo importante con los representantes de los empleados con respecto a muchas cuestiones, y estos tienen un peso importante en la toma de decisiones.

Si ‘No’ o ‘NS’ EN 13, preguntar:

G35. ¿Cree que se establecerá un CEE en un futuro?

- Si – en los próximos dos años ........................................
- Si – en más de dos años ..............................................
- No ............................................................................
- No sabe ......................................................................

SECCIÓN H: BACKGROUND DE LA EMPRESA

H1. Tamaño

a. Ahora le enseñaré una lista de 5 regiones geográficas. ¿Podría decirme por favor cuántos empleados se calculan aproximadamente en cada una de ellas? NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: POR FAVOR SEÑALE CUANDO ESTAS CIFRAS SEAN ESTIMACIONES
España _________________________________ 
Europa (excluyendo a España) ______________ 
Norteamérica _______________________________ 
Asia-Pacífico ................................................................
Resto del mundo ____________________________

SE PERMITE NS ........................................... 
NINGUNO (no ninguno para España) ............... 

CAPI para asegurar que las CIFRAS suman el NUMERO DE EMPLEADOS EN ESPAÑA EN S8B o S8C, a no ser que haya un NS o estimaciones en esas preguntas.

H1AA. ¿Estas cifras son estimaciones? (esto aparecerá por separado en cada región en H1A, donde habrá una respuesta numérica)
Si..................................................□ 
No ..............................................□ 

PREGUNTAR EN TODOS LOS CASOS: 
b. ¿Cuántos empleados de la multinacional trabajan en el país de la casa matriz? 
NOTA AL ENTREVISTADOR: POR FAVOR ANOTAR SI ESTAS CIFRAS SON ESTIMACIONES
Introducir una respuesta numérica _________________________ (MIN 1, MAX 2,000,000) 
Ninguno.............................□ 
NO SABE ...............................□ 

c. En total, ¿qué porcentaje hay en la subsidiaria de hombres/mujeres? 
Hombres ________
Mujeres ________

d. ¿Cuál es aproximadamente el porcentaje en la subsidiaria de... LEER 

Personal temporal o contratado que trabaja regularmente ________________ % 
NO SABE ........................................□ 

Personal permanente ________________ % 
NO SABE ........................................□ 

Introducir datos que sumen lógicamente un 100% 

e. ¿Hasta qué punto se ha visto modificado el número de empleados en la subsidiaria en los últimos tres años?
MARCAR UNO SOLO.

1= aumento significativo (más de un 10%) ...........................................□ 
2= leve aumento (hasta 10%) ..........................................................□ 
3= no ha cambiado .................................................................□ 
4= leve disminución (ha bajado hasta un 10%) ..................................□ 
5= disminución significativa (ha bajado más de un 10%) .....................□ 

NO SABE .................................................................□ 

H2. Nivel de Diversificación y Sector 

a. De las siguientes afirmaciones, ¿cuál describe mejor la subsidiaria? 
MARCAR UNO SOLO

Se produce...
Un solo producto o servicio que supone más del 90% de las ventas
Un grupo de productos y servicios donde [solo] uno de éstos supone entre el 70% y el 90% de las ventas
Un grupo de productos y servicios donde ninguno de éstos supone más de un 70% de las ventas
Una serie de productos y servicios no relacionados entre sí

NS

Preguntar si ‘MANUFACTURERO’ en A9 del screening:
H2C. ¿La subsidiaria lleva a cabo…?

LEER

La fabricación del producto o
Otras funciones para los productos manufacturados en otra parte
Ambas, producción y otras funciones

H3. Estandarización o Diferenciación
¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones describe mejor el producto, servicio o marca (o grupo de productos, servicios o marcas) más importante de la multinacional?

NOTA PARA ENTREVISTADOR: ‘MÁS IMPORTANTE’ SIGNIFICA EL PRODUCTO, SERVICIO O MARCA QUE GENERA MAYORES INGRESOS

MARCAR UNO SOLO.

Se ha adaptado significativamente al mercado nacional
Se ha adaptado a diferentes regiones del mundo pero está estandarizado dentro de éstas
Está estandarizado globalmente

NS

H4. Integración / Vínculos en Producción / Suministro de servicios a través de las fronteras

a. ¿Se produce alguno de los componentes, productos y servicios de la subsidiaria para operaciones de la multinacional basadas fuera de España?

Si – todos
Si – algunos pero no todos
No – ninguno

NS

H4b. ¿Hay operaciones de la multinacional en otras partes del mundo que provean componentes, productos o servicios a la subsidiaria?

Si
No
No sabe

H4e. A continuación le voy a leer una serie de afirmaciones sobre el papel de la subsidiaria en la multinacional. Para cada una, por favor dígame si está de acuerdo o no, basándose en una escala del 1 al 5, donde 1 es ‘discrepa completamente’ y el 5 es ‘completamente de acuerdo’.

1= discrepa completamente
2= discrepa
3= ni de acuerdo ni discrepa
4= de acuerdo ................................
5= totalmente de acuerdo .................

La subsidiaria tiene responsabilidad internacional para uno o más productos o servicios de parte de la multinacional.
La subsidiaria tiene experiencia significativa de Investigación y Desarrollo

H4f. ¿Qué porcentaje de ingresos de la subsidiaria proviene de ventas en el extranjero?

Escribir un porcentaje: __________________
No sabe ........................................
Ninguno .........................................

H5. Intensidad y Naturaleza de la competencia

a. ¿Ante cuántos competidores importantes se enfrenta con respecto a los principales productos o servicios de la subsidiaria?

INTRODUCIR UN NÚMERO _________________ ESCALA 1-100
SI NS ACUDIR A ESCALAS.

Ninguno .........................................
1 ...................................................
2-5 ................................................
6-10 .............................................
11-49 ...........................................
50+ .............................................
NS ................................................

H6. Sistema de Propiedad

b. En España, ¿la multinacional cotiza, o no cotiza en Bolsa?

1. Sí .............................................
2. No ...........................................

a. La multinacional, ¿cotiza en bolsa en el país de origen?

1. Sí ............................................
2. No ...........................................

H9. Fusiones y Adquisiciones Internacionales

a. ¿Alguna parte de la subsidiaria se ha unido a la actual multinacional como resultado de una fusión o adquisición en los últimos 5 años?

Sí ...............................................
No .............................................

No sabe .......................................
B. ¿La fusión o adquisición supuso un cambio en la nacionalidad de la propiedad de la subsidiaria?
LEER: Si ha tenido lugar más de una fusión o adquisición, por favor pensar en la más reciente.

Si ............................................. ir a H9c
No o No Sabe.............................. ir a H10
No sabe ..................................... ir a H10

C. ¿Cuál era la nacionalidad anterior de la subsidiaria?

1. Australiana (Australia) ........................................
2. Argentina (Argentina) ........................................
3. Austriaca (Austria) ............................................
4. Belga (Bélgica) ..................................................
5. Canadiense (Canadá) ...........................................
6. Danesa (Dinamarca) ...........................................
7. Finandesa (Finlandia) .........................................
8. Francesa (Francia) .............................................
9. Alemana (Alemania) ...........................................
10. Irlandesa (Irlanda) .............................................
11. Italiana (Italia) ..................................................
12. Japonesa (Japón) .............................................
13. Luxemburguesa (Luxemburgo) .........................
14. Malasia (Malasia) .............................................
15. Holandesa (Holanda) ........................................
16. Noruega (Noruega) .........................................
17. Singapurense (Singapur) ....................................
18. Sudáfricana (Sudáfrica) ....................................
19. Española (España) ...........................................
20. Sueca (Suecia) ..................................................
21. Suiza (Suiza) ...................................................
22. Inglesa (Inglaterra) .......................................... 
23. Taiwanesa (Taiwán) .........................................
24. Americana (Estados Unidos) .............................
25. de las Islas Vírgenes (Islas Vírgenes) ............... 
26. Otra (especificar) ............................................
27. No sabe ..........................................................

H10. Joint Ventures
a. ¿La subsidiaria tiene joint ventures, alianzas estratégicas o vínculos formales similares con otras empresas fuera del grupo?
NOTA DEL ENTREVISTADOR. Por favor incluir las franquicias dentro de esta definición.

Si ..........................................................
No ..........................................................

No sabe ..................................................

SI ‘SI’ EN H10A:

b. ¿Hasta qué punto son importantes estas actividades con respecto a sus operaciones en su totalidad?

LEER: POR FAVOR UTILIZAR UNA ESCALA DEL 1 AL 5, DONDE 1 ES ‘NADA SIGNIFICATIVO’ Y EL 5 ES ‘MUY SIGNIFICATIVO’

1= nada significativo..............................
2..........................................................
3..........................................................
4..........................................................
5= muy significativo..............................
Nuevas inversiones en la empresa en España

H11a. ¿En estos cinco últimos años, la subsidiaria se ha visto involucrada en alguna inversión significativa en un nuevo centro de trabajo, o en la expansión por centros de trabajo ya existentes en España? Por favor, excluir las fusiones, adquisiciones, joint ventures o alianzas estratégicas.

Si .................................................. □
No .................................................. □

No sabe .................................................. □

Si ‘si’ ir a b (otros ir a H12a)

H11b. Cuando se decidió que España sería el lugar de la inversión, ¿hasta qué punto las consideraciones laborales siguientes tuvieron importancia a la hora de tomar esas decisiones?

LEER. POR FAVOR UTILIZAR UNA ESCALA DEL 1 AL 5, DONDE 1 ES ‘NADA IMPORTANTE’ Y 5 ES ‘MUY IMPORTANTE’

1= nada importante
5= muy importante

Costes laborales bajos.......................................................... □
Presencia de cualidades especializadas.................................. □
Marco favorable de legislación laboral.................................... □

NO SABE .................................................................................. □

Cierre de los centros de trabajo y racionalizaciones

H12a. ¿En estos últimos 5 años, la subsidiaria ha llevado a cabo el cierre de algún centro de trabajo en España?

Si .......................................................... □
No .......................................................... □

No sabe .......................................................... □

Preguntar H12b si ‘si’ en H12a (otros, concluir entrevista)

H12b. Cuando se decidió que España fuera el lugar donde se cerraría un centro de trabajo, ¿hasta qué punto las siguientes consideraciones laborales fueron factores importantes a la hora de tomar esas decisiones?

LEER: POR FAVOR UTILIZAR UNA ESCALA DEL 1 AL 5, DONDE 1 ES ‘NADA IMPORTANTE’ Y 5 ES ‘MUY IMPORTANTE’

1= nada importante
5= muy importante
Costes laborales altos .................................................................
Escasez de cualidades especializadas .......................................
Legislación favorable en despidos y clausuras ....................... 
NO SABE ......................................................................................

SECCIÓN I: INFLUENCIA DE LAS OPERACIONES EN ESPAÑA EN LA MULTINACIONAL

Las siguientes preguntas se hacen en relación con la influencia de la subsidiaria en la multinacional.

I1a. ¿La subsidiaria ha aportado alguna práctica nueva en las siguientes áreas que haya empezado a utilizarse por la multinacional en algún otro lugar del mundo? MARCAR UNO PARA CADA CATEGORÍA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Sí, en algunas partes de la empresa</th>
<th>Sí, en las áreas de negocio principales</th>
<th>Sí, se utiliza en todas las operaciones de la MNC</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salario y evaluación del desempeño</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formación y desarrollo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participación y comunicación con los empleados</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consulta a los empleados</td>
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<tr>
<td>J12. Políticas de Diversidad</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I1B. Pensando en la manera en que se formulan las políticas de Recursos Humanos a nivel global en los diferentes países, por favor indique hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.

(1= discrepa completamente, 5= está totalmente de acuerdo. No sabe)

El HQ global de RRHH asigna regularmente a los directores de RRHH en el extranjero [es decir fuera del país de origen] una serie de funciones en la formulación de las políticas de RRHH. MARCAR UNO SOLO ......................................................... 

Existen políticas de RRHH globales que se basan a su vez en otras políticas que se desarrollaron originariamente fuera del país de origen MARCAR UNO SOLO.............................................

13a1. ¿Alguno de los siguientes niveles tiene influencia en la manera en que se formulan las políticas de desarrollo y formación en la subsidiaria? MARCACIÓN MULTIPLE PERMITIDA.

- HQ global ..............................................................................
- División internacional o área de negocio del HQ .....................
- HQ regional (p.e Europa, EMEA (Europa/Oriente Medio/Africa) ...
- Otros (por favor especifique) ...................................................
- Ninguno de los mencionados .................................................

Preguntar si I3a1 tiene marcas múltiples

I3b. ¿Cuál de los siguientes niveles es el más influyente en cuanto a política de formación y desarrollo en la subsidiaria? LEER

CAPI PARA VISUALIZAR MARCAS DESDE 13a1
PREGUNTAR I3C SI MARCAS 1, 2, 3 o 4 en I3A

I3c. Utilizando de nuevo la escala del 1 al 5, y pensando en la política de formación y desarrollo, ¿Hasta qué punto tiene influencia [el nivel más influyente dicho arriba] en la subsidiaria, a la hora de…?
1= No significativo en absoluto
5= muy significativo

- Establecer un marco amplio de política
- Establecer políticas de RRHH detalladas
- Proporcionar servicios de consulta
- Controlar la ejecución de las políticas de RRHH
- Promover benchmarking en RRHH e intercambio de información

I3a2. ¿Alguno de los siguientes niveles influye en la política de participación de los empleados en la subsidiaria? SE PERMITE MARCACIÓN MÚLTIPLE.

- HQ global
- División internacional o área de negocio del HQ
- HQ regional (p.e. Europa, EMEA (Europa/Oriente Medio/Africa)
- Otros (por favor especifique)
- Ninguno de los mencionados

Preguntar I3d si I3 a2 tiene marcación múltiple (CAPI para visualizar marcas desde I3a2)

I3d. ¿Cuál de los siguientes niveles tiene una influencia mayor en la política de participación de los empleados en la [respuesta de A1E o A1F]? LEER

- HQ global
- División internacional o área de negocio del HQ
- HQ regional (p.e. Europa, EMEA (Europa/Oriente Medio/Africa)
- Otros (por favor especifique)
- Ninguno de los mencionados

PREGUNTAR I3C SI MARCAS 1, 2, 3 o 4 en I3A

I3e. Utilizando de nuevo la escala del 1 al 5, y pensando ahora en la participación de los trabajadores, ¿Hasta qué punto tiene influencia [el nivel más influyente dicho arriba] en la subsidiaria, a la hora de…?
1= No significativo en absoluto
5= muy significativo

- Establecer un marco amplio de política
- Establecer políticas de RRHH detalladas
- Proporcionar servicios de consulta
- Controlar la ejecución de las políticas de RRHH
- Promover benchmarking en RRHH e intercambio de información
First article – Determinants of central control and subsidiary autonomy in human resource management: the case of foreign-owned multinationals in Spain
Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations in Ireland and Spain

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Abstract
This article uses two parallel large-scale surveys in Ireland and Spain to test explanations of the variation in the autonomy of foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies over industrial relations policies, in particular regarding trade union engagement and employee consultation. We bring together three strands of literature: home- and host-country effects, organizational context and international human resources structures. Our results call attention to the significance of institutional effects, along with mode of entry of the subsidiary and the trajectory of new investments.

Keywords
Employee consultation, industrial relations, international human resource management, Ireland, Spain, subsidiary autonomy, trade union engagement

Introduction
How much latitude have local managers in multinational companies (MNCs) to formulate their own employment practices? This has been an important line of enquiry in

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Third article – Modes of integration of human resource management practices in multinationals
Advancing understanding on industrial relations in multinational companies: Key research challenges and the INTREPID contribution

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University of Navarra, Spain

Abstract
This paper has three principal aims. It firstly provides some theoretical background on the key current research issues and challenges in regard to industrial relations in multinational companies. It then presents a concise review of scholarship to date on industrial relations in multinational companies using INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’...
APPENDIX D: SCHOLAR’S PUBLICATIONS

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles


Articles under Review


Articles in Progress
