READING THE RIOTS: INVESTIGATING NEWSPAPER DISCOURSE ON FRENCH URBAN VIOLENCE IN 2005

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This thesis is submitted in part fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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November 2005 saw a significant flashpoint in the long-running history of tensions between minority groups and those in power in France. Two teenagers, allegedly while hiding from the police, were accidently electrocuted in a Parisian sub-station. This incident was the catalyst for the spread of violent riots in communities across banlieues or urban French districts lasting for a number of weeks. Mindful of the printed news media as important sites of ideology production, this study contributes to a growing body of work on newspaper representations of the banlieues, with focus on the particularly traumatic events of November 2005.

Recognising the active role of the media in constituting and shaping reality, my interest lies not merely in identifying instances of prejudicial discourse in French newspaper texts, but also in highlighting how largely covert ideological structures of power and dominance can be disguised in ostensibly neutral discourse. This study examines French newspaper representations of urban violence in 2005, combining a qualitative Critical Discourse Analytical methodology with a quantitative Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies examination of a corpus of texts specifically created for the study. The project questions the discursive construction of the events of November 2005 and the associated individuals and groups. It shows how the scenes of violent rioting prompted media discussions pertaining to French national identity, and thus examines interpretations of French national identity that are implicit in news reporting on the riots. This research suggests that in its reaction to the challenging events of November 2005, the printed news media adopt strategies which ‘other’ immigrant minorities and those living in the banlieues. Residents of the banlieues are depicted as being outside the borders of the homogenously constructed French society. It is thus argued that newspaper discourse on incidents of urban violence in France in 2005 provides further evidence of how language can be used as a means of enacting and upholding social relations of dominance and discrimination.
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, and has not been submitted for any other award at this or any other academic institution. Where use has been made of the work of others, it has been fully acknowledged and referenced.

________________________________
Laura Costelloe

November 2013
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**Text 3**: Banlieues : renvoyez l’ascenseur ! *Le Figaro*, 8 November 2005. LF081105OPa


**Text 6**: Après le choc. *Le Monde*, 29 November 2005. LM291105EDFPa


**Text 8**: La République muette. *Ouest France*, 3 December 2005. OF031205OPa

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Key to Abbreviations

ADF: Analyse de Discours à la Française
CADS: Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
CDS: Critical Discourse Studies
CL: Corpus Linguistics
CPE: Contrat Première Embauche
DA: Discourse Analysis
DHA: Discourse Historical Approach
HLM: Habitations à Loyer Modéré
Mini-RiCo: The Mini-2005 Riots Corpus
PCF: Parti Communiste Français
RiCo: The 2005 Riots Corpus
SFL: Systemic Functional Linguistics
UMP: Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
ZUS: Zones Urbaines Sensibles
1 Introduction

1.1 Introductory Remarks
It is now widely accepted that the news is not merely a neutral reflection of events but is a discursively constructed interpretation of ‘reality’, and the argument that news discourse is inherently ideological has been expressed by numerous theorists (Fowler, 1991; Fowler et al., 1979; Hartley, 1982; Richardson, 2007; Van Dijk, 1988). Journalists and producers of news discourse are thus – often subconsciously – influenced by a complex system of beliefs and social ideologies which impact upon the construction of ‘facts’ in news reporting. Journalists contribute to our understanding of the world and what we come to accept as being real by using particular combinations of language and selecting to represent individuals or events in a particular way. Taking the ideological nature of news discourse as a theoretical departure point, it has been argued that news discourse is thus powerful, as it shapes our perceptions of the roles and positions of individuals and groups in society. The printed news media are the selected data source for this study, recognised as enjoying a privileged and prestigious position in modern societies (Caldas-Coulthard, 2007). Most frequently, newspapers reflect the ideological positions of powerful people and organisations (Van Dijk, 1996a). Therefore journalists’ choice of language – and consequently their discourse – tends to favour existing social positions of power, to the extent that Van Dijk (1998: 180) maintains that ‘the ideologies that are most prominent in the media are largely those of the élites’.

Newspapers occupy an important role, representing regular leisure reading and a source of information for many people on a daily basis; the privileged status of news discourse in modern societies leads Richardson (2007: 13) to conclude that ‘the language of the news media needs to be taken very seriously’. He argues (2007: 13) the following in relation to the social effects of journalism:

Through its power to shape issue agendas and public discourse, it can reinforce beliefs; it can shape people's opinions not only of the world but also of their place and role in the world; or, at least influence what you have opinions on; in sum, it can help shape social reality by shaping our views of social reality.

Furthermore, O’Keeffe (2012: 442) has identified a need for greater linguistic study of the printed news media, and given the prevalence of newspapers she suggests that
‘it is surprising how few linguistic studies there are, proportionally, of how [newspapers] use language’. Therefore, this study adopts the stance that newspaper discourse is inherently ideological and powerful, and this thesis is contributing to an existing body of research that investigates the discursive functioning of ideology and power in printed media discourse. The overarching objective of the study is therefore to analyse discourses present in news reporting on a particular incident/event – French urban violence in 2005 – and to investigate ideologies and social power structures reproduced in French newspaper discourse.

The case study selected to investigate the discursive functioning of ideologies, and consequently power, is French news reporting on riots in the banlieues (suburbs) in November 2005. The reasons behind this exclusive focus on French society and French news discourse are many: for one, conceptions of France as a nation and French national identity are influenced by complex sociocultural and historical contexts, encompassing the principles of the 1789 Revolution, the 1905 law secularising French society and policy approaches to post-colonial migrant workers and their families, among others. France’s population is made up of a large proportion (estimated at approximately 10 per cent)\(^1\) of immigrants and descendants from former French colonies, particularly individuals from North Africa and the Maghreb who are French citizens but are widely perceived as not having integrated into wider French society (Hargreaves, 2007; Moran, 2012; Robine, 2011). The emergence of the banlieues, cités or quartiers sensibles – neighbourhoods characterised by ‘severe social and economic problems, as well as a high proportion of inhabitants of immigrant origins’ (Moran, 2012: 1) – has seen post-colonial migrants and their families housed in poorly serviced areas at the periphery of French towns and cities, and the word banlieue now carries particular connotations in French popular, political and media discourse. The perception among immigrant

\(^{1}\)French data protection laws mean that it is impossible to state exactly what proportion of the French population is represented by immigrants and descendants from former French colonies. While the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) does record the birthplace of every French resident, little data is made available regarding the birthplace of parents of French residents/citizens. Motivated by the republican principles underpinning the official view of la France unique et indivisible (discussed in Chapter Four), official data collection procedures assume the integration of immigrants and their descendants and thus the immigrant origin of French citizens is not recognised in census data (for additional detail see Hargreaves, 2007).
minorities living in the banlieues is that their experiences as French citizens are not in line with the principles of liberté, égalité and fraternité expressed during the 1789 Revolution (see Chapter Four). This complex set of sociocultural and historical circumstances as expressed in news reporting on the 2005 civil disturbances is thus a fruitful ground for the exploration of ideologies and for examining how discourse is used to position individuals and groups in French society.

Furthermore, frustrations at perceived social and economic exclusion have manifested in violent rioting and the burning of cars and buildings at relatively frequent occasions, and since the early 1980s there have been sporadic and intermittent but nonetheless recurrent incidents of urban violence in towns and cities across France. However, the events in 2005 were unprecedented both in terms of scale and duration: for the first time rioting spread outside the immediate spatial surroundings of a particular banlieue, and an incident in Paris prompted violent reactions in neighbourhoods throughout France. Additionally, the civil disturbances in 2005 lasted for close to three weeks, which is considerably longer than any previous incident. The extreme nature of the events of 2005 prompted an extensive amount of media coverage and the question of the status of the banlieues and their inhabitants occupied the news pages in the days, weeks and months following the traumatic scenes.

The role of the media in the discursive construction of both the banlieues and the notion of la violence urbaine has been emphasised by a variety of theorists (see Chapter Four). To cite just two examples, consider the following quotations from Mucchielli (2002) and Moran (2012) regarding the significance of the media in creating a particular interpretation of French urban violence and the place of the banlieues in French society, respectively:

*La violence est désormais un spectacle orchestré par les médias. Il ne s’agit certes pas d’accuser les journalistes de créer un climat sécuritaire: les recherches qui se multiplient depuis l’entre-deux-guerres sur l’impact des médias auprès de l’opinion publique indiquent qu’ils ne créent pas les opinions ni ne les renversent. En revanche, ils peuvent les atténuer ou les renforcer significativement,.*
voire les révéler lorsque ces opinions étaient latentes. (Mucchielli, 2002: 12)

Media have a direct input into the construction of the socio-cultural framework of the quartiers sensibles given that the media often constitute the sole link between members of the general public and these areas of relegation [...] These organisations thus impact upon the formation of the collective identity of the banlieues in the popular imagination, with the potential to add to or dispel some of the stigma attached to these areas through the nature of their coverage. (Moran, 2012: 22-23)

For Mucchielli, urban violence is ‘un spectacle orchestré par les médias’ and he emphasises the role of the media in strengthening public perceptions of violent incidents. Furthermore, Moran maintains that the media are often the only source whereby those living outside the banlieues come to construct their understanding of life in the suburbs. Thus, popular understandings of and beliefs relating to both urban violence and the suburbs are largely shaped by media reporting. Thus, this study seeks to investigate the ideologies and social structures of power reproduced by discourses in news reporting on the incidents of November 2005.

The complex French sociocultural context generally, and more specifically the phenomenon of la violence urbaine, les banlieues and the incidents of 2005, offer a rich site for examining how media discourse and particularly newspaper discourse can be used to produce and maintain social relations of dominance and control. The notion of the banlieues broadly, and the events of 2005 specifically, have been studied from sociological, political, ethnographic and literary/film studies perspectives (e.g. Austin, 2009; Cole, 2007; Collovald, 2001; Dikeç, 2013, 2004, 2002; Higbee, 2001; Hudson, 2011; Joly, 2007; Kokoreff, 2008; Moran, 2012, 2011, 2008; Mucchielli, 2002; Mucchielli and Le Goaziou, 2006a; Murphy, 2011; Murray, 2006; Redeker, 2006; Robine, 2011; Stébé, 1999; Welch, 2007). Additionally, the role of the media and media discourse in shaping public perceptions of the banlieues and French urban violence has been examined in a number of studies. However, these analyses have approached media discourse – including newspaper and social media discourse – largely from a qualitative perspective (e.g. Garcin-Marrou, 2007; Hargreaves, 1996; Levasseur, 2010; Longhi, 2012; Moirand, 2010; Peeters, 2012, 2010; Sedel, 2011; Turpin, 2012a) or from an ethnographic/sociological viewpoint (e.g. Canet et al., 2008; Echchaibi, 2009; Moran, 2012; Sedel, 2009). This thesis
offers new insights on news reporting on French urban violence by combining qualitative and quantitative perspectives through its application of a Critical Discourse Analytical (CDA) framework enhanced by a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) approach to the study of media discourse on the banlieues. This allows us to examine the data through two complementary lenses, and the ‘methodological synergy’ (Baker et al., 2008) of these qualitative and quantitative perspectives facilitate a more complete analysis of discourses present in news reporting on the 2005 civil disturbances. Additionally, this study uses a considerably larger data sample than in existing studies. The corpus created for this project (The 2005 Riots Corpus [RiCo]) is composed of 2,271 texts and over 1.2 million words with date parameters stretching from 27 October 2005 to 30 June 2006. Existing qualitative studies analyse a smaller sample of texts or focus on a narrower timeframe; for instance, Peeters’ (2010) study uses 259 articles published between 29 October and 7 November 2005, Turpin (2012a) relies on 171 texts from 2000 to 2010 and Levasseur (2010) examines 16 articles published in one news source from 1993 to 2004.

1.2 Objectives and Research Questions
The overarching objective of this thesis is to identify and analyse discourses present in French printed news reporting on the incidents of urban violence in the banlieues in November 2005. It does so by drawing primarily on a qualitative CDA framework in Chapters Five and Six, followed by the application of a quantitative CADS approach in Chapter Seven. In line with the selected methodological approach of the study (Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA, introduced in sections 2.3.2 and 3.3), discourses are described, interpreted and explained with regard to the discourse practices of production and consumption and the broader sociocultural context introduced in Chapter Four. CDA – as will be explained in Chapter Two – adopts an explicitly critical stance, in the sense that it proceeds from the belief that society is inherently unequal, and it aims to expose the linguistic dimension of social inequalities and hierarchies. The appropriateness of CDA as the selected methodology for this study due to its focus on relations of power inequality is further explored in the next chapter. Additionally, the advantages of combining (Critical)
Discourse Analysis and CADS approaches are outlined in Chapter Three, and the suitability of this methodology to address the stated research questions is affirmed.

The following are the questions which this study aims to address:

1) How are the events and actors relating to French urban violence in November 2005 discursively constructed in a corpus of French news media texts?
2) How are the *banlieues* and their inhabitants discursively constructed by the printed news media?
3) Assuming that identities – and national identities – are discursively created, how does French news discourse on 2005 urban violence construct French national identity?
4) Is there evidence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse, particularly with regard to the positioning of suburban and immigrant minorities in the *banlieues* vis-à-vis majority French society?
5) If there is evidence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse, what ideologies, social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced in printed media discourse, and how – linguistically – are these hierarchies sustained?

To address these questions the study analyses the discourses present in French newspaper discourse on the civil disturbances in 2005, along with the representations, assumptions and understandings of urban violence, *les banlieues*, France, French national identity etc. The data used for this study (introduced in section 3.2) encompass a variety of newspaper articles from across the ideological spectrum (centre/right/left), as well as national and regional perspectives, and includes articles published between 27 October 2005 and 30 June 2006. By making use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodological frameworks, this study investigates the discourses present, along with the linguistic devices and lexico-grammatical patterns used, in the expression of ideologies and the reproduction of social power structures in French newspaper discourse on urban violence in 2005.

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2 Throughout this study Hargreaves’ distinction between majority and minority groups in French society is adopted: the former refers to ‘that part of the population which was born in France with no immediate immigrant ancestry (i.e. immigrant parents or grandparents)’, whereas the latter encompasses ‘people of immigrant origin’ (Hargreaves, 2007: 7).
1.3 Outline of Thesis
In Chapter Two the main objective is to situate the study in the context of the related literature and academic traditions. The chapter seeks to lay the foundations for the critical analysis of newspaper discourse in later chapters by identifying the theoretical principles underpinning CDA, which is the methodological framework used to structure the analysis in Chapters Five and Six. It considers the emergence of a critical stance to the analysis of discourse, presents various theoretical and methodological approaches available to analysts and shows how these approaches influence the current study. Links are drawn between this project and existing similar studies and factors which distinguish the current study from previous analyses are identified. In addition, Chapter Two examines the specificity of the media – and in particular the printed news media – as a site of discourse, and points to some characteristics unique to the genre.

Having examined the theoretical assumptions underpinning a critical approach to the analysis of newspaper discourse, Chapter Three outlines the methodological framework used in this study for the analysis of newspaper texts. It justifies the chosen methodology for the study based on the theoretical principles and stated objectives of the thesis. A detailed description of the data used for this study (The 2005 Riots Corpus [RiCo] and The Mini-2005 Riots Corpus [Mini-RiCo]) is presented at the beginning of this chapter, and a comprehensive introduction to the methodological tools employed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven is given. The individual stages of a CDA and CADS approach to the critical analysis of discourse are explained, and the appropriateness of this ‘methodological synergy’ (Baker et al., 2008) to address the research questions and objectives is highlighted. Chapter Three therefore both introduces and theoretically supports the methodological framework used for the analysis of newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005.

Chapter Four seeks to establish the discursive practices of production and consumption and the broader sociocultural practices which are to be taken into consideration during the CDA and CADS analyses in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. It first examines the discourse practices of production and consumption and
identifies the key sociocultural and institutional factors relating to the French news media context. Beginning with a discussion of the historical context from which the modern French newspaper industry emerged, the continuing influence and significance of the printed news media in France are established, before discussing processes of production relating to news reporting on the *banlieues*. The second part of the chapter addresses the sociocultural context of incidents of urban violence in France in the winter of 2005 in order to gain a fuller appreciation of the wider discourses and debates within which the current study is situated. Historical, institutional and sociocultural factors relating to the history of immigration in France and the emergence of the *banlieues* are introduced, and the incidents of 2005 are located within the context of a lengthy history of civil disturbances in *quartiers difficiles* in French towns and cities. The immediate context surrounding the riots of 2005 is then explained, including political reactions to and varying interpretations of the urban violence.

Analysis of the selected data for this study begins in Chapter Five where a CDA framework is used to examine how the events and actors relating to French urban violence in 2005 are discursively constructed in *Mini-RiCo*, a random sample of sixteen newspaper articles taken from the larger *RiCo* corpus (introduced in section 3.2). The chapter focuses on analysing the discourses present in newspaper reporting on the riots, and questions the lexico-grammatical choices made by journalists in their construction of the roles of different individuals and groups in French society. It probes the version/s of events put forward in *Mini-RiCo* and identifies and interprets the dominant discourses through which the riots and the associated social actors are constructed, using Fairclough’s three-dimensional ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ framework for CDA as introduced in Chapter Three.

Next, Chapter Six uses CDA to investigate how the *banlieues* and their inhabitants are constructed by examining how French news discourse on the civil disturbances discursively creates a particular interpretation of French national identity. The discursive construction of ‘us’ (the in-group) and ‘them’ (the out-group) in French society is identified, particularly in relation to the positioning of immigrant
minorities and those living in the *banlieues* vis-à-vis dominant and mainstream French society. Analysis in this section focuses on the orders of discourse relating to sameness and difference, as within these discourses certain assumptions are made with regard to both the in- and out-group. It argues that the presence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse suggests the reproduction of unequal social relations of dominance and that the French printed news media adopt a strategy of othering immigrants and those living in the *banlieues*, depicting them as outside the borders of the homogenously constructed French society.

The third analytical chapter, Chapter Seven, uses a CADS framework to investigate whether the discursive trends and orders of discourse identified in the preceding CDA of *Mini-RiCo* in Chapters Five and Six can be viewed as representative of wider patterns of discourse across a significantly larger corpus of texts (*RiCo*). Analysis in this chapter uses some of the techniques of Corpus Linguistics (specifically frequency and clusters, collocates and concordancing) to investigate whether discursive patterns identified in *Mini-RiCo* regarding firstly, discourses relating to blamelessness and naming in descriptions of the riots, and secondly, discourses of sameness and difference, can be generalised in the larger *RiCo* corpus. A CADS approach in this chapter also aims to uncover lexico-grammatical patterns in the *RiCo* corpus which were not present in the smaller *Mini-RiCo* collection of texts. It is argued that for the most part, the discursive trends and orders of discourse identified in *Mini-RiCo* are also present in *RiCo*. However, a CADS analysis does reveal some counter-examples and additional lexico-grammatical patterns to those outlined in Chapters Five and Six, particularly in relation to what is labelled a discourse of internal othering which draws a distinction between residents of the *banlieues* who participated in the November 2005 riots and those who did not (section 7.5).

This thesis therefore examines discourses present in newspaper reporting on incidents of French urban violence in November 2005, and explores the linguistic means which uphold relations of dominance and discrimination in French society. It is argued that the study contributes to existing scholarly research on urban violence
and the phenomenon of *les banlieues* in France, as well as offering additional insights into the discursive functioning of ideology and power in media discourse.

2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to situate the study in the context of the related literature and academic traditions. It identifies the theoretical principles underpinning the forthcoming analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, and seeks to lay the foundations for the critical analysis of newspaper discourse in later chapters. It considers the emergence of a critical stance to the analysis of discourse, and presents various theoretical and methodological approaches within the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) paradigm which are available to analysts. Links are drawn between this study and existing similar studies, and factors which distinguish this project from previous analyses are identified.

The chapter is organised into five sections: the first part of the chapter – ‘Evolution of CDA and Theoretical Assumptions’ – outlines the forerunners of the primary methodological approach of the study: CDA. It discusses the ‘linguistic turn’ which precipitated the establishment of Discourse Analysis (DA), and later, CDA, as a means of analysing texts and discourses. It also provides a theoretical profile of CDA and considers the key principles and assumptions underpinning a critical approach to the analysis of discourse. Secondly, section 2.3 introduces the three most prominent theoretical approaches to CDA: Fairclough’s sociocultural approach, the sociocognitive approach advocated by Van Dijk, and the ‘Discourse Historical Approach’ (DHA) proposed by Reisigl and Wodak. Distinctions are drawn between the three frameworks and it is shown how each of these approaches influences the current study. The third part of the chapter addresses a number of relevant criticisms of CDA and discusses potential limitations relating to context, criticisms of method,
the reader and the potential for researcher bias. Finally, section 2.5 addresses the ideological nature of media discourse – particularly newspaper discourse – and establishes the suitability of newspaper discourse as a data source to investigate social hierarchies and asymmetries in French society.

2.2 Origins of CDA and Theoretical Assumptions

2.2.1 Introduction
This section outlines the origins of a critical approach to the analysis of discourse, and identifies the academic traditions from which CDA emerged. It identifies firstly what has been termed the ‘linguistic turn’, which is a movement from a purely descriptive approach to the analysis of language to a greater interest in the social significance of language. Next, this section identifies the contribution of both the Critical Linguists and Michel Foucault to the emergence of CDA and it shows how their theoretical and methodological work represents a forerunner to what we now know as CDA. The final part of this section identifies how CDA emerged from the larger Discourse Analysis movement, and situates CDA within the context of other approaches seeking to better understand the social function of language and discourse.

2.2.2 Origins of CDA

2.2.2.1 The ‘Linguistic Turn’
Before outlining the theoretical and methodological profile of CDA, changes in the approach to the analysis of language are discussed in order to situate the current study in the context of broader debates regarding the links between language, discourse and society. The emergence of CDA in the 1980s/early 1990s was foreshadowed by what can be termed the ‘linguistic turn’ in the 1960s and 1970s. Previously, linguistic analysis of written language was largely descriptive, focusing on the level of the phoneme/morpheme, the word, clause or sentence and to an extent ignoring language users and contexts. While text and talk had been formerly analysed in the domains of literary scholarship, history and mass communication scholarship, the emergence of a greater concern with ‘discourse’ or ‘language in use’ was evident across an interdisciplinary spectrum within the Humanities and Social
Sciences. Rejecting the notion that language is merely a neutral means of describing or reflecting the world, disciplines as seemingly divergent as Anthropology, Ethnography and Artificial Intelligence witnessed almost simultaneously a paradigmatic shift with an increased interest in naturally occurring language use by real language users. Thus, ‘language [began] to be viewed increasingly in social, pragmatic and semantic terms’, and the late 1950s onwards witnessed ‘a rapid expansion of descriptive work on the properties of language’ (McCarthy and Carter, 1993: 159, xi).

Blommaert (2005) cites two motivations for the increased interest in the social context of language use and the part played by language in the creation of social reality: firstly he refers (2005: 2) to developments in linguistic theory itself, including calls for more ‘activity-centred approaches to analysis, the recognition of language-in-use as a legitimate object of analysis, and the discovery of grammatical and structural features of language operating at levels higher than the single sentence’. He also cites interdisciplinary contacts between linguists and scholars working in other fields – namely Literary Analysis, Semiotics, Philosophy, Anthropology and Sociology – as providing the impetus for the emergence of a number of new and interrelated disciplines which rejected traditional orientations in scholarly enquiry within their respective fields. Referring to the birth of Psycholinguistics, Semiotics, Pragmatics, Conversation Analysis and the study of discourse or Discourse Analysis, Van Dijk (2007: xxi) observes that despite differences in methodologies and objects of study, a number of commonalities can be observed among the newly emergent disciplines. He cites, among others, (i) an interest in properties of ‘naturally occurring’ language use by real language users, rather than study of ‘abstract language systems and invented examples’; (ii) focus on large units of texts, discourses, conversations or communicative events; (iii) extension of analysis beyond grammar to a study of action and interaction; (iv) extension to non-verbal aspects of interaction and communication, with a focus on semiotics including gestures, images, film and multi-media; and (v) study of the role of context, including social, cultural and cognitive contexts of language use. Thus, from the latter years of the 1960s a variety of disciplines within the Humanities and Social Sciences began to pay greater attention to the social importance of language,
prompting the emergence of a number of new fields of enquiry. It can be argued that the ‘linguistic turn’ mirrored developments in the wider post-war world; student revolts in May 1968 represented the questioning of knowledge and power within society, and simultaneously, the Civil Rights Movement in the USA and the feminist movement worldwide were taking hold. As Van Dijk (2007: xxi) observes, ‘it is probably no coincidence that against the broader background of African-Americans rebelling against racism, of women opposing patriarchy, and students protesting against traditional university hierarchies, the end of the 1960s also saw the emergence of scholarly new paradigms’. One of these new fields of enquiry was Critical Linguistics, which greatly influenced the theoretical and methodological profile of Critical Discourse Analysis.

2.2.2.2 The Contribution of Critical Linguistics
Led by Roger Fowler, Bob Hodge and Gunther Kress at the University of East Anglia (Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge, 1979), Critical Linguists argued that ‘social groupings and relationships influence the linguistic behaviour of speakers and writers, and moreover, that these socially determined patterns of language influence non-linguistic behaviour including, crucially cognitive activity’ (Fowler and Kress, 1979a: 185). Critical Linguistics emerged from Hallidayan theories of systemic-functional and social-semiotic linguistics (e.g. Halliday, 1978) and the Critical Linguists adopted Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) categorisation of the three metafunctions of language: SFL assumes that language in texts simultaneously functions ideationally, in the representation of experience and the world, interpersonally, in constituting social interactions between participants in discourse, and textually, in tying parts of a text together into a coherent whole and tying texts to situational contexts (for an extended discussion of the influence on SLF on CDA see Fairclough, 1995a). These three metafunctions, as Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000) indicate, along with systemic-functional analyses of transitivity, agency, nominalisation, mood, information flow and register have been adopted by CDA practitioners. Thus, Halliday’s linguistic methodology – also used by the Critical Linguists – strongly influences methodological approaches to CDA (section 2.3) because it offers ‘clear and rigorous linguistic categories for analyzing the relationships between discourse and social meaning’ (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000:
Also of relevance to CDA is the Critical Linguists’ adoption of a critical left-wing agenda for linguistics, and they were concerned with issues such as the use of language in social institutions and the relationships between language, power and ideology. They viewed power relationships as a key theoretical unit, and the text as the main unit of analysis, and from this starting point the Critical Linguists ‘formulated an analysis of public discourse, an analysis designed to get at the ideology coded implicitly behind the overt propositions, to examine it particularly in the context of social formulations’ (Fowler, 1996: 3). A central assumption of SFL’s influence on Critical Linguistics – and by extension CDA – is that speakers/writers have choices with regard to vocabulary and grammar, and these choices are consciously or unconsciously ‘principled and systematic’ (Fowler et al., 1979: 188).

Hence, the work of the Critical Linguists paved the way for the emergence of CDA, and as Tyrhwitt-Drake (2005: 12) notes, ‘over the years Critical Linguistics has effectively morphed into CDA’ with many of its central tenets being picked up and further developed into a coherent theory for the analysis of discourse. Norman Fairclough, whose book *Language and Power* (1989) is commonly considered to be the landmark publication for the ‘start’ of CDA (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000), argues that the work of the Critical Linguists lacked development in key areas. In particular Fairclough (1992: 2) cites the following:

> An imbalance between the social and linguistic elements of the synthesis [...] the linguistic analysis and the treatment of language texts is well developed, but there is little social theory and the concepts of “ideology” and “power” are used with little discussion or explanation.

Fairclough (1992) also criticises the ‘static’ view of power relations, contending that a disproportionate emphasis was placed on the contribution of the ideological shaping of language texts to the reproduction of power relations in society. ‘Little attention’, he maintains (1992: 2), ‘is paid to struggle and transformation in power relations and the role of language therein’. Fairclough (1992) also notes that Critical Linguistics fails to consider the processes of text production and consumption. Thus, it was Fairclough and others’ attempts to build on and improve the work of the Critical Linguists that allowed for the emergence of what became known as CDA. However, before outlining the central tenets of a critical approach to discourse
analysis, brief mention must be given to the influence on CDA of theories developed by French philosopher, social theorist and literary critic Michel Foucault.

2.2.2.3 Foucault’s Influence on Critical Discourse Analysis
The influence of Michel Foucault on the development of (Critical) Discourse Analysis has been such that Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 12) assert that ‘in almost all discourse analytical approaches, Foucault has become a figure to quote, relate to, comment on, modify and criticise’. Foucault’s work embraces a broad range of subjects including psychiatry, medicine, the prison system and sexuality, and a key concern throughout is the nature of power and how the control of knowledge operates as a means of social control. Recognised as one of the ‘theoretical “godfathers” of CDA’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10), there are two areas of his work which are of particular relevance to the version of CDA which is used for this study: first, his theorisation of discourse and the role of discourse in constituting society, which is primarily addressed in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972); and secondly, his conception of the discursive dimension of power relations which is contained in History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1981) and Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison (1977).

For Foucault (1972: 117), discourse is defined as follows:

[...a] group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation. [...]Discourse is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical - a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality.

Elements of the ideas contained in this quotation influence the principles of CDA (section 2.2.3), and in particular the notion that discourse does not reflect reality but is socially constitutive and contributes to the production, transformation and reproduction of reality. Fairclough (1992: 39) suggests that this constitutive view of

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3 As mentioned, this study adopts Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA, while also drawing on aspects of Van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach and the DHA (see section 2.3). Although not used in the current study, Jäger and Maier propose an explicitly Foucauldian approach to CDA which aims to analyse discourses and dispositives based on Foucauldian discourse theory (see Jäger and Maier, 2009).
discourse ‘involves seeing discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various dimensions: discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms of “self”, social relationships, and conceptual frameworks’. The quotation above also contains Foucault’s assertion that discourse ‘is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined’. This encapsulates the belief that although – in principle – there are an infinite number of ways in which statements can be formulated, the same formulations tend be used within a specific domain. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 13) explain, the statements that are produced within a specific domain are ‘rather similar and repetitive. There are innumerable statements that are never uttered, and would never be accepted as meaningful. The historical rules of the particular discourse delimit what it is possible to say’. Related to this is Foucault’s theorisation of ‘discursive relations’, which he explains (1972: 46) as:

In a sense, at the limit of discourse; they offer it objects of which it can speak, or rather [...], they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, explain them, etc.

Fairclough (1992, 1989) develops Foucault’s concept of ‘discursive relations’ and proposes the notion of ‘orders of discourse’ (section 3.3.3) to refer to ‘the totality of discursive practices within an institution or society, and the relationships between them’ (1992: 42).

The second area of Foucault’s theories which influenced the development of a critical approach to the analysis of discourse relates to his conception of power and the links between power and social practice (Foucault, 1981, 1977). Fairclough (1992: 49-56) cites Foucault’s theorisation of the discursive nature of power, the political nature of discourse and the discursive nature of social change as particularly influential to the development of CDA. Thus, for Foucault power is implicit in social practices and it constitutes discourse and knowledge through its pervasive presence at all levels in every domain of social life. He does not view power as necessarily exclusively oppressive and forcefully imposed in a ‘top down’ mechanism, but rather it is productive. Power, he maintains (1981: 86), ‘is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its
own mechanisms’. One such mechanism of power is discourse, and Foucault considers procedures by which the production of discourse can be controlled as a means of producing and maintaining social relations of power. Viewed this way, power can be seen as responsible for shaping society but also for determining how the world is formed and spoken about, and consequently the patterns of discourse which are acceptable in a given social context (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). One of the principles of CDA is that ‘power relations are discursive’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997), and section 2.2.3.3 shows how Foucault’s theories relating to the links between language, discourse and power are of central concern for CDA. Foucault’s proposals for the analysis of discourse are largely abstract. Furthermore, his theories are not directly applied in a linguistic or discursive analysis of texts, which is a key feature of Critical Discourse Analytical studies. Nonetheless, the discussion of the principles of CDA in section 2.2.3 demonstrates the strong influence of Foucault’s theories on the development of the theoretical assumptions underpinning CDA.

2.2.2.4 From Discourse Analysis to Critical Discourse Analysis
CDA emerged from the larger Discourse Analysis movement, which began in the 1980s and was aimed, simply put, at ‘the analysis of language in use’ (Nunan, 1993: 7). In line with the ‘linguistic turn’ outlined above, DA differed from previous approaches to the analysis of language as it rejected notions of language as an abstract system. Van Dijk (1989: 230) proposes that DA distinguished itself from other methods of linguistic analysis by the following:

- Its focus on theoretically specified textual units and structures, its special interest in its underlying semantic structures and subtle grammatical, stylistic or rhetorical details, and its general emphasis on a qualitative approach over a more superficial quantitative methodology, also in view of a critical interpretation of textual structures in the socio-political and ideological context.

Thus, DA moved beyond earlier more quantitative or structural approaches to language, and sought to critically consider language in the context of the political, economic and social environment/s in which it is used. Within the field of DA a number of approaches have emerged including (but not limited to) Conversation Analysis, Feminist Discourse Analysis, Multi-Modal Discourse Analysis, Corpus-
based/driven Discourse Analysis, Narrative Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis, among others (for a recent overview of the field of DA see Gee and Handford, 2012). All are concerned with language and its use in the world, but they ‘focus on widely varying aspects of its use and often define the social world in widely varying ways, from the immediate conversational context to the larger political, social or economic context’ (Bhatia et al., 2008: 3). All types of DA, Jones (2012: 4) insists, can help us to understand ‘how [...] societies [...] are maintained through our day-to-day activities of speaking, writing and making use of other modes of communication’ Additionally, Jones (2012: 4) suggests that DA ‘can help us to understand why people interact with one another the way they do and how they exert power and influence over one another’. It is important to stress that the various offshoots of the DA movement have widely differing interests and means of viewing the role of language in the world, and for some, any comparison with CDA ends with the observation that an interest in language in use is of fundamental concern. Thus, questions of power, domination and ideology – which are central for CDA – are not universally shared. What is meant by a ‘critical’ approach to DA is explained below in section 2.2.3.6, and thus at this point the discussion here concludes with the observation that all DA approaches offer opportunities for the analyst to critically consider the functioning of language in a particular setting.

Having focused on the evolution of CDA and the influence of the Critical Linguists, Michel Foucault and the Discourse Analysis tradition on the theoretical and methodological profile of CDA, the focus now turns to examining the theoretical underpinnings of CDA and its central principles and assumptions.

2.2.3 Principles of CDA

2.2.3.1 Introduction to CDA
Emerging from the Discourse Analysis tradition in the 1990s, CDA proposes to analyse ‘opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance,
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’ (Wodak, 1995: 204). Fairclough (1995a: 132-133) explains it as:

Dis

course analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determinations between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor in securing power and hegemony.

Talbot (1998: 150) proposes that CDA is an approach to Discourse Analysis that is ‘committed to examining the way language contributes to social reproduction and social change’. She suggests that it aims ‘to stimulate critical awareness of language, in particular awareness of how existing discourse conventions have come about as a result of relations of power and power struggle’. These definitions imply a difference between Discourse Analysis and CDA: attention is not merely paid to the language in use, but to the purpose and effects of the use of language by particular people in a particular social setting. CDA is concerned with the linguistic dimension of relations of power, dominance and discrimination, be this overt or concealed in ostensibly neutral discourse. Flowerdew (2008: 196) suggests that ‘participants may not be aware of how powerful or powerless they are in discourse terms. Indeed, it is the role of CDA to reveal these relationships’.

CDA thus has an explicitly emancipatory objective, since it is concerned with the intersection between language, discourse and social struggle. Van Dijk (1993: 249) proposes that it ‘seeks to understand the relations between discourse, power, dominance, [and] social inequality’, and consequently analysts are tasked with not only revealing power relations in society, but bringing about change through highlighting the linguistic dimension of social inequality and supporting social struggle. It is not ‘value-neutral scholarship’ (Haig, 2008: 52), but rather – as Blommaert (2001: 14) suggests – CDA ‘advocates interventionism in the social practices it investigates; explicitness in political interests and in the political use of social scientific research are welcomed. CDA thus openly professes strong commitments to change, anti-power biases and practice-orientedness’. Of particular concern for CDA are the linguistic means by which ideas and representations
become ‘naturalised’ and how assumptions become so ‘commonsense’ as to be unchallenged and understood as reality. As Talbot (2007: 46) explains, CDA is concerned with how ‘a particular perception of the world comes to be accepted as simply the way things are’. Thus, the naturalisation of ideas requires investigation, a point raised by Foucault (1969: 32):

Il faut remettre en question ces synthèses toutes faites, ces groupements que d’ordinaire on admet avant tout examen, ces liens dont la validité est reconnue d’entrée de jeu ; il fait débusquer ces formes et ces forces obscures par laquelle on a l’habitude de lier entre eux les discours des hommes; il faut les chasser de l’ombre où elles règnent.

Therefore, a key aim for CDA is to ‘unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse that have become so naturalised over time that we begin to treat them as common, acceptable and natural features of discourses’ (Talbot et al., 2003: 36). Consequently, CDA can be differentiated from other forms of academic analysis as it ‘has aspirations to take the part of those who suffer from linguistic-discursive forms of domination and exploitation’ (Fairclough, 1995a: 186). The discursive functioning of ideology is thus of paramount concern, and in the following paragraphs the links between discourse, power and ideology are further explored (section 2.2.3).

Before outlining the principles of CDA, it must be noted that studies in CDA can be viewed as ‘multifarious’ (Wodak, 2002: 7), and while sharing common starting points and principles a number of differing theoretical foundations, methodological approaches and preferred data sets are identifiable. As Wodak (2002: 7) observes, ‘in contrast to “total or closed” theories, like for example Chomsky’s Generative Transformational Grammar or Michael Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics, CDA has never had the image of being a “sect” nor does it want to have such an image’. However, there are a number of principles which influence all approaches to CDA, including a shared emphasis on discourse, power and ideology and a concern with a ‘critical’ stance towards the analysis of discourse – these are now discussed.

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3 Various approaches within the CDA ‘school’ can be identified, including, among others, a Cognitive Linguistic approach to CDA (Hart, 2011), Feminist CDA (Lazar, 2007), Political Discourse Analysis (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) and Positive Discourse Analysis (Macgilchrist, 2007; Martin, 2004).
2.2.3.2 The Eight Principles of CDA

Luke (2002: 100) suggests that what all CDA approaches share is a ‘principled and transparent shunting back and forth between the microanalysis of texts using varied tools of linguistic, semiotic and literary analysis and the macroanalysis of social formations, institutions and power relations that these texts index and construct’. A number of common principles underpinning all approaches to CDA have been identified by Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-280) and can be summarised as follows:

(1) CDA addresses social problems.
(2) Power relations are discursive.
(3) Discourse constitutes society and culture.
(4) Discourse does ideological work.
(5) Discourse is historical.
(6) The link between text and society is mediated.
(7) Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
(8) Discourse is a form of social action.

The paragraphs below elaborate on Points (2), (4) and (5), that is the discursive functioning of power and ideology, and the historical nature of discourse. To briefly explain the other principles: the emancipatory aims of CDA are outlined above, and ‘CDA addresses social problems’ through the selection of texts and analysis of discourses where social inequalities and unequal power dynamics are likely to be present. For instance, typical sites of analysis include discourses on immigration and immigrant identity (e.g. de Cillia et al., 1999; Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2007; Van der Valk, 2003a), political discourse (e.g. Blackledge, 2006; Chilton et al., 1998; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Krzyżanowski, 2009a; Tekin, 2008) and language and gender (e.g. Caldas-Coulthard, 1993; Kauppinen, 2013; Page, 2003; Talbot, 1998; Wodak, 1997). Additionally, in Point (3) Fairclough and Wodak note that CDA conceives the relationship between language, culture and society as dialectical: it considers language as being shaped by society, but equally, society is shaped by language. Viewed this way, discourse is a form of social practice; as Wodak (1996: 17) explains:

6 Note that Point (6) ‘The link between text and society is mediated’ is discussed below at section 2.6.2 ‘Media as a Site of Discourse’, which outlines how the media constructs particular interpretations of ‘reality’ based on a complex interplay of ideological and social factors.
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation, institution and social structure that frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constituted, as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it.

This, discourse and society are mutually constitutive, in the sense that discourse both constitutes and shapes society, but equally discourse is shaped by the surrounding social conditions. Similarly, Fairclough (1992: 3) insists that ‘discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct and constitute them’. It was established in the Introduction to this thesis that one of the aims of the study is to investigate the linguistic dimension of social relations of inequality in France; therefore, viewing language – and consequently discourse – as social practice acknowledges the role that discourse plays in shaping our constructions and perceptions of individuals and events. A Critical Discourse Analytical approach thus allows us to probe how the events of November 2005 and those connected to it (inhabitants of the banlieues, political figures etc.) are constructed discursively in news reporting on the riots.

The methodological approach chosen for this study – Fairclough’s three-dimensional sociocultural approach to CDA (section 2.3.2) – is explicitly interpretative and explanatory (Point 7). It requires not only a description of the linguistic properties of newspaper discourse on the 2005 riots, but also an interpretation of these properties in the context of their production and consumption. Explanations are offered regarding the relationship between the features of the discourse and broader discursive and social processes. Throughout Chapters Five, Six and Seven links are drawn between texts and the sociocultural contexts of the riots, including discourses on immigration, integration and the place of the banlieues in French society. The principle that ‘discourse is a form of social action’ (Point 8) reflects the emancipatory objectives of CDA (discussed above); for CDA, discourse is seen as having the potential to enact and maintain power relations and it is the task of analysts to reveal the linguistic dimension of social inequality. Thus, CDA is a
socially committed research paradigm – researchers make their interests explicit and seek to have success in changing discourse and power patterns in society.

2.2.3.3 Discourse and Power
Echoing Foucault’s theories discussed above (section 2.2.2.3), in Point (2) Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argue that power relations are discursive, and CDA links linguistic analysis with sociocultural analysis, placing questions of power as a central concern. Wodak (1996: 18) maintains that ‘both the exercise of power in the “here and now” of specific discursive events, and the longer-term shaping of discursive practices and orders of discourse require investigation’ and CDA aims to address the immediate and long-term discursive functioning of power. Van Dijk (1993: 250) – following Foucault – stresses that power and dominance need not necessarily be viewed as unilaterally imposed on others: ‘On the contrary, in many situations, and sometimes paradoxically, power and even power abuse may seem “jointly produced”, e.g. when dominated groups are persuaded, by whatever means, that dominance is “natural” or otherwise legitimate’. Furthermore, Van Leeuwen (1993: 193) argues that CDA should be concerned not only with ‘discourse as the instrument of the social construction of reality’ but also with ‘discourse as the instrument of power and control’ and ‘the way in which these things are done in and through language’. It has been pointed out that power is increasingly exercised by linguistic means (Flowerdew, 1997), and CDA aims to expose how access to and control over discourse by powerful individuals, groups or institutions can privilege interests of powerful groups ahead of the less powerful. Breeze (2011) maintains that CDA’s concern with power distinguishes it from other approaches to discourse analysis (particularly SFL), highlighting CDA’s ‘underlying assumption that the social relations reflected in language phenomena were part of a larger pattern characterised by unequal power relations’ (2011: 496).

Analysis of news reporting on the 2005 riots in France requires therefore a critical examination of whether French newspaper discourse is used as instrument of power. Analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven probes the role of the printed news media in facilitating the exercise of power and the maintenance of unequal social
relationships. For instance, Chapter Six exposes the unequal power relations contained in ostensibly neutral news reporting on the 2005 riots, and shows how discourses of sameness and difference allow the printed news media to discursively construct a particular interpretation of French national identity which is powerful in its exclusion of minority groups in the banlieues.

### 2.2.3.4 Discourse and Ideology

Furthermore, one of the key concerns of CDA is the discursive functioning of ideology and the link between language, discourse and the operation of ideologies in society. While multiple interpretations exist of what an ‘ideology’ is (for an extended discussion see Thompson, 1990), CDA adopts a Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretation which Gee (1990: 6) explains as an ‘upside-down’ version of reality:

> Things are not really the way the elite and powerful believe them to be: rather, their beliefs invert reality to make it appear the way they would like it to be, the way it “needs” to be if their power is to be enhanced and sustained.

A neo-Marxist analysis of ideology seeks to understand how ideology operates in society, how the beliefs and the way of thinking of the ruling classes become concealed and rationalised to the extent that domination is possible through the changing of social systems of belief (Richardson, 2007). Following in the tradition of the Critical Linguists who were similarly concerned with the discursive functioning of ideology (section 2.2.2.2), CDA aims to understand how beliefs, values and attitudes are constituted and therefore become the norm for how a person, group or a society interprets and comprehends the world (Oktar, 2001). Van Dijk (2006: 116) defines ideology as ‘belief systems socially shared by the members of a collectivity of social actors’, and contends that one of the cognitive functions of ideology is ‘to provide (ideological) coherence to the beliefs of a group and thus facilitate their acquisitions and use in everyday situations […I]deologies also specify what general cultural values […] are relevant for the group’. Ideologies have a significant impact on social power structures, and language is an important means by which ideologies are (re)produced, expressed and legitimated in society. However, the link between ideology and discourse is complex, and Van Dijk (2006: 124) maintains that ‘discourse is not always ideologically transparent, and discourse analysis does not always allow us to infer what people’s ideological beliefs are’.
Emphasising the sociocognitive dimension of ideology, he stresses that discourse cannot be reduced to ideology, but nonetheless suggests (2006: 115) that ‘systematic discourse analysis offers powerful methods to study the structures and functions of underlying ideologies’. Fairclough (1989) asserts that the exercise of power in modern society is increasingly achieved through ideology, and consequently, it can be argued that ‘if we want to know what ideologies actually look like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to look closely at their discursive manifestation’ (Kuo and Nakamura, 2005: 394).

Van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach to CDA (section 2.3.3) emphasises the self-serving nature of fundamental sociocultural ideologies and the prevalence of ideological polarising distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, or the use of a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ discourse. Ideological discourse, Van Dijk (2006: 126) maintains:

\[
\text{[...]} \text{is generally organised by a general strategy of positive self-presentation (boasting) and negative other-presentation (derogation). This strategy may operate at all levels, generally in such a way that our good things are emphasised and our bad things de-emphasised, and the opposite for Others – whose bad things will be enhanced, and whose good things will be mitigated, hidden or forgotten.}
\]

He also notes (2006: 116) that such ideological polarising is typically socially shared, and ‘ideologies consist of social representations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of existence and reproduction’. Of particular interest for CDA is where ideologies become so widely shared and socially accepted that they become accepted as ‘obvious beliefs or opinion, or commonsense’ (2006: 117). It was established in section 1.2 that one of the aims of this study is to question the division of society along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines in French news reporting on the 2005 riots, and to question the role of discourse in the construction and legitimation of social power structures and hierarchies. Therefore, the ideological focus of CDA highlights again that it is appropriate as the primary methodological approach: CDA provides the theoretical and methodological frameworks for identifying the linguistic dimension of ideologies and consequently recognising the operation of power and ideology in discourse.
2.2.3.5 Discourse is Historical

Fairclough and Wodak’s (1997) principles of CDA summarised above insist that ‘Discourse is historical’ (Point 5). This principle has been influenced by the writings of Foucault (section 2.2.2.3), who maintains that ‘there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others’ (1972: 98). CDA theorists have elaborated on the historical nature of discourse in a variety of ways: Wodak (1996: 19) argues that ‘utterances are only meaningful if we consider their use in a specific situation, if we recognize their embedding in a certain culture and ideology, and most importantly, if we know what the discourse relates to in the past’. Fairclough (1992: 84) similarly emphasises the inherent ‘intertextual’ aspects of texts, ‘the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth’. He cites Bakhtin’s conception of discourse as ‘heteroglossic’ or multivoiced:

At any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and past, between differing epochs of the past, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth. (Bakhtin, 1981 [1953]: cited by Fairclough, 1992)

The selected methodological approach for this study (Fairclough’s sociocultural framework for CDA) takes account of the historical nature of discourse through his theoretical concepts of ‘orders of discourse’ and ‘intertextuality’ (section 3.3.3). They allow us to identify how existing discourses impact on and are reproduced in news discourse on the 2005 riots.

2.2.3.6 A ‘Critical’ Approach to Discourse Analysis

Before outlining the primary approaches to CDA, the notion of what is meant by the ‘critical’ dimension of CDA must be considered. ‘Critical’, derived from the Greek word krino, is usually associated with a negative evaluation or finding fault with a specific endeavour. However, it has acquired a more refined meaning, and within the domain of the Arts and Social Sciences the use of the term to define an analytical paradigm, discipline or theory usually suggests that either ‘the new paradigm/discipline/theory includes social analyses, particularly the analysis of social inequality’ and the critical paradigm/discipline/theory is ‘opposing existing paradigms/disciplines/theories which, among other failings, fail to address social
inequalities’ (Billig, 2000: 291). For CDA, Van Dijk (1993: 383-384) maintains that being ‘critical’ in approach demands the following:

Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit socio-political stance: they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large [...]. Their hope, if occasionally illusory, is to change through critical understanding. Their perspective, if possible, that of those who suffer most from dominance and inequality, their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice.

As outlined earlier, CDA is not ‘value-neutral scholarship’ (Haig, 2008), but is socially committed with the aim of exposing how the use of language and the exercise of power are linked, with particular emphasis on exposing the discursive operation of power and social relations of dominance. Discourse analysis that aims to be ‘critical’ analyses ‘social interactions in a way which focuses upon their linguistic elements, and which sets out to show up their generally hidden determinants in the systems of social relationships, as well as hidden effects they may have upon that system’ (Fairclough, 2001: 4). Labelling Discourse Analysis as ‘critical’ also signals a distinction from other forms of Discourse Analysis, in particular a departure from a purely descriptive approach to linguistic analysis. It should be noted that being critical does not necessarily imply the highlighting of only negative interactions and processes; rather, as Wodak (1999: 186) points out, ‘critical means distinguishing complexity and denying easy, dichotomous explanations. It means making contradictions transparent. Moreover, critical implies that a researcher is self-reflective while doing research about social problems’. This study therefore adopts an explicitly critical approach to the analysis of discourse, and seeks to expose the linguistic dimension of inequality in news reporting on urban violence in France in 2005.

2.2.3.7 Definition of Discourse

While varying definitions of the word ‘discourse’ exist, this study adopts Fairclough’s (2003: 17) conception, defined as follows:
A discourse is a particular way of representing some part of the (physical, social, psychological) world – there are alternative and often competing discourses, associated with different groups of people in different social positions […]. Discourses differ in how social events are represented, what is excluded or included, how abstractly or concretely events are represented, and how more specifically the processes and relations, social actors, time and place of events are represented.

Thus, throughout this thesis discourse is understood as language in use, a series of choices relating to how we talk about the world, and how language is used to construct a particular understanding of an event, actor or interaction. It sees discourse as social practice, as both shaping society and being shaped by it: language, texts and discourses do not merely neutrally ‘reflect’ the world as it is, but rather constitute a particular interpretation of individuals, groups, events etc. Likewise, individuals, groups, events etc. are shaped by discourse, and discourse is viewed as creating, to use Wodak’s (1996: 17) words, ‘situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people’. This conception of discourse allows us to see newspaper reporting on the 2005 riots as a lens through which to view how the mainstream French printed media interpret events and position individuals. In line with Richardson’s (2007: 10) observations, it allows us to conceive that ‘language first represents social realities and second contributes to the production and reproduction of social reality or social life’.

Thus, this thesis adopts a definition of discourse as social practice, and emphasises the dialectical links between discourse and society. Interpreting discourse in this way facilitates the drawing of assumptions and interpretations about how discourses present in newspaper reporting on French urban violence in 2005 impact on conceptions of social reality. It means that links can be made between discourse and social relations of power, thus the linguistic dimension of power asymmetries can be identified. Therefore, adopting this definition of discourse allows us to address the research questions posed for the study (section 1.2).

In sum, this section intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the origins of CDA and the related theoretical assumptions. It established that CDA is bound up
with questions regarding the role of language, power, ideology and discourse within a society and it seeks to unpick the ideologies couched in ostensibly neutral discourse. It thus reveals how language use contributes to the maintenance of unequal social relations of power. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 16) summarise the objectives of CDA as follows:

We see CDA as bringing together a variety of theories into dialogue, especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other, so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories, though what itself theorises in particular is the mediation between the social and the linguistic.

In light of the preceding discussion it is argued that CDA offers the most suitable theoretical foundation to address the research questions outlined in the Introduction to this study: the focus on ideology and power makes it an appropriate framework to investigate social power asymmetries and hierarchies. Additionally, the emphasis on the linguistic dimension of inequality facilitates the identification of how language is used to discursively construct individuals and groups in French society and therefore reproduce unequal relations of power in French society.

Having established the theoretical foundations of a critical approach to the analysis of discourse, the next part of the chapter outlines the three primary approaches to CDA, and identifies how each one influences the methodological approach adopted for the study. There is particular emphasis on Fairclough’s sociocultural approach, as this provides the overarching framework through which discourses present in the news reporting on the 2005 riots are introduced and interpreted in Chapters Five and Six.

2.3 Principal frameworks

2.3.1 Introduction
This part of the chapter examines in some detail three of the principal approaches to CDA, specifically Fairclough’s sociocultural approach, Van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach and Wodak et al.’s DHA. It was acknowledged earlier that these are not the only frameworks available within the CDA paradigm; however a full introduction to the various approaches to CDA lies outside the scope of this study. Furthermore,
these three frameworks directly impact on the design of the methodological framework used in Chapters Five and Six and are the most relevant to the current study. Therefore, this part of the chapter identifies the theorisation of language, discourse, ideology, power etc. in each of the three approaches, noting the difference in emphasis between each. It is shown how both the sociocognitive approach and the DHA influence the theoretical and methodological framework of the current study. However, as mentioned, particular emphasis is placed on Fairclough’s sociocultural approach because this framework structures the analysis of discourses in news reporting on the 2005 French riots.

2.3.2 Fairclough’s Sociocultural Approach
Recognised as one of the principal exponents of CDA (Cameron, 2001; Goatly, 2000; Haig, 2004; Stubbs, 1997), Fairclough’s sociocultural approach aims to further advance the work of the Critical Linguists and to ‘put Foucault’s perspective to work’ (Fairclough, 1992: 38). His conception of CDA (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1995b, 1992, 1989) calls for an advancement from a purely descriptive approach to linguistic analysis through the addition of interpretative and explanatory levels of discourse analysis. Like many discourse analysts, Fairclough rejects the Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole*, with its emphasis on language and not on language in use. Cognisant of the importance of studying language use as a method for studying social change, he particularly emphasises ‘commonsense’ assumptions which are ‘implicit in the conventions according to which people interact linguistically, of which people are generally not consciously aware’ (1989: 2). His view of discourse as social practice (1989: 22) allows him to imply that language is part of society, and not external to it, that language is a social process, and that language is a socially conditioned process, conditioned by other (non-linguistic) parts of society. Consequently, the ideological workings of language are of paramount consideration: ‘Ideologies are closely linked to language, because using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and the form of social behaviour where we rely most on ‘common sense’ assumptions [...] Ideology is pervasively present in language’ (1989: 2). Seeing discourse as ‘language as social practice determined by social structure’ (1989: 17), Fairclough categorises the relationship between discourse and social structures, and more generally between
social practice and social structure, as dialectical; thus, discourse is shaped and constrained by the surrounding social structures, but conversely, discourse is socially constitutive (section 2.2.3). Power, consequently, lies in discourse, through its use and control by powerful people in political, economic, social, educational or media organisations. Perhaps the ultimate power, Fairclough (1989: 91) asserts, lies in the achievement of ‘naturalisation’ by a dominant group:

If a discourse type so dominates an institution that dominated types are more or less entirely suppressed or contained, then it will cease to be seen as arbitrary [...] and will come to be seen as natural, and legitimate because it is simply the way of conducting oneself.

Thus, Fairclough’s concern with the naturalised dimension of social relations of power aligns with the stated objectives of this thesis, which – as outlined in Chapter 1 – aims to investigate social hierarchies and asymmetries present in newspaper discourses relating to the 2005 riots.

Based on his conception of language and its powerful role in society, Fairclough (1992: 62) attempts to ‘bring together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language, in the form of a framework which will be suitable for use in social scientific research, and specifically in the study of social change’. He is explicit in attaching an emancipatory objective to his conception of CDA, aiming to raise awareness of the potential ideological dangers of commonsense assumptions and setting the objective of making a ‘contribution to the general raising of consciousness of exploitative social relations, through focusing upon language’ (1989: 4). Of particular significance to the current study are Fairclough’s arguments regarding the significance of language use by the media in modern society; he suggests (1995b: 2-3) that ‘language should be recognized as an important element within contemporary processes of social and cultural change’, and that ‘given the focal position of the mass media in contemporary social systems, there can be little argument about their relevance to the study of social change’. Cognisant of the position of the media within a specific social structure, he acknowledges their potential, particularly in the era of mass media, to both affect and be affected by power relations within the social system. He therefore argues (1995b: 16) that a linguistic analysis ‘can help anchor social and cultural research and analysis in a detailed understanding of the nature of
media output’, but such an analysis must not be ‘a rather arid, formalist analysis of language, in abstraction from social context’. Consequently, Fairclough advocates the application of a three-dimensional approach to discourse (which can be summarised as the ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and explanation’ phases), discussed in greater detail in section 3.3.

Thus, for Fairclough (2009: 165):

CDA oscillates […] between a focus on structures (especially the intermediate level of the structuring of social practices) and a focus on the strategies of social agents, i.e. the ways in which they try to achieve outcomes or objectives within existing structures and practices, or to change them in particular ways.

It is, however, important to note that while most focus in this study is placed on Fairclough’s earlier works (e.g. Fairclough, 1995b, 1992, 1989), particularly his three-dimensional conception of CDA, his more recent works have also been consulted. His later writings, most notably Discourse in Late Modernity: rethinking critical discourse analysis (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), New Labour, New Language? (Fairclough, 2000) and Language and Globalization (Fairclough, 2006), represent a rethinking of CDA in the light of social and global change (for an overview of a newer version of Fairclough's CDA framework see Fairclough, 2012). Focusing on topics including the role of discourse in the emergence and growth of globalisation, neo-liberalism, new capitalism and the knowledge economy, Fairclough continues to place language in a prominent position in the shaping and construction of social power structures. In Discourse in Late Modernity (1999) Chouliaraki and Fairclough identify a number of themes deserving of greater attention within the sphere of discourse analysis; amongst others, they list hybridity, identity, reflexivity, commodification, hegemonic globalisation and the technologisation of discourse as demanding greater attention in future studies. Some of his most recent research considers ‘transition’ in Central and Eastern Europe, and seeks to carve out a role for CDA within trans-disciplinary research in this area (Fairclough, 2005), and he also examines the financial crisis using an interdiscursive method of textual analysis (Fairclough, 2012). However, as mentioned, it is his earlier work that is of the greatest relevance to the current study and analysis in Chapters Five and Six is structured around his three-dimensional sociocultural

### 2.3.3 Van Dijk’s Sociocognitive Approach

In contrast to other scholars within the CDA paradigm, Van Dijk stresses that he prefers to term his work ‘Critical Discourse Studies’ (CDS); this term, he maintains (2009a: 62), ‘suggests that such a critical approach not only involves critical analysis, but also critical theory, as well as critical applications. The designation CDS may also avoid the widespread misconception that a critical approach is a *method* of discourse analysis’. Nonetheless, his approach is similar to other critical discourse analysts, as he emphasises the role discourse plays in reproducing social domination and injustice and seeks to expose and combat such injustice. While Fairclough proposes a sociocultural approach to discourse analysis (discussed above), Van Dijk advocates a sociocognitive approach, emphasising the importance of cognition in the study of discourse, communication and interaction. Similar to the foregoing discussion on Fairclough’s sociocultural approach, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to analyse or summarise all Van Dijk’s contributions to the field of CDA, rather the paragraphs which follow will discuss those aspects most relevant to the present research.

Like all those working in the field of CDA, Van Dijk (2009a: 63) asserts that scholars of CDS ‘are typically interested in the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse’. He is similarly interested in the discursive dimension of social power, defined in terms of the ‘control exercised by one group or organisation (or its members) over the actions and /or the minds of (the members of) another group, thus limiting the freedom of action of the others, or influencing their knowledge, attitudes or ideologies’ (1996a: 84). He views discourse as ‘a multidimensional social phenomenon’, maintaining that it is at the same time a linguistic object, an action, a form of social interaction, a social practice, a mental representation, an interaction or communicative event or activity, a cultural product or even an economic commodity that is being bought and sold (2009a: 67). Van
Dijk’s approach can be distinguished by his interest in the cognitive processes associated with the production and reception of discourse; thus he is concerned with ‘the study of mental representations and the processes of language users when they produce and comprehend discourse and participate in verbal interaction, as well as in the knowledge, ideologies and other beliefs shared by social groups’ (2009a: 64). Drawing on work on the ‘cognitive sciences’, including psychology, linguistics, philosophy and logic, Van Dijk has developed a framework to help better understand the mental models employed in the production and reception of discourse, and he is concerned with the sociocognitive interface of both personal mental models and socially shared mental representations (Van Dijk, 2009b, 2008).

Two particular aspects of Van Dijk’s theorisation of CDA and his proposed methodological frameworks are of relevance to the current study: firstly, his work on the discursive functioning of ideology and how emphasis on the positive presentation of the Self and negative presentation of the Other leads to the creation of in- and out-groups in society (Van Dijk, 2006, 1998, 1995a). Analysis in Chapter Six draws on work by Van Dijk and others to argue that emphasis on the positive characteristics of the Self and distance from negative characteristics of the Other permits a clear distinction to be drawn between the French people (us) and immigrant minorities living in the banlieues (them). In addition, this thesis also draws on Van Dijk’s writings in the area of discourse and racism, principally involving the analysis of media texts including news articles and editorials. In keeping with his sociocognitive approach to discourse analysis and emphasis on ideology, he seeks to analyse discourse structures to better recognise the beliefs or mental representations underpinning the creation of media discourse, as well as the social, institutional or political ideologies implicitly or explicitly present in a given piece of discourse. He has paid attention to the significance of headlines, editorials, the hiring of journalists/editors, access to news discourse, news production and news structures for the critical analysis of news discourse (e.g. Van Dijk, 1989, 1988). The analytical part of this thesis therefore also draws on Van Dijk’s work regarding how news discourse can be used to reproduce racist assumptions and thus functions as a tool of dominance and discrimination.
While this approach may seem similar to that of Fairclough discussed above, Fairclough (1995b: 29) is keen to point out the differences: firstly, Van Dijk’s analyses of the practices of news production and comprehension have a social-psychological emphasis on processes of social cognition, whereas Fairclough is interested how socially available discourses and genres are drawn on. Moreover, Fairclough (1995b: 29) observes that:

Van Dijk’s main motivation for linking media texts to context is to show in detail how social relationships and processes (e.g. the reproduction of racism) are accomplished at a micro-level through routine practices, whereas my major concern is to show how shifting language and discursive practicex in the media constitute social and cultural change.

As mentioned, this study primarily draws on Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA, and consequently Van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach is used to a limited extent in the analysis in Chapters Five and Six. This is largely because in the absence of reception analysis of the selected texts from Mini-RiCo, it is difficult to access the sociocognitive structures employed in the processing of the texts by consumers of French news discourse. Part of Van Dijk’s analytical framework demands the analysis of social cognition, relating ‘properties of discourse with […] underlying, socially shared, representations, which group members use as a resource to talk about (members) of other groups’ (Van Dijk, 2009a: 78). Consequently, he argues (2009a: 79) as follows:

We are thus able not only to abstractly describe text and talk, but also to explain how real language users go about producing and understanding discourse, how their personal and socially shared beliefs affect discourse production and how these are in turn affected by discourse.

This emphasis on the sociocognitive structures which influence the production and consumption of discourse arguably requires a complete analysis – using reception analysis and interviews with news journalists – of how individual cognitive structures impact on newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005. Reception analysis has not been included in the methodological design of this study, and instead a qualitative CDA approach is combined with a quantitative corpus-assisted analysis of news discourse on French urban violence in 2005. Therefore, Van Dijk’s CDA framework is not used to structure the analysis in Chapters Five and Six but is drawn on in the analysis of the discursive functioning of ideology and racism in news discourse.
2.3.4 The Discourse Historical Approach

The third approach to CDA which influences the current study is the DHA, developed primarily by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl at the University of Vienna. It was initially developed as a methodology to analyse the constitution of anti-Semitic stereotyped images as they emerged in public discourses in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of former UN general secretary Kurt Waldheim, a figure who had for a significant period of time concealed his National Socialist past (Wodak et al., 1990). Following this, the DHA was further developed in a number of studies which examined, among others, racist discrimination against migrants from Romania, and the discourse about nation and national identity in Austria (e.g. Wodak et al., 1999). The following has been identified as the most distinguishing feature of the DHA, in comparison to other CDA approaches: ‘its endeavour to work interdisciplinary, multimethodologically, and on the basis of a variety of different empirical data as well as background information’ (Wodak and Reisigl, 2003: 383). The overarching aim of the DHA is to ‘integrate texts of as many different genres as possible, as well as the historical dimension of the subject under investigation’ (Wodak, 1999: 188). It thus endeavours to transcend a purely linguistic investigation, and to include, ‘more or less systematically the historical, political, sociological, and/or psychological dimension in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive occasion (Wodak and Reisigl, 2003: 383). A key cornerstone of the DHA is an emphasis on interdisciplinarity and on the inclusion of a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches so as to enhance the analysis of a given problem as manifested in discourse. The DHA conceives an analysis that is fluid and ever-changing, moving from theory to data as required and adapting to the specifics of the analysis, not constrained by fixed categories of investigation. It has been viewed as a challenging methodological approach for the researcher, demanding a willingness to embrace disciplines and investigate areas which may be previously unfamiliar, and the analyst is encouraged to continuously push the boundaries of the investigation so as to fully appreciate the intertextual and contextual implications of the subject being studied. Consequently, a further emphasis of the DHA is on the application of the principle of triangulation, which demands taking a ‘whole range of empirical observations, theories, and methods as well as background information into account [...]’. The specific choices depend on the specific problem’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 89). Similar to Fairclough’s theorisation of orders of discourse and
Intertextuality (section 3.3.3), the DHA investigates the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts, utterances and discourse. Intertextuality is concerned with how ‘texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present’, while interdiscursivity examines how discourses are linked to each other in various ways (2009: 90).

Similar to other CDA schools, the DHA conceives of language, discourse, power and ideology in a very particular way. It does not see language as powerful on its own, but rather as a means to acquire and maintain power through the use powerful people make of it. ‘Discourse’, Wodak and Reisigl (2003: 383) maintain, should be seen as ‘a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic (oral or written) tokens that belong to specific semiotic types (genres)’. Ideologies are seen as a means of establishing and maintaining power relations within a society, and the DHA takes a particular interest in the ways in which linguistic and other semiotic practices mediate and reproduce ideology in a variety of social institutions. One of the aims of the DHA, thus, ‘is to ‘demystify’ the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance’ (2009: 88). Adopting a Weberian conception of power, viewing it as ‘the possibility of having one’s own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others’ (2009: 88), the DHA seeks to investigate how power is legitimised or de-legitimised in discourse. Hence Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 89) suggest that ‘texts are often sites of social struggle in that they manifest traces of differing ideological fights for dominance and hegemony. Thus, we focus on the ways in which linguistic forms are used in various expressions and manipulations of power’. Texts are not limited to written language, but – as in other approaches to CDA – include both verbal and visual, written and spoken, words and images – oral, written and visual language. Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 93) cite context as being a key concept, which takes into account four levels:
The immediate, language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse;

(2) The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;

(3) The extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’; and

(4) The broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to.

Thus, the DHA is an interdisciplinary approach to CDA, and similar to Fairclough and Van Dijk’s approaches, seeks to better understand the central role of language, and consequently discourse, in enacting and maintaining power relations in the world. It can be distinguished by its explicit emphasis on interdisciplinarity and the central role context plays in the discourse analysis.

While this study does not use the theories of the DHA to frame the analysis of news discourse on French urban violence in 2005 discussed in Chapters Five and Six, it does adopt aspects of its methodological approach, in particular its theorisation of discursive ‘strategies’. This is introduced in detail in section 3.3.4.5, but to summarise briefly, strategies can be defined as ‘a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 94). Chapter Six draws on the DHA’s elaboration of the discursive strategies for creating national identity (Wodak et al., 2009), and uses Reisigl and Wodak’s theorisation of constructive strategies in discourse to show how a particular interpretation of French national identity is created through discourses of sameness and difference in French news reporting on civil disturbances in the banlieues in November 2005.

### 2.4 Criticisms of CDA

#### 2.4.1 Introduction

It has thus been established that a CDA approach to the analysis of language and discourse – specifically Fairclough’s three-dimensional sociocultural approach to CDA – provides the primary theoretical and methodological foundation of the current study. However, it must be acknowledged that like most theories, CDA is not a perfect framework, and thus the next part of this chapter addresses some criticisms
levelled at CDA both as a theoretical paradigm and a research methodology. It has been described as ‘broad church’ (Breeze, 2011: 502), and consequently the multiplicity of competing approaches to CDA has resulted in an eclectic mix of frameworks. Criticisms have been raised in relation to a perceived ‘lack of coherence, indiscriminate mixing of incompatible concepts, unsystematic application of methods, and so on. Moreover, intellectual rigour aside, there are issues of disciplinary self-definition or self-understanding which clearly have yet to be resolved’ (Breeze, 2011: 502). While some commentators have outlined issues with regard to its philosophical foundations (e.g. Hammersley, 1997), the vagueness of terms used (e.g. Widdowson, 1995) and its closure to particular kinds of societies and a particular time frame used (e.g. Blommaert, 2005; Shi-Xu, 2006), the paragraphs which follow are organised thematically around four relevant criticisms of CDA: firstly, the issue of context is discussed (section 2.4.2), described by Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 460) as ‘arguably the biggest methodological issue faced’ by CDA. Secondly, criticisms relating to the selection of texts are addressed, along with concerns relating to analytical rigour and the representativeness of both data and findings (section 2.4.3). Thirdly, the absence of consideration for the reader in CDA is examined, including failures to consult with producers or consumers of discourse (section 2.4.4). Fourthly, concerns regarding excessive subjectivity by the analyst and the possibility for researcher ideologies to be implicated in the analysis of the discourse in question are addressed (section 2.4.5).

2.4.2 CDA and Context
It has been established that studies in CDA focus not only on a variety of discourses, but also adopt a broad range of methodological approaches, and there is a common acceptance of the importance of acknowledging extra-linguistic or contextual features which impact upon the complete analysis of discourse. For critics of CDA, however, the absence of thorough contextualisation is a frequently cited shortcoming; since critical discourse analysts are tasked with uncovering the covert power struggles at play in discourse, decisions regarding the inclusion of what may be assumed to be simply background knowledge or relevant context can prove to be deeply problematic. As Bhatia et al. (2008: 3) comment in relation to CDA:
Despite a common commitment to the study of texts and their use in social contexts, those working in the different approaches diverge on two of the most basic issues in this formulation: the question of what a text is, and the question of what counts as the social context in which that text is used.

Blommaert in particular has been quite explicit in his criticisms of contextualisation within the CDA paradigm (Blommaert, 2005; 1997; Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000): he mentions the often-used phrases of ‘background data’, ‘basic facts’, or ‘some preliminary observations’ as posing major methodological problems for CDA (Blommaert, 1997: 70). Analysts frequently include what may be considered to be ‘background facts’, but such ‘facts’ cannot be assumed to be neutral and unbiased observations: ‘the critical analysis of a text/discourse risks being undermined (and ideologically plied) by the uncritical acceptance of established background facts related to the text/discourse’ (1997: 70). Similarly he later (2001: 15) critiques particular selections of contexts, the relevance of which is determined by the researcher, and points out that this issue is perhaps unavoidable:

Part of this problem seems to be unavoidable […] but this problem is especially pressing in the case of CDA, where the social situatedness of discourse data is crucial and where context is often taken to include broad systemic and institutional observations.

While Blommaert does not suggest a framework for use in the contextualisation process in CDA, apart from his proposals regarding the ‘forgotten contexts’ in CDA and Conversation Analysis (Blommaert, 2005, 2001), he does suggest (2000: 460) that ‘concrete instances of talk or concrete features of text could be analysed more satisfactorily if a more dynamic concept of context – contextualisation were used’.

Verschueren (2001) also expresses concern with current approaches to context by critical discourse analysts, and argues that a systematic approach to context is necessary, ‘guided by sound and rigorous linguistic methodology’. He maintains (2001: 60) that the lack of methodological rigour and a failure to address context in analysis results in studies which concluded by ‘subjecting the media, as well as other institutions, to a circus trial, by playing fast and loose with the observable facts in order to support perceived claims’. As a guideline, he recommends (2001: 69) that ‘whatever can be detected on the basis of a “formal” analysis […] can never be ignored’. However, Verschueren does not propose a framework for use by other critical discourse analysts and thus his arguments remain theoretical rather than
practical. Furthermore, Tyrwhitt-Drake (2005: 79) suggests the following as the ‘two most obvious problems’ facing contextualisation in CDA studies: firstly, the context in which a text was written can be difficult to recover in full, particularly when the text under consideration was written in the past. Secondly, he suggests (2005: 79) that where the context is ‘well documented’ difficulties lie in assessing whether a ‘representative’ context can be established:

Some texts have such a voluminous context, are so well documented, that they are virtually intractable; [...] even if the researcher [...] actually make[s] use of all the available material, he or she could never be sure that the texts are representative, nor draw on them in a manner guaranteed to be even-handed.

Similarly, Breeze (2011: 514) maintains that ‘it is also possible to criticise CDA for failing to take context into account, since it often concentrates on decontextualised samples of language, so that texts or parts of texts are analysed without regard to their production, distribution or consumption’. He postulates (2011: 515) that the ideological focus on CDA and its explicit concern with power in society may incite researchers ‘to identify certain aspects of the text that seem to reflect their underlying thesis and to move swiftly onto the stages of interpretation and explanation rather than devote time to [...] exploring the immediate contextual surroundings’.

To summarise, it can be suggested that the main criticisms levelled at the notion of context within the CDA paradigm are the following:

- absence of consideration of context in CDA studies, which is particularly problematic given the expressed aims of CDA (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000);
- difficulties regarding the identification of the relevant context (Fowler, 1996; Verschueren, 2001);
- absence of a clear contextual framework prior to beginning discourse analysis (Blommaert, 2005); and
- difficulties posed by the contextualisation of retrospective events (Tyrwhitt-Drake, 2005).
Evidently, contextualisation poses enormous difficulties for analysts adopting a critical discourse analytical approach: where attempts at contextualisation are made, researchers are frequently accused of bias and subjectivity in their selection of what is viewed as the ‘relevant’ context. Tyrwhitt-Drake (2005: 81) succinctly summarises the main problems facing contextualisation in CDA as follows:

If CDA is committed to context, then the repeated failure to take it into real consideration […] suggests a lack of will. Too often, it is only lip service that is being paid to the paramountcy of context. The suspicion is aroused that aspects of the context are being deliberately excluded in order to confirm the interpretation that CDA exponent wishes to derive.

As established, this study adopts Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to the analysis of discourse as the primary methodological framework used in the forthcoming analytical chapters. As will be explained in Chapter Three, which outlines the precise methodological steps used for the analysis of newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005 (section 3.3), his three-dimensional approach to CDA demands a consideration firstly of the discourse practices of production and consumption, along with the broader sociocultural context within which the discourses are embedded. To this end, Chapter Four addresses in considerable detail the context surrounding the civil disturbances in the banlieues in November 2005. It examines a variety of sociocultural and institutional contexts of production and consumption relating to the French newspaper industry and news reporting on the suburbs, among others. It also endeavours to thoroughly contextualise the discourses identified in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. It is acknowledged, however, that context is potentially limitless, and thus not every possible detail of the ‘relevant’ context can be included within the scope of this study. It is also acknowledged that while every attempt has been made to thoroughly and systematically contextualise the RiCo and Mini-RiCo corpora, contextualisation necessarily involves some level of subjectivity which is difficult – if not impossible – to overcome.

2.4.3 CDA and Criticisms of Method: the Selection of Texts and Analysis of Data
CDA has also been criticised with regard to the collection of data and the selection of texts and fragments of texts for analysis. Concerns have been raised in relation to the representativeness of the data and the strategic choice of text/s to ensure that the
results gained meet those expected by the analyst. Likewise commentators have been
critical of the analytical techniques used to reach conclusions regarding the
discourses present in a text and the implication of these discourses in a given
context. As seen in the foregoing discussion on principal approaches to CDA
(section 2.3), there is little suggestion as to how researchers should select the texts to
be analysed, perhaps apart from Reisigl and Wodak’s DHA which proposes the
‘systematic collection of data and context information’, and ‘the selection and
downsizing of data according to relevant criteria’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 96).
However, guidance is not offered as to how such ‘relevant criteria’ should be
established, nor how the selection of texts should be approached in the first instance.
Wodak and Meyer (2009: 27) point out that ‘there is no CDA way of gathering data
[…]. Most of the approaches to CDA do not explicitly recommend sampling
procedures’. Thus, for Fairclough, Van Dijk and others, there is little discussion
regarding the procedure for selecting texts, apart from analysts being encouraged to
ensure that the emancipatory aims of CDA are attained through a focus on the
analysis of texts which will yield a ‘contribution to the general raising of
consciousness of exploitative social relations, through focusing on language’
(Fairclough, 1989: 4). Wodak (2002: 7) raises this issue with regard to Fairclough’s
analyses, commenting that ‘his examples most frequently illustrate theoretical
claims; he has little interest in representative sampling or reliability/validity of data
corpora’. Stubbs (1997: 7) voices similar concerns, suggesting that in CDA:

There is very little discussion of whether it is adequate to restrict
analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be sampled, and
whether the sample is representative. Often data fragments are
presented with no justification at all that they are representative.

Additionally, Koller and Mautner (2004: 218) indicate that ‘the hidden danger is that
the reason why the texts concerned are singled out for analysis in the first place is
that they are not typical, but in fact quite unusual instances which have aroused the
analyst’s attention’. Thus, analysts must endeavour to be transparent with regard to
the selection of texts; random selection may be a possibility, otherwise, clear and
justifiable reasons need to be offered for why one text or a number of texts have been
selected over others. Claims with regard to representativeness are to be avoided if the
text under analysis has been specifically chosen for the unusual linguistic properties
it contains, and analysts must be wary of drawing general conclusions from the
analysis of a small data sample. In the current study the data used for the CDA in
Chapters Five and Six is a corpus of texts labelled Mini-RiCo. This corpus of sixteen texts randomly selected from the larger RiCo corpus (the collection procedure used for RiCo and Mini-RiCo is introduced in section 3.2) is chosen in order to be representative of the four newspapers which make up RiCo in terms of temporal representation and genre but not selected to ‘fit’ a preconceived expectation of discourses present. Details regarding the downsampling techniques used in the creation of Mini-RiCo are explained in section 3.2.3, and at all times throughout Chapters Five and Six the findings are not generalised beyond the articles in Mini-RiCo.

Similarly the methodology of CDA has been criticised, in particular concerns have been raised relating to an absence of analytical rigour (Breeze, 2011; Verschueren, 2001; Widdowson, 2004, 1998). Analysts are accused of focusing on a small number of lexico-grammatical devices within a text which best suit a preferred interpretation, and ignoring those which might contradict findings. For instance, Verschueren (2001: 65) critiques aspects of Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s (1999) analysis, and concludes that ‘what seems to be transpiring throughout the interpretative-explanatory and evaluative conclusions is likely to be the product of conviction rather than the result of a careful step-by-step analysis that reflexively questions its own observations and conclusions’. Verschueren (2001: 69) insists upon the significance of context to bridge the gap between the ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ stages, as well as the importance of a ‘sound and rigorous linguistic methodology’, both of which are accounted for in the current study in Chapters Three and Four. Likewise Widdowson (2004, 1998) has also been highly critical of the absence of methodological rigour for CDA, and he suggests (1998: 136) that CDA ‘is not the systematic application of a theoretical model, but a rather less rigorous operation, in effect a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand’. His 1998 review article ‘The theory and practice of Critical Discourse Analysis’ examines works by Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard (1996), Fairclough (1995a) and Hodge and Kress (1993), and concludes (1998: 149) that in all three works ‘in the absence of a clear conceptual scheme, most of the work that appears in these pages seems essentially unprincipled and inconsequential. And oddly uninformed’. He maintains (1998: 149) that they ‘take
their expedient pick of various devices to add to their tool-kit, but without regard to theory that gives them warrant’, and thus views their analysis as being too quick to ascribe ideologies to discourse without the necessary linguistic and contextual analysis. Thus, analysts using a CDA framework have been accused of failing to exercise academic rigour in the linguistic analysis of texts, and for making assumptions regarding the function of ideology and hegemony in discourse which do not adequately take into account the discourse context.

Section 3.3.4 outlines the lexico-grammatical features analysed in articles in *Mini-RiCo*, incorporating relevant aspects of Fairclough’s proposed ‘toolkit’ (Fairclough, 2001, 1992), along with Van Leeuwen’s sociosemantic categories for the analysis of social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996) and the DHA’s proposed ‘strategies’ for the discursive construction of national identity (Wodak *et al.*, 2009). Analysis in the current study has endeavoured at all times to be systematic and rigorous, and throughout the CDA in Chapters Five and Six any evidence which contradicts or opposes the dominant orders of discourse is identified and discussed. In addition, claims made regarding the discourses present in *Mini-RiCo* are investigated in the substantially larger *RiCo* corpus, and Chapter Seven investigates (using a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies [CADS] approach, see section 3.4) whether the orders of discourse identified in *Mini-RiCo* can be viewed as representative of wider patterns of discourse in a larger sample of texts (*RiCo*). This study is thus cognisant of criticisms in relation to claims made regarding the selection of texts and/or the function of various lexico-grammatical devices within a text. It combines qualitative and quantitative analysis in order to fully investigate discourses present, and does not claim that the results obtained can be generalised beyond the sample of texts analysed for this study.

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7 As will be outlined at section 3.3.4, Fairclough’s proposed linguistic analytical categories which are less central to the current study – for instance, those relating to ‘interaction conventions’ in the analysis of conversations or interviews (Fairclough, 2001: 110-114) – are not used for the ‘description’ of discourses in Chapters Five and Six.
2.4.4 CDA and the Reader

Another limitation of CDA relates to the absence of consideration of the reader, and it has been argued that analysts ascribe meanings to discourse without consulting with the producers or consumers of the discourse. Breeze (2011: 508) suggests that critical discourse analysts have been accused of ‘what might be called a kind of naïve linguistic determinism’, and Richardson (2007) highlights the absence of academic investigation into the correlation – or otherwise – of what he terms ‘lay’ and ‘academic’ readings. Thus, analysts drawing on a CDA framework have been criticised for assuming that the analysis of a text is the only ‘true’ interpretation of discourses present. Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 455) suggest that ‘CDA does not analyse how a text can be read in many ways, or under what social circumstances it is produced and consumed’. Widdowson (1998) is similarly critical of CDA which relies on the ‘transmission’ view of meaning, with excessive emphasis on the links between linguistic signification and significance, which Breeze (2011: 508) explains as CDA research which proceeds ‘on the basis that there is a simple, one-to-one relationship between the text and its reader, or the discourse and its recipient’. Thus, Cameron (2001) has called for an ‘enriched’ CDA, for analysis that goes beyond a single text and accounts for other related texts or discourses and which takes account of the variation of reader interpretations. Here, we are moving into the field of reception studies, which addresses the fact that ‘at each point of the communicative process there is a scope of indetermination which allows for several potential meanings and impacts to be enacted’ (Jensen, 2011: 137). Mindful of the factors influencing a reader’s interpretation of texts, including class, education, socioeconomic background etc., reception analysis attempts to account for the polysemy of discourses and the existence of numerous interpretative strategies that may be applied to the same discourses by different audiences (for an overview of qualitative traditions in reception studies of media texts see Jensen, 2011).

In the absence of a reception analysis or input from the producers of the news discourse examined for the current study, it is not assumed that the findings of the analytical chapters in this thesis (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) represent the only possible interpretation of French newspaper discourse on the 2005 civil disturbances in the banlieues. Instead, dominant discourses are identified and inferences are made
regarding how these discourses are likely to be interpreted and explained in light of the detailed discussion of the discourse practices of production and consumption and the sociocultural context outlined in Chapter Four. It is also acknowledged that readers potentially interpret texts in a variety of ways, as Morley (1980: cited by Talbot, 2007) points out:

> The meaning of the text will be constructed differently according to the discourse (knowledge, prejudices, resistances etc.) brought to bear upon the text by the reader and the crucial factor in the encounter of audience/subject and text will be the range of discourses at the disposal of the audience.

However, Talbot (2007: 46) also argues that it is nonetheless important to identify ‘the reading position “inscribed” in texts’ and thus draw attention to the preferred reading encouraged by the lexico-grammatical and linguistic structures of texts. Therefore, this study adopts a similar position to that advocated by Breeze (2011: 508) in that it is accepted from the outset that ‘some discourses are more powerful or influential than others’ and the aim of using a CDA framework is to ‘focus attention on those that are particularly likely to have an impact on a large audience, or to attempt to determine what factors make such an impact probable’. Thus, the orders of discourses identified as dominant in Chapters Five and Six represent a possible interpretation of the discourses present in news reporting on the 2005 riots, and suggestions are made as to how these orders of discourse contribute to the enactment of social relations of power. However, it is accepted that alternative explanations are possible and other interpretations may be attributed to the discourses by news consumers. Furthermore, the inclusion of a quantitative CADS approach to the analysis of news discourse reporting on 2005 French urban violence also allows us to confirm the presence of dominant discourse patterns in the RiCo corpus, and therefore make assumptions regarding the likely preferred readings encouraged by the linguistic and grammatical features of the discourse patterns present.

2.4.5 CDA and Researcher Subjectivity
The final criticism of CDA is related to discussions in the previous paragraphs regarding criticisms of CDA methodologies and the absence of consideration of the reader: CDA has also been viewed as inherently open to excessive researcher subjectivity and bias and arguments have been made that the explicit ideological
focus leads analysts to reach conclusions based on pre-existing assumptions. Both Hammersley (1997) and Bucholtz (2001) have been critical of CDA in this regard, as exemplified by the quotations below. Hammersley (1997: 244-245) refers to CDA as ‘a model that gives little purchase on reality’ and the first quotation summarises what he views as the ‘most damaging feature of CDA’. Similarly, Bucholtz (2001: 167) argues that CDA privileges the analyst’s viewpoint and leads to an inherent bias:

[...] the most damaging feature of CDA: the extraordinary ambition of the task that it sets itself. It aims to achieve a very great deal more than other kinds of discourse analysis. Not only does it claim to offer an understanding of discursive processes, but also of society as whole, of what is wrong with it, and of how it can and should be changed. (Hammersley, 1997: 244-245)

Critical discourse analysis is therefore engaged in a politics that privileges the analyst’s viewpoint. This bias may help explain why much critical discourse analysis has been a disappointment, despite its initial promise as a politically engaged form of discourse analysis: it yields findings that can always be predicted in advance, once the basic power relations have been sketched out. It is too rarely surprising, too rarely sensitive to subtlety, complexity, or contradiction. (Bucholtz, 2001: 167)

Hammersley (1997: 244-245) therefore argues that the overambitious task of CDA ‘encourages the presentation of what can only be speculations as if they were well-grounded knowledge. In all forms of research there is considerable pressure to produce newsworthy findings. This can lead to researchers over-interpreting their data’. Thus, he concludes that such overambition ‘undermines sound research’.

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 67) are also cognisant of the potential for excessive researcher subjectivity, and they acknowledge that ‘CDA takes the view that any text can be understood in different ways’, that ‘different understandings of the text result from different combinations of the properties of the text and the properties (social positioning, knowledge, values etc.) of the interpreter’. More recently, O’Halloran (2012) discusses criticisms of CDA relating to the potential of the ideological standpoint of the analyst to impact on the neutrality or objectivity of analysis: he notes the ‘Widdowsonian perspective’ that ‘what a critical discourse analyst claims to analyse as a contradiction in a text is likely to be a reflex of their political values and thus a subjective interpretation’ (2012: 93). In outlining his proposals for the electronic deconstruction of persuasion texts, he maintains that academic rigour and objectivity – in so far as possible – are needed. He argues (2012: 93) thus that:
A deconstructive analysis of tensions in persuasion texts should seek to convince the widest number of people – regardless of their politics – and thus avoid such easy rebuttal. In order to do this, tensions in a persuasion text would need to be identified objectively as far as this is possible and, in so doing, the use of one’s political values to deconstruct a persuasion text would also need to be reduced as far as this is possible.

Therefore, CDA has been criticised for facilitating analyst subjectivity and the ideological positioning of researchers to impact on the analysis undertaken.

However, in response to these criticisms, it can be argued that CDA does not purport to be wholly neutral, and its emancipatory objectives were outlined in section 2.2.3 above. In attempting to address the linguistic dimension of inequality a political viewpoint is inherently adopted to a certain extent. CDA has been deliberately chosen as the primary theoretical and methodological framework for this study in order to address the stated research questions (section 1.2), i.e. to investigate (i) how events and actors relating to French urban violence in 2005 are constructed in a corpus of French news media texts; (ii) the discursive positioning of the banlieues and their inhabitants in relation to majority French society; and (iii) the discursive construction of French national identity in order to probe the presence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse in French news texts. Assuming and revealing the presence of such ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse exists, an objective of the thesis is to identify, how, linguistically, social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced and sustained in printed news discourse on civil disturbances in the banlieues. These objectives and research questions, along with the selection of CDA as the primary framework structuring the forthcoming analysis, highlight that my ideological standpoint beginning this study does not purport to be neutral, in line with Haig’s assertion that CDA is not ‘value-neutral scholarship’ (2008: 52). That is not to say that a rigorous and thorough analysis is avoided, and following the methodological steps outlined in Chapter Three discourses present in Mini-RiCo are fully ‘described’, ‘interpreted’ and ‘explained’. Contradictions within the discourses are identified, and any counter-discourses or examples which do not ‘fit’ with the analysis are also pointed out. However, adopting a CDA approach accepts a certain non-neutral dimension to analysis, and the explicit aim of the thesis is to show how newspaper discourse on French urban violence upholds power asymmetries and operates to sustain social
relations of inequality regarding majority French society and minority immigrant
groups in the banlieues. Furthermore, concerns regarding excessive researcher
subjectivity and the strategic selection of texts are reduced by the inclusion of a
complementary quantitative CADS approach to discourse analysis. The
‘methodological synergy’ (Baker et al., 2008) of (Critical) Discourse Analysis and
CADS is outlined in section 3.4, and it shown how the combination of qualitative
and quantitative approaches to the analysis of discourse limits many of the criticisms
of CDA which were just discussed.

2.5  The Critical Analysis of Media Discourse: Ideologies in
Newspaper Discourse

2.5.1  Introduction
Having established the theoretical foundations of the study – Critical Discourse
Analysis, specifically Fairclough’s sociocultural approach – the final part of the
chapter examines the media as a site of discourse, with particular emphasis on the
ideological nature of newspaper discourse. As outlined in the Introduction,
newspapers have been selected as the data source for this subject, based on their
central role in contemporary society and more significantly, given the status of
newspaper discourse as inherently ideological and powerful. This section, therefore,
elaborates on the discussion in the Introduction and outlines the significance
generally of media as a site of discourse. It also discusses the ideological nature of
media discourse, and notes that the media do not neutrally ‘reflect’ reality but
constitute reality by constructing particular interpretations of individuals and groups
within a society. Finally, section 2.5.4 focuses on newspaper discourse specifically
and proposes a general characterisation of newspaper discourse. It outlines the status
of newspapers as ‘ideological brokers’ (Blommaert, 1999) and notes some
specificities of the genre including layout (headlines/leads), quotation patterns,
issues relating to access to and the production of news discourse generally and the
editorial genre within newspaper discourse.
2.5.2 Media as a Site of Discourse
The mass media occupy a central role in contemporary society, and have done so for a considerable number of years. Newspapers, radio, television and more recently the Internet, are for many people not only a source of entertainment, but also key for sourcing information about the wider world. Media have come to occupy a pervasive presence in day-to-day life which is largely inescapable; thus much social and political knowledge and beliefs about the world are derived from media reports we encounter every day. There is, Van Dijk (1991a: 110) suggests, ‘probably no other discursive practice, besides everyday conversation, that is engaged in so frequently and by so many people as news in the press and on television’. The language of the media saturates society, to the extent that ‘people in Western countries probably hear more language from the media than they do directly from the lips of their fellow humans in conversation’ (Bell, 1991: 1). Similarly, Johnson and Ensslin (2007: 11) point out that ‘[i]n late- or post-modern Western society, our daily lives are increasingly both characterized and determined by the production and consumption of diversely mediated meanings [...] we are engaged in an almost constant process of encoding and decoding linguistic and non-linguistic messages’. Unsurprisingly, therefore, media texts – broadly understood and including written and spoken texts, as well as visual images and sound effects (following Fairclough, 1995b) – are a frequent site of analysis, particularly linguistic analysis. Garrett and Bell (1998: 3) point to a number of reasons for this:

(i) Media are a rich source of readily accessible data for research and teaching;
(ii) Media usage influences and represents people’s use of and attitudes towards language in a speech community;
(iii) Media use can tell us a great deal about social meanings and stereotypes projected through language and communication; and
(iv) Media reflect and influence the formation and expression of culture, politics and life.

Thus, media discourse represents a rich site for analysing how language is used to express, reproduce and maintain ideologies, and a number of leading critical discourse analysts such as Fairclough (1995b), Krzyżanowski (2009b; Triandafyllidou et al., 2009), Richardson (2007; 2004), Talbot (2007) and Van Dijk (1991a, 1991b, 1988), among others, have focused analysis on media discourse. As
Milani and Johnson (2010: 5) suggest, analysts have ‘systematically demonstrated over the past three decades how the media are deeply imbricated in relations of power and ideology’. Before looking more closely at the specificity of newspaper discourse, the next part of this section discusses the ideological nature of media discourse generally, in particular the role of the media in perpetuating relations of dominance and discrimination in relation to minority groups in society.

2.5.3 The Ideological Nature of Media Discourse
It was outlined in the Introduction to this thesis that while media organisations may purport to be neutral conveyors of information, ‘in that they provide space for public discourses, reflect states of affairs disinterestedly, and give the perceptions and arguments of the newsmakers’ (Wodak, 2002: 17), the argument that media discourse is inherently ideological has been articulated by many (Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991; Richardson, 2007; Van Dijk, 1988). Linked to this is the rejection of the potentially naïve notion that media texts are merely conduits of information; rather they, to quote Fairclough (1995b: 103-104), ‘constitute versions of reality in ways which depend on the social positions and interests and objectives of those who produce them. They do so through choices which are made at various levels in the process of producing texts’. Consequently, the media are not ideologically neutral vehicles, but rather constitute reality and have considerable potential to shape and influence public perceptions and beliefs. Thus, the media can be viewed as helping to construct ‘versions of reality’, and ‘while on occasion the media do appear to be striving (merely) to re-present material or physical reality […] they still cannot avoid providing an interpretation’ (MacDonald, 2003: 14).

It has been previously established that ideologies are expressed through discourse (section 2.2.3.4), and this is particularly true in the case of the media where the cumulative effect of repeated instances of ideologically loaded language should not be underestimated. Choices are made at every level of the production and distribution processes – particularly at the subconscious level – and such choices impact on public perception of political, economic, social and cultural realities. Media discourse is particularly pervasive owing to its scale and high level of
exposure, and Fowler (1991: 122) maintains that the ideological power of media discourse – particularly newspaper discourse – ‘stems from their ability to say the same thing to millions of people simultaneously’. Fairclough (2001: 45) succinctly articulates this dimension of the ideologically influential nature of media discourse as follows:

A single text on its own is quite insignificant: the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the reader and so forth. Thus […] media discourse is able to exercise a pervasive and powerful influence in social reproduction because of the very scale of the modern mass media and the extremely high level of exposure of whole populations to a relatively homogenous output.

The significance of the media for constituting particular interpretations of reality has also been acknowledged in the French Discourse Analysis tradition (e.g. Hailon, 2012; Moirand, 2007; Turpin, 2012b).8 Moirand (2007) for example, emphasises the role of media discourse in shaping public perception of actors and events, and she maintains (2007: 5) that ‘ce sont les médias qui construisent l’événement, ce sont les discours qui […] «font» l’événement, les médias intervenant plutôt dans la mise en scène qu’ils fabriquent’. She is concerned with the analysis of what she terms a ‘moment discursif’, explained as follows:

Un fait ou un événement ne constitue un moment discursif que s’il donne lieu à une abondante production médiatique et qu’il en reste également quelques traces à plus ou moins long terme dans les discours produits ultérieurement à propos d’autres événements.
(Moirand, 2007: 4)

Moirand’s comments exemplify a similar concern in the French DA tradition with role of the media in constituting and shaping reality.

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8 Given the influence of Foucault on the emergence of (Critical) Discourse Analysis (see section 2.2.2.3), it is unsurprising that a distinct tradition of French Discourse Analysis has emerged (for an overview see Hailon, 2012; Maingueneau, 2011). Although French DA is not uniform and there are variations between the different theoretical approaches, Maingueneau (2011: 109-110) identifies a number of ‘tendencies’ or commonalities which include an interest in non-empiricist research, focus on ‘constrained’ corpora bound to institutional frames (e.g. political or media discourse) rather than every day talk and a preoccupation for ‘la matérialité linguistique’, taking into account linguistic forms and their social function. Theories of French Discourse Analysts strongly echo those of Critical Discourse Analysts, and they share a similar concern with the study of the social role of ideological processes in texts. Maingueneau (2007) distinguishes the French tradition of DA due to the influence of psychoanalysis and Marxism, in particular the tradition exemplified by l’Analyse de Discours à la Française (ADF) and the theories of Michel Pêcheux (e.g. Pêcheux, 1969).
Media outlets, due to the ubiquitous nature of their presence in the lives of people, occupy a central position of power, and they have the ability to create and reinforce dominant ideologies with regard to minority groupings in society, whether intentionally or otherwise. Van Dijk (1998: 181), among others, has paid particular attention to the ideological nature of media discourse and notes that:

Much research suggests that the general, ideological influence of the media is pervasive, especially in those domains where media users have no alternative ideological sources or personal experiences that are blatantly inconsistent with the dominant ideologies as conveyed and reproduced by the mass media.

In the main, the media favour and consequently reflect and reproduce dominant ideologies, as viewed by political or social elites, which is often an inevitable consequence of capitalism – where media organisations are increasingly owned and controlled by large corporations which can exert considerable influence on media output (Van Dijk, 1998). Hence, media discourse frequently reinforces the views of the leading political and business interests, and therefore, ‘the press can influence the views of the public in general, and, more pertinently […], the public’s stance towards minority social/ethnic groups’ (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008: 6).

Thus, media discourse rarely tends to favour minority social groups, and it has been observed that ‘the mainstream media have never granted an arena for various minorities […] to participate in socio-political decision making and public discussion’ (Pietikäinen, 2001: 643-644). Typically, news discourse is created by the majority and for the majority, with the implicit and/or explicit exclusion of and discrimination against linguistic, religious, cultural or ethnic minorities. Discrimination in discourse has been defined quite broadly by Stuart Hall (1989; cited in KhosraviNik, 2010) who suggests that discourse can be considered ‘racist’ if it ‘serves to establish social, political and economic practices that preclude certain groups from material and symbolic resources’. However, Milani and Johnson (2010: 6) warn against assuming that media only favour dominant groups in society, and they suggest that ‘it would be an over simplification to reduce the media to sheer conduits of the “voices of the dominant”’. Therefore, while this study does focus on how the ‘voices of the dominant’ are reproduced by the French printed news media, discourses which support the out-group (immigrant minorities living in the suburbs) are also
highlighted throughout Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Therefore this study contributes to an existing body of work investigating media constructions of minorities and representations of the ‘Other’, which is a common research agenda among media discourse analysts (Wodak and Busch, 2004: 112). Consequently, analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven further highlights the ideological nature of media discourse and the role of the media in maintaining relations of dominance and control which reproduce social asymmetries regarding minority and majority groups in society.

While arguing that media discourse is inherently ideological, it is not intended to suggest that readers of media discourse passively interpret texts in the manner intended by the creators. Rather, readers employ a variety of interpretative strategies, influenced by media habits, education, socioeconomic background and personal ideologies. As Fairclough (2001: 41) suggests, ‘media discourse is designed for mass audiences, and there is no way that producers can even know who the audience is, let alone adapt to its diverse sections’. Thus, in the absence of reception analysis it would be incorrect to assume that readers necessarily think or behave in a manner reflective of the dominant ideology. However, it is acknowledged that ‘media power is generally symbolic and persuasive, in the sense that the media primarily have the potential to control to some extent the minds of readers or viewers, but not directly their actions’ (Van Dijk, 1995b: 10). The media therefore frequently construct an imagined or implied reader, and Talbot et al. (2003: 12-13) maintain that an implied reader is often inferred:

Any text can be said to have implied reader, an imaginary addressee with particular values, preoccupations and commonsense understandings. In having to construct an imaginary person to speak to, media producers are placed in a powerful position. They are in a position to attribute values and attitudes to their addresses, presenting them in a taken-for-granted way.

As established in section 2.2.3, CDA is particularly interested in exposing the commonsense or naturalised nature of ideologies, and it is thus a suitable

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9 There is a considerable body of research examining media representations of minority groups – both in French and other contexts – and the current study draws to a varying degree on their theoretical and methodological contributions (e.g. Baker et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2012; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Erjavec, 2001; Flowerdew et al., 2002; KhosraviNik, 2010, 2009; Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2008; Pietikäinen, 2001; Tekin, 2010; Teo, 2000; Van Dijk, 1989).
methodology to examine how the implied reader is linguistically constructed. The forthcoming analysis draws attention to the assumed readership of French newspaper discourse, and highlights how inscribing an imaginary addressee in a text facilitates the creation of a particular ideology. This is especially evident in section 6.2.4 which discusses how the use of the personal pronoun nous creates a discourse of sameness to construct an interpretation of French national identity which excludes immigrant minority groups in the banlieues. Thus, while we can only make assumptions as to how readers of texts will consume a given discourse, using a CDA framework to expose the taken-for-granted beliefs allows us to see the often uncritical ideas reinforced in French newspaper discourse.

2.5.4 A General Characterisation of News Discourse

The paragraphs above established the ideological nature of media discourse, and discussed how it is frequently a site for the reproduction of dominant ideologies and the representation of minority social groups as ‘other’. Focus now turns more specifically to newspaper discourse, and while the comments above regarding the ideological potential of the media equally apply to newspapers, some brief comments are now made about ideologies in newspapers specifically and their status as ‘ideological brokers’ (Blommaert, 1999). Following that some specificities of newspapers as a genre are discussed, including layout, quotation patterns, issues relating to access to and the production of news articles and the genre of editorials in newspapers is outlined.

2.5.4.1 Newspapers as ‘Ideological Brokers’

Unsurprisingly, journalistic discourse has been a relatively frequent site of linguistic analysis in recent years, given the far reaching nature of the discourse and its pervasiveness in modern societies (for an overview of studies in this area see Conboy, 2010; O'Keeffe, 2012). Probably the only regular leisure reading for many people, as well as the most widely circulated print medium (O'Halloran, 2003: 9), newspapers are ‘the most prominent genre read by vast quantities of people’ (Caldas-Coulthard, 1993: 197). Consequently, journalistic discourse has the potential to reach a large and varied audience, whether this is merely an occasional glance at headlines,
or careful reading of a newspaper in full on a daily basis. Krishnamurthy (1996: 129) argues that journalistic texts are particularly powerful given their status as written down media discourse:

Written texts have a great impact because they have been read and re-read by the consumer, shared with friends and colleagues, photocopied or faxed, and once they are archived, acquire permanency and public accessibility. Spoken media – radio and television – are not as permanent or readily accessible [...].

Thus, as mentioned in the Introduction to this study, Richardson (2007: 13) maintains that the language of the news media ‘needs to be taken very seriously’, and equally Mautner (2008: 32) suggests that ‘if you are interested in dominant discourses, rather than dissident or idiosyncratic voices, the major dailies and weeklies are obvious sources to turn to’. In line with the view adopted in this study of discourse as social practice, with discourse conceived as both shaping society and being shaped by it (section 2.2.3.7), journalistic discourse is seen as being socially constructed, and thus not an entirely objective process of information-gathering and reporting (Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991). Because of the distinct processes of production, consumption and reception, as well the specific structure and layout (discussed below in section 2.5.4.2, and in relation to the French newspaper context in section 4.2), newspaper discourse represents an important site for the creation and reinforcement of dominant ideologies; therefore the print media can be viewed as significant ‘ideological brokers’ (Blommaert, 1999). The wider world is framed in a particular way so as to influence social conceptions of reality, and when coupled with the authoritative status typically afforded to the newspaper industry (Milani, 2007), print media have the potential to significantly influence people’s conception and understanding of society. Fowler (1991: 122) suggests two factors which afford newspapers the opportunity to play such important ideological roles: firstly the scale of publication and extensive availability to a wide audience, which means that ‘their ideological power stems from their ability to say the same thing to millions of people simultaneously’. Linked to this, he suggests, is the economic and political circumstances of the newspaper industry, facilitating the mediation of ideas from a particular viewpoint with a repetitious reinforcement of a specific worldview.

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10 It is acknowledged that Krishnamurthy’s comments relating to the privileged status of newspaper discourse as something that is written down and thus more permanent in comparison to television and radio discourses could be viewed as outdated. Digital repositories and ‘players’ (e.g. The BBC radio and television ‘iPlayer’: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/radio) now afford a more long-lasting status to spoken or visual media discourse.
Similarly, Caldas-Coulthard (2007: 274) argues that news discourse has a ‘special status’ among other public discourses, claiming that it enjoys a ‘privileged and prestigious position in our culture’s hierarchy of values. [...] People watch or read “news” because they think “news” is about reality. The implication is that if you are exposed to news you are more knowledgeable about social facts’.

Therefore, the print media have been viewed a fruitful site of analysis for those with an interest in social dimensions of power and inequality, and consequently newspapers are a frequent focus for CDA. Newspapers can be viewed as a representation of reality, and ‘in representing reality, text producers may incorporate, and thereby indicate, a particular interpretation of existing ideologically laden discourses on this reality’ (Milani, 2007: 114). The current study uses CDA theories relating to power, ideology and control to investigate journalistic discourse on the 2005 French riots as a site of mediated reality and to identify the linguistic manifestation of dominant ideologies disguised in ostensibly neutral news reporting of ‘facts’.

2.5.4.2 Specificity of Newspaper Discourse: Layout, Quotation Patterns, Access and Editorials

The layout of a newspaper article is particular to this genre of discourse, most notably the headline/lead combination. Headlines and leads serve not only as an introduction to the subject of the article, but can also establish the tone and central argument of the discourse. Bell (1991: 189) notes that headlines are a ‘part of news rhetoric whose function is to attract the reader’. However headlines arguably serve a more complex purpose than merely to attract the reader: headlines and leads have important cognitive and textual functions, they summarise the most important information in the news text, orient the reader towards a predetermined processing of this information and also form ‘a macrostructure that serves as an important strategic cue to control the reader's preferred meaning of the news and activate relevant knowledge needed for its understanding in the reader's memory’ (Erjavec, 2008: 40). With these comments Erjavec (2008) is assuming a similar position to the argument raised in the paragraphs above: media discourse – and particularly newspaper
discourse – is not value-neutral. Rather, journalists make choices at all levels, and propose a certain point of view and therefore encourage readers to interpret events and social groups through a particular lens. This process begins with the choices made in the selection of headline and lead of an article regarding lexis, sentence construction, reference (or absence of reference) to particular social actors or actions and rhetorical tropes (for a more detailed discussion see section 3.3.4). Furthermore, headlines are generally allocated a minimal word count in comparison with the remainder of the article, and so the journalist or sub-editor/headline writer is required to carefully craft an informative and attention-grabbing headline and lead using a small number of words. For example Teo’s (2000) analysis of news discourse relating to a Vietnamese gang (known as the 5T) in two Sydney-based newspapers highlights how a particular headline and lead is constructed using a combination of lexical tokens to result in a presupposition that the gang is one of extreme violence, and consequently does not encourage any alternative interpretation by readers. Teo (2000: 14) points out the following:

The way the lead is constructed therefore suggests that writer is interested only in looking at the reasons why the 5T has become so violent rather than examining the issue of how they became violent or whether they are indeed violent in the first place. This inevitably colours the readers’ perception of the 5T.

As a result, with a mere glance at a headline and lead, the readers’ perception of the subject of the article is tempered from the outset, and ‘the macro-structure that is manifest in headlines and leads encapsulates an ideology that biases the reader to one particular reading, thereby subjugating all other possible interpretations of the news story’ (2000: 14). Thus, Teo (2000: 14) suggests, the layout of newspaper discourse means that ‘news reporting not only provides information for readers to interpret but often comes packaged with the interpretation as well’. This study also pays attention to headlines in the texts in RiCo and Mini-RiCo, and it is similarly argued that they operate to cue readers towards a particular interpretation of an individual, group, event etc. For example, section 7.5 explores the representation of inter-group relations in RiCo and analyses the use of nous in headlines to identify the discursive presence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ in French society.
A further characteristic of journalistic discourse is its inherently intertextual nature, relying heavily on information from outside sources and often in/directly quoting the speech of others. Fairclough (1995b: 79) points out that ‘[a] very high proportion of media output in news […] consists of the mediation of the speech or writing of, mainly, prominent people in various domains of public life – politicians, police and lawyers, many categories of expert, and so forth’. As a result, newspaper discourse is frequently composed of a combination of direct quotes from individuals and indirect representations of the speech of others, most frequently from dominant groups or those in power, rather than minority groups. Fairclough (1995b: 81) discusses this characteristic of journalistic discourse in detail and insists that when considering discourse as a representation of the speech of others, it is vital to examine ‘the degree to which boundaries are maintained between the representing discourse and the represented discourse – between the voices of the reporter and the person reported’. Blommaert (1999: 9) similarly points to the appropriation of existing texts and discourses by the media, whereby these texts and discourses are situated ‘into a chosen meta-discursive context and hence indicating the preferred way(s) of “reading” these texts’. Thus, the reader is guided towards a particular reinterpretation of existing debates. Consequently, journalistic representation of direct speech is always mediated, and speech acts can be interpreted and recreated in a manner most favourable to the writer. The current study examines quotation patterns and in/direct discourse in RiCo and Mini-RiCo to determine those social actors who are explicitly and implicitly included or excluded from the discourse, and considers how quotation patterns in French news discourse are used to privilege certain voices and thereby uphold relations of dominance and control (e.g. section 7.4.3).

On a similar note, an equally important characteristic of journalistic discourse concerns access: from whom is direct and indirect discourse in news text are sourced – and consequently who is given a voice – or, who has access to the creators of news discourse. As Pietikäinen (2001: 648) states:
Access to news is highly controlled; who is given access and who is allowed to define events in their own words is considered valuable. Quotation patterns also describe aspects of news making practices: to whom the journalists turn to ask for comments and information.

Most frequently, journalists display a preference for certain sources over others, often institutional or government sources or those in powerful or privileged positions, with minority voices noticeably silenced. As a result, the interests of the powerful are reproduced in news texts, and journalists relying on the same pool of sources when drafting articles frequently reflect the ideologies of the dominant in society. Baker and McEnery (2005: 199) cite Becker’s (1972) notion of a ‘hierarchy of credibility’, whereby ‘powerful people will come to have their opinion accepted because they are assumed to have access to more accurate information on particular topics than everyone else’. Teo (2000) considers this practice a ‘gate-keeping’ device, where access is granted only to those in positions of control and influence, and the opinions of others shut out. Consequently, he argues (2000: 18) that ‘while the powerful are further empowered through quotation patterns that enhance their status and visibility, the systematic silencing of the powerless – the poor, the young, the uneducated etc. – only further disempowers them’. Similarly, Milani (2007: 114) points out that ‘social groups which wield social power are likely to have privileged or exclusive admission to the production of media texts’, and thus newspaper discourse as a genre facilitates the promotion of the viewpoint of the dominant ahead of the marginalised. The issue of access in relation to French news reporting on the banlieues is addressed in section 4.2.4, and this section outlines how traditionally journalists have had difficulties sourcing opinions from residents of the suburbs. This tendency is reflected in the analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, and section 7.4.3 particularly considers the source of direct quotations in discourse in a sample from the RiCo corpus.

Finally, as there are a large number of editorials in RiCo, and Mini-RiCo includes four editorials (Text 2, 5, 6 and 9), the specificity of the editorial genre must be briefly considered. Editorials can be distinguished from the typical newspaper article as the expressed purpose is not to report facts or events, but to reflect, comment and offer opinion on selected issues. Editorial selection of a subject for commentary often reflects the ideological inclinations of the newspaper, and can be seen as a representation of the opinions of the group or of several interest groups to which the
newspaper has allegiance (Van Dijk, 1996b). The importance of studying editorials, particularly in the context of analysing the ideological role of newspaper discourse, has been emphasised (Achugar, 2004; Le, 2009; Van Dijk, 1989), and it has been suggested that their analysis is vital ‘because [editorials] are not merely idle statements of senior writers’ opinions; often they express the broader ideological stance of the newspaper’s owners and management. They are evidence of the interlocking power structures of any given society’ (Henry and Tator, 2002: 93). Van Dijk (1996b: 13) observes that the main function of editorials is ‘the expression and persuasive communication of opinions’, and, consequently editorials make it possible for newspapers to explicitly attempt to influence reader opinion. Additionally, editorials offer the possibility to ‘legitimize particular constructions of the social and political world over others’ (Trew, 1979: 140); therefore the analysis of editorials offers an insight into expressed political and social ideologies of a newspaper and consequently may aid in the interpretation of other articles published in the same title. The methodology used in this study ensures that in the compilation and saving of RiCo, a distinction is made between ‘general news’ articles and editorials, while cognisant that all news discourse is to varying extents implicitly ideological. Moreover, as mentioned, the Mini-RiCo corpus used for the CDA in Chapters Five and Six includes a selection of editorials, to ensure that the specificity of the genre is accounted for in the analysis. The role of editorials in producing and maintaining ideologies in French news discourse on 2005 urban violence is outlined at section 6.2.4, and the role of the editorial genre – particularly through the use of the personal pronoun nous – in creating a discourse of sameness which assumes national singularity and homogeneity is investigated.

2.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to situate the current study focusing on newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005 in the context of the related literature and relevant academic debates. It aimed to draw attention to the theoretical principles which frame the analysis and to establish the fundamental arguments upon which the forthcoming analysis is built. The discussion at section 2.2.2 above traced the academic origins of CDA and noted the traditions from which CDA emerged, particularly in relation to Critical Linguistics and the work of Michel Foucault.
Tracing the evolution of CDA highlighted the progressive shift from an emphasis on the description of language to examining how language functions in particular settings, and it was in this academic context that Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis emerged.

A large part of the chapter focused on identifying the principles of CDA, along with introducing some of the main approaches (sociocultural/sociocognitive/DHA) and situating the current study within existing studies using CDA. The significance of power and ideology for CDA were established, and the alignment between the objectives of this study (section 1.2) and the theoretical principles of CDA were made clear. This thesis seeks to expose the discursive functioning of social hierarchies and asymmetries in French society, and thus a socially committed theoretical framework is needed that recognises that language – and consequently discourse – can be used as a tool of dominance and discrimination. Discourse is seen as social practice, as both shaping society and being shaped by it, and the framework adopted is cognisant of the dialectical nature of language and how it can be constituted by society, but equally is constitutive of it. It is acknowledged that CDA does not purport to be an ideologically neutral means of approaching discourse, and it is stated at the outset that this study proceeds from the view that social inequalities exist. CDA offers the theoretical foundations and methodological tools to investigate these social inequalities and power asymmetries as expressed in discourse, and to expose how language functions to produce and maintain relations of dominance and control. Thus, while CDA is not without its critics (section 2.4), this study maintains that it is an appropriate grounding to examine how newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005 constructs individuals and groups in French society and thus reinforces social hierarchies in relation to majority French society and immigrant minorities in the banlieues.

Finally, before proceeding to outline the methodological steps used in the analysis of newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005, it is reiterated that the findings identified in the analytical chapters of this thesis represent the dominant discourses present in news reports on the civil disturbances. It is not assumed that
these are the only discourses present, nor is it asserted that newspaper readers or consumers of the articles in *RiCo* and *Mini-RiCo* are likely to interpret and explain the discourses in the same way as proposed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Therefore, this study identifies a range of discourses present and draws attention to their linguistic realisation and consequently suggests what this might imply regarding dominant ideologies in French society in light of the detailed discussion of the processes of consumption and production and the wider sociocultural context (outlined in Chapter Four). Assumptions are at times made regarding the authors’ intentions and how these texts are likely to be received and interpreted by readers, but it is accepted that alternative explanations are possible.
3 Methodological Approach

3.1 Introduction
As previously established in the Introduction, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate how events and actors relating to French urban violence in November 2005 are constructed in a corpus of French news media texts and to question if social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced in printed media discourse. Assuming and subsequently establishing that social asymmetries exist in news reporting on the riots, this study also examines how – linguistically – these hierarchies are sustained. It thus places particular focus on the linguistic dimension of inequality, and seeks to uncover how language – and consequently discourse – is used to represent particular social groups and strengthen existing social hierarchies. This chapter outlines the methodological framework used for the analysis of newspaper texts and justifies the chosen methodology based on the theoretical principles and stated objectives of the thesis.

The chapter is organised as follows: firstly, the data analysed in the thesis are introduced, including the collection procedure and down-sampling techniques used to reduce a large corpus of 2,271 articles (RiCo) to a more manageable sample of sixteen (Mini-RiCo). The second part of the chapter presents Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach to CDA (Fairclough, 1995b, 1992) as the primary methodological approach chosen for the study and outlines the analytical stages required under the broad headings of ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’. The concepts of ‘orders of discourse’ and ‘intertextuality’ are introduced, as well as the linguistic categories underpinning the analysis in Chapters Five and Six. Fairclough’s framework is enhanced by the inclusion of aspects of both Van Leeuwen’s sociosemantic categories for the analysis of social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996) and the Discourse Historical Approach’s (DHA) notion of ‘strategies (Wodak et al., 2009), and both are explained in section 3.3.4. The third and final section of the chapter focuses on the origins, definitions and main principles of the secondary methodological approach used in this study – Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) – with particular emphasis on the possibilities
offered by corpora for discourse analysis. The flexibility of a CADS methodology is outlined, followed by an introduction to the analytical tools used in Chapter Seven. In sum, a CDA methodology is used for analysis in Chapters Five and Six, while a CADS approach is used in Chapter Seven.

This chapter therefore both introduces and theoretically supports the methodological framework used for the analysis of newspaper discourse surrounding French urban violence in 2005 and highlights why the selected framework is best suited to the stated aims of the study.

3.2 Data: RiCo and Mini-RiCo
In the following paragraphs the data used in this project are introduced; firstly, the sources of the texts making up RiCo – four French newspapers – are detailed. Following that, the collection and saving procedure used in the creation of RiCo is explained, along with the labelling system used to facilitate easy identification of texts. Issues relating to size and representativeness are considered, before the final part of this section which outlines the down-sampling techniques used in order to reduce RiCo to a more manageable sample (Mini-RiCo) for analysis using a CDA framework.

3.2.1 Sources of RiCo and Mini-RiCo
The corpus used in the analysis of discourses in newspaper coverage of 2005 French urban violence is composed of three national daily newspapers (Le Figaro, L’Humanité and Le Monde) and one regional daily newspaper (Ouest France). These newspapers have been selected for a variety of reasons: firstly, all four newspapers have high circulation figures, ranking highly among the best-selling national and regional daily newspapers in France. The 2005 circulation figures for the selected newspapers are summarised in Figure 1:
Crucially, these newspapers have been selected in order to represent an ideological cross-section of the French printed news media, reflective of a wide variety of political and ideological perspectives: *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, *L’Humanité* and *Ouest France* exemplify, respectively, centre/centre-left, centre-right, left and regional standpoints. The selection of three national daily newspapers (*Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *L’Humanité*) are representative of the *presse quotidienne nationale* in France (discussed in section 4.2.2), recognised as exercising ‘a strong influence among key political and economic decision-makers, [helping to] set agendas for the other news media and [acting] as a major forum for the discussion of new ideas in social and cultural matters’ (Kuhn, 2011: 42). Best-selling regional newspaper *Ouest France* has been included in *RiCo* to reflect the specificity of regional newspapers in the French media context. As will be outlined in section 4.2.2, regional titles dominate – in terms of circulation – over their national counterparts: for example, in 2007 of the eight million total print run of daily newspapers, 75% were regional titles (Kuhn, 2011: 35), and Neveu (2002: 53) points out that 70 per cent of the daily newspapers sold in France are published by the regional press. However, it has been suggested that they do not occupy the powerful agenda-setting position of their national counterparts and are instead primarily sources of local information (Kuhn, 2011: 42).

Additionally, it was established previously that Mautner (2008: 32) maintains that ‘if you are interested in dominant discourses, rather than dissident or idiosyncratic voices, the major dailies and weeklies are obvious sources to turn to’. This study seeks to examine the dominant discourses expressed in news reporting on the 2005 French riots, and thus texts in *RiCo* are drawn from three national daily newspapers from across the ideological spectrum (*Le Figaro*, *L’Humanité* and *Le Monde*), and the best-selling regional daily newspaper *Ouest France* which publishes 42 editions daily.
To provide some additional contextual detail, *Le Monde* is published in Paris and was founded in 1944 under the direction of Hubert Beuve-Méry. Generally viewed as politically moderate, it is arguably the most recognisable French title internationally, and has been described as adopting ‘un air très sérieux’ (Grosse, 1996: 16). There is thus an expectation that *Le Monde* – similar to *The New York Times* – offers a ‘neutral’ viewpoint and commentary on national and international affairs and represents an authoritative stance or ‘un signifié non-sensationelle, raisonnable, bien réfléchi’ (Grosse, 1996: 16). However, it has been previously established that this study proceeds from the viewpoint that news reporting is inherently ideological, in line with Fowler’s (1991: 4) assertion that ‘news [...] is not a value-free reflection of “facts”’. Analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven therefore aims to expose the covert ideological structures underpinning ostensible value-free news reporting. The other two national daily newspapers in RiCo and Mini-RiCo are explicitly more ideological: *Le Figaro*, launched in 1866, is recognised as a conservative right-wing newspaper. It is owned by the Dassault Group, the head of which is a parliamentary senator in Sarkozy’s Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) party, although this is not to suggest that that *Le Figaro* should be seen as necessarily endorsing the political ideology of the UMP. Described as ‘a socially conservative and economically liberal title’, *Le Figaro* did give considerable support to Sarkozy under the editorship of Etienne Mougeotte (Kuhn, 2011: 76). Additionally, despite editorial efforts in the 1990s to move the newspaper from its traditional conservative stance to a more apolitical, information-oriented newspaper, it has remained closely allied to politically conservative anti-immigrant efforts (Benson, 2002). For example, Benson (2002) illustrates that *Le Figaro* has played an important role in moving the immigration public debate to the Right, and it had 149 front page immigration stories in 1991, which significantly exceeded all of its national daily competitors.11 Additionally, he notes *Le Figaro*’s ‘highly sensational’ coverage of immigration issues (Benson, 2002). The analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven demonstrates that anti-immigrant discourses in articles in this news source continued to dominate in 2005/2006.

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11 This figure is high in comparison to other daily newspapers, including *Le Monde* which had 139 front page stories discussing immigration and *Libération* which had 132.
The third news source of the RiCo and Mini-RiCo corpora can be contrasted with Le Monde and Le Figaro: while most of the élite press in France are neither owned by nor have close organisational links with a political organisation or party (Kuhn, 2011), until 2001 L’Humanité was the official daily newspaper of the French Communist Party. Established in 1904, traditionally the editor of L’Humanité was a member of the party’s executive committee and the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) exercised control over content and editorial lines. Journalists working for the newspaper were also typically members of the PCF. However, a loss of electoral support for the PCF resulted in declining circulation figures for L’Humanité and forced the newspaper to restructure its ownership. Consequently, in 2001 the links between the PCF and the newspaper were formally severed, and L’Humanité is now partly owned by the company behind the TF1 television channel and the Lagardère Group who own a substantial share of the radio market. However, analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven reveals that the articles published in L’Humanité maintain a left-oriented ideological stance and the newspaper appears sympathetic to immigrant and minority groups in the banlieues.

Finally, articles for RiCo and Mini-RiCo are sourced from the regional daily newspaper Ouest France. It is the best-selling regional newspaper in France, publishing 42 editions in 2005/2006 with a network of 1,200 journalists and approximately 5,000 correspondents supplying locally-based information. It publishes for the Brittany/north-western French regional market and it adopts a moderately left-wing editorial stance. As mentioned above, while selling considerably higher numbers than their national counterparts, French regional newspapers occupy a significantly reduced influence among readers, and regional titles such as Ouest France are primarily concerned with local or regional issues. Kuhn (2011: 36) maintains that ‘many French people cling strongly to their local roots, taking a great interest in information relevant to events and personalities in their particular locality or region’.
Having introduced the four newspapers from which the texts in RiCo and Mini-RiCo are sourced, the precise steps undertaken in the compilation of the corpora used for analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven are now detailed.

3.2.2 RiCo
The corpus created for this study (RiCo) comprises 2,271 articles (1,207,803 words)\textsuperscript{12} from the French press reporting on the death of teenagers Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna and the ensuing widespread urban violence throughout France lasting for approximately three weeks in November 2005 (see section 4.4). Articles for RiCo were selected from the four French newspapers detailed above from CD-ROM, online and Lexis-Nexis archives, using the following search terms: banlieu*, émeut* and Bouna.\textsuperscript{13} The search words banlieu* and émeut* were selected as these words intuitively point to articles discussing the civil disturbances in 2005, and they are also highly ranked on the word-list for RiCo (section 7.2.2). The search term Bouna refers to the Christian name of one of the teenagers, Bouna Traoré, electrocuted in Clichy-sous-Bois, and it was included as a check to ensure that all relevant articles had been included in the corpus; searches carried out using the search term Bouna resulted in virtually no additional articles added to the corpus. Articles which contained the search terms but not referring to cities and/or incidents in France, or which contain only fleeting or wholly irrelevant references to the subject of the study, were not included in RiCo. ‘Letters to the Editor’ were also excluded, as not all of the four titles make these letters available online and in CD-ROM archives. Additionally, ‘Letters to the Editor’ can be differentiated from more traditional journalistic reporting as they explicitly represent the voice of the ‘ordinary citizen’, whereas this study is more concerned with discourses present in the language used by journalists. Keyword searches were limited to articles published between 27 October 2005 and 30 June 2006; these dates were specified in order to ensure that

\textsuperscript{12} The number of words in RiCo has been calculated using WordSmith Tools Version 6 (Scott, 2012) with the following settings applied:
- Language set to French
- Hyphen separates words
- Apostrophe separates words

\textsuperscript{13} The use of the asterisk indicates a ‘wildcard search’, where * replaces a word, letter or group of words, e.g. a search for the term banlieu* returns all articles containing any one of the following: banlieue, banlieues, banliesation, banlieuser, banlieusard, banlieusarde, banlieusardes, banlieusards. Likewise, émeut* returns all uses of émeut, émeute, émeutes, émeutier, émeutiers.
the corpus included articles detailing initial coverage of the catalytic incident which prompted the outbreak of violence (the death of teenagers Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna) as well as the urban violence witnessed in France throughout November 2005. The expanded timeframe allows for reflection and analysis in the following months, while also offering insights into the representation of urban violence and the banlieues generally in the French news media. A substantial proportion of articles published from January to June 2006 contain only passing reference to the incidents of November 2005, but are included to provide greater insight into French news attitudes towards the banlieues and those living there, as well as newspaper representations of immigrant and minority groups in French society. Furthermore, it has been established that a key aim for CDA is to ‘unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse that have become so naturalised over time that we begin to treat them as common, acceptable and natural features of discourses’ (Talbot et al., 2003: 36). Therefore, a CDA approach is concerned not only with examining the ideological assumptions contained in texts which focus exclusively on the 2005 riots but also with what might be termed ‘passing references’ to the banlieues and the civil disturbances. The expanded timeframe allows for such ‘passing references’ to be examined. The full text (headline, by-line etc.) is included for every article, and any accompanying images, author name and date of publication removed to ensure that it is solely news discourse which makes up RiCo.

The following saving protocol and labelling system are used throughout the data collection process: firstly, articles containing one or more of the search terms were copied from the CD-ROM or online source, and saved as .txt files to facilitate manipulation using WordSmith Tools (Scott, 2012), introduced below. The following labelling system was used to allow for the easy identification of articles, comprised of a minimum 11-digit code:

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14 For example, a number of articles in the corpus from April 2006 relate to student demonstrations against Government plans to reform employment laws, particularly with regard to the introduction of a new Contrat Première Embauche (CPE) which would remove employment stability for those under 26 years of age. Anti-CPE protests are compared in a number of articles to the violence in the suburbs in November 2005.

15 The labelling system is a modified version of that used in the Chambers-Rostand Corpus of Journalistic French (Chambers and Rostand, 2005). It has been adjusted to allow for the identification of genre of the article, i.e. general news, opinion piece, editorial etc.
- Two letters indicating the newspaper source (LF – *Le Figaro*; LH – *L’Humanité*; LM – *Le Monde*; OF – *Ouest France*)
- Six numbers indicating the date of publication (e.g. 251105 – 25 November 2005)
- Two letters indicating the genre of the article (GN – General News; OP – Opinion; ED – Editorial; FP – Front Page)
- One letter indicating whether more than one article from that date is present.

A typical file name, therefore, follows the format ‘LM251105GNb’: this indicates that the article was published in *Le Monde* on 25 November 2005, and is the second article from the General News genre saved in *RiCo* for that day. The selected categorisation of genre of news article (General News/Opinion/Editorial/Front Page) is not intended to be an exhaustive classification of all potential articles in French printed news discourse, but rather they represent broad categories into which articles can be classified. ‘General news’ articles are those written by journalists of the newspaper and reporting on particular events, incidents etc. The classification of ‘Opinion’ articles follows the explanation provided by Marchi and Taylor (2009), who define them as ‘signed comment articles [....which] share with editorials the openly persuasive function’ and are frequently written by non-journalists including academic or political figures. ‘Editorials’ and ‘Front Page’ articles are identified by the CD-ROM or online source. There are a small number of articles in *RiCo* which do not fall into these four categories (e.g. those from Sport or Travel sections) and these articles are classified under the ‘General News’ heading.

Figure 2 represents visually how each of the four newspapers in *RiCo* is represented:
Ouest France is the best represented in RiCo, totalling 756 articles (33%), and there are 585 texts from Le Figaro (26%), 543 from L’Humanité (24%) and 387 from Le Monde (17%). Using the selection procedure outlined above, RiCo is thus comprised of 2,271 articles (1,207,803 words) which can be viewed as sufficiently large as to be representative of a given genre of discourse (French news discourse). While in 1998 Kennedy (1998: 68) suggested that ‘a corpus of 100,000 words will usually be big enough to make generalisations’, technological advances now allow for the relatively straightforward creation of larger corpora and what are classified as ‘small corpora’ are frequently in the region of one million words (e.g. the Chambers-Rostand Corpus of Journalistic French (2005) is 979,831 words). Additionally, Baker (2009) suggests that one million words is probably large enough to make generalisations, but does note (2009: 314) that caution must be exercised by researchers:

My own experiences with corpus research would suggest that a million words is probably acceptable for examining usage of high frequency words (most grammatical words and a couple of hundred lexical words) but only very cautious conclusions can be made about other lexis.

Furthermore, for a specialised corpus such as RiCo, it is not the size of the corpus which is of greatest significance, but rather that it aims to be representative of a

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16 Distinctions can be drawn between specialised and general corpora, following Hunston (2002): the former is ‘a corpus of texts of a particular type [...] It aims to be representative of a given type of text’ (2002: 14), such as academic articles, newspaper editorials, geography textbooks, classroom interactions etc. Examples of specialised corpora include The Chambers-Rostand Corpus of Journalistic French (CRCJF) and The Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English (MICASE). A
particular type of text, which in this study is French newspaper articles relating to urban violence in 2005. Thornbury (2010: 238) points out that ‘the advantage of a small, homogenous corpus […] is that the context (of situation) can be precisely specified’, a point echoed by Mahlberg (2007: 196):

The way in which an analysis of corpus data can be related to social situations depends on the information that is available on the origins and contexts of the texts. If the texts in a corpus are selected according to transparent criteria and information on their contexts is stored together with the texts, corpora can provide useful insights into meanings that are relevant to a society and indicative of the ways in which society creates itself.

Furthermore, Lee (2008: 94) maintains that ‘the more specialized the discourse, the less you need of it to get a representative corpus and generalizable results’. Therefore, the specialised RiCo corpus created for the purposes of this study will provide richer and more relevant results – which are contextualised in Chapter Four – than similar searches carried out in a larger, more general corpus.

3.2.3 Mini-RiCo
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 below outline the methodological steps taken in the analysis of RiCo. For the principal methodological approach, CDA, the large RiCo corpus of 2,271 articles must be down-sampled in order to reduce the large number of articles to a more manageable sample of sixteen articles (labelled Mini-RiCo) for detailed critical analysis. CDA, as will be established in the next part of the chapter, involves detailed and rigorous linguistic analysis, and as Baker et al. (2008: 285) point out, ‘CDA in-depth analysis is very labour-intensive’. Consequently, a CDA of all the articles in RiCo lies outside the scope of the thesis, and instead a smaller sample of texts is selected for analysis in Chapters Five and Six (Mini-RiCo). The decision to include sixteen articles (i.e. four texts from each of the four newspapers in RiCo) was taken following preliminary analyses which revealed that eight articles (i.e. two texts from each of the four newspapers) offered evidence of a number of linguistic patterns and orders of discourse. The process of increasing the sample size to first twelve articles and then sixteen articles progressed to a stage where Mini-RiCo can
now be viewed as providing sufficient scope for detailed linguistic analysis in order to identify dominant discursive themes and orders of discourse evident in French newspaper discourse surrounding the incidents of urban violence in 2005. In the absence of clear guidelines regarding how many texts are needed to identify discourses as being dominant, Mautner’s (2008: 35) advice regarding corpus-building for qualitative analysis was followed:

...you begin by selecting a small but relevant and homogenous corpus, analyze it and on the basis of your findings select again […]. More material is added up to the point when, following the law of diminishing returns, new data no longer yield up new representations. The corpus can then be said to have reached “saturation” […] In other words, you continue looking until it becomes evident that what you find is simply more of the same.

The comments from Mautner (2008) are not included to suggest that every possible order of discourse in RiCo is reflected in Mini-RiCo; indeed, the CADS analysis of RiCo in Chapter Seven reveals some additional discursive patterns which are not present in Mini-RiCo (see for example section 7.5). However, the sixteen articles in Mini-RiCo offer sufficient scope to analyse the linguistic means by which dominant discourses are expressed. Furthermore, while each newspaper is not represented evenly in RiCo (see Figure 1), four articles from each newspaper are included in Mini-RiCo to allow for any ideological or political differences in standpoint between each of the newspapers to be identified.

The sixteen articles in Mini-RiCo and used for CDA in Chapters Five and Six are listed and reproduced in full in Appendix A, randomly selected in order to be representative of RiCo, both in terms of representation temporally and by genre. That is, the highest concentration of articles in RiCo is in November 2005, and thus six articles of the sixteen in Mini-RiCo were published in November 2005, four in December 2005, two in January 2006, and one each in February, April, May and June 2006. Similarly, the highest proportion of articles in RiCo are classified in the General News genre; consequently, six articles of the sample of sixteen in Mini-RiCo are General News, five are Opinion, three are Editorials and two are Front Page articles. These articles are selected entirely at random, and therefore some articles included in Mini-RiCo are not focused specifically on the civil disturbances of 2005 but contain fleeting reference to the banlieues or French urban violence generally.
Section 2.4.3 discussed how a frequent criticism of CDA relates to the selection of articles for analysis (Koller and Mautner, 2004; Stubbs, 1997; Wodak, 2002), and the above-described down-sampling process ensures that articles analysed in Chapters Five and Six are a randomly-selected representative sample of RiCo and not chosen in order to yield pre-determined results.

This section discussed the data collection and sampling procedures used in the creation of the RiCo and Mini-RiCo corpora for analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Focus now turns to the methodological steps taken during the analysis of the data, beginning with a discussion of the principal methodology used, Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA.

3.3 Methodological Approach (1): Fairclough’s Sociocultural Approach to CDA

3.3.1 Introduction
It has been previously established that the theoretical profile of CDA makes it a suitable analytical tool to achieve the stated aims of the study: the focus on ideology and power makes it an appropriate framework to investigate social power structures and hierarchies that are reproduced in French printed media discourse. Furthermore, its explicit focus on the linguistic and discursive dimension of social inequality allows us to uncover – linguistically – how are these hierarchies sustained. This section details the CDA framework used in the analysis of Mini-RiCo, and outlines the methodological steps taken in two analytical chapters – Chapters Five and Six. The paragraphs which follow are divided into two sections: first, the three stages of Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to the analysis of discourse are introduced (description, interpretation and explanation). Secondly, the practical application of Fairclough’s framework is outlined, including the concepts of ‘orders of discourse’ and ‘intertextuality’, as well as an overview of the linguistic categories which are used in the analysis in Chapters Five and Six. It must be emphasised, as Fairclough (2003: 14-15) states that ‘we should assume that no analysis of a text can tell us all there is to be said about it – there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of a text’. The methodological steps outlined in the following paragraphs are not intended therefore to allow for a ‘complete and definitive analysis’ of the texts in
Mini-RiCo. Instead, they facilitate the identification of dominant discourses, and consequently allow for links to be made between social structures of power in France and the language used by the printed news media.

As previously established (section 2.3.2), Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA is concerned with discourse as social practice, insisting that language is part of society and not external to it, and consequently that language is a socially conditioned process, conditioned by other (non-linguistic) parts of society (Fairclough, 1989: 22). Like all Critical Discourse Analysts, he is concerned with the link between language and society, and he seeks to ‘bring together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language, in the form of a framework which will be suitable for use in social scientific research, and specifically in the study of social change’ (Fairclough, 1992: 62). As outlined in section 2.3.2, his theorisation of CDA is cognisant of the ideological potential of media discourse, and thus his three-dimensional framework has been developed to take into account the specificity of media discourse and the related processes of production and consumption. Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA proposes a combination of the analysis of (i) text (including micro- and macro-textual strategies), (ii) discourse practice and (iii) sociocultural practice. Emphasising the significance of analysing the text in its broader context, he argues that analysis of texts cannot be isolated from the institutional practices in which they are embedded. This is necessary, he maintains (1992: 72), because:

In so producing their world, members’ practices are shaped in ways of which they are usually unaware by social structures, relations of dominance and power, and the nature of the social practice they are engaged in whose stakes always go beyond producing meanings.

The following section describes of the three stages of Fairclough’s analytical framework, which can be summarised as ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’.

3.3.2 Description of Fairclough’s Analytical Framework
The first ‘description’ step of Fairclough’s analysis – discourse as text – is influenced by the work of Halliday and Hasan (1976), Halliday (1985), and the
Critical Linguists (Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979), and requires the consideration of linguistic strategies under four headings: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. Analysis here is similar to traditional forms of linguistic analysis, but, significantly, also includes consideration of textual organisation above the sentence: cohesion demands ‘looking at how clauses are linked together into sentences, and how sentences are in turn linked together to form larger units in text’ (1992: 77). Thus, for Fairclough, textual analysis necessitates not merely the identification of linguistic strategies, but a concern with their function at the moment of use. Section 3.3.4 below identifies the lexico-grammatical features which will be used for the ‘description’ stages of discourses in Mini-RiCo in Chapters Five and Six, drawing on Fairclough’s proposed CDA ‘toolkit’ (Fairclough, 2001, 1992), along with Van Leeuwen’s sociosemantic categories for the analysis of social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996) and the DHA’s proposed ‘strategies’ for the discursive construction of national identity (Wodak et al., 2009).

Closely related is his second level of analysis, ‘interpretation’ or the consideration of discourse practice. Discursive practices include ‘processes of text production, distribution, and consumption’ (1992: 78) and demand ‘the explication of precisely how participants produce and interpret texts on the basis of their members’ resources’ (1992: 85). The interpretation stage necessitates a concern with how institutional constraints and conventions, or indeed the absence thereof, contribute to the creation, distribution and reception of discourse within its given context. The discourse practice of each text can be indicative of ideological considerations associated with the particular conditions under which it is produced and consumed. It is thus at this analytical level, Richardson (2007: 39) observes, that ‘analysis becomes discourse analysis, rather than textual analysis’: it is no longer an observation of the linguistic and textual features present in a text, but rather an explanation of their function with regard to the given discursive practices. Fairclough’s third and final analytical level – ‘explanation’ – is the consideration of discourse as social process and requires a discussion of the sociocultural dimension surrounding a communicative event or text: ‘it may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture’ (1995b: 62). Closely
linked to this level of analysis are the notions of ideology and hegemony, and analysis at this stage particularly allows for implications to be drawn with regard to the functioning of language, and consequently, discourse, in the creation, imposition and maintenance of power relations and power asymmetries in society.

Like all approaches to CDA, the sociocultural approach is not rigid but is flexible and adaptive to the objectives of the analysis and type of discourse being studied: Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 59) insist that ‘for certain purposes analysts might focus on some parts of it rather than others’, and thus ‘the framework can be slimmed down in various ways for various purposes’. Thus, the current study – as is common in other CDA studies – does not separate the description, interpretation and explanation phases, nor is that exact order followed. Instead, Chapter Four outlines the discursive and sociocultural practices surrounding newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005; following that, in Chapters Five and Six the lexicogrammatical features of Mini-RiCo are described, and then interpreted and explained with reference to the discursive and sociocultural contexts outlined in Chapter Four. The discourses present in Mini-RiCo are therefore presented thematically, simultaneously incorporating the description, interpretation and explanation phases. As a result, dominant discourses present in Mini-RiCo are highlighted in order to better understand the social power structures and hierarchies reproduced in printed media discourse, and to identify how – linguistically – these hierarchies are sustained.

Additionally, it was previously established that CDA is by nature a qualitative and interpretative approach to the analysis of discourse (section 2.2.3.2), and it is thus impractical, as Van Dijk (2001: 99) points out, to undertake a complete discourse analysis of a large number of texts:

In any practical sense there is no such thing as a “complete” discourse analysis: a “full” analysis of a short passage might take months and fill hundreds of pages. Complete discourse analysis of a large corpus of text or talk, is therefore totally out of the question.

Consequently, as mentioned above, ‘down-sampling’ techniques (Baker et al., 2008; Freake et al., 2011) are applied in order to reduce RiCo to a more manageable sample
of sixteen articles (Mini-RiCo), selected randomly in order to be representative of RiCo. Furthermore, Van Dijk (2001: 99) points out that not every linguistic feature in a text can be examined, and analysts must ‘make choices, and select those structures for closer analysis that are relevant for the study of a social issue’. Thus, not every linguistic and grammatical feature in Mini-RiCo is described; instead, those features which contribute to the creation of dominant discourses are outlined, while remaining mindful of and questioning absences in the texts (Fairclough, 1995b: 106ff). Many of Fairclough’s proposed linguistic analytical categories (e.g. Fairclough, 2001: 91-116) are used in the analysis in Chapters Five and Six and these are outlined in section 3.3.4 below. However linguistic analytical categories which are less central to the current study – for example, those relating to ‘interaction conventions’ in the analysis of conversations or interviews (2001: 110-114) – are not employed.

Having outlined the ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ stages of Fairclough’s three-dimensional sociocultural approach to CDA, focus now turns to the practical application of this framework. In the paragraphs which follow the concepts of ‘intertextuality’ and ‘orders of discourse’ are introduced, and then the lexico-grammatical features which are used to describe the texts in Chapters Five and Six are outlined.

3.3.3 Orders of Discourse and Intertextuality
It has been established that discourses do not exist in isolation but must be considered in relation to other existing discourses (section 2.2.3.5), and one of the key theoretical points of departure for CDA is the notion of the historical nature of discourse. Fairclough cites Foucault (1972: 98) who maintains that ‘there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others’. Wodak (2001: 6) similarly insists that ‘every discourse is related to many others and can only be understood of the basis of others’. Fairclough’s framework accounts for this principle through the related concepts of orders of discourse and intertextuality. For the former, Fairclough (1995b) adopts Foucault’s concept to refer to ‘the ordered set of discursive practices associated with a particular social domain or institution […]
and boundaries and relationships between them’ (1995b: 12). He explains (1995b: 56-57) orders of discourse as follows:

The focus here is upon the configuration of genres and discourses which constitute the order of discourse, the shifting relationships between them, and between this order of discourse and socially adjacent ones. These are not, let me stress, alternatives, but complementary perspectives on the same data which we can shift between during analysis.

Media discourses both shape and are shaped by socially adjacent orders of discourse, and Fairclough is keen to stress the links between power and the structuring of a given order of discourse. The capacity to control orders of discourse typically reflects dominant social power structures, often with an ideological dimension to such control. For example, the current study in Chapter Five identifies a ‘discourse of blamelessness’ as the order of discourse through which the 2005 riots are interpreted and explained by the French news media in Mini-RiCo. This order of discourse is supported in turn by three discourses which have been labelled ‘vagueness as a discursive technique’, ‘social causes discourse’ and a ‘discourse of inevitability’.

Related to the concept of orders of discourse is Fairclough’s theorisation of intertextuality, which can be explained simply as ‘the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts’ (Fairclough, 1992: 84). Fairclough builds on the work of Kristeva and Bakhtin, particularly the notion of discourse being ‘heteroglossic’ or multivoiced, and conceives intertextuality as the ‘bridge’ between stage one and two of his analytical framework – the text analysis and discourse practice stages. Intertextuality is particularly viewed from the perspective of the ‘discourse process’, as the analyst is required to interpret the text in relation to its social repertoires of discourse practice. What is involved here is a consideration of the ways in which ‘genres and discourses available within the repertoires of orders of discourse are drawn upon and combined in producing and consuming texts, and the ways in which texts transform and embed other texts which are in chain relationships with them’ (Fairclough, 1995b: 74). Fairclough (1992: 103) emphasises the social nature of intertextuality, pointing out that:
The concept of intertextuality points to the productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (genres, discourses) to generate new ones. But this productivity is [...] socially limited and constrained, and conditional upon relations of power. The theory of intertextuality cannot itself account for these social limitations, so it needs to be combined with a theory of power relations and how they shape (and are shaped by) social structures and practices.

Discourses are thus related to others both diachronically and synchronically, and every text ‘responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks past texts, and in so doing helps to make history and contributes to wider processes of change, as well as anticipating and trying to shape subsequent texts’ (Fairclough, 1992: 102). Intertextuality thus both explicitly and implicitly draws on presumed shared reader knowledge, and consequently is a means of reinforcing naturalised ideological assumptions about what is assumed ‘known’. Fairclough (1992: 101-136) distinguishes between ‘manifest intertextuality’ and ‘interdiscursivity’: the former he explains as where other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text, whereas the latter ‘is a matter of how a discourse type is constituted through a combination of elements of orders of discourse’ (1992: 117-118). The notion of ‘manifest intertextuality’ is particularly useful for the current study, and Fairclough proposes that it is indicated in texts by discourse representation (in/direct quotation), presupposition, negation, metadiscourse and irony. Throughout Chapters Five and Six the intertextual nature of the articles in Mini-RiCo is highlighted.

3.3.4 Linguistic Categories
The following discussion outlines the linguistic categories which are used to describe the texts in Chapters Five and Six, as required in the first ‘description’ stage of Fairclough’s three-step framework. Within a CDA framework, ‘language is treated as a system of lexico-grammatical options from which texts/authors make their choices about what to include or exclude and how to arrange them’ (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 108). The identification of patterns of language use reveals how, to cite Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 140), ‘the social is built into the grammatical tissue of language’. Thus, analysis of the linguistic features now described (lexis, sentence construction, modality, representation of social actors etc.) points towards how relations of power and dominance are enacted within the context of news reporting on the civil disturbances in the banlieues in 2005.
3.3.4.1  *Lexis: Lexical Choice, Collocates, Metaphors and Pronouns*

The analysis of lexical choice – the words used in discourse – is ‘almost always the first stage of any text or discourse analysis’, since ‘words convey the imprint of society and of value judgments in particular – they convey connoted as well as denoted meanings’ (Richardson, 2007: 47). The selection of one lexical field, particularly nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs, is by no means arbitrary and the choice of one necessarily implies the rejection of another. Critical discourse analysts consequently must consider not only what words are present in the text, but also what might have been selected. In media discourse, wording can be viewed as ‘the representation or reflection of the social, political or religious ideas shared by the social group the journalist belongs to’ (Gong, 2005: 4). Thus, words often do not have single consistent meanings, but rather are, to use Fairclough’s term, ‘ideologically contested’ (2001: 95), and may reveal traces of the author’s identity and underpinning ideological beliefs. In this way, lexical choice implies value judgments, as in the often-cited example of selecting ‘terrorist’ or ‘freedom fighter’. Lexical choice can therefore be viewed as ‘ideologically encoded’ (Fairclough, 1989), offering an insight into the ideological meaning underlying news reporting. This is particularly true in instances where a particular lexical item is ‘overlexicalised’, that is, where a surplus of repetitious, quasi-synonymous terms is used, giving rise to a sense of over-completeness (Van Dijk, 1991b). Most commonly used to describe powerless, oppressed or underprivileged people (Fowler *et al.,* 1979), overlexicalisation can be indicative of ideological struggle as it shows ‘preoccupation with some aspect of reality’ (Fairclough, 1989: 115).

Also important in the area of lexical choice is the analysis of the collocates of words, defined as ‘common combinations of words that tend, statistically speaking, to keep company with one another’ (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 113). Collocates can convey implicit messages, and sometimes reveal contradictions with overtly expressed statements in the text (Fairclough, 1995b: 102). The textual analysis outlined in Chapters Five and Six considers collocates of ideologically significant words in *Mini-RiCo*; for example section 5.2.3 outlines how in one text the collocation of words relating to employment with discrimination constructs discrimination as being exclusive to the employment domain. It consequently backgrounds difficulties of
integration in other areas of French society and therefore draws on commonsense assumptions regarding the naturalised nature of discrimination in France.

The analysis of metaphors in discourse also offers enhanced understanding of the representation of people, events etc., since metaphors do not directly represent an objective and pre-determined reality, but rather are ‘a construction of reality through a categorization entailing the selection of some features as critical and others as non-critical’ (Goatley, 1997: 5). In this way, metaphor can be used to construct – consciously and subconsciously – a particular interpretation of reality. Employing an image, story or tangible thing to represent a more abstract notion allows new and/or complex situations or notions to be explained, often in colloquial terms, but by doing so the author ‘constructs and defines the social world by implementing certain interpretations and excluding others’ (Archakis and Tsakona, 2009: 365). The importance of metaphor in uncovering ideology has been highlighted elsewhere (Chilton, 2004; Goatley, 2006; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980); selective representation can be motivated by a desire to communicate and legitimise a particular interpretation or viewpoint through the highlighting of some aspects and the ‘hiding’ of others (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 156). The study of metaphor in media discourse can provide an insight into how beliefs and attitudes towards people, events, ideas etc. are represented in discourse, and may serve to provoke particular responses, reinforce solidarity and create specific personal or social myths (Archakis and Tsakona, 2009). The current study examines the use of metaphor in **Mini-RiCo** to illuminate the subjective realities constructed by French news journalists, surrounding the events of November 2005, as well as political, social and cultural realities. The use of metaphor in newspaper coverage of French urban violence in 2005 has already been examined to some extent (Moirand, 2010; Peeters, 2010), and this study seeks to contribute to these analyses, drawing on a different corpus of newspapers and examining a considerably expanded timeframe.

When considering how social actors and events are represented in discourse it is also important to consider pronoun usage, described by Benwell and Stokoe (2006: 111) as ‘another fruitful site for CDA’. It has been suggested that ‘pronoun systems are a
representation of social relations, [...] they are part of the mechanisms for reproducing the orders of power’ and thus they can have implications with regard to power, distance, formality, solidarity, intimacy and casualness (Fowler, 1991: 99). Fairclough (2001: 106) considers the use of ‘we’ in newspaper discourse, particularly newspaper editorials, and argues the following in relation to editorials:

The editorial uses (as editorials often do) the so-called “inclusive” we, inclusive that is of the reader as well as the writer, as opposed to the “exclusive” we, which refers to the writer (or speaker) plus one more others, but does not include the addressee(s). The newspaper is speaking on behalf of itself, its readers [...]. In so doing, it is making an implicit authority claim [...] – it has the authority to speak for others.

Thus, the use of we can serve to personalise a text, whether in terms of excluding or including readers, although Fowler (1991: 189) argues that any suggestions of inclusiveness are ‘phoney’: newspapers construct themselves both as having the implicit authority to tell readers, the government etc. what to do, or to speak on their behalf, in a form of ‘simulated personal address’ (Fairclough, 1989). It is equally important to consider the use of the personal pronoun ‘you’, particularly where there is ambiguity with regard to the actual or potential addressee. In French there is a clear distinction made between the informal tu and more formal vous pronoun, with their usage clearly linked to relationships of power and solidarity. Section 6.2.4 pays particular attention to the use of pronouns in Mini-RiCo and shows how personal pronouns nous and on are used by the French press, particularly in the editorial genre of news article, to speak to and for the French people, and by so doing the news text often assumes national singularity and homogeneity and creates what has been labelled a ‘discourse of sameness’.

3.3.4.2 Sentence Construction: Transitivity, Nominalisation and Active/Passive Sentences

Additionally, analysis in Chapters Five and Six examine sentence construction, particularly transitivity, nominalisation and active/passive sentence structures. Transitivity is described as a ‘fundamental and powerful semantic concept’ which refers to ‘how meaning is represented in the clause. It plays a role in showing how speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the world around them’ (Matu and Lubbe, 2007: 411). To explain simply, transitivity is concerned with who does what to whom (Fortanet, 2004); it
refers to ‘the ideational dimension of the grammar of the clause [...] and deals with the types of process which are coded in clauses, and the types of participant involved in them’ (Fairclough, 1992: 177-178). Concerned with the process itself, the participants in the process and attendant circumstances (Pietikäinen, 2001: 650), transitivity necessarily implies choice, and thus allows the same event to be represented in a variety of ways: as Fowler (1991: 71) points out, ‘since transitivity makes options available, we are always suppressing some possibilities, so the choice we make [...] indicates our point of view, [and] is ideologically significant’. Thus, an analysis of transitivity can provide clues as to the operation of bias, manipulation and ideology in discourse, as well as the attribution of agency, since transitivity grammar ‘construes a particular world view’ specific to the text in question (Pennycooke, 1994: 174, 283). Newspapers have been identified as providing multiple examples of the ideological significance of transitivity (Fortanet, 2004; Matu and Lubbe, 2007). The current study discusses the use of transitive and intransitive verbs in newspaper discourse surrounding the 2005 French urban violence (e.g. in the construction of a discourse of blamelessness regarding those responsible for the 2005 riots, section 5.2), mindful that ‘in order to probe the way language represents reality in terms of how the primarily or dominant agents are constructed, what they do to whom and with what consequences, transitivity theory has much to offer’ (Teo, 2000: 25).

Similarly, the choice of sentence type can also have ideological implications: the selection of passive over active sentence constructions raises questions surrounding agency and responsibility, as Fairclough (1992: 181-182) points out:

In a passive clause, the goal is subject and the agent is either “passive agent” [...] or omitted altogether. Active is the “unmarked” choice, the form selected when there are no specific reasons for choosing the passive. And motivations for choosing the passive are various. One is that it allows for the omission of the agent, though this may itself be variously motivated by the fact that the agent is self-evident, irrelevant or unknown. Another political or ideological reason for an agentless passive may be to obfuscate agency, and hence causality and responsibility.

Active sentences ensure that the focus is on the agent of the action, with clear attribution of responsibility, whereas the construction of passive sentences removes agent phrases and thus ‘depersonalises’ a text, and as a result, ‘the people and forces behind actions can be downplayed, leaving the process itself as the major focus’
(Carter et al., 2008: 174). Furthermore, passive structures (expressed in French using être and the past participle form of the verb) can give the impression of authority or veracity, as Carter et al. (2008: 175) point out:

The fact that the agent behind the process can be removed from a passive construction can also mean that a text can appear to have a veneer of neutrality, scientific “truth” or newsworthy “fact” when, expressed in another way, it seems to be nothing more than personal dogma or ideological bias.

Agentless passivisation can thus be viewed as a linguistic strategy that facilitates text-producers to gloss over agency in actions that might not fit comfortably within the overall ideological framework of the discourse (Toolan, 1991: 228). Chapter Five in particular considers the implication of the choice of active or passive sentences in news reporting on the riots, and demonstrates how a discourse of blamelessness is created through agentless sentence structures which avoid specifying those responsible for perpetrating the violence.

Related to the study of active and passive sentence constructions is the consideration of nominalisations in discourse, a process whereby verbs are turned into nouns, often as a means of syntactic reduction (Fowler et al., 1979), also described ‘a transformation which reduces a whole clause to its nucleus, the verb, and turns that into a noun’ (Fowler and Kress, 1979b: 39). Using this construction, ‘the “someones” whoever they may be, are deleted as the clause turns into a noun’ (1979b: 41). Richardson (2007: 241) cites the following as an example of nominalisation: ‘an Israeli extremist killed Yitzhak Rabin’ can be transformed to the nominalisation ‘the killing of Yitzhak Rabin’. Fowler (1991: 80) points to the ideological significance of nominalisation, suggesting that:

Nominalisation is a radical syntactic transformation of a clause, which has extensive structural consequences, and offers substantial ideological opportunities. To understand this, reflect on how much information goes unexpressed in a derived nominal, compared with a full clause.

Similarly, Richardson (2007: 241) suggests that nominalisations can occur for a variety of reasons: they tend to be shorter, and are sometimes used when brevity is required, or when the details of the event or process are already well-known so that their repetition is unnecessary. However, he also insists that ‘perhaps the nominalisation is used to cover some aspect of the process or event that is
embarrassing or ideologically uncomfortable’. Fowler and Kress (1979b: 43) note that, similar to the use of passive sentence structures, nominalisations depersonalise and depopulate, serving to ‘drain the language of actional vitality’. The current study considers how the construction of clauses and sentences – particularly with regard to transitivity, nominalisations and active or passive sentence structures – are used by journalists in newspaper reporting on the 2005 riots. Particular focus is placed on the issue of agency, and section 5.2 considers how a discourse of blamelessness is present in Mini-RiCo, and journalists avoid attributing human agency for the civil disturbances through lexical choice, metaphor and grammatical structures which focus on the location, time or type of violence in order to background those responsible.

3.3.4.3 Modality
Of significance also to the analysis of discourse is modality, considered by Fairclough (1992: 160) as a ‘major dimension of discourse’. Simpson (1993: 47) offers the following definition: ‘modality refers broadly to a speaker’s attitudes, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence. It also extends to their attitude towards the situation or event described by a sentence’. Modality is most commonly indicated by the use of modal verbs (e.g. pouvoir, peut-être, devoir etc.), their negations, and through other formal features including pronouns, adverbs and tense. Richardson (2007: 60) suggests that modality can be used to express a variety of options with regard to truth and obligation or duty. Thus, truth modality varies from absolutely categorical expressions (as in the present tense form of devoir), to different degrees of hedging or reduced certainty (e.g. pouvoir in the conditional). Obligation modality, he suggests (2007: 60), refers to future events, specifically ‘the degree to which the speaker/writer believes that a certain course of action or certain decisions ought or should be taken’. Similarly, this varies from expressions in categorical terms (must, will, certainly, necessarily), or more cautionary (ought, to, should). In terms of the significance of modality to the critical analysis of news discourse, modality reveals relations of authority and/or power which the creators of discourse purport to hold over their readers, particularly with regard to the representation of reported happenings as categorical truths or facts. As Fairclough (2001: 107-108) suggests:
The prevalence of categorical modalities [in newspapers] supports a view of the world as transparent – as if it signalled its own meaning to any observer, without the need for interpretation and representation. “News” generally disguises the complex and messy processes of information gathering and interpretation which go into its production, and the role therein of ideologies embedded in the established practices and assumptions which interpreters bring to the process of interpretation.

Thus, the current study considers the ideological implications of how expressions of modality are used to establish either truths or certainty with regard to the representation of people and events, and various degrees of obligation imposed on French society by the creators of the discourse examined, since modal choices ‘are an indication of the attitudes, judgments or political beliefs’ of the writer (Richardson, 2007: 62). For example, Chapter Six investigates newspaper interpretations of French national identity through the orders of discourse of sameness and difference. Modality plays an important role in constructing obligations regarding what French identity ‘should’ or ‘must’ be, while at the same time excluding minority communities in the banlieues from this interpretation (e.g. section 6.2.2).

### 3.3.4.4 Analysing Representations of Social Actors

It was established in the Introduction of the thesis that one of the objectives of the study is to investigate how the events and actors relating to French urban violence in November 2005 are constructed in a corpus of French news media texts. The representation of social actors can offer an insight to ideologies underpinning discourse, and Caldas-Coulthard (2007: 284) points out that ‘in the discourse of the media, evaluative choices, like the categorization of the social actors, are an entrance point to hidden agendas’. To this end, Van Leeuwen’s ‘sociosemantic categories’ for the analysis of social actors are used in Chapters Five and Six (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996). He offers an elaborate framework for analysing the representation of social actors in discourses, proposing a number of choices for representing actors, all of which are tied to specific linguistic or rhetorical realisations. Van Leeuwen’s framework for CDA shares similar concerns with the work of Fairclough, Wodak and others in its preoccupation with the discursive functioning of power and social inequality, however, distinctions can be drawn with regard to his approach to textual analysis. Rather than beginning with the analysis of specific linguistic operations
(e.g. nominalisation, passive agent deletion) or linguistic categories (e.g. transitivity) as is most usually the case in CDA, Van Leeuwen proposes a ‘sociosemantc approach’ which takes the ways in which social actors can be represented as its starting point, before proceeding to analyse how this is achieved linguistically. The focus is thus on what he terms ‘sociological categories’ such as ‘nomination’ or ‘agency’, rather than linguistic categories such as ‘nominalisation’ or ‘passive agent deletion’. As he points out (2008: 24), ‘there is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories, and if critical discourse analysis, e.g., in investigating agency, ties itself too closely to specific linguistic operations or categories, many relevant instances of agency might be overlooked’. His approach is nonetheless grounded in linguistics, and the paragraph below outlines the methodological procedure followed in Chapters Five and Six for analysing the representation of social actors in discourse, with particular focus on the categories of exclusion/inclusion, genericisation/specification and personalisation/impersonalisation.

Regarding exclusion/inclusion, Van Leeuwen (1996: 38) suggests that ‘representations include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended’. Such exclusion may be innocent, details are assumed known to discourse consumers or deemed irrelevant, but other exclusions ‘tie in closely to the propaganda strategy of creating fear, and of setting up immigrants as enemies of “our” interests’ (1996: 38). Van Leeuwen proposes different levels of exclusion: some are total, in the sense that the text reveals no traces of a particular social actor. In other cases, the activities of the social actor (e.g. the killing of demonstrators) may be included, but all or some of the social actor/s associated with the action are excluded (e.g. the police), thus leaving some textual trace. He distinguishes between the categories of ‘suppression’ and ‘backgrounding’. In the former, there is no reference in the text/s to the social actor in question, typically evidenced linguistically through passive agent deletion, non-finite clauses which function as a grammatical participant, nominalisations and process nouns. Backgrounding, on the other hand, is a ‘less radical’ form of exclusion:
The excluded social actors may not be mentioned in relation to a given action, but they are mentioned elsewhere in the text, and we can infer with reasonable (though never total) certainty who they are. They are not so much excluded as deemphasized, pushed into the background. (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 29)

It is typically evidenced linguistically in simple ellipses in non-finite clauses with –ing and –ed participles (-ant and –é in French), in infinitival clauses with to (à in French) and in paratactic clauses, as well as through the same linguistic functions which achieve ‘suppression’, but with respect to social actors who are included elsewhere in the text. Van Leeuwen (2008: 31) points out that both suppression and backgrounding ‘background social actors to different degrees, but both play a part in reducing the number of times specific social actors are explicitly referred to’. In Chapter Six Van Leeuwen’s framework is used to identify the suppression/backgrounding of les jeunes in Mini-RiCo and it is argued that they are not explicitly linked with having carried out the violence: instead, backgrounding them as social actors means that they are still implicitly linked with having been involved in the riots.

Additionally, Van Leeuwen’s categories of ‘genericisation’ and ‘specification’ are used in the analysis in Chapters Five and Six in order to consider whether social actors are referred to as generic classes or as specific, identifiable individuals. Van Leeuwen draws on the work of sociologists who have linked such concepts to social class (citing Bernstein and Bourdieu), particularly Bourdieu’s (1986: 444; cited by Van Leeuwen, 2008) observation that the dominant class is typically represented through ‘distance, height, the overview of the observer who places himself above the hurly-burly’. Van Leeuwen (1996: 47) notes that the difference in representation is typically evident in the way that the different sectors of the press represent social actors:

In middle-class oriented newspapers government agents and experts tend to be referred to specifically, and “ordinary people” generically: the point of identification, the world in which one’s specifics exist, is here, not the word of the governed but the world of the governors, the “generals”. In working-class oriented newspapers, on the other hand, “ordinary people” are frequently referred to specifically.

Genericisation may be realised in English by the plural without the article, the singular with a definite or indefinite article or by mass nouns. In French all nouns
include the article, and therefore genericisation can be realised by the plural or by mass nouns. Chapter Five outlines that in *Mini-RiCo* the majority of references to ‘young people’ are generic references meaning that the young people are not specified named individuals but viewed as a general class of people (section 5.3.4). References to Nicolas Sarkozy, on the other hand, are specific references and he is discussed in the context of his individual actions and utterances (section 5.3.3).

Finally, Chapters Five and Six also rely on Van Leeuwen’s related categorisation of personalisation/impersonalisation in the representation of social actors. ‘Personalisation’ is when a social actor is represented as a human being, realised by personal or possessive pronouns, proper names (e.g. Nicolas Sarkozy) or nouns. ‘Impersonalisation’ represents actors by some other means, either by abstract or concrete nouns whose means do not include the semantic feature ‘human’ (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46). In this domain he distinguishes between ‘abstraction’ and ‘objectivation’: the former occurs when actors are represented by means of a quality assigned to them by and in the representation (e.g. illegal immigrants). The latter – objectivation – refers to when social actors ‘are represented by means of reference to a place or thing closely associated either with their person or with the action in which they are represented as being engaged’ (2008: 46). One type of objectivation particularly relevant to the current study is ‘spatialisation’, where actors are represented by means of reference to a place in which they are, in a particular context, closely associated. Chapter Five identifies the use of objectivation strategies and argues that a discourse of blamelessness is created in *Mini-RiCo* where those responsible for the violence are backgrounded through spatialisation strategies which emphasise the location of the violence (*violence des cités/quartiers/banlieues*), rather than the social actors responsible (section 5.2).

### 3.3.4.5 Analysing Strategies in Discourse

As also outlined in the Introduction, another aim of the thesis is to examine how the *banlieues* and their inhabitants are discursively constructed by the printed news media, and to question whether a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ discourse is evident, particularly with regard to the positioning of suburban and immigrant minorities vis-à-vis
mainstream French society. Analysis in Chapter Six addresses this research question and investigates how discourses of sameness and difference in *Mini-RiCo* propose a particular interpretation of French national identity which excludes minority groups living in the *banlieues*. Wodak *et al.*’s DHA (section 2.3.4) has been used in the study of the discursive construction of national identity (e.g. Wodak *et al.*, 2009), and analysis in Chapter Six draws on their notion of ‘strategies’ in discourse. Defined as ‘a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 94), Wodak *et al.* (2009) propose five strategies by which national identity is imagined in discourse: constructive, perpetuation, justification, transformation and dismantling/destructive strategies. The first – constructive strategies – are of most relevance to the current study, as they attempt ‘to construct and to establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation’ (Wodak *et al.*, 2009: 33).

Constructive strategies are useful for identifying and naming the discursive means by which the orders of discourse of sameness and difference are created in *Mini-RiCo*. Within this category of ‘constructive strategies’ a number of sub-strategies are also proposed, including (i) ‘assimilation, inclusion and continuation’, which is concerned with intra-national sameness and positive political and national continuity and (ii) ‘dissimilation/exclusion and discontinuation’ which presupposes state-internal and state-external international differences. The use of constructive strategies and the related sub-strategies by French journalists in texts in *Mini-RiCo* is highlighted throughout Chapter Six, and the linguistic means by which they are realised is also emphasised. For example, in section 6.2.2 it is argued that the French press use strategies of assimilation, unification and continuation, along with personalisation, lexis and modality to create a discourse of continuity which perpetuates a particular interpretation of French national identity and reinforces a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ divide in French society.

To summarise, this part of the chapter introduced and detailed the primary methodology of this study – Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to the critical analysis of discourse – and outlined the linguistic categories identified by Fairclough and others (such as lexis, sentence construction, modality etc.) which are used for the
analysis of discourses in Chapters Five and Six. Having introduced the methodological procedure for the qualitative critical analysis of discourse in Chapters Five and Six, focus now turns to introducing the steps undertaken for the quantitative corpus-assisted discourse analysis in Chapter Seven.

3.4 Methodological Approach (2): Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS)

3.4.1 Introduction
In this section of the chapter the supporting methodology which is used for analysis in Chapter Seven – Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) – is introduced. In the first part the notion of a corpus is introduced and defined, along with a discussion of the origins and uses of Corpus Linguistics (CL). Distinctions are then drawn between corpus-based and corpus-driven analyses, and the current study is situated in the context of that discussion. The next part deals with the methodological synergy of CDA and CL – Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies – and notes the advantages of using CL techniques for discourse analysis. Following that, some of the limitations of CL are considered, before moving onto the final part of the section where the precise analytical techniques employed in Chapter Seven are discussed, with particular focus on frequency, concordancing, clusters and collocation.

3.4.2 Description of CADS Analytical Framework
In its analysis of French media discourse relating to the riots of 2005, Chapter Seven draws on the principles and analytical opportunities offered by CL, described by McEnery and Wilson (2001: 1) as ‘the study of language based on examples of “real life” language use’. As Kennedy (1998: 8) notes, ‘corpus linguists are concerned typically not only with what words, structures or uses are possible in a language, but also with what is probable – what is likely to occur in language use’. Corpus linguists thus use large bodies of texts – corpora – to examine examples of naturally occurring language in order to draw conclusions. Initially, a corpus denoted ‘any body of text’ (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 29), however its use in the context of modern linguistics typically has a specific connotation, as the following definition suggests: ‘A corpus typically implies a finite body of text, sampled to be maximally
representative of a particular variety of a language, and which can be stored and manipulated using a computer’ (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 73). This definition correctly implies that there is a difference between a corpus and a collection of machine-readable texts or a computerised archive, a difference highlighted by Kennedy (1998: 4): ‘whereas a corpus designed for linguistic analysis is normally a systematic, planned and structured compilation of a text, an archive is a text repository, often huge and opportunistically collected, and normally not structured’. Hunston (2002: 3) points out that a corpus by itself is of little analytical value, being only ‘a store of used language’, however, its value lies in its ability to be manipulated by software thus enabling observations of different kinds.

While the term CL first appeared in the early 1980s (Leech, 1992: 105), corpus-based language study dates back to the pre-Chomskyan period when it was used by linguists from the Structuralist tradition including Boas and Sapir, among others (McEnery et al., 2006: 3). It has, however, witnessed a resurgence since the 1980s, heralded by the advances of modern computer technology and the availability and ease with which machine-readable texts can be compiled and stored. CL has been used in the development of lexicography and descriptive grammar, including the Collins COBUILD Advanced Learners English Dictionary – first published in 1987 – and the Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English, respectively, and in the areas of lexical and grammatical studies, language variation studies, contrastive and diachronic studies, language teaching and learning, and of particular relevance to the current study, discourse analysis.17 Before outlining the ‘methodological synergy’ of CDA and CL (Baker et al., 2008) and the precise methodological steps taken in the current project, it is useful to draw a distinction between corpus-based and corpus-driven analytical approaches in order to appreciate the investigative possibilities offered by CL.

Tognini-Bonelli (2001) draws a distinction between corpus-based and corpus-driven analysis. The former, she suggests (2001: 65), uses corpora mainly to ‘expound, test

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17 For a detailed discussion of the uses of corpora in language analysis see McEnery et al. (2006).
or exemplify theories and descriptions that were formulated before large corpora became available to inform language study’. The corpus-based approach aims to validate the importance of empirical data without completely rejecting intuition (McEnery et al., 2006), and adopts an inductive approach, using existing theories to account for descriptive patterns in the data. Tognini-Bonelli (2001: 81) summarises this approach as ‘a type of methodology where the commitment to the data as a whole is not ultimately very strict or systematic’, and consequently, corpus linguists adopting this approach are accused of ‘not being fully and strictly committed to corpus data as a whole as they have been said to discard inconvenient evidence, i.e. data not fitting the pre-corpus theory’ (McEnery et al., 2006: 8). This can be contrasted with a corpus-driven approach, which claims to be strictly faithful to ‘the integrity of that data as a whole’, and therefore insists that ‘the theoretical statements are fully consistent with, and reflect directly the evidence provided by the corpus’ (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001: 84, 85). Corpus-driven approaches therefore rely only on evidence in the corpus and remain true to the data in language description and formulation of theories. While this contrast may appear stark, McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006: 8) view it as ‘overstated’ and consider a corpus-driven approach as an ‘idealised extreme’, as it seems difficult to completely ignore intuition and reject all pre-existing theories about language and language in use. CADS theorists avoid the corpus-based versus corpus-driven distinction, instead describing the approach as ‘corpus-assisted’, thus acknowledging its flexibility and the possibility for exploring discursive patterns based on both researcher intuition and evidence in the corpus. If a distinction is to be drawn, however, the current study is best described as being closer to a corpus-based analysis, as the RiCo corpus is used to investigate the findings uncovered by CDA of Mini-RiCo, and to assess whether such findings can be generalised and considered typical of French news reporting of 2005 urban violence.

3.4.3 Methodological Synergy of (Critical) Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics: CADS
Chapter Seven uses a CADS approach to consider whether the discursive features identified in the qualitative CDA of Mini-RiCo are representative of a wider pattern of discourse in the larger RiCo corpus. According to Baker (2006: 10-17), the
synergy of the methodologies of (Critical) Discourse Analysis [(C)DA] and CL offers a number of advantages: reducing researcher bias, identifying the incremental effect of discourse along with resistant and changing discourses and facilitating the triangulation of findings. It has been pointed out – particularly with regard to CDA – that ‘the predominance of biased interpretation begs questions about representativeness, selectivity, partiality, prejudice and voice (can analysts speak for the average consumer of texts?)’ (Blommaert, 2005: 31-32). Thus, CL software allows analysts to confirm, objectively, whether the discursive and linguistic features uncovered during analysis of specific texts can be generalised. In this way, Baker (2006: 12) suggests:

[We] are least able to place a number of restrictions on our cognitive biases. It becomes less easy to be selective about a single newspaper article when we are looking at hundreds of articles – hopefully, overall patterns and trends should show through.

However, Baker (2006) also points out that analysts must exercise caution when making generalisations, as there are usually exceptions to any rule or pattern, and such exceptions must be reported. Furthermore, corpora offer the discourse analyst the opportunity to observe the cumulative effect of language use by uncovering numerous supporting examples of a particular discourse construction, while also presenting evidence of counter-discourse/s or exceptions to the hegemonic discourses which may not be uncovered in a single text. Finally, Baker (2006) points out that a corpus-based analysis combined with discourse analysis is a method of triangulation, as well as being a mixture of a qualitative and quantitative approach to linguistic analysis.

Partington (2003: 12) further demonstrates the benefits of CL methodologies for DA, arguing the following:

At the simplest level, corpus technology helps find other examples of a phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns of use previously unthought of. In between, it can reinforce, refute or revise a researcher’s intuition and show them why and how much of their suspicions were grounded.

Baker et al. (2008) suggest that the theories of language underpinning DA insist on a focus on grammatical features (e.g. metaphors, nominalisation etc., as discussed in section 3.3.4), and the combination of DA and CL allows these grammatical features
to be identified, examined and statistically quantified.\footnote{For instance, in the current study concordancing techniques are used to quantify the presence of metaphors from the lexical field of fire in RiCo which were identified as prominent in the smaller Mini-RiCo collection of news articles (sections 5.2.2 and 7.2.4).} Mautner (2009: 123) points to three factors which influence the potential positive contribution of Corpus Linguistics to CDA: firstly, she suggests that using CL allows critical discourse analysts to examine significantly larger data volumes than possible with purely manual techniques; secondly, she maintains that CL reduces researcher bias by permitting analysts ‘to significantly broaden their empirical base’; and thirdly, she proposes the following:

> Corpus Linguistics software offers both quantitative and qualitative perspectives on text data, computing frequencies and measures of statistical significance, as well as presenting data extracts in such a way that the researcher can access individual occurrences of search words, qualitatively examine their collocational environments, describe salient semantic patterns and identify discourse functions.

Furthermore, O’Keeffe (2012: 448) conceives the combination of CDA and CL for studying newspaper discourse as providing a ‘sharp analytical tool’, arguing that the electronic availability of newspaper texts combined with the processing abilities of CL allows for the analysis of discourses beyond a single text or small number of texts. Thus, beginning with Hardt-Mautner (1995) and Stubbs (1996), there is now quite a substantial body of work which uses a CADS approach throughout the combination of (C)DA and CL (for a review of recent literature in the area see Baker \textit{et al.}, 2008; Morley and Bayley, 2009; Partington, 2010). In particular, theoretical and methodological observations from two recent large-scale projects using CADS influence the current study: firstly, the ‘RASIM’ project at the Lancaster University investigating discourses on refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants and migrants in the UK press from 1996-2006 (Baker \textit{et al.}, 2008; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008), and secondly, the ‘CorDis’ project by the SiBol group at the Universities of Siena and Bologna investigating political and media discourses on the conflict in Iraq in 2003 (Morley and Bayley, 2009). One of the aims of the ‘RASIM’ project was to ‘render explicit the interaction’ between the methodological approaches of CDA and CL, and the project sought to show that ‘neither CDA nor CL need be subservient to the other […]

\footnote{For instance, in the current study concordancing techniques are used to quantify the presence of metaphors from the lexical field of fire in RiCo which were identified as prominent in the smaller Mini-RiCo collection of news articles (sections 5.2.2 and 7.2.4).}
(rather than Fairclough's sociocultural approach, as in the current project) and concludes that a CADS approach combining CDA and CL offers mutual analytical benefits:

CL, in general, and concordance analysis, in particular, can be positively influenced by exposure and familiarity with CDA analytical techniques, and the theoretical notions and categories of DHA can inform the quantitative CL analysis. Also, CL needs to be supplemented by the close analysis of selected texts using CDA theory and methodology. CDA, in turn, can benefit from incorporating more objective, quantitative CL approaches, as quantification can reveal the degree of generality of, or confidence in, the study findings and conclusions, thus guarding against over- or under-interpretation. (Baker et al., 2008: 297)

Thus, CL offers a number of possibilities for enhancing the (critical) analysis of discourse, and a CADS approach allows that findings can be better generalised, while also permitting the identification of counter-discourses in a large corpus of texts.

Analyses in relatively similar domains to the current study have adopted a CADS approach and these studies are referenced throughout this thesis, including Freake et al.'s (2011) investigation of the construction of nationhood and belonging in Quebec popular discourse, Taylor's (2009) study of the representation of immigrants in the Italian press, Marchi and Taylor's (2009) analysis of participants in UK and US news reporting of the Iraq war, Caldas-Coulthard's (2007) study of cross-cultural representations of 'otherness' in media discourse, Baker and McEnery's (2005) corpus-based approach to discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in UN and newspaper texts and Page's (2003) examination of patterns of naming Cherie Booth/Blair – wife of Tony Blair – in British online and printed news reports. Of the studies cited thus-far, some adopt an explicitly critical discourse analytical approach (e.g. Baker et al., 2008; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Caldas-Coulthard, 2007; Freake et al., 2011) while for others a traditional discourse analytical approach is used in combination with CL (e.g. Marchi and Taylor, 2009; Page, 2003; Taylor, 2009). Regardless of whether the approach used to discourse analysis is explicitly critical or not, all studies share a similar concern with combining the quantitative strengths of a CL approach with qualitative close analysis of discourse of a given genre.
In sum, CADS is a suitable supporting methodology for the current study because it allows for the identification of patterns of discourse in a large number of texts (2,271 texts in *RiCo*), while also facilitating the statistical quantification of lexico-grammatical trends evident in *Mini-RiCo*. The methodological synergy of (C)DA and CL has been successful in a number of similar studies – detailed above – and the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches to the analysis of newspaper discourse relating to urban violence in 2005 reduces researcher subjectivity and the potential for bias. Before describing the precise analytical techniques which are used in the analysis of *RiCo* in Chapter Seven, the limitations of CL and some defences to these limitations are now considered.

### 3.4.4 Limitations

As with any research methodology it is important to acknowledge its limitations as well as its possibilities. Criticisms have been levelled at CL most commonly in the areas of context, representativeness and interpretation. First, it has been argued that context cannot be accounted for in CL (Baldry, 2000; Widdowson, 2004, 2000) and that corpora privilege language data – written or transcribed spoken data – and thus cannot account for intonation, body language and other paralinguistic contextual information. Baker (2006: 18) is critical of the lack of societal conditions of production and consumption provided in a corpus, while Baldry (2000: 36) criticises corpus linguists for ‘abstracting text from its context’. These assertions have been defended, by Stubbs (2001a: 156) for instance, who claims that ‘to accuse Corpus Linguistics of ignoring context is strange, since it is essentially a theory of context: the essential tool is the concordance, where words are always studied in their contexts’. Similarly, Thornbury (2010: 276) suggests that the use of smaller more localised corpora is to be welcomed allowing for contextual information to be ‘rigorously specified’. It was outlined above at section 2.2.3 that context is a key cornerstone of a critical approach to discourse analysis, and thus the discourses being investigated – and consequently *RiCo* – are thoroughly contextualised in Chapter Four, both in terms of the context of production and consumption, as well as the broader sociocultural context.

19 Technological advantages, however, mean that annotated multimodal corpora (e.g. the ‘AMI Meetings Corpus’) can now take into account a variety of paralinguistic features including verbal and non-verbal activity.
As mentioned, a further limitation of CL relates to representativeness, particularly since a corpus can show nothing more than its contents. McEnery et al. (2006: 121) point out that corpora cannot provide negative evidence:

This means that they cannot tell us what is possible or not possible. Everything included in a corpus is what language users have actually produced. A corpus, however large or balanced, cannot be exhaustive except in a very limited range of cases.

A corpus thus documents what Widdowson (2000: 7) terms ‘textually attested’ language, but cannot account for what is ‘the encoded possible, nor the contextually appropriate’. Stubbs (2001a: 151) rejects this as an inherent limitation, explaining that corpus linguists do not claim that corpora provide evidence of every possible use of language in a particular context, but rather are concerned with a ‘much deeper notion: what frequently and typically occurs’. Baker (2006: 73) suggests that particular caution must be exercised when making claims based on a corpus of newspaper discourse:

It is important to bear in mind that the processes of production and reception of any particular article are complex and multiple. Newspaper discourses [...] should not therefore be [...] always viewed as mainstream or hegemonic just because they have occurred within a newspaper.

Corpus linguists must therefore be wary of drawing generalisations from corpora, since ‘a statement about evidence in a corpus is a statement about that corpus, not about the language or register of which the corpus is a sample’ (Hunston, 2002: 23). Corpora cannot therefore tell us everything about how language functions in a particular context, but the analysis of corpora aims for ‘a theory of the typical’ (Stubbs, 2001a: 151) in order to infer generalisations about language use in a given social setting.

Finally, a further limitation of corpora is that corpus data necessarily require interpretation, because ‘corpora can yield findings but rarely provide explanations for what is observed’ (McEnery et al., 2006: 121). Thus, the conclusions resulting from corpus-based analysis demand researcher interpretation, and ‘researchers may choose to interpret a corpus-based analysis of language in different ways, depending on their position’ (Baker, 2006: 18). Widdowson (2004, 2000) also discusses the difficulties posed by different possible interpretations of lexical and grammatical
features, commenting that ‘you cannot read off significance from text as if it were a simple projection of textual features’ (2004: 120). Similarly, as a result Widdowson (2000) claims that CL provides us with a description of text as product, not discourse as process. Stubbs (2001a: 139) addresses this criticism and notes that the potential for biased interpretation is present in many empirical disciplines, suggesting that ‘recognizing the problem obviously does not solve it, but it shows that Corpus Linguistics is trying to develop observational, empirical methods of studying meaning, which are open to the same tests as are applied in other disciplines’. CL offers numerous methods of searching for and sorting linguistic patterns (collocations, keywords, frequency lists, clusters, dispersion plots etc.), and Baker (2006: 21) recommends that clear boundaries need to be set by the researcher when using these techniques:

For example, at what point do we decide that a word in a corpus occurs enough times for it to be “significant” and worth investigating? Or if we want to look for co-occurrences of sets of words […] how far apart are we going to allow these words to be? Do we discount cases where the words appear six words apart? Or four words?

Mindful of the potential for excessive interpretative bias, the current study sets clear boundaries for the analysis of RiCo, and the precise methodological steps applied in Chapter Seven are now discussed.

3.4.5 Practical Application

3.4.5.1 Flexibility of CADS

A CADS approach offers an array of analytical techniques for examining corpora, and Baker (2006: 21) suggests that there are ‘numerous ways of making sense of linguistic patterns’. Firstly, there are no clear rules regarding the order in which a (C)DA and CL analysis are undertaken: Baker et al. (2008: 296) suggest that a corpus might be used in the first instance to guide ‘potential sites of interest’ for qualitative CDA, but acknowledge that both CDA and CL can be used as methodological entry points, creating a ‘virtuous research cycle’. Consequently, they maintain (2008: 296) that ‘the CDA analysis […] can point towards patterns to be examined through the Corpus Linguistics lens for triangulation’, as is the case with the current study which begins with a CDA of Mini-RiCo (Chapters Five and Six)
and uses the discursive patterns and orders of discourse identified to guide a CL analysis of the larger RiCo corpus in Chapter Seven.

Additionally, CADS studies are not uniform and CL offers a suite of methodological tools for the analysis of discourse in corpora, including frequency lists, dispersion plots, concordances, collocations and clusters. A CADS analysis typically uses a combination of all or some of these analytical tools when examining lexico-grammatical and discursive trends (for a detailed discussion of the use of corpora for discourse analysis see Baker, 2006). CADS is therefore a flexible and inductive approach which requires ‘the steady, perhaps undramatic collection and measurement of observational data leading to a more or less detailed description of a phenomenon’ (Partington, 2009: 282). Consequently the methodological steps vary depending on the research question or linguistic feature under investigation. Partington (2009: 289) views CADS as being ‘both highly data-driven and serendipitous’ in the sense that ‘the data itself will inevitably dictate to a considerable degree which next steps to take’. For instance, Baker et al.’s (2008) analysis of discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press considers emerging lexical patterns (e.g. keywords/clusters, collocates) and uses these patterns to examine expanded concordance lines, and where appropriate, whole texts. Furthermore, Freake et al.’s (2011) CADS analysis of the construction of nationhood and belonging in Quebec begins with a CL analysis of keywords, collocates, clusters and concordances and uses the discourse patterns inferred from the lexico-grammatical patterns to guide the analysis of three selected whole texts. Baker and McEnery (2005), on the other hand, use a CADS approach to investigate discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in UN and newspaper texts, and focus mainly on the analysis of concordances to identify dominant discourses without examining any texts in full. Therefore, while there have been suggestions for the steps to be followed when using a CADS approach to (C)DA (e.g. Baker et al., 2008: 295), it is necessarily a flexible and data-driven approach which is informed not only by lexico-grammatical patterns identified but also by researcher intuition underpinned by theoretical and contextual awareness; as Partington (2010: 90) suggests:
As well as using wordlists and concordancing, intuitions for further research can also arise from reading, watching or listening to parts of the dataset; this process can help to provide a feel for how things are done linguistically in the discourse type that is being studied. CADS work also frequently combines what can be learned from corpus analysis with other sources of information on a given topic, be this linguistic or socio-cultural.

Therefore, the CADS analysis in Chapter Seven is data-driven, in the sense that analysis is guided firstly by the discursive patterns and orders of discourse identified through a CDA of \textit{Mini-RiCo} in Chapters Five and Six. Additionally, where appropriate concordance searches are led by the discovery of distinctive or unexpected lexico-grammatical trends,\footnote{For instance, in section 7.2.4 additional concordance searches are carried out to identify metaphorical representations of violence in \textit{RiCo}, based on the identification of metaphors from the lexical field of disease/contagion, natural phenomena and fire in a sample of 150 concordance lines using the search term \textit{brûl*}. Apart from metaphors from the lexical field of fire, other metaphorical representations had not emerged in the qualitative analysis of \textit{Mini-RiCo}.} and concordance lines are occasionally expanded where further co-text is required to make sense of the feature of discourse examined. As mentioned previously, CL offers a suite of tools for the analysis of corpora, and Chapter Seven uses WordSmith Tools Version 6 (Scott, 2012) – particularly the analytical tools of frequency and clusters, collocates and concordancing – to gain a deeper insight into the discursive representation of the events and actors associated with the November 2005 riots.

\textbf{3.4.5.2 Frequency and Clusters}

The first step in analysing \textit{RiCo} in Chapter Seven is to ascertain frequency through an examination of the wordlist – a list of all the ‘tokens’\footnote{‘Tokens’ refer to individual words present in the corpus. This is not to be confused with ‘types’, the number of \textit{original} words present. For instance the word \textit{nous} occurs 3788 times in \textit{RiCo} – each instance counted as a ‘token’ – but all instances of use are classified as one ‘type’ of word. As mentioned, the following settings are used to calculate tokens in WordSmith Tools (Scott, 2012):} present in \textit{RiCo} – since wordlists are ‘a good starting point for the analysis of any type of corpus. Used sensitively, they can illuminate a variety of interesting phenomena’ (Baker, 2006: 47). Frequency data, Baker (2006: 47) suggests, can ‘help to give the user a sociological profile of a given word or phrase enabling better understanding of its use in particular contexts’. The wordlist from \textit{RiCo} is analysed in section 7.2.2 in order to establish noticeably high number of occurrences of particular words.
Function words such as *le, et, avec* etc. are initially ignored and manually removed from the wordlist since such grammatical terms ‘tend not to be subject to linguistic innovation […]’. With few exceptions, almost all forms of language have a high proportion of grammatical words’ (Baker, 2006: 53). Ignoring function words in the wordlist for *RiCo* provides a clearer indication of what the corpus is about, and as the discussion in section 7.2.2 exemplifies, analysis of the frequency and the wordlist facilitates the identification of statistically important words and groupings of words from similar lexical fields (e.g. violence/disorder, politics and governance, education etc.). Additionally, Chapter Seven also investigates clusters of significant words (e.g. *violence*, *banlieue* etc.) in *RiCo* in order to gain a fuller appreciation of patterns of discourse in news reporting on the events and actors relating to 2005 French urban violence. Clusters are simply three to five words that occur in the same form/order a minimum of five times in *RiCo*, and they reveal how a particular word is typically used in *RiCo*.

### 3.4.5.3 Collocation
The ability of CL software to identify collocates of particular words – regarded as one of the principal functions of concordancing (O'Keeffe and Farr, 2003: 394) – is also used in Chapter Seven. The significance of collocations for textual analysis using CDA was discussed in section 3.3.4.1 above, however Baker *et al.* (2008: 275) point out that in discourse analysis collocates are not ‘usually statistically calculated, but established manually through sorted concordances, and information regarding their statistical significance, the collocation span, or any frequency thresholds, is not usually provided’. As a result strong non-adjacent collocates may be disregarded by critical discourse analysts, or conversely, non-significant collocates may be included in the analysis. For a CADS analysis, however, collocates are established using CL software such as WordSmith Tools (Scott, 2012), and they have been defined as ‘the above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the node)’ (Baker *et al.*, 2008: 278). For Chapter Seven the settings in WordSmith Tools (Scott, 2012) calculate collocates as words that occur at least five times within a scope of ten words to the left and right of the node.
Stubbs (1996: 172) points to the ideological significance of collocates, noting that ‘words occur in characteristic collocations, which show the associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody’. Similarly, Baker (2006: 98) points out that where a collocate is limited to a set pattern of language and occurs most frequently with a particular (set of) word/s, this needs to be noted. In this way, identifying and comparing the strongest collocates of particular words (e.g. the nouns banlieue* in section 7.3.1.1 and jeunes in section 7.4.3.1), allow us to obtain a better idea of the main discourses surrounding a particular actor or event, as well as mental lexicon of the text producer (Mollin, 2009). Analysis of collocates has been considered to be ‘a natural extension of frequency lists’ (Gries, 2009: 14), particularly as collocates can capture multiword expressions, rather than individual words only (Pollach, 2012). Concordance output enables researchers to easily identify collocates of particular lexical item/s, and is considerably more reliable than intuition: ‘intuition certainly cannot provide reliable facts about frequency and typicality. [..O]nly a corpus can provide thorough documentation’ (Stubbs, 1995: 250). Therefore, collocates are examined throughout Chapter Seven and lexical and semantic preferences surrounding a particular word are identified and explained in light of the sociocultural contexts and discourse practices introduced in Chapter Four.

3.4.5.4 Concordancing
Concordancing is one of the most useful and practical aspects to the manipulation of corpora, as it allows for lexico-grammatical and discursive patterns to be easily identified. Defined as ‘simply a list of all the occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus, presented within the context that they occur in; usually a few words to the left and right of the search term’ (Baker, 2006: 71), it is sometimes referred as ‘keyword in context’ (KWIC). WordSmith Tools (Scott, 2012) provides the useful facility of allowing the concordances to be sorted in a variety of ways so as to enable patterns to be easily sorted. Similarities in language use are thus identified, which may not be visible to the naked eye on an initial reading; to quote Tribble (1990: 11), ‘what the concordancer does is make the invisible visible’. Concordancing also facilities the identification of semantic preference in a corpus of texts, ‘the relation, not between individual words, but between a lemma or word-form and a set of
semantically related words’ (Stubbs, 2001b: 65); for instance, section 7.3.1.1 identifies semantic preference in concordances of *banlieue* and *cité* for nouns and adjectives which connote a negative image of the suburbs, including vocabulary from the lexical fields of violence and disorder.

Given the size of the RiCo corpus (over 1.2 million words) some concordance searches create large numbers of occurrences of a particular word: for example, a keyword search for *banlieue* returns 3519 concordance lines, which is too large for manual analysis. Some system must thus be used to facilitate analysis: Sinclair (1999) for example suggests selecting 30 concordance lines randomly, noting patterns for each selection and continuing to analyse 30 lines at a time until no new patterns emerge. Similarly, Hunston (2002: 52) proposes a method termed ‘hypothesis testing’, whereby a small selection of lines is used as a basis for a set of hypotheses about patterns, and further searches are employed to test those hypotheses and form new ones. Previous CADS analyses have adopted varying downsampling techniques, and for example, when Marchi and Taylor’s (2009) corpus of UK and US news texts returned a large number of concordances when searching for ‘we’ and ‘they’, a more manageable representative sample was obtained by focusing analysis on headlines and articles from the editorial genre only. In cases where large numbers of concordances are returned, Baker (2006: 90) cites Hunston’s (2002) suggestions for ‘hypothesis testing’, but also proposes that 140 concordances lines is ‘relatively manageable’. Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 17), however, avoid downsampling and maintain that ‘in terms of the analysis of semantic/discourse prosodies, the researcher was required to analyze hundreds of lines of concordance data by hand in order to identify wider themes that were not so easily spotted via collocation, keyword or frequency analysis’. For the current study where large numbers of concordance lines are produced by a search word, concordance lines are randomly reduced to a sample of 150 for analysis; where the total concordance for a search does not exceed 200 occurrences, all concordance
lines are examined. Concordance lines are also ‘cleaned’ (following Baker, 2006: 92) and where appropriate irrelevant lines are removed.22

In sum, the preceding sections outlined the supporting methodological approach of the study used in Chapter Seven: Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS), a combination of a (Critical) Discourse Analytical approach with the techniques of Corpus Linguistics. It was established that the combination of CDA and CL enables the aims of the thesis to be better addressed, and allows for a more complete analysis of how discourse is used by the printed French media to sustain social hierarchies and power asymmetries in the discursive representation of the civil disturbances of 2005. While CL offers a range of analytical tools, Chapter Seven relies primarily on frequency and clusters, concordancing and collocates, and in line with a CADS approach analysis is flexible and data-driven, relying on previous findings and researcher intuition to guide the exact steps undertaken.

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the methodological approach used to analyse discourses present in news reporting on the 2005 riots, and the data and methodological approach that have been selected to align with the theoretical objectives of the study introduced in Chapter One. It identified firstly the data used in the study (Le Figaro, L’Humanité, Le Monde and Ouest France) and established that newspapers represent a cross-section of the ideological spectrum of French newspapers. Thus, the RiCo and Mini-RiCo corpora are designed to be representative of news reporting on the 2005 riots, and they allow for assumptions to be made about how events and actors relating to the civil disturbances are reported by the French printed media.

22 Baker, in his analysis of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in the UK press, offers the example of where ‘aliens’ refer to extra-terrestrial creatures, which are obviously not of relevance to his study and consequently removed from the concordance results. In Chapter Seven discourses relating to Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy are investigated using the search word l’intérieur. Concordances are ‘cleaned’ to remove references to previous Interior Ministers or where ‘interior’ refers to the inside of a building, structure etc.
CDA has been chosen as the primary methodological approach of the study, and Fairclough’s three-dimensional sociocultural approach to CDA is the selected framework used for this study in Chapters Five and Six. Fairclough’s framework offers the analytical tools to identify the precise linguistic means (e.g. lexis, modality, sentence construction etc.) by which social structures of power and asymmetries are created and maintained in news reporting on the 2005 riots. The related concepts of ‘orders of discourse’ and ‘intertextuality’ are key theoretical cornerstones, and they allow for connections to be made between existing and competing discourses in French news discourse. Fairclough’s framework is enhanced by the inclusion of Van Leeuwen’s sociosemantic categories for the analysis of social actors in discourse, along with the notion of ‘strategies’ – particularly constructive strategies – from the DHA which facilitate, respectively, the analysis of social actors in French news discourse and the discursive construction of national identity.

The supporting methodological approach – CADS – allows for the analysis of a large number of texts, specifically 2,271 texts (over 1.2 million words) in RiCo. Discursive trends and orders of discourse evident in Mini-RiCo can be quantified using the analytical techniques of frequency, clusters, concordancing and collocation, and there are opportunities to identify additional patterns of discourse in the larger RiCo corpus which did not emerge during analysis of Mini-RiCo. The flexibility of a CADS approach has been established, and analysis in Chapter Seven is inductive and data-driven, guided by the findings of Chapters Five and Six along with any discursive trends that emerge during analysis of RiCo. The methodological synergy of a qualitative CDA framework with the quantitative focus of CADS facilitates a reduction in researcher bias and subjective interpretations, and allows for a large-scale analysis of newspaper discourse on 2005 French urban violence.

Having established that the selected data and methodological approaches are best suited to achieve the state aims of the study and provide answers to the questions posed in Chapter One, focus now turns to addressing the discursive practices and sociocultural contexts of the study, as required by Fairclough’s framework.
4 Contextualising the Study: French Media and Sociocultural Contexts

4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the methodological approaches of the study – Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) – and established the significance of the practices of production and consumption and the wider sociocultural context for the analysis of newspaper discourse on the 2005 riots. Section 2.2.3.7 discussed how in this study discourse is understood as social practice, whereby the relationship between language, culture and society is dialectical: language is viewed as being shaped by society, but equally, society is shaped by language. Defining discourse in this way means that, following Fairclough (1992: 3), ‘discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct and constitute them’. All approaches to CDA share a similar concern with the significance of contextualising the discourses being examined; for example Wodak (2001: 3) stresses that:

A fully critical account of discourse would […] require a theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes, within which individuals or groups as social-historical subjects create meaning in their interaction with texts.

Furthermore, the significance of context both for CDA and CADS has been previously introduced, and Fairclough (1995b: 50) stresses the importance of the ‘wider contextual matrix’ of discourse, arguing that it ‘must be attended to because it shapes discourse practices in important ways and is itself cumulatively shaped by them’. This chapter thus outlines the discursive practices of production and consumption and the broader sociocultural practices which must be taken into consideration during the CDA and CADS analyses in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

This chapter is broken into two parts: the first examines the discourse practices of production and consumption and identifies the key sociocultural and institutional factors relating to the French news media context. Beginning with a discussion of the historical perspective from which the modern French newspaper industry emerged,
the specificity of the French press is outlined and comparisons are drawn between the French and Anglo-Saxon newspaper industries. The continuing influence and significance of the printed news media in France is established, before concluding this part of the chapter with a discussion on process of production relating to news reporting on the banlieues. The second part of the chapter addresses the sociocultural context of the subject of the study – incidents of urban violence in France in the winter of 2005 – in order to gain a fuller appreciation of the wider discourses and debates within which the current study is situated. Historical, institutional and sociocultural factors relating to the history of immigration in France and the emergence of the banlieues are introduced and the incidents of 2005 are placed in the context of a lengthy history of civil disturbances in banlieues in French towns and cities. Anti-immigration ideologies and the increasing popularity of the far-Right in French politics are outlined and the related perception of the threat of Islam is also addressed. The immediate context surrounding the riots of 2005 is then explained, including political reactions and varying interpretations of the urban violence.

Criticisms relating to CDA and context are discussed at section 2.4.2, and it was established that the absence of thorough contextualisation is a frequently cited shortcoming. This chapter aims to situate the discourses analysed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven in their broader social, cultural, historical, institutional, political etc. contexts in order to gain a fuller appreciation of how the discursive practices of production and consumption and the wider sociocultural practices both shape and are shaped by the discourses identified in the forthcoming analysis. However, it is acknowledged that a ‘full’ contextualisation is close to impossible and it is likely that not every possible detail of the ‘relevant’ context is included within the scope of this chapter. However, a detailed discussion of the discursive practices of production and consumption and the wider sociocultural practices is undertaken, informed by a wide variety of sources.
4.2 Discourse Practices of Production and Consumption

4.2.1 Introduction

This part of the chapter addresses the sociocultural and institutional discourse practices of production and consumption relating to the texts and discourses contained in the RiCo and Mini-RiCo corpora. As outlined previously, Fairclough (1995b, 1992) explains discursive practices as involving processes of text production, distribution, and consumption; consequently the following paragraphs begin with an introduction to the historical context related to the newspaper industry in France. It then addresses the institutional supports and processes of production that are specific to French news media. The consumption of newspaper discourse in France is addressed at section 4.2.2, and issues relating to concentration, ownership and the influence of the printed news media are considered. Finally, this section outlines the discourse practices of news reporting on the banlieues and identifies the institutional and sociocultural specificities of reporting on events in the suburbs.

4.2.2 The French Media Context

Since the publication of the first news title La Gazette in 1631, France has virtually always placed a high value on freedom of speech and expression and the role of the press in guaranteeing same; Article 11 of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme – drafted following the 1789 Revolution – declares:

« La libre communication des pensées et des opinions est un des droits les plus précieux de l’homme : tout citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, sauf à répondre de l’abus de cette liberté dans les cas déterminés par la loi ». (cited by Charon, 2003: 8)

The post-Revolutionary period saw a boom in the newspaper industry and readers were offered not only general news and information, but literary works were also published in newspapers by authors including Balzac, George Sand, Victor Hugo and Alexandre Dumas. Apart from a brief period during the reigns of Napoleon I and II when restrictions were placed on the freedom of the press, free expression was generally fostered, culminating in the 1881 law on ‘la liberté de la presse’: Article 1 affirmed that ‘l’imprimerie et la librairie sont libres’, and Article 5 guaranteed that ‘tout journal ou écrit périodique peut être publié sans autorisation préalable et sans dépôt de cautionnement’ (Charon, 2003: 12). Kuhn (2011: 6) refers to the period
between the collapse of the Second Empire in 1870 and the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914 as the ‘golden age’ of the French press, and during this time there was a significant expansion in the number of titles published and the size of their readership. He cites statistics from Chupin *et al.* (2009) who report that in 1914 French newspapers had a total print run of over nine million copies daily and were ahead of other European countries, with a daily circulation of 244 newspapers for every 1,000 inhabitants. Challenging economic circumstances including labour shortages, restrictions on the supply of paper and transportation difficulties during and in the aftermath of World War 1 resulted in a slow-down in newspaper production and consumption. Post-World War 2 saw a ‘revolution’ in the French press (Kuhn, 2011: 10) and a variety of organisational and legislative changes were introduced – in particular the ordinance of 1944 – which were designed to protect the newspaper industry from excessive capitalist ownership and to promote the operation of a free market in the press. Consequently, the French state is viewed as a positive enabling force which supports the newspaper industry and there is an emphasis on removing economic threats to press freedom (Kuhn, 2011: 12).

The French press can be distinguished from its Anglo-Saxon counterpart in three ways: levels of state aid, a comparable absence of a tabloid culture and the style of journalism. Firstly, since the ordinance of August 1944 – intended to ensure pluralism, prevent the concentration of ownership and guarantee transparency with regard to the finances of newspaper holding companies – the French printed news media enjoy a comparatively privileged position in relation to its European and US counterparts. The printed and more recently online press avail of a number of direct and indirect government subsidies including reductions in the postal rate for deliveries, reduced VAT rates and financial assistance to supplement income from advertising and sales. Kuhn (2011: 86) reports that €847 million of indirect aid and €163 million of direct aid was paid by the French government in 2007, not including €110 million spent on state subscriptions to the *Agence France-Presse* news agency. State aid amounts to almost one third of income from sales, and France is ‘without doubt the country in the world where the press is most massively assisted’ (Montaigne, 2006: 50). Successive French governments have therefore legitimated
the importance of the newspaper industry and preserved their status as a key site for
the provision of information, public debate and intellectual commentary.

Secondly, in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon newspaper industry, in France there has
been little development of ‘la presse «à scandale»’ or a tabloid press culture. This is
due to strict laws since 1970 prohibiting action which ‘porter atteinte à l’intimité de
la vie de l’autrui’, including publishing photographs or reporting on words spoken in
a confidential or private context without the consent of the persons involved
(Charon, 2003: 24). Thirdly, Young and Dugas (2012) argue that there are stylistic
differences between the French and United States/United Kingdom printed news
media; they cite Chalaby (1996: 313) who suggests that ‘in the United States and in
England, the press grew independently from the literary field but this was not the
case in France [...] where French literary figures and celebrities have always been
very involved in journalism’. Early French journalism was less structured than in the
United States or United Kingdom and ‘commentaries’ were a regular feature,
wherein ‘the journalist analyses and comments on a topic from a specific moral or
political point of view’. Furthermore, Chalaby (1996: 319) points out that during the
nineteenth century France witnessed political pluralism, upheaval and violence, and
it was extremely common for journalists or newspapers to align themselves with
political or ideological movements, thereby viewing their work as ‘polemicising and
publicising political ideas’. As previously mentioned, the early French press
frequently printed work from intellectual and literary figures such as Zola, Dumas
etc., and consequently contemporary French newspapers are influenced by the
‘political/literary’ press tradition, with an emphasis on ‘valuing ideas over the latest
news “scoop”’ (Benson and Saguy, 2005: 239). Benson (2002: 63) defines the
‘political/literary’ tradition as ‘the use of particular narrative formats, such as the
interview, the commentary, and the reactions story, and secondly, a style of writing
that mixes to a significant extent descriptive and normative statements’. This style of
journalism contrasts with what has been described as the ‘fact-centred discursive
practice’ of Anglo-American journalism (Benson, 2002: 53), and political and

23 There have been calls to move away from this ‘opinion-focus’ approach in French newspapers to a
more American style of media reporting which emphasises an informational or objective form of
news reporting; however Benson (2002) argues that despite such calls little has changed in the French
media.
literary figures tend to feature more prominently in the French press. This trend is exemplified by one text in Mini-Rico (Text 3), an opinion piece published in Le Figaro written by Salem Kacet, an academic, medical doctor and political figure. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that journalists in France are increasingly drawn from élite social strata and commonly earn qualifications from the more prestigious French universities and training schools or Instituts d’Études Politiques (Benson, 2002).

4.2.3 State Support, Ownership and Influence
State support for the newspaper industry in France means that it continues to maintain a prominence despite a world-wide slowdown in newspaper sales. The significance of the industry was confirmed in 2009 when a forum set up by then President Nicolas Sarkozy (États généraux de la presse écrite) recommended modifying the system of state aid. In response, the State committed to a supplementary €200 million of extra aid for three years, in addition to the already generous financial assistance it provides. Furthermore, the French government now partly finances the provision of one newspaper a week for the year following every French person’s 18th birthday, and it has committed to providing state assistance for online newspapers (Kuhn, 2011: 88). Newspaper reading remains a daily ritual for a large section of French society, and in 2008 69% of French adults reported reading newspapers, with 29% reading one daily (down from 36% in 1997) and 11% ‘a few times a week’ (Donnat, 2009: 6). Additionally, in terms of the consumption practices associated with the four newspapers from which news texts in RiCo and Mini-RiCo are sourced, it was established at section 3.2 that Le Figaro, Le Monde and L’Humanité rank among the highest circulating newspapers in 2005 and Ouest France was the best-selling regional newspaper.

The printed newspaper industry – la presse payante grand public – is typically categorised into two distinct daily markets: the national press (la presse quotidienne

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24 This feature of the French press is also encouraged by State support for pluralism and an absence of statutory or self-regulatory monitoring of their activities. Thus, French journalists and contributors are ‘free to editorialise, to adopt strong positions and to support whatever political parties and candidates they choose to’ (Kuhn, 2011: 73).
nationale) and the regional or departmental press (la presse quotidienne régionale et départementale). Assessment of ownership treats these categories separately and in both cases there is a comparatively lower concentration of ownership than in other European countries, largely due to State support for pluralism. For la presse quotidienne nationale, in 2002 there were three press groups that had a combined 70% market share, in comparison with Germany’s 87.4% and the UK’s 70.6%. (Ward, 2004: 8). Additionally, Kuhn (2011: 60) points out that ownership across the national newspaper market in France is reasonably diverse and there is no large concentration of titles in the hands of any single press group. Similarly, the regional newspaper market (la presse quotidienne régionale et départementale) has ‘moderate’ concentration levels, and the top three groups held a combined 46.7% national market share in 2002 (Ward, 2004: 9). However, Kuhn (2011: 61) notes that even though concentration levels are moderate, in a particular region ‘a single daily newspaper title frequently enjoys a de facto monopoly position and is usually well able to protect its territorial fiefdom against potential competitors’. He cites the Ouest France newspaper chain, for example, and points to its dominant position in Brittany, parts of Normandy and the Pays de la Loire. Additionally, France has little cross-media concentration of ownership and has no equivalent of a company similar to Murdoch’s News Corporation in the United Kingdom, Bertelsmann in Germany or Berlusconi’s Mediaset in Italy (Kuhn, 2011: 63).

As with the worldwide newspaper industry, French newspapers face challenges with falling circulation figures and declining incomes from advertising revenues in comparison to other areas of the media. Regardless, the newspaper industry – as previously discussed – continues to occupy a privileged position and benefits from generous State aid. Furthermore, government responses to recommendations from the 2009 forum on États généraux de la presse écrite affirms State support for the sector. Despite declining circulation figures, Kuhn (2011: 42) argues that the influence of French newspapers should not be dismissed, and he rejects suggestions that newspapers are merely irrelevant commentators on events:
They continue to perform key functions, notably agenda-setting and acting as watchdogs [...] [...] in key respects the national dailies are the dominant agenda-setters in the French press system. Whereas the provincial dailies may be important sources of information for the mass of society, it is the national dailies that reflect the concerns of élitists.

He singles out *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *Les Echos* as titles which are particularly powerful, noting that they exercise ‘a strong influence among key political and economic decision-makers, help set the agenda for the other news media and act as a major forum for the discussion of new ideas in social and cultural matters’.

Before concluding this section regarding the discourse practices of production and consumption, focus now turns to the production practices relating to news reporting on the *banlieues*, which are recognised as having attracted particular journalistic attention since the early 1990s (Hargreaves, 1996).

4.2.4 News Reporting on the *Banlieues*  
Section 4.3.4 below discusses how the media played a key role in the gradual discursive repositioning of the *banlieues* as peripheral spaces distinct from the rest of French society and the inhabitants of the suburbs – particularly *les jeunes* – as representing a threat to law and order. It will show that from the 1990s, the words *banlieue*, *cité* and *quartier* have become synonymous with neighbourhoods having a large concentration of immigrants, comparatively high unemployment rates, ethnic diversity and outbreaks of civil unrest. According to Sedel (2009: 51), the discursive shift and emphasis on ‘le problème des banlieues’ saw the emergence of ‘des journalistes «spécialisés» dans les rédactions tandis que de «nouveaux experts» […] convoqués sur les plateaux de télévision’. However, there was a perception among journalists that specialising in coverage of the suburbs was futile as the same stories emerged and there was little public interest in news stories on the *banlieues*. Sedel (2009: 115-117) cites a number of journalists who echo these sentiments, the first quotation below is attributed to a journalist from the newspaper *Libération* in 2000 and the second from *Le Monde* published in 2005:
C’était toujours les mêmes choses qui revenaient, des architectures terrifiantes, des gens désespérés qui ne savent pas comment faire, donc au bout d’un moment, il y a un effet de sens, il y a un effet de lourdeur, de difficultés qui fait que bon, on en a marre, quoi, voilà.

Rubricard banlieue, c’était une page toutes les trois semaines dont tout le monde se foutait. Chaque fois que je proposais quelque chose, on disait non. Hors compagne électorale et les faits divers, la banlieue n’est pas dans l’actualité. Or Le Monde est de plus en plus dans une logique de quotidien.

The perception was that reporting on the suburbs was only of interest in the context of ‘des événements exceptionnels’ and consequently the number of journalists specialising in reporting on the suburbs was estimated at between five and ten by the end of the 1990s (Sedel, 2009). Levasseur (2010: 8) argues that the result of mainstream newspapers paying little attention to the suburbs was that ‘the dominant rhetoric about the cité immigrée has almost exclusively been disseminated through discursive modalities enhancing both danger and exoticism’. However, Sedel (2009) points out that following the unprecedented scenes of violence in November 2005 a number of news titles created positions targeted particularly at reporting on the banlieues. For instance, Luc Bronner in Le Monde continues to focus much of his writing on the suburbs and he has positioned himself as a ‘reporter société’, rather than a ‘rubicard’ or ‘un «expert» qui «écrit de haut» pour «un noyau d’intellectuels»’ (cited by Sedel, 2009: 117). Similarly, Le Parisien newspaper created an ‘Éducation-Banlieue’ rubric aimed at providing additional coverage of the suburbs.

Sedel’s (2009) book Les Médias et La Banlieue includes a detailed analysis of newspaper reporting on the banlieues based on interviews with national and regional journalists who reported on the 2005 riots or on the suburbs generally. She raises a number of issues of note: firstly, she asserts that most newspapers assign those with the least experience to report on events in the banlieues. Citing interviews with journalists from France Soir and Libération, she explains (2009: 112-114) that the suburbs are unpleasant and often hostile places for media workers to visit and consequently it is frequently newly qualified journalists who are «envoyé au charbon». For instance, of the seven news reporters who covered the death of Sidi-Ahmed, the eleven year old boy killed by a stray bullet in crossfire between rival gangs in La Courneuve (Paris) in June 2005, none were editors or columnists (2009:
Additionally, she notes (2009: 124) that finding sources from the banlieues to contribute to articles can be difficult, and journalists commonly rely on the same police sources when researching articles in the absence of co-operative informants living in the suburbs. Journalists reporting on the various outbreaks of violence since the 1980s were faced with the challenge that those involved in the riots were often ‘les populations [...] les plus vulnérables’ and consequently, ‘les moins à même de tenir un discours construit vis-à-vis de l’extérieur’. Analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven confirms this tendency, and it is shown how those directly involved in the riots are rarely directly quoted in RiCo – instead emotions and reactions are attributed to them.

It should be noted that there are some exceptions to the trends identified in the preceding paragraphs regarding newspaper reporting on the banlieues. There are limited examples of what has been termed ‘ethnic minority press’, and Levasseur (2010) discusses in detail the illustrated bulletin Afrika, produced in the Quatre-Mille suburb in Paris. His analysis suggests that ethnic minority press contribute to constructing alternative interpretations of the banlieues, and he maintains (2010: 10) that:

> By taking a different approach to the periphery and concentrating on the “ordinariness” of existence, identity matters and political engagement against racism, ethnic reporters have participated in the re-evaluation of the question of immigration and short-circuited most of the negative stereotypes usually associated with the portrayals of immigrants.

However, the newspapers making up RiCo and Mini-RiCo are characterised by the processes of newsgathering and production introduced by Sedel (2009) and discussed in the paragraphs above; as a result, analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven demonstrates how dominant discourses privileging the majority French society and reproducing power asymmetries which discriminate against minority groups in the banlieues are present in the news texts analysed.
4.3 Sociocultural Context

4.3.1 Introduction
The second part of the chapter focuses on the sociocultural context of the study and outlines the social, political, cultural, historical etc. circumstances which aid the ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ stages in the forthcoming analysis of RiCo and Mini-RiCo. The paragraphs which follow are not intended to be an exhaustive list of the sociocultural conditions underpinning the production and interpretation of newspaper discourse on 2005 French urban violence. Instead, the most salient features of the broader sociocultural context are introduced, and additional contextual detail is provided throughout the analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, where appropriate. This section therefore focuses firstly on the history of immigration in France and outlines the policy approaches to immigrants in light of the French republican tradition. The rise of the far-Right in France and the related construction of the immigrant as a ‘threat’ to French values and norms are also discussed. The final part of this section outlines the emergence of the banlieues and shows how they have become synonymous as sites of social and economic exclusion with a disproportionate immigrant population and comparatively high unemployment rates. It also addresses the phenomenon of la violence des banlieues and acknowledges the role of the media in constructing the banlieues as a ‘problem’ in French society.

4.3.2 French Immigration History and the Republican Tradition
Given the high concentration of immigrants and their descendants in the banlieues, the following paragraphs trace France’s immigration history and the republican tradition underpinning policy approaches to the treatment of immigrants. It establishes the most fundamental tenets of French republicanism, including the principle of la laïcité, and shows how recent patterns of immigration – in particular from post-colonial North African territories – challenge traditional conceptions of a French republican society.
4.3.2.1 Post-War Immigration

Low birth rates, deaths during both World Wars and a continual need for agricultural, industrial and military labour means that immigration has always been a necessity in modern France (Hudson, 2011). Like other European countries, France’s history of immigration can be traced back to the 1850s and it experienced significant inward migration prior to World War 2 (Howarth and Varouxakis, 2003: 118). Most of these immigrants came from Europe, in particular Spain, Portugal, Italy, Russia and Poland. Post World War 2, the loss of so many men during the conflict combined with demographic stagnation (Jennings, 2000) and the economic boom associated with les trentes glorieuses – a period of thirty years of unprecedented economic growth from 1945 to 1975 – meant that there was an increased need for labourers to work in the many factories, mines and construction sites throughout France. Governments adopted a laissez-faire approach to immigration policies, with their primary objective being to attract workers by providing working and residence permits (Joly, 2007: 204). In 1945 President de Gaulle saw immigration as a means to combat ‘le manque d’hommes’ and ‘la faiblesse de la natalité française […] l’obstacle principal qui s’oppose à notre redressement’ (Weil, 2008: 8). During this time immigrants continued to come to France from European countries, but there was a greater than before migratory flow from French colonies. In particular, there were increased numbers of migrants from North Africa and the Maghreb region including Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In the 1982 census, Europeans represented less than half of the foreign population in France, with those arriving from the Maghreb areas representing 14.2% of the immigrant population in 1962, rising steadily to 25.6% in 1975 and 30.2% in 1999 (Hargreaves, 2007).

Initially, most of these migrants were single men who came to France for a number of years to work and then returned home; Fysh and Wolfreys (1998: 35) refer to a ‘rotation’ system whereby North African and Maghrebi workers ‘took it in turns with others from the same village to stay a year or two, sending back money vital to the survival of their rural communities, of which they were regarded as “delegates”’. While there was no official immigration policy, there have been suggestions that

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25 This can be contrasted with the falling representation of Europe as the region of origin for those coming to France; Europe represented 78.7% of France’s immigrant population in 1962, 67.1% in 1975 and fell to 45% in 1999 (Hargreaves, 2007).
‘L’État n’impose pas de contrôles officiels pour restreindre l’immigration mais des pratiques administratives discrètes visent à limiter le nombre des Maghrébins en faveur des Européens’ (Joly, 2007: 241). During les trente glorieuses immigration from North Africa was initially welcomed and those who came to work in France impacted little on the surrounding society, instead living together in hostels or hotels run by other Maghrabis. At this point, Joly (2007: 242) maintains, ‘les immigrés sont perçus comme étant une population à part, temporaire et étrangère, et par conséquent ne méritent pas que l’État français se préoccupe de son bien-être ou de ses conditions de vie’. However, increasingly throughout the 1950s and 1960s the phenomenon of the ‘single’ immigrant worker who came to France for a number of years and returned home began to be replaced as workers were increasingly joined by their wives and families. Consequently, immigration which had been centred on the search for labour changed to immigration for the purpose of settlement (Wieviorka, 2000).

While immigrant labour had been welcomed during les trente glorieuses it had not been envisaged that those coming to work in France – particularly those from North Africa and the Maghreb region – would stay and be joined by their families. When it became clear that this category of workers and their families did not intend to return, their presence began to represent a threat to majority French society. ‘Immigration always causes stress for both sides’, Reynolds (2000: 36) points out, ‘but in prosperous times these are less obvious’. The presence of a large number of Maghrebi families – a substantial proportion of which were Muslim – coupled with an economic downturn post-1975 prompted widespread questioning of the place of immigrants in France: as Moran (2012: 95) explains, ‘the theme of immigration [emerged] as a social issue in the political sphere and [...] signalled a definitive shift in attitudes and perspectives regarding the place of immigrants in French society’.

26 Hargreaves (2007: 20) notes, for example, that the Office National d’Immigration (ONI) – set up to regulate migratory inflows – opened recruiting offices in Italy but did not target other countries. Likewise, Weil (1991: 60) suggests that the hostels established by the government to house Algerian workers were not designed to accommodate families, based on an implicit expectation that the single male workers would return home and not avail of the opportunities for family reunification.

27 Fysh and Wolfreys (1998: 35) point out the slow rise in the proportion of women immigrating to France, rising from 6.5% in 1954 to 26.7% in 1968 and 32% in 1975.
This ‘definitive shift in attitudes’ is now explored and must be understood in the context of France’s republican tradition.

4.3.2.2 The French Republican Tradition

Attitudes and policy approaches to migrants from former French colonies must be understood in the broader context of France’s republican model and its conceptions of the French nation-state. The ideals and principles of the 1789 Revolution continue to influence French politics and society to the extent that ‘politics is still framed and debated in terms of grand ideas and principles passed down from centuries of history’ (Drake, 2011: 3). Since the Revolution in 1789, the French nation has been perceived as singular and indivisible, with the aim to protect and promote individual liberté, égalité and fraternité. According to Drake (2011: 15), ‘the ideals of the revolutionaries, as expressed in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, spawned the vocabulary of contemporary French politics: popular sovereignty, the rule of law, free speech, and political representation’. The republican model of abstract equality is reflected in Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution:

La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances. Son organisation est décentralisée.

The French Constitution conceives all citizens as equal, motivated by the belief that republican cohesion does not allow for overt expressions of cultural, ethnic or religious differences. The principles and myths underpinning French national identity – and by extension policy approaches to the treatment of immigrants – had thus been established before the rise of large-scale immigration into France during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Hargreaves, 2007).

A crucial facet of France’s republican tradition is the principle of laïcité, stemming from a belief in the ‘universal and exportable values of democracy, human rights and egalitarianism’ (Drake, 2011: 7) and cemented in the 1905 law formally separating

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28 See section 6.2.3 for a discussion on the influence of the 1789 Revolution and the associated tropes of liberté, égalité and fraternité on discourses emerging in newspaper reports of the 2005 riots.
Church and State. Vince (2010: 155) outlines how between 1880 and 1900 the Third Republic slowly ‘chipped away’ at the influence of the Catholic Church on French politics and society: divorce was legalised in 1884, the presence of religious personnel in French hospitals was formally reduced and a number of laws introduced in the 1880s provided for the establishment of universal, free and secular education. She summarises (2010: 156) the three key principles of the 1905 law as follows:

Firstly, the Republic guarantees freedom of conscience and the freedom to practise one’s religion. Secondly, the Republic neither recognises nor funds any one religion – State and Church are independent of the other’s influence. [...] Thirdly, although exercised freely, religions must respect public order and the individual, and places of worship should not become political forums.

The principle of la laïcité came to represent a keystone of French republicanism, and as a result a distinction was drawn between private and public life as a means of consolidating national unity: ‘the idea of the national community as the only legitimate unifying framework was reinforced and further embedded in the popular imagination’ (Moran, 2012: 88). Jacques Chirac described laïcité as being ‘au cœur de notre identité républicaine’ (Joly, 2007: 257), and as the discussion in the following paragraphs evidences, France’s status as a secular state has influenced its approach to the assimilation and integration of immigrants throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries.

4.3.2.3 Policy Approaches to Immigration: Assimilation and Integration
Given France’s conception of itself as defined in Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution as ‘une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale’, initial policy approaches to immigrants advocated the ‘assimilation’ of those arriving in France, based on the assumption that ‘minority groups will integrate into the dominant culture sooner or later, through the promotion of constitutional citizenship, equal rights, and a secular state’ (Tekin, 2010: 104). Based on the principle of jus soli and the droit du sol, assimilation viewed identity as ‘pliable and transformable’ and aimed to fuse nation, state and culture to form a singular and indivisible Republic (Silverman, 1999). In the latter half of the twentieth century the term intégration was increasingly used to describe a similar approach, with the belief that the French nation would be strengthened through the suppression of difference. Howarth and Varouxakis (2003: 122) cite Weil’s (2001: 223) definition of l’intégration:
A goal to model society according to a secular tradition is matched by the abandonment of the traditional assumption of France's superiority compared to other cultures. In short, the adaptation of the migrants is no longer a self-evidently one-way process but becomes interactive. The immigrants’ presence and their right to preserve in private - individually and collectively - their own culture will transform French society.

As a policy shared by both the Left and Right sides of the political divide, the conception of France as ‘une République indivisible’ means that successive governments have ‘always refused to recognise rights for groups that are formed on the basis of a community of common origin, belief, culture and language. In France, there is but one abstract community, that of its citizens’ (Canet et al., 2008). The integrationist approach is explicitly favoured in France over the multiculturalist approach of the United Kingdom or United States, which leaves individuals and communities free to express beliefs and engage in practices particular to their community. A multicultural approach advocates equal respect for various cultures in a society, and recognises the place of religious and ethnic groups in a national community. In France, the notion of a community or a belief in le communautarisme is seen as posing a threat: as Van der Valk (2003a: 312) points out, ‘notions of “community”, “cultural pluralism” or any concept that emphasises the importance of the immigrants’ culture of origin are rejected because they are assumed to reflect an immigrées state of non-integration’. Seen as a destructive force, le communautarisme signals the identification by an individual with a particular group owing to shared personal connections (based on a collective history, religious beliefs etc.), ahead of identifying with the nation (Murphy, 2011). Any expression or practice which signals the presence of a community – apart from that of the national community – is thus seen as posing a challenge to France’s conception of itself as singular and indivisible.

The assimilation of immigrants – primarily from Europe – pre-World War 2 is believed to have been a relatively straightforward process, as foreigners arriving in France tended to learn French quickly and adapt to French culture in a generation or less (Hauss, 2008). However, easy assimilation and integration have not been

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29 Silverman (1992: 81) rejects the national myth of ‘the easy assimilation of past (European) immigrants’, as he maintains that this interpretation fails to acknowledge that Polish, Jewish and Slavic migrants were the victims of French racism and they constituted France’s ‘immigrant problem’
possible post-World War 2: the increased presence of North African migrants from the 1950s onwards posed a challenge to the republican model of integration and highlighted the inability of this model to achieve a ‘singular and indivisible Republic’. Although the *laissez-faire* approach to immigration was formally tightened in 1974, this new generation of immigrants differed from immigrants who had come to France from Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for a number of reasons: firstly, post-1945 immigration for the first time saw a higher percentage of non-Europeans, particularly those from North Africa and the Maghreb region. Hargreaves (2007: 21) maintains that ‘from a mere 22,000 in 1946, their numbers grew to 805,000 in 1982, making Algerians the largest national group among the foreign population in France’. In addition, it had not been anticipated – both by migrants and policy makers – that these economic migrants would stay and be joined by their families. This meant, as will be discussed in the forthcoming section, an increased need for social housing to accommodate these workers and their families. Hargreaves (2007: 26) highlights a further consequence of workers being joined by their families:

Children of immigrants were enrolled as a matter of course in French schools. In this way, immigrant groups which had seldom been encountered outside the workplace became visible on a daily basis in a growing number of neighbourhoods. Their increased visibility would not, of course, have been so marked had it not been for one other crucial point: far more than earlier generations of immigrants, those originating in Africa and Asia were instantly recognisable because of their skin colour and other somatic features.

It was consequently impossible to ignore the presence of these new migrants, and their increased visibility and unquestionable ethnic differences from majority French society presented an undeniable challenge to the republican model of integration. In addition, the fact that migrants originating in North Africa and the Maghreb could not physically blend easily into French society meant that when the economic recession hit in the later 1970s, resulting in increased hostility towards immigrant populations, ‘those immigrants marked by their somatic difference were immediately singled out’ (Moran, 2012: 100). This factor, coupled with lower literacy and skill rates among this category of migrant (discussed below) resulted in migrants from the...
colonies experiencing significantly higher unemployment compared to previous generations of migrants.

Furthermore, this new generation was different by virtue of their colonial relationship with France. Like other European colonial powers, since the 1950s France had seen the gradual dismantling of its colonial empire, beginning with French Indochina in 1954, Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, French West and Central Africa in 1960 and Algeria in 1962. Owing to its official status as part of the French territory, until the granting of independence Algerian people were regarded as French citizens, while Morocco and Tunisia were regarded as ‘protectorates’ and thus their citizens were not officially classed as French (Hargreaves, 2007: 20). The colonial relationship and painful decolonisation processes – particularly the lengthy Algerian War – impacted on public perceptions of migrants originating in former colonies. In addition, post-colonial migrants – to use Hargreaves’ term (2007) – were different to previous generations of immigrants who originated in French colonies. Pre-World War 2, a small but influential group of élites from the colonies had come to France, usually as students, or as ‘intellectual migrants’ fleeing corrupt or authoritarian regimes which had replaced French rule (Hargreaves and McKinney, 1997: 7). Economic migrants, on the other hand, tended to be composed of workers who lacked formal education and skills and were thus placed in a different cultural sphere than previous colonial migrants. This meant that post-colonial migrants were more seriously affected by the economic recession following the oil crises in the 1970s and the slow-down in industrialisation. Finally, the new generation of migrants originated in primarily Muslim countries, whereas previously the majority of immigrants to France came from Catholic countries. Islam has been described as a ‘primary marker of foreignness’ (Hudson, 2011: 116) and has been perceived a presenting a visible threat to the principle of laïcité and the French secular state.

The combination of these factors resulted in the increasing salience of questions regarding the presence of immigrants and the need for immigration control in political and academic discourse. As Moran (2012: 92) points out:
Perceptions of immigration in mainstream society underwent a profound shift from an economic and demographic perspective to an economic and socio-cultural one, a change that was intimately linked to fluctuations in the prevalent migratory patterns and the changing status of immigrant workers in France, and one that would have an enormous impact on the perceived role and place of immigrants in French society.

Thus, policy approaches to post-colonial migrants and their perceived inability to ‘integrate’ into French society has played an important role in the emergence of anti-immigrant discourses in modern French political and media discourse. Two other factors have also contributed significantly to current perceptions of immigrants: firstly, the rise of the far-Right in French politics and the increasing construction of the ‘threat’ of immigration in public discourses and, secondly, housing policies from the 1950s onwards which have led – albeit unintentionally – to the emergence of marginalised banlieues.

4.3.3 Changing Perspectives on Immigration: the Rise of the Far-Right in French Politics and the ‘Threat’ of Immigration

Tensions between immigrants and the majority population from the late 1970s onwards were also heightened by the increasing presence of discourses which constructed immigrants as a threat to mainstream French society and their presence as being fundamentally incompatible with the republican tradition. This is particularly attributable to the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National party and the decline in the ‘open idea of the nation [...] and subsequent establishment of a more closed, racist and xenophobic conception of the nation’ (Wieviorka, 2002: 134). Now an established party in the French political landscape, the Front National emerged from a far-Right tradition which included Biétry’s Jaunes movement in the early twentieth century, an anti-Semitic and anti-capitalist Socialist grouping concerned with social questions and the national mystique (Mosse, 1972: 186). Jean-Marie Le Pen’s political career began with his election to the Assemblée Nationale in 1956 as a member of Pierre Poujade’s briefly successful Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans, described as ‘a rural and petty bourgeois revolt against inter alia the state, modernisation and taxation’ (Hainsworth, 1992: 32). However, his name is synonymous with the party of which he has been the president since its foundation in 1972 – the Front National – to the extent that ‘Le Pen and the Front have become so closely associated that it is now hard to imagine the Party in the
absence of its charismatic and ebullient leader’ (Marcus, 1995: 18). In brief, the Front National advocates, amongst other things, the repatriation of large numbers of immigrants, more stringent law and order measures, including the reintroduction of the death penalty, is unequivocally anti-European and strongly condemns the ‘corruption’ of all other political parties and politicians (Forbes et al., 2000). Additionally, Tekin (2010: 99) notes that following the footsteps of old-fashioned French nationalism, the Front National further assumes the discourse of protecting France against external threats ostensibly posed by ‘l’international juive’ or ‘lobbies de la finance apatride’, as well as ‘internal enemies’ which include ‘immigrants extra-éuropéens’ along with Jews, Free-Masons and Protestants.

Although established in 1972, the Front National remained for a decade ‘at best, a political irrelevance’ (Davies, 1999: 3), operating on the fringes of French politics and rarely gaining more than one per cent in national elections. However, throughout the ensuing two decades the party gained increasing support, with 10.95% in the 1984 European elections and 12.41% in the 1993 national polls. Le Pen attracted 14.37% and 15.15% of votes cast in the presidential elections of 1988 and 1995, respectively. The rise in support for the Front National has been explained in the following way by Bréchon and Kumar Mitra (1992: 64):

The resurgence of an old national-populist tradition at an opportune moment; the personality, character, and mobilising and oratorical skills of its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen; political and contingent factors like the electorate’s exasperation with the Socialist government, the system of proportional representation, and the fragmentation of the moderate Right; and finally, the political consequences of the economic crisis of the 1970s.

Kitschelt and McGann (1995: 95) explain the extension of support for the Front National by the ‘new “catchall” extremism’ which Le Pen fine-tuned, ‘[appealing] to bourgeois elements on anti-statist, free market themes, and Catholic authority but also to more secularised groups, particularly in the working class, on its racist rhetoric’. This increasing support climaxed in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections when incumbent Prime Minister Parti Socialiste candidate Lionel Jospin was beaten to a place in the second-round by Le Pen. While sitting President Jacques Chirac had been expected to win the first round – which he did with 19.7% of the votes – polls published prior to the first round of voting failed to predict to any
extent the hugely surprising 16.86% which Le Pen secured ahead of Jospin’s 16%. The surprising result mobilised the French people in their tens of thousands to protest against the perceived threat posed by the far-Right in a series of marches in seventy different towns and cities across France (Schwarz, 2002). Chirac and his supporters launched an intensive campaign, echoed in the media, to transform the wave of spontaneous anger into a campaign of support for the Gaullist candidate. This campaign was massively successful, and France re-elected Chirac as President in a landslide 82 per cent victory, the biggest majority since direct presidential elections were introduced in 1962 (Le Quesne, 2002: 30).

While the presence of Le Pen in the second round of voting had been unexpected, it did highlight the ‘consolidation of the extreme Right’ in French politics (Evans and Ivaldi, 2005: 351) and showed ‘to what extent a racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic version of racism has gained weight in France’ (Tekin, 2010: 100). It also revealed that in the context of high unemployment, the Front National leader was able to attract new voters on an anti-tax, anti-globalisation, anti-Europe and anti-immigration platform. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s success was not as a result of change of policy approach, but rather it reflected ‘the growth of insecurity among a significant part of the electorate during a period of rising unemployment and a shift in the terms of political debate towards ethnic scapegoating’ (Hargreaves, 2007: 173). It has also been suggested that the widening of the extreme-Right voter base is indicative of a particular process of extremisation or droitisation of French politics (Birnbaum, 1998; Tekin, 2010). This implies that the extreme- and moderate-Right have become ideologically closer to each other, particularly with regard to the protection of traditional values. Tekin (2010) refers to this phenomenon as the ‘banalisation’ of extreme-Right ideas amongst the French voters. Citing a study by Duhamel (2006), she points out that a considerable number of the French public supported Jean-Marie Le Pen’s stance on certain political issues, including his approach towards the European Union and his hard-line stance on immigration. Tekin (2010: 101) thus concludes that the gradual decrease in those who find Le Pen’s discourse

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30 Twelve polls published in the week immediately preceding the first round of voting gave an average of 18% to Jospin and 12.7% to Le Pen, with every poll placing Jospin ahead of the Front National leader by at least four points (Durand et al., 2004: 603).
unacceptable implies that ‘French voters are generally becoming much less hostile to the discourse of the Front National’, and as a result, ‘France is witnessing a process of “lepénisation des esprits”, reaching far beyond the Front National electorates, as evident in the rising popular consent for the overtly xenophobic and racist statements of the Front National’. Thus, a rise in support for the far-Right Front National party suggests a growing support for anti-immigrant discourses and a concern with a ‘closed’ version of nationalism which excludes minority immigrant populations.

The rise in support for the far-Right is to a large extent attributable to the increasing construction of immigrants and immigration as problematic in academic, political and media discourse. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s immigration became established as a salient issue, ‘clearly visible in a variety of indicators ranging from agenda-setting by political élites to public opinion polls and voting patterns at a mass level’ (Hargreaves, 2007: 173). Amidst high unemployment rates, immigrants were seen as a threat to the availability of jobs for French workers, a perception that was largely inaccurate as migrants (particularly those living in the banlieues) were the most affected by the economic slowdown. Additionally, immigration was no longer viewed as a necessity, and Hargreaves (2007: 142) points out that ‘it was no accident that more restrictive attitudes [to immigrants] became dominant in the mid-1970s in a context of growing concern over unemployment, which was to reach sustained levels which were almost without precedent’. What emerged in public discourse from the 1980s onwards has been described as ‘nationalisme fermé’ (Howarth and Varouxakis, 2003: 114). The term was first used by Winock (1990) to describe an interpretation of nationalism which resurfaces from time to time and advocates a definition of the nation based on the elimination of outsiders (for additional discussion see Howarth and Varouxakis, 2003: 110-115). From the late 1970s onwards, immigrants were viewed as ‘outsiders’ and their very presence was seen as a threat to the French nation and in particular, French values and norms. During this time Silverman (1992: 73) notes that the term ‘immigrant’ became a euphemism for non-European migrants in France – particularly North Africans – to the extent that,

31 Similarly, xenophobia was previously prevalent at times of economic recession in France: Noiriel (1988) discusses how Italian and Polish migrants were viewed as ‘inassimilable’ and suffered from social discrimination during the economic downturns in the 1880s and 1930s.
to cite Moran (2012: 100), ‘the non-European immigrant population progressively came to be regarded as a threat to national unity and identity at a time when these themes were fast regaining popularity’. ‘L’immigration’ began to appear as a contentious political issue from the March 1993 parliamentary elections and the presidential elections of 1995 (Van der Valk, 2003a), and the increasing presence of anti-immigrant discourses from Le Pen’s Front National prompted other political actors to discuss ‘le problème de l’immigration’. In sum, post-colonial migrants – les immigrés – thus came to be viewed as a problem, and were considered ‘inassimilable’ and incompatible with the French model of integration. Tensions were also heightened as a result of housing policies which saw the emergence of the banlieues, and gradually the suburbs came to be perceived as sites of ‘ethnic alterity, deviance and disadvantage’ (Hargreaves, 1996: 607).

4.3.4 Les Banlieues: the Problem of the Suburbs and La Violence des Banlieues

It is against this sociocultural, historical and political background that the suburbs or banlieues must be understood, and the next part of the chapter outlines the housing policies adopted in response to the influx of migratory workers post-World War 2. It shows how high unemployment at the end of the trente glorieuses particularly affected immigrant workers and their families and identifies how the banlieues gradually became sites of economic and social exclusion. Consequently, descendants of post-colonial migrants now occupy an ambiguous status in modern French society, largely due to their status as legal French citizens but without the social benefits of citizenship. Related to this is the emergence of the banlieues as a ‘problem’ for French society, particularly with an increasing rise in urban violence since the 1980s.

4.3.4.1 The Emergence of the Banlieues

During les trentes glorieuses, France underwent a transformation from a traditionally rural to a highly urbanised society as a result of an exode rurale from small towns and villages of people seeking employment in larger urban centres (Howarth and Varouxakis, 2003). In response to an increased need for accommodation to house a dramatically rising population, the 1951 housing law made provision for the building
of ‘Habitations à Loyer Modéré’ (HLM). This resulted in large and quickly erected estates of high-rise apartment blocks built at the edge of French cities to accommodate workers from the nearby factories and industrial plants. The location of these grands ensembles – the term initially used to describe the estates of HLMs – was chosen based on inexpensive and available land, most frequently in peripheral locations which lacked social facilities and connections to other parts of the city. Moran (2012: 117) outlines the vision of Swiss architect Le Corbusier whose modernist style of architecture influenced the design of the HLMs: emphasis was placed on the ‘efficiency’ of the building and concrete was the primary building material used. Consequently, ‘the newly constructed HLMs took the form of enormous rectangular towers, often containing over a thousand apartments’, hailed at the time as ‘the zenith of urban living, a tangible sign of urban and social progress’.

In the early years following the construction of HLMs, the apartments were comfortable and well-equipped and housed French as well as immigrant families. However, the buildings were constructed using inexpensive materials and owing to their heavy use, they deteriorated rapidly. Therefore, the structural limitations and peripheral location of les grands ensembles quickly meant that those who could afford to move to more attractive locations did so, to be replaced by the recently arrived families of immigrant workers, particularly from North Africa. Within a relatively short time the grands ensembles, initially conceived as providing modern and comfortable living spaces for both working-class French families and newly-arrived immigrant workers and their families, had become sites of social exclusion with a disproportionate immigrant population.

The grands ensembles quickly became synonymous as ‘quartiers des immigrés’ (Sedel, 2009: 21) and consequently were viewed as different to other neighbourhoods in towns and cities in France. It has been argued (Moran, 2012: 120-121) that the role played by the physical form and structure of these housing estates as contributing to the exclusion of those living there from the surrounding society should not be underestimated:}

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32 Merlin (1999; cited by Moran, 2012) suggests that that the populations living in the grands ensembles were close to national average in terms of revenue and socio-professional makeup
The construction of these apartment blocks, upwards as opposed to outwards, posed a challenge to the traditional idea of the community. The street had always been a microcosm of urban society, a place of social interaction and development where adults could meet and children at play were easily supervised. However, while undoubtedly making great gains in terms of space and provision of accommodation, the high-rise apartment blocks destroyed this traditional role of the street.

Furthermore, the *grands ensembles* were often located in areas which were far from shops, cafés and supermarkets and thus lacked the traditional *ambience* of urban centres. In addition to this, after the oil crises in the 1970s and the end of the economic boom, the resulting deindustrialisation meant that many immigrants who had been working in French factories and mines were the population most affected. Thus, ‘immigrant families gained access to government-sponsored housing at the very moment when it became no longer a symbol of progress, but instead a trap for working-class families who did not have the financial means to leave’ (Cesari, 2005); as a result, many immigrant workers found themselves unemployed and at the periphery – both socially and physically – of French society and the suburbs thus became sites of economic and social exclusion.

From the 1970s onwards the *grands ensembles*, now known popularly as *les banlieues*, quar tiers and cités have become synonymous with sites of economic exclusion and disproportionately high unemployment. Moran (2012) notes that by the end of the 1970s, the populations of the *grands ensembles* were composed substantially of immigrant and socioeconomically disadvantaged French families – ‘des Français en voie de désocialisation’. In the context of high unemployment in France, ‘ceux qui avaient l’espoir de partir des cités n’en ont plus les moyens, et les nouveaux arrivants – immigrés ou français – sont pour une grande majorité dans une situation plus précaire encore que leurs prédécesseurs’ (Stébé, 1999: 46). Regarding economic exclusion, the precarious position of those living in the *banlieues* was heightened by proportionally higher unemployment rates compared to the rest of France: ‘in the industrial sector as a whole (including construction),

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33 Lamizet (2012: 147) outlines the etymology of the word *banlieue* and notes that it is ‘le lieu du ban, c’est-à-dire de l’exil’. He traces its evolution from feudal times, and points out that *le lieu du ban* was a place of punishment to where people were sent on foot of exile orders. He suggests, therefore, that ‘le lieu du ban, devenu la banlieue, est, ainsi, dans la mémoire longue de la langue, l’espace dont les habitants sont porteurs d’une identité politique de bannis, donc de marginaux’.
foreigners represented two-fifths of the jobs lost between 1979 and 1982, though they account for only about a tenth of the total industrial labour force’ (Hargreaves, 2007: 53). Additionally, the prospects of post-colonial migrants obtaining work if made redundant were limited, given firstly – as mentioned previously – the low levels of education and literacy among immigrant workers. Secondly, foreign workers tended to be employed in the construction or textile industries, both of which were vulnerable to fluctuations and offered little in terms of job security.

The quartiers also quickly became sites of social exclusion. As discussed above, the geographical and structural layout of the banlieues resulted in poorly constructed high-rise apartment blocks located at the periphery of French towns and cities. Severely lacking in infrastructure including health services, schools, shops etc. the banlieues offered little in terms of a high quality of life. In addition, little provision was made by way of public transport and the grands ensembles were poorly connected to nearby cities by either buses or trains. Stébé (1999: 44) articulates the consequences of this: ‘la localisation périphérique des grands ensembles dans des zones résiduelles mal reliées au tissu urbain dynamique et inutilisables pour d’autres activités a eu pour conséquence leur marginalisation et leur exclusion tant sur le plan physique que symbolique’. Combined with negative perceptions of immigrants and the view of post-colonial migrants as inassimilable (section 4.3.3), the fears associated with le problème de l’immigration – in particular those originating in North Africa – were, to cite Moran (2012: 124), ‘projected onto the dense immigration population of the grands ensembles and these areas came to be seen as a microcosm of all the challenges and problems facing contemporary French society’.

The exclusion of the banlieues and their inhabitants has continued in recent decades, and the children and grandchildren of migrant workers who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s have not successfully integrated into mainstream French society. There is

34 Also, in 1990 the unemployment rate stood at 10.4% for French workers, compared to 19.5% for foreigners (collectively). The rate was substantially higher for Algeria, Moroccan and Tunisian migrants, standing at 27.5%, 25.4% and 27.6% respectively; this pattern continued and by 1999 more than one in three Maghrebis and sub-Saharan were out of work (Hargreaves, 2007: 42).
disproportionately high unemployment among young people living in the suburbs, and research suggests that those living in the banlieues suffer from discrimination in the employment sphere. Hargreaves (2007: 58) cites a study by Amadieu (2004) which found that from candidates of different ethnic origins with identical experience and qualifications, a candidate of Maghrebi origin was five times less likely than a candidate of French origin to be called for interview. As a result, there is a generation of young people who are officially classed as French citizens – and known in political and media discourse as jeunes des cités or jeunes de banlieues – but have now acquired the status of what Moran (2012: 111-112) terms the ‘internal outsider’: ‘Immigrants, and especially those of Maghreb origins, found themselves in a no-man’s land at the outer reaches of the Republic – officially and legally citizens, but socially stigmatised and permanently viewed as outsiders’. Frustrations at these social inequalities have resulted in heightened tensions among young people in the suburbs and majority French society, and this has been manifested in relatively frequent outbreaks of violent rioting since the early 1980s. Thus, before introducing the subject of this study – the incidents of urban violence in November 2005 – the history of urban violence in the banlieues is introduced, and the related notion of the banlieues as a problem in media and political discourse is briefly outlined. This is done so as to situate the discourses analysed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven in the context of broader discourses where the banlieues are understood to represent a

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35 In 1999 the male unemployment rate in the ZUS (Zones urbaines sensibles – a classification used to identify areas of economic exclusion) stood at 44% for those aged 15 to 19 and 37.2% for 20 to 24 year olds, compared to 24.1% and 22.5%, respectively, for those outside the ZUS. Female unemployment rates were also substantially higher, with 39.5% of women aged 20 to 24 unemployed in the ZUS, as against 28.4% for those outside. These figures can potentially be explained by two reasons: firstly, the high proportion of immigrant children who fail to achieve academically, and the lack of financial means of households in the banlieues to finance further education beyond second level (Moran, 2012).

36 Drake (2011) outlines the laws governing French nationality and its acquisition, and summarises the current legislation as follows:

Following new legislation in 1998, the principle has been that children born in France (on French soil) to foreign parents are French [...], with some conditions:

- A child is born French if one parent at least is French, or if the child and one of its parents were themselves born in France
- A child born in France of two immigrants who have not acquired French nationality is not born French. The acquisition of French nationality is automatic at the age of 18, if the child has been resident in France for at least five years since the age of 11. Since 1998, the young person is no longer required to specifically request to become French (2011: 55).
threat to the order and stability of French society and an apparent challenge to the republican model of integration discussed above at section 4.3.2.2.

4.3.4.2 Urban Violence and the ‘Problem’ of the Suburbs

It is within the context just discussed of a high concentration of immigrants living in poorly serviced neighbourhoods with disproportionately high unemployment rates – particularly among young people – that violence/riots in the French suburbs began to emerge. The history of France has been ‘punctuated by popular uprisings’ (Mucchielli, 2009: 731), including the Revolution of 1789 and the uprisings in May 1968, and recent French history has been similarly ‘punctuated’ by civil unrest and disturbances in the banlieues. Beginning with violent outbreaks in Les Minguettes (Lyon) in 1981, throughout the 1980s and 1990s there were relatively regular scenes of violence in the suburbs, including Vaulx-en-Velin (1990), Dammarie-les-Lys (1993, 1997), Nanterre (1995), Toulouse (1998), Vauvert dans le Gard (1999), Lille (2000), Les Yvelines (2002) and Nimes (2003). These scenes typically involved confrontations between groups of youths and the police, as well as the burning of cars and buildings, looting and fights involving large numbers of people (for additional detail see Mucchielli, 2009). The words ‘émeutes’ and ‘violences urbaines’ were increasingly used throughout the 1990s to describe the violence in suburbs, to the extent that ‘violences urbaines’ in particular became ‘banalisé’:

La violence urbaine s'est banalisée au point de devenir pratiquement quotidienne dans la presse et la radiotélévision, dès lors qu'il s'agit de désigner certains comportements d'une partie de la jeunesse, ceux que l'on appelle généralement les "jeunes des cités" ou les "jeunes des banlieues". (Mucchielli, 2002: 7)

Mucchielli and Le Goaziou (2006b: 161) point out these émeutes were triggered by the death or serious injury of one or several young people in a particular quartier, most frequently involving clashes with the police. Previous to the riots of 2005, violence tended to be limited to the immediate spatial surrounds of a particular banlieue, and were isolated incidents lasting a number of days. The events of November 2005, however, were unprecedented, both in terms of their scale and amplitude and for the first time ‘the riots transcended all city and regional borders, developing a national phenomenon that posed a serious and legitimate threat to what Nicolas Sarkozy termed “Republican Order”’ (Moran, 2012: 15).
Simultaneous with this rise in urban violence from the 1980s onwards and the ‘lepénisation des esprits’ (section 4.3.3) was the emergence of ‘le problème des banlieues’ in political and media discourse (Collovald, 2001; Levasseur, 2010; Sedel, 2009). Dikeç (2004: 194) argues that throughout the 1980s and 1990s, perceptions of the civil disturbances in the banlieues as a threat increased, and as a result, ‘in the social imaginary, fed partly by the media covering incidents of unrest, the banlieue figures as a threat to security, social order and peace’. Likewise, Levasseur (2010: 6) maintains that ‘the dramatic and sensational report of the outskirts has made it difficult – not to say impossible – to imagine a banlieue depicted other than with crimes, flames, and riots caused by violent and threatening immigrants’. Hargreaves (1996: 607) similarly points out that:

During the 1990s, a new social space has been delineated in France: that of the ‘banlieues(’) [...] A term that once served simply to denote peripheral parts of urban areas has become a synonym of alterity, deviance, and disadvantage. The mass media have played a central role in this reconstruction, in the course of which they have disseminated and reinforced stereotypical ideas of people of immigrant origin as fundamentally menacing to the established social order.

There are two important issues raised by Hargreaves which require further elaboration: firstly, the notion of what has been termed ‘spatialisation’ (Dikeç, 2004, 2002; Tissot and Poupeau, 2005), and secondly, the role of the media in the construction of the banlieues as problematic for French society. ‘Spatialisation’ refers to the gradual shift in political and media discourse whereby the words ‘banlieue’, ‘cité’ or ‘quartier’ became synonymous for neighbourhoods that are characterised by a large concentration of immigrants, comparatively higher levels of unemployment, ethnic diversity and sporadic instances of civil unrest. Dikeç (2004: 205) cites Wacquant (1993: 369) who argues that ‘the powerful stigma attached to residence in the bounded and segregated spaces, the ‘neighbourhoods of exile’ [...] is arguably the single most protrusive feature of the lived experience of those assigned to, or entrapped in, such areas’. The ‘spatialisation’ of the suburbs was a gradual process, which saw ‘the reconfigured representation of the urban periphery as an alien extraordinary territory’ (Levasseur, 2010: 4). Initial government reactions to difficulties in the suburbs focused on prevention, Dikeç (2004) points out, and the Socialist government of the 1980s were sympathetic to the problems facing immigrants living in the suburbs. However, throughout the 1990s the image of the
The banlieues altered, and government policies towards the suburbs focused on repression, including constant surveillance and increased police presence. The banlieues were increasingly described as a ‘menace’, and perceptions shifted from neighbourhoods ‘in danger’ to ‘dangerous neighbourhoods’ (Dikeç, 2004). Thus, Dikeç (2004: 204-205) points out, ‘the state [...] responded to the incidents of unrest in the banlieues in the 1990s by reconfiguring a perceptive field through the introduction of urban violence and riots into the agenda, officially inscribing the dualism of city versus banlieue’. Lamizet (2012: 148) similarly considers the notion of the banlieues as semiotic spaces, and argues that ‘l’espace de la banlieue est, ainsi, à la fois, un espace de marge, et, donc, de conflit et de distance, vis-à-vis du pouvoir, et un espace utilisé par le pouvoir et l’opinion dominante comme un lieu de rélegation’. Over time, the banlieues therefore became discursively delimited as social spaces which are distinguished from other parts of France and characterised by a large number of immigrants, unemployment, ethnic diversity and outbreaks of civil disturbances. The ‘spatialisation’ of the banlieues is reflected in newspaper reporting on the civil disturbances of 2005, and section 6.3.2 analyses discourses of separation and othering which conceive the suburbs as different to other French urban centres.

The second important element from the quotation from Hargreaves (1996) above is the ‘central role’ of the mass media in the reconfiguration of the word ‘banlieue’ as ‘a synonym of alterity, deviance, and disadvantage’. Along with political discourse, media discourse increasingly linked the banlieues with ‘violence urbaine’, ‘délinquance’ and ‘immigration’, with the result that the noun banlieue ‘est devenu une expression commune, fortement relayée par les médias, pour désigner, par une sorte de raccourci, ce qui est fait un « problème social » et [...] s’est cristallisé dans l’image d’un groupe de jeunes de condition modeste’ (Sedel, 2009: 17). Sedel (2009: 29-33) analyses media representations of the suburbs and their inhabitants, and identifies how initial focus in the 1960s was on the quartiers as ‘une catégorie non constituée’ – an object of curiosity and fear – as journalists sought to define and label these new neighbourhoods. In the 1970s immigrants in the banlieues became more visible as social actors in the media, particularly due to the economic downturn and the prevalence of industrial strikes in factories and mines where many inhabitants of the suburbs worked. From the 1980s onwards, Sedel (2009: 38)
suggests, media representations of the suburbs increasingly focused on the ‘irruption d’un « problème»’, and in their reporting on urban violence the press used expressions such as ‘banlieue chaude’, ‘rage’, ‘haine’ etc. Consequently, from the mid-1990s ‘la <<violence devient une catégorie dominante d’interprétation des « problèmes de banlieue » dans les discours médiatiques et politiques’ (2009: 51).

Similarly, Collovald (2001: 104) traces press reporting on urban violence, and notes a discursive shift from descriptions of ‘des désordres sociaux’ to ‘la violence urbaine’; she identifies ‘un renversement de perspectives sur le problème social des banlieues, qui en bouleverse l’enjeux et en efface les origines politiques: la question de l’immigration et plus précisément celles des jeunes issus de l’immigration’. Additionally, Garcin-Marrou (2007: 25) cites de Lataulade’s (1996) claim that ‘l’analyse de la médiatisation d’un événement en banlieue montrait déjà que « les quartiers périphériques apparaissent comme des lieux de concentration des problèmes de société tels que le chômage, la délinquance, l’insécurité, la mixité ethnique, l’échec scolaire »’. It must also be noted that simultaneous to the construction of the banlieues as problematic in French society was increased media emphasis on ‘les jeunes des banlieues’ as posing a threat to the proper functioning of law and order. Sedel (2009: 51) argues that a consensus appeared throughout the 1990s regarding the threat posed by ‘la « petite délinquance»’ and ‘des jeunes des quartiers populaires’. The analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven shows that a similar emphasis on ‘les jeunes des banlieues/cités/quartiers’ is seen in newspaper reporting on the urban violence in 2005, and the suburbs remain in media discourse as a problematic space in French society which is discursively constructed as peripheral and separate to the rest of France.

4.4 French Urban Violence in 2005

4.4.1 Introduction
Beginning with a discussion of the event which was the catalyst for the initial outbreak of violence in November 2005 (the accidental electrocution of two teenagers in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois), the paragraphs which follow detail the spread of riots throughout France and the material damage caused. This
part of the chapter outlines the profile of the rioters and considers how during the riots tensions were aggravated by the actions of both Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and the police force. The role of the media – including social media – in contributing to scale and duration of the civil disturbances is also considered. Political responses to the riots are detailed, and the section concludes with a discussion of sociological/academic interpretations of the riots and potential explanations for why civil disturbances on such an unprecedented scale were seen during the winter of November 2005.

4.4.2 Overview of Events in 2005
On 27 October two teenagers – Zeyad Benna (age 17) the youngest of a family of six children of Tunisian descent, and Bouna Traoré (age 15), from a family of eleven children of Mauritanian origin (Canet et al., 2008: 1) – were killed by electrocution when they climbed a fence and entered the area surrounding a power transformer in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. A third teenager, Muhittin Altun (age 17) was also injured and suffered severe burns but survived the incident. It was alleged that the youths went into the power station to escape a police chase, although this version of events has been questioned. News of their deaths was the catalyst for violent riots throughout all of France, beginning on the night of 27 October when ‘angry young people ran through the streets of Clichy and neighbouring Montfermeil, setting fire to cars and attacking several buildings’ (Cole, 2007: 75). The civil disturbances which subsequently spread across the country can be divided into three phases (Mucchielli and Aït-Omar, 2006: 17-19): the first is ‘l’éméute locale’, and for five days (27-31 October) the riots were initially limited to Clichy-sous-Bois and the surrounding areas of Montfermeil.

The second phase began on 31 October/1 November, and saw a progressive increase in violence beyond the immediate surroundings of Clichy-sous-Bois to eighty other

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37 Initially, the police denied that the teenagers had been the subject of a pursuit, but later admitted that they had been in the area seeking suspects in relation to a break-in in a nearby building site. It subsequently emerged also that when police became aware that the youths had entered the power station they failed to inform EDF (the electrical suppliers) who may have been able to intervene and prevent the deaths (for a more detailed discussion see Moran, 2012: 10-12; Mucchielli, 2009: 734-736).
regions in Paris. During this phase of rioting – which lasted approximately eight days – ‘les affrontements avec les forces de l’ordre et les caillassages de véhicules de police, de pompiers et de bus se multiplient, ainsi que certains incendies de bâtiments (essentiellement publics)’ (Mucchielli and Aît-Omar, 2006: 18). The third phase was the spread of violence throughout the rest of the country, beginning with minor incidents and burned cars in Rouen, Lyon, Rennes, and Soissons on the night of 3 November. Within days violent scenes erupted in Lille, Toulouse, Strasbourg, Roubaix and Bordeaux, and at its peak 300 communes in France were affected, mainly outside Paris. By 17 November levels of violence and burned cars had returned to ‘normal levels’, according to the Ministry of the Interior (Mucchielli, 2009: 737). Over half of the areas affected were classified as ‘zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS)’ (Kokoreff, 2008: 15), and with the exception of Marseille, all major French urban areas witnessed violent scenes of rioting. Legislation enacted during the Algerian War in 1955 was used to declare a state of emergency on 7 November, granting prefects the following rights:

The right to declare curfews, imprison people without charge, place them under house arrest without trial, prohibit people from travelling or gathering in public, and enter people’s houses at any time of day or night. Normal judicial procedures could be suspended and replaced with military justice. (Cole, 2007: 77)

This state of emergency was officially lifted on 3 January 2006, although rioting had largely subsided by 17 November.

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38 ‘L’exception Marseillaise’ is considered by Kokoreff and Lapeyronnie (2013) and Kokoreff (2008); Kokoreff (2008) cites a report noting ‘aucun affrontement direct entre les jeunes résidents des cités sensibles et les forces de l’ordre n’a été enregistré et aucun incident de grande ampleur n’a été relevé’. He suggests that a number of factors explain the absence of rioting in Marseille, including the proximity of the cités to the city-centre, which prevented ‘le phénomène banlieue’ from emerging, as well as ‘une «identité méditerranéenne forte»’ among minority groups (Kokoreff, 2008: 71).

39 Mohammed and Mucchielli (2006: 105) suggest that areas where violence broke out were characterised by:

Forte proportion de jeunes âgés de moins de 25 ans et de familles nombreuses, forte proportion de familles étrangères et d’origine étrangère, fort taux de chômage et d’échec scolaire, concentration des indicateurs de précarité socioéconomique, habitat social de types « barres » et « tours » vieillissantes, rareté de commerce, des équipements et des services publics, forte activité dans certains types de délincuances [...], et, enfin, haut niveau de tension dans les relations avec la police.
In terms of material damage, there were approximately 10,000 cars and 30,000 rubbish bins burned; hundreds of public buildings were attacked, which were mainly schools, although town halls and police stations were also targeted (Mucchielli and Aït-Omar, 2006: 14). Jobard (2009: 235) reports that 250 public buildings were burned and insurance companies estimated 200 million euro worth of damage during the three week period. Burning was the primary method of attack and the use of firearms was extremely rare. Civilian casualties were low, and apart from the deaths of Benna and Traoré in Clichy-sous-Bois there was only one other fatality: Jean Jacques Le Chenadec was killed following an attack in the Parisian Seine-Saint-Denis region on 4 November, and a disabled woman was seriously injured when she was unable to escape from a bus which had been set on fire. 126 police officers were reportedly injured and during the three weeks of rioting there were 2,921 arrests, one third of which involved under-eighteens. These arrests led to 600 imprisonments, approximately 100 of which were aged under-eighteen (Joly, 2007: 262).

4.4.3 Profile of the Rioters
Initial media and political reaction to the riots strongly linked the violence with ‘les étrangers’; for example on 9 November Sarkozy called for the expulsion of all ‘étrangers’ arrested in connection with the riots, stating that ‘Quand on a l’honneur d’avoir un titre de séjour, le moins que l’on puisse dire, c’est que l’on a pas à faire arrêter en train de provoquer des violences urbaines’ (cited by Kokoreff, 2008: 83). Similarly, well-known essayist Alain Finkielkraut emphasised the ethnic and racial characteristics of the rioters, arguing that ‘le problème est […] que la plupart de ces jeunes sont noirs ou arabes, et s’identifient à l’islam. Il y an en effet en France d’autres émigrants en situation difficile, chinois, vietnamiens, portugais, et ils ne participent pas aux émeutes’ (cited by Kokoreff, 2008: 84). Likewise, commentators proposed that the riots were further evidence of ‘la délinquance’ among suburban youth (section 4.4.7.2), and Sarkozy claimed that eighty percent of those arrested had previously come to police attention for acts of delinquency.

However, of the approximately 3000 arrests, the majority had no previous history of arrest or conviction, and ‘on peut dire que ces émeutiers n’étaient pas des
Those arrested were mainly men aged 16 to 21, and while the overwhelming majority held French nationality or were born in France, they were of ‘origine étrangère’, primarily from Maghreb countries (Mucchielli and Aït-Omar, 2006: 22). What they all had in common, Cole (2007) points out, was residence in the banlieues. Most of the people arrested were unmarried and lived with their parents and they came from ‘traditional’ families (i.e. a married couple with children), which contradicted those who claimed the children of polygamous families were the perpetrators of the violence (Kokoreff, 2008: 85). Hargreaves (2007: 135) notes the lack of organisation and political leadership among the rioters: ‘no spokesperson emerged, no list of demands was put forward nor did any meetings or negotiations take place between rioters and police and politicians’. He does not interpret this as being suggestive of aimless or unstructured acts of violence, but rather sees the riots as ‘ritualised attacks on selected targets, notably automobiles – symbols of the social mobility denied to residents of the banlieues – and police forces seen as representatives of an exclusionary and repressive social order’ (Hargreaves, 2007).

Likewise, Jobard (2009: 237) maintains that the rioters never purported to be speaking on behalf of any racial group, but instead ‘generally used an “us” that was very ambivalent and complex, within which the migratory, territorial, social and racial identities interacted with each other to such an extent that it was impossible to weigh each dimension individually and precisely’.

Based on interviews with those involved in the riots, Mucchielli and Aït-Omar (2006: 22-30) propose two primary motivations behind the violence: the first is linked to the events which are alleged to have been the catalyst for the initial outbreak in violence, including the involvement of the police in the deaths of Benna and Traoré and Sarkozy’s comments prior to and during the riots. To a certain extent, Mucchielli and Aït-Omar (2006: 23) maintain, rioters were motivated by ‘ce qui est considéré comme un déni et un mensonge de la part des autorités qui fonde l’indignation et le sentiment de légitimité morale de la colère émeutière’. The second motivation cited by those involved in the riots relates to their experiences and daily life in the banlieues, summarised by Mucchielli and Aït-Omar (2006: 24) as follows:
La question se déplace alors vers le contenu de cette expérience, que l’on peut résumer en parlant d’un vécu d’humiliations multiples accumulées. Certains racontent des expériences de discriminations à l’embauche, voire font du racisme une explication généralisée. La plupart font remonter leur sentiment d’injustice et d’humiliation à l’école. Enfin, tous, sans exception, les lient avec le comportement des policiers.

Thus, comments made by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy prior to and during the civil disturbances were an important factor in the spread of violence throughout banlieues in French towns and cities. Along with the police, he is recognised as having aggravated tensions and contributed to anger among les jeunes des banlieues; these two factors which heightened tensions among minority groups in the banlieues are now considered.

4.4.4 Aggravating Tensions: Nicolas Sarkozy and Relations between the Police and Les Banlieues

4.4.4.1 Nicolas Sarkozy
The deaths of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré were not the only catalyst for the outbreak of urban violence in 2005 and comments made by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy also played a role in the initial outbreak of riots and its subsequent spreading throughout France. On 20 June 2005 while on a visit to the suburb of La Courneuve (Paris) following the death of an eleven year old boy hit by a stray bullet from an interaction between rival groups, Sarkozy declared that ‘Je vais nettoyer au Kärcher la cité des 4000’ and ‘Les voyous vont disparaître, je mettrai les effectifs qu’il faut, mais on nettoiera la cité des 4000. On va envoyer des équipes spécialisées et éventuellement, s’il le faut, des CRS’ (cited by Demiati, 2006: 63). Additionally, two days previous to the death of Benna and Traoré, while on a visit to Parisian suburb of Argenteuil, Sarkozy was captured on camera telling residents that he would ‘les débarrassers des voyous [...] de la racaille’ (Murphy, 2011: 38). Demiati (2006: 68) points out that this harsh approach towards the suburbs would be maintained throughout Sarkozy’s speeches on the riots:

Le discours de N. Sarkozy sur les émeutes sera inspiré par le prêt-à-penser de la doctrine policière : dénonciation d’une culture juvénile populaire anti-institutionnelle, euphémisation des raisons socio-économiques de leur émergence, théorie du complot dont les acteurs principaux sont les dealers, les caïds et les islamistes.
Thus, Sarkozy adopted a harsh exclusionary discourse towards the rioters throughout November 2005; to give just one example, in a speech to the Assemblée nationale on 15 November he declared that ‘L’heure de vérité a sonné! Et l’enjeu est considérable. Car si ce n’est pas l’ordre de la République qui règne dans ces quartiers, ce sera celui des bandes ou des extrémistes’ (for additional discussion see Demiati, 2006).

Sarkozy’s words – particularly his use of the terms racaille, voyous and Kärcher – can be viewed as contributing to the civil disturbances as they exacerbated tensions which were already heightened following the incident in Clichy-sous-Bois. Moran (2012) cites Dubois (2006: 70) who claims that Sarkozy intensified ‘les violences sociales et les discriminations subies par l’ensemble de la population des « quartier de rélégaation » et tout spécialement par le jeunesse qui y vit’. Furthermore, he maintains that his ‘description of certain inhabitants of the suburbs was perceived as a direct insult by many residents, compounding the discrimination that permeates life in the suburbs by publicly verbalising the stigma that has been attached to these areas by mainstream society’ (Moran, 2012: 13). Consequently, Demianti (2006: 75) argues that:

[I]l est indéniable que le langage injurieux du ministre de l’Intérieur à l’adresse d’une partie des jeunes des quartiers […], d’une part, et sa gestion des événements portée par une surenchère sécuritaire et un soutien inconditionnel aux opération de police […], d’autre part, ont contribué à attiser et sans doute à amplifier des violences.

Sarkozy thus played a significant role in aggravating tensions in the banlieues, and it will be outlined in Chapters Five, Six and Seven how news reporting on the riots similarly emphasised the role by Sarkozy in heightening tensions between majority French society and residents of the suburbs. Similarly interactions between inhabitants of the suburbs and the police have been cited as a factor contributing to the outbreak of violence in 2005.

4.4.4.2 Police Interactions with Les Banlieues
Interactions between la police and les jeunes des cités must also be considered as a factor when discussing the sociocultural context of French urban violence generally
and the 2005 riots, more specifically. As already mentioned, virtually all incidents of violence in the *banlieues* since the 1980s are linked in some way to the death of one or more young people following interactions with police forces. Additionally, Mohammed and Mucchielli (2006: 104) point out the following in relation to the 2005 riots:

> [Il] consiste principalement en un affrontement entre des groupes de jeunes et les forces de l’ordre, les deux catégories d’acteurs n’ayant aucune capacité de négociation, de régulation, de médiation : leurs relations sont enfermées dans les rapports de force, la provocation et la violence.

Generally, the relationship between *la police* and *les jeunes des cités* is ‘one built on mutual distrust, suspicion, and, above all, conflict’ (Moran, 2012: 141). Identity checks are frequent in the suburbs, and they are interpreted as a form of harassment, particularly since there is a perception that ethnic or racial minorities are subjected to higher levels of scrutiny than their ‘French’ peers (Kokoreff, 2008; Moran, 2012). It has thus been suggested that ‘the social climate in these economically marginalised zones is such that adolescents usually prefer to flee when a police car approaches even if they have not committed any offence’ (Canet et al., 2008: 1).

Police working in the *banlieues* have been accused of lacking the necessary social and interpersonal skills when dealing with *les jeunes des cités*, and instead resort to ‘outils dont ils disposent, pour l’essentiel le contrôle d’identité, c’est-à-dire des outils qui sont directement contre-productifs et qui augmentent […] la tension au lieu de l’apaiser’ (Kokoreff, 2006a: 70; cited by Moran, 2012). Additionally, Murphy (2011: 32) points out that there is sufficient evidence of police using the ‘*tu*’ form of address rather than the more formal – and respectful – ‘*vous*’ when speaking to youth in the suburbs, which serves to further aggravate tensions. Consequently, based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with young people in the *banlieues*, Mucchielli (2009: 741) maintains that relations with police were an important factor:
Revenge against the police may [...] be viewed as the main motivation of the rioters, especially when the police were not simply exposed to the violence of these youths but, [...] they sometimes went there to provoke it (for example by deploying police forces massively around the neighbourhood and multiplying identity checks in areas where they had not yet been any rioting).

Thus, there is a perception in the suburbs that police are excessively present, performing identity checks based solely on the racial or ethnic origin of young people, with the result that they ‘have [...] served to further alienate and antagonise the very people whose assimilation the authorities claim to desire’ (Murphy, 2011: 32). It is important to note, however, that policing in the suburbs is a challenging task and there is some evidence that the aggressive approach of police officers is motivated by fear of violent attacks from suburban youth (for a discussion on the bilateral nature of the poor relations between suburban youth and the police see Moran, 2012). The result is the following:

[...] police-public relations in the banlieues constitute a destructive spiral where the young people feel persecuted by police, and police officers, fearful of the potential for violence, are quick to resort to more forceful methods. [...]Excessive use of force nourishes the sense of injustice felt by the young people and ultimately serves to reinforce the cycle. (Moran, 2012: 146)

Thus, relations between les jeunes des banlieues and police were characterised by hostility and mutual distrust and perceptions of excessive and aggressive police presence in the banlieues also underscored the 2005 riots. Another significant factor which is addressed in the following paragraphs is the role of the media, including social media, in the sustained and widespread nature of the civil disturbances.

4.4.5 The Role of the Media in the 2005 Riots
A number of commentators have emphasised the significance of the media – including the printed news media, social media and television – and its contribution to the scale and duration of the 2005 riots. Kokoreff (2008) insists that the riots of 2005 can be distinguished from previous incidents of urban violence, not only because of the ‘ampleur’ of the violence but also because ‘jamais [...] des émeutes ne furent aussi médiatiques’. He points out (2008: 15) that ‘les images spectaculaires de voitures brûlées ont circulé en boucle, pour susciter les réactions les plus diverses et les plus dramatiques’. Lucienne Bui Trong (2005) suggests that ‘la télévision a joué un rôle de tam-tam battant le rappel des troupes’, and Lagrange
(cited by Kokoreff, 2008: 75) maintains that ‘les incendies de voitures ont dans la société des écrans un intérêt évident : ce sont des actes télégéniques susceptibles de donner une visibilité à la colère’. Additionally, those involved in the riots maintained a strong media – particularly social media – presence, and used the internet to make known their motivations behind the violence and their frustrations at the social exclusion of inhabitants of the banlieues. According to Russell (2007: 286):

French youth used digital communication tools and networks to coordinate with one another, exchange opinions and information, and to circulate calls to action. Activists used digital media to complain about what they viewed as biased and inaccurate reporting at some of the major national and international news outlets.

The majority of these blogs were, however, shut down by police, and Moran (2012: 23-24) outlines how the founders of two blogs entitled ‘Sarkodead’ and ‘Hardcore’ were located by police and arrested for inciting violence.

One particularly interesting blog which emerged during the riots was the ‘Bondy Blog’ ([http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/](http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/)), initially established by the Swiss magazine L’Hebdo in the Parisian suburb of Bondy. Reporters were sent to act as participant-observers over a three month period, beginning in November 2005, and to post in-depth accounts of their experiences daily; members of the public were encouraged to comment, with the best excerpts published in the weekly printed edition of the magazine (for additional detail see Echchaibi, 2009; Russell, 2007; Sedel, 2011; Turpin, 2012a). Three months after the riots finished, L’Hebdo ‘passed the keys of the blog’ onto the inhabitants of Bondy by sending aspiring young people from Bondy to Lausanne for a week-long training course partly by French-language radio and TV broadcast corporation Télévision Suisse Romande and Radio Suisse Romande’ (Russell, 2007: 291). In 2006 the Bondy Blog established a link with l’Université Sciences-Po, and the team behind it have since offered une «école de blog» with the objective of ‘donner aux jeunes de quartier des outils pour s’exprimer, par écrit mais aussi en radio et en vidéo’. Additionally, the Bondy Blog has since become ‘decentralised’, and bloggers now post from a variety of French cities, including the Marseille Bondy Blog, Lyon Bondy Blog, Lausanne Bondy Blog etc. ([http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/qui-sommes-nous/](http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/qui-sommes-nous/)). The blog has thus become a
space for ‘a networked form of communication whereby professional journalists and citizens from the banlieues collaborate to expose the realities and amplify the voice of a socioeconomic space that has been either caricatured or ignored by mainstream French media and politics’ (Echchaibi, 2009: 11).

The potential for media coverage to incite and encourage violence must also be considered, and French broadcasters admitted to censoring their coverage and limiting images of burning cars to avoid further aggravating tensions (Cozens, 2005; Moran, 2012). Jean-Claude Dassier, director-general of LCI (La Chaine Info) – the news subsidiary of TF1 – argued the following:

Having satellites trained on towns across France 24 hours a day showing the violence would have been wrong and totally disproportionate ... Journalism is not simply a matter of switching on the cameras and letting them roll. You have to think about what you're broadcasting. (cited by Cozens, 2005)

Likewise, editor-in-chief of France 2 Patrick Lecocq questioned ‘Do we send teams of journalists because cars are burning, or are the cars burning because we sent teams of journalists?’ (Cozens, 2005). Additionally, a government report on the riots, taking Aulney-sous-Bois (Paris) as a case study, notes that rioters were acutely aware of exploiting the media to draw attention to their actions, to the extent that ‘les médias sont en effet une chambre de résonance, instrumentalisée et même manipulée par les jeunes’ (Centre d'Analyse Stratégique, 2006: 53). Furthermore, the report also notes inter-city competition, and it includes the following quotation from ‘Antoine’:

Le fait qu’au départ, ils aient compté le nombre de voitures brûlées, le nombre de villes, voire de quartiers concernés, c’est sûr que ça n’aide pas. Ça fait une sorte de Top Ten de la ville la plus chaude et comme eux, ils sont un peu stimulés par le fait qu’ils soient en concurrence avec les jeunes de la ville à côté, ils veulent faire encore pire pour qu’on les voit eux.

Thus, new and traditional media played a significant role in the 2005 riots, although there was awareness in some sections of the potential of the media to overly sensationalise the actions of the rioters and thereby encourage copycat or competitive rioting between neighbouring cités. Interestingly, as the discussions in the analytical Chapters Five, Six and Seven reflect, there is no evidence in Mini-RiCo or RiCo of a meta-discourse which considers the role of the media in
encouraging inter-city competition by highlighting the numbers of cars burned in each city.

Thus, having broadly outlined the details relating to the 2005 riots, attention now turns to responses and reactions to the civil disturbances, beginning with an overview of political responses to the violence.

4.4.6 Political Responses to the Riots
Le Goaziou (2006: 41) analyses political reaction to the riots (based on AFP [Agence France Press] reports) and points out that initial reactions of politicians from both the Right and Left amounted to a ‘consensus républicain antiviolence’, with both sides focusing on condemning the violence and those involved. She also draws attention to ‘le silence des extrêmes’ and argues that the extreme-Right and Left were noticeably restrained in their commentary on the riots. Given Sarkozy’s anti-immigrant stance and the repressive measures taken by police, she suggests that Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen had little to contribute to any political debate and notes only one public declaration from him on 3 November. Regardless, the Front National party benefitted from the civil disturbances, and they attracted a reported 12,000 additional members in November/December 2005 (Le Goaziou, 2006: 42-45). The Government were quick to legislate in response to the crisis and it introduced a number of measures including increased supports for unemployed people under the age of twenty-five living in a ZUS, reduced payments for the long-termed unemployed and the reduction of the age for entry onto apprenticeship schemes from sixteen to fourteen years (for a detailed discussion see Joly, 2007: 284-292; Kokoreff, 2008: 101). One particularly controversial reform was the planned introduction of a Contrat Première Embauche (CPE), which would effectively result in reduced job security for workers aged under twenty-six; Kokoreff (2008: 307) summarises the proposed changes as follows:

Il s’agit d’un contrat de travail à durée indéterminée à destination des moins de 26 ans assorti d’une « période de consolidation » de deux ans durant laquelle il peut être rompu par l’employeur sans que celui-ci justifie le motif du licenciement.
Widespread protest against these planned changes saw peaceful street demonstrations by students in March/April 2006, and the government reversed the planned introduction of a CPE. For residents of the suburbs, the proposed CPE was interpreted as posing a further threat to employment opportunities for young people living in the banlieues.

Sarkozy’s approach towards the banlieues and the rioters was discussed above, and it was shown that he maintained an exclusionary discourse which emphasised the immigrant background of the ‘délincuants’ in the suburbs. De Villepin, however, deliberately adopted a ‘softer’ approach, and sought to engage in dialogue with inhabitants of the banlieues, encouraging ministers to avoid further stigmatising the suburbs (Moran, 2012: 42). For de Villepin, ‘la priorité est le rétablissement de l’ordre public car ces violences sont inacceptable, mais je veux aussi nouer un dialogue pour trouver des solutions adaptées, pour donner une place à chacun’ (cited by Kokoreff, 2008: 99). Demiati (2006: 61) contrasts the attitudes of de Villepin and Sarkozy and points out that ‘pendant que Sarkozy inspecte ses forces de police et entretient son image auprès d’une frange de la population, de Villepin, sans trop en faire, se rend sur les lieux les plus sensibles et dialogue avec les habitants des quartiers’. With both politicians mindful of their presidential ambitions in the 2007 elections, they used ‘la crise des banlieues’ to present differing interpretations of the French model: de Villepin proposed ‘un État sociale’, based on ‘une idée de la République qui ne saurait reposer sur la valorisation de petites entités repliées sur elles-mêmes’. Sarkozy, on the other hand, advocated ‘un État sécuritaire’, emphasising ‘une nation reconstruite sur des bases inspirées des pays voisin (Angleterre et Espagne) favorisant l’expression individuelle’ (Demiati, 2006: 60-61).

Ultimately, it appears that Sarkozy’s security-oriented approach was favoured by the majority of French people, evidenced by his victory ahead of Parti Socialiste candidate Ségolène Royall in the 2007 Presidential elections. Kokoreff (2008: 12) argues that Sarkozy’s successful strategy during the 2005 riots was based on three elements:

La fabrication de la figure d’un homme à poigne, garant l’ordre public, le gouvernement par peur et l’affirmation d’un nationalisme new-look destiné en particulier à rallier les franges de l’électorat séduites par le discours du Front National.
However, this interpretation and Sarkozy’s triumph in 2007 contradicts the tone of the newspaper coverage of the 2005 riots, which was overwhelmingly negative and critical of his hard-line approach to the violence and prejudicial language used in relation to the banlieues.

4.4.7 Interpretations of the Crisis: Social Causes, Delinquency and Alternative Explanations

In their interpretations of the riots French sociologists and commentators offered a number of differing reasons for the outbreak of urban violence in France, three of which are now considered. The first is the ‘social causes’ explanation, which sees the violence as being caused by the failure of the French social and national model; secondly, political and media figures offered ‘delinquency’ as a cause for the riots, blaming the actions of a delinquent group of young people living in the banlieues who are inherently predisposed to violent conduct. Thirdly, commentators focused on the ‘legitimate’ voice of the rioters and saw the violence as an expression of frustration and a desire to be recognised in French society which discriminates against inhabitants of the banlieues. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to carry out a complete sociological and political analysis of the causes underpinning the riots in 2005, and instead, this section focuses on the dominant interpretations of the riots.

4.4.7.1 Social Causes Explanation

One explanation put forward in the aftermath of the riots was that they could be attributed to ‘larger impersonal forces of urban development, economic conjecture, population movements and long simmering antipathies between different groups in society’ (Cole, 2007: 79). Within these debates commentators focused on the social problems which face those living in the banlieues, thus interpreting French urban violence ‘comme le révélateur d’une lente dégradation des relations sociales dans la ZUP (Zones à urbaniser en priorité)’ (Beaud and Pialoux, 2003: 10). For instance, Justin Vaisse, a former speechwriter for socialist Defense Minister Alain Richard, emphasised the difficulties regarding the integration of immigrants, arguing that ‘the challenges of integration are much greater in France than in other European countries’. He maintains that the integration of immigrant workers and their families who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s (i.e. the residents of the banlieues) is ‘certainly
slower and more challenging’, which explains to some degree the civil unrest (Laurence and Vaisse, 2005). Other commentators put forward ‘ghettoisation’ as a contributory factor to the outbreak of violence, referring to ‘l’existence d’un processus de “séparatisme social” éloignant de plus en plus les conditions de vie et les destins des différents groupes sociaux’ (Mucchielli and Aït-Omar, 2006: 31). Linked to this are lower rates of educational achievement and higher unemployment in the suburbs, all of which were put forward as potential explanations for the riots. For Beaud and Pialoux (2003: 16), the riots are the culmination of a number of social processes which have impacted upon ‘les classes populaires’ including mass unemployment and the absence of political representation:

Un ensemble de phénomènes de durée et d’importance variables, situés dans des sphères différentes de la vie sociale, qui affectent en priorité depuis vingt ans les classes populaires : chômage de masse et précarité, affaiblissement des mécanismes de défense collective au travail, effondrement d’une représentation politique proprement ouvrière, déstabilisation des familles populaires, constitution de lieux de relégation spatiale.

Thus, one interpretation of the causes of the riots focuses on the long-term failures of social processes which have impacted negatively on those living in the banlieues, and explains the outbreak of violence as a result of ‘social causes’.

However, the ‘social causes’ interpretation has been criticised, and it has been pointed out (Moran, 2012: citing Kokoreff, 2006, Rea, 2006) that the ‘social causes’ explanation is flawed, as it ‘fails to give adequate consideration to those other elements having an equally important impact on the production of violence in the suburbs’ (Moran, 2012: 55). Blaming social causes fails to consider those who are responsible for perpetrating the violence, and also ignores questions of race and ethnicity. Additionally, Kokoreff (2006b; cited by Moran, 2012: 55), suggests that ‘l’émeute ne résulte pas seulement de phénomènes structurels qui en détermineraient les conditions de possibilité parce que trop extérieurs aux diverses situations observées : affrontements avec la police […], pillages, dégradations et destructions de biens matériels ou d’équipements collectifs’. Thus, a focus on ‘social causes’ allows the riots to be explained away as a result of impersonal forces which are inherently difficult to control, and responsibility for the difficulties presented by ghettoisation, integration, discrimination can be easily avoided. This ‘social causes’
discourse is evident in Mini-RiCo, and section 5.2.3 considers how a focus on impersonal social forces behind the riots contributes to what has been termed a ‘discourse of blamelessness’. The alternative dominant explanation put forward – summarised as the ‘delinquency’ cause – is unequally incomplete as a means of explaining the civil unrest seen in November 2005.

4.4.7.2 Delinquency Explanation
As mentioned, an alternative explanation to the riots is encapsulated by the ‘delinquency’ debate, which sees those responsible as deviant youth of immigrant origin who manifest their rejection of French values and the ideals of the la République by violent rioting and burning. In an interview published in Le Figaro philosopher Alain Finkielkraut summarised this argument succinctly, stating that ‘la violence actuelle n’est pas une réaction à l’injustice de la République, mais un gigantesque pogrom antirépublicain’ (Finkielkraut, 2005). He views the riots as an outright rejection of what French society offers to immigrants, arguing that ‘les casseurs ne réclament pas plus d’écoles, plus de crèches, plus de gymnases, plus d’autobus: ils les brûlent (Finkielkraut, 2005). Likewise, Redeker (2006) interprets the riots as the ‘nihilistic’ reaction of group motivated by ‘la haine de la France’ resulting from their immigrant background. Indeed Nicolas Sarkozy claimed in December 2005 that 75% to 80% of rioters were ‘des délinquants notoires’, a tactic which Mucchielli (2006: 7-8) notes allowed him to justify his harsh response and recourse to repressive measures. Additionally, blaming the riots on the actions of immigrant and juvenile delinquency removes questions regarding both the role of the police and Sarkozy himself in fuelling the spread of violence:

Nicolas Sarkozy […] espérait alors criminaliser les émeutes, justifier leur traitement purement répressif, éviter tout débat sur le rôle de la police…et peut-être aussi couper court à la polémique qui commençait à se développer sur son rôle personnel dans l’ampleur des émeutes, puis sur sa responsabilité dans l’abandon de la police de proximité.

The ‘delinquency’ explanation is also evident in Mini-RiCo and RiCo, particularly in news texts which link the riots to les jeunes des banlieues/cités/quartiers (section 5.3.4).
However, the ‘delinquency’ interpretation has been criticised (Canet et al., 2008; Cole, 2007; Moran, 2012; Mucchielli, 2006; Murphy, 2011) for a variety of reasons. Canet (2008) suggests that this interpretation deprives the 2005 riots of all political significance, and further justifies Sarkozy’s calls for the restoration of republican authority and order. Additionally, emphasis on the immigrant origin of those involved in the riots is problematic, since as it has been previously established that the majority of those arrested in connection with the riots were born in France, and consequently possessed French citizenship (Cole, 2007). Likewise, Moran (2012: 54) points out that immigrant populations in the suburbs have reached their third and fourth generations, and thus issues of national identity and belonging differ from immigrant populations in the past. Scapegoating immigrant and suburban youth, therefore, arguably offers too simplistic an explanation for the riots; it fails to consider the inadequacies of the French model to cope with current French realities, and apportions blame to a marginalised out-group who are constructed as the irrational destructors of public property. Interpreting the violence using a delinquency explanation, Mucchielli (2006: 8) thus suggests, ‘constitue [...] une trahison de la réalité’.

4.4.7.3 Alternative Explanations: the Point of View of the Rioters
The dominant ‘social causes’ or ‘delinquency’ interpretations of the riots can thus be considered limited and flawed, and they exclude the already marginalised voices of immigrant and suburban youth. Moran (2012) labels this the ‘inaudible interpretation’ of the riots, since it fails to consider that perhaps the action of les jeunes des banlieues is a cry to be heard in a society that refuses to hear them. Ethnographic fieldwork studies based in the banlieues have revealed that those involved in the disturbances do not reject the French model, but rather are ‘deeply committed to universalist republican values’ (Murphy, 2011: 46). These observations are echoed by Drake (2011: 91), who suggests that ‘the majority of the protagonists were found to have been motivated by frustrations bred by failures to fit into French society, and not a rejection of France on extremist or separatist grounds, religious or other’. Hargreaves (2007: 136-137) draws a distinction between those involved in the riots in 2005 and earlier generations of rioters in the 1980s and 1990s:
Unlike their parents and older brothers, who had memories of full employment or at the very least hopes for its return, the rioters of 2005 born for the most part in the late 1980s and 1990s, had lived in neighbourhoods where chronic unemployment and widespread racial discrimination were the norm, with no apparent improvement on the horizon.

The majority of those involved in the 2005 riots were born French and viewed themselves as French, but do not feel that they enjoy the same benefits of citizenship as their mainstream French peers; Moran (2012: 62) thus argues that ‘it would appear that the youth of the suburbs were simply asking to be recognised for what they are: citizens of France, and to be incorporated into mainstream French society’. Marchal and Stébé (2012: 66) maintain that those involved in the riots rejected media coverage which focused on ‘delinquent youth’ and that they ‘ne se reconnaissent ni dans les épithètes péjoratives et dévalorisantes de la presse écrite, ni dans les images désolantes et avilissantes des médias audiovisuels, parcirnionieusement choisies pour tenter de rendre compte de l’événement et pour montrer comment ils vivent’. Le Goaziou (2006: 67) further argues that the riots should be interpreted as a desire from inhabitants of the suburbs to fully participate in French society, suggesting that:

Il apparaît sans conteste que le mouvement émeutier a été un appel direct aux forces politiques et à l’État, une sommation pour que ceux-ci entendent les bruissements explosifs de la colère et pour qu’ils contribuent à transformer la rage et le ressentiment en l’expression de manques et de désirs, à partir desquels il est possible d’agir.

This interpretation views the civil disturbances as ‘l’expression d’un profound sentiment d’injustice’ (Kokoreff, 2008: 22) and a wish ‘to integrate into a society that would live up to what they were taught in the national schools, that is the ideal of a French Republic in which the race, national origins, and religious citizens do not matter’ (Austin, 2009: 86). The riots thus exposed the weaknesses of the French republican model and Wieviorka (cited by Joly, 2007: 282) reminds us that France is the only country in Europe which guarantees liberté, égalité and fraternité for all citizens. Les jeunes des banlieues were raised in the context of this guarantee, and Joly (2007: 282-283) remarks that ‘ces idéaux sont louables mais il y a loin de la cuillère à la bouche […] Les jeunes des cités ont intériorisé les valeurs fondamentales proclamées par la République française et s’insurgent contre l’iniquité et l’humiliation qu’ils subissent, quotidiennement’. The riots have thus been interpreted not as a rejection of the French republican model, but conversely, an
endorsement of this model and an expression of a desire by suburban and immigrant youth to play a greater role in French society. This interpretation of the riots appears to be largely absent from the RiCo and Mini-RiCo corpora, and instead journalists reproduce the ‘social causes’ (discussed at section 5.2.3) and ‘delinquency’ explanations (discussed at section 5.3.4).

4.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to situate the discourses analysed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven in their broader social, cultural, historical, institutional, political etc. contexts in order to gain a fuller appreciation of how the discursive practices of production and consumption and the wider sociocultural practices both shape and are shaped by the discourses identified in the forthcoming analysis. In the first part of this chapter the discourse practices of production and consumption relating to the French newspaper industry generally, and news reporting on the banlieues, specifically, were identified. This part of the chapter also outlined how the banlieues are typically under-represented in French newspapers and the main newspapers in the French market tend to pay little attention to the suburbs, apart from in exceptional circumstances. Thus, the texts analysed from RiCo and Mini-RiCo are likely to be written by ‘non-specialists’, and in 2005 there were a very limited number of journalists specialising in news reporting on events in the banlieues. The second and third parts of the chapter focused on the complex sociocultural, historical and political circumstances surrounding the 2005 riots, arguably stretching back to the 1789 Revolution and the principles espoused in the Déclarations des Droits de l’Homme. Post-colonial migrants, due to their somatic, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity, fail to easily ‘fit’ into the French national model and have come to be viewed as inassimilable and consequently a threat to French national identity. These complex sociocultural circumstances influence the ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ stages of the forthcoming analysis as they form part of the existing discourses embedded in the minds of discourse producers and consumers. The forthcoming analysis investigates whether anti-immigrant discourses have become naturalised and accepted as commonsense in news reporting on the riots, and questions whether the narrowing of far-Right and right-wing ideologies is evident in RiCo and Mini-RiCo.
A crucial point emerging throughout this chapter is the role of the media, both in
discursively creating the *banlieues* as delineated and recognised spaces in the French
social and geographic landscape, but also in contributing to the spread of riots
throughout France in 2005. It has been established that particularly since the 1990s
media reporting has increasingly linked the *banlieues* with urban violence,
delinquency and immigration, to the point that these negative connotations have
become inextricably linked with the *banlieues*, *cités* and *quartiers*. Hargreaves
(1996: 609) sees this as a circular process for news reporting on the suburbs:

In lieu of explanation and analysis, the media offer “descriptive”
conglomerations in which, through repetition and contiguity, each
component comes to signify the other in an endlessly circular process.
Thus people of immigrant origin live in run-down, dangerous areas
because they are poor; because they are poor, they commit crimes;
because people of immigrant origin commit crimes, normal, law-
abiding citizens do not want to live near them; because of this, the
*banlieues* are ethnically alien places which are fundamentally
menacing to the established social order etc. etc.

Mindful of this circularity, focus now turns to examining how the events and actors
involved in the 2005 riots are reported on in *Mini-RiCo* and *RiCo*. As established
previously, Chapters Five and Six use a CDA framework and this is supported in
Chapter Seven by a CADS approach to discourse analysis to investigate the
dominant discourses present in news reporting on the riots. In line with the
objectives outlined in the Introduction to the study, analysis seeks to identify
whether the journalists challenge the dominant assumptions discussed in this chapter
regarding the *banlieues* and their inhabitants as deviant and a-typical sites in France,
or whether, on the other hand, they reproduce prejudicial discourses negatively
characterising the *banlieues* and drawing a distinction between majority French
society and immigration minorities living in the suburbs. The discourses identified in
Chapters Five, Six and Seven are thus interpreted and explained in light of the social
and discursive factors presented in this chapter.
5 Descriptions and Interpretations of the 2005 Riots: Blamelessness and Patterns of Naming

5.1 Introduction
It was established in section 1.2 that an aim of this thesis is to critically analyse how the French printed new media interpret and represent the events of November 2005; therefore, this chapter analyses descriptions of the 2005 riots and the main social actors implicated in the civil disturbances in Mini-RiCo. Also, in his definition of discourse discussed previously (section 2.3.2), Fairclough (2003: 17) reminds us that ‘discourses differ in how social events are represented, and how more specifically the processes and relations, social actors, time and place of events are represented’. Consequently, this chapter examines the discourses present in newspaper reporting on the riots and questions the lexico-grammatical choices made by journalists in their construction of the roles of different individuals and groups in French society. It probes the version/s of events put forward in Mini-RiCo and identifies and interprets the dominant discourses through which the riots and the associated social actors are constructed, using Fairclough’s three-dimensional ‘description’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ framework for CDA as introduced in Chapter Three.

The significance of the media in shaping public perceptions of individuals and events was outlined in section 2.5; Richardson (2007: 13), for example, maintains that journalistic language ‘can help shape social reality by shaping our views of social reality’. Likewise, Caldas-Coulthard (2007: 274) argues as follows:

News is not a natural phenomenon emerging from facts in real life, but socially and culturally determined. News producers are social agents in a network of social relations who reveal their own stance towards what is reported. News is not the event, but the partial, ideologically framed report of the event.

In line with the view of discourse as social practice outlined in section 2.2.3.7, this chapter proceeds from the assumption that news reporting is not neutral, but is inherently an interpretation or a particular version of events. This chapter therefore
questions the interpretation/s of the events and actors associated with the riots in November 2005 in order to gain a greater insight into the discursive functioning of ideology and media interpretations of social structures of power in French society. Mindful of Van Dijk’s (1998: 181) arguments regarding the pervasive nature of the ideological influence of the media, particularly ‘where media users have no alternative ideological sources or personal experiences that are blatantly inconsistent with the dominant ideologies as conveyed and reproduced by the mass media’, this chapter recognises that inhabitants of the banlieues are a minority group in French society and consequently media reporting on the riots – and on the banlieues more generally – is a crucial means through which mainstream French society construct their understanding of these peripheral locations.

The remainder of the chapter is divided into two main sections: the first focuses on descriptions of the riots, and investigates how the civil disturbances are reported in Mini-RiCo in order to identify the assumptions embodied in ostensibly straightforward descriptions of what took place in November 2005. It questions whether agency is attributed for the violence, and argues that the overarching order of discourse through which agency is constructed is one of blamelessness. It is argued that texts in Mini-RiCo draw on naturalised and commonsense knowledge of la violence urbaine and the underlying social causes of the 2005 riots. News journalists thus assume that readers are implicitly aware of both nature and the perpetrators of the civil disturbances in the banlieues (implicitly understood as immigrant youth living in the suburbs). It will thus be pointed out that relations of dominance are sustained through the construction of la violence urbaine as a recognised and somewhat expected occurrence in French society, perhaps to the extent that it has become normalised, and therefore journalists no longer need to explain the characteristics of this type of violence.

Building on these observations, the second part of the chapter focuses on the prominent social actors named in Mini-RiCo, and outlines the dominant discourses relating to the two principal social actors: Nicolas Sarkozy and les jeunes. Within this discussion, section 5.3.3 examines the discourse of negativity surrounding
Sarkozy and the repeated criticism of his approach to the *banlieues* and handling of the crisis posed by the riots. The presence of a discourse of negativity is examined in the context of Sarkozy’s election as French president in 2007 and it is pointed out that news reports emphasising Sarkozy’s harsh policy approaches towards the suburbs may have (perhaps inadvertently) contributed to his electoral success. Finally, section 5.3.4 examines the presence of *les jeunes* in *Mini-RiCo* and highlights the constructed nature of the noun *jeunes* when used in the context of urban violence to distinguish between immigrant youth living in the *banlieues* and what are perceived as being ‘ordinary’ or French young people. It will be shown that while *les jeunes* or *les jeunes des banlieues* are only explicitly linked to the riots in a limited number of cases, naming strategies and assumptions relating to their presumed inherently violent disposition implicitly link suburban and immigrant youth with the 2005 riots.

This chapter identifies the ways in which discourses present in news reporting on the 2005 riots legitimate and uphold dominant hegemonies and avoid questioning the role of mainstream French society in maintaining unequal social power structures. It primarily addresses the first research question of the study (outlined in Chapter One) by examining how the events and actors relating to French urban violence in November 2005 are constructed in *Mini-RiCo*, and investigating how – linguistically – societal power asymmetries and hierarchies are sustained by the French printed news media.

### 5.2 Descriptions and Interpretations of the Riots: Discourses of Blamelessness

#### 5.2.1 Introduction
This section analyses newspaper descriptions and interpretations of the events of November 2005, beginning with reports on the incident which was the catalyst for the outbreak of violence – the accidental electrocution of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré in Clichy-sous-Bois – as well as press coverage of the spread of violence throughout France (discussed in section 4.4). Additionally, explanations offered as to the causes of the riots are considered, mindful of the varying interpretations of the
riots which were offered (section 4.4.7). The paragraphs which follow highlight how a discourse of blamelessness is the overarching macro-discourse through which the 2005 riots are described and interpreted, and throughout *Mini-RiCo* the printed press present the riots as simply having ‘happened’ and avoid specifying those who are to blame. Instead, news journalists rely on naturalised assumptions regarding the nature of *la violence urbaine* and discourses in relation to *les jeunes des banlieues* implicitly point to their involvement (discussed in section 5.3.4 below). A discourse of blamelessness can thus be regarded as the ‘order of discourse’ determining news reporting on the riots; to reiterate, Fairclough (1995b: 56-57) explains an order of discourse as follows:

> [...T]he configuration of genres and discourses which constitute the order of discourse, the shifting relationships between them, and between this order of discourse and socially adjacent ones. These are not, let me stress, alternatives, but complementary perspectives on the same data which we can shift between during analysis.

This overall discourse of blamelessness is manifested through two supporting discourses in *Mini-RiCo*: the first, discussed in section 5.2, is termed ‘vagueness as a discursive technique’ and is evident in ostensibly straightforward descriptions of the civil disturbances in November 2005 which use lexico-grammatical strategies to create ambiguity as to those involved in the riots. Secondly, a discourse of blamelessness is created in newspaper discussions regarding the causes of the riots which focus on ‘social causes’ (discrimination, difficulties relating to integration etc.), rather than attributing blame to any individual or group. Analysis of these discourses highlights how the French press appear to rely on apparently straightforward descriptions of the ‘world-as-it-is’ (Sneijder and te Molder, 2005): *la violence urbaine* or *les émeutes* are constructed as a recognised reality in France and thus the status quo is unchallenged and any discussions relating to what might cause such regular outbreaks of civil disturbances are avoided. Furthermore, spatialisation strategies (Van Leeuwen, 2008) mean that urban violence is represented as something which happens in certain neighbourhoods in France (*les banlieues*) and therefore does not impact on – nor is it reflective of – what are perceived as ‘ordinary’ French neighbourhoods.
5.2.2 Descriptions of the Riots: Vagueness as a Discursive Technique
The primary discursive technique used in news reporting of those responsible for the violence can be described as vagueness: apart from a limited number of exceptions (discussed in section 5.3.4 below), news journalists avoid explicitly naming those responsible for the civil disturbances. The following paragraphs focus on vagueness in news discourses relating to both the incident which was the catalyst for the outbreak of violence in late October 2005 and descriptions of the spread of violence throughout France. Analysis of a number of texts in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16) shows how a variety of linguistic devices, including nominalisation, passive sentence structures, noun phrases which are ambiguous regarding agency, lexical choice and metaphor from the lexical field of fire are used to construct the riots as simply having happened, and consequently human agency is obscured. Remaining vague with regard to agency for those responsible for the riots reinforces perceptions that *la violence urbaine* and *les émeutes dans les banlieues* are an expected reality in France, and those who ostensibly are responsible for perpetrating the violence are backgrounded (Van Leeuwen, 2008) and assumed known to readers (i.e. immigrant and suburban youth or *les jeunes des banlieues*). Throughout the analysis in this and later chapters the signs for the presence of the discourse discussed are marked by underlining the relevant words and phrases.

Focusing firstly on vagueness as a discursive technique in newspaper reporting on the deaths of Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna in Clichy-sous-Bois on 27th October 2005, it was outlined in section 4.4.2 that the circumstances surrounding their deaths remain controversial: official reports denied claims that the teenagers entered the electrical sub-station in a bid to avoid an alleged police pursuit, although there is strong evidence to the contrary (Moran, 2012: 9-12). Throughout *Mini-RiCo* their deaths are referred to as an ‘accident’, or through nominalisation (i.e. the transformation of a verb that turns an agent into a noun) to construct an event – their death – ‘as being caused to happen but there is not clear marking of who the agent is’ (Achugar, 2004: 310). Consider the following extract from Text 1, a general news

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40 Section 5.3.4 discusses how *les jeunes (des banlieues/cités/quartiers)* are implicitly linked with the civil disturbances, and how there is a presupposition of shared reader knowledge regarding the characteristics associated with *les jeunes*. 165
article published in *L’Humanité* very shortly after the death of the teenagers which reports on political reaction to the violent riots in the *banlieues*:

> Mardi soir, le premier ministre a reçu, en présence du ministre de l’Intérieur, les familles des adolescents décédés dans des circonstances toujours non élucidées. « Toute la lumière sera faite sur les circonstances de cet accident », a-t-il promis en lançant, en vain, un appel au calme. (Text 1: *L’Humanité*, 3 Nov 2005)

Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin is directly quoted as referring to their death as an ‘accident’, and the journalist selects an adjective that does not require agency to be specified (*décédés*), which results in a high degree of imprecision and ambiguity or vagueness relating to those responsible for their death. Earlier in the same article, nominalisation is used in the repeated selection of the construction ‘the death of’ to foreground a neutral position with regard to any purported blame:

> le décès de deux adolescents à Clichy-sous-Bois

> les circonstances de la mort des deux adolescents (Text 1: *L’Humanité*, 3 Nov 2005)

Additionally, another text from *Le Monde* (Text 10) – which reports on disputes between government officials and insurance companies relating to who is financially responsible for damage caused during the riots – directly quotes unnamed government sources referring to *Conseil d’État* decisions relating to what is described as follows:

> un événement tel que «le décès accidentel d’un jeune poursuivi par les forces de l’ordre» (Text 10: *Le Monde*, 26 Dec 2005)

Interestingly, this quotation refers to the alleged chase by police officers, but uses the adjective *accidentel* in relation to the death of the teenagers. Furthermore, an article published in *L’Humanité* (Text 15) follows in the footsteps of a school-teacher as she walks around the Parisian suburb of Montfermeil. Although reference is not made to the death of the teenagers, the following quotation refers to the third child injured – although not fatally – in the same incident:


The explicit attribution of agency is avoided in the noun phrase *l’adolescent grièvement brûlé dans le transformateur EDF*, as is any surrounding discussion regarding how, or why, the teenagers came to be in the electrical transformer. Thus,
news journalists in *Mini-RiCo* are vague when it comes to attributing blame in news reports on the circumstances surrounding the death of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré. Nominalisations (e.g. *le décès de*) are selected by some journalists, which Achugar (2004: 310) notes permits ‘the demotion of the agent [and] the construction of an argument based on the judgment of events *per se* without considering where they are coming from’.

Apart from a limited number of exceptions (discussed in section 5.3.4) a discourse of blamelessness is expressed through ostensibly straightforward descriptions of the civil disturbances in November 2005 which present the riots as simply having ‘happened’. Van Leeuwen (2008: 66) refers this as the ‘deagentalization’ of social action whereby actions or reactions are not brought about by human agency, but in other ways – ‘natural forces, unconscious processes and so on’. One such means is ‘eventuation’, whereby action is represented as an event, as something that just ‘happens’, without the involvement of human agency. The representation of the civil disturbances of 2005 can thus be regarded as a form of eventuation, created linguistically in a number of ways. Firstly, through the selection of nouns which describe the riots euphemistically, including the following:

*les événements* (Text 3: *Le Figaro*, 8 Nov 2005)
*les troubles* (Text 16: *Le Figaro*, 29 June 2006)

Euphemisms are a means of creating vagueness in referential or other expressions (Ricento, 2003: 617), and consequently the attribution of agency is avoided and a discourse of blamelessness is maintained. Secondly, eventuation strategies are expressed by nominalisation, a process whereby verbs are turned into nouns as a means of syntactic reduction (Fowler *et al.*, 1979) and to represent action as an event. For instance, in the following example from Text 1 – a general news article from *L’Humanité* which discusses government handling of and political reaction to the riots – two agentless nominalised expressions (‘brawls’ and ‘clashes’) are described as having ‘multiplied’, with no indication of *who* is involved in the violent confrontations:
As outlined in section 3.3.4.2, nominalised structures allows that ‘the “someones”, whoever they may be, are deleted as the clause turns into a noun’ (Fowler and Kress, 1979b: 41). Thus, those responsible for the initial ‘brawls’ and ‘clashes’ and their multiplication are semantically vague and left for reader interpretation to attribute agency. This is also seen in a variety of texts which use noun phrases to simply refer to the ‘violence’ or ‘riots’ without any accompanying clause identifying the agent, as in the following examples:

Sans que les uns ni les autres parviennent à enrayer la progression effrayante de la violence des cités (Text 2: Le Figaro, 4 Nov 2005)

La violence dans les banlieues a beaucoup faibli ces trois derniers jours (Text 4: Ouest France, 16 Nov 2005)

Trois semaines de colère(s) et de violences urbaines ont secoué tout un pays (Text 5: L’Humanité, 10 Dec 2005)

La presse du monde entier a parlé d’émeutes (Text 6: Le Monde, 29 Nov 2005)

Referring to the incidents as émeutes or violence/s avoids specifying the individuals or groups involved in the civil disturbances and thus a discourse of blamelessness is expressed whereby journalists rely on readers’ naturalised assumptions of the nature of urban violence in France. Additionally, this discursive trend is evident in the following quotation taken from Text 1 published in L’Humanité which – as mentioned – is an article discussing political reaction to the riots:

Jacques Chirac a souhaité que les résultats de l’enquête sur les circonstances de la mort des deux adolescents « soient connus au plus vite » et a jugé « indispensable d’élucider les circonstances dans lesquelles la mosquée de Clichy a été atteinte par une grenade lacrymogène » (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

Here, a passive construction is used – a été atteinte – and agency is focused on the weapon (une grenade lacrymogène) rather than on the perpetrator/s of the attack. Focus on the action rather than the actor is a means of ‘deagentalizing’ social action (Van Leeuwen, 2008) and to present the incident as simply having happened.

Furthermore, there is a tendency across articles from the various news sources in Mini-RiCo to specify the location of the violence, for instance:
Both Marchi and Taylor (2009) and Krzyżanowski (2009b) note similar patterns in their analyses of agency in newspaper discourse surrounding the Iraq War and newspaper discourse on crisis events in Europe, and they propose that such ‘spatialisation’ strategies convey distance and serve to localise events within a specific geographical area. This is similarly evident in news reporting on the 2005 French riots, and texts in Mini-RiCo firmly locate the violence in the banlieues and not France generally. Similarly, Van Leeuwen (2008: 46) interprets spatialisation as a form of impersonalisation which avoids focusing on the ‘human’ feature of social actors. Specifically, he sees spatialisation as a form of ‘objectivation’ whereby ‘social actors are represented by means of reference to a place or thing closely associated either with their person or with the action in which they are represented as being engaged’. In Mini-RiCo, those responsible for the violence are backgrounded through spatialisation strategies which emphasise the location of the violence (violence des cités/quartiers/banlieues), rather than the social actors responsible. Vagueness with regard to agency is created as Van Leeuwen (2008: 47) maintains that impersonalisation ‘can lend impersonal authority or force to an action or quality of a social actor’. However, as will be argued below (section 5.3.4), emphasis on the location of the violence is a means of backgrounding those who are implicitly connected to the riots: immigrant youth living in the banlieues. Additionally, spatialisation strategies allow the civil disturbances to be confined to specific areas (the suburbs) and thus the riots are not viewed as impacting on ‘ordinary’ neighbourhoods in France.

The use of the lexical field of fire is a further eventuation strategy to allow the civil disturbances to be represented as an event or as something that just happens without the involvement of human agency. This discursive trend has also been examined by Moirand (2010) in her analysis of newspaper discourse on the 2005 riots in the banlieues and anti-CPE protests in March/April 2006, and also by Peeters (2010) who considers metaphors as framing devices in press coverage on the French civil
disturbances in 2005. It is hardly surprising that the lexical field of fire is so prominent in Mini-RiCo given the large volume of cars which were burned throughout the month of November 2005: Moran (2008: 1) points out that at the height of the riots up to 1,400 cars were burned on one night. Thus, throughout both RiCo (section 7.2.4) and Mini-RiCo lexis is used to construct the banlieues as being literally and metaphorically on fire. Texts in Mini-RiCo describe the riots as follows:

*l'embrasement de quartiers dits «sensibles»* (Text 1: L'Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

*la longue flambée dans les quartiers difficiles de nos cités* (Text 9: Ouest France, 23 Dec 2005)

*les feux de novembre* (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

Peut-on comprendre les émeutes de novembre 2005 par la géographie ? Quels sont les points communs entre les villes qui ont connu des flambées ? (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

La plupart se trouvent en zone urbaine sensible. Mais ce sont surtout les cités disposant d'un revenu médian très inférieur à celui du reste de la commune qui ont brûlé (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

These noun phrases focus attention on the nature of the violence rather than those involved, and foreground the ‘burning’ and not those responsible. Additionally, in one article from Ouest France (Text 14), an initiative bringing together young people in the town of Rezé is described as coincidentally having been launched:

*au moment où les voitures embrasaient les banlieues en novembre dernier* (Text 14: Ouest France, 1 Apr 2006)

Here, ‘cars’ – rather than those who set fire to the cars – are anthropomorphised whereby human characteristics are ascribed to something not human. This is an example of vagueness as a discursive strategy as it functions to conceal responsible agents or move them to the background, instead focusing attention on the nature of the violence. Thus, the lexical field of fire creates vagueness in discourse by shifting focus linguistically to the nature and scale of the violence, rather than any associated agents. The preceding paragraphs also established that throughout Mini-RiCo a discourse of blamelessness is expressed in newspaper descriptions of the riots by lexical strategies including nominalisation, euphemisms, passivisation and metaphor to construct imprecise attributions of agency regarding those responsible for the riots.
This discourse of blamelessness is also evident in press interpretations of the riots, in particular in newspaper discussions regarding the causes of the riots which focus on ‘social causes’ (discrimination, difficulties relating to integration etc.), rather than attributing blame to any individual or group.

5.2.3 Interpretations of the Riots: Social Causes
A number of texts in Mini-RiCo seek to interpret the riots and they address the underlying causes of the lengthy history of civil disturbances in the banlieues. Both journalists and politicians cited in news articles assume that the outbreak of violence in November 2005 was not necessarily singularly related to the death of the teenagers in Clichy-sous-Bois and instead interpret the riots by drawing on what can be termed a social causes discourse, i.e. discourses which foreground difficulties relating to immigration, discrimination, racism etc. Section 4.4.7 addressed how French sociologists and commentators interpreted the civil disturbances and noted a similar focus on social causes as an explanation, which sees the violence as being caused by the failure of the French social and national model. This section also pointed to the criticisms of this interpretation, including Moran’s (2012: 55) argument that it ‘fails to give adequate consideration to those other elements having an equally important impact on the production of violence in the suburbs’. In the paragraphs which follow it is shown how journalists and political figures in Mini-RiCo use a combination of lexical strategies including metaphor, passivisation, nominalisation and disclaimer strategies (Van Dijk, 1992) to interpret the riots as coming about as a result of what can be termed ‘social causes’. In particular, the presence of these linguistic strategies in the expression of (i) discourses relating to immigration and the integration of immigrants, and (ii) discourses on discrimination and the stigmatisation of certain social groups – implicitly understood as inhabitants of the banlieues – are examined in texts in Mini-RiCo (specifically Text 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 16).

One of the recurring themes in texts in Mini-RiCo is immigration, particularly French immigration policy and the treatment of immigrants, including perceived difficulties relating to the integration of immigration and their consequent
segregation from French society. Anti-immigrant discourses relating to *les jeunes des banlieues* are investigated in section 5.3.4 below, thus this analysis focuses on how the process of immigration and the associated problems (rather than immigrants as social actors) are constructed as a cause of the violence. For example Text 2 – an editorial published in *Le Figaro* reflecting on the turbulent history of the *banlieues* in France – suggests that this troubled past is as a result of immigration policies from the 1970s:

> Ce sont bien les conséquences d'une politique d'immigration sans contrôle que la France subit aujourd'hui. En ouvrant, en 1974, les vannes de l'immigration familiale qu'ils ont ensuite laissée se transformer en immigration d'ayants droit (allocations familiales, RMI, AME), les gouvernements successifs ont créé les conditions de la saturation des mécanismes d'intégration. (Text 2: *Le Figaro*, 4 Nov 2005)

The negative consequences of recent immigration policies are highlighted by the transitive verb *subir*, placing France in a position of suffering as a result of failure to control immigration policies. Similar to the findings of Tekin (2010), Van der Valk (2003a) and Chilton (1994) in the French media and parliamentary context, and Charteris-Black (2006) and Baker and McEnery (2005) in the British context, a water metaphor is used to describe the arrival of immigrants (*les vannes de l'immigration familiale*). Both Tekin (2010) and Baker and McEnery (2005) interpret such water metaphors as evoking images of natural disaster, and as a result immigrants ‘are constructed as a “natural disaster” like a flood, which is difficult to control as it has no sense of its own agency’ (Baker and McEnery, 2005: 204). Similarly, Baker and McEnery (2005: 206) point out that water metaphors serve as a mechanism of dehumanising immigrants:

> The movement of refugees is constructed as an elemental force which is difficult to predict and has no sense of control. If refugees are likened to the movement of water, then they are dehumanised and become something that requires control in order to prevent disaster to others.

In the quotation above the focus placed on the decade of the 1970s as a having seen a ‘flood’ of immigrants fails to acknowledge the tightening of immigration laws in 1974 (section 4.3). Furthermore, the emphasis placed on the principle of family reunification reinforces the immigrant origin of young people now living in the *banlieues*, rather than acknowledging that they are French citizens. In the extract

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41 This discursive pattern is also evident in Text 16 (*Le Figaro*, 29 June 2006) which refers to *cette dernière vague d'immigration.*
cited above the opening of the ‘floodgates’ of immigration is linked to the fiscal responsibility of the French state who are consequently obliged to pay a variety of social benefits: *allocations familiales, RMI (Revenu minimum d’insertion), AME (Aide médicale de l’État).*

Two articles in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 3 and 16) link the 2005 riots to immigration policies and the treatment of immigrants, particularly failures to integrate new arrivals to France in line with the assimilationalist policies advocated by the French Constitution (section 4.3.2.3). A discourse of blamelessness is maintained by using lexical strategies such as nominalisation and a disclaimer strategy (Van Dijk, 1992) to present these difficulties as simply ‘existing’, without any discussion relating to those responsible for the failures. In Text 3, an opinion piece published in *Le Figaro* and written by a self-declared ‘integrated’ immigrant and academic, Salem Kacet points to the racial difficulties in France as a potential cause for the riots, describing France as ‘*cette France métissée*’ and drawing attention to the social causes underlying the riots:


Kacet lists the social problems faced by France, including *l'immigration, l'intégration, la montée des communautarismes, l'intégrisme, and les quartiers,* and assumes reader understanding of the meaning and connotations associated with these words. The choice of the past participle of the verb *stigmatiser (des gens stigmatisés par la seule couleur de leur peau)* without an associated agent expresses a discourse of blamelessness and hides those responsible. The existence of discrimination based on skin colour and race is presented as a fact, using the declarative mood and the present tense form of the verb *vivre.* By highlighting the problem, the journalist is criticising the levels of discrimination in French society, evidenced through emphasis by repetition of the adjective *seule* and the surrounding co-text discussing the difficulties faced by immigrants – particularly young people – in France. Another
article from the same newspaper (Text 16) points to the links between the events of November 2005 and ‘difficulties of integration’:

Sans être des émeutes ethniques, puisque des personnes de toutes origines ont été interpellées, les feux de novembre ont révélé les difficultés d'intégration d'une partie des enfants d'origine africaine, issus de cette dernière vague d'immigration. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

Here, the noun phrase les difficultés d'intégration is expressed without an associated agent, which again avoids attributing responsibility for such failures. Instead the metaphor of fire (discussed above) is continued and les feux de novembre are constructed as having revealed the challenges facing children of African origin who arrived in France in recent years. The clause foregrounded at the beginning of the sentence (sans être des émeutes ethniques) could be interpreted as one of Van Dijk’s ‘disclaimer’ strategies (Van Dijk, 1992), which reinforces a positive perception of the in-group while further stigmatising the out-group. This is done by ostensibly denying racial discrimination in the first instance, but then contradicting this assertion in the second part of the clause to reveal a negative attitude towards the excluded out-group. Consequently, Van Dijk (1992: 151) points out that ‘the first, positive part primarily seems to function as a form of face-keeping and impression management: the rest of the text or fragment will focus on the negative characteristics of the Others, thus contradicting the first "positive" part’. Thus, immigration and the associated difficulties of integration in France are presented as ‘existing’, and it is presupposed that readers are aware of these challenges. Journalists assume that immigration and the associated difficulties of integration are an unquestionable reality expressed through discourses which rely on ostensibly factual descriptions of the ‘world-as-it-is’ (Sneijder and te Molder, 2005). Although the journalists in the texts quoted above are critical of the treatment of immigrants in French society and seek to highlight inequalities, a discourse of blamelessness is maintained by presenting this reality as the status quo rather than questioning how these social power asymmetries are maintained.

Discrimination and the stigmatisation of certain sections of society (implicitly understood to be those living in the banlieues) are also presented in Mini-RiCo as one of the social causes underlying the riots. As was seen with immigration and the
associated difficulties, discrimination is presented as a social issue which simply exists and this is achieved linguistically through nominalised passive structures which avoid attributing agency and apportioning blame. Additionally, there is little consideration of the type of discrimination suffered (as in racial, religious, ethnic etc.), with only a limited number of texts (Text 5 and 6) pointing to the realm of employment as a prominent area where discrimination is manifested. Consider firstly the following extracts from Text 4:

Patrick Braouezec (PCF, Seine-Saint-Denis) s'est plaint, lui, de la « stigmatisation idéologique » dont sont victimes les banlieues, qui s'ajoute, dit-il, aux « discriminations de toutes natures » subies quotidiennement par les jeunes qui y habitent. (Text 4: Ouest France, 16 Nov 2005)

Here, a Communist Party elected representative for the Parisian suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis refers to the ‘ideological stigmatisation’ and ‘discrimination of all types’ aimed at those living in the banlieues. There are no clauses attributing agency or indicating those responsible, and focus is shifted to the victims of the alleged discrimination by the noun victime and the transitive verb subir. This quotation appears in the regional daily newspaper Ouest France in the context of an article reporting on the extension of the state of emergency for an additional three months. Throughout the article various government figures are directly quoted reacting to this extension, and of those cited, they focus on the need for fermeté and une action de fond, and the ‘social causes’ discourse is maintained by one political figure calling for:

la mise en place d’un vrai « contrat d’intégration » (Text 4: Ouest France, 16 Nov 2005)

The adjective vrai is a nominal presupposition (Richardson, 2007: 64) and it presupposes that the current contrat d’intégration is insufficient to deal with social realities. Additionally, the quotation below from Text 3 illustrates how a discourse of blamelessness operates by removing the agent and presenting French social difficulties as unproblematically existing without requiring any further elaboration. In this quotation – again from self-declared ‘integrated immigrant’ Salem Kacet – the rhetorical mood is combined with the present tense declarative mood in an ostensibly factual description of the daily reality of life in France: it is a country affected by the ‘ravages of segregation’ daily, and the focus is on the outcome and those affected, rather than those responsible. Consider the following extract:
Mais puis-je être heureux quand je constate au quotidien les ravages de la ségrégation ? Quand je vois des bac + 8 raser les murs, quand je vois des jeunes, ou moins jeunes, squatter le domicile des parents faute de revenus, d’emploi, de perspective, terrorisés qu’ils sont par l’avenir. Quand je vois ces jeunes, et moins jeunes, finalement « intégrés », dans des entreprises, mais souffrant du « plafond de verre » qui les empêche de progresser (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)

The rhetorical mood is used to present France as a country which suffers from segregation on a daily basis, emphasised through the collocation of ségrégation with a noun from the lexical field of violence and destruction (les ravages de la ségrégation). Personalisation strategies are evident in the anaphoric repetition of quand je vois (Quand je vois des bac + 8..../ Quand je vois ces jeunes...); personalisation, Fowler (1991: 15) points out, serves to ‘promote straightforward feelings of identification, empathy or disapproval’ and further suggests that the segregation of residents of the banlieues is an unquestionable fact supported by Kacet’s personal experiences. The journalist’s scepticism towards the status of these young people as properly integrated into French society is indicated by the use of quotation marks («intégrés»), and represents an intertextual pointer to discourses surrounding the links between employment and integration (discussed below). Similarly, quotation marks are used in Kacet’s description of the «plafond de verre» blamed for preventing progression at various levels of employment. This can be interpreted as ‘scare quotes’ (placing single words or short expressions in quotation marks) as a marker of intertextuality in order to establish them as belonging to an outside voice. Fairclough (1992: 119-120) further explains the functions of scare quotes, including ‘distancing oneself from the outside voice, using its authority to support one’s position, showing a usage to be new or tentative, or introducing a new word’. In this text the scare quotes surrounding «intégrés» and «plafond de verre» indicate journalistic scepticism at the appropriateness of these terms when used in other political and media discursive contexts, and they also operate to distance the journalist from these expressions. In the two texts just analysed (Text 3 and 4) there is no indication of the type of discrimination suffered, and instead it is presented as commonsense and unquestioned reality in French society and consequently one of the ‘social causes’ underpinning the 2005 riots.
Apart from a limited number of examples there is little discussion as to the type of discrimination suffered, and the nouns *discrimination*, *intégration* or *stigmatisation* rarely have any direct object collocate. As outlined in section 2.2.3 one of the fundamental investigative aims of CDA is examining the discursive reinforcement of naturalised ideological assumptions about society; by presenting *discrimination*, *intégration* and *stigmatisation* as unquestionably present in French society, the printed news media are reinforcing a commonsense assumption about ‘them’ and ‘us’ groups in French society (see Chapter Six) and present unequal power dynamics as the status quo. Therefore, there are only a limited number of examples where discrimination is linked to the realm of employment, as in the following quotations from Text 5 and 6:

*Non, ces femmes et ces hommes sont humiliés par une sorte de mécanisme « ordinaire » qui a, perfidement, désédimenté quelques principes républicains fondamentaux. La discrimination à l'embauche en reste la forme la plus visible : est-ce un hasard si, dans nos cités, les taux de chômage sont parfois quatre à cinq fois supérieurs aux moyennes nationales ?* (Text 5: *L’Humanité*, 26 Nov 2005)

*L’emploi reste la seule route vers l’intégration. L’emploi devient bien plus qu’un travail rémunéré ; c’est l’apprentissage de la société, la confrontation sociale, l’insertion.* (Text 6: *Le Monde*, 29 Nov 2005)

In the first quotation the collocation – or ‘pattern of co-occurrence between words’ (Fairclough, 1995b: 102) – of lexis relating to employment with discrimination constructs discrimination as being exclusive to the employment domain and consequently backgrounds difficulties of integration in other areas of French society. Here the journalist hints at an awareness of how discrimination has become naturalised, labelling it *une sorte de mécanisme «ordinaire»*. Furthermore, in the second extract the importance of employment as a tool of social integration is thematically foregrounded in the main clause in the second sentence (*L’emploi devient bien plus qu’un travail rémunéré*), and the superlative conjunction *bien plus que* adds further emphasis to the perception that work is not merely a means of earning a living – it is a necessary condition of belonging to a society (*c’est l’apprentissage de la société, la confrontation sociale, l’insertion*). Section 4.3.4 outlined the comparatively higher levels of unemployment in the *banlieues* when compared with the rest of France (Hargreaves, 2007), and thus discourses emphasising discrimination in the employment market as a social cause of the civil disturbances are implicitly stigmatising inhabitants of the suburbs. Although the two
quotations cited above are critical of the unequal employment levels between the banlieues and other areas of France, by drawing attention to the social function of employment as a means of ‘belonging’ they are – perhaps inadvertently – reinforcing an othering discourse which implicates unemployment with a failure to ‘belong’ to French society. Apart from these examples direct object collocates with the nouns discrimination, intégration and stigmatisation are omitted, and social power asymmetries are presented as simply being the status quo in French society and an unquestionable social cause underpinning the riots.

Thus, the preceding paragraphs focused on descriptions and interpretations of the riots, investigating how the civil disturbances are reported in Mini-RiCo and questioning whether agency is attributed for the violence. It has been argued that the overarching order of discourse through which agency is constructed is one of blamelessness, manifested in two supporting discourses: vagueness as a discursive technique and a social causes discourse. As a result those ostensibly responsible for perpetrating the violence are backgrounded, and urban violence and difficulties in relation to discrimination, segregation etc. are presented as something which just ‘happens’ in France. Existing social relations are presented as the status quo, and unchallenged assumptions about French society in relation to inequalities between majority French society and immigrant minorities in the banlieues are reproduced. Journalists thus avoid any explicit ‘soul searching’ regarding the failures of the French model and policy approaches which have resulted in the emergence of the banlieues. Van Dijk (1989: 239) observes a similar discursive trend in his analysis of news reports on the Brixton riots in 1985, and notes that ‘the government, the police or any other institution that may be responsible for unemployment, bad housing or other conditions of the “ghetto” are exonerated’, and blame is instead placed within the ‘Black community’ itself. Likewise, the discussion above argued that a discourse of blamelessness reinforces la violence urbaine as an expected reality in France, and journalists thus do not need to explicitly specify those responsible as there is an assumption of implicit reader knowledge of the role of immigrant and suburban youth (discussed in more detail below). A discourse of blamelessness thus largely absolves news journalists from any introspective questioning of why urban violence broke out in November 2005, and blame is instead implicitly focused on the deviant
and violent disposition of les jeunes des banlieues. Therefore, in the next part of the chapter focus turns to naming, and the following section outlines the dominant discourses relating to the two most prominent social actors in Mini-RiCo: Nicolas Sarkozy and les jeunes.

5.3 Descriptions and Interpretations of the Riots: Naming

5.3.1 Introduction
This section examines the two most prominent social actors mentioned in Mini-RiCo: Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and immigrant and suburban youth (les jeunes des cités/quartiers/banlieues). The importance of analysing the representation of individuals and groups in discourse was established previously (section 3.3.4.5), and Caldas-Coulthard (2007: 284) points out that ‘in the discourse of the media, evaluative choices, like the categorization of the social actors, are an entrance point to hidden agendas’. Other studies using CDA have examined naming strategies in discourse including KhosraviNik’s (2010) study of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in the UK press, and Tekin’s (2010) analysis of Turkey and the European Union as social actors in French political discourse on Turkey’s possible adhesion to the EU. Furthermore, Van Dijk’s (1989) analysis of British news reporting on the 1985 civil disturbances examines discourses relating to Black and Asian communities in news discourse. Other CDA studies have also focused on naming strategies in the domain of language and gender, for example Page’s (2003) analysis of patterns of naming Cherie Booth/Blair, wife of Tony Blair, in British online and printed news reports, Mills’ (2003) examination of feminist professional women’s view on their choices about names, including surnames and titles and Clark’s (1992) study of naming in reports in The Sun newspaper of male violence against women and girls. Thus, naming strategies have been identified as an important site of ideology production and consequently of analysis for CDA, and therefore this section focuses on the two most prominent social actors named in relation to news reporting on the 2005 riots (Nicolas Sarkozy and young people). It seeks to identify what is said about them, how they are positioned in relation to other social actors.

The finding that Nicolas Sarkozy and les jeunes are the most prominent social actors in Mini-RiCo contrasts with Turpin’s (2012a: 116) study which identified les jeunes and la police as ‘les acteurs les plus communément cités dans l’ensemble des articles’. However, the prevalence of police forces as a social actor emerges during the quantitative analysis of RiCo (discussed at section 7.5).
social actors and what this reveals about dominant ideologies as reproduced by the French printed news media.

This section begins with a macrostructural analysis of Mini-RiCo (following Van Dijk, 2001) in order to confirm the presence of Sarkozy and young people as prevalent social actors. Following that, section 5.3.3 below addresses the discourses of negativity surrounding Nicolas Sarkozy and the repeated criticism of his handling of the crisis posed by the 2005 riots. Finally, the prominent positioning of young people in discourses surrounding the riots is considered, and it shown how the demographic group linked to the riots (les jeunes) does not include all young people in France, but instead indexes a specific sub-group which is presumed known to readers.

5.3.2 Macrostructural Analysis: Nicolas Sarkozy and Les Jeunes

Before analysing excerpts from the texts in Mini-RiCo it is useful to briefly consider a macrostructural analysis (following Van Dijk, 2001) in order to identify the presence of both Nicolas Sarkozy, and les jeunes as a topic or theme, and to determine the global meanings assigned to them in Mini-RiCo. Van Dijk (1980: v) defines macrostructures as ‘higher-level semantic or conceptual structures that organize the “local” microstructures of discourse, interaction and their cognitive processing’. He maintains that to link the micro- to the macrostructures of language we need to consider the ‘global meanings’ of a discourse. He explains (2001: 101-102) this as follows:

 [...] topics represent what a discourse “is about” globally speaking, embody most important information of a discourse, and explain overall coherence of text and talk. They are the global meaning that language users constitute in discourse production and comprehension, and the “gist” that is best recalled by them.

Thematically, Nicolas Sarkozy is foregrounded in one headline, ‘La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy’ from Text 1 and is present in the lead paragraph in two articles: Text 1 and Text 5. The lead or opening paragraph has been viewed as the ‘most significant’ part of the news article (e.g. Bell, 1998, 1991; Tan, 2011), and Sarkozy’s presence in the lead in two articles establishes him as a significant political player.
during the riots, which is to be expected given his position as Interior Minister. Of the sixteen articles in *Mini-RiCo*, Sarkozy is present in exactly half of the articles (eight texts), with a strong presence in articles published during the riots or in the immediate aftermath of the violence. That is, he is mentioned in Texts 1 to 7, inclusive, and Text 11, which were published between 3 Nov 2005 and 10 Dec 2005 and 5 Jan 2006 (Text 11). He is noticeably absent in articles published in 2006 in *Mini-RiCo* (Texts 12 to 16) which could suggest that initial press coverage focused on political handling of the crisis, while later articles probe the underlying causes. Clark (1992: 209) insists that ‘naming is a powerful ideological tool [...] Different names for an object represent different ways of perceiving it’, and Reisigl and Wodak (2009) note the importance of studying anthroponomy (the names of human beings) as a linguistic device within nomination strategies in discourse. Throughout *Mini-RiCo* Nicolas Sarkozy is named as either Sarkozy, Nicolas Sarkozy, le Ministre de l’Intérieur or – in one article (Text 6: *Le Monde*, 29 Nov 2005) – l’ancien maire de Neuilly, a reference to his time as a mayor of the Parisian commune of Neuilly from 1983 to 2002. There is one example of the pejorative moniker Sarko in Text 7, where an inhabitant of one of the Parisian suburbs is directly quoted referring to sa «rage contre la France de Sarko». Apart from this example, Nicolas Sarkozy is named using his full name or by reference to his official position as a government minister, and there is no evidence of any of the newspapers using insulting nicknames as sometimes seen in the tabloid press.\(^{43}\) Thematically, as the discussion below reflects, articles in *Mini-RiCo* focus on Sarkozy’s reaction to and handling of the crisis posed by the riots, including his use of the pejorative terms racaille and kärcher (section 4.4.4.1). By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that then President Jacques Chirac is only present in five texts in *Mini-RiCo*, which indicates a significantly higher discursive presence for Sarkozy.\(^{44}\) The presence of Sarkozy as a prominent social actor is explainable to a certain extent due to his role as Interior Minister with direct responsibility for dealing with the interior security of the country and consequently the civil unrest in 2005. However, the discourse of

\(^{43}\) This feature can be explained to a certain extent by the French press industry: as discussed at Section 4.2.2, in comparison their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the French press has seen little development of ‘la presse à scandale’ or a tabloid press culture. Additionally, the articles included in *RiCo* and *Mini-RiCo* are from the printed daily news press, and not *la presse magazine* which is closer to the tabloid style of reporting evident in the Anglo-Saxon press industry.

\(^{44}\) The prominence of Nicolas Sarkozy as a social actor – ahead of other political figures – is also evident in *RiCo* (see section 7.4.2).
negativity analysed below suggests that Sarkozy is singled out for particular
criticism ahead of other political figures including President Jacques Chirac and
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin.

Turning now to consider the presence of young people using a macrostructural
analysis, they are foregrounded in two headlines in *Mini-RiCo*: firstly, in Text 7 the
headline ‘Les « racailles de France » affichent leur colère’ intertextually refers to
Sarkozy’s labelling of young people from the *banlieues* as ‘scum’; and secondly, in
Text 15 the headline reads ‘Une journée consacrée à la vie des jeunes’. Young
people feature to some extent in twelve of the sixteen articles in *Mini-RiCo*, and are
the most prominent social actors in the two texts just mentioned (Text 7 and Text
15). Most frequently (in six articles of the twelve in which *des jeunes* are a
represented social actor), young people are mentioned either in direct quotations
from politicians or in journalistic comments surrounding the causes of the riots. For
example in Text 4, a general news article from the regional daily *Ouest France*, a
deputy for the *Parti Communiste Français* is quoted as follows:

*Patrick Braouezec (PCF, Seine-Saint-Denis) s’est plaint, lui, de la «
stigmatisation idéologique » dont sont victimes les banlieues, qui
s’ajoute, dit-il, aux « discriminations de toutes natures » subies
quotidiennement par les *jeunes* qui y habitent. (Text 4: Ouest France,
16 Nov 2005)*

Here Patrick Braouezec is critical of the ‘daily discrimination’ suffered by *les jeunes*,
and this quotation is typical of those in *Mini-RiCo* where young people are most
commonly mentioned either in direct quotations from politicians or in journalistic
commentary.45 This suggests the exclusion of *les jeunes* from an agenda-setting role
in news discourse as they are denied a voice and instead represented by others in a
position of power (journalists, politicians etc.) – young people and their interests are
talked about, rather than directly represented. Less frequently (in three articles),
considerations by political figures or the media of potential solutions to the violence
include references to young people. This is seen in the following extract from Text 1,
a general news article from left-wing newspaper *L’Humanité* discussing political

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45 This pattern is also replicated in the larger *RiCo* corpus, and section 7.4.3.3 outlines how the news
media speak on behalf of immigrant and suburban youth – rather than directly representing their
views – and emotions and sentiments are frequently attributed to *les jeunes*.
reaction to the ensuing riots. The article directly quotes Dominique de Villepin as follows:

Dominique de Villepin s’est contenté de renvoyer à son « plan d’urgence pour l’emploi », et d’avancer la promesse de « mesures d’urgence pour l’emploi des jeunes en Seine-Saint-Denis ». (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

There is only one example in Mini-RiCo where les jeunes are directly quoted in the sixteen articles; this is in Text 7, which is discussed in detail below. Thus, a macrostructural analysis highlights how the thematic prominence of young people points to an underlying assumption running throughout Mini-RiCo that they are somehow implicated with the events of November 2005. While they are rarely explicitly blamed for perpetrating the violence, they are implicitly linked with the civil disturbances throughout Mini-RiCo. They are negatively characterised and distinctions are drawn between les jeunes des banlieues and other French young people, with the implication that those living in the suburbs are dispositionally deviant and thus are not representative of what are perceived as ordinary or mainstream French youth.

5.3.3 Nicolas Sarkozy
Nicolas Sarkozy has been described elsewhere as ‘la cible principale de la vindicte’ and as ‘le ministre-pyromane’ by the Parti Socialiste representative Arnaud Montebourg (Le Goaziou, 2006: 40; see also discussion in section 4.4.4.1); therefore, it is unsurprising that one of the themes running through all the coverage of the riots is criticism of the actions of the Interior Minister. As evidenced in the discussion below and in the CADS analysis of RiCo in Chapter Seven, his negative handling of the crisis posed by the riots is articulated in news titles from across the ideological spectrum by the presence of a strong discourse of negativity. In the following paragraphs one article from Mini-RiCo (Text 1) is analysed in detail; following that, the representation of Nicolas Sarkozy in four other articles in Mini-RiCo is outlined (Texts 2, 3, 5 and 7), to show that a discourse of negativity in relation to then Interior Minister and future President Nicolas Sarkozy is one of the dominant discourses through which the French press interpret and consequently report on the 2005 riots.
5.3.3.1 Discourse of Negativity

Beginning with the first text in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 1), which is headlined ‘La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy’, this article documents political reaction to the ongoing riots, with particular focus on a negative evaluation of Sarkozy’s response, expressed through metaphor, unfavourable comparison with other political figures (de Villepin, Chirac), vocabulary from the lexical field of play to undermine his credibility as a politician and direct quotations emphasising his negative actions. The headline, lead and four of the five paragraphs in the article focus on Sarkozy, and criticise his recent and current performance as Interior Minister. Richardson (2004: 46) points out that the positioning of information – or in this case, social actors – in a newspaper article indicates the importance of that information, actor, statement etc. Therefore, the prominent positioning in this text affirms Sarkozy’s political prominence and establishes the significance of his role as Interior Minister in dealing with the crisis. The headline (‘La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy’) references Sarkozy’s position of power in French society, through metaphorical allusion to his possession of a ‘Pandora’s box’. The intertextual connection to Greek mythology positions him as having control of the box which contains all the evils of the world. The image of Pandora’s Box is implicitly critical, drawing comparisons with actions that result in the spreading of evil throughout the world, as was the consequence in the case of Pandora. Thus, the headline primes the reader to interpret Sarkozy’s actions through a negative lens, since – as established in section 2.5.4.2 – headlines orient the reader towards a predetermined processing of information in relation to individuals, events etc.

Throughout the article Nicolas Sarkozy is negatively evaluated, as in the following lead paragraph:

*Le ministre de l'Intérieur est critiqué jusque dans son camp pour avoir attisé les violences urbaines qui ont gagné quatre départements d'Île-de-France. Dominique de Villepin reprend la main. Jacques Chirac lance un appel au calme.* (Text 1: *L'Humanité*, 3 Nov 2005)

The article reports that Sarkozy has been criticised – even by his peers, emphasised by the possessive adjective *son* (*jusque dans son camp*) – for having fuelled the ongoing violence. Again, vocabulary from the lexical field of fire is used (see also sections 5.2.2 and 7.2.4), and the metaphor of the *banlieues* being literally and
figuratively on fire is expressed through the past participle of the verb *attiser*. Sarkozy’s negative actions are contrasted with those of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and President Jacques Chirac, and Sarkozy is particularly criticised for having *attisé les violences urbaines*. In comparison, de Villepin *reprend la main* and Chirac *lance un appel au calme*, thus emphasising the negative evaluation of Sarkozy’s actions. A discourse of negativity relating to Sarkozy and his behaviour is repeated throughout the article, particularly in the first paragraph. The journalist hints at Sarkozy’s interaction with the media in a negative way, noting that he has created a *toupie médiatique* and that he is:

*un ministre de l'Intérieur qui joue, devant les caméras, à la guerre contre les classes dangereuses* (Text 1: *L'Humanité*, 3 Nov 2005)

Reference to a ‘spinning top’ and selecting the verb *jouer* implies an infantile and unprofessional approach, and metaphors from the lexical field of play are used to undermine Sarkozy’s credibility and handling of the crisis posed by the riots. The significance of metaphor in discourse is discussed in section 3.3.4.1, and Archakis and Tsakona (2009: 365) for example, argue that ‘metaphor [...] provokes affective responses and contributes to bonding between the speaker and the audience by activating positive or negative connotations aroused by the words used in them’. Consequently, they argue that metaphors assess underlying social and cultural value systems, and operate as a means of creating evaluative frameworks: ‘as a result, they can — and are actually used to — reinforce solidarity and create specific identities or even personal (and) political myths’. In this case, metaphors from the lexical field of play are used to negatively evaluate Sarkozy’s hard-line political response to the crisis, and to construct him as involved in game-playing rather than serious political decision-making.

Additionally, in this article (Text 1) actions linked to Sarkozy include *toupie médiatique*, *multipliés les faux pas*, *ses provocations sur les banlieues, échauffourées et affrontements [...] attisés, joue [...] à la guerre contre les classes dangereuses*, all of which contribute to the presence of a discourse of negativity. This is illustrated in the following quotation:

*Rien ne va plus pour Nicolas Sarkozy. La toupie médiatique du ministère de l’Intérieur, qui a multiplié les faux pas ces derniers mois,*

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a ouvert, avec ses provocations sur les banlieues après le décès de deux adolescents à Clichy-sous-Bois, une dangereuse boîte de Pandore. Depuis jeudi, échauffourées et affrontements se sont multipliés dans quatre départements d'Île-de-France, attisés par un ministre de l'Intérieur qui joue, devant les caméras, à la guerre contre les classes dangereuses. (Text 1: L'Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

The journalist refers to ses provocations sur les banlieues après le décès de deux adolescents à Clichy-sous-Bois and there is an assumption of shared knowledge and reader awareness of these provocations. Continuing the tone of the lead paragraph of the article, Sarkozy’s actions are contrasted with other political actors, particularly Dominique de Villepin:

Dominique de Villepin a décidé, face à l'ampleur prise par les événements, et après avoir laissé son rival s'empêtrer, de reprendre la main. Le premier ministre, qui s'était montré jusque-là d'une grande discrétion, est allé hier jusqu'à reporter son voyage officiel au Canada. (Text 1: L'Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

The verbs décider and reprendre la main imply strong leadership and decisive action, and de Villepin is placed in a position of agency who can laissé son rival s'empêtrer, again compounding a negative representation and using vocabulary from the lexical field of game-playing to challenge Sarkozy’s political integrity and abilities. As established previously, discourse plays a central role in identity construction through the discursive placing of individuals in subject positions; this article positions Sarkozy in a game-playing childlike role, which is highlighted through comparison with the ‘steady hand’ of de Villepin and Chirac.

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the article move away from explicitly considering Sarkozy to focusing more generally on political reaction to government handling of the crisis. A number of elected representatives are directly quoted, including Marie-Georges Buffet, the secretary of the Parti Communiste Français, which is to be expected given that L’Humanité is the former newspaper of the French Communist Party. Consider the following extract:

Pour le groupe communiste, Marie-George Buffet a alerté sur « l'extrême gravité » de la situation. La secrétaire nationale du Parti communiste n'a pas mâché ses mots à l'endroit de Nicolas Sarkozy, dont les « déclarations guerrières à visée présidentielle », les « versions mensongères » et les « propos stigmatisants » participent d'une « stratégie de la tension inacceptable ». « Les gens ne supportent plus que l'on traite leurs enfants de racaille ! » s'est indignée la députée de Seine-Saint-Denis en annonçant le dépôt, par le groupe communiste, d'une demande de commission d'enquête sur

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Buffet draws on vocabulary from the lexical field of warfare, referring to Sarkozy’s déclarations guerrières and negatively evaluates his actions, for example:

les « versions mensongères » et les « propos stigmatisants » participent d’une « stratégie de la tension inacceptable » (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

Furthermore, Buffet purports to speak on behalf of the French people (les gens) and she intertextually references Sarkozy’s use of the derogatory term racaille, claiming that:

les gens ne supportent plus que l’on traite leurs enfants de racaille (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

By directly reproducing Buffet’s criticisms of Sarkozy, L’Humanité can be seen as implicitly endorsing her point of view and persuading readers to adopt a negative view of Sarkozy’s handling of the difficulties posed by the 2005 riots. Thus, analysis of Text 1 suggests the prominent theme running throughout is unequivocal criticism of Nicolas Sarkozy and a discourse of negativity is expressed through metaphor, unfavourable comparison with other political figures (de Villepin, Chirac), vocabulary from the lexical field of play to undermine his credibility as a politician and direct quotations emphasising his negative actions.

Other articles in Mini-RiCo similarly construct a discourse of negativity in relation Sarkozy’s performance as Interior Minister by using intertextuality to refer to other discourses criticising his approach towards the banlieues, in particular his choice of language. For example, in Text 2 Sarkozy is criticised – along with former Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who served in Lionel Jospin’s Socialist government from 1997 to 2000 – for failing to curb the ‘frightening’ advance of urban violence. Sarkozy is thus placed within a tradition of Interior Ministers who have unsuccessfully attempted to tackle the ongoing problem of urban violence since the 1980s, and the journalist is drawing on the reader’s assumed knowledge of where Sarkozy is situated within this tradition. Consider the following quotation from Text 2, an editorial from right-wing Le Figaro which reflects on twenty-five years of difficulties in the banlieues:
De Chevènement à Sarkozy, les ministres de l'Intérieur ont enchaîné, contre les « sauvageons » ou les « racailles », « plans de reconquête » et « opérations coup de poing ». Sans que les uns ni les autres parviennent à enrayer la progression effrayante de la violence des cités. (Text 2: Le Figaro, 4 Nov 2005)

Inverted commas are a means of ‘extravocalisation’ ( Cotterill, 2000) to attribute external authorship of the derogatory terms sauvageons and racaille to Chevènement and Sarkozy, respectively, and are also a marker of manifest intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992), referencing previous occasions when Chevènement and Sarkozy were criticised for pejorative descriptions of the suburbs. Additionally, in Text 3 Sarkozy is criticised for his use of the term racaille in the context of an opinion article calling for a France which is ‘plus solidaire, plus fraternelle’:

*Racaille, Kärcher ? Oui, Nicolas Sarkozy a employé des mots malheureux. Mais des mots qui ont été la goutte qui a fait déborder un vase depuis longtemps rempli par des déclarations irresponsables de l'élite politique et intellectuelle de ce pays. (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)*

His use of the term racaille and inference of washing the suburbs with a power-hose (kärcher) collocate with the adjective malheureux, again emphasising Sarkozy’s negative handling of the crisis in the banlieues. However, this criticism is mitigated by the inclusion of a metaphor in the following sentence which minimises his responsibility for antagonising the banlieues. Instead, Sarkozy’s words represented merely ‘the drop’ which caused an already full vase to overflow:

*la goutte qui a fait déborder un vase depuis longtemps rempli par des déclarations irresponsables de l’élite politique et intellectuelle de ce pays. (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)*

Thus, Text 3 is critical of Sarkozy but in this example his blame is presented as one in a long list of wrongs perpetrated against the suburbs. It has been pointed out that ‘metaphor offers new conceptualisations for problematic notions and helps explain complex political arguments or situations in simple, colloquial terms’ (Archakis and Tsakona, 2009: 365). Text 3 therefore offers readers an alternative interpretation of Sarkozy’s response to the riots, while still acknowledging that his words can be considered ‘malheureux’.

Additionally, Text 5 expresses a discourse of negativity in its reporting on Sarkozy’s response to the crisis posed by the civil disturbances in November 2005. In the extract below – which comes towards the end of the article – the journalist questions
the implications of the riots and what France can learn from the events. Sarkozy is linked to the riots in the following quotation:


He is accused of *communautariste* policies, which as previously outlined carry negative connotations in the French context because it implies identification by an individual with a particular social or cultural community ahead of identifying with the national community (section 4.2.2.3). Furthermore, Text 7 highlights how one group of young people use irony as a form of protest against his use of the term *racaille*. Under the headline ‘Les « racailles de France » affichent leur colère’, the article interviews a group of young people from the Parisian banlieues in the 92nd, 93rd and 94th arrondissements who affix plaques in strategic locations around Paris as an alternative form of protest. The chosen ironic moniker *Les « racailles de France »* indicates the level of resentment felt by these young people towards Sarkozy, and emphasises negative perceptions of Sarkozy’s actions in the build-up to and following the riots. Foregrounding the word *racaille* in the headline and throughout the article reinforces a discourse of negativity in relation to Sarkozy, mindful of the persuasive power of a headline and its ability to manipulate and influence the opinion of the reader (Reah, 1998).

In sum, the preceding discussion shows that a discourse of negativity is the dominant discourse through which the actions of Nicolas Sarkozy are constructed, and he is repeatedly negatively evaluated using metaphor, comparison with other political figures, lexis, intertextuality and direct quotation. There is an assumption that readers are similarly critical of Sarkozy’s response and nowhere in *Mini-RiCo* is there any indication that his harsh policy towards the banlieues is welcomed by readers. However, this negative evaluation of Sarkozy was not reflected in the presidential polls of 2007, evidenced by his victory ahead of Parti Socialiste candidate Ségolène Royall in 2007 presidential elections. Thus, it is possible that Sarkozy’s consistent hard-line approach to immigration and the difficulties in the banlieues was welcomed by French voters in 2007 who sought a less sympathetic approach to the problems in
the suburbs and welcomed the implicit anti-immigrant ideologies underscoring Sarkozy’s policies and discourse. An analysis by Campus (2010) of Sarkozy’s image management on French television reveals that he relies on projecting an image based on ‘a French tradition of heroic, decisive, and strong leaders’ (2010: 231). Referring specifically to his actions as Interior Minister, Campus (2010: 229) points out that:

Even though he was not always portrayed in flattering terms because of his display of authoritarian character and hyperactivity, regular television appearances did help him to convey an image of assertiveness that greatly assisted him in building up his credentials for the presidency.

Therefore, it is possible that a discourse of negativity in relation to Sarkozy’s handling of the crisis and emphasis on his hard-line approach to the banlieues resulted in an increase in support among French voters, reflected in his triumph in the 2007 presidential election.

5.3.4  Les Jeunes: Suburban and Immigrant Youth

Turning now to consider discourses relating to suburban and immigrant youth, the macrostructural analysis in section 5.3.2 above reveals the prominent positioning of les jeunes in news reporting on the riots and as a social actor they are mentioned in twelve of the sixteen articles in Mini-RiCo. This finding is perhaps to be expected, given that it has been pointed out elsewhere that les jeunes are frequently referred to in political and media discourses on civil disturbances in the banlieues (Garcin-Marrou, 2007; Longhi, 2012; Turpin, 2012a). Garcin-Marrou (2007: 33) maintains that les jeunes (sometimes followed by the adjectival qualifier des banlieues/quartiers/cités) is a ‘catégorie floue’ and there is no fixed definition of the term despite its prevalence in media and political discourse. As Aquatias (1997: 3) points out:

[cette catégorie] ne correspond pas à un groupe parfaitement déterminé [...] on trouve des enfants d’ouvriers ou d’employés aussi bien que des enfants issus des classes moyennes, des Français de souche aussi bien que des descendants d’immigrés, Français ou non, des personnes en promotion sociale ou en situation d’indétermination, délinquants ou non, etc. Cette désignation de la jeunesse ne correspond même pas à une ou des classes d’âge définies [...] La «jeunesse» de banlieue est une catégorie aux contours flous et mal définis.

Thus, despite the fact that les jeunes (des banlieues/cités/quartiers) is a vague category and does not refer to a fixed demographic group, there is an assumption by
This section begins by showing how *les jeunes* are backgrounded (Van Leeuwen, 2008) with regard to their purported involvement in the riots, and the discourse of blamelessness (discussed above) means that there are only a limited number of examples where agency is explicitly attributed to young people. However, their prominence as a social actor – particularly in news articles discussing the causes of and potential solutions to the civil disturbances – implicitly presupposes a link between *les jeunes* and the violence. Analysis below investigates the characteristics associated with *les jeunes* and seeks to uncover the commonsense assumptions embodied in the use of terms *les jeunes* or *les jeunes des banlieues/quartiers/cités* by journalists and politicians. The naming of individuals and groups in news discourse carries particular significance and Richardson (2007: 49) points out that:

> Journalists have to provide names for the people in the events they report and this naming always involves choice. And logically, by choosing one social category over another, they include them within a category and exclude them from other different categories - or perhaps, choose to foreground one social category over other equally accurate alternatives.

Richardson (2007: 50) further notes that naming strategies perform an important psychological, social or political function within a text: ‘not only do they project meaning and social values onto the referent, they also establish coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and represented’. In the following paragraphs it will be shown that the naming of immigrant and suburban youth as *les jeunes* – sometimes followed by an adjectival clause (as in *jeunes des banlieues, jeunes des quartiers, jeunes des cités* etc.) – is implicitly understood by both readers and writers as being a nuanced use of the word when used in the context of urban violence. *Les jeunes* does not refer to all young people in France, but rather to a specific category which has been gradually discursive constructed and has come to signify a perceived distinction between *les jeunes des banlieues* and ‘ordinary’ or French youth.
Analysis below begins by pointing out the explicit links drawn between young people and the 2005 riots and then shows how *les jeunes* are implicitly linked to the civil disturbances. Lexico-grammatical devices – in particular the strategic use of quotation marks and lexis – indicate the constructed nature of the word *jeunes* when used in discourses surrounding the riots. Homogenisation strategies (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003) are also considered, which indicate how the identity and characteristics associated with *les jeunes* are made obvious to readers: *les jeunes* are distinctive by virtue of being ‘other’ – i.e. not French – and are represented as having inherently violent dispositions. Finally, the link between *les jeunes* (*des banlieues*) and immigration in press coverage of the riots is outlined, and it is shown how the immigrant origin of suburban youth is constructed as a feature which distinguishes them from other French young people. Rather than – as in previous analyses - discussing one text in detail and then providing evidence of how other texts in *Mini-RiCo* contribute to the analysed discursive pattern, the discussion below draws on examples from a number of texts throughout (Texts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14 and 16). Analysis is organised in this way because young people are not thematically prominent in every article, but rather it is the cumulative effect of their representation across *Mini-RiCo* that leads to the conclusions drawn. As Fairclough (2001: 45) reminds us, ‘the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the readers’. Consequently, analysis below is organised thematically, highlighting prominent discursive patterns relating to the construction of young people in media coverage of the riots.

5.3.4.1 *Association of les Jeunes with the 2005 Riots*

Analysis of discourses of blamelessness (section 5.2) revealed that the dominant discourse through which the 2005 riots are described and interpreted is one where journalists and politicians are vague with regard to those responsible for the violence and highlight the ‘social causes’ underpinning the riots. However, there are a limited number of examples where blame is explicitly attributed, and on three occasions in *Mini-RiCo* lexis is used to draw explicit links between the violence of November 2005 and young people. This is seen for example in Text 6 when *Le Monde* editor
Jean-Marie Colombani discusses how the foreign media have reported on the riots as:

\[ \text{l'expression d'une rage nihiliste souvent perpétrée par des mineurs} \]


Additionally, Salem Kacet’s opinion piece from *Le Figaro* explicitly links the riots with *les jeunes*:

\[ \text{La violence ne peut mener nulle part. Les jeunes qui n'ont que ce mode d'expression doivent apprendre à se manifester par d'autres moyens. (Text 3: *Le Figaro*, 8 Nov 2005)} \]

Furthermore, an editorial published in *L'Humanité* (Text 5) directly implicates young people in the following quotation:

\[ \text{Les jeunes, eux, à de rares exceptions (il y en a), ne portent pas leur révolte comme une revendication ethnique. (Text 5: *L'Humanité*, 26 Nov 2005)} \]

Apart from these examples, throughout *Mini-RiCo* *les jeunes* are backgrounded (to use Van Leeuwen’s term) and are not explicitly linked with having carried out the violence: instead, backgrounding them as social actors means that they are still implicitly linked with having been involved in the riots. As Van Leeuwen (1996: 39) explains, backgrounding means that:

\[ \text{The excluded social actors may not be mentioned in relation to a given activity, but they are mentioned elsewhere in the text, and we can infer with reasonable, though never total certainty who they are. They are not so much excluded as de-emphasised, pushed into the background.} \]

Thus, while young people are only explicitly linked with having perpetrated the violence in a limited number of texts, the prominence of *les jeunes* as a social actor throughout *Mini-RiCo* – as revealed by a macrostructural analysis (section 5.3.2) – implicate young people with the riots. The paragraphs which follow investigate the characteristics and assumptions embodied by the term *jeunes* (*des banlieues/cités/quartiers*), and it is argued that it carries a specific meaning which is assumed known to readers: it refers to young people living in the *banlieues* who are assumed to engage in violent rioting, and also implicit in this assumption is that they are of immigrant origin.
5.3.4.2 Specificity of ‘Jeunes’ When Used In the Context of the Riots

Throughout Mini-RiCo there is evidence of presupposition of shared reader knowledge that the noun *jeunes* is not referring to all young people, but to a specific demographic category which is discursively constructed and is interpreted as such by readers. The significance of presupposition as a discursive strategy is explained in the discussion regarding CDA’s interest in the commonsense assumptions articulated in discourse (section 2.2.3); to reiterate:

Presuppositions anchor the new in the old, the unknown in the known, the contentious in the commonsensical. A text’s presuppositions are important in the way in which it positions its readers or viewers or listeners: how a text positions you is very much a matter of the common-sense assumptions it attributes to you. (Fairclough, 1995b: 107)

Additionally, Grundy (2008: 48) explains it as ‘information that is accommodated by the addressee as part of the non-controversial background necessary for utterance to be a sensible or an apparent thing to say’. Presupposition of assumed knowledge in relation to the social actors signified by the word *jeunes* is indicated in Mini-RiCo by punctuation (in particular, quotation marks) and lexis as a de-authentication strategy (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003). The use of ‘strategic’ quotation marks (Richardson, 2007) signifies the contentious nature of the noun *jeunes* and orients the reader towards interpreting the term as not referring to all young people in France, but to a specific group who are associated with the riots and consequently represent a problematic group in French society. This is seen for instance in the final paragraph of Text 2, an article which discusses 25 years of urban violence and concludes by suggesting what needs to be done to ensure that similar patterns do not continue. Within this discussion it is argued that there is a greater need for educating the youth and instilling French pride:

*Education, bien sûr, qui ne devrait pas renoncer à inculquer aux « jeunes » la fierté d’être français. Formation, surtout, car on n’a jamais trouvé mieux que le travail pour se faire une place dans la société.* (Text 2: *Le Figaro*, 4 Nov 2005)

In this quotation the noun *jeunes* is placed in inverted commas to point to the constructed nature of the term. Strategic quotation marks indicate that the use of *jeunes* in this context is ideologically loaded – not *all* young people need their ‘Frenchness’ instilled in them. The verb *inculquer* has connotations of force and obligation, and its collocation with the expression *la fierté d’être français* implies that the young people referred to at present do not feel – or indeed are not viewed by
the journalist as being – ‘French’. It is presupposed that the young people referred to are those from the banlieues and of immigrant origin; this can be inferred from the surrounding co-text in this article (Text 2) including the headline (‘Banlieues: vingt-cinq ans après’) and expressions which clearly point to problematic status of the suburbs, including references to le problème des « quartiers » throughout the article.

It is also interesting to note in this extract that the selection of the reflexive verb in the expression se faire une place dans la société places the onus for integration with the out-group, which is in this case, young people in the banlieues. It was established previously (section 3.3.4.1) that words can be ideologically encoded (Fairclough, 1989), and in this example jeunes is used to signify the presence of anti-immigrant ideologies which seek to distinguish immigrant and suburban youth from the rest of French society.

Strategic quotation marks are also used in an editorial published in Le Monde at the end of November 2005 (Text 6) which presents an A to Z of problems currently facing France, ranging from Arrogance to Immigration to Politique. Journalist Jean-Marie Colombani also uses strategic quotation marks to point to the constructed nature of the term jeunes de banlieue in the following extract discussing high unemployment rates:

Chômage de masse dont on a dit et redit qu’il était de nature à défaire une bonne partie du tissu social. Il est, dans les « quartiers », de 30 %, plus encore chez les « jeunes de banlieue ». (Text 6: Le Monde, 29 Nov 2005)

Here the noun quartiers as well as the expression jeunes de banlieue are placed in inverted commas to highlight journalistic awareness of the connotations associated with these terms; Colombani is not referring to ‘suburban youth’ or ‘neighbourhoods’ generally, but to a specific demographic which is implicitly known by both readers and writer. Koller (2012: 20) reminds us that ‘hegemonic ideologies work implicitly, as “common sense”,’ and here Colombani is assuming a commonsense understanding that quartiers and jeunes de banlieues carry particular connotations in the context of news reporting on urban violence. Later in the same article, under the sub-heading V, comme Vocabulaire, Colombani considers the impact of the use of pejorative words by politicians and those in the public eye, and in the example below the terms racaille and jeunes de banlieue are in inverted

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commas, drawing attention to both the external authorship of the words, as well to the difference between the explicit (denoted) and implicit (connoted) meanings of the words (Richardson, 2007). Thus, *jeunes de banlieue* signifies not only ‘suburban youth’, but also a range of predominantly negative characteristics associated with this demographic group:

[...] il était d’autant plus choquant d’user d’un vocabulaire de stigmatisation - « racaille » - (qui est, par parenthèses, aussi celui des beaux quartiers lorsqu’il s’agit des « jeunes de banlieue ») comme l’a fait l’ancien maire de Neuilly; encore plus dangereux de laisser accroire que ces violences furent le fait de récidivistes et d’étrangers quand il s’agit de jeunes français ordinaires, comme l’a montré l’enquête du Monde. (Text 6: Le Monde, 29 Nov 2005)

Here we see the only example in *Mini-RiCo* of a meta-discursive commentary on news reporting on the riots in *Mini-RiCo*, explained by Fairclough (1992: 123) as ‘a peculiar form of manifest intertextuality where the text producer distinguishes different levels within her own text, and distances herself from some level of the text, [treating] the distanced level as if it were another, external, text’. *Le Monde* editor Colombani evaluates the language used by journalists in news reports on the riots, and highlights the distinctions drawn by the media between *des beaux quartiers* and the *banlieues*, as well as between *recidivists* and *étrangers* and *jeunes français ordinaires*. He criticises media and political discourses which he claims:

*laisser accroire que ces violences furent le fait de récidivistes et d’étrangers quand il s’agit de jeunes français ordinaires* (Text 6: Le Monde, 29 Nov 2005)

Although critical, he is re-articulating a distinction which we have seen appears implicitly in a number of other articles in *Mini-RiCo* whereby the terms *recidivistes* and *étrangers* are linked together and contrasted with *jeunes français ordinaires*. The implication is that to be a ‘foreigner’ is considered inherently negative, while to be ‘ordinary’ is equated to being French.

Thus, two articles in *Mini-RiCo* (Texts 2 and 6) use inverted commas around the noun *jeunes* to point to the contested nature of the term. Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 262) suggest that using inverted commas operates as a de-authentication strategy, in the sense that they question the authenticity of the term used and point to the othering of the referent social group. In their analysis of the othering of football
hooligans in the British printed news media Bishop and Jaworski maintain that inverted commas ‘allow the papers to question group membership and to create a distance between themselves and their readers, and the people they do not deem to fit in the role of “football fan” adequately’. In the current study, the use of «jeunes» implies that the young people referred to do not fit the typical and expected profile of ‘ordinary’ French young people and are consequently marked out as a separate demographic category. A number of other articles in Mini-RiCo use an alternative means to indicate the specificity of the term jeunes when used in the context of the riots and instead use homogenisation strategies.

5.3.4.3 Homogenisation of les Jeunes
Homogenisation strategies (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003) are present in news articles in Mini-RiCo which presuppose a link between les jeunes and the riots. These strategies identify a set of attributes which make the identity of a particular group of social actors obvious to readers, and can simultaneously operate as an othering strategy. In Mini-RiCo, homogenisation strategies emphasise the violent disposition of les jeunes and assume that a distinction can be drawn between immigrant and suburban youth and what are assumed to be ‘ordinary’ French young people. One discursive means by which the homogenisation of suburban youth is achieved is the repeated use of the definite article les jeunes as a ‘trigger’ (Richardson, 2007: 63) to a presupposition that suburban youth is a recognised social demographic category. Richardson (2007) cites Reah’s (2002) list of linguistic structures common to presupposed meanings, one of which is the use of the definite article. He suggests that, for example, a sentence which includes the clause ‘the challenge facing the modern world....’ presupposes that a challenge exists. Similarly in Mini-RiCo repeated references to les jeunes presupposes that a group jeunes exists as a recognisable and shared demographic categorisation among journalists and news consumers.

Homogenisation strategies and the characteristics associated with les jeunes are expressed by lexis and punctuation in the following extract from Text 3, and throughout this text there is an assumption that les jeunes des banlieues are a
marginalised group who are the ‘other’ in French society. Mid-way through the article Salem Kacet, a self-declared ‘integrated’ immigrant discusses the neglect of the banlieues and questions:

Mais puis-je être heureux quand je constate au quotidien les ravages de la ségrégation ? Quand je vois des bac + 8 raser les murs, quand je vois des jeunes, ou moins jeunes, squatter le domicile des parents faute de revenus, d'emploi, de perspective, terrorisés qu'ils sont par l'avenir. Quand je vois ces jeunes, et moins jeunes, finalement « intégrés », dans des entreprises, mais souffrant du « plafond de verre » qui les empêche de progresser, de montrer leurs capacités, d'être obligés d'en faire beaucoup plus que les autres pour espérer atteindre un but sans cesse repoussé. (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)

Kacet repeatedly uses the rhetorical mood to question the positioning and treatment of young people from the banlieues in French society, and the repetition of first person pronoun je with the verb voir personalises Kacet’s experiences and adds greater weight to his observations. The demonstrative adjective ces (‘quand je vois ces jeunes, et moins jeunes’) reinforces the perception that it is not to all young people that Kacet is referring, but instead to a prejudiced out-group. These young people are constructed as homogenous, sharing certain fixed and predictable forms of behaviour (following Bishop and Jaworski, 2003: 263) which is evident by the roles allocated in the extract above: verbs associated with young people include raser les murs and squatter, and they are placed in a passive role and subjected to actions using negatively evaluative lexis such as terrorisé, être obligés d’en faire beaucoup plus que les autres and sans cesse repoussé. His identification of les autres supports the view that there are different categories of young people in France who do not share the same experiences. Furthermore, placing the adjective intégrés between inverted commas points to scepticism at the levels and success of the integration of these young people when compared with their peers. Kacet’s references to les jeunes are generic references (following Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996), as there is no indication of individual characteristics or experiences attributed to them; the only defining characteristic appears to be that these young people live in the suburbs and that they can be differentiated from les autres. The implication is thus that these ‘others’ enjoy greater status and opportunities than those from the banlieues, and while the journalist (Salem Kacet) seeks to draw attention to and criticise their situation, he is perpetuating a prejudicial and generalised stereotype.
Homogenisation strategies are also expressed in Text 5 and les jeunes are constructed as a generic and homogenous group which are defined both by their violent disposition and difference from ‘ordinary’ French young people. Under the headline ‘Discriminations’, this article discusses the lessons that France might learn from the traumatic events of 2005, and the following quotation is taken from the closing paragraph:

*Les jeunes, eux, à de rares exceptions (il y en a), ne portent pas leur révolte comme une revendication ethnique. Ces populations, ethniquement mélangés (précisément), s’inscrivent au contraire dans une tradition de soulèvement populaire qui jalonne notre histoire. Leur violence même, aussi condamnable soit-elle, « traduit aussi la désintégration de la famille mağhrébine et africaine au contact des valeurs d'égalité françaises », comme le pense l'historien et démographe Emmanuel Todd. (Text 5: L’Humanité, 26 Nov 2005)*

Deictic pointers (les jeunes, eux; ne portent pas leur révolte; ces populations; leur violence) act as a membership categorisation device (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009) to highlight a perceived difference between these and other young people in France. They reinforce a commonsense understanding that ‘these’ young people are homogenous – sharing identical traits and characteristics – as well as belonging to a distinctive and recognisable group. The explicit suggestion that those living in the suburbs are not a homogenous group, that they are ethniquement mélangés, is in direct contrast to the tone of the paragraph which assumes homogeneity. This is evident for example by the lexical selection of soulèvement populaire as a tradition, which implies a practice that is shared and predictable among a recognised group, thus reinforcing the construction of young people from the suburbs as a generic and homogenous group which are defined by virtue of being ‘other’.

Similarly, Text 8 uses lexis and metonymy to infer an implied categorisation of les jeunes in French society, and to categorise suburban youth as being inherently predisposed to violent rioting. The article which purports to speak on behalf of the French people in the wake of the turbulent scenes includes the following quotation, where the journalist addresses an implied reader using the interrogative mood on two occasions in the opening paragraphs of the article:

*Comment ne pas ressentir un double sentiment de peine et d’humiliation après la violence qui a éclaté dans les banlieues : peine de ne pouvoir se solidariser avec des jeunes dont le mode*
d'expression est si frustre, humiliation d'appartenir à un pays qui a fabriqué aveuglément ces fractures. [...] 

Comment ces jeunes Français peuvent-ils se sentir appartenir à la communauté nationale s'ils sont exclus de l'imaginaire national et, en particulier, de ce qui le fonde, à savoir l'histoire et la démocratie. (Text 8: Ouest France, 3 Dec 2005)

The journalist uses vocabulary from the lexical field of pain and suffering (peine, humiliation) to attribute negative emotions allegedly experienced by the people of France. The noun pays is metonymically attributed responsibility for having created the fractures which exist in French society, which is an example of metonymic replacement whereby ‘a country, or state, is replaced by (certain) people living in this country’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 57). Metonymies allow speakers/writers to avoid naming responsible, involved or affected actors (whether victims or perpetrators), or to ‘keep them in the semantic background’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 58), and in this example responsibility for the fractures is evaded, emphasised by the adverb aveuglément to further obscure any involved social actors. Richardson (2007: 63; citing Reah, 2002) notes that another means by which presuppositions are ‘triggered’ in discourse are ‘wh’ questions (who, where, why etc). It is arguable that ‘how’ questions (as in the two quotations above which begin with the question comment) could be added to this list; the interrogative mood presupposes that ces fractures exist, and the question below relies on the presupposition that ‘these young French people’ do not currently belong to the national community:

Comment ces jeunes Français peuvent-ils se sentir appartenir à la communauté nationale.... (Text 8: Ouest France, 3 Dec 2005)

These quotations provide examples of what has been termed a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse, discussed in the forthcoming chapter. Both quotations above point to an implicit categorisation of French youth, and there is an assumed understanding that not all young people are included in the generalised references to les jeunes. This is expressed in the first quotation by the qualification of the term jeunes by the subordinate clause dont le mode d'expression est si frustre, which excludes those young people who have a less ‘frustrating’ form of expressing themselves, i.e. ‘ordinary’ French youth. Furthermore, in the second extract the adjective Français collocates with jeunes, but the surrounding co-text contradicts the assertion that these young people are viewed as French:

Comment ces jeunes Français peuvent-ils se sentir appartenir à la communauté nationale s'ils sont exclus de l'imaginaire national et, en
The demonstrative adjective *ces* suggests a distinction between ‘these’ young people and others; furthermore, they are *exclus* from a supposed *imaginaire national*, and as a result they cannot be considered to feel that they belong to the *communauté nationale*. The surrounding co-text therefore negates the assertion that ‘these’ young people – implicitly those living in the *banlieues* – are considered by the journalist or the readers as being French, and instead suburban youth are again represented as a homogenous group which are negatively evaluated and constructed as being inherently violent.

Thus, analysis suggests that homogenisation strategies are evident in press reports implicating suburban youth in the 2005 riots. Certain characteristics – in particular an inherently violent disposition and a tendency towards violent rioting – are associated with *les jeunes des banlieues*, and lexis, metonymy and presupposition marks them out as a homogenous recognisable group that can be distinguished from other French youth. A further feature which the French press assume distinguishes *les jeunes (des banlieues)* from other young people is an immigrant origin or that they are *issus de l’immigration*.

**5.3.4.4 Anti-Immigrant Discourses: Association of les Jeunes and Immigration**

It was observed in the preceding paragraphs that the majority of references to *les jeunes* are generic references (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996), meaning that the young people are not specified named individuals but viewed as a general class of people. It was also established that in referring to *les jeunes* the French press do not seem to be referring to all young people, but instead a specific and homogenous sub-group who share similar characteristics. One distinguishing feature of this class – as mentioned above – is that they live in the suburbs and have a violent disposition and are consequently implicated with violent rioting. A further distinguishing feature of these young people according to the texts in *Mini-RiCo* is their immigrant origin. A number of articles in *Mini-RiCo* – three of which are discussed below (Text 7, 14
and 16) – specify the origin of the young people in the suburbs as a factor which marks them out as different from ‘ordinary’ French youth.

The first article considered (Text 7) positions young people as thematically prominent and the article discusses how a group of suburban youth (self-titled ‘Les racailles de France’) offer an alternative means of protest to violence and rioting. Following that, the representation of young people and the links drawn between the riots and immigration is analysed in Text 16. The discussion concludes with the examination of Text 14 which at first instance appears to be an exception to the negative characterisation of young people in discourses surrounding the riots. However, it will be argued that les jeunes referred to in this article are not the same as those which are implicated in the violence in the majority of texts in Mini-RiCo. This section concludes by highlighting the contradiction between media reporting on the riots which implicated les jeunes issus de l’immigration and statistics regarding those arrested and charged in connection with the disturbances. In the introduction to this section Caldas-Coulthard’s (2007: 284) argument that ‘in the discourse of the media, evaluative choices, like the categorization of the social actors, are an entrance point to hidden agendas’ was cited. In the paragraphs that follow it is outlined how the categorisation of les jeunes issus de l’immigration as being associated with the riots points to anti-immigrant agenda, particularly against those from North Africa and the Maghreb.

Looking first at Text 7, in this general news article young people are foregrounded in the headline and throughout the article, and lexis including intertextuality and presupposition are used to link les jeunes with immigration. The article focuses on a group who are self-titled ‘Les racailles de France’ (an ironic play on Sarkozy’s use of the insulting term) who seek to draw attention to the difficulties faced by young people in the suburbs by posting des plaques commémoratives in strategic locations around Paris. Fairclough (1992: 123) sees irony as a marker of manifest intertextuality, noting that ‘irony depends upon interpreters being able to recognise that the meaning of an echoed text is not the text producer’s meaning’. The article details interviews with members of this group of people and cites examples of
typical messages that are posted on their ‘commemorative plaques’, which include
the following:

« A la mémoire des grands-parents de la racaille venus défendre la France chaque fois qu'elle était en guerre. (...) En avril 1917, ils étaient 170 000 à se battre aux côtés des Français. Leurs enfants et petits-enfants méritent la patrie. »

« Hommage aux centaines de milliers d'immigrants venus construire et reconstruire une France qui maintient depuis toujours leurs enfants et petits-enfants au ban de sa société. A quand une loi sur le rôle positif de l'immigration ? » (Text 7: Le Monde, 10 Dec 2005)

The link between the racailles – and by extension suburban youth – and immigration is explicitly articulated, and the repetition of a verb of movement (venir) emphasises that the ancestors of the racailles came to France at some point in the past. A numeric reference (centaines de milliers d'immigrants) draws attention to the large numbers of immigrants who have contributed to the rebuilding, both literally and metaphorically of post-war France, highlighted by repetition of the verb construire, with the prefix re- added for additional emphasis. Baker and McEnery’s (2005: 202-203) corpus-based analysis of discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in UN and newspaper discourse reveals a similar emphasis on what they term ‘pre-modifying quantification’ in descriptions of refugees or asylum seekers, such as ‘tens of thousands of...’ or ‘up to 200 asylum seekers’. They suggest that this may indicate an underlying discourse concerning alarm over their growing numbers, or signify that their presence is troublesome. This interpretation is unlikely to be the same for the current text (Text 7), as in this instance it is the children of immigrants who are drawing attention to the centaines de milliers d’immigrants venus, most likely implying frustration at their exclusion from mainstream French society, despite the fact that immigrants represent such a large minority group and France has a considerable history of immigration since the nineteenth century (section 4.3.2). In the second quotation above France is metonymically placed in the subject position of the sentence and is accused of excluding the children and grandchildren of immigrants:

une France qui maintient depuis toujours leurs enfants et petits-enfants au ban de sa société (Text 7: Le Monde, 10 Dec 2005)

This is again an example of metonymic replacement whereby ‘a country, or state, is replaced by (certain) people living in this country’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 57), and the question of who is responsible for keeping the children of immigrants au ban
de sa société is evaded. Additionally, the adjective toujours normalises this exclusion, and implies that it has ‘always’ been this way. The closing question operates as one of the triggers of presupposition (Richardson, 2007: 63; citing Reah, 2002), and articulates a commonsense assumption that immigration is currently negatively evaluated:

A quand une loi sur le rôle positif de l’immigration? (Text 7: Le Monde, 10 Dec 2005)

The inference is thus that the role of immigration – and by extension, immigrants – is constructed as not contributing in a positive way to French society. Both quotations intertextually draw on discourses of the family and the traditional duty of care that is owed to children and grandchildren by older family members, for instance:

Leurs enfants et petits-enfants méritent la patrie

une France qui maintient depuis toujours leurs enfants et petits-enfants au ban de sa société (Text 7: Le Monde, 10 Dec 2005)

The mistreatment of the racailles de France suggests a subversion of this traditional family set-up and further emphasises the estrangement felt by young people of immigrant descent.

Later in the same article more detail is given as to the identities of the young people who make up the racailles de France group. They are directly quoted discussing the characteristics – including age and sex – of the group, and in this quotation they demonstrate awareness of how their actions offer an alternative means of expression to the scenes of violence in the suburbs. Two members of the racailles are quoted as follows:


The choice of lexis, in particular the adjective solidaire highlights how the group align themselves with those who rioted in the banlieues and identify with their
frustration. Interestingly, the question of gender is introduced something which is largely absent throughout other texts in Mini-RiCo:

...explique Nadia avant d'égrener les origines des garçons, « basanés, Noirs, Vietnamiens ». Les filles ont toutes le même profil (Text 7: Le Monde, 10 Dec 2005)

In all but this article in Mini-RiCo les jeunes are constructed as a homogenous and generic group (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996) and male or female identity is not specified. The racailles group in Text 7 is mixed gender, and the direct quotations above establish two unifying features of the group. Firstly, they are all from Parisian suburbs – specifically the 92nd, 93rd and 94th arrondissements (Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne), areas which witnessed considerable violence during the riots. Secondly, they are all of immigrant origin, and are descendants of those from former French colonies (tous issus de pays colonisés), a characteristic which carries negative connotations in French society. Section 4.3.3 discusses the discursive shift from the 1970s which constructed immigrants – particularly those from Africa and the Maghreb region – as a problem or threat in French society, to the extent that ‘the non-European immigrant population progressively came to be regarded as a threat to national unity and identity at a time when these themes were fast regaining popularity’ (Moran, 2012: 100). Thus, by drawing attention to their immigrant origin the racailles group demonstrate awareness of the presence of anti-immigrant discourses in France and also how residence in the banlieues and being of immigrant descent marks them out as the other in French society.

It should be noted that this article is the only text in Mini-RiCo which directly quotes les jeunes: throughout the other fifteen articles in Mini-RiCo les jeunes are spoken for or about, rather than directly representing their own views. It has been established that quotation has been viewed as ‘a highly valued aspect of news’ (Pietikäinen, 2001: 648) and the absence of direct quotation from immigrant and suburban youth in Mini-RiCo indicates their exclusion from a powerful or agenda-

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46 It will be seen in Chapter Seven that this example contradicts the general trend in RiCo. Section 7.5 analyses how the pronouns nous, ils and eux are used in RiCo to construct internal divisions in the banlieues, primarily between rioters and non-rioters or young people and adults in the suburbs. Additionally, section 7.5.2 outlines how nous, when used in headlines in RiCo, signifies those members of communities in the banlieues who condemn the actions of the rioters. Thus, the CADS analysis identifies little representation of solidarity between inhabitants of the banlieues who did not participate in the riots and those who did.
setting role in news discourse. Additionally – as is also evident in RiCo (section 7.5) – it is les jeunes who are opposed in some way to the violence who are represented by the printed news media. The voice of the rioter is excluded, and only the legitimate or rational point of view is reproduced in news discourse – the actions and plaques of the racaille group represent a symbolic assault on French society, rather than an actual threat to law and order, as is the case for the rioters. Thus, this article gives voice to a certain group of young people from the banlieues, and confirms other discourse patterns in Mini-RiCo by using irony, lexis and presupposition to link les jeunes with immigration.

Another article associating immigration and les jeunes is Text 16, an opinion article entitled ‘La carte des émeutes de novembre 2005 confirme le profond malaise des immigrants africains’. The article questions whether geography and demographics can help understand why certain towns and cities were involved in the riots and not others and pays particular attention to the demographics associated with des immigrés africains. Throughout the article les jeunes are dominant social actors – mentioned in six of nine paragraphs in the text – beginning with the following extract:

Les contrastes sociaux ont bel et bien alimenté la rébellion. Tout comme la présence de très nombreux jeunes. Dans ces cités, ils représentent parfois jusqu'à 40 % de la population. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

The adjectival description (de très nombreux jeunes) combined with statistical evidence (ils représentent parfois jusqu'à 40 % de la population) uses a quasi-scientific discourse to construct les jeunes as a clearly established demographic category. However, nowhere in the article (as with other texts in Mini-RiCo analysed above) is the term ‘jeunes’ defined. Additionally, the presence of statistics relating to les jeunes must be questioned in light of France’s strict laws on data protection which prevent the collection of information pertaining to ethnicity, religion etc in the national census (for additional information see Hargreaves, 2007: 11). Thus despite the quasi-scientific discourse there is no indication of whether les jeunes refers to those aged under 18, under 25 etc., nor is gender considered. Throughout this article les jeunes or les adolescents are referred to as a generic category of social actor and homogeneity among African immigrant youth in particular is assumed through lexis
which presents generalised and vague statements as facts. Richardson (2004: 45) points out that facts are really ‘an index of power’ as ‘facts’ are themselves a product of social discourse. Throughout the article expressions such as *il est fréquent que les jeunes..., la plupart des jeunes..., certains adolescents* are used, a pattern which is evident in the following extract:

*Logés dans des appartements exigus, les enfants ont bien du mal à étudier. Ils sont aussi souvent victimes de rivalités entre co-épouses dans les foyers polygames, et forcés dans certains cas de défendre leurs mères contre leurs demi-frères.* (Text 16: *Le Figaro*, 29 June 2006)

In this extract the expression *les enfants ont bien du mal à étudier* is presented as an unquestionable fact by the use of the present tense declarative form of the verb *avoir* and the emphasising adjective *bien*. The adverbs *souvent* and *dans certains cas* reinforce the generalised discourse which surrounds the construction of young people in this article, and puts forward vague and imprecise assertions as being representative of a general class. The article continues to discuss some of the social and cultural characteristics associated with *des immigrés africains* living in the *banlieues*, and throughout there is an assumption of homogeneity. This assumption of homogeneity is contradicted in the closing paragraph of the text when the journalist expressly urges readers to avoid generalisations:

*Pour autant, gardons-nous de généraliser : l’émigration africaine est loin d’être homogène. Une partie est composée d’étudiants restés en France. Leurs enfants sont souvent encouragés à faire des études, tandis que les parents développent des stratégies pour s’extraire des quartiers de relégation.* (Text 16: *Le Figaro*, 29 June 2006)

An implied reader is addressed in the main clause in the first sentence, indicated by the imperative declaration using the inclusive personal pronoun (*gardons-nous*). The subordinate clause containing the intensifying adverb *loin* (*l’émigration africaine est loin d’être homogène*) unequivocally asserts that African emigration should not be considered homogenous. This is qualified in the sentences that follow, with *une partie* made of ‘students who have stayed in France’. These immigrants are positively evaluated, as they are credited with encouraging their children to study and ‘extracting themselves’ from what are called *des quartiers de relégation*. 
What is particularly interesting in the extract above is that firstly, the selection of the reflexive verb *s’extraire* implies that it is for immigrants arriving in France to ensure that they manage to remove their families from deprived neighbourhoods. The verb *s’extraire* collocates with the noun-phrase *développent des stratégies* which connotes struggle and difficulty, rather than something which is easily achievable. Additionally, there is an implicit acknowledgement that immigrants inevitably live in *des quartiers de relégation* on arrival in France, and it is only *une partie* – specifically those immigrants who came to France to study – who succeed in moving away from these neighbourhoods. Typically immigrants from colonial states who came to France to study were from privileged or ruling classes in Africa. Children in the colonies who received schooling through French, and who subsequently went on to further studies in France, were in the minority and cannot be viewed as representative of most immigrants (Costelloe, 2008; Gadjigo, 1990). Consequently, one group which are implicitly backgrounded in this extract consists of those immigrants who do not belong to the *une partie* explicitly referred to. It is inferred that the other group of immigrants did not come to France to study, and consequently do not encourage their children’s educational endeavours. Furthermore, this group fails to ‘extract themselves’ from the suburbs, and their descendants – the young people now living in the banlieues – are forced to remain living in *des quartiers de relégation*. Van Dijk (1995b: 16) notes that ideological control can be exercised by ‘active consensus’ when ‘persuasive text and talk are no longer seen as ideological but as self-evidently true’. In this text (Text 16) the link between *les jeunes, des quartiers de relégation* and immigration are presented as ‘self-evidently true’, and the quasi-scientific discourse and generalising constructions such as *il est fréquent que* and *la plupart des jeunes* allow these links to be presented as unquestionable facts.

Finally, one article in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 14) appears to represent an exception to the negative characterisation of young people by positively evaluating *les jeunes*, however closer examination reveals that this is not the case. The young people referred to in the headline ‘*Une journée consacrée à la vie des jeunes*’ are arguably not viewed as the same category of *jeunes* as those mentioned in other articles in *Mini-RiCo* – that is, those of immigrant origin and living in the banlieues – but
instead are the ordinary French young people with whom *les jeunes des banlieues* are contrasted. The article from the Nantes edition of the regional daily newspaper *Ouest France* discusses a day of activities targeted at 14 to 18 year olds which was organised in the town of Rezé, coincidentally *au moment où les voitures embrasaient les banlieues en novembre dernier*. Throughout the article the term *les jeunes* is presented as a generic category, and apart from indicating the age of the target group (14-18 years old), there is no discussion of specific characteristics of these young people. In contrast to the other articles in *Mini-RiCo*, *les jeunes* in this article are attributed a positive role using the declarative mood, lexis and modality. For instance, the journalist states:

*C’est sûr, les jeunes ont des choses à dire. Encore faut-il savoir les écouter.*

*Pour cela, la municipalité a confié l'organisation à 16 jeunes volontaires de Rezé. Pendant cinq mois, ils ont donné leur avis sur le choix des thèmes, le déroulement de la journée et la programmation musicale en fin de soirée.* (Text 14: *Ouest France*, 1 Apr 2006)

The declarative mood (*c’est sûr*) is used to positively evaluate the contribution of young people to society, and an implied reader is addressed using the modal expression *il faut* to insist upon a change of attitude towards *les jeunes*. It is presupposed that young people are currently ignored, and it is for others to learn to ‘listen’ to them. Throughout the article a positive role is allocated to these young people, and verbs collocating with the noun *jeunes* include *donner leur avis*, *lister les sujets qui leur sembler propices au débat*, *suggérer modifications* and *livrer leurs impressions*. It should be noted that Rezé, where this event takes place, was not affected by the November 2005 riots and thus the youth mentioned in this article are most likely not associated with urban violence. Consequently, it can be argued that the young people represented in this article can be differentiated from the *jeunes* who feature prominently in other articles in *Mini-RiCo*, and thus are not an exception to prevailing discourses which link immigrant and suburban youth to the 2005 riots and which identify ‘*les jeunes*’ as a group which can be distinguished from other French youth.

The emphasis in *Mini-RiCo* on linking immigrant youth with the riots must be questioned in light of statistics available for those arrested in connection with the
civil disturbances (section 4.4.3): Cole (2007: 78) points out that an overwhelming majority of those charged were born in France, and consequently were French citizens. Most frequently aged between 14 and 20, many were from families who had previously immigrated from North and West Africa, although not exclusively. Indeed in certain areas those arrested were not of immigrant origin, and the majority had no criminal record. The single factor common to all, however, was their residence in the banlieues (Cole, 2007: 78). Additionally, the use of the phrase *issus de l’immigration* in French media and political discourse generally is problematic. Cole (2007; citing Noiriel, 1988) points out that as many as one in four French people have a grandparent who was not born in France, given France’s lengthy history of inward migration for economic reasons in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (section 4.3.2). Furthermore, Hargreaves (2007: 6-7) argues that if analysis of ancestral origins examined a further generation or two, ‘the population of immigrant origin would appear larger still’. He argues that:

In their everyday lives, many people descended from immigrants are quite ignorant of their foreign origins or attach little or no importance to them. They are apt to consider themselves - and to be regarded by others - as part of France’s indigenous population, especially if they are white. By contrast, second- and even third-generation non-whites are less likely to be treated as part of the indigenous population, despite the fact that all those born in a given country, including the children or grandchildren of immigrants are, in the literal sense of the term, natives of that territory.

Current discursive trends seem to indicate that the phrase *issus de l’immigration* primarily refers to those from North and West African former French colonies, and consequently omits the many immigrants from southern and eastern Europe who arrived since the 1800s. These observations, combined with the analysis outlined above, suggests a particular prejudice against those immigrants living in the banlieues, and the presence of anti-immigrant discourses implicitly stigmatising certain sections of the population.

In sum, the foregoing paragraphs discussed the constructed nature of the word *jeunes* when used in discourses surrounding the riots to signify that *jeunes* used in this context does not refer to all young people in France. A macrostructural analysis revealed the presence of young people as a dominant theme throughout Mini-RiCo, particularly in news discussions relating to the causes of and potential solutions to
the riots. Analysis identified the specificity of the noun *jeunes*, and discussed how despite being ‘*une catégorie floue*’ (Garcin-Marrou, 2007: 29) there is a presupposition in *Mini-RiCo* that *les jeunes* are a homogenous group who share identical characteristics: residence in the *banlieues*, immigrant origin and an inherently violent disposition and consequent tendency for violent rioting. Emphasis on *les jeunes* as a theme or topic throughout *Mini-RiCo* indicates their construction as a problem or threat to French society: as Erjavec (2003: 89) argues, ‘by recognising a certain topic (e.g. ‘the problem of illegal immigrants’) as legitimate, and ignoring another topic, journalists constitute a social problem as a political problem’. Throughout *Mini-RiCo* *les jeunes* – implicitly understood as suburban and immigrant youth – are negatively evaluated and distinguished from ordinary French youth, and consequently viewed as problematic in French society.

### 5.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine the discourses present in newspaper reporting on the riots in *Mini-RiCo* and question the lexico-grammatical choices made by journalists in their construction of the roles of different individuals and groups in French society. Analysis shows that in its description and interpretation of the 2005 riots the press in *Mini-RiCo* draw on discourses of blamelessness which avoid specifying those responsible and emphasise the social causes underpinning the riots, including discrimination, immigration etc. Interpretations of the 2005 riots focus on the process of immigration, as well as implicitly on immigrants and their descendants as social actors; this indicates the presence of anti-immigrant ideologies and the construction of immigrant minorities in the *banlieues* as ‘other’. The result of these patterns of discourse is to present urban violence as somewhat being the status quo in France, rather than questioning whether the events of November 2005 should be viewed as the expression of legitimate frustrations, as has been suggested by some commentators (section 4.4.7.3). The voices of the rioters are silenced, and discourses which ignore the issue of agency fail to address *why* unequal social relations exist in French society. Instead, power asymmetries are presented as an accepted social reality; a discourse of blamelessness fails to challenge this status quo and as a result dominant ideologies remain unchallenged.
The analysis in section 5.3.3 of the discursive strategies used in news reports on Nicolas Sarkozy's handling of the crisis has shown that a discourse of negativity dominates articles which discuss actions taken and words used by then Interior Minister. A macrostructural analysis established Sarkozy as one of the most prominent social actors in *Mini-RiCo*, ahead of other political actors, and a discourse of negativity in relation to his approach to the civil disturbances and the *banlieues* generally dominates. The apparent contradiction between this discourse of negativity and Sarkozy’s success in the 2007 presidential election was also discussed, and it appears likely that negativity in news reporting on Sarkozy’s hard-line approach towards the 2005 riots had little impact on his presidential ambitions or his popularity among the French electorate. His success in 2007 is perhaps indicative of what Tekin (2010; 2008) terms the *droitisation* of French politics and a related *lepénisation des ésprits*, whereby France is undergoing a shift to the Right with a narrowing between extreme- and centre-Right ideologies (discussed in section 4.3.3). It is likely that news reports on Sarkozy’s policy approaches to the *banlieues* and harsh stance on immigration increased his popularity among French voters who were eager to see a more restrictive approach to immigration and a return to perceived traditional values of Frenchness.

Analysis of patterns of discourse relating to the social actor ‘*les jeunes*’ revealed the presence of simultaneous discourses which imply the specificity of the word ‘*jeunes*’ when used in the context of the riots. It identified the presence of homogenisation strategies which presuppose that *les jeunes (des banlieues)* can be distinguished from ‘other’ French youth by virtue of their residence in the *banlieues*, supposed inherently violent disposition and immigrant origin. Apart from one example (Text 7) suburban youth are presented as a generic social category in the sense that they are constructed as a class, rather than specific, identifiable individuals (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996). Van Leeuwen (1996: 46) argues that a difference between generic and specific identification of social actors is common in the press, noting that in what he terms ‘middle-class newspapers’ (presumably not tabloid newspapers) specific reference is more widespread in the case of government agents and experts, given that ‘the point of identification, the world in which one's specifics exist, is here, not the world of the governed, but the world of the governors, the “generals”’. 
In the French media it seems that ‘the point of identification’ for readers is from the standpoint of the majority dominant mainstream French society, and ‘they’ – *les jeunes des banlieues* – are presented as a generic class of ‘other’. As a result, existing social power asymmetries are maintained, and there is an assumption that *les jeunes* in the suburbs are different from ‘us’ or perceived norms of Frenchness. This distinction has become so naturalised that newspapers unquestionably reproduce it as a ‘fact’, possibly unconsciously or unintentionally but nonetheless with ideological repercussions. Richardson (2007: 49) notes that referential – including naming – strategies ‘not only […] project meaning and social values onto the referent, they also establish coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and represented’. Thus, emphasis on the negative characterisation of ‘them’ – *les jeunes* – simultaneously highlights the qualities which ‘we’ do not have, and highlights a perceived difference between ‘them’ (the out-group) and ‘us’ (the in-group). This is explored further in the next chapter which analyses the discursive construction of ‘them’ and ‘us’, particularly in relation to the positioning of immigrant minorities living in the *banlieues* vis-à-vis dominant and mainstream French society.
6 The Discursive Construction of ‘Them’ and ‘Us’: Discourses of Sameness and Difference

6.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to discuss constructions of an in-group and an out-group in French newspaper reporting of urban violence in 2005. As mentioned previously, this thesis aims to examine how the banlieues and their inhabitants are discursively constructed by the printed news media and to question how, linguistically, social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced and sustained in printed media discourse. The previous chapter analysed descriptions and interpretations of the 2005 riots and the main social actors implicated in the civil disturbances in Mini-RiCo. It identified evidence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse and the othering of immigrant and suburban youth. This chapter further explores the discursive construction of ‘us’ (the in-group) and ‘them’ (the out-group) in French society, particularly in relation to the positioning of immigrant minorities and those living in the banlieues, vis-à-vis dominant and mainstream French society. Analysis in this section will focus on discourses relating to sameness and difference, as within these discourses certain assumptions are made with regard to both the in- and out-group, and it is argued that the discursive creation of opposing social groups allows the 2005 riots to be explained in light of a fundamental difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’.

Mindful of the role of the media as key ideological brokers, reproducers and maintainers of the dominant social order (Allan, 1998; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Fairclough, 1995b; Van Dijk, 1988), this section argues that the French news press ‘other’ residents of the banlieues by simultaneously assuming and reproducing in-group homogeneity while articulating discourses of differences from the excluded minority out-group. A number of other studies have considered how discursive othering is achieved through the creation of in- and out-groups both in French (e.g. Tekin, 2010) and in other contexts (e.g. Crawford, 2011; Erjavec, 2001;
Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2008; Oktar, 2001; Van Dijk, 2006). Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2008: 2) observe that there is considerable evidence that ‘othering’ (including racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism etc.) has become normalised in political and increasingly media discourse. The current discussion draws on this and other studies to identify instances of othering in news reporting on the 2005 riots. It is argued that emphasis on the positive characteristics of the self and distance from negative characteristics of the other permits a clear distinction to be drawn between French people (us) and immigrant minorities living in the banlieues (them). The violent scenes of the winter of 2005 are challenging to the French social order and conceptions of itself; this chapter highlights that in its reaction to the events, the French printed news media adopt a strategy of othering immigrants and those living in the banlieues, depicting them as outside the borders of the homogenously constructed French society in order to explain the violence.

The chapter is divided in two parts: in the first section, the expression of a discourse of sameness as one of the dominant orders of discourse is discussed, and three supporting discourses in Mini-RiCo are identified: these have been labelled a discourse of continuity, republicanism and nationalism, all of which assume in-group homogeneity and construct a particular interpretation of French identity based on a common past, present and future which is grounded in France’s republican tradition. In the second section the second dominant order of discourse is introduced and the discourse patterns relating to firstly, separation and othering, and secondly cultural incompatibility, are outlined to show how the French press represent suburban and immigrant minorities as lying outside the boundaries of the homogenously imagined French society. The lexico-grammatical and linguistic devices in Mini-RiCo which realise these discourses patterns are pointed out and the discourses are interpreted and explained within the context of the discourse processes and socio-cultural context, following Fairclough’s framework. Similar to the preceding chapter, a number of texts from the four newspapers in Mini-RiCo are analysed in detail and additional examples are drawn from other articles to show the presence of the discourses introduced.
This chapter thus aims to show how the French printed news media position immigrant minority groups living in the *banlieues* (the out-group) in relation to mainstream French society (the in-group) in *Mini-RiCo* and it examines the discursive strategies used to ultimately uphold relations of discrimination and dominance in news construction of the events relating to urban violence in 2005.

### 6.2 The Discursive Construction of an In-Group: Discourses of Sameness

#### 6.2.1 Introduction

This section argues that in its representation of urban violence in 2005 the French press assume and reproduce national homogeneity and singularity, presupposing a particular interpretation of the French nation and French national identity. By so doing a discourse of sameness is created which emphasises a shared cultural and political heritage from which immigrant minorities are excluded. Identity is relational (Connolly, 2002) and by highlighting the common history, traits and characteristics of the French in-group, an immigrant minority out-group is necessarily created. Identity – and national identity – is as much defined by what you are not as what you are: there can be no national ‘we’ without a foreign other (Billig, 1995). Benhabib (1996: 3) points out that ‘since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference’. Therefore, discourses of sameness, analysed below, implicitly suggest difference from others, and consequently contribute to the elaboration of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ in French society. As the discussion below reflects, throughout *Mini-RiCo* the French press emphasise what ‘we’ – the inferred homogenous readership – share, with the implicit understanding that ‘they’ are not members of this national collective.

Before analysing how a variety of lexico-grammatical and linguistic devices are used by the French press to construct a particular interpretation of the French nation and national identity, the discourses in *Mini-RiCo* must be placed in the context of theoretical discussions relating to the discursive construction of the nation and national identity. As Anderson (1983) points out, nations are not only defined by
fixed geographical boundaries but are ‘imagined communities’, and they are cognitively and socially constructed as a ‘coherent, unproblematic and homogenous community in terms of both time and space’ (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003). Conceptions of a nation and national identity are not determined in a ‘top down’ imposition of nationalist ideas; instead, discourse plays a central role. Hall (1995: 613) states that a national culture is a discourse, ‘a way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our conceptions of ourselves’. This is not to suggest that nations and national identities are fixed and stable constructs, but rather they are fluid and ever-changing or ‘dynamic, vulnerable and ambivalent’ (Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2003: 214), open to being re-interpreted at a given moment depending on the social context, audience, topic etc. Wodak et al. (2009: 4) maintain that ‘national identities are [...] malleable, fragile and, frequently, ambivalent and diffuse’. Thus, the analysis below does not conceive the construction of a collective French national identity as something that is cohesive and permanent, but rather identity is viewed as being dynamic and subject to change in response to changing contexts. This is in line with Krzyżanowski’s (2003: 177) comments, whereby essentialist views of identity are rejected in favour of a ‘dynamic’ view of identity: ‘the dynamism inherent in identity allows for the individual, as well as the collective, to constantly assign anew what and through what means a person or a group identifies him/herself or themselves’.

Wodak et al. (2009: 29-30) highlight the significance of discourse in the construction of national identity and they point out that:

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47 Triandafyllidou and Wodak (2003: 211) reject the argument that a rigid distinction should be drawn between collective and individual identity, maintaining that such a distinction risks ‘reifying both, taking identities as an essential quality that people “have” or as something to which they “belong”’. They suggest that individual and collective identities are mutually constituted and intertwined, and thus ‘personhood is socially constructed through social interaction, between individuals and/or between individuals and groups’.
The national identity of individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to a national collectivity is manifested, *inter alia*, in their social practices, one of which is discursive practice. The respective national identity is shaped by state, political, institutional, media and everyday social practices, and the material and social conditions which emerge as their results, to which the individual is subjected. The discursive practice as a special form of social practice plays a central part both in the formation and in the expression of national identity.

The mass media play a significant role in the collective imagining of the nation since ‘mass media discourse, with its (re)production of ideologies in social life and its deictic delineation of Us versus Them, makes natural and unproblematic “our” place and purpose within the world of nations’ (Lewis, 2008: 415). Of particular interest for the current study, newspapers have been highlighted for their role in perpetuating particular constructions of the nation (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995). Viewing them as like a ‘nationalist novel’, Anderson (1983: 63) argues that newspapers create ‘an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers’. Newspapers, by their very conception, ‘implies the refraction of even “world events” into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers (Anderson, 1983: 63), and consequently, Law (2001: 300) points out that they both anticipate and create national audiences. Similarly, Funk (2013: 576) highlights the role traditionally played by the print media in creating nations and national identities; he points out that ‘by simply documenting a common history at a steady pace, and for a set population, print media effectively established intangible connections between its readers while determining common characteristics for its audience’. A number of studies have examined the printed news media’s role in the discursive construction of the nation and national identity (e.g. Alameda Hernández, 2008; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Brookes, 1999; Krzyżanowski, 2003; Law, 2001; Richardson *et al*., 2008), and the current study contributes to this body of work by seeking to better understand the role played by the French news media in the discursive construction of the French nation. Of particular interest is how the construction of a particular view of what it means to be French facilitates the exclusion of others in society.

As previously mentioned, one order of discourse determining news reporting on the riots is a discourse of sameness which is manifested through three supporting discourses in *Mini-RiCo*. First, a discourse of continuity: the printed news media
equate being French with the sharing of a common past, present and future, in order to exclude those coming from other traditions and assume the continuation of France as a unified and singular nation. Second, what we call a discourse of republicanism is analysed. Both politicians and news journalists stress France’s republican tradition – grounded in the constitutional ideals of liberté, égalité and fraternité – as a form of national self-glorification and emphasis on shared French values. Finally, a discourse of nationalism in Mini-RiCo is considered. The use of pronouns, particularly what can be called the ‘editorial we’ (Fairclough, 2001), articulates a discourse of nationalism which is simultaneously exclusive and inclusive. Throughout Mini-RiCo national homogeneity is assumed and reproduced, and consequently the existence of an in- and out-group in French society is discursively created.

6.2.2 Discourse of Continuity
Throughout Mini-RiCo being French is equated with the sharing of a common past, present and future, in order to exclude those coming from other traditions and assume the continuation of France as a unified and singular nation. In terms of creating nations discursively, Hall (1995) suggests that this often takes the form of references to shared stories, myths and histories in order to imagine a specific identity associated with a given nation. Likewise, in emphasising the significance of a perceived common past and present for national identity, Bishop and Jaworski (2003) draw on Nairn’s (1990) metaphorical conception of the nation as ‘Janus-faced’: Janus – a Roman mythological God – was two-faced, simultaneously looking backward and forward. They point out that this ‘metaphoric imagery highlights well the point that the nation is constructed by looking simultaneously backwards into the past and forward into the future’ (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003: 248). In the following paragraphs the use by the French news press of what Wodak et al. (2009) term ‘strategies of assimilation, inclusion and continuation’ is discussed. This means that the printed news media aim ‘linguistically to create a temporal, interpersonal or spatial (territorial) similarity and homogeneity’ (Wodak et al., 2009: 33), by the discursive imagining of a homogenous and united French nation which draws on references to a shared past, present and future. The analysis below shows how in Mini-RiCo there is particular emphasis on the notion of a collective past, with lesser emphasis on the elaboration of a shared present and future. The analysis begins with
an examination of one text (Text 8), which although critical of the treatment of immigrants by the French Government, implicitly reinforces the importance of a collective past and the French assimilationist model of immigration which assumes national homogeneity and sameness. This will be followed by a discussion on the construction of the discourse of continuity throughout Mini-RiCo, in particular in Text 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9.

Text 8 is an opinion piece written by Jean de Legge, then director of TMO Régions (an enterprise research agency) which uses personification, lexis, repetition and modality to create a discourse of continuity. Entitled ‘La République muette’ and published in the daily regional Ouest France, it discusses the sense of grief and humiliation felt by French people in the wake of the violent scenes witnessed in the banlieues. The headline ‘La République muette’ uses personification as a means of presuming intra-national similarity (Wodak et al., 2009), and it attributes human qualities (silence) to an abstract entity (la République). Wodak et al. (2009: 44) view personification as a type of metaphor to imply intra-national sameness and equality, and they suggest that it ‘favours identification of the addressee with that of the personified collective’. Using personification in the headline serves cognitive and textual functions, and as established in section 2.5.4.2, headlines form ‘a macrostructure that serves as an important strategic cue to control the reader's preferred meaning of the news and activate relevant knowledge needed for its understanding in the reader's memory’ (Erjavec, 2008: 40). This headline cues the reader to identify as a member of the collectivity signified by la République and throughout the article the importance of a collective past and present is explicitly and implicitly highlighted to create a discourse of sameness insisting that being French necessarily demands national homogeneity. For instance, consider the following extract:

COMMENT CES JEUNES FRANÇAIS PEUVENT-ILS SE SENTIR APPARTENIR À LA COMMUNAUTÉ NATIONALE S’ILS SONT EXCLUS DE L’IMAGINAIRE NATIONAL ET, EN PARTICULIER, DE CE QUI LE FONDE, À SAVOIR L’HISTOIRE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE.

(Text 8: Ouest France, 3 Dec 2005)

This quotation was discussed in the context of the othering of les jeunes in MiniRiCo (section 5.3.4), and the demonstrative adjective ces immediately draws a distinction between ‘these’ young people and others. The interrogative mood
comment, combined with the present tense sont exclus and peuvent-ils establishes their exclusion as a fact, rather than questioning it. Using the present tense mode of the verbs être and pouvoir draws on readers’ commonsense understanding of the way the world is, thereby reinforcing a dominant ideology which presupposes an in-group and an out-group in French society. As a result, their exclusion from the ‘national imagination’ and ‘national community’ is presented as an unquestioned fact. Readers’ understanding of, and belonging to, la communauté nationale and l’imaginaire nationale is presumed and shared history is emphasised as one of the conditions necessary for belonging to these imagined social groupings.

Throughout Text 8 the journalist acknowledges that there is a shared history, resulting from France’s colonial policies, between French people and immigrants from du Sud. This is particularly evident in two extracts; firstly, consider the following quotation:

Nous avons su mettre en scène, et très tôt après la guerre, notre réconciliation avec l’Allemagne ; nous n’avions pas de conflit avec les principaux pays d’émigration d’avant-guerre, Italie et Pologne, ni d’après-guerre, Espagne et Portugal. La spécificité de l’émigration du Sud n’est pas l’islam, mais le rapport historique de la France à ces pays. (Text 8: Ouest France, 3 Dec 2005)

Here, repetition of the personal pronoun nous collocating with the possessive adjective notre presupposes a shared French past, as well as a collective remembering of a politically and historically significant event: post-War reconciliation with Germany. Wodak et al. (2009: 157) stress the significance of a common political past in the construction of national identity, noting that ‘historical or mythicized recollections which are stored in the collective memory of social groups are of particular importance’. The final sentence refers to the significance of a shared colonial history as a distinctive feature of the relationship between France and immigrants from former colonial territories, as compared to Italian, Polish, Spanish or Portuguese immigrants who also came to France in the twentieth century (see section 4.3.2). This discursive pattern is also thematically foregrounded in a second extract:

Comment s’approprier un imaginaire national tant que l’histoire de la décolonisation n’a pas été faite, discutée, patrimonialisée, appropriée par nous tous ? Sinon, comment ces enfants de l’émigration

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The interrogative mood (comment) is employed with the personal pronoun nous, implicitly addressing the reader as an accepted member of a presupposed existing nation. As above, a politically significant event – decolonisation – is evoked to remind readers of their collective history, while the selection of the past participle of the verb patrimoine helps to reinforce a sense of shared cultural inheritance. The extract explicitly articulates the desire that ‘these’ young people should recognise themselves as French, and uses a modal expression auraient dû to construct this as an obligation, rather than a choice. As with the previously cited extract, the significance of a shared history as a distinctive feature of the relationship between France and immigrants from former colonies is emphasised. In terms of dominant hegemonies, it is interesting that it is the French – as opposed to Algerian, Moroccan etc. – dimension of this common history that is stressed. In line with the assimilationist approach to the integration of immigrants (section 4.3.2.3), the journalist is rearticulating a discourse of sameness which insists that to be properly considered French is to acknowledge a national similarity and homogeneity, but from a French perspective. Greater awareness of the shared historical dimension of the relationship between France and its immigrants is advocated, using a type of paternalistic discourse to suggest that ‘they’ cannot properly expect to feel part of the ‘imaginaire nationale’ and ‘recognise themselves’ as being French until it is better understood how much, historically, is shared with ‘us’ already.

Broadening analysis to other articles in Mini-RiCo, a singular and homogenous French past is similarly discursively constructed in two texts in Mini-RiCo (Text 1 and 2). In both texts there is implicit evidence of what Wodak et al. (2009: 36) term a strategy of ‘we are all in the same boat’. Such constructive strategies have ‘a unifying and solidarity-enhancing function’ (Kienpointner, 1983: 151; cited by Wodak et al., 2009), and the traumatic events in the French past (including previous riots) are used to remind readers of their shared suffering and to promote French identity as unified. Text 1 – an article published in the left-wing newspaper L’Humanité on 3 November in the immediate aftermath of the death of the teenagers
in Clichy-sous-Bois – reproduces the following direct quotation attributed to then Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin:

« [...] L'expérience de ces vingt dernières années doit nous inciter, tous, à la modestie et à l'humilité ». (Text 1: L'Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

De Villepin uses the personal pronoun nous, adjective tous and the deontic modal verb of obligation (devoir) to both construct and insist on a supposed homogenous French identity, and he draws on recent history in the banlieues to remind readers of their shared past. The placing of the indefinite pronoun tous as a subordinate clause following doit nous inciter is an implicit acknowledgement by de Villepin of the lack of clarity regarding the deictic referents of the personal pronoun nous in French society. Similarly, an editorial published the following day in Le Figaro (Text 2) reminds readers of recent difficulties in the banlieues, citing riots in the Lyon suburb Vaulx-en-Velin in 1990 and protests against the attempted introduction of employment contracts (known as the CIP) for those under 26 in 1994:

Quatre ans plus tard, sur fond de manifestations contre le CIP, les casseurs des banlieues s'invitaient en centre-ville. Charles Pasqua, ministre de l'Intérieur, affichait alors une mâle fermeté : on allait en finir avec les zones de non-droit. (Text 2: Le Figaro, 4 Nov 2005)

Again, common suffering is emphasised and a unified French response is presupposed, using the imperfect tense combined with personal pronoun on: on allait en finir avec les zones de non-droit. Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 249), as mentioned above, emphasise the importance of a collective history in the discursive imagining of the nation, arguing that ‘a key aspect in the imagining of the nation and its sense of collective identity, is the construction of a shared history; a sense of continuity through time’. Throughout Mini-RiCo the French press remind readers of this sense of continuity, by drawing on strategies of assimilation, unification and continuation and using lexical strategies including personalisation and modality to express a discourse of continuity which perpetuates a particular interpretation of French national identity and reinforces a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ divide in French society.

The previous paragraphs examined the discursive imagining of a collective past, and now focus turns to highlighting how a discourse of continuity is created through the elaboration of a homogenous French present and future. In Text 5 a sense of
continuity through time is expressed in the opening sentence phrased using the interrogative mood:

*Lira-t-on un jour, dans nos futurs livres d’histoire qu’un mouvement d’une ampleur nationale a surgi au lendemain d’une provocation verbale d’un ministre?* (Text 5: *L’Humanité*, 26 Nov 2005)

The possessive adjective *nos* collocating with the adjective *futur* unequivocally denotes an unproblematic imagining of the nation as existing, possibly forever, into the future. This is an example of what Van Dijk (1995a) terms ‘self-identity description’ – that is a preoccupation with ‘our’ history or ‘our’ future – which is a typical semantic feature of ideological discourse, particularly for dominant groups whose dominance is threatened. Furthermore, Text 9 uses the metaphoric expression ‘*Tourner la page*’ both as the headline and closing statement of the article. A sense of continuity is implied, with the inference that the same story, with the same characters, is to be perpetuated into the future. Both this text (Text 9) and Text 8 discussed above come from the regional daily newspaper *Ouest France*, which – as discussed at section 3.2 – had circulation figures of greater than 750,000 in 2005 (OJD, 2008), and is targeted at a variety of urban and rural readers. *Ouest France* is maintaining a homogenous view of the nation, and it can be argued that ‘the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the newspaper’ (Billig, 1995: 94).

Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 254) suggest that:

> The specific projection of the nation into the future as a “timeless” or “eternal” entity results from the notion of the nation understood as a common sense, taken for granted category. [...] If the nation is believed to ‘exist’ now, as it always has done, to think that it might not do so in the future is impossible or even absurd.

Thus, the insistence upon a unified French future presupposes the existence of a homogenous national community which is implicitly exclusive of those who do not share this projected continuing national identity.

The textual analysis has revealed how a discourse of sameness is reinforced by the discursive imagining of a homogenous and unified French nation by using constructive strategies including personification, lexis, repetition and modality to emphasise the collective sharing of a past, present and future. The analysis showed how moments of historical significance – such as post-War reconciliation with Germany and decolonisation – are used by the French press to remind readers of
what ‘we’ (mainstream French society) as a homogenous nation share. By extension, ‘they’ (immigrant minorities) are implicitly excluded, given that, as mentioned previously, expressions of national unity necessarily entail implicit prejudice against others. As Anderson (1991: 3) points out, ‘since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference’. Focus now turns to examining how this discourse of sameness is created in another way in Mini-RiCo: both politicians and newspapers stress France’s republican tradition – grounded in the constitutional tropes of liberté, égalité and fraternité – as a form of national self-glorification and emphasis on shared French values in what can be called a discourse of republicanism.

### 6.2.3 Discourse of Republicanism

Throughout Mini-RiCo there is evidence of both politicians and journalists drawing on vocabulary which evokes France’s republican tradition and the related foundational principles of liberté, égalité and fraternité (section 4.3.2.2). Wodak et al. (2009: 83) refer to the significance of the ‘foundational myth’ in the discursive construction of national identity, pointing out that ‘narratives about nations portray concepts of history which, through certain linguistic means, identify and designate particular historical events and facts which are deemed relevant for a large number of human beings and establish chronological and causal relations’. Edwards (2012: 252) similarly refers to means of discursively creating an in-group whereby a historical link to a point in the past indicates a ‘year zero’ to suggest ‘an ancient and ongoing connection between a group of people and a geographical area and suggest an “original” state’. Furthermore, Hall (1995: 614) maintains that the narrative of a national culture is often told through emphasis on the origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness of an imagined nation, and he similarly highlights the importance of the foundational myth: ‘a story which locates the origin of the nation, the people and their national character so early that they are lost in the mists of, not “real”, but “mythic” time’. In line with the assertions by Wodak et al. (2009), Edwards (2012) and Hall (1995), the French press reinforce a discourse of sameness through allusions to the foundational myths of the French state, particularly the constitutional principles of liberté, égalité and fraternité which emerged during the French
Revolution, recognised as the starting point for modern democratic and republican politics in France.

The following paragraphs show how references to France’s foundational myths and republican traditions are reinforced throughout Mini-RiCo as a means of emphasising from where ‘we’ as a nation emerged. First, the use by political figures of this discourse is considered, particularly in Text 1, 4 and 5; following that, evidence of vocabulary used by journalists evoking France’s foundational myth and republican principles in discussed, evident mainly in Text 6 but also to a lesser extent in Text 2, 9 and 16. The effect of this discourse is to remind readers what ‘we’ share and to emphasise a discourse of sameness, while simultaneously excluding those who are not part of this tradition.

Thus, throughout Mini-RiCo a discourse of republicanism is expressed firstly by politicians using lexis, modality and direct and indirect quotation to construct a particular view of ‘Frenchness’. For instance, the following quotation is taken from Text 1, a critical commentary on the handling of the crisis by the French government, and particularly Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy:

*Le président de la République est ensuite sorti à son tour de sa réserve pour appeler, en Conseil des ministres, à « l’apaisement des esprits ». « Il ne peut pas exister de zone de non-droit en République et il revient aux forces de l’ordre (...) de faire appliquer la loi et de garantir à chacun le respect et la sécurité », a-t-il déclaré. […] « Nous devons agir en nous fondant toujours sur les principes qui font notre République : chacun doit respecter la loi, chacun doit avoir sa chance». (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)*

The fundamental principles upon which the French republican ideal is built are invoked, and the modalised constructions (*il ne peut pas exister, nous devons*) as well as the anaphoric repetition of *chacun doit* permits Chirac to emphasise these constitutional rights as representing an essential component of French identity. Modality, Richardson (2007: 62) suggests, is an indication of the attitudes, judgments or political beliefs of the writer/speaker, and in the quotation above Chirac’s use of modals reinforces France’s republicanism as a marker of French national identity:
It is interesting that Chirac’s comments are presented using direct quotation, a strategy which absolves *L’Humanité* – the former newspaper of the Communist Party – from explicitly endorsing the content therein (Bell, 1991). The co-text of Chirac’s words also indicates the newspaper’s criticism of Government reaction to the crisis:

> Le président de la République est ensuite sorti à son tour de sa réserve pour appeler, en Conseil des ministres, à «l'apaisement des esprits». (Text 1: *L’Humanité*, 3 Nov 2005)

The implication here is that Chirac was distanced from the people, and the adverb *ensuite* could be interpreted as suggesting his delay in engaging with and discussing the violence.

Another article from the same news source – *L’Humanité* (Text 5) – is also critical of government handling of the crisis, which is unsurprising given that the leading government party (UMP) are situated ideologically centre-right on the political spectrum, whereas *L’Humanité* has a long-standing tradition of representing Communist views from the left. Regardless, in criticising the government they simultaneously rearticulate France’s republican traditions:

> Lira-t-on un jour, dans nos futurs livres d’histoire, qu’un mouvement d’une ampleur nationale a surgi au lendemain d’une provocation verbale d’un ministre ? Y apprendra-t-on comment la France républicaine, aux premières années du XXle siècle, a enfin ouvert les yeux sur ce qu’elle faisait endurer à ses enfants, tous ses enfants, mais d’abord et avant tout aux héritiers de l’immigration? (Text 5: *L’Humanité*, 26 Nov 2005)

Here, lexis is used to indicate a presumption of a common French future (*lira-t-on, nos futures livres d’histoire*). There is also criticism of *la France républicaine* which has forced her children to ‘endure’ suffering, again presenting the adjective *républicain* as a defining characteristic of French identity. Additionally, in Text 4 indirect quotation from Nicolas Sarkozy articulates a discourse of republicanism. This article considers the decision of the French Assemblée Nationale to extend the state of emergency for an additional three months. Within this context, Nicolas Sarkozy is indirectly quoted as having used the myth of France’s republican foundation to legitimise this decision:
As with the example just cited, the adjective *républicain* is used as a signifier of republicanism as an essential component required to ensure proper law and order prevails in France. Likewise, Lentin (2008: 117) cites an excerpt from a televised speech delivered by Jacques Chirac in November 2005 on leading French television channel TF1, claiming that the riots must be met by ‘being firm, being just, and by remaining loyal to the values of France’ (Lentin translation). Thus, a number of articles in *Mini-RiCo* reveal that French politicians drew on a discourse of republicanism and the foundational myths of the French state in order to emphasise a certain definition of ‘Frenchness’, which is by implication simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. ‘Republican’ France is inclusive of those who have been in France for centuries, and consequently excludes post-colonial migrants and their children and grandchildren. The following paragraphs show how French journalists also rearticulate these foundational myths through a discourse of republicanism in order to similarly construct a particular national identity for their implied readership.

A lexicon that invokes France’s perceived status of republican superiority is evident throughout the articles in *Mini-RiCo*, which can be viewed as a typical form of national self-glorification and positive self-presentation (Tekin, 2010; Van der Valk, 2003b; Van Dijk, 1997). There are numerous references to French political history and republican tradition, as in the following extracts:

*Ils nous font regretter que la République ne soit pas plus « girondine ».*

*Dans notre monarchie républicaine, il n’est pas indifférent que des désordres aient surgi alors que le sommet de l’État s’est trouvé affaibli.* (Text 6: *Le Monde*, 29 Nov 2005)

These extracts are taken from an editorial published in *Le Monde* (Text 6) which considers the various problems facing contemporary French society, as revealed by the violence of November 2005. Editor Jean-Marie Colombani reminds readers of the significance of the French republican tradition as a defining feature of in-group identity, using the subjunctive mood with the comparative adjective *plus* to refer to
France’s supposed failure to be more girondine.\textsuperscript{48} The same article presents France as indisputably notre monarchie républicaine, once more using political tradition to suggest a unified homogenous French identity, emphasised by the possessive adjective notre. Brossard et al. (2004) cite Lamizet (1996) who claims that a strong French sociocultural identity is traditionally maintained by the French media and the origin of this approach is in France’s historically deep sense of social cohesion. In this article (Text 6) Le Monde editor Colombani uses a republican discourse to reinforce a sense of ‘social cohesion’, which has the simultaneous effect of excluding those who don’t share this republican tradition. Furthermore, throughout Mini-RiCo the abstract notion of a French model - le «modèle français» - is repeated (e.g. Text 2, Text 6, Text 9, Text 16), implying a particular French identity grounded in the constitutional ideals of liberté, égalité and fraternité.

Thus, textual analysis reveals that across the variety of news sources there is a preoccupation with France’s traditional republican roots as a defining feature of ‘our’ sameness and superiority as a homogenous and unified group. Tekin’s (2010: 160) analysis of French political discourse relating to Turkey’s accession to the European Union establishes the presence of a discourse of national self-glorification, pointing out that:

> Positive references praising France and myths of Frenchness, French culture, French Enlightenment, French republicanism, and France’s exceptional role in the world as well as in Europe are all found to be quite common in the discourse of the speakers of almost all political convictions.

By referring to the France’s republican history and the constitutional ideals of liberté, égalité and fraternité as representing France’s ‘year zero’ (Edwards, 2012), the French press and politicians emphasise a definition of Frenchness which necessarily excludes those from alternative political traditions or who cannot be described as belonging to this definition of Frenchness, i.e. immigrants. Even in the case, as with L’Humanité, where France’s republican traditions contradict the ideological preference of the newspaper, there is acknowledgement that the ideals from the 1789 Revolution continue to greatly influence France’s conception of itself.

\textsuperscript{48} This is a reference to the Girondist – so-called as they originated in the Gironde region – political faction in the Legislative Assembly and the National Convention during the French Revolution.
and its people. This discourse of republicanism reinforces the boundaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’ through emphasis on ‘our’ sameness. This strategy is also achieved through the use of pronouns, particularly in editorials, to articulate a discourse of nationalism, which is now discussed.

6.2.4 Discourse of Nationalism: the ‘Editorial We’
In three texts in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 3, 6 and 9) national homogeneity is assumed and reproduced through the use of personal pronouns *nous* and *on* and the possessive adjective *nos* to articulate what can be called an ‘editorial we’. The ‘editorial we’ can be simultaneously exclusive and inclusive, depending on whether ‘we’ is taken to be inclusive of the reader as well as the writer (section 3.3.4.1 and Fairclough, 2001). It has been pointed out that:

> National newspapers by definition are nationally distributed, and although there may be differences of age, gender, region, social class and ethnicity even within the readership of individual titles, the limit is that of the nation. So it is within these contexts that the ‘we’ and ‘us’ in these articles can be understood as referring to the nation. (Brookes, 1999: 255)

The significance of pronoun usage in discourse was discussed at section 3.3.4.1, and it is important to remember Fortanet’s (2004: 46) observation that ‘in the negotiation of meaning that is always present between the person issuing a message and the person receiving the message one of the key elements is the reference of the personal pronouns’. The discussion below shows how personal pronouns are used by the French press, particularly using the editorial genre, to speak to and for the French people, and by so doing it often assumes national singularity and homogeneity. Billig (1995: 115) describes this as ‘the nationalised syntax of hegemony’, and using personal pronouns in this way allows newspaper editors and commentators to draw on expressions of nationalism as a means of emphasising in-group solidarity, and by extension, out-group exclusion.

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49 Tekin’s (2010) analysis of French political discourse notes that ‘by employing the indefinite pronoun “On”, French speakers leave blank the subject of the utterance and [...] become involved in a strategy of implicitness’ (2010: 158). In the case of the French printed news media reporting on the 2005 riots it can be argued that there is an implicit assumption of national homogeneity in the referent of *on* used in editorials.
Three articles in *Mini-RiCo* provide numerous examples of the significance of pronouns in the discursive construction of French nationalism, and interestingly, two are editorials while the third is an opinion piece. As outlined at section 2.5.4.2, editorials are particularly significant from an ideological perspective since they offer the possibility to ‘legitimize particular constructions of the social and political world over others’ (Trew, 1979: 140). Additionally, Van Dijk (1989: 235) points out that the editorial genre necessarily requires the summarising or recapitulating of events, but this ‘summarising, selection, and focusing presuppose ideologically framed opinions’. The following discussion highlights how in their summary and selection of events for discussion both editorials analysed (Text 6 and 9) construct France as a unified and homogenous society sharing certain fundamental values and ideals. The first text discussed below (Text 6) outlines the problems currently facing French society, using an A to Z type format to offer analysis under headings such as *A, comme Arrogance, C, comme Chômage, I, comme Intégration* and so on. While this article does acknowledge the challenges and inconsistencies in French society, a discourse of nationalism reinforces the perception that there is a singular French national identity from which immigrant minorities are excluded. The second editorial (Text 9) was published in *Ouest France* in late December 2005 when much of the violence had abated. As a new year approaches, editor Jean Boissonat encourages readers in the headline to ‘turn the page’ (*Tourner la page*), to look forward and move on from a problematic year for France. The discussion below shows how Boissonat assumes and reproduces national homogeneity in his reflection on these events. The third article examined (Text 3) is a particularly interesting example of how the pronoun ‘we’ can simultaneously refer to a variety of in-group as well as out-group members, a feature which Petersoo (2007) terms the ‘wandering we’ and which Mulderrig (2012) acknowledges in his assertion that ‘the pronoun we is referentially complex’. Text 3 offers examples of a counter-discourse to this prevailing discourse of sameness and the construction of a homogenous national identity. The author, Salem Kacet, writes from his unique perspective as an Algerian immigrant who is, in his own words, ‘integrated’ into French society, and his use of the personal pronoun *nous* offers an insight into the tensions facing his definition of

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50 In 2005 France not only witnessed scenes of violence in the *banlieues*, but also controversially rejected the European Constitutional Treaty and the weaknesses of the French justice system were exposed during the ‘Outreau Affair’.
French national identity. In the following paragraphs these three articles are analysed, with particular focus on the deictic pointing of pronouns in order to better understand how discourses of sameness are created through the assumption of national singularity and homogeneity.

It should be noted also that nationalism has been interpreted as a type of ideology (following Billig, 1995) and it has been argued that expressions of nationalism are inherently linked to race (Miles, 1987) – whether on the one hand overt expressions such as those of extreme political parties (e.g. the Front National party discussed in section 4.3.3), or on the other hand, everyday expressions of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995), including the singing of the national anthem before sports games or the flying of national flags outside buildings. Miles (1987: 38) suggests that ‘racism is the lining of the cloak of nationalism which surrounds and defines the boundaries [of the nation] as an imagined community’. In this way, by using the editorial genre and pronouns such as nous and on and the possessive adjective nos, three texts in Mini-RiCo express a discourse of nationalism which implicitly rejects those who lie outside the boundaries of the discursively constructed homogenous and singular nation.

Beginning with Text 6 an editorial entitled ‘Après le choc’ from Le Monde, consider the following extract:

_Discrimination : telle est la véritable urgence. Nous sommes face à la réalité des résistances que nous opposons à notre propre diversité._

(Text 6: Le Monde, 29 Nov 2005)

Here, editor Jean-Marie Colombani is critical of the discrimination which exists in French society; however, repetition of personal pronoun nous emphasises his construction of French identity as singular. Repetition is recognised as an ‘intensifying’ strategy in the DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009), used to encode emotions and for emphasis; in the quotation above the repetition of nous reinforces the presumption of a shared national identity. This is also evident in the following extract, referring to the role of mayors in French society:
French mayors are praised for ensuring the awakening of ‘national consciousness’ as result of the urban violence and the personal pronoun *nous* collocating with the strong emotive verb *regretter* assumes an intra-national sameness in French society. Synonymously referring to France as *la République* reinforces the republican discourse discussed above. Furthermore, throughout the article the personal pronoun *nous* and possessive adjective *notre* are repeated:

*notre* modèle social-colbertiste  
*notre* monarchie républicaine  
*nous* savons bien que là est la question centrale de la société française. (Text 6: *Le Monde*, 29 Nov 2005)

*Le Monde* is purporting to have the authority to speak for the French people – or to use Billig’s (1995: 114) words to ‘stand in the eye of the country’. Mulderrig (2012: 708) points out that the deictic choice of the pronoun ‘we’ always entails ‘a particular demarcation of participatory boundaries in the “discourse world” created in texts; of speakers’ and hearers’ relative positions to the events described and their involvement with them’. For Colombani the ‘discourse world’ created is one which assumes national homogeneity. His closing comments evidence many of the strategies already discussed in the discursive construction of French national identity: anaphoric repetition of temporal markers *en 1984....*, *en 1995....*, *en 2005...* emphasises the historical dimension associated with French identity, along with explicit reference to the constitutional ideals of *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* which underpin shared French values. *Le pays* is metonymically described as having brushed with paralysis in 1995, and reference to a place ‘*le pays*’ is substituted for the French people. Dissimilarity in French society is not considered and instead ‘we’ are all assumed to have been obliged to feel similarly:

*En 1984, deux millions de personnes avaient défilé de Versailles à Paris, au nom de la liberté; en 1995, le pays frôlait la paralysie au nom de l'égalité. En 2005, c'est de fraternité qu'il s'agit. Les « violences urbaines » nous ont obligé à dépasser une fausse confiance dans une politique de la ville mise à mal, pour prendre conscience de la nécessité de réhabiliter une République digne de ce nom. Rouvrir le chemin d'une promesse républicaine, sans distinction d'origine, sans discrimination : telle est la véritable urgence. (Text 6: *Le Monde*, 29 Nov 2005)*
This editorial, published on November 29th as the violence had predominantly abated, purports to highlight the ‘difficulties’ facing modern France, and it acknowledges that discrimination is a feature of French society. However, it reinforces a particular exclusive view of French society, using the editorial format to accentuate nationalist sentiments and the view that there is a singular French identity which ‘we’ share, without consideration for dissimilarity or variation. Throughout the article heterogeneity is assumed, and regardless of differences, ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1991: 6-7).

Similar discursive patterns are evident in an editorial entitled ‘Tourner la page’ (Text 9), an article which projects a positive future for the French nation recovering from a variety of traumatic events during 2005. The imperative mood rappelons-nous is used in the opening sentences to establish supposed authority to speak as representatives of the French people, and references to pivotal events and decisions taken by les français reinforce a taken for granted national ‘us’. For example:

le «non» des français au traité constitutionnel pour l’Europe

les Français voient se gripper la construction européenne dont leur pays avait été le principal moteur depuis un demi-siècle. (Text 9: Ouest France, 23 Dec 2005)

Additionally, personal pronouns nous and on are used throughout to presuppose French solidarity, as in the following examples:

La crise des banlieues ébranle la confiance que nous mettions dans les vertus « intégratrices » de notre modèle social.

on a changé de gouvernement après le « non » au référendum

nous ne parvenons toujours pas à l’atteindre

aucune de ces déceptions ne doit nous décourager. Tous les pays connaissent « des passages à vide ». Rappelons-nous... (Text 9: Ouest France, 23 Dec 2005)

As with the editorial published in Le Monde, Ouest France addresses its readership as a united and homogenous group, making extensive use of the editorial ‘we’ to address readers as members of inclusive group. Wodak et al. (2009: 38) propose the strategy of ‘autonomisation’ for the discursive construction of national identity, maintaining that ‘presupposition/emphasis on national autonomy and independence’
is a typical means of presupposing a singular national identity. This strategy is evident in the following extract:

*Certains le pensent, observant que, à nos portes, le chancelier Schröder a provoqué des élections anticipées (qu'il a d'ailleurs perdues) après un lourd échec dans un scrutin régional. Le président français - qui a sans doute ses raisons - en a décidé autrement chez nous.* (Text 6: *Le Monde*, 29 Nov 2005)

Here the actions of the French are contrasted with those of Germany, with emphasis placed on the different decisions taken by ‘us’. Throughout the article the reference point of the deictic expressions referring to ‘we’ or ‘us’ is implicit; as Petersoo (2007: 427) uncovered in her analysis of national deixis in the Scottish print media, ‘whether [a] homogenous ingroup exists in the “real” world or not, is not important – debates about [...] national identity take nationness as given’. The two articles just considered (Text 6 and Text 9) emphasise a discourse of nationalism to ensure positive identification by its readership, which simultaneously assumes and reproduces homogeneity. As a result, a discourse of sameness is created which provides readers with ‘a convincing point of self-reference’ (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003: 276) and which in turn reinforces in-group togetherness and homogeneity. However, such straightforward interpretations of who ‘we’ are are not always possible, particularly given the complex French social situation discussed earlier in Chapter Four. Consequently it is hardly surprising that one article in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 3, *Le Figaro*: 8 Nov 2005) offers an example of what Petersoo (2007) terms the ‘wandering we’. This text is now analysed, again with particular focus on the personal pronouns *nous* and *on*.

One text in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 3) provides examples of a counter-discourse to this prevailing discourse of sameness and the construction of a homogenous national identity. This article was written by Salem Kacet and published in centre-right conservative newspaper *Le Figaro*. As the forthcoming analysis reflects, Kacet’s use of the personal pronoun *nous* allows him to simultaneously position himself as being a member of both the in-group and, at the same time, the out-group. Petersoo (2007: 51) The author of Text 3 is not a journalist of *Le Figaro* but a medical doctor, vice-president of l’Université Lille-II, former deputy mayor of the commune of Roubaix in the north of France and member of la Commission des Sages sur le Code de la Nationalité, established to consider the reform of *la Code de la nationalité française*.
429) refers to this notion as the ‘wandering we’: ‘it is not a single type of “we” but rather a particular usage that can be traced within a whole paragraph or whole article’. Consider firstly the following extract:


In the extract above nous refers to Français issus de l’immigration, a group defined not in terms of what they are, but what they are not – ‘real’ French citizens. Their identity is assigned by an unspecified outsider, presented using the passive voice on as an implicit reference to unspecified human animate – nous que l’on nomme Français issus de l’immigration. This power of naming and categorising a certain group of people positions those with the authority to categorise as the legitimator of group membership, and consequently excludes the nominated group as having a role to play in the definition and elaboration of the categories of social membership. Within this specified group (French immigrants), Kacet hints at internal othering (Petersoo, 2007), suggesting a sub-category of the out-group of which he is a member: he states that beaucoup d’entre nous lancent des alertes, des mises en garde…. Thus, the out-group is further divided into those who attempt to play an active role in French society, and by implication, those who do not.

Later in the article Kacet states the following:

Aujourd’hui, il est dans la représentation, qu’il le veuille ou pas, d’une France qui aspire à vivre normalement, dans un pays où chacun doit apprendre les valeurs de respect et de solidarité, dans un pays pacifié, reconnaissant une place pour chacun de ses enfants. Et dans les « quartiers », tous sont attentifs à la façon dont nous sortirons de cette crise qui dure depuis trente ans. A la façon dont nous allons reconstruire une France plus solidaire, plus fraternelle. (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)

Here, the deictic pointing of the personal pronoun nous and indefinite subject pronoun tous is interesting: the immediate co-text refers to une France who is trying to ‘live normally’, to learn the values of respect and solidarity and recognising the place for ‘all’ its children. Kacet expresses a desire that ‘we’ will emerge from this
crisis and ‘rebuild’ France; the implication is that the deictic referents of nous are assigned an active role in the future of France and consequently are members of the in-group in French society. The role assigned to nous in this extract contrasts with the marginalised and excluded role in the first extract above. Additionally, placing the noun quartiers within inverted commas suggests its status as a contested word in French discourse. However, the proceeding indefinite pronoun tous raises a certain amount of ambiguity as to whether Kacet is placing himself and other immigrants within this group. Such ambiguity regarding the place of immigrants in French society and their identity within the context of a French national identity reflects the difficulties created by the assimilationist model of integration, discussed at section 4.3.2.3. As Bellier (2008: 136-137) points out the following in relation to the French model of integration:

[...]

Thus, Text 3 is an example of how news discourse is used to construct a definition of French national identity that is far from straight-forward in the context of multicultural France.

The previous two texts analysed in this section (Text 6 and 9) assumed in-group homogeneity and singularity, and used personal pronouns within the editorial genre to articulate discourses of nationalism and sameness which by implication exclude those who are not part of this national ‘we’. However, Text 3 shows how there are counter-discourses running throughout Mini-RiCo which challenge this hegemonic interpretation of French national identity. Petersoo (2007: 432) makes similar observations in her analysis of national deixis in the UK media representations of Scottish national identity, noting that ‘there is no simple and banal national “we” in the media, but a kaleidoscope of different “we”s’. The CADS analysis in Chapter Seven further analyses the use of nous, ils and eux in RiCo and concludes that nous
is used to reinforce a discourse of separation, whereby French society is divided along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines, with inhabitant of the banlieues positioned as outsiders.

6.3 The Discursive Creation of an Out-Group: Discourses of Difference

6.3.1 Introduction

This section analyses how in its reporting of events relating to 2005 urban violence the French press discursively construct an out-group by drawing on discourses which emphasise the difference of immigrant minority groups, particularly those living in the banlieues, from mainstream French society. The foregoing discussion showed how discourses of sameness necessarily imply a difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’; this section outlines how difference is expressed throughout Mini-RiCo. Discourses of difference serve to ‘establish social, political and economic practices that preclude certain groups from material and symbolic resources’ (Hall 1989; cited by Erjavec, 2001: 91). Consequently, in Mini-RiCo the image of the majority as a singular social group and the minority as the other is expressed, and immigrants those living in the banlieues are depicted as being outside the homogenously imagined society. Discourses of difference remind newspaper readers of the characteristics and traits ‘they’ share which are different to the rest of France, and a further distinction can therefore be drawn between ‘them’ and ‘us’.

As there are two discursive patterns which cumulatively contribute to the creation of this order of discourse, analysis of the discursive construction of difference is broken into two sections in the following paragraphs: first, a discourse of separation and othering; and next, a discourse of cultural incompatibility. The former considers how the othering of those who live in the banlieues is discursively created through analysis of a discourse of separation which positions the suburbs as literally and metaphorically peripheral and separate. The crisis and associated violence is confined to specific nominated areas which are negatively characterised; as a result, French people are distanced from the problem and the banlieues are not considered representative of mainstream French society (e.g. Text 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 15). Regarding the latter, the French press draw on what can be called a discourse of
cultural incompatibility to avoid explicitly rejecting immigrant and minority groups on the grounds of race or colour. Instead, cultural incompatibility is used an exclusionary mechanism which is not constructed as racism, but rather as legitimate cultural self-defence (Van Dijk, 1992), seen particularly in Text 16, and to a lesser extent in Text 2 and 3.

6.3.2 Discourse of Separation and Othering
The representation of the banlieues by the French news media as separate and different to what is perceived as the ‘real’ France contributes to the expression of a discourse of difference and consequently the division of French society into ‘them’ versus ‘us’ binary opposites. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 54) refer to predication strategies in the discursive presentation of self and other in discourse, which they explain as ‘linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena. Through predication, persons, things, events and practices are specified and characterised with respect to quality, quantity, space, time and so on’. The French press consistently assign pejorative qualities to the banlieues and those living there: the crisis and associated violence witnessed in November 2005 are confined to specific nominated areas which are negatively characterised and interpreted as being outside the boundaries of the homogenously constructed French society. Representing the suburbs in this way distances the French people from the problems and negative behaviour associated with the banlieues and the difficulties highlighted by urban violence are not therefore characteristic of typical French society – the suburbs are an exception, and the French press are keen to emphasise the distinction by drawing on discourses of separation and othering. The discussion below is structured as follows: first, the construction by the French press of the banlieues as being distinct from what is perceived as ‘real’ France is outlined, and second, the negative characterisation of the suburbs is considered.

6.3.2.1 The Banlieues are Different from and Separate to the Rest of France
The naming of the areas where violence took place, as well as a variety of metaphors and vocabulary from the lexical fields of lawlessness and distance, allows the French news media to construct the banlieues as being separate to the rest of France. As
previously established, naming strategies necessarily imply power relations, and as Clark (1992: 209) points out, ‘naming is a powerful ideological tool […]’ Different names for an object represent different ways of perceiving it. The newspapers adopt a relatively homogenous approach to naming the areas which witnessed violent outbreaks and across Mini-RiCo the nouns banlieue/s, quartier/s and cité/s are used interchangeably in descriptions referring to the geographical location of the riots. These terms appear to be used implicitly to collectively refer to certain areas in France which have a high concentration of immigrants and/or have experienced issues of social unrest in the past. Only rarely in Mini-RiCo are neighbourhoods where violence took place (e.g. Clichy-sous-Bois, Vaulx-en-Velin) identified by name (see also section 7.3); typically, areas are only specifically nominated in news reports detailing particular incidents of violence.

Thus, French journalists use the nouns banlieue/s, quartier/s and cité/s interchangeably with the assumed understanding that they are not referring generally to ‘suburbs’, ‘areas’ or ‘cities’ in France. For instance, Text 2, published in Le Figaro in early November 2005 while the violence was spreading across France, provides examples of the interchangeable use of these terms. Entitled ‘Banlieues: vingt-cent ans après’, the text reflects on the problems of the suburbs in France, and efforts by various governments to tackle ongoing social issues. Foregrounding the noun banlieues in the headline without any additional contextual information suggests the implicit connotations associated with the term and draws on the taken-for-granted meaning of the word.\(^{52}\) Consider also the following extracts from the article:

\begin{quote}
C’était en 1990. Vaulx-en-Velin s’enflammait, la France découvrait le problème des « quartiers »

Pourtant les chiffres sont là : 200 quartiers « difficiles » dans les années 90, plus de 900 aujourd’hui. Près de 30 000 véhicules brûlés depuis le début de l’année. 3 000 par mois ! 100 par jour! (Text 2: Le Figaro, 4 Nov 2005).
\end{quote}

\(^{52}\) Similarly, Hargreaves (1996: 608) traces the role of the media in the emergence of the banlieues as recognised delimited spaces in French public discourse. He notes that from 1991 onwards the noun ‘BANLIEUES’ became a ‘tag’ placed in capitals before headlines discussing what were conceived as ‘problem-districts’ in France. He argues that ‘the tag serves to situate the news event within a preconceived category, which contextualises the report and is in turn exemplified by it’.
These extracts demonstrate how words are not always literally interpreted but can be ‘ideologically encoded’ (Fairclough, 1989): in the first extract the term quartiers is proceeded by the expression le problème and is placed in quotation marks. Similarly, the quartiers are described as «difficiles». The use of quotation marks, Richardson (2004: 45) suggests, ‘demonstrates not only the constructive role the reporter in the story but also the ideological stake which journalists have in disavowing such a role’. In the case of the French printed media, there appears to be an acknowledgment of the contested nature of these terms, as well as presupposed knowledge of readers’ interpreting them not in the literal sense but as referring to specific areas in France.

Similarly, in the extracts below the noun cité is placed in the object position and following nominalised constructions (la violence de, le pourrissement de), with the implicit understanding that cité refers to specific areas in France, and not every urban area:

Sans que les uns ni les autres parviennent à enrayer la progression effrayante de la violence des cités

Fermeté d’abord, car le pourrissement des cités se nourrit des démissions de l’Etat face aux petits caïds. (Text 2: Le Figaro, 4 Nov 2005)

This pattern is repeated throughout Mini-RiCo, and journalists do not refer to areas where violence broke out by name but instead use the generic terms banlieue/s, quartier/s and cité/s interchangeably to assume homogeneity among the suburbs, as in the following extracts:

La toupie médiatique du ministère de l’Intérieur, qui a multiplié les faux pas ces derniers mois, a ouvert, avec ses provocations sur les banlieues après le décès de deux adolescents à Clichy-sous-Bois, une dangereuse boîte de Pandore. (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

[...] l’embrasement de quartiers dits « sensibles » fait figure d’ambaine pour une droite en échec sur tous les fronts, particulièrement sur celui de l’emploi. (Text 1: L’Humanité, 3 Nov 2005)

53 Turpin (2012a: 107-108) discusses the origins of the word cité and notes that initially in the Middle Ages the term cité designated the oldest part of a town, and by the nineteenth century it came to signify a ‘groupe de maisons formant un ensemble clos à l’intérieur d’une ville ou un ensemble d’habitations ayant la même destination’. This interpretation evolved to the point where the Grand Robert dictionary now assigns a more nuanced definition to the word cité labelling it an area ‘habité par des personnes à revenus modesties, souvent des immigrés (La cité des 4000 à La Courneuve, Les cités de la banlieue)’.

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2005 ne laissera pas un bon souvenir dans la mémoire collective des Français. Rappelons-nous : le « non » des Français au traité constitutionnel pour l'Europe ; la longue flambée dans les quartiers difficiles de nos cités ; l'effarante disqualification de notre système judiciaire dans l'affaire d'Outreau. (Text 9: Ouest France, 23 Dec 2005)

In the first extract the neighbourhood of Clichy-sous-Bois is specifically named, but Nicolas Sarkozy’s reaction is criticised as having antagonised all the suburbs: the implication is that all the suburbs are the same, and Sarkozy’s negative characterisation of the events in one particular Parisian suburb is simultaneously negatively characterising all areas with a similar demographic makeup. In the second extract the adjective sensible\(^5\) is placed in inverted commas and combined with the nominalised verb dits to again highlight the contested nature of the naming strategies for the suburbs. Clichy-sous-Bois – the Parisian neighbourhood where the violence first broke out – is also used metonymically in one article:

*Et ne touchez pas aux symboles, ce qui ne ferait que désespérer un peu plus Clichy-sous-Bois. La classe politique ne doit pas choisir une France contre l'autre ; et elle doit s'interroger sur les modes de représentation qui sont les siens.* (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)

As outlined previously, metonymy replaces the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it in either concrete or abstract terms (Wodak *et al.*, 2009: 43); in this case, substituting the residents of the *banlieues* throughout France with the name of a particularly significant suburb further reinforces the presumption that all the *banlieues* are the same and carry similar negative connotations. Additionally, the metonymic use of Clichy-sous-Bois to represent people who live in the suburbs reinforces a discourse of separation whereby certain neighbourhoods are constructed as being different from other cities in France.

A discourse of separation regarding the *banlieues* in *Mini-Rico* is also achieved linguistically through the use of vocabulary from the lexical field of lawlessness and distance. This is particularly evident in one text in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 15), but before analysing that in detail the presence of this discourse in other texts (Text 1, 2, 4 and 8) is first considered. Two politicians in *Mini-RiCo* (Jacques Chirac and former

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\(^{5}\) Turpin (2012: 111-112) also considers the adjective sensible when used to describe the *banlieues/quartiers/cités* and argues that is euphemistically used to avoid discussing the complex problems facing the suburbs. She maintains that ‘Flou, le lexème fonctionne comme euphémisme et masque la question sociale, celle du chômage, de la pauvreté, du manque de perspective, question le plus souvent évacuée du discours des médias consacré aux banlieues’.
Minister for the Interior Charles Pasqua) are cited as referring to the *banlieues* as a *zone de non-droit*:

« Il ne peut pas exister de *zone de non-droit* en République et il revient aux forces de l'ordre (...) de faire appliquer la loi et de garantir à chacun le respect et la sécurité ». (Text 1: *L'Humanité*, 3 Nov 2005)


Using terminology from the lexical field of lawlessness (*zone de non-droit*) implies that the areas where the violence took place lie outside the boundaries of ‘lawful’ France, an area which is unsafe for most French citizens (‘us’). Additionally, a number of journalists draw on the lexical field of distance to emphasise the discourse of separation: one text refers the *fractures* highlighted by *la violence qui a éclaté dans les banlieues* (Text 8) and another (Text 4), a general news article published at the height of the crisis, uses the demonstrative adjective *ces* to indicate an assumed difference between the *banlieues* and other areas in France. Describing the actions of Sarkozy, the text states that:

*Nouveauté, il a quand même dit tendre « une main fraternelle et audacieuse » en direction de ces quartiers*. (Text 4: *Ouest France*, 16 Nov 2005)

The demonstrative adjective *ces* draws on a presumed shared understanding between journalist and readers of the connotations associated with ‘these neighbourhoods’ and reinforces a perception of a ‘real’ difference between the *banlieues* and mainstream French society. Thus, French newspapers from across the ideological spectrum draw on vocabulary from the lexical field of lawlessness and distance and the effect of this is to implicitly remind readers that the *banlieues* are separate – literally and figuratively – from the rest of France.

Text 15 provides an example of this discourse of separation, and both the journalist and those living in the *banlieues* who are cited in the article construct one particular suburb as being separate to the rest of France. Published in *L’Humanité* at the end of May 2006, Text 15 reflects on the events of the winter of 2005 by following in the footsteps of Sandra – a secondary school teacher – as she walks around the east-Parisian suburb of Montfermeil. It uses lexical strategies including passive clauses
and direct quotation to highlight how those living in the banlieues – through their representations of daily life in the east-Parisian suburb of Montfermeil – construct themselves as being distinct from alternative French society. The text directly quotes a number of young people living there, thereby giving their assertions a sense of ‘facticity and authenticity’ (Tuchman, 1978); the young people and residents of the suburb are directly quoted in the following extracts:

"Au pied de leur immeuble, Moussa et Medhi sont rejoints par Mohammed, vingt et un ans. « Brûler, c'est le seul moyen qu'on a pour se faire entendre, lance-t-il, énervé. S'il n'y avait pas eu ça, qui se serait intéressé à ce qui se passe ici ? »

Un brin provocateur, [Mohammed] lâche : « De toute manière, ici, on passe tous par la case prison. »

« Ici, même si tu sors de l'école avec un diplôme, tu enchaînes les stages et les missions d'intérim au moins jusqu'à vingt-cinq ans, nous dit Nourredine. Fatalement, la démotivation arrive un jour ou l'autre... » (Text 15: L’Humanité, 31 May 2006)

The sense of separation and distance felt by the residents of Montfermeil from the rest of society is indicated by repetition of the adverb ici, questioning – using the rhetorical mood and conditional tense – the interest of those outside the banlieues in what happens ‘here’. The deictic pointing of the adverb ici is implicit in these direct quotations: it refers to both to Montfermeil, specifically, but also to the suburbs generally. The final two extracts above are direct quotations from ‘Mohammed’ and ‘Nourredine’ (pseudonyms are given to those mentioned in the article), and they again encapsulate the estrangement felt by those living in the banlieues. The use of the passive voice on passe with the adjective tous emphasises the perception that a prison sentence is a certainty for those ‘here’. The choice of pseudonyms – Nourredine, Mohammed, Moussa, and Medhi – is an additional marker of difference, and unquestionably indicates their ethnic origin and their status as immigrants, and consequent difference to other members of French society. CDA as a methodological approach requires that ideological implications of alternative lexical choices be considered and had the names Nicolas, Céline or Alexandre, for instance, been chosen as pseudonyms it would possibly have altered interpretation of this text by readers of L’Humanité.
While the author of the text is sympathetic to the experience of those in the Parisian suburb and is critical of their treatment, throughout the article the journalist implicitly draws on a discourse of separation. Consider the following extract:

La relégation, ici, n’est pas qu’un sentiment. Les Bosquets, c’est 20 % des 26 000 habitants de Montfermeil. Mais seulement 10 % des électeurs et quelques centaines de votants. Abderammane montre les immeubles autour : « Moi, je n’ai qu’une question : où sont passés nos impôts ? » (Text 15: L’Humanité, 31 May 2006)

The deictic adverb ici again indicates the perceived difference between this banlieue and the rest of France. Abderammane’s questioning of where ‘our’ taxes go indicates how those living in Montfermeil position themselves vis-à-vis French society: Abderammane contributes financially to the State through the payment of taxes, but yet he – and others living in his neighbourhood – fails to reap the benefits for such contributions. As a result, sentiments of exclusion and separation are reinforced. The co-text of his comments links his feelings of exclusion to low voter turnout in the Montfermeil area, and the journalist’s assertions that la relégation, ici, n'est pas qu'un sentiment implicitly adds approval to Abderammane’s perception of his segregation and distance from mainstream French society.

A discourse of separation is also articulated throughout this text (Text 15) through lexical and semantic fields which construct the cité of Montfermeil as bounded physically from other areas in Paris, as in the following examples:

...ils oublient un peu les murs de la cite
...le bar PMU à l’entrée de la cite
«Comme les flics savaient qu’ils ne pouvaient pas les attraper dans la cité...» (Text 15: L’Humanité, 31 May 2006)

The suburb is constructed in the extracts above – by Sandra (the teacher), the journalist, and a resident of Montfermeil, respectively – as being physically separate from the rest of Paris, with a clearly defined entry point and surrounded by walls. In reality, Montfermeil is not surrounded by walls but forms part of the large urban sprawl in the greater Parisian suburbs. One of the people cited in the text, ‘Nourredine’, also draws on the lexical field of lawlessness to construct the suburbs as lying outside the scope of the law in the final extract above: the police knew that catching suspects within the cité was unfeasible. Here, their construction as being
outside the law comes to be synonymous for their exclusion from France, in terms of their social, geographical and cultural exclusion. It has been established previously (section 2.5.4.2) that quotation is ‘a highly valued aspect of news’ (Pietikäinen, 2001: 648), and throughout Mini-RiCo suburban and immigrant minorities are rarely directly quoted (the only other instance is in Text 7, discussed in section 5.3.4). Residents of the banlieues are predominantly spoken for or about, rather than represented in direct discourse. Furthermore, Pietikäinen (2001: 648) points out that ‘access to news is highly controlled; who is given access and who is allowed to define events in their own words is considered valuable’. In Text 15 residents of the suburb of Montfermeil articulate a discourse of separation in ‘their own words’ (Pietikäinen, 2001: 648) and this adds emphasis to the perception of the banlieues as different from other areas in France.

As a result, the overall discourse which emerges in this article (Text 15) and throughout Mini-RiCo is one which can be termed separateness or difference: through passive clauses, direct quotation and vocabulary from the lexical field of distance and separation the banlieues and those living there are depicted by the French press as being outside or different to French society. As is typical with a newspaper from the left side of the ideological spectrum, L’Humanité criticises this situation, and attempts to highlight the social exclusion felt by those in banlieues – they are denied the benefits of French citizenship and feel distanced, literally and figuratively, from the rest of society. Apart from Text 15, other articles in Mini-RiCo do not criticise the separation of the banlieues but present it as the reality in French society and reinforce a dominant discourse which distinguishes between ‘us’ (the majority of French people) and ‘them’ (minority groups in the banlieues). It has been pointed out previously that news discourse plays an important role in creating an ‘apparent’ social reality (section 2.5.3), and by expressing a discourse of separation and othering journalists in Mini-RiCo are reiterating for readers the unquestioned assumption that the banlieues are not and cannot be considered as being on an equal footing with other areas in France.
6.3.2.2 Negative Characterisation of the Banlieues

A discourse of separation and of ‘them’ versus ‘us’ is also achieved by the negative characterisation of the banlieues and those who live there, using lexis, particularly collocates and metaphors, to construct an image of specified areas in France as in crisis and suffering from social decay. Depicting a group as other, and consequently different from ‘us’, frequently comprises the ascription of varying degrees of negativity to the out-group (Tekin, 2010), and throughout Mini-RiCo the banlieues are uniformly constructed as hostile and unpleasant places to live with negative qualities ascribed to those living there. Chilton (2004: 47) refers to such strategies as ‘delegitimisation’, arguing that:

Delegitimisation can manifest itself in acts of negative other-presentation, acts of blaming, scape-goating, marginalising, excluding, attacking the moral character of some individual or group, attacking the communicative cooperation of the other, attacking the rationality and sanity of the other. The extreme is to deny the humanness of the other’. The following paragraphs show how such strategies of othering and delegitimisation are present in texts in Mini-RiCo in order to negatively characterise the banlieues and those who live there. Collocates of the terms banlieue/s, quartier/s and cité/s are analysed firstly; following that the naming of those living in the suburbs is considered, before concluding with a detailed analysis of how one text (Text 15) negatively characterises the banlieue of Montfermeil in its description of everyday life for those living there.

Mindful of the ability of collocates to convey implicit messages (Fairclough, 1995b), collocates of the nouns banlieue/s, quartier/s and cité/s are now considered. As outlined at section 3.3.4.1 in discourse analysis collocates are defined as ‘common combinations of words that tend, statistically speaking, to keep company with one another’ (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 113) and can be used to convey implicit and explicit messages. The term banlieue/s collocates most frequently with the noun violence, or with synonymous constructions such as embrasements réguliers (Text 3), émeutes (Text 7, 11) or similar expressions connoting violence, including les voitures embrasent les banlieues (Text 14) and les casseurs des banlieues (Text 2). The noun crise is also a collocate of banlieue (as in crise des banlieues (Text 5, 6, 9, 13) and la violente crise des banlieues (Text 6)). Metaphors from the lexical field of
violence and waste are used in one text in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 2) to negatively characterise suburban areas in France:

> ...pour des millions de nos concitoyens prisonniers de banlieues balkanisées, la vie quotidienne devient un enfer.


The image of hell in the first extract further recalls the recurring metaphor of fire which pervades *Mini-RiCo* (section 5.2.2), and characterises the *banlieues* as an undesirable place to be, with daily life for the citizens a constant torment. Comparisons are drawn between the suburbs and the Balkans (*prisonniers de banlieues balkanisées*), as a means of emphasising cultural and linguistic dissimilarity. Furthermore, we have seen that metaphor ‘constructs and defines the social world by implementing certain interpretations and excluding others’ (Archakis and Tsakona, 2009: 365). The metaphor of pouring or dumping millions of euro into the *banlieues* (déversé des milliards (combien, au juste?) dans les banlieues) implies a substantial wastage of public finances in areas which are already negatively connoted in the minds of French people.

Likewise, collocates of the terms *quartiers* and *cités* have strong negative connotations, including nouns *violence* (Text 2,15), *émeutes* (Text 15), *relégation* (Text 16), *l’isolement terrible* (Text 15), and adjectives *précarisée* (Text 5) and *difficiles* (Text 2,9). Metaphors of fire (*la longue flambée dans les quartiers difficiles de nos cités* (Text 9) and *l’embrasement de quartiers* (Text 1)) and that of rotting (*le pourrissement des cités* (Text 2)) further imply a negative characterisations of the suburbs. The textual emphasis on the suburbs as a source of decay or disease in society is not uncommon, and Fairclough (2001: 100) suggests that disease metaphors carry particular ideological significance as ‘they tend to take dominant interests (strikes, demonstrations, “riots”) as undermining (the health of) society per se’.

Similarly Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 60) note that metaphors associated with disease or infection are frequently employed in the negative predicational qualification of German and Austrian discourses about migrants or ethnic minorities.

55 The metaphor of disease is also evident also in *RiCo*, and it is seen in concordances of the noun *violence* (see section 7.2.4).
Focusing again on Text 15 – discussed in detail above in the preceding section – this article uses a ‘fly on the wall’ format to negatively present the suburb of Montfermeil using a variety of linguistic and grammatical constructions, including pejorative vocabulary and the selection of sentence structure. As mentioned, the author is highly critical of the living and social conditions of those in Montfermeil, and using the ‘fly on the wall’ reporting style facilitates the presentation of what can be interpreted as the harsh realities of life in the banlieues. Highlighting the negative experiences of those in Montfermeil reminds readers of the contrast between the suburbs and the rest of France, and the text includes vocabulary that depicts those living in the banlieues as inarticulate, unmotivated and without aim or purpose in life apart from sporadic periods of work:

Le jeune homme bredouille une réponse

Moussa se tâte. Medhi détourne la tête.

« Ici, même si tu sors de l’école avec un diplôme, tu enchaînes les stages et les missions d'intérim au moins jusqu’à vingt-cinq ans, nous dit Nourredine. Fatalement, la démotivation arrive un jour ou l’autre... »

Pas tranquille, Mohammed entre et sort du hall, jette un œil à gauche, à droite, lance une vanne, hèle un pote, puis repart. Il y a peu encore, il travaillait tous les matins sur les marchés, après avoir enchaîné pas moins de vingt-huit missions d'intérim. « Mais j'ai dû arrêter depuis que je suis recherché par la police », glisse-t-il. (Text 15: L’Humanité, 31 May 2006)

The text presents those living in the suburb of Montfermeil as uncommunicative and demotivated, using the verbs bredouiller and se taire, along with the description of ‘’Medhi’ turning his head to avoid engaging in conversation. Representing those living in Montfermeil this way aligns with one of Chilton’s (2004: 47) strategies of delegitimisation, mentioned above – ‘attacking the communicative cooperation of the other’ as a means of negatively presenting the out-group. Additionally, la démotivation is presented as inevitable for those living in the banlieues, using the present tense form of the verb arriver and the adverb fatalement. The third extract employs the linguistic strategy of overlexicalisation to imply that the behaviour of ‘Mohammed’ is somewhat suspicious:

Pas tranquille, Mohammed entre et sort du hall, jette un œil à gauche, à droite, lance une vanne, hèle un pote, puis repart. (Text 15: L’Humanité, 31 May 2006)
Overlexicalisation, Fowler (1991: 85) suggests, is ‘an excess of quasi-synonymous terms for entities and ideas that are a particular preoccupation or problem in the culture’s discourse’; similarly, Fairclough (2001: 96) maintains that ‘overwording shows preoccupation with some aspect of reality – which may indicate that it is a focus of ideological struggle’. Providing an excessive amount of detail on ‘Mohammed’s’ actions (entering and leaving the hall/lobby, looking right and left, cracking a joke and signalling to a friend) draws attention to his behaviour, with the possible implication that it is mistrustful or threatening.

Further enhancing this image of the banlieues as a hostile environment are descriptions of the poor physical conditions of the buildings in the suburbs:

*D'un doigt, Mohammed désigne les murs du hall, constellés de graffiti multicoles.*

*Le décor, construit dans les années soixante, flirte aujourd'hui avec la désolation : chaussées parsemées de nids-de-poule, façades d'immeubles décatis d'où affleure le ferraillement du béton, ascenseurs hors service... (Text 15: L’Humanité, 31 May 2006)*

The surrounding co-text and tone of this article infers that the journalist is critical of the poor physical state of the buildings and homes in the banlieues, foregrounded through explicit descriptions of poorly-maintained structures and graffiti-covered walls. The second extract above places the old-fashioned nature of the decoration in the main clause, with further detail backgrounded as a list in the subordinate clause. The verb *flirter* from the lexical field of play undermines the seriousness of the neglect of these homes, and the noun *la désolation* conceals agency of those responsible for the upkeep of the homes in the suburbs, most of which fall within social housing schemes (as discussed in section 4.3.4). The concluding ellipsis implies an unfinished – or perhaps never-ending – list of physical destruction in the suburb of Montfermeil. Throughout this article the journalist ascribes negative qualities to the banlieues in his representation of the daily life for those living in Montfermeil, and although critical, a discourse of separation and othering is created which draws a distinction between life for ‘us’ and life for ‘them’ in the suburbs. As mentioned above, the French news media use the nouns banlieue/s, cité/s and quartier/s interchangeably to describe troubled areas with high concentration of immigrants; thus, it can be argued that by placing such focus on one particular suburb
and concentrating on a negative – if critical – representation of Montfermeil, this is likely to be interpreted as representative of daily life in the *banlieues* generally throughout France. It will be discussed in section 7.3 that all four newspapers in *RiCo* produced articles purporting to offer an insight into ‘daily life’ in a particular suburb, and it will be argued that this form of reporting operates as a subtle form of othering, as readers are offered a voyeuristic insight into how ‘they’ live. Articles such as Text 15 explicitly set out to represent ‘their’ voices, whereas the voice of the ordinary French person is assumed – by default – to be that of the newspaper. In the current article (Text 15) the out-group in French society is negatively characterised, and it has been argued that ‘within intergroup contexts, people construct a contextually appropriate representation of the defining features of each group’ (Matu and Lubbe, 2007: 406). In the case of the *banlieues*, the ‘defining features’ are constructed by the French press as physically run-down and neglected areas where the people, particularly young men, are uncommunicative and unmotivated.

In sum, textual analysis shows that throughout *Mini-RiCo* the *banlieues* are uniformly constructed as hostile and unpleasant places to live, with negative qualities ascribed to those living there by lexis, metaphor and quotation. Thus, discourses of separation and othering are reinforced, and the deictic delineation between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ in French society is constructed.

### 6.3.3 Discourse of Cultural Incompatibility

The final section of the analysis of a discourse of difference in *Mini-RiCo* now focuses on how culture is used as an exclusionary mechanism to create a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ divide in French society. The absence of discussions regarding race and skin colour in *Mini-RiCo* is notable, with exclusion instead justified based on cultural incompatibility. National culture, like national identity, is discursively constructed (Hall, 1995), and is typically expressed as unifying and homogenous (Gellner, 1990: 37-38). As Hall (1995: 616) argues, ‘to put it crudely, however different its members may be in terms of class, gender or race, a national culture seeks to unify them into one cultural identity, to represent them all as belonging to the same great national family’. Constructing culture as both unifying and singular
facilitates the rise of what has been termed ‘New Racism’ (Barker, 1981): overt expressions of exclusion based on race have been replaced by rejection grounded on cultural difference and cultural essentialism. Culture, ethnicity, religion etc. are advanced as having fundamental features incompatible with those of a majority population and thus Aykaç (2008: 128) argues that:

[…] the “other” is different; his/her difference is recognized yet seen as irreconcilable with the identity of the dominant group. Moreover, he/she is seen as a threat to the identity, the values, the economic stability and the security of the majority population.

Explicit rejection for reasons of colour, race, ethnicity etc. is usually not socially appropriate, whereas justifications offered in terms of culture linked to national identity are likely to be more socially acceptable (Silverman, 1999). In Mini-RiCo exclusion on the grounds of colour are in the main avoided and instead a discourse of cultural incompatibility is used as an exclusionary mechanism – a discourse which has been recognised as a feature of ‘New Racism’ (Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2008). Exclusion is not constructed as racism, but rather as legitimate cultural self-defence (Van Dijk, 1992: 93). The limited references to race and skin colour in texts in Mini-RiCo are first discussed (Text 2, 3, 6 and 16); following that a discourse of cultural incompatibility in one particular text (Text 16) is considered in detail before outlining the presence of this discourse in other articles in Mini-RiCo (Text 5 and 11).

In Mini-RiCo there are limited references to race or skin colour: one text (Text 6, an editorial published in Le Monde) expresses the desire that those in positions of leadership be less ‘white’. Furthermore, another article (Text 16) refers to how the riots forced the emergence of la question noire:

Les dernières émeutes ont bien fait émerger la question noire, avec une problématique sociale et culturelle jusqu’ici négligée. Néanmoins, la situation pourrait évoluer avec l’inscription croissante des femmes africaines aux cours d’alphabétisation. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

Here la question noire is presented as an existing ‘fact’, without any additional discussion or evaluation of what this might mean for French society. Agency is avoided as the past participle négligée does not have an associated subject, the adverb néanmoins implies that regardless of this state of affairs, responsibility for
change can be attributed to ‘African women’ who enrol in literacy classes. Modality expressed by conditional tense (pourrait) indicates the journalists’ scepticism of success, and the choice of the verb évoluer implies that a change in French society will come about as a result of a natural process, rather than by a determined political or social effort. The discussion below focuses on this text (Text 16) in detail, and demonstrates how throughout the article a discourse of cultural incompatibility is primarily used in the place of race as an exclusionary device.

However, before considering that article, it is interesting to briefly note how two texts in Mini-RiCo implicitly refer to the issue of race through reference to the victory of the French national football team in the World Cup in 1998. Text 2 is an opinion piece from Le Figaro which considers failures by successive governments to tackle French social problems; mid-way through journalist Alexis Brezet states that:

Tous les deux ans, comme aujourd’hui, une flambée particulièrement brutale, un acte plus atroce que les autres concentrent l’attention. Mais, très vite, la France officielle revient à ces certitudes - Ah ! la victoire des blacks-blancs-beurs en 1998, qui consommait le triomphe de notre « modèle d'intégration » ! (Text 2: Le Figaro, 4 Nov 2005)

Furthermore, Text 3 offers an appraisal of French society from the perspective of ‘integrated’ immigrant Salem Kacet. The article opens and closes with a reference to French football star and captain of the 1998 World Cup-winning team Zinedine Zidane:

Mon Dieu, que Zidane est loin ! Les événements de la banlieue parisienne viennent souligner avec cruauté les espoirs qu’avait fait naître cette France métissée, une France qui gagne, une France heureuse de vivre ensemble.

Et dans les « quartiers », tous sont attentifs à la façon dont nous sortirons de cette crise qui dure depuis trente ans. A la façon dont nous allons reconstruire une France plus solidaire, plus fraternelle. Mon Dieu, que Zidane est loin... (Text 3: Le Figaro, 8 Nov 2005)

Following the victory of the national team in Paris in 1998, sport – particularly football – was used as a means of promoting social inclusion and national solidarity (Dine, 2003), since the team was composed of the children and grandchildren of immigrants from numerous former French colonies including Algeria, Senegal, Guadeloupe and French Guyana, among others. Le Monde editor Jean-Marie Colombani (1998) declared at the time that the victory ‘pourrait symboliser un changement d’époque [...] symbolisant une unité nationale refondée sur les pelouses au terme d’une “guerre” mondiale ludique. Apportant un démenti à l’inéluctabilité
d’une France sociale et politique éclatée [...]’. Reference in Text 2 above to the victory of the blacks-blancs-beurs (a play on the bleu-blanc-rouge of the French national flag) in the article from Le Figaro is an implicit acknowledgement of the race issue. Similarly, evoking Zinedine Zidane in the opening and closing lines of Text 3 could be interpreted as a type of ‘iconization’ (Irvine and Gal, 2000). Irvine and Gal (2000: 37) suggest that ‘linguistic features that index social groups or activities appear to be iconic representations of them, as if a linguistic feature somehow depicted or displayed a social group’s inherent nature or essence’. While Irvine and Gal focus on ‘linguistic features’, such as vocabulary, pronunciation etc., it can be argued that Zidane is iconised by the French media to the extent that he can be interpreted as representing the essence of a particular social group. That is, the generation of children of immigrants from former French colonies who settled in France and, at the time of the World Cup final in 1998, were perceived as ‘integrated’ into French society. Referencing Zidane and commenting that ‘we are a long way’ from him is an implicit acknowledgement of the integration difficulties facing immigrants to France, while highlighting Zidane’s former status a type of ‘poster boy’ for the success of the French assimilationist model of integration. Thus, race, while not entirely absent, is in the main avoided throughout Mini-RiCo, apart from the brief references just outlined; instead focus is placed on culture to justify the exclusion of minority immigrant group in what can be called a discourse of cultural incompatibility, where ‘their’ culture is presented as being incompatible with ‘ours’.

6.3.3.1 ‘Their’ Culture is Incompatible with ‘Ours’
The discourse of cultural incompatibility is evident in three articles in Mini-RiCo, and most particularly in Text 16 from Le Figaro which has been classified as an opinion article using the classification system outlined in section 3.2.2. This article ostensibly considers the causes of the riots from a geographical standpoint, with the headline claiming that ‘La carte des émeutes de novembre 2005 confirme le profond malaise des immigrants africains’. However, little attention is paid to the

56 Richardson (2004: 46) argues that ‘the importance of any particular actor, statement, argument (etc.) is implied by its location in the text. News text is structured like an inverted pyramid, whereby the facts/points deemed to be most important are located at the top’. Consequently, referencing Zidane in the opening lines of the article points to the significance of race and ethnicity as a factor to be considered in discourse surrounding the 2005 riots.
geographical dimension of the violence; instead the article justifies the exclusion of African immigrants from French society on cultural grounds, implicitly reinforcing the existence of a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ social divide. The following paragraphs are structured as follows: firstly, Text 16 is considered in detail, focusing on how adverbs, pronouns and the present tense are used to present the journalist’s generalised assertions as obvious facts and to discursively oppose African and French culture. The analysis then shows how a number of features of African culture are highlighted in the text as being particularly incompatible with French culture, the cumulative effect of which is to emphasise immigrant – particularly African immigrant – culture as being in conflict with French norms. Following the analysis of Text 16, the presence of a discourse of cultural incompatibility in two other articles in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 5 and 11) is considered, to show how this discourse contributes to the dichotomous ‘them’ and ‘us’ divide which pervades the sample of French newspaper discourse.

Throughout Text 16 generalised and stereotypical statements about immigrants are presented using adverbs, pronouns and the present tense to create a discourse of difference, particularly one of cultural incompatibility. In the discursive presentation of in-groups and out-groups ‘stereotyping justifies or rationalizes existing negative attitudes towards social groups and social conditions in which one group is systematically treated more favourably than another’ (Matu and Lubbe, 2007: 406). Generalisations in the article are also presented through the absence of quotations from immigrants or those living in the suburbs to support the assertions presented; instead their experiences are presented as ‘facts’, a strategy which we have seen that Richardson (2004: 45) proposes is ‘an index of power’, since such ‘facts’ are themselves a product of social discourse. Repetition of adverbs draws on readers’ common-sense understanding of the daily lives of immigrants, and reinforces a stereotyped image, as in the following extract:

Les familles sahéliennes se sont installées dans les années 80 ou 90, suivies par de nouvelles populations venues du Cameroun, du Congo, de Guinée ou du Cap-Vert. Leurs foyers cumulent les handicaps. Car, le plus souvent, ces familles conservent le modèle démographique du village et les fratries y sont très nombreuses. Enfin, les mères sont souvent analphabètes. Or, le niveau d'éducation maternel conditionne
Generalised statements about immigrants to France (e.g. the mothers are often illiterate) are presented through repetition of the adverbs souvent and largement. The possessive adjective leurs, demonstrative adjective ces and adverbial pronoun y reinforces the underlying assumption that there is a difference between ‘their’ homes and those of the rest of France. Conjunctions car and or render assertions about African culture as undisputed facts, and these ‘facts’ are constructed as liabilities (des handicaps) in French society. The selection of a noun from the lexical field of disability points to an inherent difference between African and French culture, and indicates ‘their’ culture as something which is disadvantageous or atypical compared to ‘us’. In the extract above the conservation of indigenous demographic models, tendencies towards large families and the ‘fact’ that mothers of immigrant families are ‘often’ illiterate (les mères sont souvent analphabètes) are presented as incompatible with the French cultural model, and their children are therefore inherently disadvantaged by the imported parental cultural norms.

The discursive pattern seen in this extract is repeated throughout Text 16. A number of adverbs present generalised and vague statements about French immigrants as fact, including principalement, il est fréquent que, la plupart des, certains and souvent. These statements are negatively connoted and reinforce a discourse of cultural incompatibility; for instance consider the following quotations:

Les écarts d’âge sont souvent très importants avec les derniers fils. Il est fréquent que les jeunes grandissent avec des pères à la retraite qui partagent leur vie entre l’Afrique et la France.

Le décalage entre la norme familiale et la réalité de la société alentour est donc souvent à la fois très douloureux et profondément entravant. Certains en jouent pour échapper à toute autorité.

Au final, certains adolescents dénient toute autorité aux professeurs [...]. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)

The use of generalisations about the out-group assumes that readers will interpret them as common-sense; as Teo (2000: 17) points out, ‘the less evaluative and more factual generalizations appear, the less questionable and more generalized they become’. In the extracts above it is suggested ‘some’ young people do not respect the authority of their teachers, but the journalist does not specify whether this is the
majority or minority of young school-goers (*certains adolescents dénient toute autorité aux professeurs*). Likewise, the gap between immigrant familial norms and French social norms is ‘often’ both a source of distress and a hindrance; omitted from these statements is the experience of those who do not fall into this generalised and stereotyped categories of ‘some’ immigrants, categories created by the journalist without any apparent supporting evidence. A discourse of difference and cultural incompatibility is also evident in the following extract from Text 16, expressed through lexical choice and the discursive opposition of traditional African and French culture:

`Le choc est aussi de nature culturelle. Les familles d’origine sénégalaise et malienne sont principalement issues d’un milieu rural. […] La transposition brute de code culturel dans un milieu urbain occidental à la fois confiné et brutal fait vaciller les repères de ces familles et va jusqu’à les disloquer. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)`

The arrival of immigrants to France is defined as a ‘shock’, and the *milieu rural* from which most immigrants moved is contrasted with the *milieu urbain occidental* facing them in France. Placed in a passive position, the difference is such as to *fait vaciller* and *disloquer* these families, both verbs implying powerlessness and the imposed feeling of unsteadiness and displacement. Repetition of the adjective *brutale* from the lexical field of violence highlights the extreme nature of this cultural shock for African families, and again constructs immigrant and French culture as profoundly differing.

Throughout Text 16 a number of features of African culture are named as being particularly in conflict with French culture, including disciplinary norms, marital traditions and parental education levels. Singling out these particular aspects throughout the article allows the journalist to reinforce how ‘their’ culture is different from ‘ours’, and to present such features as inherently incompatible with French social and cultural norms. This is exemplified in the following extract which uses the present tense to draw on readers’ commonsense understanding of the way the world is, along with singling out disciplinary norms – euphemistically described as *modèles d’éducation* – among African families as being particularly different from those in France:
African immigrant culture is again negatively constructed vis-à-vis French culture using the adjective pénalisant, and the personal pronoun choice ils and possessive adjective leur reminds readers of the difference between ‘their’ norms, and ‘ours’. Vocabulary from the lexical field of dominance and submission is used throughout this article to construct African cultural norms both as violent and patriarchal. Lexical constructions used to describe ‘typical’ immigrant behaviour include:

*Ce sont donc les pères qui incarnent la loi*

*Ils imposent la soumission aux plus âgés de leurs enfants, exigeant qu’ils baissent les yeux devant les adultes. Des codes que les jeunes respectent en apparence, comme ces adolescents remplis de rage après la mort d’un camarade poignardé lors d’une rixe à Evry, au mois de mai. Ils étaient tous venus faire leurs condoléances à cette famille malienne, ont écouté les appels au calme des mères les yeux rivés au sol, avant de filer pour une expédition punitive une fois dans la rue. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)*

Thus, verbs from the lexical field of violence (imposer, exiger, forcer, défendre) construct brutality as an inherent feature of African immigrant culture; children are represented as submissive to dominant parental figures, through emphasis on the practice of lowering the eyes:

*ils baissent les yeux devant les adultes, les yeux rivés au sol […]. (Text 16: Le Figaro, 29 June 2006)*

The final extract above demonstrates how differences in marital traditions (les foyers polygames) are highlighted, and the inference is such that a polygamous domestic environment leads ‘in certain cases’ to violent confrontations.

The theme of inherent cultural difference is presented as an obvious matter of fact, particularly through the use of the present tense form of verbs as well as lexis which denotes a fundamental difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’ which can only have negative implications:
The terms déphasage, décalage and rupture prompt a discourse which constructs immigrant culture as profoundly differing from French culture; in particular, the noun déphasage places these cultures as diametrically opposed, akin to positive and negative electrical currents who repel each-other upon coming into contact. French cultural norms are thus constructed throughout Text 16 as dominant and hegemonic, while specific nominated features of immigrant way of life oppose these norms and are presented as being inherently disadvantageous in the French cultural context.

Having looked in detail at one text in the corpus which articulates a discourse of cultural incompatibility (Text 16), focus is now on how this discourse is evidenced throughout Mini-RiCo. Text 11 for instance considers how the legal right of ‘family unification’ is affecting immigration to France in recent years. The text suggests that this principle has been blamed by some political factions as being a major contributory factor to the 2005 riots; however, the journalist concludes that marriage to a French national is the most common route of entry for migrants, rather than the family reunification principle. While the text primarily draws on facts and statistics to support arguments made, the closing comments implicitly present immigrant and French culture as opposing:

Les enfants et les petits-enfants d’étrangers, nés en France, souhaitent souvent, par le mariage, garder un lien culturel avec le pays d’origine de leurs parents. (Text 11: Le Figaro, 5 Jan 2006)

As with some examples cited above, the generalising adverb souvent is used, and the verb garder implies that ‘cultural links’ might be lost. Again a difference between French and immigrant culture is implied.

Similarly, Text 5 is an editorial published in L’Humanité in late November 2005 as the violence throughout France was abating, and it considers how history will
interpret the crisis and the lessons that France might learn. As seen previously, this is an article from *L’Humanité* the former newspaper of the Communist Party and it is critical of the treatment of immigrants by successive French governments. However, in a discussion of how these riots form part of France’s history of popular uprising, well-known historian and demographer Emmanuel Todd is directly quoted using lexis to create a discourse of cultural incompatibility:


As discussed in section 2.5.4.2, journalistic discourse is inherently intertextual and direct quotation from respected sources indicate the preferred way of ‘reading’ a text and interpreting existing debates (Blommaert, 1999). The noun phrase *la désintégration de la famille maghrébine et africaine* is attributed to the contact between immigrant culture and French values, again referring to the exclusiveness and distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’. It has been argued that rejection for reasons of culture operates on commonsense ideology and essentialised understandings of what culture ‘is’: ‘it is intimately interlaced with what we “know” about the nature of differences between groups’ (Hanson-Easey and Augoustinos, 2010: 314). The cultural incompatibility of immigrants is presented in a number of articles in *Mini-RiCo* as an indisputable fact, primarily achieved through the use of generalising pronouns and adverbs, the present tense form of verbs and vocabulary which discursively opposes immigrant – particularly African immigrant – culture with French culture. Consequently, the differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’ are again emphasised, and immigrant minority groups are once more discursively excluded from French society.

### 6.4 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to uncover how the French printed news media position immigrant minority groups living in the *banlieues* as the out-group in relation to mainstream French society (the in-group) in *Mini-RiCo*. It identified discourses of sameness and difference, and showed how within these discourses a particular interpretation of French national identity is posited which implicitly excludes minority groups, in particular post-colonial migrants living in the *banlieues*. The
incidents of 2005 represented a time of enormous crisis in France, resulting in the declaration of a state of emergency and introduction of curfews. It has been observed that moments of crisis represent ‘a fundamental threat to the very stability of the system, a questioning of core assumptions and beliefs, and risk to high priority goals, including organizational image [...] and ultimately survival’ (Seeger and Ulmer, 2002: 126). The French press responded to the threat posed to their national model and national identity by drawing on simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary discourses of sameness and difference. The othering of those living in the banlieues and ostensibly responsible for the riots means that the civil disturbances are not therefore reflective of ‘our’ national character, and consequently the urban violence can be explained away as a result of a fundamental difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Consequently dominant hegemonies do not need to be questioned in light of these traumatic events and existing social hierarchies are reproduced which position immigrant minority groups in a subjugated position vis-à-vis majority French society.

Analysis of discourses of sameness revealed that the news texts in Mini-RiCo use discourses of continuity, republicanism and nationalism to construct a particular interpretation of French national identity which is based on a shared past, present and future and a collective republican identity. The editorial genre is used to speak on behalf of ‘us’, an assumed national community which is implicitly and explicitly exclusive of those of immigrant background. Particular attention was paid to the use of the pronoun nous in RiCo, and it was pointed out that the pronoun ‘we’ is referentially complex (Mulderrig, 2012: 708), at times used inclusively where the speaker/s and addressees are ‘bound together, jointly anchored to the deictic centre’ (Petersoo, 2007: 709) and other times used exclusively as a means of limiting a discursively imagined (national) community. Petersoo (2007: 709) suggests that ‘the listener may actively choose to include themselves in its referential scope, thus implying a degree of alignment with the speaker’s perspective’. Thus, analysts can only speculate as to how readers will position themselves along an in- and out-group division, and it is for both the producers and consumers of news discourse to assign group membership. In this way, consumers are co-constructors in the discursive creation of ‘them’ and ‘us’ groups in French society. Their implicit awareness of in-
and out-groups in French society is assumed in news reporting on the 2005 riots. As a result, social asymmetries and a distinction between majority French society and immigrant minorities are taken-for-granted as necessary ‘background knowledge’ by producers of most of the texts in Mini-RiCo.

Analysis in this chapter also revealed that a discourse of difference is used as a means of constructing a particular interpretation of French national identity which is implicitly and explicitly exclusive of immigrant minority groups living in the banlieues. Similar to the discourse patterns relating to the discourses of sameness, news producers reproduce assumptions relating to the banlieues and their inhabitants as naturalised, drawing on commonsense assumptions. A discourse of separation and othering constructs fundamental differences between ‘here’ (majority France) and ‘there’ (the suburbs), and the suburbs are negatively characterised as peripheral living spaces. A discourse of cultural incompatibility expresses assumptions regarding ‘their’ culture, and uses culture as a means of excluding minority groups from membership of the French national community. Again, consumers of news discourse are assumed to be complicit in the discursive construction of difference, and the stratification of French society along in- and out-group lines is presented as the status quo. This reinforces an ethnocentric view of the world whereby those who deviate from the consensual ‘we’ are stigmatised as different or other (Kelly-Holmes and O'Regan, 2004).

Although discourses of sameness and difference are articulated in virtually every text in Mini-RiCo (with the exception of texts which contain only fleeting references to the banlieues and the events of November 2005, e.g. Text 10), it can be argued that the presences of these orders of discourse is not always intended as a means of othering minority groups in the banlieues. It has been established that some texts in Mini-RiCo are sympathetic to the social, political and cultural exclusion of residents of the suburbs, particularly Text 5 and 15 from the left-wing former newspaper of the Communist Party, L’Humanité. However, in seeking to criticise the power asymmetries which exist in French society, journalists are bound to use the same ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourses. In a type of vicious circle, to criticise existing social
realities news producers have little option but to reproduce the naturalised assumptions about the existence of in- and out-groups in French society. Articles such as Text 5 and Text 15 thus, while seeking to highlight unequal relations of power in France, are unwitting co-constructors of discourses of sameness and difference.

This chapter thus confirms that the presence of in- and out-groups in French society is assumed in news reporting on the 2005 riots in Mini-RiCo. It identified that discourses of sameness and difference are used to construct a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse in relation to the positioning of suburban and immigrant minorities and majority French society. Additionally, it outlined the linguistic means (e.g. lexis, metaphor, intertextuality, sentence construction etc.) by which social power structures and hierarchies are maintained and reproduced in French news discourse. However, the findings discussed in this chapter and in Chapter Five can only be generalised at this point within the Mini-RiCo corpus, and cannot be assumed to be reflective of news reporting on the civil disturbances in 2005. To this end, the larger RiCo corpus is now examined to assess whether the patterns of discourse identified are also present, and whether any counter-discourses or additional discursive trends emerge from the substantially larger collection of news texts.
7 Corpus-Assisted Discourse Analysis: Descriptions of the Riots, Profiling the Suburbs, Naming and Inter-Group Relations in RiCo

7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether the discursive trends and orders of discourse identified in the preceding CDA of Mini-RiCo in Chapters Five and Six can be generalised and viewed as representative of wider patterns of discourse across a significantly larger corpus of texts (RiCo). The previous chapters identified how the events and actors relating to French urban violence in November 2005 are constructed in a corpus of French news media texts and examined how the banlieues and their inhabitants are discursively constructed by the printed news media. Discourses of blamelessness relating to descriptions and interpretations of the riots were examined, and patterns of naming social actors were outlined (in particular Nicolas Sarkozy and immigrant/suburban youth). Additionally, Chapter Six uncovered how discourses of sameness and difference allow for social power structures and hierarchies to be reproduced and sustained in printed media discourse. This chapter uses a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) approach – combining a Critical Discourse Analytical methodology with the techniques of Corpus Linguistics (CL) – to examine discourses present in the RiCo corpus. As outlined in Chapter Four, RiCo is a corpus of 2,271 texts (1,207,803 million words) composed of news articles from Le Figaro, L’Humanité, Le Monde and Ouest France and incorporating coverage of the civil disturbances of 2005 and the banlieues generally from 27 October 2005 to 30 June 2006. Analysis in this chapter uses some of the techniques of CL (specifically frequency and clusters, collocates and concordancing) in order to investigate whether discursive patterns identified in Mini-RiCo can be generalised in the larger RiCo corpus. Following on from the findings outlined in Chapters Five and Six, particular attention is paid to firstly, discourses of blamelessness and naming in descriptions of the riots, and secondly, discourses of sameness and difference.
Section 3.4.3 discussed the ‘methodological synergy’ of CL and (Critical) Discourse Analysis (Baker et al., 2008), and outlined how CADS combines the qualitative and quantitative analysis of discourse. Defined as ‘the investigation and comparison of features of particular discourse types, integrating into the analysis, where appropriate, techniques and tools developed within Corpus Linguistics’ (Partington, 2010: 88), Baker (2006: 10-17) points to the following advantages of a CADS approach to (C)DA: possibilities for reducing analyst bias, opportunity to triangulate findings and facility to identify the incremental effect of discourse as well as resistant and changing discourses. It has also been established (section 3.4.5.1) that CADS is necessarily a flexible and inductive approach, relying on researcher intuition and the data to dictate the methodological steps taken. This data-driven approach leaves the analyst ‘free to shunt back and forth among hypotheses, data-collection, evaluation and even speculation, as long as these phases are kept separate and the movements among them are closely charted’ (Partington, 2006: 4). Thus, this chapter uses frequency lists, clusters, collocates and concordancing techniques (section 3.4.5) to investigate the discursive features of news discourse on the civil disturbances of 2005, guided by the findings of the previous two chapters. A CADS approach in this chapter also aims to uncover lexico-grammatical patterns in the RiCo corpus which were not present in the smaller Mini-RiCo collection of texts. It is argued that for the most part, the discursive trends and orders of discourse identified in Mini-RiCo are also present in RiCo. However, a CADS analysis does reveal some counter-examples and additional lexico-grammatical patterns to those outlined in Chapters Five and Six.

The chapter is broken into four main sections: the first analyses discourses present in newspaper descriptions of the civil disturbances in 2005 and questions the semantic preference and lexical patterns associated with the words émeute*, violence* and various forms of the word brûl*. It also investigates metaphorical representations of the riots, and identifies metaphors used by journalists reporting on the riots. The second part of the chapter investigates how the banlieues are constructed in RiCo, through concordancing and collocation of the words banlieue* and cité*. The third section of the chapter builds on the analysis of naming and representations of social actors in Mini-RiCo in Chapter Five, focusing firstly on representations of Nicolas
Sarkozy and discourses relating to the Interior Minister’s handling of the crisis posed by the events of November 2005. Following that, patterns of naming relating to les jeunes are addressed, and the actions and characteristics most frequently associated with immigrant and suburban youth in RiCo are questioned. Finally, the fourth part of this chapter focuses on inter-group social relations and constructions of an in- and out-group in French newspaper reporting of urban violence in 2005. There is particular emphasis on pronouns and how nous is used to reinforce a discourse of separation, whereby French society is divided along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines, and inhabitants of the banlieues are positioned as outsiders.

7.2 Descriptions of the 2005 Riots

7.2.1 Introduction
This section analyses how the 2005 riots are discussed and reported in RiCo. In line with the methodological steps outlined in Chapter Four, the wordlist of RiCo is first analysed; following that, cluster and concordancing techniques are used to examine how words identified as ‘key’ during the CDA in Chapter Five (e.g. émeute*, violence*, brûl*) are typically used in RiCo in order to probe typical lexico-grammatical and discursive patterns used in news reporting on the riots. Connotations associated with the use of these keywords are highlighted, and consequently the assumptions embodied by their presence in this discourse context becomes evident (following Stubbs, 1996). It is shown how discursive patterns in Mini-RiCo are also apparent in RiCo and a discourse of blamelessness is created in descriptions of the 2005 riots in RiCo by lexis including passivisation, spatialisation strategies, metaphor and adjectival clauses foregrounding time/location rather than agency.

7.2.2 Frequency: Examining the Wordlist in RiCo
The first step in identifying how the civil disturbances are discussed in RiCo is to examine the wordlist, a list of all the tokens present in the corpus. As outlined previously, frequency data can ‘help to give [...] a sociological profile of a given

57 As outlined previously, the use of the asterisk indicates a ‘wildcard search’, where * replaces a word, letter or group of words.
word or phrase enabling better understanding of its use in particular contexts’ (Baker, 2006: 47). Figure 3 summarises the most frequent lexical/content words in RiCo, i.e. function grammatical words such as le, la, avec etc. are manually removed from the wordlist:  

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<td>familles (n=288)</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>discrimination (n=391)</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominique (n=170)</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>national (n=290)</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>force (n=392)</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationale (n=171)</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>sociaux (n=293)</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>besoin (n=400)</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politiques (n=176)</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>èlus (n=294)</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>économique (n=402)</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voitures (n=179)</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>publics (n=295)</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>étrangers (n=396)</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>française (n=180)</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>également (n=296)</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>culture (n=404)</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE (n=181)</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>compte (n=300)</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>délinquance (n=405)</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>école (n=187)</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>millions (n=301)</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>député (n=406)</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cités (n=195)</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>éducation (n=306)</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>entreprise (n=411)</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parents (n=199)</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>discours (n=313)</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>système (n=412)</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policiers (n=201)</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>villes (n=315)</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>droits (n=413)</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Lexical frequency wordlist for content words in RiCo

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58 In Figure 3 ‘n’ is the ranking of the word on the wordlist, where ‘n=45’ indicates that the word is ranked as the 45th most frequent word in the full wordlist for RiCo, including grammatical terms. ‘o’ indicates ‘occurrences’ and refers to the number of times the word is used in RiCo, with the following settings used in WordSmith Tools (Scott, 2012):
- Language set to French
- Hyphen separates words
- Apostrophe separates words

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One striking feature of the list in Figure 3 is the high frequency of the words *jeune/s* \((o=3142/548)\),\(^{59}\) which supports the observations made in Chapter Five regarding the prominent positioning of young people as a social actor in discourses surrounding the riots (the lexical significance of *jeunes* in RiCo is discussed in detail in section 7.4.3). Interesting also in Figure 3 is the frequency of words from the lexical field of politics and governance, including *ministre* \((o=1923)\), *politique* \((o=1736)\), *Sarkozy* \((o=1601)\), *gouvernement* \((o=1195)\), *Nicolas* \((o=1135)\), *president* \((o=1035)\), *Villepin* \((o=884)\), *intérieur* \((o=837)\), *UMP* \((o=709)\), *Dominique* \((o=698)\), *Jacques* \((o=552)\) and *Chirac* \((o=550)\). This confirms that discussions regarding political and government figures are common in RiCo and there is a high frequency of lexis indicating government handling of and reaction to the crisis posed by the events of November 2005 (see section 7.4.2 below for an analysis of the representation of Sarkozy in RiCo). Additionally, this points to the significance of government and political figures as social actors in newspaper discourse surrounding the riots. This is in line with theories relating to how access to news media can be indicative of unequal power relations, whereby ‘members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites) have more or less exclusive access’ (Van Dijk, 1998: 5). The resulting effect, Fowler (1991: 45) points out, is an ‘imbalance between the representation of the already privileged on the one hand, and the already unprivileged on the other’. The high frequency of words referencing those in positions of power could imply the privileging of already dominant voices in society ahead of those which are traditionally marginalised and already excluded.

Another striking feature of the wordlist in Figure 3 is the prominence of vocabulary from the lexical field of education, including *école* \((o=644)\), *éducation* \((o=424)\), *élèves* \((o=459)\) and *scolaire* \((o=350)\). This is most likely due to newspaper reporting on protests against the planned changes to the *CPE* (*Contrat Première Embauche*); anti-CPE demonstrations saw large numbers of students demonstrating in April 2006 and many newspapers noted similarities and differences between anti-CPE

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\(^{59}\) Throughout this chapter the following abbreviations are used:

- f = relative frequency, calculated as a percentage of the total number of relevant concordances and rounded to the nearest single figure;
- n = numerical ranking on relevant list i.e. wordlist, list of clusters etc.;
- o = occurrences, or the number of times the word is used in RiCo.
demonstrations and the 2005 civil disturbances. The word CPE (o=664) has a high frequency in RiCo and coupled with the high frequency of words from the lexical field of education suggests the presence of discussions concerning anti-CPE marches. However, Moran (2012) notes the role played by schools in the social exclusion of residents of the banlieues, and section 7.4.3.2 of this chapter outlines how educational failure is singled out as a means of othering immigrant and suburban youth. Finally, the wordlist in Figure 3 also points to the differing interpretations of the causes of the riots, including the ‘social causes’ and ‘delinquency’ debates, outlined in section 4.4.7. The term délinquance (o=315) is relatively high on the frequency list, indicating discourses blaming the violence on destructive and criminal actions carried out by les jeunes de cités, rather than probing the causes behind these expressions of anger. The alternative explanation offered (‘social causes’) also features prominently in the wordlist, including immigration (o=594). chômage (o=561) and discrimination/s (o=344/326). This points to what Cole (2007: 79) terms an explanation of the riots based on ‘larger impersonal forces of urban development, economic conjecture, population movements and long simmering antipathies between different groups in society’.

In sum, examination of the wordlist and frequency in RiCo reveals similar patterns to those identified in Chapters Five and Six: the macrostructural analysis in section 5.3.2 pointed to the prominence of social actors – in particular Nicolas Sarkozy and les jeunes – in Mini-RiCo and this is also evident in the wordlist in Figure 3. Furthermore, section 5.2.3 outlined how both journalists and politicians interpret the outbreak of riots in 2005, France’s history of urban violence and the so-called problème des quartiers more generally by focusing on social causes, including difficulties relating to immigration, discrimination etc. There is a high frequency of

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60 Moran (2012: 132-133) considers the role of education as a mechanism for exclusion, citing Ott’s (2006) observation regarding educational segregation: in the suburbs, ‘une veritable tendance à la creation des ghettos scolaires se développe: 10 per cent des colleges concentrent 40 per cent des élèves immigrés ou issus de l’immigration’. Additionally, social inclusion could previously have been facilitated by employment, and educational failure did not necessarily equate with an absence of employment opportunities. However, the slowdown of industrialisation has resulted in a situation where educational failure or a lack of educational qualifications greatly diminishes job opportunities and the related opportunities for social mobility. Students from the banlieues are more affected than those from other areas of society, as a result of comparatively high levels of academic failure among those living in the suburbs.
words in RiCo which similarly indicate the presence of this ‘social causes’ discourse (e.g. immigration, discrimination, chômage). However, analysis of the wordlist represents only the starting point for a corpus-based analysis (Baker, 2006), and collocation, cluster and concordancing tools are required to further probe discursive patterns in RiCo.

7.2.3 Analysing Concordances and Clusters: Émeute*, Violence* and Brûl*

This section uses concordance, collocation and cluster techniques to analyse how the violence of November 2005 was reported in RiCo. To reiterate briefly, collocation is the ‘above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the node)’ (Baker et al., 2008: 278). It allows us to obtain a better idea of the main discourses surrounding a particular actor or event, as well as indicating the associations and connotations of a particular word. Concordancing is defined as ‘simply a list of all the occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus, presented within the context that they occur in; usually a few words to the left and right of the search term’ (Baker, 2006: 71). Concordancing facilitates the identification of patterns in a large number of texts which would otherwise be impossible by manual analysis. To cite Tribble (1990: 11), ‘what the concordancer does is make the invisible visible’. In line with the methodological approach outlined previously (section 3.4.5.4) concordance lines are randomly reduced to a sample of 150 for analysis; where the total concordance for a search does not exceed 200, all lines are examined. The discussion below also draws on a cluster analysis of words that emerged as key during analysis of Mini-RiCo (émeute, violence and brûl*). Clusters are defined for this study as three to five words that occur in the same form a minimum of five times in the corpus, and they reveal how a particular word is typically used. Following on from the discussions in Chapter Five which investigated descriptions and interpretations of the riots, analysis begins by looking at words which would intuitively point to a discussion of the riots and the associated actors, including émeute* and violence*.61 Given the prominence of metaphors and lexis relating to

61 For a discussion on the significance of the words violences (urbaines), émeutes and révoltes in political, media and police discourses see Kokoreff (2008). To summarise, he argues (2008: 18) that violences urbaines is a new categorisation by police and officials since the 1990s, and ‘Parler des violences urbaines a conduit à mettre en relief le caractère délictuel de l’émeute et à faire des
fire in *Mini-RiCo* (section 5.2.2), concordance and cluster analyses of forms of the verb *brûler* are also examined. Analysis focuses on ascertaining whether the findings outlined in Chapter Five – particularly with regard to agency and discourses of blamelessness – can be generalised and viewed as representative of a wider pattern of discourse across a significantly larger corpus of texts (*RiCo*).

**7.2.3.1 Émeute* (o=785)**

A keyword search for *émeute* returns 785 occurrences, and analysis of a random sample of 150 concordance lines reveals that with few exceptions *émeute* is typically used without any accompanying clause indicating agency. In 29% of concordance lines (o=43) it is accompanied by adjectival clauses indicating location (e.g. *les émeutes dans les banlieues*) and the timing of the riots (e.g. *les émeutes de novembre 2005*) is specified in 20% of concordance lines (o=30). These trends are evidenced in Figure 4, a random sample of twenty concordance lines of *émeute*:

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estimé que les *émeutes* dans les *banlieues* sont « une crise de sens, de repères et d'identité » et rappelé validité de leurs modèles sociaux, les *émeutes* dans les banlieues françaises sont suivies de près dans 26 novembre 1990. Après les *émeutes* de Vaulx-en-Velin, la direction centrale des RG (DCRG) réduire les *émeutes* des banlieues à leur dimension sociale, y voir une révolte de jeunes contre la tout un chacun, il a suivi les récentes *émeutes* des banlieues : « Pour les jeunes d'origine étrangère et - de La Courneuve. Des *émeutes* agitent la Seine-Saint-Denis. Trois jeunes fonctionnaires ont l'idée leçons soient tirées de ces *émeutes*. Autant sur les failles de la politique de la ville que sur n'en veut pas aux responsables des *émeutes*. Bien au contraire : « Depuis trente ans, les pouvoirs attaques de la gauche, qui l'accusait lors des *émeutes* d'avoir supprimé la police de proximité, a été son auteur, suivent des clichés dignes du FN sur les *émeutes* : « Il s'agit d'un pogrom antirépublicain » de-France où se concentrait l'essentiel des *émeutes*. Le retour au calme tenait essentiellement à d'avoir écouter durant les *émeutes* les fréquences de la police avec un appareil fourni par des policiers. des risques. Les *émeutes* ont montré aux patrons l'ampleur des discriminations, et renforcé les provocations du ministre de l'Intérieur et les *émeutes* qui s'étaient ensuivies en Seine-Saint-Denis, pas leur peine. « Le spectre des *émeutes* ressurgit chaque fois que la police réinvestit le terrain, mais il surveillance adopté pour assurer la sécurité des lieux pendant les *émeutes*. Selon un commissaire de Extension géographique : les *émeutes* touchent désormais des villes « sans histoire ». Contagion décrété suite aux *émeutes* de novembre, le gouvernement souhaite s'attarder sur cette mesure et politologue Jean-Yves Camus. Les *émeutes* de novembre ont conforté leurs prédictions les plus afin de dénoncer l'attitude du gouvernement après les *émeutes* du mois dernier. Premier rendez-vous,

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Figure 4: Concordance of *émeute**

émeutiers des délinquants, bref à en dépolitiser le sens pour légitimer une solution répressive à la violence’. ‘Émeutes’, he suggests (2008: 19), implies ‘le caractère spontané en non structuré des violences collectives’ as well as ‘une dimension protestataire’ to the violence. Finally, he argues (2008: 19-20) that categorising civil disturbance as révoltes ‘présentent l'intérêt de mettre d’emblée l’accent sur la dimension protestataire en jeu, qui ancre le réel dans une perspective historique peu mobilisée, sans contribuer au processus de stigmatisation des banlieues et des jeunes de milieux populaires’.

*62 Exceptions to this trend are concordances where agency is attributed to a named individual who was brought before the courts, for example: *le tribunal pour leur participation aux *émeutes*, Bakayoko, 27 ans, se trouve dans une position*
The underlined words in Figure 4 show how émeute* is followed by a clause indicating location (i.e. émeutes dans les banlieues, émeutes des banlieues, émeutes de Vaulx-en-Velin), or with accompanying detail on the timing of the riots (i.e. émeutes du mois dernier, émeutes de novembre). An absence of agency can also be seen in the three to five word clusters which similarly focus on location and time when discussing the riots, summarised in Figure 5. For example, the second most frequent cluster is émeutes dans les (n=2, o=65), and the clusters émeutes de novembre (n=4, o=62) and émeutes dans les banlieues (n=6, o=58) are ranked in the top 10 most frequent clusters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster/Ranking</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>Cluster/Ranking</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes de (n=1)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>des émeutes dans les (n=27)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes dans les (n=2)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>début des émeutes (n=28)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>après les émeutes (n=3)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>les émeutes ont (n=29)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes de novembre (n=4)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>émeutes en banlieue (n=29)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dans les banlieues (n=5)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>sur les émeutes (n=31)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes dans les banlieues (n=6)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>des émeutes dans les banlieues (n=31)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>des émeutes de (n=7)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>le début des émeutes (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes dans (n=8)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>participé aux émeutes (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes dans les (n=9)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>le début des émeutes (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes des banlieus (n=10)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>aux émeutes de (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dans les banlieus (n=11)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>mois après les émeutes (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes de novembre (n=12)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>mois après les (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes des (n=13)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>de novembre dernier (n=33)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>que les émeutes (n=14)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>avant les émeutes (n=40)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes urbaines (n=15)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>des émeutes urbaines (n=40)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>les émeutes des banlieues (n=16)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>des émeutes en (n=42)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>des émeutes de (n=17)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>émeutes de novembre dernier (n=42)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes qui (n=18)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>les émeutes en (n=44)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lors des émeutes (n=19)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>de novembre 2005 (n=44)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes de l’automne (n=20)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>des émeutes des (n=44)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>depuis les émeutes (n=21)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Clichy sous Bois (n=44)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>des émeutes de novembre (n=22)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>émeutes de novembre 2005 (n=48)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes qui ont (n=23)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>les émeutes qui ont (n=48)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>des émeutes dans (n=24)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>des émeutes le (n=48)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pendant les émeutes (n=25)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>des émeutes qui (n=48)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>par les émeutes (n=26)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>les émeutes de l’automne (n=48)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>après les émeutes de (n=27)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Top fifty 3 to 5 word clusters of émeute*

An interesting lexical pattern which emerges through analysis of concordances and clusters of émeute* are prepositions pointing to the riots as a turning point, or a significant temporal marker for French society. This is seen in clusters underlined in Figure 5, such as après les émeutes (n=3, o=63), depuis les émeutes (n=20, o=20) and avant les émeutes (n=40, o=14).
7.2.3.2 Violence* (o=1936)

Similar patterns (absence of agency and vagueness as a discursive technique) emerge in a concordance of violence*, of which a random sample reduced to 150 is analysed (keyword search for violence* returned 1936 concordance lines). Section 5.2 outlined the prominence of nominalisation and agentless passivisation in news descriptions of the 2005 riots in Mini-RiCo and it showed that apart from a few exceptions, the violence is presented as simply having ‘happened’ through ostensible straightforward description of the civil disturbances. Journalists in Mini-RiCo draw on naturalised understandings of la violence urbaine and thus assume that readers are aware of the perpetrators of the violence – immigrant youth living in the suburbs. To explore this discursive pattern future, adjectival clauses in the random sample of 150 concordance lines are analysed and classified and the most prominent patterns are summarised in Figure 6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No adjectival clause</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim/type of violence</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Classification of adjectival clauses in concordance of violence*

Most frequently (o=70, f=44%) violence* is used in descriptions without any accompanying clause indicating agency, victim, time, location etc., and in 44% of uses of the word violence* journalists assume reader understanding of the incident either from the surrounding co-text or intertextual references. This is exemplified by the concordance in Figure 7 which reproduces examples of violence* without any adjectival clause:

89 mineurs présents au tribunal dans le cadre des violences, 37 étaient «connus» au plan pénal ou immédiate, réservant trois chambres au traitement des violences. Cinq magistrats sont venus renforcer se sont fait virer du collège pour des histoires de trafic ou de violence. «Des vrais cow-boys» Mais Poursuivre notre action pour les quartiers. Des nuits de violence, d’incendies ciblés. Des jours où, à terme. C’est quand on ne sait plus quoi faire que vient la violence. Il est temps que ceux qui ont pour l’envie et le plaisir, les trois pulsions qui génèrent la violence, il est nécessaire de répondre avec du , en panne, qui vivent en permanence dedans. C’est cette violence-là que j’entends, insiste Alain Le tout le pays, ont été le théâtre d’actes d’une extrême violence. Les militants et les élus communistes

Figure 7: Concordance of violence* (1)

Note that 8 concordance lines have been classified under two headings because these concordance lines contain more than one adjectival clause, i.e. a clause indicating both time and agency or a clause indicating both location and time of violence. For example:

Comment en est-on arrive à la flambée de violence en novembre 2005 dans les banlieues?
As also seen in Mini-RiCo (section 5.2.2) there is strong evidence of vagueness as a discursive technique to remain ambiguous with regard to agency in the concordance lines in Figure 7. The majority of concordance lines of violence* use eventuation strategies (Van Leeuwen, 2008) to present the violence as simply having happened by omitting an adjectival clause or by foregrounding the location or time of the violence. There is evidence of spatialisation strategies – also seen in Mini-RiCo – in which ‘social actors are represented by means of reference to a place with which they are, in the given context, closely associated’ (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46). Spatialisation strategies are seen in one third of concordance lines of violence* (o=52, f=33%) and adjectival clauses indicate the location of the violence, as in violences à Clichy-sous-Bois, violences dans les banlieues etc. (Figure 8). Additionally, ambiguity in relation to agency is also created by temporal adjectival clauses in 14% of concordance lines (o=22) e.g. violences actuelles, violences récentes, violence de novembre etc. (Figure 8):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dans la majorité, la réponse à apporter aux violences urbaines est vite venue le nouveau terrain Autre initiative, une adresse à Jacques Chirac suite aux violences dans les banlieues pour l’exhorter des pouvoirs publics est responsable de l’explosion de violence dans les banlieues, l’UMP réclame encore plus notre République ? interroge le Père Brugués, sur fond de violences urbaines. Or la fraternité n’est-elle pas devrait verser aux communes et aux départements après les violences urbaines, qu’à les banlieues. Tout en reconnaissant que les violences à Clichy-sous-Bois sont «inacceptables, l’expression a resurgi à la faveur des récentes violences dans les banlieues. Plusieurs responsables de Pen porte sur la réponse du gouvernement aux violences urbaines. Invité, dimanche 13 novembre du « Il ne faut pas rapprocher ces événements des violences de novembre ; ce sont des faits ponctuels qui quatre fois supérieur à la moyenne nationale... Les violences de ces nuits de novembre ont souvent été pression». La Courneuve a plongé dans la violence dans la nuit du 2 au 3 novembre. Jaloux des en Seine-Saint-Denis. Les violences de la nuit de lundi sont-elles la preuve que rien n’est« patronat, Laurence Parisot, voit dans les violences récentes un «avertissement pour notre pays», même institutions. Il suffisait de faire le relevé de cette violence au quotidien : le degré atteint sur un site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 8: Concordance of violence* (2)

Echoing the findings of the analysis of Mini-RiCo (section 5.2), a discourse of blamelessness is created by backgrounding the social actors responsible for the violence, and in only 2% of concordance lines of violence* (o=3) is agency specified (Figure 9):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>régional communiste. Il n’y a rien d’acceptable dans les violences exercées par les jeunes, mais les à l’ordre public ou chaque fois que les violences sont le fait de multiémetants ou de récidivistes» présumés des coups sont poursuivis pour «violences commises par personne dépositaire de l’autorité</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 9: Concordance of violence* (3)

The first concordance line in Figure 9 links the violence with les jeunes and suggests the presence of the discursive patterns identified in section 5.3.4 regarding the specificity of the noun jeunes when used in the context of news reporting on the riot
(discursive trends relating to les jeunes in RiCo are explored in detail in section 7.4.3 below). The final concordance line in Figure 9 appears at first glance to be an explicit attribution of agency (auteurs présumés des coups sont poursuivis pour «viences commises par personne dépositaire de l’autorité»; however examining the source text of this concordance line reveals that the article (Le Figaro, 12 Nov 2005) refers to investigations against five police officers for the alleged use of excessive force when arresting a man in the Parisian suburb of Bobigny.

Additionally, clusters of violence* imply an absence of agency and vagueness as a discursive technique, with similar emphasis on the timing or location of the riots rather than those responsible (Figure 10):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster/Ranking</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>Cluster/Ranking</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>les violences urbaines (n=1)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>que les violences (n=11)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>des violences urbaines (n=2)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>violences urbaines de (n=12)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de la violence (n=3)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>violences dans les banlieues (n=13)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dans les banlieues (n=4)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>violences urbaines qui (n=13)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violences dans les banlieues (n=5)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>début des violences (n=16)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violences dans les banlieues (n=6)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>le début des (n=17)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de violences urbaines (n=7)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>le début des violences (n=17)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>à la violence (n=8)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>la violence dans (n=17)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence dans les (n=9)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>les violences dans (n=20)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>par les violences (n=10)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Top twenty three to five word clusters of violence*

Twelve of the twenty clusters in Figure 10 indicate the prominence of spatialisation strategies and clusters including les violences urbaines (o=165), des violences urbaines (o=125), dans les banlieues (o=103) and violences dans les banlieues (o=63), among others, indicate a predominance of clauses specifying the location of the violence ahead of those responsible. It is interesting to note the higher frequency of the definite article les violences urbaines (o=165) compared to the indefinite des violences urbaines (o=125). As outlined previously, Richardson (2007) sees the definite article as an indicator of presupposition, suggesting that, for example, a sentence which includes the clause ‘the challenge facing the modern world....’ presupposes that a challenge exists. The prominence of the definite article les violences urbaines in RiCo presupposes that ‘urban violence’ as a category exists as a taken-for-granted and accepted meaning for both producers and consumers of news discourse.
Thus, analysis of concordance lines and clusters using the search-word *violence* indicates a preference for phraseology in *RiCo* that create vagueness in discourse regarding agency. Analysis of concordance lines sorted first right, second right and first left (Figures 7-9) reveal only a limited number of examples where agency is explicitly attributed. As is also seen in *Mini-RiCo*, journalists in *RiCo* similarly draw on naturalised understandings of *la violence urbaine* or simply *la violence*, and assume reader knowledge of the nature and perpetrators of the civil disturbances. Urban violence has become a recognised occurrence in French society, perhaps to the extent that it has become normalised and journalists no longer need to explain the characteristics of this type of violence. As is also seen in *Mini-RiCo*, the analysis above of a random sample of 150 concordances of *violence* highlights only one concordance line that indicates the association of urban violence with *les jeunes* (this pattern is explored in detail in section 7.4.3 below). As will be argued below, in virtually all other occasions, there is an assumption that immigrant and suburban youth are to blame.

### 7.2.3.3 Brûl* (o=657)

Having looked at discursive trends relating to the search terms *émeute* and *violence*, focus now turns to concordance analysis of various forms of the verb *brûler*, which emerged as a key lexical term in the analysis of *Mini-RiCo*. Section 5.2.2 discussed how vagueness regarding agency is expressed by vocabulary and metaphors from the lexical field of fire to focus attention on the nature of the violence – the ‘burning’ – or the intended targets of the fires (cars, schools etc.) rather than the perpetrators. To investigate whether these findings can be generalised in *RiCo* the form of the search word *brûl* is analysed and results are classified in a random sample of 150 concordance lines (reduced from 657). This is done in order to identify how *brûl* is used, in particular whether active or passive structures are selected and whether the responsible agents are identified. Figure 11 summarises the findings:
There is evidence of passivisation (the conversion of an active clause into a passive clause) in 13 of the 150 concordance lines analysed (f=9%) and the passive form of the verb is used to create vagueness by excluding participants and therefore removing agency from the sentence (Figure 12). As outlined in section 3.3.4.2, using a passive sentence construction removes agent phrases and thus ‘depersonalises’ a text and as a result ‘the people and forces behind actions can be downplayed, leaving the process itself as the major focus’ (Carter et al., 2008: 174). Examples of passive forms of the search word *brûl* are reproduced in Figure 12:

Concordance lines in Figure 12 ‘gloss over agency’ (Toolan, 1991) and create a discourse of blamelessness through passive forms of the verb *brûler* which place emphasis on the number of cars damaged on a particular night ahead of the agents behind the action (e.g. *15 voitures ont été brûlées à Brest*, *519 véhicules avaient été brûlés dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi*, *165 voitures ont été brûlées en Ile-de-France*). Broadening this search to consider the use of *étë brûl* throughout the full

{64 }"f" indicates relative frequency, calculated based on the random sample of 150 concordance lines returned using the search word *brûl*, and the percentages cited indicate the relative frequency of the classification with regard to this sample of 150 concordance lines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verb</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Active]</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Passive]</td>
<td>[60]</td>
<td>[40%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Active Infinitive]</td>
<td>[13]</td>
<td>[9%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[23]</td>
<td>[15%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjective</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Classification of forms of search word *brûl*

Figure 12: Concordance of *brûl* (1)

auprès de l’éditeur First. 15 voitures ont été *brûlées* à Brest dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi alors cars de transport public et véhicules d’EDF avaient été *brûlés* – (AFP). Selon un décompte de la de majeurs ont été condamnés ; 3,300 voitures ont été *brûlées* au total depuis le début des violences. a progressé : alors que 519 véhicules avaient été *brûlés* dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, 563 l’ont été Sevran. Une soixantaine de véhicules ont encore été *brûlés*. Des faits similaires se sont déroulés à banlieues : d’abord rétablir l’ordre. 165 voitures ont été *brûlées* en Ile-de-France et 33 à Dijon, en dans la cour, fermée par une grille, une été complètement *brûlées*. Le bureau de poste, qui a ouvert bus au cours de laquelle une femme avait été grièvement *brûlée*, le 2 novembre 2005 à Sevran (Scine-cours de laquelle une femme handicapée a été gravement *brûlée*. Le maire, Stéphane Gatignon (PCF) récurrents. L’année dernière, 333 voitures ont été *brûlées* pendant la nuit de la Saint-Sylvestre. A de voitures incendiées. Nantes. 35 voitures ont été *brûlées*, samedi soir. Principalement à l’ouest de mois de l’année, près de 31 300 véhicules avaient été *brûlés*, soit une centaine, en moyenne, chaque nuit où une cinquantaine de véhicules, seulement, sont *brûlés*. Voilà la réalité de nos banlieues !
RiCo corpus reveals that there are 41 occurrences of the passive form, which represents 6.2% of all uses of the verb *brûl*.

The active form of the verb *brûler* (o=83) in the sample of 150 concordance lines from RiCo can be classified as follows: (1) no agent with the verb (o=60, f=40%), (2) agency assigned implicitly and explicitly to *les jeunes* (o=16, f=11%) and (3) vagueness regarding agency through use of the pronoun *on* (o=5, f=3%), the referent *personnes* (o=1, f=0.5%) and metonymy (o=1, f=0.05%). This classification indicates that the discursive features identified in the CDA of Mini-RiCo in Chapter Five are representative of a wider pattern of discourse in RiCo, particularly regarding discourses of blamelessness in descriptions and interpretations of the riots (section 5.2), and the analysis of naming strategies which pointed to the prominence of *les jeunes* as a social actor in Mini-RiCo (section 5.3.4). Thus, in 60 concordance lines of *brûl* the active form of the verb is used without any agent attributed to the action of burning (Figure 13):

If we examine the 23 occurrences of the active form of *brûler* which specify an agent (Figures 14-16), with a limited number of exceptions discourses implicating immigrant and suburban youth with the violent disturbances dominate these 23 occurrences. 16 occurrences (f=11%, Figure 14) explicitly associate the action of burning with *des jeunes, des jeunes issus de l’immigration, les enfants d’immigrés* and *les «Arabes»* and where agency is implied but not immediately obvious (e.g. pronominal constructions such as *ils brûlent aussi les voitures par jeu* or *car pour eux brûler une voiture...*) concordance lines are expanded to ascertain the agent responsible for the action. Expanded concordance lines similarly identify the agents as *les jeunes* and *les jeunes des quartiers populaires*; for example:
frais des contribuables ? À supposer que les 400 aient brûlé 4 ou 5 voitures chacun, ce qui est quinquagénaire handicapée avait déjà été gravement brûlée au cours de l’attaque d’un autobus par les un appel aux jeunes, les exhortant à voter plutôt que brûler des voitures pour se faire entendre. Peut-
ça choque et, donc, ça fait parler. Ils peuvent, le soir brûler des voitures, et dire dans la journée à leurs quand ils commencent à venir au théâtre, il s’arrêtent de brûler et de casser. Comment expliquez-vous fils de maçon algérien au pied du mur. Les banlieues brûlent et les enfants d’immigrées sont montrés ils les remettaient au pas, les enfants d’immigrées qui brûlent les voitures, incendient les écoles et les manipulent les jeunes qui «choufent» (guettent) ou qui brûlent les voitures pour quelques dizaines calmer des jeunes qui veulent en découvre avec la police ou brûler les voitures. «Je ne l’ai pas vu trois soirs de suite et «encouragé d’autres jeunes à brûler une voiture» par ras-le-bol de la précarité jeunes sont manipulés : «On les met en avant, car pour eux brûler une voiture ressemble à un jeu, à

Of the remaining occurrences where agency is attributed using the active form of brûler, 5 occurrences (f=0.3%) ascribe agency using the personal pronoun on (Figure 15). As discussed previously on creates ambiguity regarding the referent/s implied by the pronoun, and Tekin (2010: 158) maintains that ‘by employing the indefinite pronoun “On”, French speakers leave blank the subject of the utterance and […] become involved in a strategy of implicitness’. Additionally, Van der Valk’s (2003a) analysis of right-wing parliamentary discourses on immigration identifies the use of on when assigning agency for negative actions (e.g. abuse, breaking the law); however in the concordance lines in Figure 15 on signifies an unspecified ‘we’ which is left to reader interpretation and consequently group membership is vague:

voitures qui brûlent, meme si je n’applaudis pas lorsqu’on brûle des voitures. Le temps du pas mieux qu’un couscous, comment s’étonner qu’on brûle des bibliothèques ?», s’interroge ainsi le gymnase, les bus. Je ne puis accepter non plus que l’on brûle des véhicules, que l’on dégrade des de fraternité, de liberté. Je déplore le fait que l’on brûle les voitures. Cependant, si on ne donne pas à ville, mais dans la nuit, on la déqualifie, on la brûle, on s’attaque aux symboles. les adultes ne cessent

Finally, there is one example (Figure 16) where agency is assigned using metonymy, and a place (Aulnay-sous-Bois) replaces the people responsible for the action:

sensible. «Quand une cité d’Aulnay-sous-Bois brûle dix voitures le lundi, constate un expert des Figure 16: Concordance of brûler (5)

The concordance line in Figure 16 evidences how the active form of brûler is used and the location of the attack – the cité of Aulnay-sous-Bois – is metonymically ascribed an active role. Although the sentence in Figure 16 does – grammatically speaking – specify the agent of the action brûle, it can be argued that it contributes to the discourses of blamelessness as human agency is vague.
In sum, analysis of the form of the verb *brûler* in *RiCo* confirms the qualitative CDA outlined in Chapter Five. The use of passivisation strategies in 9% of concordance lines (o=13) and the prominence of active verbs without an agent (o=60, f=40%) show that a discourse of blamelessness is created by descriptions of the civil disturbances which are vague regarding the perpetrators of the violence, and instead present the riots as simply having happened. As seen in *Mini-RiCo*, newspaper reporting in *RiCo* appears to rely on apparently straightforward descriptions of the ‘world-as-it-is’ (Sneijder and te Molder, 2005), and consequently reinforces the perception that ‘burning’ in the *banlieues* is an expected reality in France. An exception to this trend of vagueness in discourse is the limited presence of discourses implicating *les jeunes*: in 11% of concordance lines (o=16) immigrant and suburban youth are implicitly and explicitly linked with the riots, echoing the anti-immigrant discourses identified in *Mini-RiCo* (section 5.3.4.3).

Before concluding the investigation of discourses present in descriptions of the 2005 riots in *RiCo*, the next section examines metaphors used in news reporting on the civil disturbances, and identifies metaphors from three lexical fields which are drawn on by journalists when writing about the civil disturbances.

### 7.2.4 Metaphorical Representations of Violence

Chapter Five discussed descriptions of the riots using a qualitative Critical Discourse Analytical approach and on a number of occasions it drew attention to presence of metaphors in news reporting on the civil disturbances, in particular metaphors from the lexical field of fire (section 5.2.2). The paragraphs which follow examine the presence of imagery from other lexical domains in journalistic discourse on the events, mindful of the ideological potential of metaphors (section 3.3.4.1). It is shown how the metaphorical representation of the riots contributes to the expression of a discourse of blamelessness. Given that *violence* (o=1936) is the most frequent of the three search terms used thus-far, the randomly reduced sample of 150 concordance lines is examined to ascertain additional metaphors used. Manual

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65 To reiterate, there are 785 occurrences of *émeute* and 657 of *brûl*. As a keyword search using *violence* returns the most concordance lines, the analysis in this section is based only on these concordances.
analysis of the 150 concordance lines reveals that imagery from three lexical fields is used: fire, natural phenomena (waves) and disease/contagion (Figure 17):

Villeurbanne n’ont pas connu ce week-end de flambée de violence, à l’inverse de la tranquille les policiers. Et pourtant, la ville n’a pas connu la flambée de violence enregistrée dans des villes de défrêses hier soir devant le parquet. Une nouvelle flambée de violences était hier redoutée par la a pas de travail. Il n’est pas du tout surpris par la flambée de violence. «Les gens ne sortent que le

Surenes (Hauts-de-Seine). Depuis le début de la vague de violences urbaines, le 27 octobre, environ 4 l’état d’urgence « si la situation l'exige ». Une contagion des violences dans la capitale aurait un effet à Brême : l’Europe s’alarme d’une possible contagion des violences urbaines qui embrasent la France.

To ascertain the frequency of these metaphors in RiCo, the full concordance results for violence* (1936 lines) are searched using the words flambée*, vague* and contagion*. CADS has been recognised as being exploratory in nature, and Partington (2009: 289) maintains that it is ‘both highly data-driven and serendipitous, in the sense that, during the course of the research, the data itself will inevitably dictate to a considerable degree which next steps to take’. Thus the presence of the metaphors in the random sample of 150 concordance lines of violence* prompts a more detailed examination of the full concordance results produced using the keyword violence* in RiCo. Figure 18 summarises the presence of metaphors from the lexical fields of fire, natural phenomena and disease/contagion, and Figure 19 reproduces concordance lines evidencing these lexical patterns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural phenomena</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease/contagion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18: Classification of metaphors in concordance of violence*

66 It is acknowledged that it is likely that there are metaphors from other lexical fields present in the concordances of violence* in RiCo. However, manual analysis of the 1936 concordance lines of violence* is not within the scope of this analysis, and consequently analysis focuses on metaphors from the three lexical fields identified in the random sample of 150 concordance lines of violence*: fire, natural phenomena and disease/contagion.
Villeurbanne n'ont pas connu ce week-end de flambée de violence, à l'inverse de la tranquille psychiatriser la misère sociale. Comment analysez-vous la flambée de violence qu'a connue la coproduction » Le sociologue Manuel Boucher analyse la flambée de violence dans certains quartiers de prévention et sécurité. Comment en est-on arrivé à la flambée de violence en novembre 2005 dans pas « découvert leur force en quelques heures d'incendie ». La flambée de violence des dernières nuits trouver. Le cri des jeunes de banlieue, la flambée de violences d'octobre-novembre qu'il faut se jeter dans la turbine ». n Pourquoi une telle flambée de violences ? « Les explications officielles, déclaré, dimanche 13 novembre, au micro de la BBC, que la vague de violences dans les banlieues est pharmaceutique à Suresnes (Hauts-de-Seine). Depuis le début de la vague de violences urbaines, le 27 originaire de Mormaison, de revenir, à son tour, sur la récente vague de violence urbaine qui à déferlé jour avec l'embrasement des banlieues. Cette vague de violences met en lumière les « failles » de nouvelle vague de violences antijuives ? Est-il l'expression de la criminalisation en cours de certaines l'Europe s'alarme d'une possible contagion des violences urbaines qui embrasent la France. Et dans Orléans, Saint-Étienne. La nuit de samedi, déjà, avait vu la contagion de la violence s'étendre à de gestion sarkoynienne des problèmes sécuritaires à l'aide de la contagion des premières violences. Le maire (PS) de l'état d'urgence « si la situation l'exige ». Une contagion des violences dans la capitale aurait un Violences urbaines : les raisons de la contagion Les violences qui ont démarré le 27 octobre dernier à

Figure 19: Concordance of violence* (5)

It has been established that metaphor can be used to construct reality – consciously or unconsciously – particularly social reality. Employing an image, story or tangible thing to represent a more abstract notion allows new and/or complex situations or notions to be explained and by doing so the author ‘constructs and defines the social world by implementing certain interpretations and excluding others’ (Archakis and Tsakona, 2009: 365). The first set of concordance lines in Figure 19 are a sample of metaphors from the lexical field of fire, which also emerged during the CDA (section 5.2.2) and is discussed elsewhere by Moirand (2010) and Peeters (2010). The riots are repeatedly described as une flambée, which depicts the French suburbs as literally and metaphorically in flames. This image serves to obscure questions of agency as outside uncontrollable forces are blamed, rather than human agents, and attention is drawn to the method of attack (burning) rather than the perpetrators.

The second set of concordance lines in Figure 19 show how a natural disaster metaphor is used to describe the violent events of November 2005, drawing comparisons between the spread of violence and ocean waves. These metaphors contribute to the expression of a discourse of blamelessness since natural phenomena by definition lack an agent and they are difficult to predict and impossible to control (Baker, 2006: 81). Interestingly, natural phenomenon or disaster metaphors have been identified as common in newspaper discourses surrounding refugees and
asylum seekers in the UK press (Baker, 2006; Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008) and in Slovenian media discourses on temporary refugees/migrants (Zagar, 2009), and in both cases they are similarly used to imply that the movement of immigrants is threatening to a particular society. Finally, Figure 19 also reproduces the concordance lines which use imagery to link the violence to disease, particularly through repeated use of metaphors relating to the ‘contagion’ of the riots. This metaphor arguably functions to depersonalise the violence and further obscure questions of agency, thus creating a discourse of blamelessness. Peeters’s (2010) article examining metaphorical framing devices in press coverage of the 2005 riots also considers metaphors relating to contagion and disease. Peeters (2010: 108) suggests the following relation to the contagion frame:

[It] triggers the drawing of a number of inferences with respect to the riots: those who spread the riots are ill; just as contagion can only be stopped by a competent doctor, the riots can only be stopped by firm actions of competent politicians.

As outlined previously, the disease/contagion metaphor has also emerged in analyses of news reporting on civil disturbances and migrants in other discourse contexts: in his analysis of an article reporting on riots in Scotland in 1981, Fairclough (2001: 100) suggests that disease metaphors invoke particular ideological significance as ‘they tend to take dominant interests (strikes, demonstrations, ‘riots’) as undermining (the health of) society per se’. Similarly Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 60) note that metaphors associated with disease or infection are frequently employed in the negative predicational qualification of German and Austrian discourses about migrants or ethnic minorities.

Thus, concordancing techniques reveal a predominance of metaphors from three lexical fields (natural phenomena/disease/fire) through which the riots of November 2005 are constructed. All three cumulatively contribute to creating a discourse of blamelessness, as the specification of human agents is avoided and the violence is constructed through imagery which focuses on the nature of the violence or its scale and spread throughout French cities, rather than the perpetrators. Kokoreff’s (2008: 63-64) sociological analysis of urban violence in France addresses the use of metaphors to describe the violence, in particular ‘celles du feu [...], de l’épidémie [...], voire de la guerre’. He rejects the usefulness of these metaphors, suggesting
that they are essentially reductive: ‘Non seulement ils évacuent totalement la chronologie et la morphologie spécifiques des troubles, leurs dimensions territoriales, mais ils restituent une vision «naturalisée» des rapports sociaux sous-jacents aux violences, en particulier les tensions entre les jeunes et la police’. He further questions whether ‘s’agissait-il donc de neutraliser la puissance déstabilisante des violences émeutières tout en alimentant la peur?’ (2008: 64).

Metaphorical representations of violence can therefore be interpreted as a means of reinforcing anti-immigrant ideologies through emphasis on the ‘natural’ nature of tensions between inhabitants of the suburbs and majority French society and as a result these tensions become accepted as part of the accepted status quo.

7.3 Profiling the Suburbs: Interpretations of Les Banlieues

7.3.1 Introduction
Having looked at how the civil disturbances of 2005 are described in RiCo focus now turns to examine how the French suburbs are discussed in newspaper coverage of the riots. It was established in section 6.3 that in their reporting of events relating to the 2005 riots the French press discursively construct an out-group by drawing on discourses which emphasise the difference of immigrant minority groups – particularly those living in the banlieues – from mainstream French society. Residents of the suburbs are depicted as being outside the homogenously imagined French society, and discourses of difference remind newspaper readers of the characteristics ‘they’ share which are different to the majority of ‘us’. To probe the presence of these discourses in RiCo, this section investigates how the banlieues are constructed and represented linguistically in RiCo through concordancing and collocation of banlieue* and cité* to identify semantic preference and dominant

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Turpin (2012a: 108) considers the names used in media discourse to describe the areas where violence took place in 2005, and notes that banlieue, cité and quartier are most frequently used. She notes the virtually exclusively negative connotations associated with the nouns banlieue/s and cité/s, but suggests that quartier/s is a more general term and is not always synonymous with areas of social exclusion with a high concentration of immigrants:

> Le lexème de quartier quant à lui un caractère plus générique et est a priori indépendant du type du habitat. Du point de vue axiologique, le terme est plus neutre, la dimension axiologique pouvant être apportée par le contexte («un quartier difficile» ou «un quartier tranquille»).

Given the context-dependent use of the noun quartier this study will focus on identifying lexical patterns and discourses relating to the search terms banlieue/s and cité/s.
discursive trends. The first part of this section analyses collocates of *banlieue* and *cité* and identifies a semantic preference for negatively connoted lexis and vocabulary indicating the use of spatialisation strategies. Following that, the concordance of *banlieue* is examined and two dominant patterns introduced: firstly, the suburbs as homogenous areas sharing identical characteristics; and secondly, the suburbs are repeatedly negatively characterised and constructed as unpleasant living spaces.

7.3.2 Analysing Collocates of *Banlieue* (o=3519) and *Cité* (o=1130)

Collocates allow us to get a better idea of the main discourses surrounding a particular actor or event, as well as mental lexicon of the text producer (Mollin, 2009), and the most frequent lexical collocates of *banlieue* and *cité* confirm the findings discussed in Chapter Five regarding the negative positioning of the suburbs with regard to the rest of France (Figure 20):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>problème (n=93)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>jeunes (n=18)</td>
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<td>vie (n=157)</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>jeunes (n=28)</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>monde (n=161)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>émeutes (n=36)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Sarkozy (n=104)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>(n=53)</td>
<td>caïds (n=162)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violences (n=43)</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>cœur (n=163)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>banlieu(e)s (n=71)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>filles (n=164)</td>
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<td>semaines (n=114)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>crise (n=88)</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>petits (n=187)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>jours (n=122)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>talents (n=98)</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>(n=104)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>troubles (n=141)</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>51</td>
<td>explosion (n=141)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>quartier (n=132)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>victimes (n=215)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quartiers (n=88)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politique (n=149)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>casseurs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>certaines (n=154)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Lexical collocates of *banlieue* and *cité*.

Lexical collocates of *banlieue* and *cité* (Figure 20) indicate semantic preference for nouns and adjectives which connote a negative image of the suburbs, including vocabulary from the lexical fields of violence and disorder (*crise, violence(s)*, *

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To reiterate, ‘o’ indicates occurrences, or the number of times the search word is used in RiCo.
révolte, malaise, troubles, l’explosion, l’embrasement, émeutes, mal). Semantic preference, Stubbs (2001b: 88) reminds us, is indicated by a frequent co-occurrence with ‘a class of words which share semantic features’ – in this case, civil unrest. Nouns signifying destructive human behaviour are also prominent, including caïds and casseurs, and the prominence of a metaphor of fire in descriptions of urban violence (section 5.2.2) is indicated by the noun embrasement which collocates 28 times with banlieue* in RiCo. Lexical collocates in Figure 20 echo the findings of the qualitative analysis in section 5.3.4, and the noun jeunes is a strong collocate of banlieue* (n=28, o=186) and cité* (n=18, o=93). This could suggest the presence of discourses which other immigrant and suburban youth along with the prominent positioning of les jeunes as a social actor in discourses surrounding the riots (see section 7.4.3 below). Collocates such as situation, problème(s), sensibles, populaires etc. again signify the negative evaluation of the suburbs, and imply – as observed in section 6.3.2 – that the terms banlieue(s) and cité(s) are used to refer to certain areas in France which have a high concentration of immigrants and/or have experienced social unrest, rather than neighbourhoods and suburbs generally.

A further pattern present in collocates of banlieue* and cité* in Figure 20 confirms a discursive trend identified in the preceding discussion and in Chapter Six, as there is a high frequency of words indicating location – France, parisienne, français(es), certaines, Paris, etc. This again indicates the presence of ‘spatialisation’ strategies (Marchi and Taylor, 2009), signifying a distancing from the suburbs and drawing a distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’ (‘ordinary’ France vis-à-vis les banlieues). Finally, Figure 20 indicates semantic preference for lexis from the political domain (e.g. ministre, gouvernement, politique, Sarkozy, Villepin, Nicolas), which echoes the findings discussed in section 5.3.3 regarding the strong criticism of government – in particular Nicolas Sarkozy’s – negative handling of the crisis in November 2005. The picture that emerges thus from collocates of banlieue* and cité* is of areas which are strongly negatively evaluated, with a semantic preference for vocabulary from the lexical fields of violence and conflict, and an implication that these neighbourhoods are singled out as being different from other urban centres in France. The suburbs appear to be synonymous with civil unrest and social difficulties. These findings guide analysis of concordance lines and the search term
*banlieue* is now examined in the context of its textual environment. A keyword search for *banlieue* in RiCo returns 3519 concordance lines, and following the methodological steps outlined in Chapter Three this is randomly reduced to a more manageable sample of 150 concordance lines for detailed manual analysis. As mentioned, two dominant patterns emerge: firstly, the suburbs as homogenous areas sharing identical characteristics; and secondly, the negative characterisation of the suburbs.

7.3.3 Homogeneity of the Banlieues/Cités
What emerges firstly from analysis of the concordance of *banlieue* is an assumption that the suburbs are homogenous and share identical characteristics, and it is rare that journalists distinguish between different *banlieues* in France. Instead – as was also seen in Chapter Five – it is inferred that they are all the same and the term *banlieue/s* is used to signify neighbourhoods which are assumed known to newspaper readers. This is achieved linguistically through repetition of prepositional phrases, as well as lexis and punctuation which foreground homogeneity in news text and headlines. The prepositional phrases *dans les banlieues* (o=23, f=15%) and *en banlieue* (o=9, f=6%) are repeated to reinforce the perception that these disadvantaged neighbourhoods are homogenous throughout France (Figure 21):

Concordance lines in Figure 21 show how the areas which were the scenes of violence in November 2005 are uniformly constructed as *les banlieues*, and there is
an assumption that certain events (problèmes, agitation, émeutes etc.) are associated with these areas. Journalists draw on commonsense understandings of the banlieue as designated areas in France, and they are discursively imagined through the absence of additional information specifying geographical location – it is assumed that all readers similarly interpret the noun banlieue/s and are aware of what happens ‘in the suburbs’. Additionally, this representation is emphasised by an absence of lexis indicating the particular suburb that is referred to in news articles, and only 13 concordance lines (f=9%) of banlieue* are followed by clause specifying geographical location (Figure 22). However, of these 13 concordance lines, only two specify a specific neighbourhood, as in à Hérouville-Saint-Clair, cité de 25 000 habitants dans la banlieue de Caen and la banlieue d’Evreux (Eure). The remaining 11 concordance lines are vague and generalised geographical references (e.g. banlieues du nord de Paris, banlieues françaises, banlieue de la région parisienne, banlieue parisienne, banlieues de grandes villes françaises, banlieues lyonnaises etc.):


Figure 22: Concordance of banlieue* (2)

The first concordance line in Figure 22 lists a number of French cities – banlieues de Paris, de Lyon ou de Marseille – which reinforces an assumption that a banlieue in Lyon is the same as one in Paris or in Marseille.

Examining a sample of 150 concordance lines of cité* (reduced from a total of 1130) reveals slightly different patterns of use. There is a marginally higher number of occurrences of cité* than of banlieue* which specify a particular suburb: for banlieue there are 13 occurrences (f=9%) and for cité there are 19 occurrences (f=13%). Additionally, Figure 23 shows how the geographical identification of the
suburbs is vague and generalised (*banlieues françaises, banlieues parisiennes*), whereas when the noun *cité* is followed by the identification of a specific neighbourhood, as in *cité au Blanc-Mesnil, cité de la Forestière, cité des Courtillières* etc. (Figure 23):

Thus, it appears that the noun *banlieue* is used generally to signify particular urban areas in France which are synonymous with urban violence and social difficulties and they are assumed to be homogenous. There are only two examples of *banlieue* followed by a named area in a sample of 150 concordance lines (f=1.3%). On the other hand, while also used to implicate the ‘suburbs’ generally, there is a higher frequency of *cité* used to designate a named urban area (o=18, f=12%).

Finally there is an assumption that the suburbs are homogenous spaces in 6 headlines (f=4%) in the sample of 150 concordance lines of *banlieue* (Figure 24) which assume homogeneity by using the plural form of the noun *banlieues* to foreground assumptions regarding the *banlieues* as neighbourhoods which are identical and can be classified similarly:

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**Banlieues en crise:** «Eviter les amalgames»
**Banlieues:** la colère de la population
**Banlieues:** pourquoi ça bloque ?
**Banlieues:** les médias américains sans complaisance
Les banlieues font salle comble
Les banlieues s’invitent au congrès du PS

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Figure 23: Concordance of *cité* (3)
Figure 24: Concordance of *banlieue* (3)
Headlines serve important cognitive functions in news texts, and it was discussed previously (section 2.5.4.2) that headlines:

[...]

form a cognitive macro-structure that serves as an important strategic cue to control the way readers process and make sense of the [news] report. Part of this involves the activation of relevant background knowledge from our long-term memory that is needed to contextualize the meaning of the text. (Teo, 2000: 14)

Using a minimum number of words, headlines must attract reader attention while summarising the most crucial information contained in the news report. Consequently Teo (2000: 14) maintains that the ‘macro-structure that is manifest in headlines and leads encapsulates an ideology that biases the reader to the particular reading, thereby subjugating all other possible interpretations of the news story’.

Headlines in Figure 24 rearticulate ideologies which presuppose that the banlieues are recognised and recognisable geographic locations which can be distinguished from other areas in France. Punctuation, particularly the colon (as in Banlieues: la colère de la population etc.), also draws on commonsense understandings associated with the noun banlieue, thus reinforcing the discourse of separation and othering identified in Mini-RiCo (section 6.3.2). This trend is confirmed by analysing a sub-corpus of headlines only in RiCo: Figure 25 quantifies the use of banlieue* in headlines in RiCo, broken down by news title, and Figure 26 reproduces sample concordance lines from all four news titles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Humanité</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest France</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 25: Classification of banlieue* in headlines

Les banlieues mettent à mal la solidarité gouvernementale
Malaise des banlieues et déficit d'action sociale
Banlieues : vingt-cinq ans après
Banlieues: la colère de la population
Banlieues : portraits d'émeutiers
Le Pen tire les leçons de la crise des banlieues
La colère des banlieues
Villepin se saisit du dossier des banlieues en crise
Violences et vigilance, le face-à-face des banlieues
La crise des banlieues interpelle la pratique du journalisme
Une ambassade de l'art en banlieue
Des banlieues sans espoir
Ce dont souffrent les banlieues
À l'Assemblée, le PCF porte la voix des banlieues
France-Culture consacre une semaine aux banlieues
With very limited exception when the noun *banlieue/s* is used in headlines in *RiCo* it refers to suburbs generally, rather than specific or named districts in a given French city. The concordance in Figure 26 also shows how punctuation, in particular a colon, is used to reinforce ideologies distinguishing the *banlieues* from other areas in France, and headlines such as *Banlieues: comment sortir du chaos?* and *Banlieues: portraits d'émeutiers* discursively imagine the suburbs as homogenous areas.

It can be argued that headlines such as those in Figure 26 operate as a subtle form of othering, as readers are offered a voyeuristic insight into how ‘they’ live. Articles such as these explicitly set out to represent ‘their’ voices, whereas the voice of the ordinary French person is assumed – by default – to be that of the newspaper. Additionally, access to newsmaking and agenda-setting is determined by established journalists, and it is very rare that an article is written entirely by someone from the suburbs. Instead, their voices are either represented in direct quotation in articles by journalists seeking to expose what ‘they’ think, or (less frequently) by representatives of community organisations working in the *banlieues* who publish articles ‘on behalf’ of those living in the suburbs. This discursive trend reinforces the notion of the suburbs as being separate from the rest of France (section 6.3.2.1), as they are constructed as areas which must be specifically singled out for particular attention and it assumes that readers are not aware of what life is like ‘there’. This type of voyeuristic othering is possibly unintentional, and it has been seen previously that some articles in *Mini-RiCo* seek to draw attention to the difficulties faced by inhabitants of the *banlieues* and their exclusion from French society. However a discourse which positions the suburbs and those who live there as distinct and different from the rest of France is nonetheless reproduced and rearticulated: in a type of vicious circle, by seeking to criticise the unequal status of people living in the *banlieues*, the more sympathetic newspapers in *RiCo* (e.g. *L’Humanité*) are forced to

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69 It should be noted that letters and emails to the editor were excluded from *RiCo*, for reasons discussed in section 3.2, so it is possible that the opinions of those living in the *banlieues* were reflected in this genre.
rely on the same exclusionary discourses as the right-wing and explicitly anti-immigrant newspapers (in particular *Le Figaro*).

Thus, the first pattern which emerges in the use of *banlieue* is an assumption that the suburbs are homogenous and share identical characteristics, that they are as Marchal and Stébé (2012: 61) suggest ‘*des mondes clos parfaitement homogènes [...] des enclaves n’accueillant que des invidus à la même identité ethnique*’. The term *banlieue/s* is used to signify neighbourhoods which are assumed known to newspaper readers, achieved linguistically through repetition of prepositional phrases, as well as lexis and punctuation which foregrounds homogeneity in news text and headlines. The effect of this discursive trend is to firstly reinforce the discourse of separation present in *Mini-RiCo* (section 6.3.2), whereby the suburbs are constructed as separate and distinct areas which can be distinguished from the rest of France. Consequently, newspaper readers are implicitly primed to view the *banlieues* using a type of ‘here’ and ‘there’ division, rather than the suburbs forming part of the imagined French territory. Furthermore, the patterns discussed above allow for the omission of any discussion regarding the individual characteristics of *banlieues* in different French cities – there is an assumption that a suburb in Paris is identical to one in Toulouse, Lyon, Lille etc. This further stigmatises the *banlieues* and their inhabitants, and generalised references to ‘*les banlieues*’ ignores any demographic or social specificities of a given neighbourhood.

### 7.3.4 Negative Characterisation of the Banlieues

The second discursive pattern which emerges from analysis of the sample of 150 concordance lines of *banlieue* echoes the analysis in section 6.3.2.2 regarding the repeated negative characterisation of the suburbs in *Mini-RiCo* and the construction of the *banlieues* as unpleasant places to live. This is evident in the sample from *RiCo* in the close collocation of negatively connoted lexis (*e.g.* *ghetto, malheureux, problème/s*) with the noun *banlieue/s*, as in the following concordance (Figure 27):
l'Allemagne ne connaît ni les violences urbaines, ni les banlieues ghetto, et entretient une relation occidentale confronté à des banlieues devenues des ghettos ethniques. Elle a admis depuis longtemps ou les structures HLM qui ont organisé la ghettoïsation en banlieue en protégeant les centres- villes. champignons, ce mal plonge les nouvelles villes de banlieues dans la déprime et la violence, à avenir de précarisation proposé à la jeunesse, celle des banlieues ensuite, qui touche la société lorsqu'on est à l'écoute d'habitants des banlieues paupérisées ? Producteur de documentaires de EN ÉTAIT BESOIN, le mal des banlieues vient nous rappeler l'importance du pacte social dans la « Avec un langage guerrier, Nicolas Sarkozy a transformé le mal des banlieues en une épreuve de notamment le problème des banlieues, ainsi que les prochaines campagnes électorales. « Il y aura un résoudre l'ensemble des problèmes des banlieues. La création des zones franches urbaines (ZFU) en pleine tourmente, aux problèmes des banlieues vous incite-t-il à réagir toujours plus « à chaud » ? première cause du chômage, de la désespérance, de la violence dans les banlieues, ce n'est pas la crise qui permettent de réduire l'échec scolaire dans les banlieues défavorisées, et aussitôt le ministre de Dix-huit jours de troubles dans les banlieues, et le visage de Nicolas Sarkozy se creuse. C'est évident. de cette acmé de violence dans les banlieues et les quartiers défavorisés. Et sur le nom à donner à condamner les violences dans les banlieues et « la réponse politique qui est de mettre le pays sous état à la population française que les gens des banlieues sont des gens d'ethnies différentes, qu'ils viennent Sans stigmatiser la banlieue, les agressions physiques y sont 33 % plus importantes et violentes qu'en ville.

Figure 27: Concordance of banlieue* (5)

In the first three concordance lines in Figure 27 ‘ghetto’ is used in descriptions of the suburbs, as an adverb (les banlieues ghetto), a noun (des banlieues devenues des ghettos ethniques) and in nominalised form (la ghettoïsation en banlieue). Using the word ‘ghetto’ implies comparisons with disadvantaged areas in the United States, and it carries connotations associated with gangs, violence, drugs etc. Other concordance lines in Figure 27 similarly evidence how the banlieues are negatively characterised in RiCo: there is a semantic preference (to again use a term from Stubbs, 2001b) for pejorative terms including problèmes des banlieues, troubles dans les banlieues, violences dans les banlieues, précarisation, le malaise des banlieues, l'échec scolaire etc. This suggests that newspapers are drawing on readers’ commonsense assumptions whereby the banlieues are unquestionably associated with trouble and violence, thus reinforcing a negative image of the suburbs. The final concordance line in Figure 27 can be interpreted as an ‘apparent disclaimer’ (Van Dijk, 1992), which – as previously outlined in section 5.2 – Van Dijk explains is a semantic move where the in-group is first positively presented by denying a negative property (for example, not being racist), and in the second part of the sentence a negative property of the out-group is expressed. In the first part of the concordance line it is denied that any stigmatising of the suburbs is intended, but the second and main clause of the sentence explicitly compares the suburbs to ‘les villes’, and notes the higher levels of violence: ‘« Sans stigmatiser la banlieue, les agressions physiques y sont 33 % plus importantes et violentes qu'en ville, comme ce
viol avec une batte de base-ball.’ The quotation (Le Monde, 30 Jan 2006) is taken from an official report investigating violence directed at homosexuals in the banlieues, and provides evidence of how an apparently sympathetic stance towards the suburbs can reinforce prejudicial discourses which negatively characterise the banlieues.

Thus, the second discursive trend which emerges is one where the banlieues are negatively characterised by lexis which associates the suburbs with a ghetto, problems or failures. Hunston (2002: 198-199) points to the significance of corpus-based analysis for establishing ‘patterns of association – how lexical items tend to co-occur’, and notes that they are ‘built up over large amounts of texts and are often unavailable to intuition or conscious awareness’. Analysis has therefore confirmed the findings of the qualitative analysis in Chapter Five, and the repeated generalising discourses stigmatising the suburbs contributes to their construction as stereotyped areas which are synonymous with social exclusion and civil disturbances.

7.4 Investigating Patterns of Naming in RiCo

7.4.1 Introduction
The next part of this chapter builds on the analysis of naming and representations of social actors in Mini-RiCo in Chapter Five, in particular incumbent Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and les jeunes (section 5.3). The importance of analysing individuals and groups in discourse has been outlined previously, and the significance of identifying the representation of social actors as a means of uncovering dominant ideologies has been established: ‘in the discourse of the media, evaluative choices, like the categorization of the social actors, are an entrance point to hidden agendas’ (Caldas-Coulthard, 2007: 284). A CADS approach has been previously used for examining individuals and groups in discourse, for instance Page’s (2003) study of patterns of naming Cherie Booth/Blair – wife of Tony Blair – in British online and printed news reports, Taylor’s (2009) analysis of the representation of immigrants in the Italian press and Baker et al.’s (2008; Baker and McEnery, 2005) work on discourses relating to refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in the UK press. Following on from the qualitative analysis in Chapter
Five, this part of the chapter is divided into two sections: the first focuses on representations of Nicolas Sarkozy and investigates discourses relating to the Interior Minister’s handling of the crisis posed by the events of November 2005. The second part of this section focuses on les jeunes and questions the actions and characteristics most frequently associated with immigrant and suburban youth in RiCo.

7.4.2 Nicolas Sarkozy

Section 5.3.3 outlined how Nicolas Sarkozy, Ministre de l’Intérieur at the time of the 2005 riots, is particularly prominent in news articles in Mini-RiCo. He is singled out for criticism ahead of his political counterparts for having antagonised residents of the banlieues through his use of the terms racaille and kärcher and his hardline approach towards delinquency among immigrant and suburban youth (section 4.4.4.1). However, as previously outlined (section 5.3.3), negative representations of Sarkozy appeared to have little damaging impact on the French electorate’s perception of him, and it is possible that his consistent hard-line approach to immigration and the difficulties in the banlieues was a factor in his success in the presidential elections of 2007. The paragraphs which follow question whether Sarkozy is similarly foregrounded in RiCo ahead of other political figures in news reporting on the riots, and analyses collocates and concordances to identify the actions and characteristics with which he is most commonly associated.

7.4.2.1 Frequency Comparison of Sarkozy, Chirac and de Villepin

At the time of the riots in 2005 the three most powerful political figures in France were President Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy. A concordance search for each of these three politicians – using surnames as search terms – is carried out to ascertain their frequency in the four newspapers in RiCo. Statistics used in Figure 28 are based on the percentage of articles which include the politicians’ names in each of the Le Figaro, L’Humanité, Le Monde and Ouest France sub-corpora. Nicolas Sarkozy is more prominent than either Jacques Chirac or Dominique de Villepin in articles in three of the four newspapers in RiCo (Ouest France is an exception, and de Villepin is referred to in
21% of articles in that title [167 texts], compared to Sarkozy in 17% [127 texts] and Chirac in 16% [122 texts]):

![Figure 28: References to Chirac, de Villepin and Sarkozy in each newspaper in Mini-RiCo](image)

Sarkozy is particularly prominent in the right-wing newspaper *Le Figaro* and left-wing *L’Humanité*, named in 91.11% (533 texts) and 90.98% (494 texts) of articles, respectively; this figure is also high in *Le Monde* (87%, 327 texts), but is significantly lower in the regional newspaper *Ouest France*, as Sarkozy is only mentioned in 17% of articles (127 texts). Similar trends emerge with regard to Dominique de Villepin, who is named in 57% of articles in *Le Figaro* (331 texts), 39% in *L’Humanité* (211 texts), 47% in *Le Monde* (176 texts) and 21% in *Ouest France* (158 texts). This pattern is replicated for Chirac also: 9% in *Le Figaro* (540 texts), 25% in *L’Humanité* (135 texts), 40% in *Le Monde* (150 texts) and 16% in *Ouest France* (122 texts). This trend confirms the observation made in section 4.2.2 that local newspapers tend to be sources of regional information and are not as concerned with agenda-setting or political matters as their national counterparts. Kuhn (2011: 42) maintains that national dailies ‘exercise a strong influence among key political and economic decision-makers, help set the agenda for the other news media and act as a major forum for the discussion of new ideas in social and cultural matters’. Thus, the comparatively low number of texts which include references to the three main political figures in France in *Ouest France* implies that this title is
more concerned with local matters of interest to readers of its 42 regional editions, than national political issues.

Sarkozy is significantly more prominent as a social actor in RiCo than either de Villepin or Chirac, which echoes the findings of the CDA of Mini-RiCo where it was established using a macrostructural analysis in section 5.3.2 that he was singled out for particular criticism above all other political figures for his actions and words in the weeks leading up to and during the violence. As Moran (2012: 13) points out, ‘although Sarkozy’s statements did not directly result in rioting, his claims added to the frustration of the inhabitants of these areas, effectively moving the situation in the suburbs towards a context where the potential for civil unrest was markedly increased’. Given Sarkozy’s prominence in RiCo, collocates and concordance patterns in relation to then Ministre de l’Intérieur are now analysed.

### 7.4.2.2 Collocates of Sarkozy
Looking first at collocates of Sarkozy in RiCo in order to get an indication of the mental lexicon of the text producers (Mollin, 2009), the most frequent lexical words with a frequency of nine or higher are summarised in Figure 29 (i.e. grammatical function words are manually removed):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Word/Ranking</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas (n=3)</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>étrangers (n=93)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>nationale (n=162)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ministre (n=22)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>place (n=101)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>question (n=169)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villepin (n=23)</td>
<td>119</td>
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Figure 29: Lexical collocates of Sarkozy
One pattern which is evident in collocates of Sarkozy is the prominence of lexis indicating his pejorative and inflammatory declarations before and during the riots; this is indicated by words such as discours (n=68, o=29), racaille/s (n=76/204, o=25/10), karcher/kärcher (n=141/209, o=13/9), provocations (n=223, o=9) and déclaration (n=230, o=9). Additionally, the collocates in Figure 29 highlight his harsh approach to the suburbs and how Sarkozy was determined to face the civil unrest with a characteristic hard-line stance on crime and perceived delinquency. This is evident in the prominence of collocates including fermeté (n=175, o=11), prévention (n=185, o=10) and guerre (n=229, o=9). Furthermore, Sarkozy’s focus on les jeunes des banlieues as responsible for the riots, as well as his preoccupation with immigrants and their perceived threat to the proper functioning of law and order, are indicated by the collocation of jeunes (n=61, o=31), étrangers (n=93, o=20), immigration (n=115, o=16), sécuritaire (n=192, o=10) and sécurité (n=193, o=10) with Sarkozy. Collocates also hint towards an awareness of how the riots, and in particular Sarkozy’s handling of the crisis, could impact on his aspirations for presidency of France in the upcoming elections in 2007; this is seen in collocations such as président (n=124, o=15) and présidentielle (n=132, o=14). Thus, collocates of the search word Sarkozy seem to confirm the findings of the textual analysis discussed in section 5.3.3 above, indicating anti-immigrant discourses, particularly directed towards les jeunes des banlieues, and a harsh approach to civil unrest in the suburbs.

7.4.2.3 Discourse of Negativity: Concordance of Sarkozy (o=1601) and l’Intérieur (o=818)

Turning now to look at the concordance of Sarkozy, a random sample of 150 lines is examined, reduced from 1601 total occurrences in RiCo. Sorting concordance lines by first left, second left and first right allows for the identification of when Sarkozy is the object of the clause (i.e. followed by the preposition de) and consequently the actions attributed to him. There are 31 occurrences (f=21%) of [noun] + [de] + [Sarkozy], and similar to the findings discussed in section 5.3.3.1, a discourse of negativity is evident through emphasis on Sarkozy’s use of language in relation to the riots [evident in the first set of concordance lines in Figure 30 (o=8, f=5%)] and
his policy approach to les banlieues more generally [evident in the second set of concordance lines in Figure 30 (o=8, f=5%)]:

The concordance in Figure 30 shows how news articles in RiCo display a concern with Sarkozy’s propos, discours, déclarations and paroles, which is an implicit intertextual reference to how his use of language aggravated tensions between residents of the suburbs and majority French society. Additionally, eight concordance lines (f=5%) draw attention to his policy approaches (e.g. libéralisme triomphant et violent, texte, politique sécuritaire, posture, initiatives, cynisme, stratégie), four of which negatively evaluate his actions. It is interesting to note the concordance line which refers to Sarkozy’s tutoiement (use of the tu rather than vous form of address) to a young person he met while on a visit to a Parisian suburb (Rien ne manque décidément, ni le tutoiement de Nicolas Sarkozy - « Tais-toi ! » - s’adressant à un jeune qui l’interpelle). Flowerdew (1997: 318) cites Brown and Gilman’s study (1960) regarding the implications of the choice of first and second subject pronoun tu and vous when addressing someone, and notes that ‘the tu/vous distinction [...] functions as an index of power in language’. Sarkozy’s use of the informal tu form of address when speaking to a young person while on the visit to the suburbs is criticised in an article published in L’Humanité (1 June 2006); by reproducing the insulting expression ‘« Tais-toi ! »’ the journalist is drawing attention to Sarkozy’s lack of respect towards the inhabitants of the suburbs.
A discourse of negativity is also present in the concordance using the search term l’intérieur to identify additional representations of Nicolas Sarkozy in RiCo. A search for l’intérieur returns 818 occurrences, and a random sample of 150 lines is analysed.\(^7\) 23% of occurrences (o=35) use a discourse of negativity when evaluating Sarkozy’s actions, as evidenced by the concordance in Figure 31:

A discourse of negativity is also present in the concordance using the search term l’intérieur to identify additional representations of Nicolas Sarkozy in RiCo. A search for l’intérieur returns 818 occurrences, and a random sample of 150 lines is analysed.\(^7\) 23% of occurrences (o=35) use a discourse of negativity when evaluating Sarkozy’s actions, as evidenced by the concordance in Figure 31:

Actions associated with Sarkozy include effrayer des banlieues, créer un climat terrible, effets désastreux, un facteur de troubles, posture provocatrice and isolé, and the concordance in Figure 31 evidences a similar preoccupation with his policy approaches and use of language. This implies journalistic awareness of the negative effects of Sarkozy’s comments and the perception that they contributed to the civil unrest. There are a very limited number of examples in the concordance of l’intérieur where Sarkozy is explicitly praised for his actions; for instance one article from Le Figaro (7 Jan 2006) declares that C’est surtout dans sa lutte contre l’immigration clandestine que l’Intérieur obtient ses meilleurs résultats. Under the headline ‘La délinquance baisse, mais moins vite’ the article discusses a reduction in ‘delinquency’ rates, citing figures from police and the Ministry of the Interior. The concordance line just cited (C’est surtout dans sa lutte contre l’immigration clandestine que l’Intérieur obtient ses meilleurs résultats) is the opening line of the final paragraph of the article. Praising Nicolas Sarkozy for his success on ‘clandestine immigration’ in the context of a discussion on delinquency expresses an anti-immigrant discourse through presupposing a link between immigration and delinquency. This is a further example of the right-wing Le Figaro newspaper

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\(^7\) Concordance lines are ‘cleaned’ following the procedure outlined in section 3.4.5.4 to ensure that only those referring to Nicolas Sarkozy – and not his predecessors or the ‘interior’ of a building etc. – are included for analysis.
stigmatising immigrants, and Chapters Five and Six drew attention to the presence of anti-immigrant discourses in this newspaper (e.g. section 5.3.4.3). Thus, concordances of Sarkozy and l’intérieur reveal that Sarkozy’s actions and use of language is negatively evaluated in RiCo. In order to ascertain whether he is singled out for particular criticism ahead of other political figures, concordance lines where Sarkozy strongly collocates – i.e. within six words – with de Villepin are now considered.

Querying concordances where the search word Sarkozy closely collocates with Villepin (o=15, f=10%) reveals that they are rarely explicitly compared, but instead collocate in news reports discussing government reaction to the riots. Sarkozy and de Villepin are frequently named as representative of the official political position and the conjunction et is used to link them. This establishes them as members of the same ‘team’, rather than being set up as offering different responses to the crisis. The concordance in Figure 32 also shows that in a small number of cases (o=10, f=6.67%) Jacques Chirac is listed along with Sarkozy and de Villepin to reiterate their status as the leading political figures in France:

To a lesser extent, Sarkozy closely collocates with Villepin in discussions relating to their presidential ambitions for the 2007 elections (o=5, f=3.3%) and in reports on their popularity in pre-election opinion polls (e.g. Figure 33):

Figures 32 and 33 thus suggest that comparisons are not drawn between Sarkozy and his leading political counterpart, Dominique de Villepin. They are frequently named
as the representatives of the French government, and decisions taken regarding the declaration of the state of emergency, introduction of a curfew etc. are attributed to both of them.

In sum, of the three leading political figures named in RiCo, then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy is by far the most prominent, ahead of President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. In all but one of the four newspapers which make up RiCo, Sarkozy is named more frequently, ahead of Chirac and de Villepin, and collocate and concordance analysis suggests that he is singled out for particular criticism for his provocative words and actions towards inhabitants of the banlieues. The prominence of Sarkozy ahead of his political counterparts is to a certain extent explainable due to the scope of his role as Interior Minister and his direct responsibility for policies impacting on the banlieues. However, his representation in RiCo could be viewed as being somewhat disproportionate and it suggests media preoccupation with his reaction to and handling of the crisis. As discussed in section 4.4.4.1, in his handling of the crisis in 2005 Sarkozy was mindful of his presidential ambitions for the elections in 2007: his chosen policy approach was a hard-line attitude towards curbing immigration and ensuring harsh penalties for those involved in the riots, including deportation. This approach is summarised succinctly by Joly (2007: 268): ‘Sarkozy représente la tendance pure et dure sur le traitement des émeutes’. Demiati (2006: 58) confirms this observation, noting that:

Depuis qu'il est revenu au ministère de l'Intérieur, Nicolas Sarkozy a délibérément choisi de jouer le jeu de la provocation des jeunes des quartiers populaires et d'y faire monter la tension. Son attitude pendant les différentes phases des émeutes du mois de novembre doit ainsi être située dans le cadre plus général d'une stratégie dont la finalité électorale ne fait pas de doute mais dont les effets sont beaucoup plus larges.

Thus, as previously pointed out, discourses of negativity relating to Sarkozy’s handling of the crisis and attitude towards the banlieues are likely to have contributed to his electoral success in the presidential elections in 2007 and French voters supported his proposed policy approaches to the suburbs.
Having examined discourses relating to Nicolas Sarkozy in RiCo, focus now turns to analysing lexical and discursive patterns relating to another prominent social actor: *les jeunes*.

### 7.4.3 Les Jeunes

This section probes the representation of young people in RiCo, and questions the actions and characteristics most commonly associated with *les jeunes*. The preceding discussion in section 7.2.3 established how collocate, cluster and concordance analyses of *violence*, *émeute* and *brûl* reveals that young people are linked with the violence of November 2005 in a limited number of concordance lines. It was also established in section 5.3 that *les jeunes* are prominent in discourses surrounding the riots, and a macrostructural analysis of Mini-RiCo indicated that young people feature to some extent in twelve of the sixteen articles in the sample and are the most prominent actors in two texts. It is thus argued that while *les jeunes* are not consistently explicitly blamed for the riots, their prominence as a social actor implicitly links them with having perpetrated the violence in November 2005. This section builds on these observations and investigates whether the discursive patterns identified in Chapter Five can be generalised in the larger RiCo corpus of 2,271 texts. As with the previous sections, concordancing and collocation techniques are used in the analysis of RiCo and lexical and semantic preferences in the representation of young people are identified. Analysis largely confirms the findings in Chapter Five and the noun *jeunes* in RiCo carries particular connotations when used in newspaper coverage of the riots. These connotations are explored using concordance searches and it is argued that *les jeunes des banlieues* are a demographic group who are consistently associated with violent activities and who can be distinguished from what are perceived as ‘ordinary’ French young people.

#### 7.4.3.1 Collocates of Jeunes, Adolescents and Mineurs

Collocates of *jeunes*, *adolescents* and *mineurs*\(^{71}\) indicate that – perhaps surprisingly – the words do not appear to be used synonymously for each other, but have

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\(^{71}\) These words are selected based on the examination of the wordlist for RiCo (section 7.2.2). It was determined that the most frequently used synonyms for *jeunes* are *adolescents* (n=648; f=191) and *mineurs* (n=681; f=185).
differing uses and connotations in media coverage of the riots. Figure 34 summarises their most frequent lexical collocates, and they suggest that firstly, *adolescents* is primarily used with lexis pointing to the incident that was the catalyst for the initial outbreak of violence – the accidental electrocution of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré in an electrical substation of Clichy-sous-Bois (e.g. mort/s, Clichy, transformateur, électrocutés, EDF, enfants, octobre, Seine Saint Denis, Bouna, poursuivis, fuite, Zyed). In contrast, *mineurs* collocates with vocabulary from the lexical field of justice and the courts (e.g. interpellés, présentés, justice, délits, juges), while the collocates of *jeunes* indicate more general discourses relating to the suburbs, the events of November 2005 and the problems facing French society:
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| Figure 34: Lexical collocates of *jeunes, adolescents* and *mineurs* |

Collocates in Figure 34 seem to indicate a set pattern of language (following Baker, 2006), and point to assumptions about the ideological implications of the terms *jeunes, mineurs* and *adolescents*. It is interesting to note the collocation of *adolescents* with vocabulary linked to the electrocution of the young people in Clichy-sous-Bois, particularly in comparison to collocates of *jeunes*: for instance *transformateur* is ranked 17th in the list of collocates of *adolescents* (o=25), in comparison to ranking 192nd for *jeunes* (o=24). This suggests a distancing of the teenagers killed in Clichy-sous-Bois from often prejudicial and negative discourses surrounding *les jeunes de banlieues* or *les jeunes des cités*. Similarly, the differences
which are highlighted in Figure 34 between collocates of the terms *jeunes*, *mineurs* and *adolescents* echo the findings of the CDA discussed in section 5.3.4: it indicates that in newspaper coverage of the riots, the expression *jeunes* (*des banlieues/cités/quartiers*) carries particular ideological connotations and embodies specific assumptions, rather than being simply a deictic marker of the general demographic group ‘young people’. This observation is also supported by the high frequency collocation of *banlieues* (*n*=30, *o*=188), *cités* (*n*=52, *o*=141) and *quartiers* (*n*=83, *o*=91) with *jeunes*. Likewise, there is a high frequency for lexis indicating a preoccupation with specifying origin which is different to ‘normal’ French young people: for instance the high frequency of collocates *issus* (*n*=50, 91 occurrences) and *immigration* (*n*=91, 48 occurrences) with *jeunes*. Finally, the collocates of *jeunes* in Figure 34 give an indication of the roles and characteristics with which young people are associated, the overwhelming majority of which carry negative connotations: *chômage*, *difficulté/s*, *interpellés*, *violence*, *colère*, *discrimination/s*, *difficiles*, *révoltes*, *délinquance*, *précarité*, *émeutiers*, *défavorisés chômeurs*, *délinquants* and *racaille*. To reiterate Stubbs’ (1996: 172) observation, collocates show ‘the associations and connotations [words] have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody’. Thus, collocation techniques appear to confirm the findings of the CDA of *Mini-RiCo*, which showed that for the printed news media, the noun ‘*jeunes*’ is linked to discourses on immigration, the suburbs, unemployment and civil disobedience.

The observations just made regarding the different connotations linked to *jeunes*, *mineurs* and *adolescents* is an example of the benefits of a corpus-assisted approach to discourse analysis. This subtle difference was not evident in *Mini-RiCo*, but using the collocate function to examine the larger *RiCo* corpus demonstrates the usefulness of having a large sample, a point articulated by Hamilton et al. (2007: 171):

A large sample of instances of use [forms] the basis for an analysis of emerging patterns of use [...]and] can be used as the basis for arguments concerned with the general meaning of a particular word in use as it occurs in a particular data-set.

As previously mentioned, media discourse has potentially the greatest impact when we consider the cumulative effect of repeatedly reinforcing a particular meaning of a word or phrase; to again cite Fairclough (1989: 54):

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The hidden power of media discourse and the capacity of [...] power-holders to exercise this power depend on systematic tendencies in news reporting and other media activities. A single text on its own is quite insignificant: the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the reader, and so forth.

Thus, the sustained use of the noun *jeunes* to signify immigrant and suburban youth who are linked to high unemployment rates and civil disturbances reinforces a prejudicial view of young people living in the *banlieues* and serves as a means of othering them vis-à-vis what are implicitly constructed as ‘ordinary French’ *adolescents*. This discursive trend is now investigated further through analysis of the concordance of the search term *jeunes*, and a random sample of 150 concordance lines (reduced from a total of 3,412 occurrences of *jeunes*) reveals two discursive patterns: firstly, homogenisation of *les jeunes* and their repeatedly negative characterisation, in particular highlighting a lack of educational achievement as a means of othering immigrant and suburban youth; and secondly the news media speak on behalf of *les jeunes*, rather than directly representing their views. It is argued that emotions and sentiments are frequently attributed to *les jeunes* (*des banlieues/cités/quartiers*).

7.4.3.2 Negative Characterisation and Homogenisation of *Les Jeunes*

The most prominent discursive trend evident in the concordance of *jeunes* is the use of lexis to negatively characterise the behaviour of young people and the related use of homogenisation strategies (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003) to discursively construct *les jeunes* as a demographic group with an inherent violent disposition. Homogenisation strategies are also used in *Mini-RiCo* to assume that the identity and characteristics associated with *les jeunes* are obvious to readers, and to mark them out as a distinctive and recognisable category that can be distinguished from other French youth. It was pointed out in section 5.3.4.2 that one discursive means by which the homogenisation of suburban youth is achieved is the repeated use of the definite article *les jeunes* as a ‘trigger’ (Richardson, 2007: 63) to a presupposition that suburban youth is a recognised social demographic category. Of the 150 concordance lines of *jeunes* analysed, 49 (f=33%) are preceded by the definite article *les*, presupposing that a group *jeunes* exists as a recognisable and shared social categorisation among journalists and news consumers. Longhi (2012: 135-136) also
examines the prevalence of the use of the definite article *les jeunes* and proposes that ‘Les [...] impliquerait la référenciation, l’opposition et l’individuation : le référent est particulisé est positionné différemment par rapport à d’autres entités [...] les indique [...] la cristallisation des stéréotypes’. Furthermore, in 7 concordance lines (f=5%) the noun *jeunes* is preceded by the demonstrative adjective *ces* (as in *ces jeunes des ZUS, ces jeunes des quartiers défavorisés*), and in 14 occurrences (f=9%) *jeunes* is followed by adjectival qualifiers specifying geographical or demographic information, such as *jeunes des banlieues* (o=5, f=3%), *jeunes des cités* (o=3, f=2%), *jeunes des quartiers populaires* (o=2, f=1.3%), *jeunes des ZUS* (o=1, f=0.67%), *jeunes issus des milieux défavorisés* (o=1, f=0.67%) etc. (Figure 35):

Il estime, lui, que ce que réclament ces jeunes, c’est « une reconnaissance de leur identité culturelle ». qu’il faut débloquer et injecter dans la société. Ces jeunes, qui aujourd’hui se sentent rejetés, humiliés, doute qui puisse porter, la façon médiatique, ces jeunes, pour la première fois occupent un espace de moyens humains pour développer des projets avec ces jeunes. « Nous sommes souvent confrontés qui me frappe, c’est que personne ne parle de ces jeunes des ZUS où le taux de chômage atteint 55 ruraux ». Génération « précaire » Pour gagner les jeunes des villes et des cités, l’une des solutions le chef de l’UMP a tenu des propos indécents envers les jeunes des quartiers populaires : en parlant la République est souvent en échec. Beaucoup parmi ces jeunes des quartiers populaires se considèrent environnement laid, sale, dégradé ? Comment sortir les jeunes des cités pour qu’ils découvrent un mois, les initiatives se multiplient pour pousser les jeunes des cités populaires - et d’ailleurs - à provocation les antagonismes entre police et jeunes des cités - les chansons Brigitte femme de flic ou autour des transports en commun. On y découvrait que les jeunes des banlieues excentrées prenaient considérables. Comment s’étonner alors que les jeunes des banlieues, situés à la marge de la marge, ghettos et des clichés... Trois mois après le cri des jeunes des banlieues, rencontre avec l’âme de

The concordance in Figure 35 distinguishes immigrant and suburban youth from other young people in France and by so doing, a ‘them’ and ‘us’ divide is implied. These findings echo those of Turpin (2012a: 116-117) and her analysis of representations of *les jeunes* in French newspapers and on the Bondy Blog (section 4.4.5) suggests that:

 [...] le jeune est évoqué en tant qu’il fait partie d’un groupe, cela se traduisant très souvent par l’emploi de termes évoquant la pluralité en relation avec de cooccurrences et avec une forte spécificité – pluralité de pairs ou multitude qui fait peur.

As previously outlined, ideologies are particularly powerful when they become naturalised to the extent of becoming part of an apparently accepted reflection of reality; the concordance in Figure 35 reinforces a commonsense understanding of the difference between ‘these’ and other young people, and draw on assumed reader
knowledge of the demographic category implied by *jeunes des banlieues/cités/quartiers*.

Furthermore, homogenisation strategies are also evident in 29 occurrences (f=19%) which explicitly link *jeunes* with anti-social behaviour, as encapsulated by the concordance in Figure 36:

The concordance in Figure 36 shows how *les jeunes* are negatively characterised using adjectives such as *voyous*, *révoltés* and *incendiaries* and associated with activities including *touchent au shit*, *«choufent» (guettent)* or *qui brûlent les voitures* and *explosent*. This discursive pattern emphasises what is perceived as the inherently violent disposition of *les jeunes*, and generalised references such as those in Figure 36 reinforce stereotypes which presuppose that violence is an innate characteristic of young people living in the suburbs. Additionally, the second set of concordance lines in Figure 36 exemplifies how the domain of education is singled out as an area which particularly marks out immigrant and suburban youth as ‘other’, and explains to a certain extent the frequency of lexis from field of education in the frequency list for RiCo (section 7.2.2). For example, the final concordance line (*Ces actes de violences sont le fait de petits groupes de jeunes qui ne sont plus scolarisés*) links the events of November 2005 with an absence of educational attainment. Both Moran (2012) and Hargreaves (2007) draw attention to the significance of the French educational system as an integration tool, and Hargreaves (2007: 134) cites the ‘pivotal importance’ of education for ‘young people of immigrant origin hoping to escape from the low socio-economic status to which most of their parents were
confined’. However, as previously pointed out, education has not proven to be an integrating mechanism as initially conceived and students in the banlieues tend to achieve less academically in comparison to students living in other areas in France (Moran, 2012). Additionally, Ott (2006: 126) questions ‘Pourquoi ont-ils brûlé les écoles?’ and suggests that ‘il est fort possible que les jeunes n’aient pas gardé un si bon souvenir de ces structures et qu’ils les aient vécues bien davantage comme des lieux d’exclusion ou de répression que comme des lieux d’accueil et d’éducation’.

Consequently, negative characterisation by highlighting the academic failure of les jeunes is a means of othering immigrant and suburban youth and it reinforces perceptions that residents of the banlieues are viewed as ‘other’ when compared to their ‘French’ counterparts who remain part of the school system.

7.4.3.3 Attribution of Emotions to Les Jeunes
The second prominent discursive trend which emerges in concordance lines of jeunes is the prevalence of vocabulary which purports to represent the feelings and emotions of young people. There are 19 occurrences (f=13%) in the random sample of 150 concordance lines which attribute sentiments to les jeunes, examples of which are reproduced in Figure 37:

Various forms of the verb sentir and noun sentiment are repeated, as well as lexis indicating emotion including exaspération, inquiétude, colère, angoisse and mépris. However, in all but one of the examples cited in Figure 37, it is not suburban or immigrant youth who are expressing their emotions and explaining their feelings, but rather these sentiments are attributed to them, either by journalists or directly quoted sources. For instance, the first concordance line (Pas étonnant dès lors que les jeunes aient le sentiment d'une fracture générationnelle) is a direct quotation from Erwan

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Lecoeur, a sociologist and scientific director of l'Observatoire du Débat Public. Furthermore, the quotation in Figure 37 referring to l'inquiétude des jeunes des banlieues is from an opposition politician. As has been mentioned previously, Pietikäinen (2001: 648) asserts that quotation is a highly valued aspect of news: ‘access to news is highly controlled; who is given access and who is allowed to define events in their own words is considered valuable’. In RiCo young people do not define events in their own words, and instead sentiments of exclusion, anger etc. are predominantly attributed to them. An absence of direct quotation or representation of the thoughts of les jeunes is also evident in Mini-RiCo and it was seen that only one text in the corpus of sixteen news articles directly quotes les jeunes. Thus, in news reporting on the riots young people are spoken for or about, rather than directly representing their own views. As a result, the voices of suburban and immigrant youth are silenced and marginalised, as more powerful voices purport to speak on their behalf.

In sum, both discursive trends outlined suggest that les jeunes – implicitly understood to be immigrant and suburban youth – are consistently demonised in RiCo. They are presented as being dispositionally deviant and their behaviour is presented as destructive. There are implicit and explicit comparisons between other or ‘French’ young people, resulting in les jeunes des banlieues being constructed as other. It has been established previously that identity is relational, and identity is ‘operative only dialectically, i.e. in connection with its opposite, otherness’ (Therborn, 1995: cited by Tekin, 2008: 741). Constructing the out-group – les jeunes des banlieues – as other serves as an important tool of emphasising in-group sameness. It also reinforces an interpretation of French national identity which is exclusive of communities living in the banlieues and constructs the jeunes des banlieues as the ‘other’ and thus not conforming to the discursively imagined definition of ‘Frenchness’. Consequently, it can be argued that the discourses of nationalism evident in Mini-RiCo are also present in RiCo, particularly in light of Triandafyllidou’s (1999: 67) observation regarding the inherent link between othering discourses and expressions of nationalism:
the notion of the Other is inherent in the nationalist doctrine. For the nationalist, or simply for every individual that recognises her/himself as member of a national community, the existence of her/his own nation presupposes the existence of other nations too [...] For most national communities, there have been and probably still are significant Others, other nations and/or states, from which the community tried to liberate and/or differentiate itself.

It should be noted that constructing immigrant and suburban youth as being different from other demographics of ‘young people’ in France is not always done in a prejudicial manner. In a number of the concordance lines in Figures 35–37 there is apparent sympathy for inhabitants of the banlieues and criticism of social inequalities. However, emphasis on the difference of ‘them’ to ‘us’, even when it is done to highlight discrimination in France, reinforces discourses of the other, and consequently discursively creates in-group sameness and dominance. The next – and final – part of this chapter further explores the presence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ in French society, as identified in Mini-RiCo and discussed in Chapter Six.

### 7.5 Exploring Inter-Group Relations: ‘Us’ and ‘Them’

#### 7.5.1 Introduction

The aim of this section is to explore constructions of in- and out-groups in French newspaper reporting of urban violence in 2005, following from the observations made in Chapter Six. It was established that the French press responded to threat posed to their national model and national identity by the traumatic events of November 2005 through drawing on simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary discourses of sameness and difference. In Mini-RiCo, distinctions are drawn between ‘us’ (majority French society) and ‘them’ (immigrants living in the banlieues), resulting in residents of the suburbs being represented as the other when compared to a homogenously imagined French society. A CADS methodology has been successfully used in the analysis of national identity (Freak et al., 2011), nationalism (Prentice, 2010), collective identity (Koller, 2012) and immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Baker et al., 2008; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008; KhosraviNik, 2010; Taylor, 2009) in media and other types of discourses.
In particular, this section focuses the use of pronouns in RiCo. The significance of pronoun usage in discourse has been discussed previously (sections 3.3.4.1 and 6.2.4), and it has been pointed out that ‘pronoun systems are a representation of social relations, [...] they are part of the mechanisms for reproducing the orders of power’, and consequently can have implications with regard to power, distance, formality, solidarity, intimacy and casualness’ (Fowler, 1991: 99). In the paragraphs which follow the use of the personal pronoun nous in headlines in RiCo is analysed, and what has been termed a discourse of internal othering is identified which constructs oppositions between inhabitants of the banlieues who opposed the violence and those who participated in the civil disturbances. Following that, concordances where nous collocates with ils and eux are examined, and it is shown that the referent of ‘we’ varies depending on the context of the article. Throughout the analysis emphasis will be placed on probing referents of the personal pronoun nous, given that it is typically ‘referentially complex’ (Mulderrig, 2012: 708) and its significance is dependent on the surrounding co-text and implied referent. Chilton (2004: 56) insists that ‘we’ can be used ‘to induce interpreters to conceptualise group identity, coalitions, parties, and the like, either as insiders or outsiders’. The following paragraphs will show how nous is used to reinforce a discourse of separation, whereby French society is divided along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines, and residents of the banlieues are positioned as outsiders.

7.5.2 Discourse of Internal Othering: Concordance of Nous in Headlines
(o=23)
Given that there are a large number of occurrences of nous in RiCo (o=2746) a more manageable analytical sample is initially required and therefore the first step in analysing the presence of in- and out-groups in RiCo and assumptions made regarding ‘us’ and ‘them’ is to examine headlines in the corpus. Headlines, Erjavec (2008: 40) reminds us, form ‘a macrostructure that serves as an important strategic cue to control the reader’s preferred meaning of the news and activate relevant knowledge needed for its understanding in the reader’s memory’. Additionally, Murphy (2009: 198) proposes that headlines serve three primary functions in newspapers: they attract attention, indicate the content of an article, and also point towards the news values of the newspaper and its intended audience. For these
reasons, she suggests (2009: 198), headlines are a ‘fundamental feature’ of news discourse. Querying nous in a sub-corpus composed of headlines in RiCo resulted in 23 occurrences (f=1%), reproduced in Figure 38. The most common verb collocating with nous is the present tense form of être, and nous sommes is used four times in headlines from L’Humanité, Ouest France and Le Monde. Additionally, the majority of verbs (o=17, f=74%) following nous in the headlines in Figure 38 are in the present tense (voulons, réclamons, partageons, ne tolérons pas, expérimentons and devons), suggesting that ‘we’ are primarily ascribed an active role:

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Begag : « Nous partageons tous la responsabilité des émeutes » (LF)
Un lycéen de La Courneuve : « On nous met tous dans le même sac ! » (LF)
Immigrés, ces Français qui nous ressemblent (LF)
Nous sommes tous des rappeurs de banlieue (LH)
« Nous voulons réapprendre à rêver » (LH)
Émeutes Nous sommes nos propres pères... (LH)
Le « nous » citoyen du peuple Nord-Sud (LH)
Il faudrait pouvoir en finir avec les « eux » et les « nous » (LH)
Nous ne sommes pas « le bras armé » des calmants (LH)
Pourquoi nous signons l'appel de l'Humanité (LH)
« C'est par des actes non violents que nous devons réagir » (LH)
« Un candidat qui nous ressemble » (LH)
Bernard Thibault : « Nous sommes confrontés à une crise sociale » (LM)
Une militante : « Nous, le petit peuple, on est paumé » (LM)
Qu'on nous respecte ! (OF)
Savons-nous entendre les jeunes à problèmes (OF)
« Aujourd'hui, nous réclamons notre place » (OF)
Le monde nous observe (OF)
Nous six, jeunes profs en banlieue... (OF)
Coluche nous fait encore rire (OF)
« On est contre l'État parce que l'État ne veut pas de nous » (OF)
« Nous ne tolérerons pas l'incivilité » (OF)
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Figure 38: Concordance of nous in headlines (1)

Analysis of the co-text of the headlines in Figure 38 shows that nous does not refer to a single group, but can be classified into three distinctive groups. The first classification is where nous is used to refer to a defined group identified in the article, such as members of an organisation or political party. For instance, in the Ouest France headline ‘Savons-nous entendre les jeunes à problèmes’, ‘we’ refers to the members of l’Association nationale des instituts thérapeutiques, éducatifs, pédagogiques et de leurs réseaux. Similarly in the headline ‘Nous ne sommes pas «le bras armé» des calmants’ (L’Humanité), nous refers to an exclusively defined group – a collection of child psychologists working with children from the Parisian suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis whose views are represented in the article. Secondly, echoing the findings of the CDA in section 6.2.4, nous is also used in headlines to signify a
discursively imagined national French community. An implied reader is addressed in
this inclusive use of ‘we’ (Fairclough, 2001), seen for example in the Ouest France
headline ‘Le monde nous observe’ and in an article from Le Figaro entitled
‘Immigrés, ces Français qui nous ressemblent’, which opens with the following
statements:

Mieux connaître et comprendre les comportements et les valeurs des
Français d’origine immigrée est une bonne façon de juger notre
modèle d’intégration. À chaud, face aux événements des banlieues
intervenus dans un contexte de terrorisme international, on est en
effet tenté de conclure que la France a gravement raté sa mission
auprès de cette population. (Le Figaro, 9 Dec 2005)

Similar to articles discussed in Chapter Six, distinctions are drawn in this article
between ‘des Français d’origine immigrées’ and ‘us’, implied by the ostensible lack
of ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ of their ‘comportements et […] valeurs’, in the
face of ‘our’ model of integration. In the quotation above inhabitants of the suburbs
are further stigmatised through allusions to international terrorism, even though not
all those living in the banlieues are Muslim; linking the ‘événements des banlieues’
and the ‘contexte de terrorisme international’ is a means of stereotyping those living
in the suburbs. Stereotyping plays ‘a major role in constructing ingroup and outgroup
distinctions and in their articulation provide a sense of national identity through
(re)producing conceptions of what “we” are and are not’ (Bishop and Jaworski,
2003: 256). The in- and out-group distinction is further emphasised through the
division drawn between ‘la France’ and ‘cette population’ in the final sentence in
the quotation above.

Interestingly, in close to half the headlines in Figure 39 (o=11, f=48%), nous refers
to those from the banlieues – either from suburbs specifically named in the article
(e.g. La Tourfaudière in Avranches, north-western France) or the banlieues generally
– who appear to self-identify as a group which can be distinguished both from
mainstream French society and other inhabitants of the banlieues, in what can be
termed a discourse of internal othering (Figure 39):
In *Mini-Rico* there were only a limited number of examples where *nous* indexed the out-group, i.e. suburban and immigrant minorities living in the *banlieues*. However, headlines in Figure 39 contrast with these findings, and these headlines include direct and reported speech from those living in the suburbs, referring to ‘us’ as an identifiable group of people living in the *banlieues*. In light of the findings of the analysis of *Mini-RiCo*, it is perhaps surprising that residents of the suburbs are so prominently positioned, given their status as an out-group in French society. However, examining the co-text of these headlines reveals that in all but one of the headlines in Figure 39, the referents of *nous* are those in the *banlieues* who are opposed to the violence and ‘we’ signifies those members of the community who condemn the actions of the rioters. The exception to this trend is the final headline in Figure 39 – ‘«On est contre l’État parce que l’État ne veut pas de nous»’ – which is a direct quotation from a rioter ‘Karim’ explaining his motivations behind participating in the violent disturbances. Apart from this example, it is only the ‘reasonable’ voices of inhabitants of the suburbs that are represented by *nous* in Figure 39, and the news media appear willing to give prominence to people living in the *banlieues* who oppose the violence and who express a discourse constructing those involved in the riots as other. Consequently, the suburbs are represented as being divided along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines, where ‘us’ is those who oppose the violence, and ‘them’ refers to the rioters perpetrating the violence. As a result, the young people engaged in the riots are doubly marginalised through a discourse of internal othering: they are excluded both by mainstream French society and by members of their own communities who are keen to emphasise difference from ‘them’. This finding contrasts with Marlière’s (2006) investigation of solidarity among rioters and non-rioters in an unnamed Parisian *banlieue* in the Hauts-de-Seine commune following the 2005 riots. Based on interviews with residents of the suburb...
– both rioters and non-rioters, and of varying ages – he concludes (2006: 92) that even those who opposed the riots were sympathetic to the underlying frustrations of those involved in the disturbances:

*Ces habitants croient comprendre et sont largement solidaire des motivations sociales et surtout symboliques des émeutiers : pour eux, derrière ces agitations, se cache un ras-le-bol général lié à l’abandon de ces quartiers et à l’exclusion d’une frange importante de leurs habitants.*

However, contrary to Marlière’s research, in news reporting on the riots it appears that where there is solidarity/support in the *banlieues* for those involved in the riots, it seems to be backgrounded and instead the voices from the suburbs of those opposed to the violence are given prominence. Wodak *et al.* (1999) highlight the importance of identifying ‘internal inconsistencies’ in the discursive construction of national identity, mindful that national identities are not fixed and stable but open to reinterpretation and change in response to changing contexts. The expression of a discourse of internal othering in *RiCo* highlights that the discursive imagining of French national identity is not straight-forward. It has been argued that interpretations of Frenchness rely on a distinction between ‘us’ (majority French society) and ‘them’ (immigrant minorities living in the *banlieues*), and simultaneously, the discursively imagined identity of residents of the *banlieues* is similarly divided along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines.

Before moving on to the next section it is worth briefly highlighting the source texts of the headlines in Figure 39: unsurprisingly over half the headlines (6 of 11 headlines, f=54.5%) are from the left-wing *L’Humanité* newspaper, which has displayed a sympathetic approach towards immigrants throughout the analysis of *Mini-RiCo* and *RiCo*. There is only one headline from *Le Figaro*, and it may appear unusual that right-wing *Le Figaro* is giving prominence to the voice of immigrants, given that it is known for its ‘aggressive stance towards immigrants’ (Benson, 2002: 64). The article from which the headline ‘*Un lycéen de La Courneuve : « On nous met tous dans le même sac ! »*’ is taken (*Le Figaro*, 12 Nov 2005) contains a number of direct quotations from young people describing their ‘rage’ and ‘hatred’ for Nicolas Sarkozy. It concludes with the following advice from Idr, a ‘reformed’ resident of an unnamed *banlieue*:
Idr a longtemps écumé les commissariats, de garde à vue en garde à vue. « J'ai arrêté grâce à la bonne influence de ma copine. » Il a compris « un peu tard » que l'école était « la clef de tout » : « C'est la seule solution pour s'en sortir. Je le dis aux plus jeunes pour qu'ils ne fassent pas les mêmes erreurs que moi... mais je ne suis pas sûr qu'ils m'entendent. »

Again, it is the voice of someone opposed to the violence that is given prominence, and the words of the rioters are interspersed with ‘wise advice’ from the more reasonable members of the community.

In sum, analysis of *nous* in headlines in *RiCo* both supports and contrasts with the findings of the examination of *Mini-RiCo* in Chapter Six. French society is divided along ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines, and *nous* is used at times to signify a discursively imagined national French community which can be distinguished from ‘them’, immigrant populations living in the suburbs. Headlines in Figure 39 show how *nous* is also used by those living in the *banlieues* to self-identify as a group which is differentiated both from mainstream French society and those involved in the riots. Consequently, there is evidence of a discourse of internal othering, and the news media promote the voices of those in the *banlieues* who are opposed to the violence. These findings are an example of how CADS can be used to identify ‘resistant and changing discourses’ (Baker, 2006: 10), as the smaller *Mini-RiCo* largely did not indicate either the prominence given to the ‘reasonable voice’ of the *banlieues* or the double marginalisation of immigrant and suburban youth.\(^\text{72}\) In order to further explore constructions of in- and out-groups in French newspaper reporting of urban violence in 2005, instances where ‘us’ and ‘them’ co-occur in *RiCo* are now examined.

### 7.5.3 Identifying ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Concordance of Close Collocation of *Nous* with *Ils* (\(o=94\)) and *Eux* (\(o=12\))

As mentioned, this section of the chapter focuses particularly on the use of pronouns in *RiCo*, and their significance in the construction of in- and out-groups in France in newspaper coverage of the riots. Figure 40 shows the comparative frequency of the

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\(^{72}\) However, Text 7 in *Mini-RiCo* could be cited as an example of the news media promoting the ‘reasonable’ voices of inhabitants of the *banlieues* (section 5.3.4.3). This article (*Le Monde*, 10 Dec 2005) introduced a group of young people self-titled ‘Les « racailles de France »’ who expressed solidarity with rioters in the *banlieues* by placing plaques in strategic locations in Paris.
pronouns *nous*, *ils/elles* and *eux*, based on the wordlist for *RiCo* and the individual wordlists of the *Le Figaro*, *L’Humanité*, *Le Monde* and *Ouest France* sub-corpora:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>RiCo</em></th>
<th></th>
<th><em>Le Figaro</em></th>
<th></th>
<th><em>L’Humanité</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Word/Ranking</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Word/Ranking</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Word/Ranking</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>nous</em> (n=35)</td>
<td>3788</td>
<td><em>nous</em> (n=38)</td>
<td>914</td>
<td><em>nous</em> (n=32)</td>
<td>1182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ils</em> (n=46)</td>
<td>2746</td>
<td><em>ils</em> (n=44)</td>
<td>734</td>
<td><em>ils</em> (n=46)</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>eux</em> (n=152)</td>
<td>757</td>
<td><em>eux</em> (n=182)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td><em>eux</em> (n=145)</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>elles</em> (n=198)</td>
<td>609</td>
<td><em>elles</em> (n=204)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td><em>elles</em> (n=204)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
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<th></th>
<th><em>Le Monde</em></th>
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<tr>
<td>Word/Ranking</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>nous</em> (n=42)</td>
<td>659</td>
<td><em>nous</em> (n=34)</td>
<td>1033</td>
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<td><em>ils</em> (n=44)</td>
<td>602</td>
<td><em>ils</em> (n=42)</td>
<td>689</td>
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<td><em>eux</em> (n=119)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td><em>eux</em> (n=174)</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>elles</em> (n=157)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td><em>elles</em> (n=220)</td>
<td>126</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 40 shows that *nous*, *ils/elles* and *eux* are used with approximately the same frequency in *RiCo*, and in the four newspapers which make up the corpus. *Nous* is the most frequently used pronoun, followed by *ils*, *eux* and *elles*. Examining frequency lists thus offers little insight into the referents of *we/us* and *they/them*; to further probe the relation between ‘*us*’ and ‘*them*’ in *RiCo*, contexts where ‘*nous*’ is used with ‘*ils*’ and ‘*eux*’ are analysed to investigate inter-group relations and assess discourses present when the ‘other’ co-occurs as subject or object with the ‘*self*’ (following Marchi and Taylor, 2009).

Of the 2,746 occurrences of *nous* in *RiCo* there is a close collocation with *ils* in 3.5% of these occurrences (o=94). In a small number of concordances lines, ‘*us*’ and ‘*them*’ do not refer to any group implicated in the civil disturbances, but is concerned with relations between different political parties, or between France and other countries. However, given the nature of the corpus, the majority of collocations of *nous* and *ils* indexes relations involving those involved in the riots and/or inhabitants of the *banlieues*. Three discursive trends emerge in the use of these pronouns: firstly, the most prominent pattern is where ‘*us*’ and ‘*them*’ signifies relations between people living in the *banlieues* – in particular young people – and the police (o=19, f=20%). Secondly, the division between those who participated in the riots and the rest of the population living in the suburbs are indexed by the use of
**nous** and **ils** (o=10, f=11%); and thirdly, ‘us’ and ‘them’ is used to explicitly construct a division between **les cités** and the rest of France, both by those living in the **banlieues** and journalists reporting on the problems in the suburbs (o=11, f=12%).

Approximately one in five uses (o=19, f=20%) of **nous** and **ils** reference negative relations between those living in the suburbs and the police (Figure 41):

> ou de Livry, là où il y a des Français. Quand **ils** viennent ici, **nous** disent : «Mets-toi contre la BAC est déjà passée deux fois dans l'après-midi, **ils** veulent **nous** mettre la pression pour qu'on parle. « Même si on est innocents, les parents **nous** disent : «Pourquoi **ils** t'ont attrapé si t'as rien fait ?» », assure le jeune homme, les choses ont mal tourné. « **Ils** sont venus **nous** contrôler. Ils ont été vers un Après on lui a dit : «Pourquoi tu veux qu'on coure ?_ Après il a dit : «**Ils** sont en train de **nous** ». »

> « **Ils** voient que les keufs **ils** tutoient, qu'**ils** **nous** vannent, qu'ils y vont au culot, à l'audace, qu'ils ne prononcent jamais sans y accoler un chapelet d'injures. « Les flics, **ils** **nous** cherchent, ils nous la voiture, bouffon», et après **ils** disent que c'est **nous** les malpolis. Même si on n'a rien, rien fait,

> « Les Renois et les Rebeus, ils les fouillent dès qu'ils ont 13 ans. **Ils** respectent pas et en GAV démarches pour retrouver mon frère, avec ma mère, **ils** **nous** ont vraiment mal parle. Est-ce que ce notre travail aux policiers, **ils** **nous** ont traités de « bougnouls » et nous ont dit de rentrer chez leur demander pourquoi, **ils** **nous** ont répondu : "Vous direz merci aux jeunes" ! À quoi ça rime ? les flics sont cools. Ils font pas la morale, **ils** **nous** laissent même sortir le soir », assure Benjamin.

> « **Ils** voient que les keufs **ils** tutoient, qu'**ils** **nous** vannent, qu'ils y vont au culot, à l'audace, qu'ils ne prononcent jamais sans y accoler un chapelet d'injures. « Les flics, **ils** **nous** cherchent, ils nous la voiture, bouffon», et après **ils** disent que c'est **nous** les malpolis. Même si on n'a rien, rien fait, **Ils** **nous** disent que c'est **nous** les malpolis. Même si on n'a rien, rien fait, **ils** **nous** traitent de petits pédés. »

All of the concordance lines in Figure 41 are direct quotations from residents of the suburbs recounting their negative interactions with police, using vocabulary from the lexical field of intimidation and disrespect: **mettre la pression**, **attraper**, **courser**, **tutoyer**, **vanner**, **mal parler**, **ne respecter pas**, **traiter de « bougnouls »**, **arreter**, **traiter de petits pédés**. In only one concordance line are relations between ‘us’ (young people from the **banlieues**) and ‘them’ (the police) portrayed in a positive light: ‘**les flics**’ are described as ‘**cool**’, in a quotation from an article (**Ouest France**, 8 Feb 2006) discussing an initiative in the town of Saint-Malo offering young people from disadvantaged areas the opportunity to take a ‘taster’ course in a police training academy. The concordance in Figure 41 contrasts with earlier analyses, both of **Mini-RiCo** and the larger **RiCo** corpus: up to this point there was little evidence of the voice of those living in the **banlieues**, apart from those who oppose the violence. However, concordance lines in Figure 41 suggest that inhabitants of the suburbs are not entirely silenced and there are limited opportunities for representation through

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direct quotation. Furthermore, the inclusion of voices from the suburbs reinforces ‘them’ and ‘us’ ideologies which presuppose a division between the forces of law and order, and residents of the banlieues. Tensions between police and the banlieues have been highlighted elsewhere (Mohammed and Mucchielli, 2006; Moran, 2012; Murray, 2006), and Moran (2012: 268) suggests that in France ‘the police are seen as unjust and discriminatory by the population of the suburbs, a viewpoint that has important implications for how the state in general is perceived by these populations’. Highlighting tensions between inhabitants of the banlieues and the police arguably contributes to a discourse of difference (section 6.3), and a distinction is drawn between majority French society (implicitly law-abiding) and minority groups in the suburbs who are unable to live peacefully and demand police attention.

Another division referenced by the use of the pronouns nous and ils is the construction of internal divisions in the banlieues, primarily between rioters and non-rioters or young people and adults in the suburbs (o=10, f=11%). The concordance in Figure 42 reflects how those who did not take part in the riots use a discourse of internal othering in relation to those who did and attempt to construct those who participated in the civil disturbances as different from ordinary people living in the suburbs:

Distinctions are drawn between older and younger generations in the suburbs, with the former describing the latter as ‘plus individualistes et plus violents qu’hier’, and accusing them of treating their elders ‘comme des animaux’. Similarly, those who did not participate in the riots distance themselves from those who did: for example, one resident states that ‘quand ils cassent, c'est nous qui payons!’ As previously
discussed, constructions of internal divisions within the suburbs has been contradicted by sociological and ethnographic research (e.g. Marlière, 2006), but emphasis on how rioters are othered by residents of the banlieues further reinforces discourses of separation and difference.

Finally, the pronouns ‘us/we’ and ‘them’ also signifies a division between the banlieues and the rest of France (o=11, f=12%), confirming the findings discussed in section 6.3.2. This distinction is most commonly drawn by those living in the suburbs, who construct themselves and the banlieues generally as different from other people and areas in France (Figure 43):

| ministres, ils vivent pas ce que nous on vit, ils connaissent pas notre monde. Eux avec des milliers République. On est mis à l'écart, même avec des diplômes. Ils nous prennent comme des animaux. » ou quoi ? Il se fout de notre gueule, ils se foutent de nous ! Déjà qu'on est confiné dans les cités qui vont travailler avec, il vaudrait mieux s'attaquer à l'Etat, ils nous prennent trop pour des racailles, s'époumoné : « Ils cherchent à nous diviser selon nos origines sociales et nos parcours scolaires, mais jalouse, parce que l'on fait plus attention aux juifs qu'à nous, assure Marc. Ils ont un mot pour leur « jeunes de banlieue ». « Comment ils nous perçoivent dans les campagnes ? En fonction de ce que où « normalement, l'éducation a la priorité ». « Eh bien, ils nous l'ont grillée la priorité », s'amuse quand on va les interroger comme nous l'avons fait. Ils expriment alors l'injustice et l'humiliation majorité des familles que nous rencontrons, ils apparaissent comme un nirvana inaccessible. Il n'est conclusion de tout ça : « Les Français ont peur de nous et ils votent Sarkozy », analyse le « rouquin ».

| Figure 43: Concordance of nous and ils (3)

In Figure 43 those living in the suburbs clearly articulate a ‘them’ and ‘us’ distinction, identifying themselves as the victims of ‘humiliation’ and ‘injustice’, and maintain that those living outside the banlieues ‘connaissent pas notre monde’, ‘nous prennent comme des animaux’, and ‘nous prennent trop pour des racailles’. The othering of the banlieues by news journalists through the explicit use of pronouns ‘us’ and ‘them’ is less evident, apart from in the right-wing Le Figaro who – as expected – use an anti-immigrant discourse. Consider the following expanded concordance lines:

Mais il ne faut pas oublier que vivre avec nous, c‘est aussi vivre comme nous. Le premier devoir des immigrés est de respecter la culture du pays qui les accueille [...] Que les censeurs francophobes hurlent donc, qu‘ils éructent, qu‘ils fulminent leurs fatwas : les Français ne les écoutent plus. Ils l‘ont montré le 21 avril. Continuons à nous excuser d‘être nous-mêmes, et ils nous le montreront à nouveau. (Le Figaro, 30 Dec 2005)

The first quotation outlines what ‘they’ (those responsible for the riots) have prompted ‘us’ to do, and in the second quotation the journalist explicitly states that to live with ‘us’ is to live ‘like us’. The modalised expressions ‘il ne faut pas oublier’ and ‘le premier devoir’ are used to identify the obligation of ‘des immigrés’ in relation to ‘us’, the French people. This echoes the findings of the CDA discussed in section 6.3.2, where it was shown how in Mini-RiCo the French news media use discourses of separation and othering to represent the banlieues as different from the rest of France and consequently divide French society along in- and out-group lines. These quotations also provide evidence of the discursive imagining of French national identity and show how a particular interpretation of ‘Frenchness’ is proposed for readers which is exclusive of immigrant communities living in the banlieues.

Turning now to briefly examine the close collocation of nous with the disjunctive pronoun eux (they/them), nous collocates closely with eux twelve times in RiCo (Figure 44). In all instances it is implicit that the groups deictically indexed by nous and eux are either ‘we/us, the French’ or ‘we, those (immigrants) living in the banlieues’. In none of the concordance lines in Figure 44 below is it suggested that French people and inhabitants of the suburbs belong to the same social grouping, but are understood as being separated along clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines. Contrasting with the collocation of nous with ils, in the majority of its usage the personal pronoun nous is used to assume to speak for and on behalf of a homogenous French readership. There is evidence of a paternalistic discourse in the first concordance line in Figure 44 and the modal verb devoir is used to describe what ‘we’ should do for ‘them’, such as greater mobility in the housing market (Nous devons créer pour eux les conditions d‘une véritable mobilité..):
urbaines sensibles (ZUS). Nous devons créer pour eux les conditions d’une véritable mobilité pas dans cette impasse. « Maintenant, c’est eux contre nous », résume un jeune, complètement remonté. Nous devons pour eux les conditions d’une véritable mobilité dans cette impasse. « Maintenant, c’est eux contre nous », résume un jeune, complètement remonté. reconnaître en eux un peu de nous-mêmes ? Le diagnostic tombe tous azimuts : échec de l’intégration parents immigrés. « Nous avons grandi dans une cité comme eux, sans argent, et nous ramos comme que nous faisons c’est pour eux, et je suis très attachée à maintenir à Paris les catégories populaires » les autres n’ont pas à venir chez nous et on ne va pas chez eux. Il y avait de très beaux textes, vais rentrer le soir dans ma maison comme eux, mais personne ne nous en donne les moyens. Dès que à l’origine de violences sont, pour la plupart, de la même génération que nous. Mais eux ne sont pas certains jeunes émeutiers évoquent entre eux « les Français », nous sommes perdus. J’ajoute que souvent pensées en termes d’« eux » et « nous » ? Qu’est-ce que « nous » allons faire pour « eux » ? qu’il n’y ait plus d’« eux » et de « nous » entre les habitants des cités et le reste de la population. Il

In the final two concordance lines nous and eux are placed between inverted commas, as a means of criticising the existing distinctions drawn between mainstream French society and those living in the suburbs. As discussed previously, punctuating words by surrounding them with quotation marks serves as a distancing strategy, and aims to question the authenticity of these terms within the discourse (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003: 262). Indeed, in the final concordance line in Figure 44 above the journalist explicitly calls for an end to the ‘them’ and ‘us’ distinction between residents of the cités and ‘the rest of the population’. Similarly, a number of concordance lines in Figure 44 are critical of the presence of ‘them’ versus ‘us’ discourses in political and media discourses. For instance the second concordance line is taken from a general news article published in Le Monde which discusses the reaction of artists, photographers and comedians in Seine-Saint-Denis to the riots; a comedian is quoted as saying ‘Eux et nous. Le quartier et l’extérieur, les garçons et les filles, ou encore les Arabes, les Noirs et les « Gaulois »’. Although critical, by explicitly rearticulating the ‘nous’ and ‘eux’ divide in French society, these journalists are reinforcing this distinction and consequently legitimate its presence as one of the dominant discourses surrounding those living in the banlieues.

In sum, the close collocation of nous and ils/eux in RiCo implies discourses of separation and othering and points to divisions among three groupings: young people in the banlieues and the police; rioters and non-rioters living in the suburbs; and the division between les cités and the rest of France. It is important to note that the overwhelming majority of close collocation of nous and ils in Figures 41-43 above occur in the context of direct quotations from inhabitants of various banlieues – and in particular young people – although it is rare that those who admit to having
participated in the riots are directly quoted. Thus, minority communities are also co-constructors of ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourses and there appears to be an unquestioned assumption that France is divided along an in- and out-group dichotomy.

7.6 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to investigate whether the discursive trends and orders of discourse identified in Mini-RiCo using a CDA framework in Chapters Five and Six can be generalised and viewed as representative of wider patterns of discourse in the significantly larger RiCo corpus. It adopted a flexible and inductive CADS approach, guided both by the orders of discourse identified in Chapters Five and Six and by the data, where appropriate.

For the most part, analysis confirmed that the patterns of discourse identified in Chapters Five and Six can be generalised and viewed as representative of news reporting on the 2005 riots. For instance, examining discursive trends in descriptions of the civil disturbances in RiCo identified very similar trends to those discussed in Chapter Five. The wordlist of RiCo along with concordances and clusters of violence*, émeute* and brûl* showed that a discourse of blamelessness is expressed through spatialisation strategies, passive sentence structures and ambiguity regarding the perpetrators of the civil disturbances. The riots are confined to specific named locations (les banlieues/quartiers/cités) and eventuation strategies present the violence as simply having ‘happened’, thus drawing on naturalised and commonsense assumptions of the phenomenon of la violence urbaine. This part of the chapter also probed metaphorical representations of violence in RiCo and identified metaphors from the lexical fields of fire, disease and natural phenomena as prominent. These metaphors had not emerged during the analysis in Chapter Five and therefore it can be argued that broadening the initial analysis in RiCo from a sample of 150 concordance lines of violence* to all occurrences of violence* in RiCo (section 7.2.4) demonstrates the benefits and flexibility of a CADS approach, where ‘lines from one concordance frequently elicit testable intuitions/hypotheses which lead the researcher on to further concordancing, which can then open up unexpected
 avenues of exploration, and so on, with, in a very real sense, the data leading the way’ (Partington, 2009: 286).

Furthermore, investigating interpretations of the suburbs in *RiCo* through concordance, collocation and cluster analyses of the search words *banlieue* and *cité* also largely confirmed the patterns of discourse identified in *Mini-RiCo*. The *banlieues* are repeatedly constructed as a ‘problem’, and are seen as lying outside the boundaries of the discursively imagined French nation. Analysis in this part of the chapter also revealed that all four newspapers in *RiCo* purport to offer an insight into the life in the suburbs, assuming that their readership is by default a ‘French’ person who does not live in the *banlieues*. Newspapers rarely suggest that the communities in the suburbs form part of the broader French national community. As argued above, discourses seeking to ‘expose’ the reality of life in the suburbs operates as a type of voyeuristic othering, and society is assumed to be separated along clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ lines. Furthermore, patterns of naming in *RiCo* also largely echo the discursive trends identified in relation to Nicolas Sarkozy and immigrant/suburban youth in *Mini-RiCo*, discussed in Chapter Five.

Perhaps the most significant difference between *Mini-RiCo* and *RiCo* emerged in the final part of this chapter (section 7.5), where inter-group relations were investigated through concordance of the personal pronouns *nous* and *ils/eux*. In line with the findings of Chapter Six, *nous* and *ils/eux* were similarly used to express discourses of sameness and difference, to reinforce power asymmetries and to construct a particular interpretation of French national identity which simultaneously excludes minority groups in the *banlieues*. However, a new pattern of discourse was identified in *RiCo* where *nous* and *ils* are used to signify internal divisions among communities in the *banlieues* and to signal disapproval among non-rioters for those who participated in the civil disturbances. Furthermore, analysis above established that prominence is given to the ‘reasonable’ voice from the *banlieues* and those who participated in the violence are largely silenced by an absence of direct quotation. As a result, *les jeunes des banlieues* are excluded from playing a meaningful role in
news discourse and instead are represented only in relation to their activity (violent rioting).

This chapter thus confirms that patterns of discourse identified in Mini-RiCo using a CDA framework in Chapters Five and Six can – to a large extent – be generalised and viewed as representative of broader patterns of discourse in the larger RiCo corpus. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies allowed for discursive trends to be quantified, and to confirm – statistically – intuitions regarding discursive themes and orders of discourse which emerged in Chapters Five and Six. It also allowed for the identification of resistant or differing discourses which were not expressed in Mini-RiCo (e.g. a discourse of internal othering). A CADS analysis substantiated hypotheses expressed in the Introduction to the thesis regarding the presence of ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourses in news reporting on the riots, and consequently showed the linguistic means by which social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced and maintained by French newspaper discourse.
8 Conclusion

8.1 Summary of Thesis
This study aimed to contribute to an existing body of work highlighting the ideological nature of newspaper discourse. The selection of French newspaper discourse, generally, and articles relating to the incidents of urban violence in 2005 specifically, was motivated by a variety of factors, including the complex but fascinating sociocultural, historical, political etc. context underpinning the experiences of minority communities (often of immigrant descent) living in the banlieues. Additionally, the civil disturbances of 2005 were unprecedented in terms of their scale and duration, and thus represented a time of enormous crisis in French society. Urban violence has been a phenomenon in France since the 1980s (Hargreaves, 2007; Kokoreff, 2008; Moran, 2012), and the sporadic but regular outbreaks in towns and cities have been interpreted as an expression of frustration among suburban youth who feel denied the benefits of French citizenship and perceive themselves to be socially and culturally excluded (see section 4.3). Wieviorka (2007: 11) suggests that:

La violence ne surgit pas du vide...Qu'il s'agisse des émeutes urbaines ou de terrorisme, pour la comprendre, les sciences sociales doivent reconstituer dans toute leur complexité des processus diversifiés, examiner comment ils s'inscrivent dans le temps et dans l'espace, comment ils procèdent d'interactions où interviennent toutes sortes d'acteurs.

Thus, this study sought to examine newspaper discourse discussing the discursive positioning of various individuals and groups in French society in relation to urban violence in the suburbs. It has been argued that the 2005 civil disturbances offered a compelling site to investigate how discourse can be used to construct a particular interpretation of social relations in French society.

To briefly reiterate the organisation of the thesis, the early chapters discussed the key concepts and theories underpinning the critical analysis of media discourse and established the role of the media in constituting and shaping reality. Chapters One to Three established the theoretical and methodological frameworks for the study and the features which distinguish an explicitly critical approach to the analysis of
discourse were highlighted in Chapter Two along with the key concepts of discourse, power and ideology. Chapter Three outlined the methodological design of the study, which included qualitative and quantitative components in the combination of Fairclough’s sociocultural approach to CDA with a corpus-assisted analysis of Mini-RiCo and RiCo, respectively. The ‘methodological synergy’ of these complementary approaches to the analysis of discourse allowed for a detailed qualitative analysis of the sixteen texts in Mini-RiCo (Chapters Five and Six), which was followed by the quantitative analysis of discursive trends in the larger RiCo corpus (Chapter Seven). Mindful of the importance of contextualising the orders of discourse and discursive trends identified in Mini-RiCo and RiCo, Chapter Four addressed in some detail the broader sociocultural, historical, political etc. contexts of the 2005 riots. Ultimately, this research aimed to identify the discourses present in news reporting on the 2005 civil disturbances in the banlieues and to analyse the ideologies contained therein, particularly regarding the discursive operation of social relations of power and inequality. By so doing, it sought to contribute to existing studies highlighting the ideological nature of media discourse, and within the analysis in Chapters Five to Seven issues pertaining to discourse, youth identity, national identity, nationalism, culture and racism were examined.

8.2 Research Questions Revisited
The research questions which framed the current study were introduced in section 1.2 and included the following:

1) How are the events and actors relating to French urban violence in November 2005 discursively constructed in a corpus of French news media texts?
2) How are the banlieues and their inhabitants discursively constructed by the printed news media?
3) Assuming that identities – and national identities – are discursively created, how does French news discourse on 2005 urban violence construct French national identity?
4) Is there evidence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse, particularly with regard to the positioning of suburban and immigrant minorities in the banlieues vis-à-vis majority French society?

5) If there is evidence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse, what ideologies, social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced in printed media discourse, and how – linguistically – are these hierarchies sustained?

To reiterate, the first research question was addressed in Chapters Five and Seven (sections 5.2, 5.3 and 7.2 – 7.5), and analysis identified firstly that news reporting on the incidents of violence uses a discourse of blamelessness as the over-arching order of discourse through which the civil disturbances are reported. The discourse is supported by the use of two supporting discourses, labelled vagueness as a discursive technique and a ‘social causes’ discourse, to construct the riots as simply having happened. Thus social difficulties in French society simply exist, and there is an absence of agency regarding those responsible for creating the social conditions that allow such problems to persist. The metaphorical representation of la violence in RiCo was investigated in section 7.2.4, and metaphors from the lexical fields of fire, disease and natural phenomena (particularly waves) emerged as prominent. Emphasis is on the nature and location of the violence and spatialisation strategies which foreground where the violence took place suggest a preoccupation with confining the civil disturbances to specifically named areas (les banlieues/quartiers/cités). As a result, violent rioting is not represented as taking place in France generally, but very explicitly in the ‘suburbs’, areas which we have seen are implicitly and explicitly distinguished from what are perceived as ‘ordinary’ neighbourhoods in France. Two social actors emerged as particularly prominent in Mini-RiCo and RiCo: Nicolas Sarkozy and les jeunes (des banlieues) (see sections 5.3 and 7.4 for a detailed discussion). It was established that a discourse of negativity dominates news reporting relating to Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and he is singled out for particular criticism for his handling of the crisis posed by the events of November 2005. Similar patterns emerged in RiCo and analysis of frequency lists established that he is significantly more prominent in news reporting on the riots than other political figures.
Discourse patterns surrounding the second prominent social actor – les jeunes – also relate to the second research question of this study (How are the banlieues and their inhabitants discursively constituted by the printed news media?). Analysis in sections 5.3.4 and 7.4.3 revealed that when used in the context of the riots, the word jeunes does not signify ‘young people’ generally, but rather implicitly refers to immigrant youth in the banlieues. There is an assumption of homogeneity among les jeunes des banlieues and a generalising discourse constructs this category as singular and easily identifiable by virtue of their difference from what are viewed as ‘ordinary’ French young people. The discursive construction of the banlieues was investigated mainly in Chapters Six and Seven (sections 6.3 and 7.3), and it was established that news articles in Mini-RiCo use a discourse of difference to assume that there is a fundamental difference between ‘here’ (majority French society) and ‘there’ (the banlieues). A discourse of separation and othering draws on commonsense understandings regarding the distinctions that ostensibly can and must be drawn between the suburbs and other neighbourhoods in France and the banlieues are repeatedly characterised as unpleasant living spaces. The CADS analysis in section 7.3.2 identified some difference between the use of the nouns banlieue* and cité* and highlighted how the word banlieue* when used in news reporting on the riots assumes homogeneity among suburbs in various French towns and cities.

The third research question posed relates to national identity, and it asked – assuming that identities (and national identities) are discursively constructed (following Hall, 1995; Wodak et al., 2009) – how does French news discourse on 2005 urban violence construct French national identity? The discursive construction of French national identity in Mini-RiCo was examined in Chapter Six, and discourses of sameness and difference were identified as the orders of discourse through which national identity is expressed. Discourses of sameness are expressed through supporting discourses of continuity, republicanism and nationalism (see section 6.2), and they cumulatively create a particular interpretation of French national identity which assumes that to be French is to share a collective past, present and future. In Mini-RiCo a discourse of nationalism is expressed using the personal pronoun nous (particularly in editorials) and a national community is imagined which is implicitly and explicitly exclusive of those of immigrant
background living in the banlieues. Discourses of difference – expressed by what has been called a discourse of separation and othering and a discourse of cultural incompatibility – emphasise in what ways ‘they’ can be distinguished from ‘us’, and further constitute inhabitants of the banlieues as the ‘other’ in French society. Implicit awareness of in- and out-groups is assumed in the articles in Mini-RiCo and consequently unequal relations of power are upheld whereby immigrant minorities living in the banlieues are excluded from membership of the discursively imagined French society.

The identification of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse in Mini-RiCo thus confirmed the hypothesis articulated in the fourth research question, and throughout Chapter Six it was established how – linguistically – social power structures and hierarchies are reproduced and sustained in printed media discourse (fifth research question). At the level of orders of discourse it has been established that a ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse is expressed through discourses of sameness and difference. Analysis in Chapter Six also showed that in-groups are created by ‘constructive strategies’ (Wodak et al., 2009) which discursively create a French national identity by emphasising solidarity and unity and a shared cultural and political heritage. Discourses of difference assume the presence of an out-group in French society, and the printed news media rely on generalised references to generic classes of people – rather than specific identifiable individuals (Van Leeuwen, 2008, 1996) – to presuppose reader knowledge of the fundamental differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Discourses of sameness and difference are expressed in texts in Mini-RiCo by personification, lexis, repetition, modality, intertextuality, in/direct quotation, presupposition, collocation, nominalisation and sentence construction. Thus, a variety of lexico-grammatical devices and discursive patterns operate to ‘other’ inhabitants of the banlieues and therefore insist that what happens in the suburbs – i.e. urban violence – is not reflective of ‘our’ national character. Social power asymmetries are reproduced in news reporting on the 2005 riots through discourses positioning immigrant minorities in the suburbs as lying outside the boundaries of a homogenously imagined French society.
However, the CADS analysis of RiCo in Chapter Seven highlights some complexities within this ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse, and concordancing and collocation analysis identified additional divisions of in- and out-groups in French society (section 7.5). The personal pronouns nous and ils are similarly used to express discourses of sameness and difference and to reinforce power asymmetries between majority French society and immigrant minorities in the banlieues. However analysis of RiCo discussed in section 7.5 demonstrates that nous and ils signifies a discourse of internal othering, and it was shown that those who participated in the civil disturbances are constructed as the other in relation to ‘law-abiding’ non-rioting inhabitants of the banlieues. Prominence is thus given to the reasonable voices from the suburbs, and those who participated in the riots are largely silenced by an absence of direct quotation and discourses which signal a division in communities in the banlieues and disapproval among non-rioters. It has been pointed out that the discourse of internal othering in RiCo contradicts ethnographic research in this area which identifies considerable support among communities in the banlieues for the frustrations expressed by those who engaged in the civil disturbances (e.g. Marlière, 2006). Therefore, it seems that the French news media downplay any support among non-rioting members of the banlieues community and prominence is given to discourses which ‘other’ young people who participated in the violence.

8.3 Discussion of Key Findings
One key finding which emerges relates to the discursive construction of the banlieues and the positioning of the banlieues vis-à-vis majority or mainstream French society. In line with the findings of previous studies (e.g. Garcin-Marrou, 2007; Turpin, 2012b) the banlieues are constructed as homogenous spaces which share overwhelming negative characteristics, and analysis in the foregoing chapters confirmed this trend through both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The argument that the word banlieue/s carries an exclusively pejorative connotation is further evidenced by the absence of positively connoted lexis collocating with the search term banlieue*: the first explicitly positively connoted adjective is solidaires, ranked at number 2,020 on the list of collocations and with only two occurrences in RiCo. Thus, the word banlieues has come to occupy an exclusively negative
connotation in French public and media discourses, and it is a generalised term used
to refer to neighbourhoods which are assumed to have a high concentration of
immigrants, low levels of education and are associated with sporadic incidents of
civil disturbances. One *banlieue* is assumed to be the same as another, and there is
virtually no discussion of the demographics of individual suburbs which are referred
to in news reports on the riots. While French data protection laws prevent the
gathering of information relating to race, ethnicity, religion etc. (Hargreaves, 2007),
in the absence of statistical evidence journalists rely on commonsense assumptions
that the *banlieues* are *des quartiers des immigrées*. There is an assumption of
homogeneity and that residents of the *banlieues* are exclusively immigrants from
North Africa and the Maghreb. Furthermore, the *banlieues* are repeatedly negatively
characterised whereby discourses in relation to the *banlieues* are constructed based
on a presumption of ‘otherness’. Marchi and Taylor (2009: 27) reach similar
conclusions regarding the discursive representation of Iraq as a geographical entity
in UK and US news reporting of the Iraq war; they conclude that ‘Iraq is a place on a
map and not a social/cultural/political entity where there is an under-defined menace,
i.e. secretive and unknowable Others’. In French news reporting on the 2005 riots,
the *banlieues* are similarly constructed as simply places on a map and constructed as
neighbourhoods on the literal and metaphorical periphery of mainstream French
society.

A further trend which emerged in news reporting on the civil disturbances is the
prevalence of articles purporting to offer an insight into daily life in the suburbs. In a
type of voyeuristic othering, newspaper readers are offered numerous articles
detailing life in the *banlieues* and how ‘they’ live. In particular, headlines beginning
with ‘*Banlieues: ...*’ (see section 7.3) reiterate a view of the *banlieues* as
neighbourhoods unfamiliar to readers and by extension assume that the default
reading position is from the viewpoint of majority French society. Residents of the
*banlieues* are implicitly excluded from the imagined readership, and are further
stigmatised through discourses seeking to ‘expose’ the reality of life in the suburbs.
In 1996 Hargreaves drew attention to the trend of tagging news articles with the
noun ‘**BANLIEUES**’ in capital letters as an othering strategy and a means of
signalling synonymy with ‘alterity, deviance and disadvantage’ (Hargreaves, 1996).
Although there is no diachronic element to this study, the analysis of news discourse in 2005 suggests that little has changed in the years since Hargreaves’ study and similar discursive trends are evident in news reporting on the *banlieues* in 1996 and 2005/6. Hargreaves (1996: 609) notes the circular process of media reporting whereby the repetition of negative portrayals of the suburbs results in the *banlieues* becoming synonymous as sites of social exclusion with disproportionate immigrant populations:

Thus people of immigrant origins live in run-down, dangerous areas because they are poor; because they are poor, they commit crimes; because people of immigrant origin commit crimes, normal, law-abiding citizens do not want to live near them; because of this, the *banlieues* are ethnically alien places which are fundamentally menacing to the established social order, etc. etc.

Hargreaves’ comments could equally apply to news reporting on the 2005 riots, and thus it seems that the media continue to play a key role in the construction of the suburbs as sites of ‘ethnic alterity, deviance and disadvantage’ (Hargreaves, 1996: 607). The cumulative effect of this discursive representation of the *banlieues* is to strengthen ideological assumptions regarding the distinctions which can and must be drawn between the *banlieues* and other neighbourhoods in France. Despite the sympathetic stance taken by some journalists and their expression of discourses drawing attention to the difficulties faced by residents of some *banlieues*, an unfavourable discourse is nonetheless reproduced which assumes a distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’, thereby reinforcing the same negative assumptions for newspaper readers.

It was shown in Chapters Five and Seven that descriptions of the 2005 riots rely on spatialisation strategies which firmly locate the civil disturbances *dans les banlieues*. Violent incidents are confined to particular areas, which are discursively delimited as separate and different to other neighbourhoods in France. This could be suggestive of an implicit intention to ensure that the riots were not perceived as ‘French riots’ but instead as ‘*banlieues* riots’, and the actions of those in the suburbs were not to be viewed as reflective of French people generally. One article in *Mini-RiCo* (Text 6 from *Le Monde*) includes a passing reference to how these events might be perceived internationally; *Le Monde* editor Jean-Marie Colombani comments that ‘*les médias*
européens, et surtout américains, ont mis en scène les nouveaux malheurs français [...] La presse du monde entier a parlé d’émeutes’. Although not articulated directly, it is possible that spatialisation strategies and an emphasis on the location of the violence reflect an implicit concern with protecting France’s reputation internationally. Underpinning such spatialisation strategies is an assumption that the banlieues do not form part of the discursively imagined national landscape and that they lie outside the boundaries of what is perceived to be ‘real’ France.

Another key point of discussion relates to the construction of les jeunes and the representation of youth identity in news reporting on the 2005 French riots. It was established that les jeunes are represented as ‘other’ and existing social hierarchies are maintained through naturalised assumptions regarding the fundamental difference between ‘them’ (immigrant minorities in the banlieues) and ‘us’ (what are perceived as ‘ordinary’ or French young people). Les jeunes des banlieues are excluded from the discursively constructed definition of ‘Frenchness’ by virtue of certain characteristics with which they are implicitly and explicitly associated. The characteristics assumed to be associated with les jeunes include violent rioting, links to immigration and an absence of education, and they are thus repeatedly constructed as a generic social class of ‘other’ – rather than specific, identifiable individuals – who are defined primarily by their anti-social activity and difference from ‘us’. Although explicit attributions of blame in relation to les jeunes for perpetrating the violence are largely avoided (see section 5.3.4), blame is implicitly attributed through naming strategies, including vague generalisations and stereotypes regarding the inherent characteristics of suburban youth. This broad categorisation of les jeunes in French news discourse relies on assumptions that as a class they are dispositionally deviant and inherently criminal, and blame is implicitly attributed to an undefined and generic class of ‘other’. Fowler (1991: 94) emphasises the ‘tremendous’ power of discourse for facilitating and maintaining discrimination against members of groups; he notes that ‘language provides names for categories, and so helps to set their boundaries and relationships; and discourse allows these names to be spoken and written frequently, so contributing to the apparent reality and currency of categories’. Repeated reference in newspaper discourse to les jeunes reinforces perceptions that les jeunes is an accepted homogenous category of social
actor, rather than recognising that it is a discursively constructed ‘catégorie floue’ (Garcin-Marrou, 2007: 29). Discourses which negatively characterise les jeunes and implicate an inherent association with violent rioting contribute to its ‘apparent reality’ (Fowler, 1991) as a social categorisation and consequently its uncritical acceptance as a legitimate demographic category in news discourse. Thus, since the 1990s les jeunes (des banlieues) have been constructed as problematic (Sedel, 2009), and by 2005 this formulation had become so ingrained as ‘factual’ in media, political and public discourses that generalising statements negatively characterising les jeunes (des banlieues) became naturalised to the extent that they were not perceived as anti-immigrant or racist expressions, but simply a statement of ‘fact’.

A further interesting discursive trend which emerged in Mini-RiCo and RiCo is the representation of Nicolas Sarkozy and in particular the discourse of negativity which dominates in news reporting on his attitudes and actions following the violence in the banlieues. Qualitative and quantitative analysis revealed that he is singled out above all other political figures for his harsh policy approaches towards the banlieues and he is repeatedly criticised for heightening tensions and consequently doing little to prevent the spread of violence. As alluded to previously in Chapter Five, there is an apparent contradiction between the discourse of negativity expressed in news reports which discuss Sarkozy’s handling of the crisis and his subsequent success in the presidential elections in 2007. However, his electoral success could be interpreted as a trend identified by Tekin (2010; 2008) and discussed in section 4.3.3. She refers to the droitisation of French politics, noting that the extreme and moderate Right have become ideologically closer to each other, particularly in relation to the protection of what might be viewed as traditional national values. She posits that France is undergoing a process of a lepénisation des esprits, whereby overtly racist or xenophobic statements from the Front National party are gaining support among more moderate Right voters. Although a political/sociological analysis lies outside the scope of this study, it is possible that Sarkozy’s success in 2007 despite such a prevailing discourse of negativity in news reporting on the 2005 events could be indicative of a growing support for anti-immigrant discourses among French voters. Kuhn (2013) points out that the theme of national identity played a key role in Sarkozy’s 2007 electoral campaign, a strategic
move taken in an attempt to win voters from the extreme Right and narrow the existing gap between moderate and extreme Right politics in France. It thus could be argued that the discourse of negativity expressed in news reporting on the 2005 riots – perhaps inadvertently – strengthened Sarkozy’s presidential ambitions and was in fact a means of increasing his popularity among the conservative French electorate who were eager to see a more restrictive approach to immigration and a return to perceived traditional values of Frenchness.

Related to this is a further point of interest which emerges from the current study: the discursive construction of national identity and the imagining of French national identity in news articles reporting on the civil disturbances. The analysis of interpretations of Frenchness presented in this study corresponds to Hall’s (1995) assertion that citizenship of a nation does not necessarily equate with membership of a discursively imagined national community (section 6.2) Many of the residents of the banlieues are notionally French citizens, but the analysis of news discourse on the 2005 riots reveals their exclusion from the discursively imagined French national community. Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2008: 2) argue that in the current post-industrial/information societies nationalism is no longer defined with regard to other nations, but increasingly ‘nationalism is becoming more defensive and defined by reference to migrants and other marginalized groups’. Furthermore, Mercer (1990: 43) points out that identity particularly becomes an issue at a time of crisis, ‘when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty’. It is thus not surprising that news coverage of the riots prompted implicit and explicit contemplation of French national identity and how Frenchness can and should be defined. Questioning interpretations of French national identity is not always done explicitly, and a CDA methodology provided the analytical tools for examining the implicit assumptions underscoring news reporting on the riots. It has been argued throughout this study that in response to the crisis posed by the traumatic events of November 2005, the definition of French national identity imagined in news reporting on the riots does not extend to those living in the banlieues. Interpretations of what it means to be French are premised on sameness, grounded in a perceived collective experience as ‘French people’. ‘Frenchness’ is inferred based on a presumed republican identity stemming from the principles of
liberté, égalité and fraternité as espoused during the French Revolution. The assumption of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ emerges across all news sources and genre of news text, with the implicit understanding that ‘we’ are majority French society and ‘they’ are anything that falls outside this definition of the imagined French community, including – and in particular – immigrant minorities living in the banlieues.

This discussion of the key findings of the study suggests that much of the reporting on the riots could be interpreted as a type of ‘New Racism’ following Barker (1981) and introduced in section 6.3.3 in relation to the discourse of cultural incompatibility. Explicitly racist assertions are predominantly avoided, and skin colour or race are not proposed as a means of excluding residents of the banlieues from membership of the discursively imagined national community. Instead, discourses of sameness and difference rely on a wide range of references to what are taken to be commonsense ‘facts’ about immigrant minorities in the suburbs, particularly in relation to why they do not fit the perceived profile or definition of a ‘French’ person. It has been observed that the discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is the foundation of ‘exclusionary, prejudiced and racist perceptions and views’ (Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2008: 13), and this study highlighted how the discursive creation of in- and out-groups operates as a means of excluding immigrant minorities living in the banlieues without explicit reference to race, skin colour etc. Relying on generalisations and an assumption of shared reader knowledge avoids specific assertions about why inhabitants of the banlieues are not French. Instead, news discourse on the riots expresses ostensibly factual descriptions implying a fundamental incompatibility and difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Immigrant minorities in the banlieues are constructed as representing a threat to traditional French values, and anti-immigrant discourses which negatively characterise residents of the banlieues can be seen as a form of ‘legitimate cultural self-defence’ (Van Dijk, 1992), rather than an expression of racism. The media play a key role in the discursive imagining of national identity (Anderson, 1983; Wodak et al., 2009), and the definition of French national identity proposed by the news media in reporting on the 2005 incidents of urban violence is one which relies heavily on emphasis on intra-national sameness and homogeneity, thus excluding immigrant minorities in the banlieues.
A final observation which can be made regarding the findings of this study relates to differences in representations in the four newspapers from which RiCo and Mini-RiCo were sourced, selected to exemplify centre, right and left ideological positions, as well as national (Le Figaro, L’Humanité, Le Monde) and regional perspectives (Ouest France). Apart from the expected differences between right-wing Le Figaro and left-wing L’Humanité, little discernible variance emerged across the four newspapers in RiCo and Mini-RiCo. As established throughout Chapters Five, Six and Seven, Le Figaro expresses implicit and explicit anti-immigrant discourses, and continually reinforces perceptions of immigrant minorities as the ‘other’ in relation to majority French society. L’Humanité, on the other hand, expresses discourses which recognise social inequalities and texts from this newspaper tend to be sympathetic towards the treatment of immigrants and their experiences of cultural, political, social etc. exclusion in the banlieues. However, it has been argued that these seemingly opposing standpoints rely on similar patterns of discourse, and by drawing attention to and critiquing social inequalities, L’Humanité is forced to reproduce assumptions regarding the presence of in- and out-groups in French society. In criticising structures of power and social ‘realities’ journalists and the producers of news discourse are bound to accept these ‘realities’, and thus the key assumption underpinning the definition of discourse adopted for this study is affirmed: discourse is seen as social practice and dialectical in nature. Discourse shapes how we interpret and understand society, but equally society is shaped by discourse.

No clear ideological positions emerge from the other two newspapers in RiCo and Mini-RiCo (Le Monde and Ouest France) which are viewed as being situated in the centre of the ideological scale (see section 3.2.1). Discourses present in these news texts vary between naturalised assumptions regarding power asymmetries and the presence of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ in French society, to criticising social inequalities and reiterating assumptions relating to the banlieues as a problem. Thus, no explicit editorial line or ideological standpoint emerges, and a variety of competing discourses are present in these newspapers. Apart from the expected right/left divide between Le Figaro and L’Humanité, it can be argued that there is surprisingly little variation across the four newspapers from which RiCo and Mini-RiCo are sourced.
This finding in itself is interesting, and is perhaps explainable by Kokoreff’s (2008) lengthy – but insightful – observations about how French society relatively quickly returned to normal following the events of November 2005; any introspective questioning of what this might mean for France or what changes are needed were merely ‘ephemeral’. Kokoreff (2008: 11-12) argues that:

\[
\text{Si les émeutes de 2005 ont suscité une prise de conscience collective à l'égard de problèmes que l'on croyait réglés ou atténués, force est de constater qu'elle a été éphémère. Une fois l'émotion passée, l'ordre public restauré, les images des véhicules et bâtiments incendiés effacées de nos écrans et journaux, les lycéens et étudiants rentrés dans le rang, l'ordre des choses est revenu. Les questions posées par ces actions collectives regroupant des fractions de Jeunesses si éloignées (par les positions sociales qu'elles occupent et les représentations collectives qu'elles suscitent) et pourtant si proches (par l'absence de perspectives d'avenir que partagent ces membres d'une même génération) se sont dissipées. La répression et l'indifférence semblent avoir été les seules réponses légitimes. Tel est le paradoxe de cette séquence socialement mouvementée: personne n'a oublié ce qui s'est passé mais tout le monde est passé à autre chose, avant d'être rattrapé par l'actualité...}
\]

Kokoreff maintains that ‘normality’ swiftly returned, and the traumatic scenes were quickly erased from public memory: people paid attention at the time, but once the buildings were no longer burning the concerns of inhabitants of the banlieues were of little interest to majority French society. Sarkozy’s election as French President in 2007 with a platform that advocated a hard-line approach towards la délinquance dans les banlieues suggests that French voters support this status quo, where a fundamental difference is assumed between majority French society and immigrant minorities in the banlieues. Therefore, this study has established that newspaper discourse reporting on the 2005 riots appears overwhelmingly accepting of the status quo and expresses discourses which reproduce social power asymmetries and unequal relations of dominance in French society.

8.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Study

Finally, the limitations and restrictions of the current study must be acknowledged, along with indicating some potential avenues for future study. Firstly, the discussion in section 2.4.3 addressed criticisms of CDA in relation to the selection of texts and noted that there is little suggestion as to how researchers should select the texts to be analysed using a CDA approach (Stubbs, 1997). Additionally, it has been pointed out that ‘CDA in-depth analysis is very labour intensive’ (Baker et al., 2008: 285) and
thus Critical Discourse Analysts focus on a sample of texts which are selected in order to be representative of a given genre of discourse. It could thus be argued that the size of Mini-RiCo is limited, and that additional orders of discourse could have been identified through the inclusion of a larger number of texts to be critically analysed in Chapters Five and Six. Incorporating a quantitative CADS analysis in the design of the methodological framework used for this study aimed to address this limitation, but it is acknowledged that a larger sample of texts in Mini-RiCo may have yielded additional discursive means by which orders of discourse are expressed. Furthermore, one of the fundamental principles of CDA (discussed in section 2.2.3) conceives it as an interpretative and exploratory approach to the analysis of discourse (following Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Analysts drawing on a CDA framework have been criticised for assuming that the analysis of a text is the only ‘true’ interpretation of discourses present (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000; Widdowson, 1998). Thus, it is acknowledged that the analysis and findings presented in this study represent an interpretation of the dominant discourses present in newspaper reporting on French urban violence in 2005. While every effort has made to reduce researcher subjectivity – particularly through the combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses of the Mini-RiCo and RiCo corpora – it is acknowledged that a CDA approach necessarily involves some element of subjectivity. Nonetheless, such limitations do not reduce the significance of this study, particularly in relation to better understanding the discursive functioning of ideologies in newspaper discourse, generally, and the operation of ideology in French news discourse specifically. There are, however, certain questions which remain unanswered and provide scope for analysis in the future.

Avenues of future research include extending the current study to include a diachronic element, tracking changes over time in discursive representations of les banlieues and la violence urbaine. The starting point for French urban violence as a phenomenon is recognised as 1981, and in the intervening decades there have been multiple incidents of violence of varying scale and duration. Examining change – or the absence of change – in discursive representations over time would provide additional insight into how discourse shapes perceptions of individuals and events in French society. Additionally, future research projects could extend the current study
through the inclusion of a new media element, supplementing the analysis of the traditional print media with a consideration of discourses present in blogs, chat-rooms, online forums etc. New media discourse introduces additional semiotic elements which are absent from the current study. Thirdly, this project could be enhanced through greater consideration of the processes of news production, possibly through semi-structured interviews with news journalists reporting on the banlieues in order to probe the motivations behind the various choices made in the process of creating newspaper discourse. Alternatively, an ethnographic study of newsrooms or participant-observation of journalists reporting on events in the banlieues would provide additional contextualisation and understanding of the discourse practices involved. Furthermore, a reception analysis of news texts – either among majority French readers or minority communities in the banlieues – would also enrich the current study. In the absence of direct input from discourse producers or consumers, the analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven has relied on secondary data from existing sociological studies (e.g. Kokoreff, 2008; Moran, 2012; Mucchielli and Le Goaziou, 2006a; Sedel, 2009). However, the combination of a critical analysis of media discourse with enhanced awareness of the discursive practices of production and consumption would contribute to our understanding of how news discourses are created and consumed in a given social context. Finally, a further area of interest for future study involves applying the methodological framework used in the current study but expanding the scope of the study beyond the French context to consider a comparative analysis between media representations of French urban violence in 2005 and the London riots in 2011. Comparative analyses have been undertaken in other disciplines (e.g. Body-Gendrot, 2013; Robine, 2011) and discourse analytical studies of the 2011 London riots are also beginning to emerge (e.g. Bennett, 2013; Kelsey, 2013; Krishnamurthy, 2012). Similarities and differences between events in France in 2005 and London in 2011 invite comparison, particularly in the light of differing approaches which have been adopted to immigrants – British multiculturalism can be contrasted with the French assimilationist approach. Thus, it is likely that an analysis of news reporting on these two incidents of urban violence would provide a fruitful site for comparison of ideological assumptions embedded in news reporting on violence.
All suggestions regarding areas of future research display a similar concern with the discursive functioning of ideology, as well as the role of the media in (re)producing and maintaining unequal relations of power in society. The current study has contributed to an existing body of research that investigates how language can be used as a means of enacting and upholding relations of dominance and discrimination, with particular focus on the compelling case-study of newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005.
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Appendices: Texts in Mini-RiCo

Text 1: La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy. L’Humanité, 3 November 2005. LH031105GNb


Text 3: Banlieues: renvoyez l’ascenseur! Le Figaro, 8 November 2005. LF081105OPa


Text 5: Discriminations. L’Humanité, 26 November 2005. LH261105EDa

Text 6: Après le choc. Le Monde, 29 November 2005. LM291105EDFPa


Text 8: La République muette. Ouest France, 3 December 2005. OF031205OPa


Text 10: L’État refuse de payer les dégâts des violences urbaines. Le Monde, 26 December 2005. LM261205GNd


Text 12: Banlieues : le rôle des «grands frères» en cause. Le Figaro, 11 January 2006. LF110106GNb


Text 14: Une journée consacrée à la vie des jeunes, Ouest France, 1 April 2006. OF010406GNa

Text 15: Montfermeil, sept mois après, L’Humanité, 31 May 2006. LH310506OPb

Text 16: La carte des émeutes de novembre 2005 confirme le profond malaise des immigrants africains, Le Figaro, 29 June 2006. LF290606OPa
La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy

L'Humanité, 3 November 2005

Le ministre de l'Intérieur est critiqué jusque dans son camp pour avoir attisé les violences urbaines qui ont gagné quatre départements d'Île-de-France. Dominique de Villepin reprend la main. Jacques Chirac lance un appel au calme.

Rien ne va plus pour Nicolas Sarkozy. La toupie médiatique du ministère de l'Intérieur, qui a multiplié les faux pas ces derniers mois, a ouvert, avec ses provocations sur les banlieues après le décès de deux adolescents à Clichy-sous-Bois, une dangereuse boîte de Pandore. Depuis jeudi, échauffourées et affrontements se sont multipliés dans quatre départements d'Île-de-France, attisés par un ministre de l'Intérieur qui joue, devant les caméras, à la guerre contre les classes dangereuses. Alors que la polémique a gagné les rangs de la droite sur cette gestion désastreuse de la situation, Dominique de Villepin a décidé, face à l'ampleur prise par les événements, et après avoir laissé son rival s'empêtrer, de reprendre la main. Le premier ministre, qui s'était montré jusque-là d'une grande discrétion, est allé hier jusqu'à reporter son voyage officiel au Canada.

Déterminé dans sa course à l'élection présidentielle

C'est que, entre récupérations politiciennes et coups de projecteur sur cette « insécurité », dont Jacques Chirac avait fait son principal axe de campagne en 2002, l'embrasement de quartiers dits « sensibles » fait figure d'aubaine pour une droite en échec sur tous les fronts, particulièrement sur celui de l'emploi. Aubaine pour Nicolas Sarkozy, lui qui est déterminé, dans sa course à l'élection présidentielle, à faire de « l'insécurité » son fonds de commerce. Mais aussi pour Dominique de Villepin, qui ne voit pas forcément d'un mauvais œil les dossiers sociaux sensibles relégués à l'arrière-plan.
Mardi soir, le premier ministre a reçu, en présence du ministre de l'Intérieur, les familles des adolescents décédés dans des circonstances toujours non élucidées. « Toute la lumière sera faite sur les circonstances de cet accident », a-t-il promis en lançant, en vain, un appel au calme. Dominique de Villepin a également rencontré son ministre délégué à la Promotion de l'égalité des chances, Azouz Begag, pris pour cible par les amis de Nicolas Sarkozy pour avoir critiqué les propos et l'attitude du ministre de l'Intérieur. Sur le ton de l'indignation, les sarkozystes, d'habitude prompts à invoquer la liberté de parole, ont exigé la « solidarité gouvernementale », certains allant jusqu'à demander la démission du ministre délégué. Hier matin, Matignon a réuni en urgence une dizaine de ministres pour discuter « des violences dans les banlieues », sans qu'aucune information ni déclaration ne filtrent à l'issue de la rencontre. Le président de la République est ensuite sorti à son tour de sa réserve pour appeler, en Conseil des ministres, à « l'apaisement des esprits ». « Il ne peut pas exister de zone de non-droit en République et il revient aux forces de l'ordre (...) de faire appliquer la loi et de garantir à chacun le respect et la sécurité », a-t-il déclaré. Jacques Chirac a souhaité que les résultats de l'enquête sur les circonstances de la mort des deux adolescents « soient connus au plus vite » et a jugé « indispensable d'élucider les circonstances dans lesquelles la mosquée de Clichy a été atteinte par une grenade lacrymogène ». « Nous devons agir en nous fondant toujours sur les principes qui font notre République : chacun doit respecter la loi, chacun doit avoir sa chance », a affirmé le chef de l'État en demandant au gouvernement de faire, « dans un délai d'un mois », des propositions en faveur de « l'égalité des chances ».

L'après-midi même, le premier ministre a tenu à répondre personnellement aux questions des députés, édulcorant çà et là son discours sécuritaire de vagues déclarations d'intention sur la lutte contre les discriminations ou encore le refus des amalgames et de la stigmatisation. Son leitmotiv : « la sécurité », comme « première des libertés ». Répondant à une question de Bruno Leroux, député (PS) d'Épinay-sur-Seine, qui dénonçait « l'absence de politique globale dont ont besoin les quartiers » et la multiplication des « incursions ministérielles sans lendemain », le premier ministre a insisté sur « l'unité du gouvernement autour d'un même principe : la volonté de répondre à l'exigence de sécurité et d'égalité des chances ». « Il n'y a pas de solution miracle, a-t-il lancé en forme d'aveu d'échec. L'expérience de ces vingt
dernières années doit nous inciter, tous, à la modestie et à l'humilité ». S'il a reconnu que « cela passe surtout par un emploi pour tous », Dominique de Villepin s'est contenté de renvoyer à son « plan d'urgence pour l'emploi », et d'avancer la promesse de « mesures d'urgence pour l'emploi des jeunes en Seine-Saint-Denis ».

« stratégie de la tension inacceptable »

Pour le groupe communiste, Marie-George Buffet a alerté sur « l'extrême gravité » de la situation. La secrétaire nationale du Parti communiste n'a pas mâché ses mots à l'endroit de Nicolas Sarkozy, dont les « déclarations guerrières à visée présidentielle », les « versions mensongères » et les « propos stigmatisants » participent d'une « stratégie de la tension inacceptable ». « Les gens ne supportent plus que l'on traite leurs enfants de racaille ! » s'est indignée la députée de Seine-Saint-Denis en annonçant le dépôt, par le groupe communiste, d'une demande de commission d'enquête sur les événements de Clichy-sous-Bois. Des propos qui ont visiblement irrité le ministre de l'Intérieur. Mais sans doute pas autant que le refus ostensible du premier ministre de le laisser répondre à la dirigeante communiste. « Le gouvernement agira dans un esprit de justice, s'est défendu Dominique de Villepin, contre les discriminations, pour renforcer le service public dans ces quartiers, pour défendre l'emploi, priorité absolue de notre gouvernement ». Autant de serments vides de sens quand la droite, depuis son retour au pouvoir, s'est appliquée à démanteler une à une toutes les solidarités, déchirant dangereusement le lien social.
Text 2

_Banlieues : vingt-cinq ans après_

*Le Figaro*, 4 November 2005


Tous les deux ans, comme aujourd'hui, une flambée particulièrement brutale, un acte plus atroce que les autres concentrent l'attention. Mais, très vite, la France officielle revient à ses certitudes - Ah ! la victoire des blacks-blancs-beurs en 1998, qui consommait le triomphe de notre « modèle d'intégration » !

Pourtant les chiffres sont là : 200 quartiers « difficiles » dans les années 90, plus de 900 aujourd'hui. Près de 30 000 véhicules brûlés depuis le début de l'année. 3 000 par mois ! 100 par jour ! Et c'est ainsi que, pour des millions de nos concitoyens prisonniers de banlieues balkanisées, la vie quotidienne devient un enfer. On s'étonnera ensuite qu'ils transforment chaque élection en grand chamboule-tout...
Et si, plutôt que de jouer au petit jeu des « républicains » contre les « communautaristes », nos dirigeants politiques commençaient par attaquer le problème à la racine ? Ce sont bien les conséquences d'une politique d'immigration sans contrôle que la France subit aujourd'hui. En ouvrant, en 1974, les vannes de l'immigration familiale qu'ils ont ensuite laissée se transformer en immigration d'ayants droit (allocations familiales, RMI, AME), les gouvernements successifs ont créé les conditions de la saturation des mécanismes d'intégration. Il faut d'urgence maîtriser le flux des entrées, régulières et clandestines, sinon, dans quinze ans, ce sont les enfants des arrivants d'aujourd'hui qui mettront le feu aux « quartiers ».

Ce préalable posé, que faire sinon reprendre l'ouvrage ? Fermeté d'abord, car le pourrissement des cités se nourrit des démissions de l'Etat face aux petits caïds. Prévention ensuite, à condition de pas tomber dans le piège des fausses solutions : qu'exigeront demain les imams pour prix de leur « médiation » ? Education, bien sûr, qui ne devrait pas renoncer à inculquer aux « jeunes » la fierté d'être français. Formation, surtout, car on n'a jamais trouvé mieux que le travail pour se faire une place dans la société. Courage, par-dessus tout : la crise actuelle est le produit d'un quart de siècle d'aveuglement ; le risque serait qu'il n'en faille pas moins pour la résorber.
Banlieues : renvoyez l’ascenseur !

Le Figaro, 8 November 2005

Mon Dieu, que Zidane est loin ! Les événements de la banlieue parisienne viennent souligner avec cruauté les espoirs qu'avait fait naître cette France métissée, une France qui gagne, une France heureuse de vivre ensemble.

Nous sommes nombreux, nous que l'on nomme Français issus de l'immigration, à observer, avec attention et dépit, les embrasements réguliers des « banlieues ». Sans aucune surprise. Voilà des années que beaucoup d'entre nous lancent des alertes, des mises en garde, des SOS qui ne sont pas entendus, ou pas vraiment pris au sérieux. Voilà des années que nous écoutons les uns et les autres discutant à l'infini sur l'immigration, sur l'intégration, sur la montée des communautarismes, sur l'intégrisme, sur les quartiers, sur ceci, sur cela. Beaucoup de discours creux, qui masquent souvent une réalité que l'on ne veut pas voir. Celle d'un pays où vivent des gens stigmatisés par la seule couleur de leur peau, par la seule consonance de leur nom. Des gens qui - ayons le courage de le dire - sont au bord de la révolte, et qu'un accès de fièvre, qu'une formule maladroite poussent à la rébellion.

Racaille, Kärcher ? Oui, Nicolas Sarkozy a employé des mots malheureux. Mais des mots qui ont été la goutte qui a fait déborder un vase depuis longtemps rempli par des déclarations irresponsables de l'élite politique et intellectuelle de ce pays, par des années d'inaction, par le refus de voir ces « minorités », leur désespoir, alimenté par un horizon bouché partout : l'éducation, l'emploi, la vie sociale. Le regard des autres.

Cette situation est générale, à divers degrés. Je veux simplement apporter un témoignage personnel. Je suis, comme ils disent, intégré. Professeur de cardiologie, vice-doyen de la faculté de médecine de Lille, vice-président de l'université de Lille-II, je n'attends rien, à titre personnel, d'une quelconque politique d'intégration en
France. Mais puis-je être heureux quand je constate au quotidien les ravages de la ségrégation ? Quand je vois des bac + 8 raser les murs, quand je vois des jeunes, ou moins jeunes, squatter le domicile des parents faute de revenus, d'emploi, de perspective, terrorisés qu'ils sont par l'avenir. Quand je vois ces jeunes, et moins jeunes, finalement « intégrés », dans des entreprises, mais souffrant du « plafond de verre » qui les empêche de progresser, de montrer leurs capacités, d'être obligés d'en faire beaucoup plus que les autres pour espérer atteindre un but sans cesse repoussé, je me dis que la révolte rougeoie sur des braises qu'un simple souffle suffit à enflammer. D'où la nécessité d'une action majeure pour redonner de l'espoir. Et, pour cela, il faut mettre des moyens massifs pour sortir du marasme dans lequel nous sommes plongés depuis si longtemps. Il faut enfin une vraie politique d'intégration, que préfigure le plan Borloo.

La classe politique tout entière doit se remettre en question. L'idée de progrès et d'égalité a déserté les discours et les actes. Classe politique, milieux économiques, acteurs de l'éducation, élites intellectuelles, prenons nos responsabilités. On dit que l'ascenseur social est bloqué ? On sait où il s'est arrêté. S'il vous plaît, renvoyez l'ascenseur !

Je condamne toute action de violence, d'où qu'elle vienne. La violence ne peut mener nulle part. Les jeunes qui n'ont que ce mode d'expression doivent apprendre à se manifester par d'autres moyens. Les forces de l'ordre doivent apprendre à utiliser tous les outils à leur disposition, et pas seulement la suspicion, le mépris, la répression.

Et ne touchez pas aux symboles, ce qui ne ferait que désespérer un peu plus Clichy-sous-Bois. La classe politique ne doit pas choisir une France contre l'autre ; et elle doit s'interroger sur les modes de représentation qui sont les siens. Car, dans cette affaire, Nicolas Sarkozy doit pouvoir remplir sa mission, qui est d'assurer la paix dans le pays, et Azouz Begag doit continuer à prendre la parole au nom de tous ceux qui ne parlent pas. Car Azouz Begag rend visibles ces populations qu'on ne veut pas
voir. Aujourd'hui, il est dans la représentation, qu'il le veuille ou pas, d'une France qui aspire à vivre normalement, dans un pays où chacun doit apprendre les valeurs de respect et de solidarité, dans un pays pacifié, reconnaissant une place pour chacun de ses enfants. Et dans les « quartiers », tous sont attentifs à la façon dont nous sortirons de cette crise qui dure depuis trente ans. A la façon dont nous allons reconstruire une France plus solidaire, plus fraternelle. Mon Dieu, que Zidane est loin...
État d’urgence : fini le consensus

Ouest France, 16 November 2005

L'Assemblée prolonge la mesure de trois mois

L'Assemblée nationale a voté, hier soir, en première lecture, le projet de loi qui proroge l'état d'urgence pendant encore trois mois. La gauche a voté contre.

La violence dans les banlieues a beaucoup faibli ces trois derniers jours. Mais comme « rien n'est définitivement acquis », le gouvernement a obtenu de l'Assemblée nationale qu'elle prolonge de trois mois l'état d'urgence décrété le 9 novembre. La droite (UMP, UDF) a voté pour, la gauche (PS, PCF, PRG, Verts) contre. Le consensus de mise jusqu'ici a volé, hier, en éclats.

Nicolas Sarkozy a justifié cette prolongation par la nécessité de rétablir l'ordre républicain sur l'ensemble du territoire. Il a indiqué que le gouvernement appliquerait l'état d'urgence « avec fermeté », mais aussi « avec discernement et mesure », étant entendu qu'il pourra être rapporté à tout moment par un simple décret pris en Conseil des ministres.

L'UDF approuve mais...

Sur le fond, Nicolas Sarkozy n'a pas modifié son point de vue d'un pouce. S'il a dit « prendre la mesure » des facteurs « notamment économiques et sociaux » qui motivent cette violence, il a cependant vigoureusement condamné les « fauteurs de troubles », les qualifiant à nouveau de « voyous ». Nouveauté, il a quand même dit tendre « une main fraternelle et audacieuse » en direction de ces quartiers.
Une fois n'est pas coutume, l'UDF a approuvé la mesure proposée par le gouvernement. Mais, à condition, a-t-elle aussitôt ajouté, qu'elle soit assortie « d'un respect total des libertés fondamentales ». Son porte-parole Nicolas Perruchot (Loir-et-Cher) a réclamé dans la foulée « une action de fond », seule susceptible de répondre à l'attente des banlieues. Pour lui, les mesures annoncées « ne semblent pas être à la hauteur de la crise ». Et de réclamer la mise en place d'un vrai « contrat d'intégration ».

À gauche, Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS, Loire-Atlantique), tout en réaffirmant son attachement à la « fermeté », a estimé que la prorogation de l'état d'urgence n'était pas « la mesure la plus appropriée » à la situation actuelle. Pour lui, les dispositifs classiques ont fait la preuve qu'ils étaient « aussi efficaces » que les mesures d'exception. « Commençons par appliquer le Code pénal », a-t-il lancé en reprochant une fois encore à Nicolas Sarkozy d'« instrumentaliser la peur ». Sur le fond, il a eu cette formule, « les jeunes ont plus besoin aujourd'hui d'ascenseur social que d'un car de CRS ».

Patrick Braouezec (PCF, Seine-Saint-Denis) s'est plaint, lui, de la « stigmatisation idéologique » dont sont victimes les banlieues, qui s'ajoute, dit-il, aux « discriminations de toutes natures » subies quotidiennement par les jeunes qui y habitent. Pour lui, seule « un véritable changement d'orientation politique » est capable de résoudre un problème d'une telle gravité.

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**Text 5**

*Discriminations*

*L'Humanité*, 26 November 2005

Lira-t-on un jour, dans nos futurs livres d'histoire, qu'un mouvement d'une ampleur nationale a surgi au lendemain d'une provocation verbale d'un ministre ? Y apprendra-t-on comment la France républicaine, aux premières années du XXIe siècle, a enfin ouvert les yeux sur ce qu'elle faisait endurer à ses enfants, tous ses enfants, mais d'abord et avant tout aux héritiers de l'immigration ? Trois semaines de colère(s) et de violences urbaines ont secoué tout un pays. Braquant sur lui un miroir peu sympathique. Bousculant sur leurs bases tous les acteurs des missions publiques. Et alimentant les débats sur cette « crise des banlieues » jusqu'aux dérapages les plus vils.

Et qu'a donc appris la France sur elle-même ? Deux choses essentielles. D'abord, que la crise sociale atteint une ampleur moins souterraine qu'on veut bien le croire. Ensuite, que cette crise sociale, enracinée désormais dans les réalités quotidiennes les plus banales, frappe certes indistinctement, mais s'acharne tout particulièrement sur les familles « issues de l'immigration ». En moyenne, ils sont 20 % plus pauvres. Mais plus pauvres en tout : chômage, logement, santé, éducation, etc. C'est ce qu'on appelle la discrimination ethnique. C'est ce que beaucoup refusent de voir en face. C'est pourtant ce que vivent chaque jour des millions de nos concitoyens, humiliés sorceusement. Pas par des individus racistes placés à des échelons de la société pour exprimer leur xénophobie en actes. Non, ces femmes et ces hommes sont humiliés par une sorte de mécanisme « ordinaire » qui a, perfidement, désédimenté quelques principes républicains fondamentaux. La discrimination à l'embauche en reste la forme la plus visible : est-ce un hasard si, dans nos cités, les taux de chômage sont parfois quatre à cinq fois supérieurs aux moyennes nationales ?

Autant le reconnaître : de ce constat peuvent surgir les meilleures comme les pires analyses. Pour certains, il est pour le moins aisé de s'appuyer sur la politique
communautariste du ministre de l'Intérieur et d'en trouver toutes les preuves d'une fracture « coloniale ». La création du Conseil français du culte musulman et l'aménagement souhaité de la loi de 1905 symbolisent ce « glissement » revendiqué par le patron de l'UMP, au risque de réduire l'identité des citoyens d'origine étrangère à leur pratique religieuse, par exemple, et de transformer les volontés de combattre les discriminations en morcellement de la population au détriment de toute possibilité d'un projet d'intérêt général définissant des politiques collectives. Le spectre du conflit ethnique en réponse à des discriminations ethniques serait mortifère et cacherait la réalité de conflits sociaux auxquels il faudra donner des réponses concrètes qui ne soient pas une aggravation de la situation en fonction de l'origine, comme le fait le gouvernement. Car l'esprit de la République peut rapidement s'anéantir dans tous les populismes identitaires. Or, une bonne fois pour toutes, veut-on bien entendre qu'il est ici question tout simplement de quartiers et de villes populaires, de la partie de la population la plus précarisée par plus de vingt ans de libéralisme économique et de capitalisme sauvage ?

Justement. Les jeunes, eux, à de rares exceptions (il y en a), ne portent pas leur révolte comme une revendication ethnique. Ces populations, ethniquement mélangées (précisément), s'inscrivent au contraire dans une tradition de soulèvement populaire qui jalonne notre histoire. Leur violence même, aussi condamnable soit-elle, « traduit aussi la désintégration de la famille maghrébine et africaine au contact des valeurs d'égalité françaises », comme le pense l'historien et démographe Emmanuel Todd. D'accord, admettons qu'il y ait une part d'angélisme à l'affirmer et plus encore à le croire. Néanmoins, affirmons avec force que cette révolte contre les discriminations reste avant tout une aspiration à la justice sociale... dans une France de plus en plus traversée par une poussée inégalitaire planétaire.
Text 6

Après le choc

Le Monde, 29 November 2005

Et si les apôtres du déclin avaient raison ? C'est, hélas, la question qu'il faut se poser après le choc qu'a constitué, pour la France comme pour son statut extérieur, son « rang », aurait dit François Mitterrand, la vague de « violences urbaines » qui a conduit le gouvernement, puis le Parlement, à placer le pays sous le régime de l'état d'urgence.

Celles-ci ont été, à tout le moins, un révélateur des pathologies françaises, la partie émergée et violente des failles du « modèle français ». A ce stade, il n'est pas inutile d'en répertorier quelques-unes.

A, COMME ARROGANCE

Bien sûr, il y a eu quelque chose comme une joie malsaine : les médias européens, et surtout américains, ont mis en scène les nouveaux malheurs français. Quand le New York Times titre « Paris brûle », c'est exagéré (et factuellement inexact), mais à peine plus que quand les médias français annoncent la énième « chute » de l'Amérique, dans le désastre provoqué par l'ouragan Katrina, en Louisiane.

L'important est ailleurs : cette couverture médiatique a révélé aux Français à quel point la distance entre le discours officiel sur le « modèle français » et la réalité sociale crée un effet d'arrogance sur la scène internationale. Or les événements de l'automne 2005 ont balayé toute justification à une quelconque expression de supériorité française à l'endroit des « Anglo-Saxons ».
Au-delà, la fragilité sociale de la France diminue son crédit, même quand elle parle juste. Le profil d'un Jacques Chirac ressort largement aussi diminué de la crise des banlieues que celui d'un George Bush du cyclone Katrina. Après le coup d'arrêt porté à l'Europe par le non au référendum, il est à craindre que l'influence de la France ait encore descendu quelques marches.

C, COMME CHÔMAGE

Le taux de chômage est, à de courtes périodes près (gouvernement Rocard 1988, puis Jospin 1997), bloqué depuis un quart de siècle à 10 % de la population active. Chômage de masse dont on a dit et redit qu'il était de nature à défaire une bonne partie du tissu social. Il est, dans les « quartiers », de 30 %; plus encore chez les « jeunes de banlieue ». Ce n'est plus une situation, qu'une conjoncture meilleure pourrait améliorer, c'est devenu un état. Or lorsque les corps intermédiaires sont affaiblis - partis, syndicats, école, église -, l'emploi reste la seule route vers l'intégration. L'emploi devient bien plus qu'un travail rémunéré : c'est l'apprentissage de la société, la confrontation sociale, l'insertion.

Si l'on n'était pas à quelques mois d'une échéance majeure - l'élection présidentielle -, serait-il inconcevable de demander aux acteurs politiques, à l'instar de ce que font les partis allemands, d'identifier et de faire sauter tous les obstacles à l'emploi ? En sachant que les vingt dernières années ont montré que ce n'est pas en diminuant l'offre de travail que l'on peut avancer, mais au contraire en la dopant.

D, COMME DISCRIMINATION

Discrimination : telle est la véritable urgence. Nous sommes face à la réalité des résistances que nous opposons à notre propre diversité. Qu'il s'agisse de la ghettoïsation urbaine ou scolaire, elles sont le fruit non d'une politique mais d'un mouvement de la société, de sa parcellisation, de l'éloignement que chacun cherche à organiser d'avec la catégorie qui lui est réputée inférieure, au nom de l'angoisse du déclassement. La « discrimination négative », celle qui frappe les « minorités
visibles », avait d'ailleurs été dénoncée par le président de la République lui-même. Elle ne pourrait être corrigée que par une action « positive », de façon à obtenir qu'au sommet des administrations, des partis, des syndicats, des universités, des grandes entreprises, de la presse, les élites soient moins uniformément masculines, blanches et fermées.

I, COMME INTÉGRATION

L'intégration des minorités, qu'elles aient ou non la nationalité du pays d'accueil, est la grande affaire de l'Europe de ce début de XXIe siècle. De l'Espagne à l'Italie ? (qui vivent jour après jour des épisodes dramatiques, à Melilla ou à Lampedusa), des Pays-Bas à la Grande-Bretagne, de la France à l'Allemagne : les particularités nationales ne manquent pas. Mais les traits communs non plus : discrimination, difficultés d'intégration - n'est-ce pas l'Evêque d'York qui dénonçait le multiculturalisme britannique comme un facteur de désintégration ? - place de l'Islam, impact des conflits proche-orientaux, etc.

Or, la question de l'immigration dans nos sociétés n'en est qu'à ses débuts, sous la double pression de la faiblesse démographique de l'Europe et des migrations venues du sud et de l'est. Cette immigration, il faudra la canaliser, la réguler, la maîtriser. Après le marché unique, l'union monétaire, l'esquisse d'une politique de défense, la nouvelle frontière de l'Europe sera celle-là : réussir l'absorption et l'intégration de ces nouvelles vagues d'immigration.

M, COMME MAIRES

La France a redécouvert ses maires. Dans le désamour constant qui sépare les politiques de l'opinion, ils soutiennent la démocratie à bout de bras. Quelle que soit leur étiquette, ils ont permis, par leurs actes et par leurs paroles, que chacun, à sa place - gouvernement, opinion, médias - prenne conscience que les violences étaient l'expression d'un véritable problème social et politique; ils ont évité qu'une fraction trop importante du pays se contente du tout-répressif; ils ont aidé à la prise de
conscience nationale, au-delà des violences. Ils nous font regretter que la République ne soit pas plus « girondine ».

N, COMME NOSTALGIE

On connaissait le « y a qu'à ». Il faut vivre désormais avec le « c'était mieux avant ». Certes, le marché du travail est plus volatile; l'emploi devient précaire; école et armée ne sont plus des facteurs de brassage social. Mais rien ne justifie l'idéalisation des inégalités d'hier (quand ce n'est pas celle de la colonisation). La nostalgie, le recours incantatoire à un modèle républicain d'autant plus recherché qu'il est ancien, nourrissent la régression plus que la recherche de remèdes aux maux actuels. Pierre Rosanvallon parle d'une « idéologie radicale-nostalgique », de l'idéalisation d'un capitalisme à l'ancienne, ou de notre modèle social-colbertiste qui n'a jamais été ce havre de paix sociale et d'intégration que l'on vante aujourd'hui. Qui se souvient que la principale promesse du premier ministre Chaban-Delmas fut de faire disparaître les bidonvilles qui, en 1969, entouraient Paris ? Et que signifiait la « ceinture rouge », sinon la traduction politique d'une ghettoïsation de la classe ouvrière ? On recrée, on invente, on parle des classes moyennes d'alors, pour lesquelles l'échelle sociale n'était pas moins abrupte. A cette différence près, il est vrai : avant-hier, le plein emploi; aujourd'hui, le chômage de masse.

N, COMME NEUF

De Pékin à Rio, de Stockholm à New York, le monde est entré dans une mutation vertigineuse. Des millions d'êtres humains accèdent à la production et à la consommation mondialisée. Le monde neuf suscite, pour toute réponse, un seul mot d'ordre : la défense du modèle national. Le gouvernement court donc de l'ANPE aux banlieues, des logements insalubres aux écoles pour apprentis; il distribue ce qu'il peut, ou ce qu'il trouve dans des caisses en grave déficit; il balaie d'un geste les politiques de ses prédécesseurs et annonce leur prompt rétablissement, en même temps qu'il ajoute des plans d'urgence aux plans d'urgence : l'emploi, la fiscalité, le logement, les banlieues... Manque toujours une vision de l'avenir; manque la pédagogie du neuf, qui impose d'adapter le « modèle » français, donc l'État, en
renouant avec les politiques de croissance qui seules permettent la rénovation sociale.

Mais la France est d'abord le paradis des faux-fuyants sémantiques : il suffit qu'une mesure soit qualifiée de « libérale » pour être disqualifiée. Comment alors accepter le pragmatisme qui permet l'efficacité ? La France ne veut pas voir, ni croire, que l'on peut faire mieux. La dernière des oeillères consistant à dire que suédois et britanniques (pourtant gouvernés à gauche), bref ceux qui approchent le plein-emploi, ne procèdent que par détournement statistique : on se rassure à bon compte. Or, l'immobilisme est la source du mal : la France refuse de s'adapter au nom de la préservation du statut de ceux qui en ont un.

P, COMME POLITIQUES

Arnaud Montebourg ne le sait pas, mais sa thèse sur une république « primo ministérielle » a déjà triomphé : le couple improbable Villepin - Sarkozy a suppléé la défaillance présidentielle, dans un partage des rôles où le premier ministre exerce tout le pouvoir tandis que le ministre de l'Intérieur occupe le terrain. A eux deux, ils ont été efficaces et ont satisfait à l'exigence première du retour à l'ordre. Ils ont, comme on dit, tenu l'État grâce au soutien de l'opinion et à celui, tacite, de l'opposition - qui s'est à ce point gardée de toute surenchère qu'elle en a paru absente.

Dans notre monarchie républicaine, il n'est pas indifférent que des désordres aient surgi alors que le sommet de l'État s'est trouvé affaibli. La présidence n'est pas, impunément, la clé de voûte des institutions. Cela vaut dans les deux sens : dans le déroulement des uns, et dans la retenue des autres - les syndicats -, qui ont confusément sans doute, jugé trop dangereux de donner un prolongement politique et social à la violente crise des banlieues.

U, COMME URGENCE
Pour justifier le recours à l'« état d'urgence », texte d'exception datant de la guerre d'Algérie, le premier ministre a fait valoir qu'il n'avait pas d'autre moyen juridique permettant de transférer des maires aux préfets l'établissement de couvre-feux. L'opinion n'a pas cillé, car elle n'a retenu de cet arsenal que la notion de couvre-feu. Ce fut habile et efficace. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'y avoir recours donne des moyens parmi lesquels figure la possibilité de perquisitions administratives, mesures de temps de guerre civile, dont la teneur symbolique est désastreuse. En écartant les mesures ordinaires de maintien de l'ordre, le gouvernement a également oublié que quiconque observe la scène nationale, sait bien de quel poids pèse telle ou telle catégorie dès lors qu'elle se manifeste, parfois violemment, dans la rue. Mais il est des lobbies à qui l'on consent plus facilement son lot de sous-préfectures ou d'antennes de l'URSSAF mises à sac.

V, COMME VOCABULAIRE

La presse du monde entier a parlé d'émeutes. Ce furent des violences, du vandalisme, l'expression d'une rage nihiliste souvent perpétrée par des mineurs. Très précisément le stade de violence qui précède les émeutes; lesquelles ont toujours des objectifs définis, s'accompagnent de pillages, provoquent des morts. Les États-Unis, dans les années 1960, la Grande Bretagne dans les années 1980, ont connu des émeutes urbaines, qu'ils ont mis quelques longues années à traiter.

Dans ce contexte, il était d'autant plus choquant d'user d'un vocabulaire de stigmatisation - « racaille » - (qui est, par parenthèses, aussi celui des beaux quartiers lorsqu'il s'agit des « jeunes de banlieue ») comme l'a fait l'ancien maire de Neuilly; encore plus dangereux de laisser croire que ces violences furent le fait de récidivistes et d'étrangers quand il s'agit de jeunes français ordinaires, comme l'a montré l'enquête du Monde. Ce sont là des réflexes qu'il convient de laisser à un bord extrême de la vie publique. Cela est d'autant plus dommageable pour le ministre de l'intérieur qu'il a, en quelques provocations, occulté le fait que, le premier à droite (en 2003), il a prôné la « discrimination positive » (là encore, vocabulaire interdit mais que l'on est prié d'appliquer), le premier il avait défini une attitude (« fermeté et justice ») qui tient lieu désormais de doctrine pour la majorité comme pour l'opposition.
Cette difficulté à nommer les événements marque bien le malaise profond qu'ils ont suscité, et révélé. Car l'expression de cette rage, de cette haine aussi parfois, qui n'avait ni porte-parole, ni revendication, ni objectif précis, n'a surpris personne en France. Tout le monde a tout de suite compris la gravité de cette colère : nous savons bien que là est la question centrale de la société française.

En 1984, deux millions de personnes avaient défilé de Versailles à Paris, au nom de la liberté; en 1995, le pays frôlait la paralysie au nom de l'égalité. En 2005, c'est de fraternité qu'il s'agit. Les « violences urbaines » nous ont obligé à dépasser une fausse confiance dans une politique de la ville mise à mal, pour prendre conscience de la nécessité de réhabiliter une République digne de ce nom. Rouvrir le chemin d'une promesse républicaine, sans distinction d'origine, sans discrimination : telle est la véritable urgence.
Les « racailles de France » affichent leur colère

Le Monde, 10 December 2005


Lundi 5 décembre, à 17 h 31, « Les racailles de France » annoncent dans un communiqué de presse solennel qu'ils viennent de déposer « 300 plaques commémoratives dans Paris en l'honneur de leurs parents et de leurs grands-parents, qui ont tout donné pour une France qui n'a aucune considération ou presque pour leurs petits-enfants ». Le Monde a pu rencontrer quatre membres du noyau dur de ce « groupuscule ». Ils souhaitent garder l'anonymat.

ras-la-casquette Lacoste » de la discrimination. « En 1968, on n'a pas mis les jeunes en prison car ils étaient les enfants de la bourgeoisie. Nous oui, car nous sommes les enfants de personne », assure la responsable du groupe.

Medhi, 29 ans, l'un des cinq garçons du groupe, le plus révolté, travaillant dans l'événementiel, un diamant à l'oreille gauche, enchaîne : « On va acheter une flûte à Chirac. Je n'oublierai jamais ses mots : " le bruit et l'odeur ". Il peut toujours déclarer après que nous sommes les enfants de la République. »

Samantha, plus timide, affirme : « Nous voulons continuer la lutte mais d'une manière plus constructive et intelligente. Après le feu, les mots, avec humour, mais un humour désespéré. » Medhi acquiesce et atteste : « Généralement quand les jeunes se regroupent, c'est pour vendre du shit, braquer ou voler. Nous, notre démarche est pédagogique. » « La France nous méprise. Quand elle avait besoin de nous pour se défendre contre l'Allemagne, nous faisions partie de la solution. Quelques générations plus tard, nous sommes le problème », enrage Nadia. Elle poursuit : « Ce rappel historique de la France coloniale est important. Dire que des milliers d'Africains sont morts pour la France et qu'aujourd'hui elle ghettoïse ses enfants : c'est honteux ! L'immigration, ce n'est pas un Yo-Yo ! »

Dans la nuit du 4 au 5 décembre donc, de 23 heures à 5 heures du matin, les 16 « racailles de France », embarquées dans huit voitures, carte de Paris en poche, armés de rouleaux de ruban adhésif double face payés 50 euros, ont placardé « stratégiquement » leurs « plaques commémoratives » de papier imprimées en format A3, notamment sur les murs de l'AFP, du Figaro, de Libération, du Monde, de l'UMP, sur des Abribus et dans le métro à Nation, Bastille, République...

« Faut pas oublier que c'est l'état d'urgence. On a eu peur de se faire arrêter surtout devant l'UMP. On s'était préparés à aller en garde à vue », confesse Nadia mais, « c'était important de montrer le contraste entre les héros et la racailles ». 

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Text 8

La République muette

Ouest France, 3 December 2005

Comment ne pas ressentir un double sentiment de peine et d'humiliation après la violence qui a éclaté dans les banlieues : peine de ne pouvoir se solidariser avec des jeunes dont le mode d'expression est si frustré, humiliation d'appartenir à un pays qui a fabriqué aveuglément ces fractures.

Sans doute l'État est-il dans son rôle en réaffirmant ses missions régaliennes de sécurité et d'ordre, mais on peut voir, dans ces manifestations de violence, une incapacité à se payer de mots face à une République muette. Comment ces jeunes Français peuvent-ils se sentir appartenir à la communauté nationale s'ils sont exclus de l'imaginaire national et, en particulier, de ce qui le fonde, à savoir l'histoire et la démocratie.

Nous avons su mettre en scène, et très tôt après la guerre, notre réconciliation avec l'Allemagne ; nous n'avions pas de conflit avec les principaux pays d'émigration d'avant-guerre, Italie et Pologne, ni d'après-guerre, Espagne et Portugal. La spécificité de l'émigration du Sud n'est pas l'islam, mais le rapport historique de la France à ces pays. Comment s'approprier un imaginaire national tant que l'histoire de la décolonisation n'a pas été faite, discutée, patrimonialisée, appropriée par nous tous ? Sinon, comment ces enfants de l'émigration maghrébine et d'Afrique noire peuvent-ils se reconnaître français ? Les livres d'histoire, les manuels scolaires et les ors de la République auraient dû, depuis longtemps, être convoqués à la production de cette histoire commune.

Des valeurs partagées
Et que dire de la démocratie, que dire de la symbolique républicaine, réduite à des Marseillaise dans les stades ? Quel est donc le contenu du mot République aujourd'hui ? Quelles sont les images et les valeurs attachées à nos institutions ? La scène politique est tout encombrée d'acteurs en concurrence, de tactiques individuelles et de compétitions, mais qui se préoccupe de donner de l'éclat aux lieux où s'incarne la légitimité démocratique ?

On parle aisément de la crise des institutions, encore faut-il analyser les conséquences de cette crise. Qui peut s'identifier à un conseil général ou à un conseil régional ? Qui peut encore sacraliser le Parlement ? Qui peut voir, dans l'institution présidentielle, la clé de l'ordre démocratique ?

Face à l'éclatement du corps social, l'enjeu est de construire des appartenances et des valeurs partagées nationales et européennes. Le titre 1 de la Constitution européenne aurait pu y contribuer si tous les leaders politiques avaient compris l'urgence d'offrir des perspectives et de donner une force identitaire à de nouvelles institutions. Il faut, d'urgence, ouvrir à tous la société du travail, mais la relation affective au pays se nourrit aussi de la reconnaissance d'une histoire, de l'évidence d'une République dont les lieux et les rites disent notre appartenance et rappellent l'ordre démocratique.
2005 ne laissera pas un bon souvenir dans la mémoire collective des Français. Rappelons-nous : le « non » des Français au traité constitutionnel pour l'Europe ; la longue flambée dans les quartiers difficiles de nos cités ; l'effarante disqualification de notre système judiciaire dans l'affaire d'Outreau. C'est beaucoup pour un seul pays dans une seule année.

Tout à coup, les Français voient se gripper la construction européenne dont leur pays avait été le principal moteur depuis un demi-siècle. L'accord in extremis sur le budget de l'Union pour la période 2007-2013 n'efface pas le malaise né de ce référendum malheureux où la France a déchiré de ses propres mains un texte dont elle avait été la principale inspiratrice.

La crise des banlieues ébranle la confiance que nous mettions dans les vertus « intégratrices » de notre modèle social. Tant de belles paroles, de grands principes et d'argent dépensé n'aboutiraient donc qu'à ce constat désenchanté devant des populations déboussolées, amères, révoltées, au risque d'ajouter aux conflits sociaux des antagonismes raciaux ? Quant à la crise de la justice, elle ébranle une institution sur laquelle se fonde toute société de droits et de libertés.

De tels chocs restituent à la politique toutes ses responsabilités. Car on ne soigne pas avec des remèdes techniques - quelle que soit leur nécessité - une crise de confiance de cette nature. Certes, on a changé de gouvernement après le « non » au référendum. Était-ce suffisant ? Le Président aurait-il dû remettre son mandat au peuple pour épargner au pays la longue période qui reste à courir d'ici à l'élection présidentielle de 2007 ? Certains le pensent, observant que, à nos portes, le chancelier Schröder a provoqué des élections anticipées (qu'il a d'ailleurs perdues)
après un lourd échec dans un scrutin régional. Le président français - qui a sans doute ses raisons - en a décidé autrement chez nous.

Rien d'irréversible

Il est vrai que, du côté de l'économie, c'est-à-dire de la vie quotidienne, les choses s'améliorent un peu. Le chômage baisse, sans que l'on crée beaucoup d'emplois, par l'effet combiné de départs à la retraite plus nombreux et d'aides ponctuelles pour certains emplois. La croissance change légèrement de vitesse, passant d'un rythme de 1,5 % l'an à un rythme de 2 %. Notre potentiel est certainement plus élevé (entre 2,5 et 3 %), mais nous ne parvenons toujours pas à l'atteindre, faute d'innovations suffisantes dans la création de nouveaux produits et de nouveaux services, et dans la conquête de nouveaux marchés, singulièrement en Asie.

Aucun de ces malheurs n'est irréversible, aucune de ces déceptions ne doit nous décourager. Tous les pays connaissent « des passages à vide ». Rappelons-nous l'Angleterre des années 70, embourbée dans un travaillisme vieillissant ; l'Amérique du début des années 80, en voie d'être rattrapée par le Japon ; le Japon lui-même dans les années 90, plombé dans la stagnation ; tout récemment, l'Allemagne, saignée par la réunification ; aujourd'hui même, l'Italie, peut-être plus affaiblie que nous. Dans tous les cas, un signal politique a remonté le ressort d'une horloge collective temporairement en panne. C'est aussi cela la démocratie : tourner la page.
L’État refuse de payer les dégâts des violences urbaines

Le Monde, 26 December 2005

Les assureurs des municipalités et des particuliers menacent d'aller «jusqu'au Conseil d'État»

Qui va payer la facture des violences urbaines de novembre ? Ni l'Etat ni les assurances ne veulent, à ce jour, supporter les frais des dégâts. Le 4 décembre, Jean-François Copé, ministre délégé au budget, a indiqué que « l'Etat n'interviendrait pas financièrement dans ce dossier ». Les assureurs, de leur côté, ont promis de payer les dommages de leurs assurés « rubis sur l'ongle ». Mais ils entendent assigner l'Etat en justice pour obtenir remboursement des indemnités versées. La plupart des assureurs introduiront des recours devant les tribunaux administratifs aussi bien pour les sinistres causés aux particuliers - voitures ou locaux commerciaux - que pour les bâtiments communaux.

Entre le 27 octobre et le 17 novembre, 233 bâtiments publics ont été dégradés ou incendiés dans 300 communes. La Fédération française des sociétés d'assurances (FFSA) évalue les dommages sur le patrimoine municipal à 80 millions d'euros. La Société mutuelle d'assurances des collectivités locales (SMACL) les estime à 150 millions.

Pour réclamer l'engagement financier de l'Etat, les assureurs invoquent la loi du 7 janvier 1983. Elle dispose que « l'Etat est civilement responsable des dégâts (...) résultant des crimes et délits commis (...) par des attroupements ou rassemblements (...) soit contre des personnes, soit contre des biens ».
Le gouvernement se retranche derrière la jurisprudence de cette loi pour refuser de payer la note. Plusieurs arrêts du Conseil d'Etat ont exclu la responsabilité de l'Etat lorsque les actes de violence étaient « prémédités » ou lorsque les dégâts étaient le fait de « petits groupes », et non des attroupements, « plusieurs heures » après un événement tel que « le décès accidentel d'un jeune poursuivi par les forces de l'ordre » ayant pu par ailleurs donner lieu à une « manifestation ».

Mais la SMACL, qui a pris la tête de la contestation, récuse en bloc ces arguments. Elle réfute la thèse de la « préméditation » en s'appuyant sur le rapport des renseignements généraux du 23 novembre, consacré aux émeutes, qui évoque « une forme d'insurrection non organisée ». Elle estime qu'en décrétant l'état d'urgence, à partir du 8 novembre, le gouvernement a lui-même reconnu « qu'il y avait atteinte grave à l'ordre public ». Ordre public dont l'Etat est responsable. « Nous assurons 150 communes touchées pour lesquels nous avons 173 dossiers de sinistre. Pour chacun, nous engagerons un recours contre l'Etat. S'il le faut, nous irons jusqu'au Conseil d'Etat », prévient Bernard Bellec, président de la SMACL.

D'autres assureurs, comme AXA, menacent d'en faire autant. Mardi 13 décembre, Gérard de La Martinière, président de la FFSA, a déploré la future « partie de cache-cache, à durée indéterminée, à travers tribunaux administratifs interposés » entre le gouvernement et les assureurs. Il a plaidé, au nom de toute la profession, pour « un protocole d'accord sur les modalités d'indemnisations » qui prévoirait un versement financier global de l'Etat aux assureurs. Le gouvernement s'y refuse. « Chaque cas est spécifique et sera tranché devant les tribunaux s'il le faut », explique-t-on au cabinet de Brice Hortefeux, ministre délégué aux collectivités territoriales.

En choisissant le contentieux plutôt qu'une « transaction à l'amiable », le gouvernement « joue la montre », déplorent les assureurs. Les jugements prendront entre trois et cinq ans. Mais la SMACL se rassure en rappelant qu'« entre deux tiers et trois quarts » des arrêts rendus par le Conseil d'Etat sur la base de la loi de 1983 ont retenu la responsabilité de l'Etat. « L'Etat ne va tout de même pas prendre en
charge toutes les dégradations des bâtiments publics sinon à quoi servirait-il qu'il y ait des assurances ?, fait-on valoir dans l'entourage de M. Hortefeux. L'Etat n'a pas les moyens de payer dans le contexte budgétaire. »

Pour les assureurs, il est « injuste » que les communes assument financièrement « des risques d'exception » qui n'ont rien à voir avec leur gestion quotidienne. « Les violences urbaines sont un nouveau risque comme les catastrophes naturelles ou les attentats. Elles doivent être prises en charge par la solidarité nationale », assure M. Bellec.

Pour sortir du bras de fer, M. Hortefeux a proposé, lundi 12 décembre, que se tienne, fin janvier 2006, une table ronde entre l'Etat et les assureurs en vue de créer un fonds de « mutualisation de certains risques spécifiques dont ceux liés aux violences urbaines ». Il pourrait être financé par une prime sur les cotisations des villes les moins exposées au profit des plus vulnérables. Neuilly-sur-Seine aiderait Clichy-sous-Bois. L'Etat, au-delà d'un certain montant de dégâts, financerait les réparations à travers la Caisse centrale de réassurance nationale, alimentée par des taxes prélevées sur les cotisations.

En attendant, à défaut du concours de l'Etat pour éponger les dégâts et pour faire face à d'éventuelles nouvelles flambées de violences, les assureurs prévoient d'augmenter sensiblement le montant des franchises ainsi que les cotisations d'assurances des communes. Toutes devraient connaître une hausse de 5 %. Celles qui ont été touchées par les émeutes pourraient subir une augmentation en moyenne de 30 % pendant plusieurs années. « Les cotisations sont fonction du degré d'exposition aux risques. Mais la hausse découle aussi des incertitudes que l'Etat, par son refus de financer, fait peser sur les comptes des assureurs », se justifie Jean-François Irastorza, chargé de la communication à la SMACL. Les communes pauvres, souvent plus exposées, devraient supporter cette hausse.
CHIFFRES

200 MILLIONS D'EUROS.

Coût global des dommages causés par les violences. Les incendies de voitures représentent 23 millions, les dégâts sur les bâtiments publics entre 80 et 150 millions.

45 MILLIONS D'EUROS.

Montant des indemnités que devra verser la Société mutuelle d'assurances des collectivités locales (SMACL) pour les violences urbaines de novembre sur le patrimoine public. Cette mutuelle est gérée par des élus et des fonctionnaires territoriaux.

150 MILLIONS D'EUROS.

Montant total des cotisations des collectivités locales à la SMACL, sur un marché total, tous assureurs confondus, de 450 millions.

DÉGÂTS NOISY-LE-GRAND.

L'incendie du gymnase a provoqué des dommages pour 6 millions d'euros.

LE BLANC-MESNIL.

L'incendie ou les dégradations de plusieurs locaux municipaux sont évalués à 4,3 millions d'euros.

PONTOISE.

La destruction du théâtre représente 3 millions d'euros, tout comme les dégradations du théâtre de la communauté d'agglomération de Cergy.

AIDER LES COMMUNES.

Le gouvernement a décidé de raccourcir d'un an le délai de remboursement de la TVA sur les travaux de reconstruction.
Text 11

Immigration familiale : les faits

Le Monde, 5 January 2006

L'entrée en France d'étrangers mariés à des Français constitue l'essentiel du flux, loin devant le regroupement familial

Au plus fort des émeutes en banlieue, la question du regroupement familial a une nouvelle fois surgi, désignée par des élus de droite comme la raison principale de l'explosion de violence. Le gouvernement, désireux de promouvoir une « immigration choisie » de travailleurs qualifiés, leur a emboîté le pas en annonçant vouloir durcir les critères de ce mode d'entrée sur le territoire. C'est un des points-clés de l'avant-projet de loi sur l'immigration actuellement en préparation (Le Monde du 4 janvier).

Certes, depuis l'arrêt de l'immigration de travail non qualifié, massive dans les années 1950-1960, les migrations pour motif familial fournissent le plus gros contingent d'entrées légales en France - 102 662 personnes, soit 73 % des étrangers admis pour une durée d'au moins un an en 2004. Mais, contrairement à un mythe tenace, le regroupement familial à proprement parler, c'est-à-dire la procédure permettant à un étranger en situation régulière d'être rejoint par sa femme et ses enfants, n'en constitue pas l'essentiel. Il représente aujourd'hui moins d'un quart de ce flux. En revanche, plus de la moitié concerne des étrangers entrant en France pour y rejoindre leur conjoint français.

Longtemps resté un droit non réglementé mais pratiqué depuis toujours, le regroupement familial n'a été reconnu qu'en 1976, par un décret de trente lignes encadrant et organisant la procédure. Le conjoint et les enfants d'un immigré obtiennent alors un titre de séjour si ce dernier est régulièrement installé depuis un an, s'il dispose de ressources « stables, suffisantes » et d'un logement « adapté ». Le texte est signé par le premier ministre de l'époque, Jacques Chirac, et par quatre de ses ministres (travail, intérieur, affaires étrangères, santé). Il vise à réglementer la pratique alors courante de la régularisation sur place.


« La variation de ces règles a des répercussions sur le statut des personnes concernées et sur le processus d'intégration. Mais, sur le long terme, elle en a peu sur l'immigration des familles concernées », souligne Patrick Weil, dans son ouvrage La France et ses étrangers (Folio Histoire, 2005). En dépit des variations de procédure, l'immigration familiale a toujours suivi de quelques années l'arrivée des travailleurs célibataires. Tout en s'atténuant fortement, ce comportement s'est maintenu après 1974, d'autant que les lois restrictives sur l'immigration, en restreignant les possibilités d'allers-retours entre le pays d'origine et la France, ont eu pour effet de fixer sur le territoire français des immigrés qui n'étaient pas tous venus dans l'intention de s'y installer.
Aussi, contrairement là encore à une idée reçue, ce ne sont pas des familles nombreuses qui viennent rejoindre les résidents étrangers. Elles comptent moins de deux personnes en moyenne (1,64), et se réduisent le plus souvent à un conjoint.

Si l'immigration familiale ne se tarit pas, alors que l'immigration de travail est quasi suspendue depuis plus de trente ans, c'est parce qu'on assiste, depuis les années 1980, à l'arrivée des conjoints des enfants d'étrangers entrés en France au titre du regroupement ou nés en France.

Plus de la moitié des 102 662 personnes entrées en France en 2004 pour un motif familial sont en fait des étrangers venus rejoindre un membre de leur famille de nationalité française. Membre qui, dans la quasi-totalité des cas (49 888), n'est autre que leur conjoint. Le mariage avec un conjoint français est la première voie d'entrée en France, loin devant le regroupement familial. Le ministre de l'intérieur entend d'ailleurs durcir fortement la législation de ces mariages binationaux.

Car cette réalité est liée, veut croire le gouvernement, à un certain nombre de détournements des règles du mariage à des fins migratoires. Mais elle s'explique avant tout par une tendance sociologique de fond. Les enfants et les petits-enfants d'étrangers, nés en France, souhaitent souvent, par le mariage, garder un lien culturel avec le pays d'origine de leurs parents. Même s'ils se sentent pleinement français.
Text 12

Banlieues : le rôle des « grands frères » en cause

Le Figaro, 11 January 2006

« LES ÉMEUTES ont montré, entre autres, l'échec des politiques de grands frères », estime-t-on à la section des renseignements généraux chargée d'analyser les violences urbaines. Les policiers dressent un profil critique des médiateurs, qui présentent « plus souvent un profil d'agresseurs que d'éducateurs ».

Dans ces métiers de contacts, qui reposent beaucoup sur du charisme personnel, les évaluations globales sont toujours délicates. Mais le dispositif apparu au milieu des années 80 à titre expérimental, pour répondre aux violences urbaines, a mal résisté à son institutionnalisation. Au départ, « c'était artisanal. Les grands frères apportaient une réponse, là où les professionnels avaient perdu le contact avec les jeunes », explique Jacques de Maillard, professeur de sciences politiques, spécialiste de la médiation sociale.


Les grands frères, dont le rôle ambigu est de ramener la paix sociale en dehors de véritable projet, attirent les critiques. La population, comme les policiers, les ont souvent assimilés aux voyous qu'ils étaient censés amadouer. A Chanteloup-les-Vignes (Yvelines), un des « messagers » n'était pas intervenu, alors qu'une bande
délestait un policier de son arme devant lui. Par la suite, le médiateur a récupéré le pistolet pour le rendre à la police. Une façon détournée « d'affirmer leur pouvoir propre, plutôt que de conforter l'ordre public », assure encore Lucienne Bui-Trong, qui adresse le même reproche aux associations musulmanes.

**Affirmer leur propre pouvoir**

« L'autorité des grands frères repose sur un rapport de forces et pas sur la transmission de consignes ou de savoir », assure un policier d'Argenteuil. « L'ériger en système sape la chaîne éducative », affirme celui qui s'est battu pour éviter ce système dans sa ville. Les élus sont régulièrement tentés d'y recourir pour trouver des relais dans les quartiers. Pourtant la plupart des maires qui avaient embauché des emplois-jeunes en sont revenus. Faute de pouvoir les licencier, ils en ont souvent fait des fonctionnaires affectés à l'entretien des espaces verts, à la propreté... Une façon de reconnaître que la simple médiation ne pouvait pas fonctionner sur la durée. Les collectivités, tout comme le gouvernement, réfléchissent maintenant à de nouvelles formes d'encadrement dans les cités, notamment pour réguler l'occupation des espaces publics. Certains misent sur des gardiens mieux formés, d'autres sur des adultes relais, en pensant notamment aux mères de famille.
Le gouvernement échoue sur la croissance

L'Humanité, 13 February 2006

Conjoncture. La progression du PIB n'aurait été que de 1,4 % en 2005, sur fond de recul de la production industrielle.

Dominique de Villepin et Thierry Breton n'ont pas réussi à relancer l'activité. Selon l'estimation précoce de l'INSEE parue vendredi, la croissance en 2005 n'aurait pas dépassé 1,4 % (contre 2,1 % en 2004). Le rythme de création de richesses a été très faible au quatrième trimestre, le PIB n'augmentant que de 0,2 %. En dépit des faits, le premier ministre parlait ce week-end d'une « croissance solidement repartie en ce début d'année 2006 ». Ayant fait de la « confiance » son credo, l'hôte de Matignon n'a plus d'autre choix que de masquer l'atonie de l'économie française. Il s'en remet, en guise de toute explication, à des « phénomènes conjoncturels », comme « la situation de l'automobile » ou « la crise des banlieues ». Forçant son optimisme, il rapproche la situation de la France de « celle d'un pays qui reprend confiance en lui et d'un pays qui avance ».

Le son de cloche est le même à Bercy. Le 17 janvier, Thierry Breton s'attendait à un PIB en progression de « 1,5 % à 2 % ». Déjà très basse, cette fourchette ne sera peut-être pas atteinte si l'on en juge les estimations tombées vendredi. Comment, dans ces conditions, croire à la baisse du chômage proclamée par Matignon ? L'indicateur de l'activité industrielle, livré également vendredi par l'INSEE, n'est pas non plus en faveur du premier ministre. Le rythme de la production a décéléré entre les mois de novembre et décembre. Sur un an, l'industrie (hors énergie) ralentit de 1,1 %, avec un très net recul du secteur automobile (-11,3 %). La production du secteur des biens intermédiaires se tasse sur un an (-0,8 %), avec une perte nette de 45 000 emplois (source : SESSI). En 2005, l'industrie manufacturière en France a perdu 90 000 emplois. Pour autant, des sommes considérables sont dilapidées par les groupes dans de vastes opérations financières de fusions-acquisitions. Les très grandes
entreprises, appuyées par des dispositifs fiscaux avantageux, placent leur trésorerie sur les marchés de capitaux et réduisent leur masse salariale au moyen d'investissements coûteux en capital matériel.

La publication des résultats financiers pour l'année 2005 semblent confirmer la déconnexion observée depuis deux ans. D'un côté, profits et dividendes explosent alors que, de l'autre, salaires et prestations sociales sont écrasés. Une tendance aussi lourde ne peut qu'entretenir le cercle vicieux de la déflation salariale couplée à l'inflation des marchés financiers. En progression de 6,30 % depuis le début d'année, le CAC 40 a franchi le 9 février la barre des 5 000 points, un niveau qu'il n'avait pas atteint depuis l'été 2001.
**Text 14**

*Une journée consacrée à la vie des jeunes*

*Ouest France, 1 April 2006*

Samedi 8 avril aura lieu « Vis ta ville », un forum fait par et pour les jeunes, afin d'échanger entre eux, mais aussi avec les élus et les services.

La municipalité souhaitait depuis longtemps mettre en place un temps d'échange avec les 14-18 ans, pour entendre leur point de vue sur la ville, mais aussi connaître leurs préoccupations, leurs inquiétudes et centres d'intérêt. Pure coïncidence : le projet avait été lancé au moment où les voitures embrasaient les banlieues en novembre dernier et le forum, prévu samedi 8 avril, tombe en pleine crispation sur le CPE. C'est sûr, les jeunes ont des choses à dire. Encore faut-il savoir les écouter.

Pour cela, la municipalité a confié l'organisation à 16 jeunes volontaires de Rezé. Pendant cinq mois, ils ont donné leur avis sur le choix des thèmes, le déroulement de la journée et la programmation musicale en fin de soirée. Au cours d'une première rencontre, en décembre, ils ont listé les sujets qui leur semblaient propices au débat. Quatre ont été retenus : que faire lors des temps libres ? Comment bouger dans l'agglo ? Quels lieux pour les jeunes ? Comment trouver sa place dans la société ?

L'affiche a aussi fait l'objet d'intenses cogitations. Avec le studio graphique, les jeunes organisateurs ont suggéré plusieurs modifications, tant sur la forme que sur le fond. À une semaine de l'événement, ils livrent leurs impressions. « Comme on a peu l'occasion de venir en mairie, on ne savait pas que les élus pouvaient être accessibles », déclare Lolita Guibaud. « Au début, le projet nous semblait flou, explique Alexandre Perier. Tout était à faire. En fait, il s'agit d'une première, pour nous comme pour les adultes qui nous entourent. C'est vraiment un essai. On verra ensuite comment il faut continuer.»
Après les débats, un moment festif et musical est prévu à la BaraKaSon. Là aussi il a fallu choisir entre différents styles musicaux, artistes locaux ou nationaux. C'est le rap qui domine, avec le duo Les Spécialistes et Dj Nark, issu du quartier Château et membre du collectif R2C.

Le programme. Accueil en mairie, samedi 8 avril, à 14 h 30. Débats à 15 h et à 17 h. Clôture des débats, suivie d'un pot à 18 h 45. Restauration à 19 h 30. Concerts à la BaraKaSon à 20 h 30, avec les Spécialistes (hip-hop), Dahlia (pop-rock) et Dj Nark. Les débats sont gratuits et ouverts à tous. Pour plus d'infos, appeler le 02 40 84 42 75.
Text 15

Montfermeil, sept mois après

L’Humanité, 31 May 2006

Réalisé dans la cité des Bosquets avant la nouvelle nuit de violences de lundi soir, notre reportage dans les pas d'une éducatrice de l'association Arrimages.


Mais il en faudra plus pour décourager Sandra. Depuis huit ans, cette éducatrice spécialisée à l'énergie décoiffante arpente ainsi le quartier des Bosquets, à Montfermeil (Seine-Saint-Denis). Chaque jour, elle va à la rencontre des habitants pour le compte d'Arrimages, une association de prévention subventionnée par le conseil général, qui oeuvre aussi sur Clichy-sous-Bois et Sevran. Un quotidien fait de dialogue, d'écoute et de conseils, au service de la lutte contre l'exclusion.

Les Bosquets et ses 7 000 habitants, c'est le secteur de Sandra et de quatre autres « éduc' spé ». Le décor, construit dans les années soixante, flirte aujourd'hui avec la désolation : chaussées parsemées de nids-de-poule, façades d'immeubles décatis d'où affleure le ferraillement du béton, ascenseurs hors service... « La cité fait partie du plan Borloo de rénovation urbaine, commente la quadragénaire. Malheureusement, au nom de ça, on en fait encore moins pour entretenir l'habitat... »
En octobre dernier, la commune limitrophe de Clichy-sous-Bois connaissait ses premières nuits de violence. Une colère qui s'était rapidement propagée aux Bosquets où habite la famille de Muhettin, l'adolescent grièvement brûlé dans le transformateur EDF. Sept mois plus tard, « rien n'a changé, constate Sandra, si ce n'est plus de présence policière ».

Au pied de leur immeuble, Moussa et Medhi sont rejoints par Mohammed, vingt et un ans. « Brûler, c'est le seul moyen qu'on a pour se faire entendre, lance-t-il, énervé. S'il n'y avait pas eu ça, qui se serait intéressé à ce qui se passe ici ? » Pas tranquille, Mohammed entre et sort du hall, jette un oeil à gauche, à droite, lance une vanne, héle un pote, puis repart. Il y a peu encore, il travaillait tous les matins sur les marchés, après avoir enchaîné pas moins de vingt-huit missions d'intérim. « Mais j'ai dû arrêter depuis que je suis recherché par la police », glisse-t-il. Une histoire bête. Il y a quelques semaines, sa soeur a eu un accident de scooter dans le centre-ville. Mohammed a voulu aller la chercher. Il a pris la voiture d'un copain. Au bout de 100 mètres, des policiers l'ont repéré. Mohammed n'a pas de permis... et deux joints de cannabis dans ses poches.

Aujourd'hui, il ne veut pas répondre aux convocations de la justice. Un brin provocateur, il lâche : « De toute manière, ici, on passe tous par la case prison. » D'un doigt, Mohammed désigne les murs du hall, constellés de graffitis multicolores. Dans un coin, une dizaine d'entre eux ont été soigneusement entourés d'un trait. « C'est le nom de ceux qui sont en taule... », précise le jeune homme. Perdu au milieu des tags et autres graphèmes, un message étonnant se détache en lettres noires : « Au secours, je suis perdu. »

Sandra reprend sa route. Direction le restaurant grec, en plein cœur de la cité. En chemin, elle revient sur le cas de Mohammed. Inquiétant ? « Pas tant que ça. Au moins, il parle de ses problèmes et c'est une étape essentielle, assure l'éducatrice. Suite aux émeutes, on n'a pas assez donné la parole aux habitants des cités pour qu'ils expriment leur traumatisme. Or, quand on n'exprime pas les choses, bien souvent, on les rejoue... »
Donner la parole, écouter. Mais aussi construire des liens en permanence. Sandra ne fait pas cent mètres sans serrer une main, glisser un mot à une mère de famille ou demander à un petit des nouvelles d'un grand-frère. « C'est un travail de fourmi, dit-elle. Il faut gagner la confiance, tisser de nouveaux liens, sans cesse, par le biais des familles, des copains des copains... » Depuis plusieurs années, l'association Arrimages organise des séjours baptisés « pause vacances ». Chaque été, une trentaine de familles des Bosquets partent dans un village vacances de Vendée. Là, pendant une dizaine de jours, ils oublient un peu les murs de la cité. « Cela leur permet de sortir de l'isolement terrible que représente le quartier, de découvrir pour certains des familles blanches, de s'ouvrir », raconte Sandra.

C'est aussi, pour les parents, une bonne occasion de se rappeler qu'ils ont des compétences, même si celles-ci sont sans cesse disqualifiées par le discours ambiant. « À force de se voir traités d'incapables, ils finissent par le penser... », glisse Sandra. Un exemple anodin : ces professeurs de collège qui acceptent que les grands-frères des élèves viennent aux rendez-vous à la place des pères. « Faire cela, c'est refuser au père de jouer son rôle, s'emporte l'éducatrice. On fait venir un traducteur, si besoin, une femme relais, mais le père doit être maintenu à sa place, comme il l'est dans son pays d'origine ! »

Le cliché du père « démissionnaire », véhiculé par certains politiques et médias, exaspère Sandra. « Depuis que je suis ici, je n'ai jamais connu un père qui n'aït jamais bossé ! Des pères au chômage, oui, des pères cassés physiquement par le boulot, oui, mais des pères qui n'ont jamais rien fait, non ! » Aux Bosquets, le problème numéro un reste bien l'emploi. Le taux de chômage des jeunes y tourne autour de 40 %. Une bonne partie du travail des éducateurs consiste donc à épauler ceux qui le souhaitent dans leur démarche. Plus facile à dire... « Ici, même si tu sors de l'école avec un diplôme, tu enchaînes les stages et les missions d'intérim au moins jusqu'à vingt-cinq ans, nous dit Nourredine. Fatalement, la démotivation arrive un jour ou l'autre... »
Aux Bosquets, le quotidien, c'est le travail précaire, la vie au jour le jour. Avec ses modes. « Il suffit que quelqu'un trouve un boulot de bagagiste à Roissy pour que tout le monde s'y précipite pensant avoir trouvé le bon filon, sourit Sandra. Une autre fois, ce sera un boulot de cariste... » Ici, la plupart des propositions de la mission locale concernent des emplois dans le BTP et la manutention. « Comme si les jeunes des cités étaient prédisposés pour ça..., souffle Sandra. Au final, on ne tient jamais compte de leur désir. Or, si tu n'es pas valorisé, tu ne te projettes pas dans l'avenir. » La débrouille, évidemment, prend souvent le relais. « Un peu les marchés, un peu de revente de shit, un peu de manutention... », résume un habitant.

Dans son camion, Abderammane, trente-huit ans, vend des poulets rôtis en plein coeur des Bosquets. Il est né ici. Sa tchatche est aussi radicale que son avis sur la cité : « C'est une erreur urbaine et humaine ! On a concentré ici tous les immigrés alors qu'il fallait mixer. Au final, les gens sont exclus et s'excluent eux-mêmes... » La rélegation, ici, n'est pas qu'un sentiment. Les Bosquets, c'est 20 % des 26 000 habitants de Montfermeil. Mais seulement 10 % des électeurs et quelques centaines de votants. Abderammane montre les immeubles autour : « Moi, je n'ai qu'une question : où sont passés nos impôts ? »

Noredine raconte les petites humiliations quotidiennes, le délit de faciès, les amalgames. Il y a deux jours, des jeunes sont venus jouer la provocation avec les CRS. « Comme les flics savaient qu'ils ne pouvaient pas les attraper dans la cité, ils ont décidé de verbaliser toutes les voitures garées devant le café ! On est sorti pour leur demander pourquoi, ils nous ont répondu : "Vous direz merci aux jeunes" ! À quoi ça rime ? Comme si on était complice... » Ce père de famille envisage de revendre son bail et de reprendre son boulot d'avant. « Je ne sais pas quoi faire, je ne vais tout de même pas changer de couleur de peau ! »

Sandra ressort du café. Il est 16 h 30. C'est la sortie de l'école. Sandra croise Bala. « Tu viens au foot, samedi ? » Le jeune lui fait signe de s'approcher. Elle s'isole quelques secondes, puis revient. « Ah, Bala... encore une histoire compliquée... »

(1) Les prénoms ont été modifiés.
La carte des émeutes de novembre 2005 confirme le profond malaise des immigrants africains

Le Figaro, 29 June 2006


Pour le sociologue du CNRS Hugues Lagrange, les troubles ont éclaté pour l'essentiel dans des zones urbaines sensibles abritant une large proportion de familles africaines de plus de six enfants. Ce chercheur a examiné les caractéristiques des quartiers touchés. La plupart se trouvent en zone urbaine sensible. Mais ce sont surtout les cités disposant d'un revenu médian très inférieur à celui du reste de la commune qui ont brûlé. Les contrastes sociaux ont bel et bien alimenté la rébellion. Tout comme la présence de très nombreux jeunes. Dans ces cités, ils représentent parfois jusqu'à 40 % de la population. Et paradoxalement, c'est aussi là où d'importantes opérations de rénovation urbaine ont été lancées que le feu a pris. Car pour démolir des barres, les familles sont relogées de façon provisoire, ce qui semble déstabiliser les plus fragiles, expliquent encore les sociologues.

La carte de la géographie des émeutes recoupe celle des zones à forte « concentration de grandes familles ». Habitué à travailler à Mantes-la-Jolie où sont installés de nombreux immigrés africains, Hugues Lagrange a noté que « dès la deuxième semaine d'émeutes, dans l'Ouest notamment, une série de villes qui constituent les lieux d'installation de familles originaires d'Afrique noire ont connu des violences ». Sans être des émeutes ethniques, puisque des personnes de toutes origines ont été interpellées, les feux de novembre ont révélé les difficultés d'intégration d'une partie des enfants d'origine africaine, issus de cette dernière vague d'immigration.
Les familles sahéliennes se sont installées dans les années 80 ou 90, suivies par de nouvelles populations venues du Cameroun, du Congo, de Guinée ou du Cap-Vert. Leurs foyers cumulent les handicaps. Car, le plus souvent, ces familles conservent le modèle démographique du village et les fratries y sont très nombreuses. Enfin, les mères sont souvent analphabètes. Or, le niveau d'éducation maternel conditionne largement les performances scolaires des enfants.

Le choc est aussi de nature culturelle. Les familles d'origine sénégalaise et malienne sont principalement issues d'un milieu rural. Par tradition, le père occupe une place centrale dans l'organisation familiale. Aussi « l'enfant est d'abord envisagé comme un membre de la communauté », explique Nathalie Kapko, chercheuse associée au laboratoire Cultures urbaines et sociétés (Iresco-CNRS). Ce sont donc les pères qui incarnent la loi. La transposition brutale de code culturel dans un milieu urbain occidental à la fois confiné et brutal fait vaciller les repères de ces familles et va jusqu'à les disloquer. Les écarts d'âge sont souvent très importants avec les derniers fils. Il est fréquent que les jeunes grandissent avec des pères à la retraite qui partagent leur vie entre l'Afrique et la France. Quant aux mères, elles manquent de l'ascendant nécessaire. « La plupart des enfants rajeunissent leur mère lorsqu'ils remplissent les fiches à l'école, car ils les perçoivent presque comme des soeurs », confie d'ailleurs Hugues Lagrange.

Autre déphasage culturel pénalisant, les parents reproduisent les modèles d'éducation importés de leur village d'origine. Ils imposent la soumission aux plus âgés de leurs enfants, exigeant qu'ils baissent les yeux devant les adultes. Des codes que les jeunes respectent en apparence, comme ces adolescents remplis de rage après la mort d'un camarade poignardé lors d'une rixe à Evry, au mois de mai. Ils étaient tous venus faire leurs condoléances à cette famille malienne, ont écouté les appels au calme des mères les yeux rivés au sol, avant de filer pour une expédition punitive une fois dans la rue.
Le décalage entre la norme familiale et la réalité de la société alentour est donc souvent à la fois très douloureux et profondément entravant. Certains en jouent pour échapper à toute autorité. « Dans le système traditionnel africain, rappelle à juste titre Lagrange, tous les adultes interviennent. En France, ces enfants vivent une rupture entre le discours parental et les règles externes. Or la parole adulte fonctionne lorsque tous la renforcent. » La plupart de ces familles n'ont guère de relation avec l'école. Par respect souvent, mais aussi par crainte face à une institution qu'elles ne comprennent guère. Les parents ne délèguent pas l'autorité affective aux maîtres. Au final, certains adolescents dénient toute autorité aux professeurs. Logés dans des appartements exigus, les enfants ont bien du mal à étudier. Ils sont aussi souvent victimes de rivalités entre co-épouses dans les foyers polygames, et forcés dans certains cas de défendre leurs mères contre leurs demi-frères. « Les parcours scolaires chaotiques des garçons d'origine subsaharienne témoignent aussi de la force des tensions intrafamiliales », ajoute encore Nathalie Kapko.

Il faut encore prendre en compte les familles nouvellement arrivées de pays en guerre, qui sont totalement déboussolées. Pour autant, gardons-nous de généraliser : l'émigration africaine est loin d'être homogène. Une partie est composée d'étudiants restés en France. Leurs enfants sont souvent encouragés à faire des études, tandis que les parents développent des stratégies pour s'extraire des quartiers de relégation. Car, note encore Hugues Lagrange, dans les cités à forte présence de africaine, la disparition des cadres est notable.

Les dernières émeutes ont bien fait émerger la question noire, avec une problématique sociale et culturelle jusqu'ici négligée. Néanmoins, la situation pourrait évoluer avec l'inscription croissante des femmes africaines aux cours d'alphabetisation.