The Neoliberal Gospel

An examination of global Christian social forces in relation to states, societies, markets, and the production of global neoliberal hegemony

Kyle Murray

Thesis submitted to the University of Limerick for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Politics and Public Administration
University of Limerick
Student Number: 0401765

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Owen Worth
Internal Examiner: Dr. Lucian Ashworth
External Examiner: Dr. Randall Germain

Thesis submitted to the University of Limerick: 2010
For Mildred Barrett & Mary Sue Murray…I hope that I have done you both proud
# Table of Contents

Abstract.............................................................................................................i

Declaration......................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgements.......................................................................................iii

Chapter One: Introduction..............................................................................1
  1.1 Hypothesis & research aims.................................................................1
  1.2 Research methods................................................................................4
  1.3 Chapter synopsis...................................................................................6

Chapter Two: ‘Hegemony’—Cox, Gramsci, religion, and world orders........10
  2.1 Introduction...........................................................................................10
  2.2 Robert Cox: ‘hegemony’ in International Relations and global political economy.................................................................11
    2.3 The Neo-Gramscians..........................................................................17
      2.3.1 The Italian School of Critical IPE..............................................18
      2.3.2 The Amsterdam School.............................................................20
      2.3.3 Criticisms of the Neo-Gramscians...........................................21
  2.4 Religion and worldview as avenues for Gramscian hegemony in IR/IPE and world orders.............................................................26
  2.5 Conclusion............................................................................................37

Chapter Three: Hegemony, religion, and conceptions of the world—a Gramscian conceptual framework for situating religious institutions and intellectuals in IR/IPE............................................................40
  3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................40
  3.2 Gramsci on hegemony: power, state and society.................................41
    3.2.1 Hegemony and the state.................................................................41
    3.2.2 Intellectuals as the agents of hegemony.......................................46
  3.3 Hegemony, “contradictory consciousness” and religion.................50
    3.3.1 Gramsci’s critiques on the semantics of defining religion.51
    3.3.2 The contradictory nature of individual and collective consciousness...............................................................................54
  3.4 Contradictory ‘conceptions of the world’, class, and hegemony........56
    3.4.1 Levels and sublevels of analysis for particular conceptions of the world.................................................................57
Chapter Four: Beneath IR theory—the historical development of Western Christendom in relation to production, the origins of modern states, and global civil society

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The rise and fall of Western Christendom as an intellectual, moral, political and economic hegemony

4.2.1 The waning of the Western Empire and the vanguard role of the Catholic Church in the preservation of the Latin identity

4.2.2 The continued ambiguity as to the balance of civil and political society in Western Christendom

4.2.3 The mercantilist phase of the Catholic Church and the Renaissance-era

4.3 “Scission”: Reformation & Counter-Reformation

4.3.1 “Scission” and the popular rejection of Latin hegemony

4.3.2 Lutheranism

4.3.3 Calvin, Arminius, and the Calvinist/Arminian impasse

4.3.4 Radical Reformers and “moral anarchy”

4.3.5 The Counter-Reformation and the Catholic Coalition

4.4 “Court” & “Country”; “Scission” & “Suture”: contested state formation and “passive revolution” in Britain & Ireland

4.4.1 Britain as an incubator of contradictory Reformation conceptions of the world

4.4.2 “Court” & “Country”; “Scission” & “Suture”: the religious wars of Britain & Ireland

4.4.3 “Passive Revolution”: the Restoration for England, the Glorious Revolution for the Covenanters, and the flight of the separatists

4.5 Conclusion

Chapter Five: The convergence of Traditional Christian forces and the separate development of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Global civil society, the modern state-system, and the Pan-Christian Movement

5.2.1 Mainline Protestantism
5.2.2 Catholicism and the Ecumenical Movement…………151
5.2.3 Traditional Western Christianity and the Enlightenment-dialectic…………………………………………………………154
5.2.4 Gramsci’s analysis of the Pan-Christian Movement……156

5.3 Frontier Christianity: from isolated folk-groups to global centrifugal forces………………………………………………………159
5.3.1 Evangelicalism, fundamentalism, and charismatic revivalism…………………………………………………………160
5.3.2 Restorationism………………………………………………163
5.3.3 The Holiness Movement……………………………………165
5.3.4 Premillennialist eschatology and the Organic Pan-Christian Movement…………………………………………………………166

5.4 Factions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement…………169
5.4.1 Baptists and Southern Baptists…………………………169
5.4.2 Charismatics and Pentecostals: transnational Christian “Renewalism”………………………………………………………176

5.5 The shared meta-narrative, popular culture, and corresponding expressions of activism of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement……182
5.5.1 ‘Church Growth’, ‘megachurches’, and the ‘Prosperity Gospel’……………………………………………………………………183
5.5.2 Socially-conservative expressions of activism………………187
5.5.3 Christian Zionism and premillennialist eschatology in global politics……………………………………………………………………192
5.5.4 Organic Pan-Christian media…………………………196

5.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………198

Chapter Six: Transnational Christian Renewalism in relation to states, societies, and markets—contextualising the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in global politics and production……202
6.1 Introduction……………………………………………………202
6.2 Perspectives on contextualising Organic Pan-Christian forces…..204
6.2.1 Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity as an extension of the United States?………………………………………………………205
6.2.2 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a transnational social force……………………………………………………………………219
6.2.3 Economic and situational forces: the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within the context of globalisation and the “Global Religious Economy”…………………………………………………………224
6.2.4 Establishing the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a singular social force in the context of a plural world order…229
6.3 ‘Purifying’ societies by engaging states and markets: putting the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world into practice……237
6.3.1 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement and political structures…………………………………………………………..238
6.3.2 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement and markets…246
6.4 Conclusions and departure points……………………………..251

Chapter Seven: The Organic Pan-Christian Movement within and beyond sub-Saharan Africa—a case study…………………………..253
  7.1 Introduction……………………………………………………253
  7.2 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement within the political and religious economies of sub-Saharan Africa……………………….256
  7.3 Socially-conservative activism and ‘exclusionary populism’ in sub-Saharan Africa…………………………………………………..267
    7.3.1 The politics of the family: ABCs and social exclusion as healthcare policy…………………………………………………..268
    7.3.2 Biblical inerrancy, premillennialist eschatology, and Christian Zionism in sub-Saharan Africa……………………………………..278
  7.4 Globalising African Christianity: reverse-agency……………283
  7.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………290

Chapter Eight: Conclusion………………………………………………293
  8.1 Summative conclusions…………………………………………….293
  8.2 Research limitations and potential for further development…..300
  8.3 Final thoughts…………………………………………………………304

Bibliography…………………………………………………………306
Abstract

This dissertation analyses specific transnational Christian social forces in relation to states, societies, and markets. It is argued here that Pentecostal, charismatic, and fundamentalist Christian institutions and intellectuals constitute a globalised demographic group and transnational social identity that shares a common worldview. This common worldview is anchored by a singular meta-narrative and popular culture, and is expressed through corresponding forms of socio-political and economic activism within and between states, societies, and markets throughout the world. This phenomenon is defined in this dissertation as the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. It is argued in this dissertation that Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions are playing an increasingly important function in the production of global neo-liberal hegemony, and its precipitation into popularised forms of common sense and religion in a variety of different sets of social relations across the globe. This dissertation attempts to situate and contextualise the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within the larger discourses on International Relations, globalisation, and critical International Political Economy. This portrayal of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement is constructed with the social and political thought of Antonio Gramsci—using his theory of ‘hegemony’ and his analytical framework for examining individual and collective ‘conceptions of the world’. For over two millennia, Christian social forces have historically played vital roles in the production of successive world orders, and the configurations of politics, production, and philosophy therein. It is argued here that the Organic Pan-Christian Movement plays such a role in the present plural world order by precipitating the global supremacy of neoliberal philosophy into globalised forms of common sense and popular religion.
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university

Signed: Kyle Murray

Date:……………………………………………………..
Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank the Department of Politics & Public Administration at the University of Limerick. The department has been instrumental in facilitating a wonderful environment in which I have been able to pursue my PhD. I would like to specifically thank Maura Adshead, for her leadership as Head of Department. Similarly, I would like to thank Luke Ashworth for his service in the same capacity. The experience I’ve had teaching 1st year political theory with Luke year after year is absolutely priceless within the larger context of my academic experience. I would also like to thank both Neil Robinson and Edward Moxon-Browne for the many teaching hours they provided me.

I would also like to thank many of my PhD colleagues in the Department of Politics & Public Administration, whom have come and gone over the years in which I have written this dissertation. I particularly appreciate the friendships of Barry Hussey, Annelin Andersen, Helen Young, Eidin Ni She, and Gerard Downes. All of you have inspired me, and enhanced my own PhD experience. I am equally grateful for my dear friends from UL for all of their support through thick and through thin: Joanna McDarby, Patrick O’Brien, Hama Munyikwa, Igal Gabbay, Paul Bellew, Aoife Kennedy, Dave Studer, Jeff Lambert, Paddy McHugh, Fearghal McCarthy, Fergal Mawe, Kris Ellefson, and Marie Shanahan.

I am also greatly appreciative to the Department of Languages & Cultural Studies—particularly Liam Murray, for all of his support with the politics component of the Evening B.A. programme. I would like to wish a special thanks to Lorna Moloney, who has tirelessly assisted me with advice and training sessions with regard to both the Evening B.A. and the technological production of this dissertation.

I would like to personally thank the personnel of the Southern Baptist Convention, LifeWay Christian Resources, and the International Mission Board whom have corresponded directly with me and enhanced this dissertation with their testimonies. These include R.W. Murray, Jimmy Hester, and Sharon Pumpelly.

I am forever grateful to my parents, Denise & Woody Murray, for their continued financial support throughout the duration of this dissertation. Without them, this dream of mine would never have been realised. I would also like to thank my dear cousin (brother) Brad Barrett, for his daily correspondences and support. My dearest friend Michael King has also kept me feeling connected to ‘home’ during the many years I have been in Ireland. Many thanks to Brad Spain, Adebayo Oyebade, and Jyotsna Paruchuri...for building my academic foundation, and helping me get to Ireland more than 6 years ago.

Above all, I would like to express my utmost gratitude to my friend, my mentor, and my supervisor: Owen Worth. Without Owen’s patience, friendship, and vision for me, none of this would have ever been possible. I will eternally be grateful to Owen Worth for believing in me, unselfishly giving me a voice, and allowing me to grow and find expression within academia.
Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Hypothesis & research aims

Religious social forces have historically played key roles in the construction of states, societies, and markets. Christianity, in particular, has evolved and reinvented itself over two millennia, and produced a variety of expressions in different sets of historically-determined social relations throughout the world. Christian institutions and intellectuals have often been wholly bound up with changes in the realms of politics and economic production within and between states and societies throughout different parts of the world. The entire structure and contradictory culture of the Western world has been uniquely shaped by conflicting Christian social forces. From the decline of the Western Roman Empire, the Catholic Church was instrumental in producing the European era of feudal politics and production.

The modern state-system of international relations is itself largely a product of conflicting Christian social forces, from the decline of the Catholic Church’s intellectual and moral leadership that had presided over feudal politics and production. The dialectic produced by these conflicting Christian social forces produced changes in both philosophy and the nature of economic production. Industrial capitalism, modern states, and the modern state-system of international relations have, in no small part, been shaped by Christian institutions and intellectuals. As both the modern state-system of international relations and capitalism have evolved, so too have Christian social forces within global politics, production, and society. Changes in global politics and production have also led to the development of new emergent Christian philosophies and corresponding institutions.

Thus, world Christianity is now characterised by three different layers, or sets of institutions and social forces. Firstly, there are those Christian institutions which have
persisted since the 1st century A.D. These traditional institutions have evolved and adapted through different successive periods of global politics and production, within and between different states and societies throughout the world. Secondly, there are those Christian institutions which were born of the Reformation-era of Western Europe. Many of these institutions were instrumental in shifting European politics, society, and production from the era of mediaeval feudalism to the development of both capitalism and the natures of specific modern states. Thirdly, there are those Christian institutions which have emerged from amongst the subaltern and popular classes from within the situational forces of industrialisation and globalisation. All three sets of Christian institutions play key roles within modern global politics and production. Thus, they are each important blocs of social forces within the present and plural constellation of world order.

Within the context of globalisation, some Christian social forces are playing key roles in the popular precipitation of neoliberal philosophy within many states, societies, and markets. This is particularly the case with the newer, emergent sets of Christian institutions. The modern ‘charismatic’ movement within global Christianity, which includes myriad Pentecostal and non-denominational congregations, is effectivel y merging popular expressions of Christian philosophy with neoliberal principles, such as independency and individual material prosperity. This charismatic wave of Christianity represents the fastest growing segment of global Christianity (Pew Forum 2006a). Its growth has been most pronounced over the past three decades within vast regions of the developing world, or the ‘global south’, and states, societies, and markets therein. Thus, this rapidly growing segment of global Christianity is assisting in popularising the dominant, larger macroeconomic neoliberal philosophies which states, societies, and markets are attempting to adjust to.

It is argued in this dissertation that the current charismatic wave of world Christianity plays a key role in the proliferation and popular precipitation of global neoliberal hegemony. Within this emergent and global wave of Christianity, Pentecostal, charismatic, and some fundamentalist Christian social forces share a common conception
of the world. This conception of the world binds more than 500 million believers throughout the world, and it transcends national, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences within and between states, societies, and markets across the globe (Pew Forum 2006a). The intellectuals, institutions, and social forces which hold this conception of the world express a common meta-narrative and worldview, in terms of global politics and economic production. This dissertation argues that its adherents, agents, and institutions comprise a singular transnational bloc within the present, historically-developing world order. Furthermore, this vast, transnational, and decentralised bloc of global Christianity provides key forms of agency in the production of global neoliberal hegemony—particularly amongst the popular and subaltern classes of many states and societies.

The hegemonic agency of this bloc of global Christianity is conducted through a variety of different means, but is expressed through common forms of socio-economic and political activism. These common forms of activism are all tied to the shared conception of the world that binds myriad Christian intellectuals, institutions, and popular social forces. Thus, the charismatic wave of global Christianity is increasingly manifesting as a singular, transnational demographic group. This demographic group links not only peoples from states and societies across the globe, but also the movement as a whole, with the larger and dominant neoliberal macroeconomic philosophies which drive the processes of globalisation.

This dissertation argues that the hegemonic agency of these Christian social forces is equally as important to the production and proliferation of neoliberal hegemony as states, multinational business organisations, and international institutions. This dissertation will prove that these Christian social forces are just as much part of the processes of neoliberal hegemonic production and globalisation because of the role they play in producing consent for the larger hegemonic direction of global politics and production. Furthermore, these social forces are also adding to the nature and expression of neoliberalism, in a dialectical sense, by injecting their shared conception of the world to the character of neoliberalism in many parts of the world.
Thus, neoliberalism is expressed and/or adapted to in a host of different ways throughout the world. This dissertation argues that one-such, and widespread, example of global neoliberal expression is produced hegemonically through these Christian social forces. Thus, it is the aim of this dissertation to illustrate the profound role that specific Christian institutions, intellectuals, and social forces play within the historical construction of world orders, the present world order, and the production of neoliberal hegemony in the wider context of globalisation. Religious forces have always constituted, and continue to constitute, important components within the hegemonic processes and developments of historic blocs of power and production. The overall aim of this dissertation is to illustrate specific Christian social forces in this capacity.

1.2 Research methods

In order to prove the claim that Christian social forces play key roles in the hegemonic production of historic blocs of power and economic production, this dissertation will employ a variety of analytical tools. Firstly, it will construct an historical materialist theoretical framework that will establish the use of terms such as “hegemony”, “world order”, and “conceptions of the world”. In relation to the larger context of global politics, this theoretical framework will engage with certain bodies of literature within the discipline of critical International Political Economy (IPE), drawing particularly from the work of Robert Cox (1981; 2002). With regard to contextualising religion, and specifically Christianity, the theoretical framework utilised throughout this dissertation is predominantly constructed through a unique and direct reading of the works of Antonio Gramsci (1971; 1985; 1995; 1991; 1996; 2007).

Gramsci’s social and political thought is quintessential to this dissertation’s use of the term “conceptions of the world” (ibid). Cox’s portrayal of “world order” is, to a significant (though not exclusive) degree, drawn from Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” (Cox 1981; 2002). The concept of “hegemony”, as a theoretical tool in this dissertation, is inspired by both Gramsci and Cox. The way in which “hegemony” will be used in this
dissertation will be clearly illustrated in the following chapter. Nevertheless, the concepts of both Gramsci and Cox will be used throughout this dissertation. A unique feature of this dissertation is the way in which Gramsci’s analysis of “conceptions of the world” will be utilised in relation to contemporary global politics. In this sense, the conceptual framework that will be established in the following chapters is innovative. Furthermore, it establishes a conduit through which religious social forces can be situated and contextualised within a larger framework of global politics, production, and within the hegemonic production of different world orders.

Secondly, this dissertation relies on a great deal of historical analysis. It provides a unique historical narrative on the development and adaptation of Christianity through successive blocs of power, social organisation, and economic production—situating specific Christian social forces within different periods of world order. It is argued here that this is both important and necessary in order to display how traditional global Christian social forces have been produced, and how they have both catalysed and adapted to changes in the realms of philosophy, politics, and production. Furthermore, it is only through an historical narrative that the contradictions within these sectors can be illustrated.

It is such contradictions, within the realms of philosophy, politics, and production, which have produced new and emergent forms of Christian social forces. In other words, the emergence of these new Christian social forces, and their corresponding conceptions of the world, can only be illustrated through a proper historicism of Christianity. For this dissertation, Gramsci’s own historicism on the Catholic Church and the Reformation is one of the key anchors in developing such an historical narrative of Christianity. The historical narrative of this dissertation, with regard to the Catholic Church, is augmented by the works of Machiavelli (1950) and Montesquieu (1989), respectively. The historicism of David Hume (1998) is also used in order to articulate a materialist account of the Reformation-era, and the contradictions and developments therein with regard to philosophy, politics, and production.
With regard to outlining the historical development of the singular conception of the world attributed to emergent charismatic Christian and Pentecostal social forces, this dissertation will rely largely on the empirical surveys conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2006a, 2010a). The Pew Forum uses the term ‘Renewalism’, as an umbrella term, in order to describe both Pentecostal and charismatic social groups. The reports produced by the Pew Forum have created a vibrant discourse across academic disciplines. The crux of this discourse centres on how best to contextualise the widespread, global proliferation of Pentecostal and charismatic Christian belief-sets, and the increasingly uniform expressions of activism tied to these belief-sets.

In order to augment the empirical studies of the Pew Forum, this dissertation will utilise the actual discourse, or meta-narrative, expressed by charismatic and Pentecostal intellectuals and institutions. Joining the discourse, or meta-narrative, of the global popular culture of Renewalism with the empirical studies of the Pew Forum will illustrate how the ideas produced by Pentecostal/charismatic intellectuals precipitate into widespread popular practice within states, societies, and markets across the world. This dissertation has also been greatly enhanced through direct correspondences with representatives of some of the Christian social forces discussed here. These correspondences will be utilised in order to illustrate the agency of some of these social forces in relation to specific issues discussed.

1.3 Chapter synopsis

Chapter 2 of this dissertation will provide a literature review with regard to the use of Gramscian within the discourse on critical IPE. It will discuss the central bodies of literature within the discourse on hegemony and global politics. This includes the work of Cox (1981; 2002), as well as the neo-Gramscian schools of critical IPE. Chapter 2 will critically navigate through these bodies of literature in order to display the larger context in which this dissertation is attempting to situate itself. It will engage with some of the
key aspects of Gramsci’s own political thought pertaining to global politics. It will attempt to chart new conduits through which Gramsci can be applied to the realm of the transnational. In addition to this, another key issue for Chapter 2 to resolve is to establish religious social forces as key players within global politics, hegemonic production, and the historical developments of specific world orders.

Chapter 3 displays the construction of a conceptual methodology with which the phenomena discussed in this dissertation will be analysed. This conceptual methodology is based on the work of Gramsci, specifically pertaining to “hegemony”, “contradictory consciousness”, “conceptions of the world”, and Gramsci’s expansive concept of the state. Furthermore, it will establish a Gramscian framework with which religion and religious social forces will be analysed throughout this dissertation. Following on from Chapter 2, it is argued that the conceptual methodology outlined is an appropriate tool that can used in order to bridge some of Gramsci’s key concepts to the larger framework of global politics, production, and neoliberal hegemony. Furthermore, it is an appropriate tool with which to situate specific religious social forces within the context of, and discourse on, world orders.

Chapter 4 establishes an historicism for the development and evolution of Christianity within global politics and successive blocs of power, production, and world orders. It focuses on the role of Christian intellectuals, institutions, and social forces through successive historic blocs in defining the parameters between civil and political societies. It specifically focuses on the following key historical areas: the role of the Catholic Church as a vanguard institution that protected the Latin cultural identity during the Dark Ages, following the political collapse of the Western Roman Empire; the role of the Catholic Church in the production of the hegemonic construction and maintenance of the historic bloc of mediaeval feudalism in Western Europe; the mercantilist phase of the Catholic Church before and during the Renaissance-era, and the contradictions which were produced therein with regard to the balance of political structures, civil society, and economic production; the Reformation-era, and how different Christian philosophies were produced, which subsequently conflicted and interacted in order to produce
different forms of states, with different balances between civil and political societies. Furthermore, this chapter will illustrate how these conflicting Christian conceptions of the world dialectically produced the modern state-system of international relations, global civil society, and catalysed the growth of industrial capitalism.

Chapter 5 highlights the growth of two specific blocs within global Christianity. The first bloc, referred to as the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement, represents a re-convergence of the Catholic, Orthodox, and Reformation-era Christian social forces within global society. It is illustrated how these traditional Christian institutions re-converged within the larger Enlightenment-dialectic throughout the development and ascendency of industrial capitalism. The second bloc, referred to as the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, represents the production and convergence of many new Christian conceptions of the world, and corresponding social forces, which were produced during the era of industrial capitalism. Chapter 5 illustrates how these myriad sets of institutions, intellectuals, and social forces have grown from amongst popular and subaltern classes, and have subsequently converged through shared philosophical aspects in order to produce an increasingly uniform conception of the world. It is argued that both of these blocs of world Christianity constitute key factions within the modern context of globalisation.

Chapter 6 deals specifically with the issues of contextualising the emergent Organic Pan-Christian Movement within global Christianity. It provides a critical literature overview on some of the ways in which Pentecostal, charismatic, and fundamentalist Christian institutions, intellectuals, and social forces have been portrayed within the larger context of global politics. Recent empirical studies, particularly those conducted by the Pew Forum (2006a), have generated a cross-disciplinary academic debate centred on how best to contextualise a rapidly proliferating globalised popular culture within and between states, societies, and markets throughout the world. Many of these portrayals have articulated a position that these social forces are somehow extensions of either US civil society and/or US foreign policy. Other bodies of literature have asserted that this is indeed a transnational phenomenon, and tantamount to a new Christian Reformation.
Chapter 6 will clearly contextualise the new charismatic wave of global Christianity as being indicative of a growingly global and transnational demographic group within world politics and in the context of globalisation. In framing this phenomenon as such, Chapter 6 will illustrate the ways and means through which this phenomenon is spreading and manifesting throughout the world, in different sets of historically-determined social relations. Furthermore, it will illustrate the uniform expressions of popular religion, socio-economic and political forms of activism this transnational demographic group produces in different states, societies worldwide. Following on from Chapter 5, Chapter 6 will continue to reveal the movement’s persistent trend of popularising neoliberal macroeconomic philosophy, and how neoliberalism is precipitated at a popular cultural level through themes of individual prosperity, congregational expansion, and Christian independency.

Chapter 7 is a case study that focuses specifically on sub-Saharan Africa, both as a region, and within and between specific states, societies, and markets therein. All of the themes illustrated in Chapters 5-6 will be illustrated within this regional context, in order to display how Organic Pan-Christian ideas, corresponding to the larger transnational popular culture, have precipitated into uniform expressions of popular practice and forms of socio-economic and political activism. Furthermore, Chapter 7 will display how many indigenously-developed African Christian social forces have subsequently developed global proselytising enterprises.

These examples will reveal the actual transnationality of the larger new charismatic wave of Christianity, as well as how all of these different geographical nodes unite an otherwise decentralised transnational movement by reinforcing a larger, shared conception of the world and popular culture. Again, a core element that is componential to this transnational social force is the popularisation of neoliberal philosophy through shared global expressions of popular religion. This, it is argued, acts as a highly important consensus-building process in the production of global neoliberal hegemony at the popular and subaltern levels within and between states, societies, and markets.
Chapter Two: ‘Hegemony’—Cox, Gramsci, religion, and world orders

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to establish the use of the term “hegemony”, as articulated by Antonio Gramsci, as the primary conceptual tool for this dissertation. While the application of Gramscian hegemony within the context of global politics and political economy has been contested, this chapter argues that Gramsci’s analysis on both religion and his concepts pertaining to worldview, or “conceptions of the world,” represent clear avenues through which Gramscian political thought can be applied to the production of global hegemony and the construction of world orders. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on Gramscian and neo-Gramscian theory, and how Gramscian concepts will be utilised in this dissertation.

Section 2.2 addresses the fundamental semantic differences between hegemony, within the dominant international relations literature and Robert Cox’s Gramscian usage of the term as an overarching theme within his political thought within his portrait of world orders within International Political Economy (IPE) and International Relations (IR) theory. Section 2.3 highlights and critiques the literature produced by the neo-Gramscian schools of IR/IPE. These schools, referred to as the “Italian School” and the “Amsterdam School”, respectively, emerged subsequent to the interventions of Cox and sought to further apply Gramsci’s political thought to global politics and political economy (Worth 2008). This section attempts to critique previous attempts to apply Gramscian hegemony within the context of global politics. It also attempts to renew the application of Gramscian hegemony within IR/IPE, by offering alternative ways in which to articulate Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.
Section 2.3 attempts to re-orient the discourse on Gramscian hegemony away from the neo-Gramscian schools, and seeks to ground the term back within Gramsci’s own political thought. Section 2.4 takes up the issue of situating religion and religious social forces within the context and literature of IR theory and world orders. This section engages some of the traditional concepts regarding religion and its place within IR history and theory. This is followed by a brief illustration of Gramsci’s analysis on religion, as both a concept and a tangible social force within his larger anthology on the concept of hegemony. This is done in order to effectively qualify both religion and worldview as specific avenues with which Gramsci did indeed engage global politics. By illustrating the implicit and explicit links between religion, worldview, and hegemony, within Gramsci’s political thought, Section 2.4 seeks to lay the groundwork for a conceptual methodology that can assist in explaining and categorising global religious social forces within the larger context of globalisation and world order.

### 2.2 Robert Cox: ‘hegemony’ in International Relations and global political economy

The term “hegemony” within International Relations (IR) theory has most frequently been used to describe power at a global level, in relation to a specific state actor and its foreign policy in relation to the domination of other state actors. Niall Ferguson (2003; 2004) uses the term in relation to the empires of Great Britain and the United States, respectively. Noam Chomsky (2003) uses the term hegemony in relation to the United States exerting its military resources globally in an imperial effort to protect and/or further its national state interests. Robert Keohane (1984) used the term hegemony in order to characterise a period of history where state power, alone, dominated international relations, and to describe a past era of empire from which liberal institutionalist policymakers are attempting to progress from towards a global financial cooperation and interdependence between states. This dissertation, however, will be using the term hegemony in the more expansive sense described in the political thought of Antonio
Gramsci in relation to power, production, states, societies, and even consciousness—within the context of global politics.

Robert Cox’s (1981) Millennium piece, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond International Relations theory,’ broke down a long-sealed door in the field of global politics. Cox called for further critical studies into the nature of transnational social forces perpetuating, enabling and/or opposing the globalisation of free market capitalism. Cox applied Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to the generation and dissemination of neoliberal philosophy, and a worldview that espouses free-market ideology at even a common sense level for both the ruling classes and the popular masses. He argued that for too long IR theory had generated state-centric, dogmatic and deterministic debates on the nature and reality of global power and world order. Cox referred to these as “problem-solving theories,” which were ontologically implicit within the body of Cold War IR theory.

Cox (1981) asserted the need for the academic discourse on global politics to move “beyond” positivistic state-centric conceptions of power in international relations and global political economy. He argued that the Cold War had led the discourse on global power into an anti-historical, state-centric cul de sac that failed to appreciate the power and global capabilities of social forces. The discourse of IR theory was articulating assumptions on post-1945 world order, from the standpoint that the nature of all states was the same, and that inquiries into the internal relations and links to other social forces operating within and between various state-society complexes were perceived to be sub-disciplinary pursuits next to global high politics (Cox 1981). In a more objective picture of the realities of global politics, Cox argues that there is indeed “the prospect that there exist a plurality of forms of state, expressing different configurations of state/society complexes,” which “remains very largely unexplored,” within IR theory (Cox 1981, p.127).

Cox credits the work of historians, such as Vico, Hobbsbawm, Carr, Collingwood, and Braudel in inadvertently providing departure points for “filling the gap” in more
accurately understanding the nature of world orders (past and present) and the involvement of historical social forces and their relation to global production (Cox 1981, p.127). He applauds the Worlds Systems theorists, such as Wallerstein, for at least pushing forward an alternative mode of thought for analysing international relations (ibid). The World Systems framework for understanding world order, by defining a core, semi-periphery, and periphery, is, however, according to Cox, theoretically flawed in the sense that their model tends to “undervalue the state by considering the state as merely derivative from its position in the world system” (ibid). Also, like other positivistic approaches to IR theory and “structural sociology,” it is espousing a “problem-solving,” or “system-maintenance bias” in that it is simply “accounting for forces that maintain or restore a system’s equilibrium, [rather] than identifying contradictions which can lead to a system’s transformation” (ibid).

Cox warned of the flaw in “underrating state power” (Cox 1981, p.128). What he offered was a methodological balance, with respect to understanding global politics, in recognising the power of the political state, but also giving “proper attention to social forces and processes,” in order to “see how they relate in the development of states and world orders” (Cox 1981, p.128). He argued that developments and even subtle changes in international relations, or global power, “can be traced to fundamental changes in social relations,” as it is the implicit social relations within a state-society complex which shape the nature of the state and its style of agency within world order (Cox 1996, pp.133-35).

We must progress, he argued, by not relying on theory to prove theory, but by refocusing inquiries on to empirical historical materialism and the dialectical complexities of not only the nature of states, but also on world order itself. Cox’s brand of critical theory “is theory of history in the sense of being concerned, not just with the past but, with a continuing process of historical change” (Cox 1981, p.129). Cox argued that Gramsci’s political thought, amongst others’, offered an expansive conception of state and society, rooted in historical materialism, which could provide a conceptual framework for better
understanding the dialectical and changing nature of states, social forces and world orders.

An expansive conception of ‘State’ is implicit in Gramsci’s overall political thought on power and *hegemony*. Traditional conceptions of IR theory posit only governmental superstructures as the dominant actors in world politics. Those conceptions are based on what Gramsci would call a narrow and fictitious notion of what ‘States’ are, but that they are instead, in a more objective reality, *state-society complexes* (Cox 1981; 2002). Cox, and all those who followed his lead, reinvented IR theory and IPE by taking Gramsci’s expansive concepts into the discourse on the socio-politico-economic relations, intellectual activities, and the interaction of productive forces within and between state-society complexes. Cox argued that incorporating Gramsci’s concept of *hegemony* into our understanding of global power can give us insight into the propagation of free market capitalism—as thought and practice—by states and social forces within and between state-society complexes. The hegemony produced by ruling classes, within and between state-society complexes, bridges “the conventional categories of state and civil society, categories which retained a certain analytical usefulness, but ceased to correspond to separable entities in reality” (Cox 1996, pp.126-27).

State-society complexes thus interact in conflict or in accordance to form what Gramsci (drawing on Sorel) referred to as “historic blocs” of world order. Gramsci’s concept of the historic bloc is “dialectical…in the sense that its interacting elements,” of structures and superstructures are reflective “of the ensemble of the social relations of production” (Cox 1996, p.131; Gramsci 1971, p.366). Such a bloc, Cox argues, “cannot exist without a hegemonic social class,” or the convergence of interests of different social classes (Cox 1996, p.131). Critical analyses, Cox argues, must turn more towards the implicit social forces, institutions and intellectuals, which culminate as a hegemonic raison d’etat. These include the complexities of Gramsci’s analysis: education systems, all forms of media and publishing, as well as “all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order,” which includes the hegemonic role of religious social forces (Cox 1996, pp.126-27).
Cox has thus provided a critical framework for better understanding global power, with world order being the summation of contradictory historically-determined social relations within and between state-society complexes. He draws on the work of Gramsci in order to better qualify the dialectical nature of states, and the implicit social relations which respectively define their character. Thus, hegemony represents the intertwined consensual constellation of political and social forces, and economic production, within which the ruling classes consensually exercise intellectual and moral leadership over the popular masses within and between state-society complexes. Cox, drawing from these Gramscian conceptual premises, points to periods of world order where such a hegemonic process has shaped and/or conflicted with world order.

Gramsci had already expounded on several contradictory, yet hegemonic, historic blocs. These include the period of mediaeval feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Counter-Reformation. Likewise, Cox¹ points to the period of 1845-75 as being an era within which Gramsci’s concept of hegemony could be applicable to understanding world order. He argues that the British state-society complex was at the centre of a global economy characterised by a standard currency of exchange (gold). This was coupled with the dissemination of a liberal ideology built on the principles of comparative advantage and free trade (Cox 1996, pp.135-37). These were all features of a consensual/hegemonic global agenda that emanated from social relations within the UK, and all its governed territories and trading partners. This consensus was reinforced by a British navy that represented a coercive auxiliary for when those hegemonic features were challenged.

This was also a period that saw the attempt to establish certain common sense rules for a globalised free market, but was eventually met with a seven decades-long anarchic period resulting from challenges posed to market hegemony and “British supremacy,” which saw the rise of isolationism, protectionism, and frequent devastating outbreaks of global warfare (Cox 1996, pp. 135-137). What emerged from the post-war era of the 1940s was tantamount to an even stronger attempt to fashion a global hegemonic political-economic

¹ Also see: (Arrighi 1993).
world order. The era of Keynesian economics fashioned by the Bretton Woods institutions represented a period of a global hegemonic project, which waned with the demise of the dollar and the oil crises of the 1970s.

The ‘new’ world order that emerged from these crises and the eventual fall of the Eastern Bloc has been characterised by the proliferation of global political/economic institutions in which free market ideology has precipitated as common sense (Cox 2002). ‘Global civil society’ has expanded within this new world order in the form of myriad international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and transnational social forces. Social forces, intellectuals, and institutions have emerged alongside states as key players in world politics—acting within and between state-society complexes on the planetary stage, as either facilitators or dissidents, of this emergent global political-economic order. With the developments of the past three decades, Cox’s portrayal of world order has continued to evolve. As of 2002, Cox portrays world order as such:

“management of global capitalism is a multilevel process, determined at the national level by the balance of social forces within states, at the transnational level by an evolving ideology (neo-liberalism) produced by business schools, journalists and other intellectuals, at the international level by those institutions that develop officially endorsed policy guidelines, and again at the national level by the translating of these guidelines into concrete measures of national fiscal and monetary policy” (Cox 2002, p.33).

All of these forces, the intellectuals and institutions of global free-market hegemony, constitute what Cox calls a “nebuleuse,” or a vaguely discernible mosaic of global political/economic power which fashions and facilitates global capitalism (Cox 2002, p33). Part of the function of global capitalism, throughout the vague “nebuleuse,” of global structures and agents that generate it, is to (consciously and unconsciously) establish and reproduce free market ideology as common sense at a global level (Cox 2002; Rupert 2003). It is the overarching thesis of this dissertation that a large faction of the global Christianity, and its associated bodies, represents a specific component of this mosaic, or “nebuleuse”.
It is the aim of this dissertation to contextualise a specific bloc of Christianity within Cox’s paradigm of world order by providing a variety of empirical examples in order to illustrate the role of this faction of world Christianity in reproducing and popularising neoliberalism in a variety of ways. In order to better understand the role of structure and agency (or, intellectual and institutional capabilities) of this particular movement within the context of global capitalism and world order, it is necessary to illustrate both the thought, or conception of the world, held by its constituents and leadership, as well as the practices carried out by its institutions and intellectuals—in terms of both the manufacturing of consensus, as well as its role(s) in policymaking and the fashioning of free market common sense. The material discussed in this dissertation fits into the ongoing critique of IR theory and global political economy that was generated by the work of Cox.

2.3 The Neo-Gramscians

The overall premise of Coxian IR/IPE theory is that “world orders...are grounded in social relations” (Cox 1981). Emerging from Cox’s (1981) intervention was a body of critical theorists whom have collectively become known as the “neo-Gramscians” of IPE. These scholars also utilise Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to situate, define, and contextualise global power and transnational social forces—categorising actors within IR and IPE in Gramscian terms. The Italian School and the Amsterdam School, respectively, have applied Gramsci in order to articulate and portray globalisation as a hegemonic project (Worth 2008). This portrayal involves structures and agents fashioning and facilitating neo-liberal philosophy and free market ideology, and the formation of transnational classes.
2.3.1 The Italian School of Critical IPE

The Italian School, according to Gill, represents a network that involves “clusters of scholars working in ways that address some of the questions raised and posed in Gramscian terms” (Gill 1993a, p.2). The structures and agents facilitating globalisation, according to Gill, work within global political economy and are part of “a system of planetary reach, not just as system of independent national economies primarily co-ordinated through exchange mechanisms and portfolio and speculative capital flows,” as it was in the period between the 1800s-1960s (Gill 1993a, pp.7-8). It has grown beyond previous blocs of hegemony in world politics because of major changes in security structures, global communications, and technology. There may well now be “outlines of an informal global power structure,” but this has emerged only on an elite level—and very little headway has been made in the construction “of global civil and political society” in a system of “patterned disorder,” which was orchestrated by “the vanguard forces” of the G7, the Trilateral Commission and the World Economic Forum. According to Gill: “these forums indicate the conditions of entry into the ‘core’ institutions in the global political economy” (ibid).

In terms of analysis, Gill argues that we can no longer rely on “abstract structuralism,” or short-sighted historicism, and that we must dialectically analyse the emergent world order as “the transformation involving three interlinked levels”: the economic; the political; the socio-cultural (Gill 1993a, pp.8-11). In light of these interacting levels of hegemony and crisis it becomes necessary, according to Gill, to question the nature of state sovereignty, particularly in the developing world, and ask “what kind of sovereignty, for whom, and for what purposes?” (ibid). He argues that this is tantamount to a “new constitutionalism,” that is, the relationship between state-society complexes and the forces of market hegemony, as it raises the potential for political figures to now be “as accountable to international market forces as they are to electorates” (ibid). According to Gill, the emergent world order is hierarchical in the sense that there are degrees of sovereignty with regard to respective states, in that “some are more sovereign than
others” (ibid). We must accept that the peripheral/semi-peripheral/core concepts of World Systems theory and Developmentalists “might apply within, as well as across, states” (ibid).

In terms of acknowledging Gill’s “outlines of a research agenda”, this dissertation is a study involving a specific phenomenon within the emergent world order with implicit and dialectical “economic, political, socio-cultural dimensions”, and one of its specific areas of contradiction, as it involves “analysis of the structures/agents of globalisation…and their relations with more territorially bounded social structures and forces” (Gill 1993a, pp.16-17). This inquiry, also in accordance with Gill’s outline, involves “analysis, in various social formations, of the role of and changes in social institutions such as state and civil society, the market and family…connected to analysis of…change[s] in patterns of interest and identity,” including “religion” (ibid).

Gill argues that Gramsci helps to ground us with the notion that “the central task of social science is to explain social action, social structure and social change” (Gill 1993b, pp.21-25). In providing a theoretical framework that analyses, dialectically, the material history of (and interaction between) the realms of the “economic, socio-cultural, and political,” Gill provides a departure point for this dissertation in that it aims to stand as that “an epistemological and ontological critique of the empiricism and positivism which underpin the prevailing theorisations” (ibid). Gramsci’s historical materialism “is consistent with the idea of historical structures” being “partly constituted by the consciousness and action of individuals and groups,” and that “historical change is understood as, to a substantial degree, the consequence of collective human activity” (ibid).

Thus, applying Gramsci to the way in which we view global power is “a praxis-based approach” and an attempt to “understand international politics from the perspective of the production and reproduction of social life” (Rupert 1993, p.85). A Gramscian approach seeks to categorise the dialectical nature of particular state-society complexes and, subsequently, the nature of world order through implicit social relations and “specific constellations or factors (the interaction of local and global) which have shaped the
historical production of particular states and the relations among them” (ibid). According to Gills (1993), “the Gramscian approach forces us to examine not only the productive and military capabilities of the state(s) as the motor of hegemonic transition, but also to investigate how class alliances are built and how ideology is employed in order to both construct and legitimate hegemonic order” (p.186).

### 2.3.2 The Amsterdam School

The Amsterdam School of critical IPE\(^2\) fuses the work of both Gramsci and Cox into a framework for understanding transnational class formation. The work of van der Pijl (1984; 1998) strives to account for the formation of organic trans-Atlantic class ties and alliances. Van der Pijl, drawing on the work of Harvard Professor Carroll Quigley (1966; 1981), argues that this Anglo-American hegemonic class has produced an emergent transnational neoliberal ruling class that spans, and even plans, global politics. Globalisation, as articulated by van der Pijl, is thus a top-down elitist movement facilitated by a transnational capitalist class.

Within this portrayal of global processes and transnational class formation, van der Pijl loosely affixes a Gramscian definition of hegemony. Everything, from elements of the global Evangelical Christian movement to Alcoholics Anonymous, serves an elitist function in steering society (the “Lockeian Heartland”) towards the productive ends of the ruling classes (van der Pijl 1998). Van der Pijl, like Gill (1993a), points to examples such as the Bilderberg group and the Trilateral Commission, as empirical evidence that a transnational capitalist class is equipped with elitist structures and agents.

The Amsterdam School focuses much of its emphasis on transnational class formation through these types of elitist institutions, as well as the structures of financial capitalism—with historical empirical examples such as the structure and agency of the

---

\(^2\) See: van der Pijl (1984; 1998); Overbeek (2000); van Apeldoorn (2001)
transatlantic banking establishment. This culminated in what van der Pijl refers to as an international “Lockean Heartland” (van der Pijl 1998). This “Lockean Heartland” consists of liberal democracies which are financially and culturally interlinked through a transnational capitalist class (van der Pijl 1998). The Amsterdam School takes this idea of an historically-determined transatlantic elite, and points to the further development of an Atlantic-European elite set of agents and structures, casting European consolidation and unification as a project of the transnational capitalist class in accelerating the globalisation of neoliberal hegemony—again, articulated in the Gramscian sense of the word³. The EU is thus portrayed as implicitly neoliberal body, despite explicit tendencies by many EU actors towards regulatory measures (Worth and Murray 2009).

The Amsterdam School has been subjected to not only charges of economic reductionism, but also failing to articulate Gramscian hegemony in a more accurate consensual fashion (Strange, G. 2006; Worth and Murray 2009). That being said, however, the Amsterdam School, and the work of van der Pijl (1998) in particular, is incredibly useful in at least accounting for global elitist superstructures and transnational social forces. In order for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to be applicable, however, analyses require an equal amount of focus on the consensual and consensus-building processes of global capitalism in relation to the popular masses. In other words, equal attention needs to be paid to how and why the popular masses within the “Lockean Heartland” submit to the intellectual and moral leadership of the elite intellectuals and institutions described within the work of the Amsterdam School.

2.3.3 Criticisms of the Neo-Gramscians

Fusing Gramsci’s concept of hegemony with IR/IPE has not emerged without criticisms. Germain and Kenny (1998) raised doubts about the theoretical viability of affixing Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to analyses of global politics. These doubts are rooted in

---

³ See: van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil, and Horn (2008)
the assertion that Gramsci did not write a substantial amount about international relations, and that the neo-Gramscians’ “use of his framework is difficult to sustain with respect to the scholarship devoted to his ideas” (Germain and Kenny 1998, p.3). The specific areas in question by Germain and Kenny, with regard to the neo-Gramscians are as follows: whether or not their claim that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony being applicable to understanding world orders is based on “a viable interpretation of his [Gramsci’s] work”; “whether his key concepts (from an IR point of view) can be ‘internationalized’ in quite the way that the new Gramscians propose”; “whether his concepts are fully adequate to comprehend the nature of social order in the contemporary period” (Germain and Kenny 1998, p.4).

Germain and Kenny are questioning whether or not neo-Gramscians have lost sight of the importance of properly historicising Gramsci’s writings and situating them within the context and conditions of his own time. They also point out the fact that Cox, himself, has established his complex understanding of world orders not only on the works of Gramsci alone, but also on those of Vico, Sorel, Carr, Braudel, etc. (Germain and Kenny 1998, p.4). Germain and Kenny point to the inseparable nature of civil and political society implicit within Gramsci’s concept of the modern state. As such, they question how we can apply Gramsci to the international realm if there is no international state.

Femia (2005) argues that “the case for using Gramsci in IR/IPE also rests on the assumption that the key concepts of his political analysis can help us to comprehend the salient features of world order,” but that, in reality, and “in Gramsci’s usage, hegemony referred to the cultural or spiritual supremacy of a class or group within a particular national entity,” which “is achieved through ‘civil society’” within a given nation (pp.342-43). Femia continues: “if capitalism now enjoys world dominance, it is not because the people of the planet, or even the elites, have been converted en masse to bourgeois liberal values; it is because the only practical alternative, socialism, has imploded” (Femia 2005, pp. 343-44). Femia argues that Gramsci’s true ontological value is not challenging realist assumptions in IR theory but, rather, his “steering a middle course between naïve idealism and sterile realism,” based on his own reading of
Machiavelli—a contribution which has been “overlooked” by the Italian School (Femia 2005, p.348). Both critiques questioned the level of historicism utilised by the neo-Gramscian schools with respect to Gramsci’s writings and overall political thought.

A series of rebuttals from within the neo-Gramscian circles emerged in order to respond to the challenges put forth by critics. These include Murphy (1998), Morton (2003), and Rupert (2005). Murphy argues that the way in which Gramsci analysed the Italian Risorgimento as “a situation in which elements of a national civil society proceeded formation of a national state proper at the same level” (Murphy 1998, p421). In other words, civil society in pre-unified Italy was, in a sense, transnational (ibid). Thus, Gramsci had already applied his expansive concept of civil society to the realm of the ‘international’ in terms of a hegemonic project.

With regard to the US and the international, Murphy argues that Gramsci pointed to the YMCA and other “international voluntary associations” as laying the groundwork for a potential “American, Atlantic-bridging hegemonic project” (1998, p.422). Murphy points also to modern transnational civil society entities, such as the “International Chamber of Commerce, the World Council of Churches, the ILO, and various international fraternal orders,” as being examples of such global superstructures (Murphy 1998, p.423). This echoes Gramsci’s own examples of Freemasonry, Rotary clubs, and transnational religious forces, which are all constitutive elements of larger global enterprises, not to mention his more specific analyses on international phenomena, which threaten the sovereignty of states, such as Concordats signed between a nation-state and the Vatican (Gramsci 1971, p.182; 1996, pp. 220-225).

Rupert (2005), also responding to the criticisms levied at the neo-Gramscians, argues that the Italian School is only grounding itself in Gramscian historical materialism as a conceptual departure point for better understanding global power and how it is fashioned. Rupert (2005) displays an in-depth situating of Gramsci’s ideas and key concepts within their historical context. Rupert offers the departure point that “a Gramscian-inflected historical materialism” can help us to better understand global capitalism, “its relations of
power and structures of governance, as the product of struggles—at once material and ideological—among concretely situated social agents” (p.495). Morton (2003), echoing Stuart Hall (1980; 1988; 1991), recognises the importance of historicising Gramsci, but also points to the potential in “thinking in a Gramscian way,” when analysing the interaction of the social, political, economic, and cultural channels of global power and production.

Worth (2008), responding to both the critiques and defences of the neo-Gramscians, attempts to reinvent the use of Gramsci in IR/IPE by pointing to both “the poverty and potential of Gramscian thought.” Worth agrees with Germain and Kenny (1998) in the sense that those using Gramsci in the context of world order and global political economy should firmly ground their understanding(s) of Gramsci’s work in the framework of early Gramscian scholars and historians such as Hall (1980; 1988), Laclau (1977), Mouffe (1979); Williams, R. (2005), Johnson (1986), etc. By re-orienting Gramsci’s thought, properly historicised, using accounts of Gramsci from other disciplines outside of IR and IPE, such as language, media and/or cultural studies, we can gain a broader understanding of Gramsci’s ideas in order to refine the processes entailed in “thinking in a Gramscian way” regarding global political economy and world order (Worth 2008; Morton 2003). As Worth (2008) argues, Gramsci, “himself, paid particular attention to culture, religion and education in his analysis of hegemony,” built within and between the world of production and the superstructures of modern states and global capitalism.

Worth claims that the neo-Gramscians have acknowledged but hitherto failed to articulate “the complexities and contradictions evident in the maintenance of capitalism, such as competing cultures, identities and beliefs, which a transnational capitalist class would have to address” and harness towards its ends (Worth 2008, p.637). This is largely attributed to the fact that many use “Gramsci as a stopgap,” and articulations of hegemony are limited “largely to understand economic factors and governance” alone (ibid). This poverty within the epistemology remains, despite the diversity of scholarship called for by Gill in his outlines for a research agenda (Gill 1993a). Thus, the concept of global hegemony has continued to be articulated as more a conscious and elitist project of
the transnational capitalist class, rather than an organic and dialectical summation of social contradictions based on the relationship and myriad processes of global power and production.

The neo-Gramscians, according to Worth, have overlooked some of the more organic links and processes which bind and generate global free market hegemony, and the dissemination of neo-liberal philosophy—particularly those of a cultural or religious function (Worth 2008). Worth and Murray (2009) argue that the theoretical problems implicit within neo-Gramscian scholarship are ones of articulation, with respect to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Worth and Murray (2009) attempt to re-orient Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in order to reveal the levels of analysis for understanding the complexities of hegemony with regard to socio-cultural forces such as religion, and the relationship of such forces to different and emergent forms of production, as well as to the consciousness and conception(s) of the world held by individuals and specific groups. Thus, the neo-Gramscians have created an epistemological clique that applies Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to the establishment of a transnational capitalist class. They tend to highlight the activities of elitist institutions and associations, such as the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission as being agents and proliferators of global neo-liberal hegemony.

In actuality, however, such analyses are built on a very narrow conception of Gramscian hegemony. This is because such scholarship focuses predominantly on the top-down processes of the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes, which are referred to as the transnational capitalist class. Understanding and articulating hegemony, in a Gramscian sense, however, requires equal focus on the bottom-up processes, which enable hegemony to function organically; that is, the establishment of popular consensus that allows a liberal elitist global agenda to come into being without any substantial or subsequent resistance from the popular masses and subaltern classes (Worth & Murray 2009). It is argued in this dissertation that religion, and religious social forces, have historically been, and continue to be, conduits through which hegemony is produced—both within and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.
2.4 Religion and worldview as avenues for Gramscian hegemony in IR/IPE and world orders

It is argued in this dissertation that religion, religious intellectuals, institutions, and religious social forces have always played—and continue to play—significant roles in the construction of world orders and historic blocs of power and production. This has been acknowledged by Hedley Bull (1979), in terms of the historical foundations of IR and early historical attempts to fashion International Law. Philpott (2000) has provided an excellent treatise on the “religious roots of international relations”. Likewise, Fox (2001) argues that religion is frequently “overlooked as an element of international relations”. The modern state system of international relations, in fact, emerged from the religious wars of Europe which spanned the 16th and 17th centuries, and irreparably fragmented the historic bloc of feudal Christendom in Europe. The very principle of state sovereignty, itself, was rooted in a territory’s right to follow the Christian tradition of an individual sovereign’s choice within a demarcated set of boundaries. Prior to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Reformation-era, religion defined world order before and during the Middle-Ages, setting the tone for the relationships between Western Europe and the other civilisations of the known-world.

An early critique describing what the relationship between civil and political society ought to be was provided by Augustine during the late Roman period. Augustine explicitly prescribed a state-society balance in which church and state were to remain separate (Nelson 1996). The waning of the Roman Empire, however, forced the clergy and hierarchy of the Latin Church to provide cultural continuity during the mediaeval period in Western Europe. Gramsci’s entire concept of “traditional intellectuals” is rooted in this Church role—of salvaging, reproducing, and expanding the Latin culture of the previous historic bloc (Gramsci 1996, p.200). The medieval and Renaissance periods of Western Europe were characterised by the constant struggle for power between secular/political forces and the Catholic Church. The Reformation, as a series of movements, and the Counter-Reformation, were the ultimate expressions of these
tensions which had built up over several centuries. The work of Augustine was reborn during the 16th century with the scholarship and notions of statecraft provided by John Calvin.

Many aspects of Realist and Neo-Realist IR theory are built from Calvin’s Augustinian ontology. This is particularly so within the work of Kenneth Waltz (1959), whose template for understanding ‘man’, in *Man, the state, and war*, comes in part from Augustine’s ontology of inherent human depravity (Waltz 1959, p.3). Likewise, the entire tradition of Christian Realism within IR theory is similarly explicitly connected to Calvinist-Augustinian ontology (Niebuhr 1953; Patterson 2008). Hugo Grotius, the purported ‘Father of International Law’, was a theologian of the Arminian-freewill tradition who stood in opposition to the Original Sin doctrine espoused by Augustine and Calvin (Bull et al 1992). The very notion of humanistic liberal internationalism sprang forth from Arminian theology. Furthermore, different forms and expressions of Christianity played paramount roles in the early construction of modern Western states, including the way in which early-modern states, respectively, defined the parameters within and between civil and political societies (Gramsci 1995, p.10; pp.407-08; 1996, pp.140-44). Likewise, such factors also characterised the colonial development of the Americas and eventually the formation of the United States (Fisher 1989; Augelli and Murphy 1988; Tocqueville 2001).

All of these themes will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4, but the overarching point to be made here is that Christianity and Christian schisms represent the primordial pool from which modern Western states and the modern state system of international relations emerged during the 17th century (Philpott 2000). That applies for both the respective configurations of civil and political societies within states, as well as informing the core principles of relations between states at the international level. One does not have to go “beyond IR theory” in order to illustrate that but, rather, ‘beneath’ IR theory, to the very roots of the modern state-system itself. Religion has always played, and continues to

---

4 See: Niebuhr (1953); Amstutz (2008); Lawler (2008)
5 In reference to Cox (1981)
play, a significant role in the fashioning of world orders. It informs the character and nature of particular states, and also provides structures and agents which operate at both the levels of the international and even transnational within global society.

In terms of contemporary global politics, the role of religion—namely radical Islam, in both state and non-state expressions—is front and centre in terms of the security threats which are perceived to be posed to the present world order and the hegemony of liberal capitalism. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enduring concern regarding religiously-based non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, along with the tensions between the West and Iran, all fall under the umbrella and meta-narrative of the global ‘War on Terror’. These tensions all reinforce the popular worldview articulated by Huntington (1996): that there is an imminent cultural ‘clash of civilisations’ present within world order. Religion is thus still very much at the forefront of security studies, media accounts, political rhetoric, and ideas of what world order is and where world order is going.

While there has been a great deal of focus on the role of Islamic states, societies, and social forces within world order over the past decade, the role of Christian institutions, intellectuals, and social forces has largely been overlooked within the wider context of IR/IPE. More and more scholarship, however, is emerging with regard to particular Christian social forces operating within global politics and economics. Some of these accounts have focused on the role of certain ‘evangelical’ and/or ‘fundamentalist’ Christian forces within the context of US politics. Others have focused on the increasing presence and importance of similar, and often related, Christian forces within the politics and economies of the developing world—particularly with regard to Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Adogame (2006) and Martin (2006) describe the growing importance of these Christian forces as being part of a wider transformation within what they refer to as the “global religious economy”. At the forefront of this wider global transformation in the global religious economy are myriad Pentecostal and/or ‘charismatic’ Christian groups.

---

6 (Rupert 2000, pp.110-111); (van der Pijl 1998, pp.122-32); (Wilcox 1989); (Jelen 1992); (Leege 1992)
7 Gifford (1994; 2001); Freston (2004)
The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2006a; 2010a) has conducted wide-ranging empirical studies which highlight the growing importance of this global phenomenon, with particular emphasis on its impact on the worldviews and practices of many population groups in relation to globalisation, economics, and politics within and between states around the world. Many Pentecostal, ‘charismatic’, ‘evangelical’, and/or ‘fundamentalist’ intellectuals and institutions carry with them a message of material prosperity (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a). This message has become widely known as the ‘Prosperity Gospel’, the ‘Word of Faith’ movement, or the ‘Gospel of Health and Wealth’. This Prosperity Gospel is part and parcel of a wider worldview and meta-narrative that unites many different popular Christian social forces within a shared conception of the world and popular culture; one which has come to transcend race, class and national boundaries (Martin, D. 2006; Adogame 2006; Pew Forum 2006a).

This emergent, globalised popular culture is actively transforming neo-liberal philosophy and free market ideology into common sense amongst different population groups around the world (Martin, D. 2006; Pew Forum 2006a). This dissertation seeks to highlight not only this emergent popular culture and worldview, but also the specific complexities and processes involved in this transformation—and the precipitation of thought into popular practice. It is argued here that this emergent global phenomenon constitutes a tangible example of neoliberal (or free market) hegemony within IR/IPE—as it permeates states, societies, and class structures in the many areas of the globe where it manifests and grows at the levels of both consciousness and action. The empirical data of the Pew Forum (2006a; 2010a), and the many accounts on the global religious economy, will be situated within Cox’s (2002) larger context of world orders and the “nebuleuse” of global capitalism. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is not only the most convenient conceptual tool with which to account for the growth of this phenomenon, but it is also one that can best contextualise the complexities involved within and between states and societies within the larger context of world order.
Despite the well-articulated arguments\textsuperscript{8} against applying Gramscian hegemony to IR/IPE, it is argued here that much of Gramsci’s own scholarship was dedicated to the role of religion and religious actors in the fashioning of hegemony (Portelli 1974; Fulton 1987). Gramsci’s analysis of religion was not limited to the construction of hegemony within modern states, nor was it limited to the formation of historic blocs which emerged subsequent to the rise of the modern state and system of states. Religion is not just an occasional theme within Gramsci’s prison writings. It is, rather, one of the main anchors of his prison anthology (Portelli 1974; Fulton 1987; Pozzolini 1970). While it has been asserted that Gramsci’s scholarship did not involve much analysis with regard to international relations, it is argued here that religion represents one of the specific conduits with which he did engage with global politics—-with his analysis spanning from the Dark Ages to his contemporary world. The majority of Gramsci’s analysis on religion involves the historical development of the Catholic Church before, during, and after the formation of modern states.

The Catholic Church is explicitly articulated by Gramsci as a transnational entity that compromises the sovereignty of modern states. He describes the inherent imbalance of a concordat as being disproportionately favourable to the Church (Gramsci 1996, pp.220-225). Gramsci specifically discusses the Church as a “supranational” entity that curbed national development in both Italy and Germany from the 5\textsuperscript{th} century to the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Gramsci 1971, pp. 17-22). He accounts for the hegemonic construction and myriad adaptations of the Catholic Church throughout history in relation the popular masses through different expressions of popular culture such as Brescianism, other forms of popular literature, activities for the working classes, lotteries, and even the language and folklore of the lower strata of a historically-variegated class structure within Catholic culture (Gramsci 1992, p.112; 1996, p.385; 1995, p.35; p.58; 1971, p.325). He reveals how Catholicism has historically and organically tied Latin intellectuals, ruling elites, and the popular masses into one functional hegemony, culture and worldview (Gramsci 1971, pp.419-423). Gramsci thus provides myriad examples to account for how Catholicism

\textsuperscript{8} Germain and Kenny (1998); Femia (2005)
acted as a socio-cultural, economic, and political cohesion in the production of hegemony within and between Catholic states and societies.

Gramsci’s scholarship on the world of religion is not limited to his analysis of the Catholic Church. Almost as extensively as Weber (2002), Gramsci reveals the role of the Protestant Reformation—particularly the roles of both Luther and Calvin—in the development of both modern states and the rise of capitalism (1995, p.10; p.26; p.389; pp.407-08; 1996, pp.140-44). Gramsci has provided an entire sociology of the role of Christian social forces, institutions, and intellectuals within early-modern statecraft and the rise of the capitalist mode of production. Gramsci’s sociology of religion has been frequently utilised by scholars across academic disciplines. His analysis of the United States and ‘Fordism’ reveals the implicit and explicit role of religion in the hegemonic binding of 20th century industrialists with assembly workers, even with regard to the politics and sociology of the working class family (Gramsci 1992, pp.235-36; 1971, pp.295-306). Furthermore, Gramsci took notice of the potential socio-political role of the emergent Protestant ‘Pan-Christian Movement’ within global political economy (1992, p.234; 354-355; 1995, p.116; 1996, pp.11-12; 282; 386-87). This dissertation answers Gramsci’s specific call for more research to be conducted on what was then an embryonic global phenomenon.

Gramsci’s analyses of religion even extended, albeit to a lesser degree, to a wide range of topics, including: African-American Christianity (in a global context); Judaism; Islam and Wahabism; Buddhism in Japan; Chinese religion; India; etc. (1996, pp.285-92; 305-330; 344-46; 1995, pp.4-137). The point to be made here is that his emphasis on religion and religious forces were reflective of Gramsci’s attempts to understand and account for different state/societal formations, and their respective historical developments, throughout the world. He also focused on other transnational social forces such as Freemasonry, Rotary International, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA),

---

9 Billings and Scott (1994) and Bode (1971) explored the role of religious social forces in US history and their roles in industrial relations. Simms (2002; 2003) used Gramsci’s sociology of religion to examine the regime of Nkrumah in Ghana, as well as the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood. Finocchario (2005) explores Gramsci’s analysis of popular religion during World War I.

10 Gramsci (1992, p.234); (1996, pp.386-87)
and so on (Gramsci 1992, pp.162-63; 167-69). All of these represent avenues with which Gramsci engaged the realm of the global in terms of his scholarship. The historical developments of Catholicism and Protestantism, however, alongside the development of modern states and the modern state system, represent the most viable conduits through which Gramsci can be applied to IR/IPE. He utilised these avenues himself in order to engage the international and global realms of power and production.

Like his broadened concept of the ‘State’, Gramsci’s concept of religion was equally as expansive. This was expressed through his many critiques of how Maurras, Sorel, Hitler, Bukharin, Croce, etc. articulated and defined ‘religion’ (Gramsci 1971, p.266; 1996, pp.154-55; 1995, p.359). As Fulton (1987) has illustrated, religion was a complex component of what Gramsci described as a “conception of the world”, which is a much larger theme directly related to his concept of hegemony. Gramsci’s socio-political thought on the notion of worldviews, or “conceptions of the world”, is directly linked with his analysis on “contradictory consciousness” (Gramsci 1971, p.333). Robinson (2005) reiterates the importance of this macro-thematic concept within Gramsci’s work, and points back to Gramscian sources, outside of IPE, such as Laclau, Hall, and Mouffe; each of whom elaborated the importance of this underlying Gramsican theme (Robinson, A. 2005). It is upon the terrain of contradictory individual and/or collective consciousness that hegemony is built—by influencing or channelling the conception(s) of the world of individuals and social groups.

Any form of hegemony, which organically binds the ruling classes with the popular/subaltern masses, must necessarily, through the agency of intellectuals, engage with and weld the contradictory conceptions of the world held by individuals and social groups. Within Gramscian scholarship, there have been many invocations of the term conception(s) of the world\textsuperscript{11}, and specific sub-elements of the term, such as language; folklore; common sense; popular religion; and religion(s) of the intellectuals (Fulton 1987). In terms of Gramsci’s analysis, religion is but one element of the larger amalgam

\textsuperscript{11} See: Bates (1975); Williams, G. (1960); Femia (1975); Mouffe (1979); Laclau (1977); Laclau & Mouffe (1985); Bobbio (1979); Pozzolini (1970); Robinson, A. (2005); and Hall (1980; 1988; 1991). Each has explored hegemony and its function in relation to the consciousness of individuals and social groups.
of specific contradictory conceptions of the world. His analysis of contradictory conceptions of the world attempts to reveal the complexities of hegemony and the processes of hegemonic construction.

If hegemony is the overarching theme of Gramsci’s prison notebooks, then his analysis of contradictory conceptions of the world (i.e. worldview and consciousness) is the underlying current of his anthology. These two concepts are inseparable within his overall political thought. Gramsci, in fact, believed that the character of hegemony is also partially shaped by the popular masses, and their conceptions of the world, in order to organically link them to the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes (1971, pp.418-20). This is a fundamental difference between Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and traditional elitist conceptions of power, state and society, such as the political thought of Pareto (1979).

Thus, hegemony is a structural and superstructural project of consensual totality that can fuse contradictory conceptions of the world held by the popular masses and mobilise them at the level of consciousness so as to consensually allow the ruling classes to exercise intellectual and moral leadership. Hegemony represents a fusion, across class lines, of the three interconnected realms of philosophy, politics, and economic production. According to Gramsci, “if these are constitutive elements of a single conception of the world, there must necessarily be, in the theoretical principles, convertibility from one to the others” (1996, p.196). Furthermore, “each element is implicit in the others and all of them together form a homogenous circle” (ibid). This “homogenous circle” is the foundation upon which hegemony, ideology, and systems of thought and practice are constructed—across class lines (Gramsci 1996, pp.188-89). Gill articulates these levels as the “economic,” “political,” and the “socio-cultural” (1993a, pp.8-11). Cox’s triangular model of the inner workings of the modern state, which includes “ideas,” “institutions,” and “material capabilities” is also derived from Gramsci’s “constitutive elements” of conceptions of the world (1981, p.136).
Hegemony results from the solicitation of and subscription to a programme of intellectual and moral norms which bind the ruling classes, the world of production, and the popular masses in an organic and synchronised fashion. It is a system, albeit contradictory, of thought and practice, culture, production and polity, which functions throughout the variegated class strata at the levels of individual and collective consciousness, which guides the structures and superstructures of material life. The organic conduits throughout superstructures are “the intellectuals” (Gramsci 1996, pp.199-210). Producing and maintaining hegemony involves as much subscription on the part of the subaltern classes and popular masses to the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes, as it does directives from any elitist hierarchy established by the ruling classes (Gramsci 1995, pp.15-16).

Hegemony is the ultimate convergence between elitist conceptions of power, state and society, and pluralistic ones. Hegemony involves the organic links established within and between the ruling classes, the world of production, the superstructures of state and society, and the popular/subaltern masses (Gramsci 1971, p.161). This is because there is a persistent dialectic that takes place within hegemony. This dialectic involves the worldview(s), or “conceptions of the world”, of the popular masses. These emerged from within folklore, common sense, popular religion(s). In addition, this dialect bridges these conceptions of the world to those of the ruling classes, which are generated from philosophy and religion(s) of the intellectuals (Gramsci 1971, pp.323-43). The areas of exchange, facilitated by the intellectuals, are through language and through the organs of civil society, which the popular masses are largely confined to. Thus, the product and evolution of hegemony will always be dialectical and contradictory in character and nature because the mosaic of power within such a “political constellation” is implicit with contradictory conceptions of the world (Gramsci 1971, pp.187-88). It is upon this contradictory terrain that any hegemony is built.

This brief illustration of hegemony brings us back to the original dilemma of how it can be applied to phenomena not only within states, but also between (and even above) states within the larger context of global politics and world orders. Again, it is argued here that
both Gramsci’s analysis of religions and the larger notion of contradictory conceptions of the world serve as gateways through which phenomena within global politics can be analysed in the contemporary world. Both of these concepts are interdependent with Gramsci’s articulation of hegemony and his understanding of how hegemony has historically been produced. Religions, as componential to particular conceptions of the world, have historically proved their respective ability to transcend the political boundaries of the modern state. Religions/worldviews have the ability to both shape and be shaped by each element of Cox’s larger triangular model for describing the terrain of global political economy: “social forces”; “forms of state”; and “world orders” (1981, p138). Thus, it is argued in this dissertation that understanding specific global religious social forces can assist in clearing up aspects of the structural and ideological “nebuleuse” Cox (2002) describes in his portrayal of the current historically-determined world order in which global capitalism reigns supreme.

The specific religious forces in question are represented by several emergent strains which are bound by a common meta-narrative and popular culture. Furthermore, they are directly linked to popularising free market/neoliberal ideology as a new form of common sense that is permeating states and societies across the globe. The overarching aim of this dissertation is to contextualise this large faction of the global religious economy within Cox’s larger portrait of world order and the global political economy. It is argued here that Gramsci’s conceptual framework for understanding religion and specific conceptions of the world are appropriate tools with which to undertake this. Understanding this movement as part of the “nebuleuse” of free market hegemony will assist in providing a better understanding of the complexity of the processes of producing consent for the forces and leadership of global capitalist production.

Much of the research in this dissertation involves an inquiry into the thought, or conception of the world, and practices of a social force that is working within and between state-society complexes worldwide. When conceptualising power, state, society, and the intellectual moral and leadership of the ruling classes within Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, the production of consensus across class lines must be analysed through the
specific processes which have disseminated and fostered that hegemony through organic links within and between state-society complexes, the world of production, and the social forces across global society.

This dissertation purports itself to be ‘Gramscian’ in the sense that it uses Gramsci’s overarching and underlying themes of hegemony, and contradictory conceptions of the world (as the terrain of hegemony) as the main conceptual tools which it bases analysing a religious social force, as well as how that global social force behaves in relation to the fashioning of hegemony within, between, and beyond structures at the global level—as a global social force in the proliferation of free market hegemony, as well as an often contradictory transnational pressure group in international and state policymaking.

This dissertation analyses Christian intellectuals and institutions, and the transnational channels of capital they control, as well as the specific brand of intellectual and moral reform they market. This intellectual and moral programme is conducive to free market ideology and serves to build popular consensus for neo-liberal policies. This dissertation will measure the relationships between specific religious institutions/intellectuals at the local, domestic, and global levels of analysis: politics, production, philosophy. Furthermore, it will display how conceptions of the world are fused, across class lines and national boundaries, to form mass movements which incorporate the economic/theological/political religions of intellectuals (as philosophy) into the common sense of popular masses through the mediums of language and popular religion. It is alleged, in this dissertation, that significant elements of global Christianity are quite active in the dissemination of global free market hegemony, in providing programmes of intellectual and moral reform which are conducive to global capitalist production.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the place and importance of religion and religious social forces within the larger discourse within IR/IPE on world order. Section 2.2 highlighted the work of Robert Cox (1981; 2002) in broadening the concept of world order by using Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in his account for how world orders are historically developed. It has been shown that Cox asserted that social forces have the ability to not only add to the nature and character of states, but to also shape the character and expression of world orders. Section 2.3 provided a critical literature review with regard to two schools of IPE which emerged from Cox’s initial interventions: the Italian School and the Amsterdam School. It was illustrated that both of these critical IPE schools have sought to apply Gramsci to international politics and global political economy—and the theoretical problems which lie therein.

It was displayed that one of the primary problems with applying Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in this fashion is the absence of an international state, as Gramsci typically applied his theory of hegemony with regard to relations within states. Section 2.3 then presented the approaches of Worth (2008; 2010) and Worth and Murray (2009) in attempting to “re-cast” Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in a way so as to display the complexities of hegemony. One of Worth’s and Murray’s chief criticisms of the neo-Gramscian schools were the limited ways in which hegemony was being articulated. These limitations include both schools’ failure to account for the issue of popular consent, and consensus-building social forces, in the larger construction of global neoliberal hegemony.

Thus, the nature Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has been misrepresented, as both the Italian and Amsterdam schools have largely articulated hegemony as being a top-down, elitist project of global capitalist classes, driven by neoliberal philosophy (Worth 2008).
In applying the term hegemony in this way, both schools have overlooked the more myriad processes which produce consent for neoliberal philosophy from the bottom-up amongst the popular masses within and between states and societies. By exploring the complexities of hegemonic construction, through the work of earlier Gramscian scholars\textsuperscript{12} outside the disciplines of IR/IPE, we can better account for how hegemony can be applied at the global level—via the structure and agency of social forces operating amongst the popular and subaltern classes. Such social forces provide the avenues through which Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be applied to global politics, provided that it can be displayed that certain popular social forces actively work towards facilitating a larger global agenda, such as the proliferation of neoliberal policies and philosophy. One such avenue, it is argued, is religion and certain popular religious social forces.

Section 2.4 situates religion and religious social forces within the larger discourses of IR theory and history. It was displayed that Christianity, in particular, has had an instrumental historical role in the production of world orders as well as in the construction of the modern state-system of international relations. Section 2.4 also displayed that religion was one of the main avenues through which Gramsci did indeed engage global politics, both historically and within his own contemporary world. It has been illustrated that, for Gramsci, religion was a componential element within his larger theoretical framework regarding individual and collective worldviews, or “conceptions of the world.”

It has been displayed that Gramsci’s framework for analysing particular conceptions of the world is inherently tied to his overarching theory of hegemony. It has been demonstrated that his neither religions nor conceptions of the world, for Gramsci, were limited to the bounds of the modern state. Thus, religion and his larger conceptual framework for analysing and articulating conceptions of the world are avenues with which Gramsci’s theory of hegemony can be used in order to contextualise phenomena within global politics. Chapter 3 will deal specifically with the work of Gramsci on

\textsuperscript{12} Such as Laclau (1977); Laclau and Mouffe (1985); Hall (1980; 1988; 1991); Williams, R. (2003); etc.
hegemony, religion, and conceptions of the world. This will be done in order to provide
departure points from which Gramsci will be utilised throughout this dissertation in
relation to specific global religious social forces.
Chapter Three: Hegemony, religion, and conceptions of the world—a Gramscian conceptual framework for situating religious institutions and intellectuals in IR/IPE

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual paradigm that legitimately situates religious intellectuals and institutions within the larger framework of International Relations theory and critical IPE. It is argued here that Gramsci provides us with a viable conceptual methodology in order to do this through his explicit approaches to historical materialism, and his implicit themes on worldview, or “conceptions of the world” that is organically linked to his overarching concept of “hegemony.”

Section 3.2 addresses Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, and how it was used in order to explain the structuring of political superstructures, society, and the forces of production within the modern state. It is illustrated how these three realms are fused across variegated class structures in order to organically fuse the ruling classes and the popular/subaltern classes, through consensus-building, so as to streamline all forces towards a common order. Also illustrated is Gramsci’s analysis on the role of religious social forces, through the agency of intellectuals, within the production of hegemony.

Section 3.3 illustrates Gramsci’s elaboration of hegemony in the wider and more abstract context of “contradictory consciousness”, of individuals and social groups, as an important terrain upon which consensus is built across the class spectrum. Section 3.3 also highlights the paradigm presented by Gramsci for analysing and articulating religion, both broadly and specifically, from mass ideological movements to specific sects, within the larger framework of contradictory consciousness and hegemonic production.
Section 3.4 situates religion within Gramsci’s conceptual framework for analysing specific “conceptions of the world,” which are inherently tied to politics, philosophy, and production. It seeks to reveal the historically-determined and class-based dialectical interaction between Gramsci’s levels and sublevels of analysis for approaching specific conceptions of the world. Section 3.5 codifies the Gramscian system of analysis that will be utilised throughout this dissertation. Furthermore, it argues that it constitutes a viable conceptual methodology for analysing specific social forces within the context of IR, IPE, and the historical development of world orders.

3.2 Gramsci on hegemony: power, state and society

3.2.1 Hegemony and the state

Hegemony is defined here as a structural and superstructural project of consensual totality that can fuse contradictory conceptions of the world held by the popular masses and mobilise them at the level of consciousness so as to allow a ruling class to exert intellectual and moral leadership whilst controlling and perpetuating economic production. The first area of Gramsci’s political thought that should be covered in effectively defining his concept of hegemony is his expansive definition of the term ‘State.’ Gramsci argues that “State,” narrowly defined, “as a politico-juridical organisation…has never existed except on paper, as a limiting hypothesis” (Gramsci 1971, p.261). Gramsci’s precise equation in expanding the term “State” is “State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971, p.263).

Thus, the order of a given state-society complex represents what Gramsci relates back to the image of the mythical centaur first invoked by Machiavelli. The nature of the centaur is precisely “half animal and half-human,” which represents “the levels of force and
consent,” or the proverbial ‘carrot and stick’ (Gramsci 1971, pp.169-70). In expanding the term ‘State’ to include government, civil society (the so-called ‘Private’ sector), and the forces of production, Gramsci remains true to the Marxian concept of “Base” (or “Structure”) and “Superstructure(s)”, whilst “‘upgrading’…the factor of cultural leadership in history,” which occurs within the superstructure(s) of a given state-society complex (Bates 1975, p.353).

The plethora of capitalist superstructures is seemingly infinite, but they can all be broken down into two distinct categories of superstructures with respect to analysing the nature of their interdependence with the world of production: political and civil society, respectively (Bates 1975). Within a particular hegemonic apparatus, these superstructures are also functioning interdependently via the organic links within and between these two floors in tandem with those organically fashioned links between the superstructures and the world of production towards the ends of the ruling classes of the state-society complex. Hegemony describes a harmonious balance of class interests within and between the two floors of superstructures and the realm of economic production. Thus, civil and political society form a mosaic of consensual and coercive power within the modern industrial state-society complex wherein consent for the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes of production is established amongst the popular and subaltern masses.

Much of the content of Gramsci’s prison notebooks focuses precisely “on the anatomy of modern Western states,” and articulates how consent for the ruling classes “is manufactured, albeit through extremely complex mediums, diverse institutions, and constantly changing processes” (Buttigieg 1995, pp.3; 7). It must be understood that “Gramsci’s concept of civil society…is intertwined with his theory of hegemony,” and, throughout his work, “hegemony and civil society are interdependent concepts” (Buttigieg 1995, pp. 3; 25). Thus, in order to understand Gramsci’s overall theory of hegemony, we must “fix [these] two major superstructural levels”: “private” and “political” (Gramsci 1971, p.12). The concept of ‘State’ must be amalgamated as one entity: the state-society complex. Unlike liberal notions of civil society being the realm of
freedom for the private sector, “civil society is best described not as the sphere of freedom but of hegemony” (Buttigieg 1995, pp.6-7). Modern democracies, with highly developed civil societies, tend to rely less on the coercive apparatus of the political state in order to perpetuate the domination of the ruling classes. They rely, rather, on hegemony—or the consent granted for their brand of intellectual and moral leadership, which is generated from amongst the popular masses within civil society.

Gramsci credits Hegel and Marx, respectively, with an understanding of the nature and potential power of civil society. Gramsci credits Hegel’s conception of civil society in noting that “Hegel, in a certain sense thus already transcended pure constitutionalism and theorised the parliamentary state with its party system” (Gramsci 1971, p. 258). Hegel, however, was limited by his time in history, before the development and massive expansion of civic organisations as characteristic of latter-developed modern democracies. Thus, Hegel’s “conception of association could not help still being vague and primitive, halfway between the political and the economic” (ibid). According to Gramsci, Marx also suffered from the same historical limitations in his concept of civil society, though he credits Marx with having “a sense for the masses” through his understanding of the underdeveloped civil society of his time, which included “Jacobin clubs; secret conspiracies by small groups; [and] journalistic organisation”—with civil society providing potential avenues of emancipation, representing the “trenches,” in a “war of position” (1971, pp. 108-111; 243).

By Gramsci’s own era, civil society, including profound developments in mass communications in modern industrial states, had developed to a point that required re-evaluating the Marxian conceptions of superstructures in order to better understand the complexities of the so-called ‘Private’ sector, and its relationship with and between government, the popular/subaltern masses, and the realm of economic production. Thus, with the onset of highly developed civil societies and the growing reliance on “cultural leadership” to wield the popular masses in modern states, there was a need for “a reappraisal” of the understanding of historical materialism with respect to

---

13 Meaning, a battle for ‘hearts & minds,’ or the promotion of an ideology
superstructure(s), “which could no longer be construed as a pale reflection of socioeconomic organisation” (Bates 1975, p.353).

Hegemony and material consciousness are theoretical keys to understanding the whole of Gramsci’s myriad prison notebooks. Both are the interdependent, overarching, and underlying themes within his writings, which explain how the interests are aggregated and the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes is exercised within a complex modern industrial state. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be broken down into three strands: “intellectual, moral, and political hegemony” (Gramsci 1971, p.58). Even whilst categorising these separately, however, they must be fixed compositely in order to understand the organic links fashioned within and between them, as well as to understand the function of manufacturing consensual power within a state-society complex (ibid). As a Marxist, Gramsci conceived of ideas as being material forces, and the concept of hegemony represents the fusion of ideas with material and social forces at the “intellectual, moral, and political” levels of thought and action. Thus, a successful hegemony produces a philosophy of praxis.

Hegemony is the thread with which Gramsci theoretically sewed together the superstructures of his time to the ruling classes and the world of production. It was the term through which he explained the relationship between the ruling classes and the subaltern/popular masses, as a means of a successful homogenisation bound by the construction of an intellectual and moral ethic conducive to both production and the classes who control production during a given historical period. Thus, people are “not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas” (Bates 1975, p.351). Ideas, intellectual and moral social norms act as the cohesive of a singular socio-cultural, economic, and political system (ibid). Gramsci was not, however, arguing that “ideas were powerful enough to eliminate class struggle, but they were obviously capable of muting it sufficiently to allow class societies to function” (ibid). Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is used in relation to the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes, which is established

14 A term Gramsci also attributes to the aspired development of the Communist Party.
through the consent of the popular and/or subaltern masses, “which is secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class” (Bates 1975, p. 353).

Understanding hegemonic construction within states necessarily involves an inquiry into how power relationships are fashioned as consensual within them. This becomes more complex due to the “massive structures of the modern democracies,” which are not limited to governmental powers (Gramsci 1971, p. 243). Within these expansive parameters, consent is manufactured in the “trenches,” in the “complexes of associations in civil society,” which, amalgamated, with government bodies and the ruling classes of production, “constitute the art of politics” (ibid). Building on Hegel, Gramsci argues that it is within the “private organisms” of civil society, with its “political and syndical associations” that “government with the consent of the governed” is established, but also “organised, and not generic and vague as it is expressed in the instant of elections” (Gramsci 1971, p. 259). It is, rather, a lasting consent that permeates the consciousness of those masses which are providing that consent to the ruling classes. Thus: “the acquisition of a hegemonic position in civil society is ultimately more important to the ruling classes than the acquisition of control over the juridico-political apparatus of government” (Buttigieg 1995, p. 31).

Once hegemony has been established and entrenched within civil society, the worldview of the dominant classes can be reproduced and precipitated throughout every layer of the state-society complex. According to Gramsci this permeates “the school, at all levels…the Church…newspapers, magazines…the book trade and private educational institutions [and] cultural institutions” (Gramsci 1995, p. 342). Gramsci places particular emphasis on the dissemination of ruling-class ideology through the mass media of his time: “printed matter in general”, including “publishing houses…newspapers, journals of all sorts—scientific, literary, philological and so on, periodicals down as far as the parish newsletter”\(^{15}\). In creating an “ideological structure”, the ruling classes rely not only on the “printed word,” but “everything that influences or may influence public opinion,”

including “libraries, schools, groups and clubs of different kinds, right up to architecture, street lay-out and street names,” and most certainly “the Church” (Gramsci 1995, p.155).

3.2.2 Intellectuals as the agents of hegemony

Those chiefly responsible for the fashioning and maintenance of hegemony are referred to by Gramsci as: “the intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971, pp.6-20). Intellectuals are the intermediaries between the base of economic production and within and between the two categories of superstructures: political and civil society. Intellectuals, by linking the world of production with the superstructures, act as the “functionaries” of hegemony (Gramsci 1971, p.12). The term “intellectual”, much like Gramsci’s expansive definition of the state, is a broad and encompassing one. He divides the range of intellectuals into four broad and overlapping categories: organic; traditional; urban; rural. Collectively, these four categories of intellectuals disseminate the worldview of the dominant social groups via the superstructures of both political and civil society. Teachers, clergy, party leaders, union leaders, heads of civic associations etc., or, all those who lead or represent the institutions and associations of the state-society complex, are the intellectuals of hegemony. Gramsci places a very high analytical emphasis on the role of clergy as intellectuals in the fashioning of hegemony throughout the body of his massive collection of prison writings.¹⁶

*Traditional intellectuals* are defined by Gramsci as those which have evolved not from social forces “emerging into history”, but stand as “pre-existing categories of intellectuals that…represent a historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated changes in social and political forms” (Gramsci 1996, p.200). The clergy, he argues, represent the most prominent category of such intellectual cliques which have emerged from previous historic blocs of production—namely the clergy of the Catholic Church¹⁷.

¹⁶(Gramsci 1971, pp.6-7); (1992, Q1:154, p.234; Q1:128, pp.213-14; Q1:51-52, pp.162-63; Q1:77, p.182); (1995, Q1:51, p.11; Q6:152, pp.20-21; Q20:3, p.35)
His analysis of the role of clergy in the fashioning of different hegemonies throughout history is coupled with his analysis of the “Italian intellectuals,” with respect to their roles in providing cultural and historical continuity, and their relationships with the ruling classes of specific states and regions from the fall of Rome up to Gramsci’s era. At great length, Gramsci discusses the international roles and cosmopolitan functions of traditional Italian intellectuals within and between states over the course of hundreds of years (Gramsci 1996, pp.102-05). Thus, the institutions of traditional intellectuals predate the modern state, and have always functioned within and between states. Gramsci was, in large part, referring to the Latin/Catholic enterprise with regard to his usage of the term “traditional intellectuals”. If, however, we apply his expansive definition that traditional intellectuals are those intellectuals/institutions which have emerged from earlier historic blocs into successive ones, it then broadens the scope for the application of the term.

Within this expansive context, we may also affix the term to the clergy of the Orthodox churches of Greece, Russia and Eastern Europe, Ethiopia and Syria, as well as to the Coptic institutions of North Africa. All of these institutions, like the Catholic Church, have served the transnational function of preserving knowledge from previous historic blocs of power, production, and world orders—and carried ancient knowledge through successive historic blocs. In this same fashion, we may also apply the term to the clergy of Lutheran, Anglican, and Calvinist-Reformed institutions because they too emerged from the period of medieval feudalism into the successive historic blocs of industrial capitalism and globalisation. Similarly, outside of the Christian world, the intellectuals and institutions of Orthodox and/or Hasidic Judaism, the Brahmin castes of India, and the Shi’ite Ayatollahs of Iran and Iraq carry out the same international and/or global functions: as the preservers and carriers of ancient knowledge and traditions into successive historic blocs of power, production, and world orders.

In terms of Catholicism in Italy, however, it was in rural areas, inhabited by the peasantry, where the traditional Catholic intellectuals most predominantly carried out the facilitation of hegemony. According to Gramsci, rural intellectuals “bring the peasant masses into contact with the local or state administration (lawyers, notaries, etc.), and
because of this function they are of greater political importance: this professional mediation, in fact, is hard to separate from political mediation” (Gramsci 1996, pp.201-02). Priests, lawyers, teachers, notaries, doctors, etc. represent “a social model for the average peasant, who aspires to escape from his condition in order to improve himself,” or at the very least as a model for the children of peasants (ibid).

*Organic intellectuals*, on the other hand, are those organically tied to emergent forms of production throughout history. Thus, within the prison notebooks, organic intellectuals are those which are inherently bound up with capitalism, as either facilitating intermediaries or dissident leaders of subaltern forces with respect to capitalist production. Gramsci argues that his definition of organic intellectual(s) is broad and encompassing, but it is necessarily so as it is “the only possible way to arrive at a concrete approximation of reality,” with regard to how hegemony is fashioned and maintained along a variegated class spectrum (Gramsci 1996, p.201). His expansive definition of organic intellectual is reflective of his belief in the wide dissemination of knowledge pools—consistent with the complexities involved within and between the state and capitalist production.

This complexities of production and the plethora of corresponding superstructures necessitates that hegemony must weave throughout every technical role of its facilitation and maintenance. This interaction subsequently produces specific and intertwined sectors of knowledge in which consent must also be produced. This includes producing hegemony within and between specific bodies of popular and specialised literature and institutions. Intimately related to, and often overlapping, the category of organic intellectuals is that of *urban intellectuals*, as both are closely “tied to industry,” in that “they establish the relationship between the entrepreneur and the instrumental masses, they execute the production plan drawn by the general staff of industry” (Gramsci 1996, pp.201-02). Gramsci uses the term “organic” in order to specify that this concept of the role of intellectuals, and the perpetuation of hegemony, is not completely elitist, but that hegemony is, rather, a consensual product of the historically-determined social relations within a cultural, socio-politico, and economic order.
In the context of the modern state, hegemony becomes the natural pursuit and cultural product, or the brand of intellectual and moral leadership, marketed by the ruling classes in order to perpetuate capitalist production with least resistance from the popular masses. The predominant role of all such intellectuals (organic; traditional; rural; urban) are both separate and specific, but are also intertwined towards the same underlying and overarching ends: establishing the consent necessary for the ruling classes to exercise intellectual and moral leadership, and allowing a political climate where the use of coercion is reserved only for diffusing aberrational crises which emerge from contradictions implicit within an otherwise consensual order.

Within and between the structures and superstructures, “the intellectuals have a function in the ‘hegemony’ that is exercised throughout society by the dominant group that is embodied by the state, and this function is precisely ‘organisational’ or ‘connective’” (Gramsci 1996, pp. 200-01). In terms of the playing field of hegemony and consensus-building within civil society, “the intellectuals have the function of organising the social hegemony of a group and that group’s domination of the state, in other words, they have the function of organising the consent that comes from the prestige attached to the function in the world of production,” in such a way that organically harmonises the balance between the forces of production and the two categories of superstructures (ibid). Gramsci argues that social crises occur as a result of a breakdown of these internal social relations carried out by the intellectuals (ibid).

The relevance of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, and the role of the intellectuals in its fashioning and dissemination across the strata of a given class spectrum, is profound with respect to the intellectuals and institutions of religion. Religious intellectuals and institutions are some of the primary hegemonic agents which Gramsci analyses in terms of his overall concept of hegemony, and represent an entire subcategory within his analysis of intellectuals. Gramsci’s analysis constitutes the theoretical lens through which religious intellectuals and institutions will be analysed in this dissertation. Religious forces have historically informed the intellectual and moral leadership exercised by the
ruling classes of different historic blocs of production. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony was largely confined to different expressions within different state-society complex, but was not entirely limited to such. The following section will illustrate Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in its most expansive sense, with regard to individual and collective consciousness as one of the key areas of hegemonic construction.

### 3.3 Hegemony, “contradictory consciousness” and religion

Section 3.2 illustrated how Gramsci applied the term hegemony in relation to the context of the modern state. Hegemony, however, is also linked with Gramsci’s more abstract theoretical framework for understanding both religion and worldview, or specific conceptions of the world. In this respect, the term hegemony becomes more expansive and transcendent of the bounds of the modern state. In this more expansive context, Gramsci affixes hegemony to individual and collective “contradictory consciousness,” as well as to his articulation of human nature (Gramsci 1971, p.333).

This section will explore hegemony in this more expansive context and highlight Gramsci’s application of hegemony to the interdependent realms of consciousness and religion. Gramsci’s concept and articulation of religion and consciousness emerges from his critiques of how other intellectuals have expressed and defined both consciousness and religion. It must be clarified, that in this context, Gramsci is exploring religion and consciousness with a larger aim to popularise international socialism. Thus, his analyses of both religion and consciousness are avenues through which he theoretically engaged realms both within and without the context of the modern state with his concept of hegemony.
3.3.1 Gramsci’s critiques on the semantics of defining religion

In his critique of Mein Kampf, Gramsci accuses Hitler of not properly understanding the nature and function of religion in terms of power and hegemony. Hitler claimed that the destruction of a religion was much more cataclysmic on the scale of human history than the destruction of a political party or a state. Gramsci calls this claim “superficial and acritical,” because “religion (or active conception of the world), state, party—are indissoluble, and in the real process of historico-political development there is a necessary passage from one to the other” (Gramsci 1971, p.266). Gramsci also, with similar criticisms, points to Bukharin’s Popular Manual as an example of a shortcoming implicit amongst his contemporary Marxist thinkers and complains that “the failure to pose the question of ‘theory’ also prevents a correct posing of the question ‘what is religion?’ and a proper evaluation of past philosophies, which are reduced to mere delirium and folly. There is a lapse into dogmatism, etc, etc” (Gramsci 1996, pp.154-55).

Gramsci complains that Bukharin uses, as his departure point:

“the assumption that the elaboration of an original philosophy of the popular masses is to be opposed to the great systems of traditional philosophy and the religion of the leaders of the clergy—i.e. the conception of the world of the intellectuals and of high culture. In reality these systems are unknown to the multitude and have no direct influence on its way of thinking and acting” (Gramsci 1971, pp.419-420).

Gramsci argues that Bukharin’s analysis represents a short-sightedness with respect to the worldviews of the subaltern classes and popular masses. This is largely because Bukharin ignores the fundamental organic links established between the ruling classes of production and the political apparatus throughout all of society. In other words, the popular/subaltern classes would not be so quick to spontaneously dismiss their religious beliefs, if and when collective class consciousness ever manifested. The popular masses

---

18 Q4:13
and subaltern classes will not necessarily be opposed to the religions and traditions of the ruling classes because the worldview of ‘the people’ is a more generalised expression of the religions and traditions of the ruling classes.

The danger that Gramsci was alluding to, with regard to the assumptions made by Communists like Bukharin, was the idea of religion being “considered a totally dependent variable” on “socio-economic structure,” within a larger and cruder form of Marxist economic determinism (Maduro 1977, p.359). Gramsci’s understanding of religion, both historically and within the context of socio-political and economic organisation, is wholly bound up with his larger concept of hegemony. Gramsci’s affinity for Machiavelli is implicit in his writing style and explicit in his analysis of power structures and superstructures (Femia 2005). Religion was a key component in Machiavelli’s analysis on statecraft. Machiavelli did not at all view religion as a variable dependent on economic structures or the state. Machiavelli, in fact, viewed the state, itself, as at least partially dependent upon a strong religious presence within it (Machiavelli 1950, pp. 397-402).

This is not to say that Machiavelli believed that religion was paramount to the state, but that is was more of a necessary partner in keeping social order and a sustainable balance in the aggregation of class interests (ibid). Thus, for Machiavelli, religious intellectuals and institutions would ideally become instruments of the ruling class in the organisation of the state and the maintenance of social order. Gramsci, however, would not argue that religious institutions and intellectuals would benefit the cause of Marxism. What he is arguing, however, particularly in his numerous notes and treatises on the Reformation 19, is that religion has historically been an engine that has, on occasion, been a catalyst for developments in human production.

Gramsci, within his analysis of the “problems of Marxism”, argued that the leaders of the Communist Party needed a better conceptual framework and, ultimately, a better understanding of religion and the worldview of the popular classes (Gramsci 1971, ibid).

pp.378-472). This includes an understanding of the role of religion and religious institutions and intellectuals in historical and ongoing socio-economic-political organisation, as part of its function in the construction and maintenance of hegemony. In analysing religion, Gramsci does not simply isolate it as one unit of analysis. He instead approaches it dialectically, and situates it within his larger analysis of material consciousness in a system of variegated class relations (Fulton 1987). Before approaching Gramsci’s analysis on religion, we must situate it in his larger concept of contradictory material consciousness—at the levels of both the individual and the social group.

Gramsci, with his concept of hegemony, provides us with an anatomy of how power is fashioned and embedded within a socio-economic-political space; namely, but not conceptually limited to, the modern state. His profound affinity for Machiavelli is indicative of the overall project of his prison writings: to understand how power is fashioned and maintained by the ruling classes with the consent, or subscription, of the popular masses and subaltern classes at the levels of consciousness and action (Femia 2005). This was to be a guide for Marxism in practice, so that the moral and intellectual leadership of the Communist movement, both in Italy and internationally, could better understand how to construct their own hegemonic project on the same terrain of popular consciousness, passion, and action that the ruling classes engage with in order to create their hegemony.

Thus, within his concept of hegemony, Gramsci produced a conceptual methodology for better understanding the complexities of superstructures, and how to better engage with the popular masses on the terrain of individual and collective consciousness. With a better understanding of popular culture and the organic links between the worldviews of the ruling classes and popular masses, the Communist Party would be better equipped, internationally, to redirect popular consent away from the ruling classes to historical materialism in both philosophy and in practice. This would ideally produce a functional, transnational ideology that would exist at the level of material consciousness throughout the social strata.
3.3.2 The contradictory nature of individual and collective consciousness

The Marxian ontological standpoint that everyone and everything to do with humankind is a product of historically-determined social relations—including consciousness—is the departure point for Gramsci’s inquiry into the nature of individual and collective consciousness. Gramsci expands and expounds upon the notion of the worldview, or the “conception of the world,” of an individual and/or social group being a product of historically-determined social relations based on the dialectical and teleological nature of humanity’s material evolution. From the standpoint that it is this dialectical nature an individual is born into, and a social group is born out of, it stands to reason that both individuals and social groups possess what Gramsci termed a “contradictory consciousness,” based on the dialectical nature of the social relations which have been historically-determined around them (Gramsci 1971, p.333). For Gramsci, every social group was the product of a summation of contradictions—at the level of both the conscious and unconscious—both individually and collectively.

This echoes the work of the early empiricist, David Hume (1711-1776), whose method of inquiry included a similar standpoint as Gramsci’s, with regard to human consciousness. Hume asserted that human consciousness represented a summation of “impressions” made by material stimuli outside of the individual and, furthermore, that human consciousness is an amalgam of scattered perceptions based on the individual’s interpretation of their own senses (Hume 1993; Kelly 2003). Hume claimed that, as individuals, humans each respond differently based on their respective bundled perceptions, but that individuals congregate by creating both symbols, such as language, and structures upon which to facilitate unity and mutual gain. Such is the condition out of which social groups and collective identities are constructed according to Hume (Hume 1998; Kelly 2003). This is part and parcel of Hume’s non-deterministic take on causation theory (Kelly 2003). Gramsci’s inquiry is similar in many ways, yet adds a Marxian
orthodoxy. Gramsci argued that not only are the consciousnesses of individuals and social groups representative of amalgams of perceptions, but also that these contradictory amalgams of consciousness are the summations of historically-determined socio-economic relations, which are generated by the dialectical nature of our material evolution up to a given point in history.

Gramsci, in viewing consciousness through a similar materialist lens, cites Marx and Machiavelli in his standpoint on human nature:

“The basic innovation introduced by Marx into the science of politics and of history, in comparison with that of Machiavelli, is the demonstration that 'human nature,' fixed and immutable, does not exist and that therefore the concrete content (as well as the logical formulation) of political science must be conceived as a historically developing organism” (Gramsci, 1996, pp.150-51).

This leads Gramsci to conclude:

“One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the real world, and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. But this verbal conception is not without consequences. It holds together a specific social group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often powerfully enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity” (Gramsci 1971, p.333).

Ontologically, the idea of “contradictory consciousness” is a major contribution by Gramsci because it makes no essentialist philosophical claim to understanding the concept of “being” from an introvert individual standpoint. With a standpoint similar to that of Hume’s, Gramsci avoids the likes of Sartre, Heidegger, Nietzsche, etc. in the sense that his inquiry into individual and collective “contradictory consciousness”
refrains from stepping on a Cartesian cliff of metaphysics. Gramsci avoids metaphysics by holding the line of historical materialism: that it is material conditions, the material world, and humanity’s diverse material evolution which have contributed to the contradictory nature of individual and collective consciousness.

It is upon this terrain of “contradictory consciousness” where ideas and institutions operate at the levels of individual and collective worldview(s). It is upon this same terrain that hegemony is forged and class alliances are built for the facilitation of, isolation from, or contestation of a hegemonic system of thought and practice. Religion, too, according to Gramsci, is both a product and a generator of contradictory conceptions of the world (Fulton 1987). How religion shapes, and is shaped by, this historical development of contradictory conceptions of the world, along a variegated class spectrum, through the historical process and the evolution of production, is of particular interest to Gramsci. The following section will situate religion in his layered paradigm for understanding contradictory consciousness and conceptions of the world.

3.4 Contradictory ‘conceptions of the world’, class, and hegemony

Contradictory consciousness produces an active worldview, or “conception of the world,” that contains three levels and five sublevels of analysis. These levels of analysis combine in different proportions, according to historically-determined social/class relations, to form social groups and class alliances. This is the primordial cauldron of civil society in the modern democracies from whence the ruling classes and productive forces of society emerge, and where the consent for their intellectual and moral leadership is solicited for hegemony and reinforced by coercion in the events of crises. As a departure point for deeper analysis, Gramsci provides us with the most expansive level of his paradigm of contradictory consciousness and conceptions of the world—consisting of three overarching, and interdependent levels of analysis: philosophy; politics; production.
According to Gramsci:

“If these are constitutive elements of a single conception of the world, there must necessarily be, in the theoretical principles, convertibility from one to the others, a reciprocal translation into the specific language of each constitutive part: each element is implicit in the others and all of them together form a homogenous circle…” (Gramsci 1996, p.196).

This circle, according to Gramsci, represents a “conception of the world” in its most expansive and abstract sense. Any attempt to decipher the specific elements which amalgamate to form the conception of the world of an individual or social group should use this dialectical framework as a departure point to understand the relationship within and between the world of productive forces, the political apparatus, and the guiding philosophy or ideas of a given space, along with any individual or social group historically situated within it. Other sublevels are analysed in terms of where they fit into the dialectic of these three macro sectors of Gramsci’s paradigm—depending on their place along the class spectrum.

3.4.1 Levels and sublevels of analysis for particular conceptions of the world

In terms of production, or the economic sphere, within this paradigm, Gramsci provides us with the concept of historic blocs\(^\text{20}\) (Gramsci 1971, pp.137; 168; 360; 366; 377; 418). Two major historic blocs of power and production which Gramsci uses in his analysis are those of mediaeval feudalism and modern capitalism, respectively. Furthermore, he reveals the transition between them, illustrating the dawn of capitalism to its rise as the

---

\(^{20}\) Which Cox expands upon (1981; 1983; 2002)
dominant form of production within and between Western states and societies (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-44; 243; 362-74).

Under the heading of politics, emphasis must be placed on those governmental superstructures of the modern state, which become the instruments of the ruling classes. It is within the realm of philosophy, however, that Gramsci situates religions, in all their forms and manifestations, with his expansive concept of the term, along with folklore and common sense. Gramsci subdivides the element of religion into two distinct, yet interdependent categories: popular religion(s) (or “religion of the people”) and religion(s) of the intellectuals, which include both philosophy (moral, political, economic, etc) and theology (Gramsci 1971, p.323; 326; 420; Fulton 1987).

Intellectuals and institutions, as clergy and clerical institutions, disseminate religion(s) of intellectuals or, the worldview(s) of the ruling classes, through the conduits of language and popular religion (Gramsci 1971, pp.323-30; 420). This process is a direct engagement with the contradictory conceptions of the world held by the subaltern classes and popular masses by reaffirming and reproducing their role along the levels of production (service/dependency roles), and philosophy in the forms of common sense, folklore, and popular religion (ibid). Within the context of hegemony and hegemonic construction, the product of this interaction is an amalgamation and harmonisation of the class spectrum towards the ends of gaining popular subscription to the consent for the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes, which is driven by their own conceptions of the world rooted in production (ownership role), politics (leadership role), and philosophy (political, economic, theological, etc).

It has often historically been the role of the clergy and church officials, as intellectuals, to translate the worldview of the ruling classes, through language21 and the institutions of popular religion, into common sense and folklore for the popular masses (Gramsci 1971, pp. 323-30; 1996, pp.173-74). According to Gramsci, common sense is the “philosophy of the man on the street,” “the philosophy of non-philosophers,” or “the traditional

---

21 Including dialects, vernaculars, and national languages (Ives 2005)
popular conception of the world” (Gramsci 1995, p.301; 1971, p.198). Any hegemonic programme must necessarily be translated and understandable within the boundaries of the established, contradictory, historically-determined common sense. Hegemony must somewhat conform to the worldview of the popular masses in order to solicit their consent for the ruling classes to exercise intellectual and moral leadership, and subsequently shape the conceptions of the world of the masses (Gramsci 1971, p.134; 161).

The most descriptive definition of common sense that Gramsci provides is that it is “the conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed” (Gramsci 1971, p.330). Two polar forces are constantly and respectively retarding and progressing common sense, according to Gramsci. Firstly, there is folklore/common sense, representing the source of historical residue from past eras of power/production (Gramsci 1971, pp.323-30). All past philosophies reside within the depths of common sense, which act to hold back the popular masses and subaltern classes from progressing in terms of consciousness. Secondly, religion(s) of intellectuals, or the philosophies of the ruling classes of the existing historic bloc of power/production, are precipitated through language and venues such as popular religion. These act to progress, or upgrade, the consciousness of the popular/subaltern classes into the existent historic bloc (Gramsci 1971, pp.323-330; 418-472; 1996, pp.173-74).

Gramsci argues that common sense “is not a unique conception, identical in time and space” (Gramsci 1971, p.419). Thus, common sense is never static, as it is constantly being pulled by both poles: religion(s) of the intellectuals and folklore/popular religion(s) (Gramsci 1971, pp. 323-330; 418-472). Because of this constant dialectical activity, however, Gramsci admits that there is a degree of healthy merit in common sense. This is precisely because it is mutable in terms of teleological human progression within the historical process. Humans, with the evolution of common sense in their development, according to Gramsci, are now “capable of overcoming bestial and elemental passions through a conception of necessity which gives a conscious direction to one’s activity”
The intangible concept of conscience is the “healthy nucleus that exists in ‘common sense,’” a subunit of common sense being what Gramsci terms “good sense” (ibid). It is this nucleus, good sense, which establishes a mutability that allows for the progression of common sense, and enables the possibility of transcendence from the cultural, ideological, religious and superstitious baggage that may exist in an individual and/or collective contradictory conception of the world. It is, however, folklore, according to Gramsci, that holds back the subaltern classes/popular masses.

In his critique of Crocioni’s Problemi fondamentali del folklore, Gramsci argues that “folklore has been studied primarily as a ‘picturesque’ element” (Gramsci 1985, p.188). Most scholarly attempts to situate and analyse folklore tend to deal with methodology or historiography with respect to how to collect and sample folklore. Gramsci argues that:

“Folklore should instead be studied as a ‘conception of the world and life’ implicit to a large extent indeterminate (in time and space) strata of society and in opposition…to ‘official’ conceptions of the world…or…the conceptions of the cultured parts of historically determinate societies that have succeeded one another in the historical process. Hence the strict relationship between folklore and common sense which is ‘philosophical folklore’ (Gramsci 1985, p.189).

“Folklore can be understood as a reflection of the conditions of cultural life and of the people, although certain conceptions specific to folklore remain even after these conditions have been (or seem to be) modified or have given way to bizarre combinations” (Gramsci 1985, pp.189-190).

Of all the sublevels of analysis of a specific conception of the world, “it is only in folklore that one finds surviving evidence, adulterated and mutilated, of the majority of these conceptions,” or “fragments of all the conceptions of the world and of life that have succeeded one another in history,” and, within people, “the sum total of the instrumental and subaltern classes of every form of society that has so far existed” (Gramsci 1985, p.189). As much as Gramsci appreciates the depth of folklore being indicative of the contradictory conceptions of the world for individuals and social groups, he also sees it,

22 Q37:1; Cross Reference with: (Gramsci 1971, pp.333-38).
simultaneously, as an obstacle that must be overcome through educational institutions and intellectuals having a better understanding of the role of folklore.

For educators, knowing and understanding folklore will help to curb it from retarding the consciousness of the popular masses and subaltern classes. Gramsci argues that, “for the teacher…to know folklore means to know what other conceptions of the world and of life are actually active in the intellectual and moral formation of young people” (Gramsci 1985, p.191). For Gramsci, this was part of a larger proposed systematic effort “to uproot” such conceptions “and replace them with conceptions which are deemed to be superior” (ibid).

Thus, Gramsci argued that Communist intellectuals needed to reinvent the way in which the subject of folklore is approached altogether; that “the spirit of folklore studies” needed to be revamped and that “folklore must not be considered an eccentricity, an oddity or a picturesque element, but as something which is very serious and is to be taken seriously” (Gramsci 1985, p.191). Such an effort, he argued, was vital to the advent of “a new culture among the broad popular masses, so that the separation between modern culture and popular culture of folklore will disappear” (ibid). Gramsci then likens such an executed strategy in this realm to the raising of “the intellectual plane,” particularly in Catholic societies, “to what the Reformation was in the Protestant countries” (ibid). Gramsci credited the Reformation for the rise of individualism at the level of common sense for the popular masses in the Reformed countries (ibid).

Gramsci’s primary grudge against folklore is that he saw it as being wielded as an instrument of hegemony by the ruling classes. He acknowledged that “folklore has always been tied to the culture of the dominant class and, in its own way, has drawn from it the motifs which have then become inserted into combinations with the previous traditions” (Gramsci 1985, pp.194-95). Furthermore, “there is nothing more contradictory and fragmentary than folklore,” which is inherently tied to the other sublevels of analysis: popular religion and common sense (ibid). This fragmentary and contradictory nature reveals folklore as one of the most unstable elements of an individual or collective
conception of the world. Gramsci argues that “even a comparison between different areas, although it is the only methodologically rational approach, cannot allow inflexible conclusions absorbed by each area, and one is often comparing heterogeneous entities” (*ibid*).

The contradictions produced by this interaction, amongst individuals and social groups, are immense. These levels and sublevels of analysis, however, must be engaged with and fused into a functional constellation, as a system of thought and practice if a ruling class wishes to exercise hegemony. In a successful hegemony, Gramsci argues, the dominant classes espouse and exercise a brand of “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci 1971, p.57). This produces organic links, across the class spectrum, which streamlines the thought and practice of the ruling classes and popular masses in terms of production, politics, and philosophy (Gramsci 1971, pp.57-58; 1996, pp.173-74). Any group or group of classes that desires to rule with a balanced Machiavellian mixture of force and consensus must necessarily engage with the elements of folklore, common sense, religion, philosophy, which is done through the medium of language. Because folklore is inherently tied to common sense and popular religion, it does, however, necessitate us to isolate the organic points of nexus between folklore/common sense and the religion(s) of the intellectuals/philosophies of the ruling classes.

The question of ideology in this paradigm is reconciled by Gramsci’s own reckoning of ideology being a system of thought and practice established by a class, or group of classes, in order to maintain control of power and production (Gramsci 1995, p.352; Gramsci 1971, pp.376-77). Ideology threads together the levels and sublevels of analysis: *philosophy, politics and production; and religion(s) of the intellectuals, popular religion(s), common Sense, folklore, and language*. Through these channels an intellectual and moral ethic is produced that is conducive to production and, subsequently, consent for the leadership and/or dominance of the ruling classes from amongst the popular masses. Ideology is precisely a philosophy of praxis, or a system of thought and practice that fuses the class spectrum towards a shared end.
Thus, the conception of the world of the average individual of the popular masses would be dialectically shaped by the interaction between language, religion(s) of the intellectuals, popular religion(s), folklore, common sense, or an interaction within and between the levels of philosophy, politics, and production. How this manifests, proportionally, according to these elements, is dependent on that individual’s and/or social group’s place within the hierarchy of the class structure. It must be reiterated that a specific conception of the world is informed by *all* of these elements laid out by Gramsci. It must also be clarified that these constitutive sublevels of analysis are *not*, in reality, isolated from one another, but are indeed overlapping, interdependent, and represent the sum of dialectical activity within and between each element (Fulton 1987). Together they constitute the sum of interacting contradictory consciousnesses (Gramsci 1971, pp.323-333).

When synthesised, these levels represent the intellectual and psychological terrain of hegemony—the molecular chemistry of ‘hearts and minds’ upon which consent is produced. Simply put, the social and political hegemony of the ruling classes is built upon the consent granted within the ‘hearts and minds’ of the ruled. Hearts and minds must be channeled towards furthering the ends of the ruling classes, whilst retaining an intellectual and moral character that the masses can understand individually and collectively. For Gramsci, the proverbial ‘hearts and minds’ is merely a composite of these elements, which, amalgamated, form contradictory individual and collective conceptions of the world.

Through this conceptual lens the class spectrum can be divided into two overlapping realms of activity. The ruling classes and intellectuals engage in religion(s) of the intellectuals, in terms of Philosophy. These can range from everything from theologies, to Jacobinism, Freemasonry, to Rotarianism (Gramsci 1992, pp.162-63; 1996, pp. 272; 318-20). In relation to the role of the ruling classes with regard to politics, they have access to and control of the governmental superstructures and political apparatus. In terms of production, they mediate the controlling forces and means of production through an ownership and management role. The subaltern classes and popular masses are thus
relegated exclusively to civil society in terms of politics; to common sense, folklore, and popular religion(s) in terms of philosophy; and to dependency and service roles in terms of production. It is from here that our attention must turn towards points of nexus in the interaction of these two realms of activity between the two spheres of the class spectrum and to the points of convergence between class interests in the production and fashioning of hegemony.

3.4.2 Points of nexus along the class spectrum for the convergence of conceptions of the world

One large meeting ground for the convergence of class-driven and contradictory elements of worldview is through language. Ives (2005) has produced substantive work on Gramsci’s account for the importance of language in the facilitation of hegemony, with particular reference to the Italian Risorgimento as a hegemonic, multicultural nation-building project. Gramsci viewed the understanding of a national language, which transcends dialects and regional dialectics, which are laden with the characteristics of superstitions and folklore, as vital to educate the subaltern classes to the point of a collective critique of common sense and folklore in their conceptions of the world. In terms of language, Gramsci touches on deep-seated implications with regard to how we understand the conceptions of the world of popular/subaltern classes.

He points to the words “disaster” and “disgrace” as transparent examples of an undercurrent of negative “immanence” within languages (Gramsci 1971, pp.450-52; p334). “Disaster,” literally means ‘bad fate,’ or a negative alignment of the heavenly bodies, which is an obviously Ptolemaic astrological assumption. Astrology may have once been a religion of the intellectuals, in terms of the philosophy of previous ruling classes, but it has persisted through folklore and common sense to remain within language and manifests as a residual presence of ancient superstition from past blocs of

23 Also see: (Ives 2005, pp.463-65)
power and production within popular/subaltern conceptions of the world. The creation of national languages can facilitate hegemony in the sense that a national language seeks to transcend regional dialects and vernaculars, which cuts off segments of the masses from both the state and the cultural diversity of the world at large. It is only through national languages that culture can be translated into an exchangeable format (Gramsci 1971, p.325).

Gramsci states:

“in language…there is no parthenogenesis, language producing other language. Innovations occur through the interference of different cultures and this happens in very different ways” (Gramsci 1985, p.177)

“Between the dialect and the national-literary language something changes: precisely the cultural, politico-moral-emotional environment. The history of languages is the history of linguistic innovations, but those innovations are not individual (as in the case of art). They are those of a whole social community that has renewed its culture and has ‘progressed’ historically. Naturally, they too become individual, yet not in the artist-individual, but in the individual as a complete, determinate historical-cultural element” (ibid).

Gramsci discusses the manifestations of national languages and establishes the “sources of diffusion of linguistic innovations in the tradition of a national language conformism in the broad national masses” (1985, pp.182-83). These “sources of diffusion” include the following: “the education system”; “newspapers”; “artistic writers and popular writers”; “the theatre and sound films”; “radio”; “public meetings of all kinds, including religious ones”; “the relations of ‘conversation’ between the more educated and less educated strata of the population”; “the local dialects” (Gramsci 1985, pp.182-83). He adds:

“Since the process of formation, spread and development of a unified national language occurs through a whole complex of molecular processes, it helps to be aware of the entire process as a whole in order to be able to intervene actively in it with the best possible results” (ibid).
The ability for the Communist Party to “intervene” in this process was crucial for the success of the party amongst the popular masses, according to Gramsci. The key for the party was to take this development of national languages and siphon its power, as an organisational tool, away from the ruling classes. It could then be applied in an educational and emancipatory fashion so as to liberate the entirety of the popular masses and subaltern classes. This would ideally enable the progression of their respective and collective conceptions of the world by transforming folklore, common sense, and popular religion into a new conception of the world conducive to international socialism. Language, he argues, “should be treated as a conception of the world,” in terms of how we analyse it and situate it in blocs of power and production (Gramsci 1996, p.384). With the expansion of popular cultural genres, global ideas and the means of their dissemination through mass communications, the molecular interactions of languages (and expressions of specific languages) within and between states, societies, and class spectrums, languages have become an even more relevant level of analysis for understanding contradictory conceptions of the world (Gramsci 1971, p.325).

Another key point of nexus between classes in a functional hegemony is popular religion, with the clergy serving as intellectual intermediaries through whom the philosophy and religion(s) of intellectuals are translated through to the common sense and folklore of the popular masses. Religion(s) of intellectuals are drawn from the highest echelons of the ruling classes in the realm of philosophy (Fulton 1987; Gramsci 1971, p.328). Religions of intellectuals represent institutionalised philosophy for the ruling classes. Religion(s) of intellectuals can include all forms of theology: Calvinism; Jesuitism; Franciscanism; Dominicanism; Zionism (Judaic and/or Christian); Masonic/Jacobin deism; etc. Such philosophies are expressed amongst intellectuals in institutions such as seminaries, academia, fraternal associations, higher forms of media/publishing, etc. With Gramsci’s expansive definition, however, we can even situate global ideological concepts and trends such as Liberalism, Marxism, conservatism, etc., as religion(s) of the intellectuals.
Such philosophies are expressed amongst intellectuals in institutions such as civic/fraternal institutions, political action committees and political parties, chambers of commerce, educational institutions at all levels, media, etc. A Catholic official, for example, may hold a conception of the world shaped by any number of religious orders or associations to which they either belong to or were educated by. These could be Jesuit, Benedictine, Franciscan, or Dominican in orientation. The cleric may be a member of Opus Dei or the Congregation for the Doctrine of the faith. Such a traditional intellectual may be fluent in Latin, but this does not mean that the people of his parish are educated as such or understand the higher theological issues discussed at the higher echelons of Catholic institutions. The parish priest must be able to provide a more understandable and palatable means of translating the Catholic message for the popular/subaltern classes to whom he ministers. A Protestant preacher may espouse and market a Calvinist, Arminian-Freewill, or Zionist, conception of the world. He could even be a Freemason, a Rotarian, or belong to any host of other intellectual associations. Clergy members may also be active in parties within the political entities in which they operate. Nevertheless, he too must be able to provide a message that is conducive to his parishioners who hold more popular/subaltern conceptions of the world.

Clergy, as intellectuals, thus indeed act as the “intermediaries” within and between the ruling classes, the world of production, and the popular masses. Bode (1971), using Gramsci’s concepts, illustrates this point in relation to how different Protestant denominational clergy intervened in labour disputes in US history. Clergy engage with higher forms of philosophy and rebrand these philosophies so that they can become affixed to the popular religion, common sense, and folklore of the laity amongst the popular classes. This process is how the Enlightenment-era Liberalism, as a religion of intellectuals, subsequently became the Protestant Ethic and the Social Gospel amongst the popular classes—as forms of popular religion and common sense which were representative of higher philosophies (Gramsci 1995, p.26; 1985, pp.190-94). Likewise, as will be displayed in the latter chapters of this dissertation, the ideologies of neoliberalism and the globalisation of free market capitalism have been developed and disseminated to become the globalised Prosperity Gospel.
Thus, the clergy, as intellectuals, have their own bodies of philosophy, distanced from the folklore/common sense of the popular masses and subaltern classes, which they convey through the conduits of language and popular religion into forms of common sense. The perception of being part of an “elect” body legitimises the higher standing of the ruling classes of the ruling classes and intellectuals, and can potentially create a condescending conception of the world in which the “elect” are perceived to be engaging in ‘higher’ pursuits of knowledge, or philosophy, than those pursuits of the popular masses which are drawn from folklore and common sense (Gramsci 1995, p.11). The key for the ruling classes in exercising hegemony is to form organic conduits through popular religion and overlapping associational bodies, such as parties. Such conduits enable the dissemination of the religion(s) of intellectuals to be translated from the realm of philosophy across the class spectrum in order to channel common sense and folklore towards subscription to, or consent for, the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling classes.

In a functional hegemony, religious intellectuals and institutions act as the brokers of consent between the ruling classes and the popular masses. Gramsci maintains that “the principle elements of common sense are provided by religion and, consequently, the relationship between common sense and religion is much more intimate than that between common sense and the philosophical systems of the intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971, p.420). Popular religion thus serves a twin function in the fashioning of hegemony. Firstly, it establishes a conduit between the realm of philosophy and the popular masses, through the clergy and church officials in order to garner popular consent and mobilise the masses. Secondly, it reproduces the contradictory social relations which perpetually relegate the popular masses and subaltern classes solely to civil society. With consent comes a fatalistic acceptance of this collective position of service/dependency in terms of production.

Gramsci credits Sorel’s conceptual framework for understanding the function of popular religion in that Sorel agrees that religion “has two aspects: one that is properly theoretical belonging to political science, and an immediate programmatic political aspect,” i.e.
thought and practice (Gramsci 1995, p.390). Gramsci states that Sorel’s interpretation is rooted in “actual reality and that this reality has not been superseded or dissipated” (ibid). This brings us back to the same points made in his Gramsci’s critique of Hitler and Bukharin regarding the need to maintain an expansive definition of religion in order to understand its role in the fashioning and expression of power and production (ibid). Thus, hegemony builds intellectual and institutional bonds between individuals and social groups, all with unique conceptions of the world, in a most organic fashion. This envelops both the civil and political floors of the superstructure, and amalgamates state and society into one organic state under the intellectual and moral direction of the ruling classes. The key for hegemony to transcend the transparency of coercion is the ruling classes’ degree of success in passively fusing the constitutive elements within and between diverse and contradictory conceptions of the world within a site of socio-economic-political organisation. Thus:

“...the relation between the governors and the governed is given by the fact that the governors work in the interests of the governed and therefore ‘must’ have their consent, in other words the identification of the individual with the whole must occur, the whole (whatever organism that may be) being represented by the rulers” (Gramsci 1995, pp.15-16).

“A collective consciousness, which is to say a living organism, is formed only after the unification of the multiplicity through friction on the part of the individuals; nor can one say that ‘silence’ is not a multiplicity. An orchestra tuning up, every instrument playing by itself, sounds a most hideous cacophony, yet these warm-ups are the necessary condition for the orchestra to come to life as a single ‘instrument’” (ibid).

When philosophy is transmitted through intellectuals, it becomes organically-linked to the popular masses. It becomes a philosophy of praxis, or a system of thought and practice, with a specific intellectual and moral programme that encompasses the class spectrum. In any historical situation where philosophy has amalgamated with the popular masses to form “a cultural movement, a ‘religion,’ a ‘faith’”, and likewise “produced a form of practical activity or will in which the philosophy is contained as an implicit theoretical ‘premise’”, the problem then becomes “preserving the ideological unity of the
entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and unify” (Gramsci 1971, p.328). There must be compromises within this process, whereupon hegemony takes on some of the characteristics which resonate with the conceptions of the world of the popular masses. It creates situational forces in which the popular masses must adopt “a conception which is not its own but it is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’” (Gramsci 1971, p.327).

Balancing and organically harmonising this process across the class spectrum amounts to what Gramsci refers to as a historic bloc of power and production “in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without the form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces” (Gramsci 1971, p.377). A successful hegemony, ideology, or system of thought and practice is thus:

“…the equality of, or equation between ‘philosophy and politics’, thought and action, that is, at a philosophy of praxis. Everything is political, even philosophy or philosophies (cf. the notes on the character of ideologies) and the only ‘philosophy’ is history in action, that is, life itself” (Gramsci 1971, p.356).

“…a philosophical movement properly so called when it is devoted to creating a specialised culture among restricted intellectual groups, or rather when, and only when, in the process of elaborating a form of thought superior to ‘common sense’ and coherent on a scientific plane, it never forgets to remain in contact with the ‘simple’ and indeed finds in this contact the source of problems it sets out to study and resolve? Only by this contact does a philosophy become ‘historical’, purify itself of intellectualistic elements of an individual character and become ‘life’” (Gramsci 1971, p.330).
Gramsci likens such systems to medieval feudalism, the Protestant Reformation, and French nationalism, respectively (Gramsci 1995, p.26; 1985, pp.190-91). In terms of French nationalism, with respect to the larger transnational religion of “liberty,” he clearly isolates this system of thought and practice to the bounds of a specific nationality and its articulation—both as a larger system of philosophy and as a national popular mass movement (Gramsci 1995, p.359). Liberty may have started out as a transnational religion of intellectuals, promulgated in academic circles, salons, Jacobin Clubs, and Masonic lodges, but it facilitated a mass movement, which Gramsci argues supplanted Catholicism and Bourbon divinity as the dominant popular religion of France (*ibid*). The same larger influence of philosophical liberalism, as expressed in both philosophy and associated institutions like Masonry, had also inspired the American Revolution. Like the Reformation, the religion of liberalism saw different nationalities apply transnational philosophical movements to statecraft and development.

What makes the Reformation and the French Revolution so important, as historical events, according to both Sorel and Gramsci, is that they respectively represent moments of “scission” between the popular masses and the ruling classes (Gramsci 1985, pp.192-94). As for the Reformation, it was immediately a popular mass movement that had to eventually grow into a high culture (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-44). The French Revolution represented liberty as a religion of intellectuals, whilst taking on the qualities of the popular masses, in a seemingly religious form (Gramsci 1985, pp.192-94). The need to create a nexus between classes, however, is of a much more fundamental importance, even at the level of the political party or civic association. This is measured by Gramsci’s theorem of “fixed proportions,” which he applies to political parties and/or civic associations (Gramsci 1971, pp.151-56).

The theorem of fixed proportions situates the organic links established between the three fundamental constitutive elements of any such movement: a “mass element”; a “principle cohesive element,” which establishes intellectual and moral norms; an “intermediate element,” which facilitates the organic links within a “nexus of classes” (Gramsci 1971, pp.151-56). It should be clear at this point, however, that Gramsci’s concept of the fixed
proportions, with regard to parties/associations, is just a microcosm of his larger conceptual framework for understanding how power is fashioned, at the levels of contradictory consciousness, by a nexus of classes establishing intellectual and moral dominance. Hegemony is produced through the subscription of consent for that leadership by the popular masses, at all levels of socio-economic-political organisation. As it has been displayed, religion is one of the primary venues in which this consent is solicited and forged.

3.5 Theoretical and methodological departure points

Section 3.4 illustrated Gramsci’s levels and sublevels of analysis for examining specific conceptions of the world, in relation to his larger concept of hegemony. The three overarching levels of analysis include philosophy, politics, and production. Gramsci asserts that these three levels of analysis are interdependent and amalgamate to form a “homogenous circle” (Gramsci 1996, p.196). The level of philosophy is comprised of several sublevels which are similarly interdependent along the class spectrum. These sublevels of philosophy include religions of intellectuals, popular religion, common sense, and folklore. Another level of analysis, that of language, also works to bind these levels and sublevels of analysis and, in and of itself, represents a component of a particular conception of the world. As a unit of analysis, it can also be subdivided into languages of intellectuals (such as Latin), national languages, and dialects/vernaculars as the lowest sublevels of communication.

It was illustrated in Section 3.4 that both national language and popular religion serve as points of nexus within which hegemony is produced, and through which the religions of intellectuals are transformed from higher philosophy into common sense. These levels and sublevels, of particular conceptions of the world, are illustrated by the two diagrams below.
Table 1: *Conception of the World*
Table 2: *Philosophy* within a class hierarchy, as a component of analysis for *conceptions of the world*
Again, according to Gramsci, an inquiry into these levels and sublevels of analysis must necessarily illustrate the dialectical natures within and between these three “constitutive elements” of a contradictory conception of the world (Gramsci 1996, p.196). The purpose of this section is to take Gramsci’s framework for understanding particular conceptions of the world and illustrate how it will be utilised in terms of this dissertation. This dissertation attempts to analyse a large faction of global religion, and reveal how it is instrumental in the production of free market hegemony within the context of globalisation. This includes an analysis of the shared meta-narrative, conception of the world, institutions, and intellectuals of the emergent charismatic Pan-Christian movement, and how it relates to global politics and production through the dissemination of larger neoliberal philosophies at the levels of popular religion and common sense within and between states and societies across the world. Towards this end, this section will illustrate the larger conceptual framework that will be utilised in the forthcoming chapters.

It is asserted in this dissertation that the charismatic wave of Christianity, as a whole, represents a rapidly growing global phenomenon and that this phenomenon is tantamount to a new globalised Christian reformation. This is supported by the worldwide empirical studies conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2006a; 2010a), as well as the analyses provided by scholars such as Martin, D. (2006) and Adogame (2006) which situate this phenomenon within the context of an emergent “global religious economy”. All of these studies indicate that there is indeed a new and coherent wave of Christianity growing within and between states and societies around the world that promotes a common conception of the world, in terms of theology, expressions of popular religion, common sense, and folklore. Furthermore, these studies indicate that a major component of the shared meta-narrative of this faction of global religion is the theme of individualism and material prosperity. Included in this meta-narrative, coupled with a corresponding brand of activism, is a conception of the world that is global and borderless in its outlook.
The growth of this phenomenon has been wholly bound up with the larger processes of globalisation, particularly over the past three decades. One of the fundamental points raised in this dissertation is that the processes of globalisation, driven by the philosophies of neoliberalism and free market ideology, are interrelated with this emergent faction of the global religious economy. Thus, in illustrating this interrelation, the points of nexus between the global religious economy and the global political economy must be clearly demonstrated. The overarching aim is to legitimately situate the charismatic Pan-Christian movement, as a coherent and singular global social force, within Cox’s (2002) larger portrait of the current, historically-developing world order. In other words, this dissertation seeks to place the movement as not only a faction of the global religious economy, but also within Cox’s (2002) larger “nebuleuse” of global capitalism and political economy—as a supportive mass element and agent of global free market hegemony.

Gramsci’s framework for analysing specific conceptions of the world will be used in order to contextualise the common worldview, meta-narrative, and corresponding forms of activism expressed by the global charismatic Christian movement. This involves displaying the overall shared belief system and aspects of folklore, common sense, and popular religion which serve as the popular-cultural cohesive of this global social movement, all of which are maintained and globally extended by its intellectuals and institutions. Furthermore, Gramsci’s linguistic level of analysis will be augmented by displaying the shared and globalised forms of *habitus*.

These forms of habitus include a variety of common practices characteristic of the charismatic Christianity, including such things as ‘speaking-in-tongues’ and other facets of charismatic forms of Christian worship which transcend race, class, and nationality (Coleman & Collins 2000). Gramsci’s framework will also be utilised in order to display the precipitation of the larger philosophy of neoliberalism into forms of popular religion and common sense, and expressions of activism implicit and explicit within the
charismatic Pan-Christian movement, as well as the points of nexus through which this precipitation occurs within and between states, societies and markets around the world.

Global Christianity, as a whole, represents a multifaceted, multi-denominational faction within global society and the global religious economy. Many Christian groups, intellectuals, and institutions represent very different conceptions of the world and corresponding global social forces. One of the main tasks of this dissertation is to distinguish and categorise the different factions of global Christianity and evangelism which have arisen from very different historical developments. It will be illustrated that Pentecostal, many charismatic, and some ‘fundamentalist’ Christian social forces have converged as a singular bloc within global Christianity based on shared elements of folklore, common sense, expressions of popular religion, and language/habitus as an overall shared conception of the world and global popular culture with corresponding forms of activism.

This singular globalised conception of the world stands in opposition to many of the more traditional Christian groups active throughout the world, with regard to its approaches to philosophy, politics, and economic production. These differences will likewise be displayed by using Gramsci’s conceptual framework in order to reveal the points of divergence along the levels and sublevels of analysis displayed in this chapter. Both factions, often in opposition to one another, work within and between states, societies, and markets around the world.

This dissertation does not seek to minimise the role of the state when situating global Christian social forces within IR/IPE. It will, however, be displayed how Christian social forces played key historical roles in the development of modern states and the modern state system of international relations. The following chapter will utilise the work of Augustine, Calvin, Hume, and Gramsci in order to display the roles played by Christian social forces in terms of early-modern statecraft, as well as the role of Christian ideas with regard to the historical development of modern capitalism. The roles of Christian social forces with regard to the historical development of industrial-era production will be
illustrated in order to show how global Christianity has both shaped and been shaped by industrial relations across states, societies, and corresponding class structures. Furthermore, over the course of the past three decades, the social forces, intellectuals, and institutions of the contemporary charismatic Christianity have come to form key partnerships with many states/governments. These partnerships and organic links between Pan-Christian forces and governments will be fully addressed in the latter chapters of this dissertation.

It is argued here that neoliberal philosophy, or free market ideology, is one of the driving forces of contemporary global capitalism. The question again presents itself as to whether or not neoliberalism can be classified as a transnational form of Gramscian hegemony within the context of global political economy. Within a Gramscian conceptual framework of hegemony, this comes down to whether or not neoliberal ‘thought’ precipitates into widespread and consensual ‘practice’, at the global level. Worth (2010) argues that neoliberalism is indeed a coherent and global set of ideological beliefs and practices, but that its expression takes on many different forms as it interacts within different sets of state-societal relations.

Building on this premise, it is argued here that international institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Trilateral Commission, the International Chamber of Commerce, etc. are institutional representations of the larger free market ideology at work within and between states and societies. Even non-Gramscian scholars, such as Cerny (2010), have come to agree that neoliberalism is indeed the driving global ideological force affecting states, societies, and markets worldwide. As expressed in Chapter 2, however, if we are to apply Gramscian hegemony to this global ideological formation, we must also seek to display more of the consensual processes which work to solicit the subscription of the popular masses towards the same ends of neoliberalism.

This is precisely what Gramsci did with his analyses on previous transnational ideological formations, including the feudal bloc of medieval Christendom/Renaissance, the Reformation within and between Protestant states and societies, the Counter-
Reformation within the Catholic world, and early-modern Liberalism. With respect to medieval Christendom and the Renaissance, Gramsci’s analysis focuses on hegemony during a specific historic bloc of power and production that predates the modern state. Gramsci’s analysis of the Protestant Reformation provides an example of how a larger transnational religious phenomenon acutely and uniquely affected the development of certain states and early national-cultural expressions. Contrariwise, he also displays how the Catholic world adapted, within and between Catholic states, in order to remain intact during this period. Hume (1998) also illustrates this Protestant-Catholic dialectic in his comparative analysis of European states and societies within the larger context of 18th century political economy. With regard to the emergence of liberalism, another transnational ideology, Gramsci illustrates how it was adapted hegemonically at a national level within France and Italy, respectively.

By illustrating the complexities of how neoliberal philosophy is disseminated within and between states and societies, we can more appropriately contextualise neoliberalism as a global form of hegemony within IR/IPE. This dissertation will display how Christian social forces, intellectuals, and institutions have historically acted as agents of hegemony in the construction of previous historic blocs of power production. Furthermore, it will illustrate how the emergent global charismatic Christian movement is assisting in the production of neoliberal hegemony by transforming neoliberal philosophy into popular expressions of free market ideology through forms of popular religion at the level of common sense amongst large segments of the popular masses within and between states and societies across the world. By illustrating these processes, we can effectively merge the contemporary discourse on global religious economy with those on global political economy within the larger context of world order. This will be done in order to reveal the historical development of both, and the interrelation and association between the two growing phenomena within and between specific states, societies and markets.

Thus, like neoliberalism, religion has to be analysed uniquely as a global force—which produces many different national expressions from a larger global phenomenon. One attempt of this research is to widen the analytical scope of hegemony, in the Gramscian
sense, in order to reveal the complexities and consensual processes of global production and world order. Hoogvelt (1997) has addressed the rapid global institutional collaboration of global social forces and states in the advent of the growing neoliberal trend of privatising foreign aid and the decline of state-led development projects for debt-ridden countries. This is most evident in the transparent rise of the involvement of NGOs, since the Thatcher-Reagan 1980s and the end of the Cold War, in global politics. A large segment of these development-oriented NGOs are religious in nature—falling under Catholic, Anglican, and/or charismatic-evangelical umbrella-movements, as well as trans-denominational organisations.

It is argued here that the aforementioned critical conceptual methodology can serve as a valuable tool in order to better understand the nature and behaviour of specific religiously-affiliated NGOs and the conception of the world they espouse and propagate as part of their development strategies—as well as their facilitation, contestation, or indifference with regard to the politics, philosophy, and production of global capitalism and the dissemination of free market hegemony. This has the potential to do much in clearing up Cox’s “nebuleuse” of global capitalism by pinpointing specific functions and specific actors operating within it at the popular and subaltern levels (Cox 2002).

What has been established in Chapter 3 is a Gramscian conceptual framework in order to contextualise Evangelical global political and economic behaviour and the access of Evangelical intellectuals to moral leadership roles and policymaking at many different levels. It is not, however, the argument that Gramsci is some sort of soothsayer, or that within his prison diaries rest all of the explanations for understanding the present world order. What Gramsci has done, however, is to establish a viable framework for understanding contradictory conceptions of the world—through specific levels and sublevels of analysis—in order to understand how hegemony is produced along this terrain. He also issued a specific call for research on the global Pan-Christian movement, which this dissertation attempts to answer through the framework which Gramsci provides (Gramsci 1996, pp.386-87).
The issue of situating a religious movement, with a global agenda, against the backdrop of a dominant body of IR literature that articulates the supremacy of states in international affairs can be effectively remedied by illustrating the global origins of specific movements which predate the supremacy of the modern state in international relations. This can be achieved by re-articulating Gramsci’s own thought on the relationship between the Vatican and modern states (including the historical international cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals), as well as the dissemination of specific conceptions of the world established by dissidents of the Church of Rome stemming from the Reformation. There remain many forms of religious NGOs and non-state entities, operating at the global level, within and between nation-states, societies, and markets.

In order to better understand the global behaviour of such structures and agents, and to ascertain their relationships with global power/production, we need to better understand the conception of the world that such institutions and intellectuals espouse and propagate locally, nationally, and globally in order to facilitate, contest, or isolate themselves from the forces of free market hegemony and global capitalism. This can be done through putting such institutions and intellectuals through Gramsci’s paradigm of the constitutive elements of a specific conception of the world in order to ascertain their roles within and between politics; philosophy, and production, and the sublevels of religion(s) of intellectuals, popular religion, common sense, folklore, and language.

This research attempts to isolate current strains of global Christianity and their specific roles in fashioning free market hegemony, corresponding lifestyles, and social policies conducive to mass production/consumption. This will reveal how various and contradictory conceptions of the world are fused—across denominational, class, and even state lines, in order to form larger politically and economically coherent social forces which enfranchise their corresponding institutions and intellectuals at the local, national, and global levels of participation and policymaking. By isolating specific institutions and intellectuals we can also reveal the points of nexus which are organically fused at the levels of language, folklore, common sense, popular religion, and religion(s) of intellectuals within and between states, societies and markets. All of these elements
characterise different brands of intellectual and moral programmes offered by different persuasions of Christian institutions and intellectuals operating in the world.

What are of interest here are those institutions and intellectuals which have pooled their resources in order to act coherently in the aforementioned sectors through the construction of shared conceptions of the world. The following chapter will provide a concise material history of Christianity—its institutions and intellectuals—and its relationship to the ruling classes and popular masses during specific blocs of power and production; from its beginnings in imperial Rome to its ascendancy during the era of feudal Christendom, the subsequent fragmentation of western Christendom into the modern state system, the role of different Christian forces in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and the exportation of these western contradictions to the rest of the globe. This is done in order to illustrate the historical development and fragmentation of global Christianity, and how many of these fragments are being repackaged and reproduced in the context of modern globalisation. All of the specific Christian social forces discussed in the latter chapters of this dissertation are directly descended from Western Christianity. Thus, all of the contradictions which have dialectically produced modern/global Christian social forces are relevant to understanding the manifestation of the active Christian social forces within the global religious and political economy.
Chapter Four: Beneath IR theory—the historical development of Western Christendom in relation to production, the origins of modern states, and global civil society

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish an historical context within which the modern Christian social forces discussed in this dissertation will be analysed. Such an historical context is necessary for understanding and contextualising specific, conflicting, and converging Christian conceptions of the world within global politics and society. Only an in-depth historical analysis can display the historical developments of the languages, habitus, religions of intellectuals, popular religions, forms of common sense, and the use of folklore with regard to different Christian social forces. All of the Christian social forces highlighted in the latter chapters of this dissertation emerged from the same overarching set of contradictory social relations: Western Christianity. This chapter traces the historical development of Western Christianity, as well as the contradictions within it which produced its fragmentation and separate paths of further development. It is illustrated in this chapter that these separate paths of further development, to a very large degree, were instrumental in the development of modern states, societies, and markets.

One of the central themes of this dissertation is to illustrate the relationships between specific Christian conceptions of the world and how their respective intellectuals, institutions, and social forces interact within and between states, societies and markets. The various contradictory brands of Christianity which will be analysed in the forthcoming chapters all emerged from, and grew out of, the contradictions produced during the period of mediaeval feudalism in Western Europe, during which the Catholic
Church represented the intellectual and moral leadership apparatus of feudalistic hegemony. Each Christian social force which emerged during the decline of this hegemonic period of power and production added to the nature and character of early modern states, the modern state system of international relations, as well as to varieties of capitalist production which grew out of the Reformation (Philpott 2000; Gramsci 1995, p.26).

During the formation of these new productive structures and corresponding superstructures, both the Catholic enterprise and the various Protestant groups became globalised, via the construction of channels and networks of intellectuals and institutions within and between early modern states. They were also instrumental in the establishment of settler colonies and proselytising enterprises throughout the world (Fischer 1989). Each prescribed a unique approach to statecraft in terms of the configuration between civil and political society, or ‘church’ and ‘state,’ as well as to production.

This chapter will illustrate the historically contested issue of ‘church’ and ‘state,’ or ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, in Western Europe from the late Roman Empire to the hegemony established during the feudalistic era of medieval Christendom. It will include the Reformation/Counter-Reformation period which saw the decline of Catholic hegemony in Western Europe and the emergence of new Christian conceptions of the world which led directly to changes in the world of production and the rise of the modern state system (Gramsci 1995; Philpott 2000). This historical development involved different emergent states with varying natures and unique configurations between civil and political society, which were all based on differing Christian systems of thought and practice.

Whilst Catholicism and mainline Protestant institutions may have conflicted during the Reformation-era, each adapted during that period and these adaptations produced the Enlightenment-era which was characterised by productive/scientific innovations and rationalism (Gramsci 1995). Other Protestant sects which emerged during and after the Reformation period, however, developed largely in isolation from modern states and
Enlightenment-era rationalism. It is precisely these groups and their ascension as global social forces which will be the focus of forthcoming chapters of this dissertation. In order to understand their emergence and ascension, however, the contradictory social relations of Western Christendom, from whence they initially emerged, must firstly be displayed. Towards this end, this chapter is divided into three sections.

Section 4.2 provides an historical account of the rise of the Catholic Church as the intellectual and moral cohesion of mediaeval feudal hegemony, and the Church’s role in fusing philosophy, production, and politics during that period (Gramsci 1995; Montesquieu 1989). The theme throughout Section 4.2 is the constantly contested balance between feudal political authorities and the Church, or the configuration of civil and political society, during the Church’s hegemonic supremacy, as well as the contradictions that led to its demise. Section 4.3 illustrates the contradictory Christian conceptions of the world which emerged during the Reformation-era. Each affected the world of production, and articulated a different balance between church and state, or civil and political society, and produced different forms of early modern states.

Section 4.3 will also illustrate how the Catholic Church adapted during this period in order to maintain its supremacy in certain realms throughout Europe and its global expansion as a supranational power within an emergent state-system of international relations. Section 4.4 deals specifically with all of the aforementioned contradictions and their respective roles in the state formation of the United Kingdom. Section 4.4 will also highlight some of the knock-on effects which these British contradictions produced, as well as the role they played in the construction of both the formation of the United States and transatlantic civil society (Fischer 1989; Tocqueville 2001).
4.2 The rise and fall of Western Christendom as an intellectual, moral, political and economic hegemony

This section highlights the contested balance between the Church of Rome and political authorities after the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century CE. This balance includes the cultural and intellectual vanguard role of the Catholic Church during the so-called Dark Ages, and the hegemony established by the Church during its mercantilist phase of the Renaissance-era by organically synthesising philosophy, politics, and production in Western Europe into a singular feudalistic system of thought and practice (Gramsci 1996, p.327; 362-74; Montesquieu 1989). The key contestation that will be highlighted here is the historically ambivalent relationship between the Church of Rome and secular political forces. Many of these secular political forces were co-opted to protect Rome’s cultural, intellectual and moral supremacy (Machiavelli 1950). This practice, however, also created a high degree of ambiguity with regard to the balance between civil and political societies in Western Europe.

The term ‘Western’ is used here in reference to the identity that evolved from the initial subdivision of the Roman Empire into two halves by Constantine, and subsequently grew into the contradictory culture of medieval Christendom. The Eastern Empire (Byzantium) was based in Constantinople, and represented the culturally-Greek constituency of the Roman world, whilst the Western Empire represented the Latin cultural identity (Meyendorff 1968; Martin, R. 1972). The Western/Latin identity is precisely what the Church of Rome attempted to salvage, perpetuate and disseminate following the political collapse of the Western Empire (Gramsci 1971, p.17). It is the Latin cultural identity that grew and dialectically evolved across Western and Northern Europe from the 5th century to the Renaissance era. This identity fragmented in the wake of the Reformation, since it was the Latin Church that had bound it culturally and bureaucratically (Gramsci 1985, pp.192-94). Prior to discussing the economic, philosophical, and political fragmentation
4.2.1 The waning of the Western Empire and the vanguard role of the Catholic Church in the preservation of the Latin identity

Various theological issues, regarding interpretations and semantics, had historically divided the Christian Church in Rome from its more easterly counterparts in Greece, Asia Minor, and Southwest Asia (Chadwick 1960; Gager 1972; Percival 1990). One issue was that the Church of Rome continued to view all other Christian churches as its own subordinate satellites (Meyendorff 1968; Chadwick 1960; Gager 1972; Percival 1990). Constantine not only initiated the subdivision of the Empire and began the institutionalization of Christianity as the imperial religion, but he also became the first secular political leader to intervene and attempt to moderate these East/West theological tensions (Agobard of Lyons 1981; Martin, R. 1972).

The most pertinent theological issue at hand for Constantine to arbitrate was Arianism, a growingly popular non-Trinitarian Christian conception of the world both in the East and amongst Germanic tribes outside the Empire (Fanning, S.C. 1981). Another growing issue, however, was that of investitures on several different levels. Firstly, one issue was whether or not bishops could be appointed in the East without the permission of the Bishop of Rome. Secondly, the very primacy of the Bishop of Rome above all other bishops was a perpetual source of contention. Another issue was whether or not the Eastern Emperor, as a secular power, had the spiritual authority to appoint bishops in the East, which became commonplace as Byzantium developed as an increasingly separate entity from the Latin Empire (Robinson, J.H. 1905; Meyendorff 1968; Martin, R. 1972). The Church in Rome remained adamant that its bishop (the pope) held ultimate spiritual authority over all investitures, thus transcending the worldly power of secular authorities.
Pope Damasus I (366-384) personally oversaw and encouraged St. Jerome’s canonical compilation of the Latin Vulgate Bible (Chapman 1922). This would serve as the philosophical cohesive of the Western Empire in its waning years, and later act as the auxiliary text of Latin cultural authority after the political collapse of Rome. This calculated division of Christian language would do much in culturally and politically alienating East from West, as the churches of the East used both Aramaic and Greek culturally and liturgically (Meyendorff 1968; Martin, R. 1972). Augustine, at great length, articulated the importance of the Latin language within both the conventions of everyday life in the Western world, as well as in relation to the consciousness of individuals and social groups within it (Elshtain 2003). The Latin Vulgate, however, did much for Western cultural preservation in the wake of the unique difficulties the Roman world of the West would face in the 5th century and beyond (Montesquieu 1989; Chapman 1922).

Politically, the Latin Church was still very much trying to find its feet with regard to its relationship to secular power structures, whereas the Eastern Emperor gained and retained much more control over the affairs of the Eastern Church (Robinson, J.H. 1905; Meyendorff 1968; Martin, R. 1972). One of the earliest champions of the Latin branch of Christendom was Augustine, who took an active intellectual role in the philosophical debates of Nicaea, Chalcedon, and Ephesus (Nelson 1996; Martin, R. 1972). Augustine, inspired by Plato’s ontology, used predestination as a counter to the Pelagian conception of free will, and asserted that divinity represented the perfect ‘Form’; and that there is a higher spiritual set of ideals which humans should strive to reach during physical existence rather than seeking material pleasures (Augustine 1890; Nelson 1996; Elshtain 2003). Augustine expressed a detailed ontology as to the desired nature of the relationship between Christianity and the material world.

In *City of God*, Augustine articulated a Manichean dualism between the spirit world and the material world, which translates into his views on the nature of the relationship between church and state (Augustine 1890; Nelson 1996). For Augustine, it mattered not

---

24 In reference to Plato’s ontology.
what system of government was in place, as each and all political structures are fallible because they are comprised of humans (Nelson 1996; Elstain 2003). This is due to the inherently sinful nature of humankind resulting from “Original Sin” (Nelson 1996; Martin, R. 1972). Augustine argues that some humans are predestined for salvation, but that many are predestined to worldliness and damnation (Augustine 1890; Nelson 1996). Even the righteous, however, are prone to sin, according to Augustine. For Augustine, the Church and civil society must find ways to coexist with, but also remain separate from, political structures (Nelson 1996; Martin, R. 1972; Elshtain 2003).

Augustine argues that politics should be left to the sphere of the material and corrupted world of men. Augustine argued that the world of politics was governed by a different system of laws and warfare for the corrupted material world, whilst the Church was governed by Divine laws and stood as a representative of otherworldliness (Nelson 1996). Furthermore, the Church’s role was to emulate the metaphysical and perfect ‘City of God’ as a dualistic parallel to the material world (Nelson 1996; Martin, R. 1972). Augustine’s advocacy of Church reluctance towards politics, in part, stems from a general unwillingness to take up the political and structural burdens of the late Western Empire, which was marred by constant infighting, pestilence, and perpetual invasions.

The reluctance of the Latin Church to take up the reins of politics was quickly unsustainable during and after the 5th century, as Rome was politically and militarily destroyed by successive waves of Germanic invasion (Agobard of Lyons 1981). The Church of Rome was the only imperial intellectual and moral leadership apparatus that remained in the power vacuum created by the West’s collapse (Montesquieu 1989). The Church of Rome was inadvertently left with the responsibility of unifying the productive, political, and philosophical spheres of Western Europe if it was to survive. Thus, the Catholic Church moved beyond the boundaries of philosophy to take a role of leadership and supremacy with regard to culture, production, and politics. This was a hegemonic project that would always be characterised by the unstable cohesion between philosophy, politics, and production in the material world (Machiavelli 1950; Gramsci 1995).
This period saw the ascendancy of the hegemonic and international function of what Gramsci refers to as the “Italian Intellectuals”, in terms of the cultural homogenisation of multicultural Western Europe and intellectual and moral leadership/supremacy with regard to culture, education, architecture, etc. (Gramsci 1971, p.17). ‘Traditional intellectuals,’ in Gramsci’s strictest sense, are those agents who carry with them the knowledge of previous historic blocs of power and production into successive ones and adapt them accordingly (Gramsci 1996, p.200). The Italian Peninsula thus became the producer of teachers, scholars, artisans, composers, explorers, etc. As a result, Italy exported its cultural agents throughout Catholic Europe whilst remaining politically and militarily impotent until the Italian Risorgimento of the 19th century (Gramsci 1971, p.17).

Through the development of the Italian Intellectuals, Latin remained and expanded as the language of Western scholarship, as well as religion. Rome was re-established, at the very least, as the cultural centre of the West (Gramsci 1971, p.17). Franks, Britons, and other subsequent political and military constituents of the Catholic faith began a tradition of sending representatives of their families to Rome in order to take places within the Latin Church hierarchy, thus organically re-linking Rome to the rest of Western Europe (Gramsci 1971; 1992; 1995; 1996). This was, in essence, how the old Roman aristocracy of the Italian Peninsula preserved itself following its geopolitical decline (Gramsci 1971, p.17).

The weakness of this system, however, for both the Church hierarchy and/or the Italian aristocracy, was its reliance on foreign military protection to defend them (Machiavelli 1950). Threats indeed came from the Germanic Arian-Christian groups such as the Ostrogoths, Visigoths, as well as the growing spread of Islamic forces after the 6th century (Agobard of Lyons 1981; Gregory of Tours 1916). Each, at times, controlled or threatened much of the territory surrounding the Italian Peninsula through successive

---

25 Gramsci provides an in-depth historical analysis that traces the origin of the Roman enfranchisement of traditional intellectuals, from all over the ancient and classical world, back to the transition between the Republican and Imperial phase of Rome, in which he credits Caesar with catalysing the growth of traditional intellectuals throughout the Latin World (1971, p.17).
periods (Agobard of Lyons 1981; Fanning 1981). The initial military alliance that the
Italian Intellectuals made, in order to preserve their assets and Roman culture, was with
the Franks\textsuperscript{26}, though their reliance on the Franks was severely challenged until the rise of
Charlemagne in the 8\textsuperscript{th} century (Gramsci 1995; 1996; Montesquieu 1989; Agobard of

During Charlemagne’s reign, the Catholic Church, its traditional intellectuals, and the
Franks fused the realms of production, philosophy, and politics at every sublevel of a
vast, and expanding, geographical area in order to produce the template for a system of
thought and practice that would unify Western Christendom: feudalism (Montesquieu
1989; James 1988). The symbolic establishment of this new Western European order was
the crowning of Charlemagne as ‘Emperor’ by the Pope in the early 9\textsuperscript{th} century (Ladner
1947; Einhard 1880). By this time, Islam had been effectively contained, and Arian-
Christian Germanic tribes had been respectively driven out by the Catholic Franks or
Islamic Arabs (Gregory of Tours 1916; Goffart 1988).

Furthermore, pagan tribes, such as the Saxons, were crushed and assimilated (Einhard
1880; Gregory of Tours 1916; Montesquieu 1989). The alliance between the Franks, the
Church, and the Italian Intellectuals established the hegemony of Christendom in Western
Europe in the form of the Holy Roman Empire. The hegemonic features of this new order, in terms of production, included laws to bind the common lands for subsistence
and commercial agriculture, the establishment of the “fife,” or canton-parish-diocese
system of regulating production and tax collection affixed to the Judeo-Christian custom
of the tithe, and the revitalisation and creation of trade routes throughout the realm
(Einhard 1880; Montesquieu 1989).

In terms of politics, the hegemonic features of the new order included the reinvention of
the title of Emperor and the unification of much of Western Europe under one system of
rule via the establishment of the common law system to govern the fifes, thus
decentralising law to accommodate a realm of multicultural cantons/parishes.

\textsuperscript{26} Namely Clovis and the Merovingian kings who followed him (Montesquieu 1989; Daly 1994).
Furthermore, it re-established Rome as a world city, and the Pope as a global political actor (Einhard 1880; Montesquieu 1989). In terms of philosophy, and at the level of language, Latin was disseminated by the Italian Intellectuals of the Church throughout the Holy Roman Empire as a language of liturgy and scholarship. Secondly, with the system of common law, dialects and vernaculars were able to develop into the prototypes of national languages with respects to different regions within the Empire. Ultimately, common sense was organically fused with popular religion and the philosophies and religions of the Latin intellectuals into one material consciousness of Western Europe: feudal Christendom (Gramsci 1971, p.17). This gave the Papal States in central Italy the breathing room the Holy See needed in order to establish itself as the bureaucratic centre of intellectual and moral leadership for this new Western European order (Montesquieu 1989).

4.2.2 The continued ambiguity as to the balance of civil and political society in Western Christendom

One of the key comparative differences which grew between the Eastern Empire and the emergent Holy Roman Empire of the West, in terms of the configuration and balance between ‘Church’ (civil society) and ‘State’ (political society), was the issue of investiture. Bishops of Rome continued to view the Patriarchs of Constantinople as somehow subordinate to their authority within the overall hierarchy of Christian political and spiritual power (Robinson, J.H. 1905, p.72; Meyendorff 1968; Barthrellos 2004). Popes, however, after the fall of the Western Empire, had very little physical resolve to enforce their authority over the Eastern Church (ibid). This issue of investiture, between East and West, had only been tentatively resolved by Damasus at the ecumenical councils of Constantinople and Rome (381-382), brought on when Emperor Theodosius I 27 appointed Nectarius as Archbishop of Constantinople without papal approval (Agobard of Lyons 1981; Chadwick 1960).

27 The last Emperor to jointly rule over East and West.
Once the Empire was re-divided, and particularly after the fall of Rome, successive popes had very little recourse to prevent imperial investitures of power in the Eastern Church (Robinson, J.H. 1905, p.72). Until the 15th century, the Eastern Empire operated as a relatively balanced system of Caesaro-Papism within which the Archbishop (Patriarch) of Constantinople crowned the Emperor, but the overall power and moral authority of the clergy was invested in the religious structure, or ‘civil society,’ by the Byzantine Emperor (Meyendorff 1968; Robinson, J.H. 1905). The West, after the 5th century, was left with much less legal or traditional precedents for linking ‘state’ with ‘church’ (or ‘political’ and ‘civil’ society). Pope Leo III took the step of investing the power of the title of Emperor in Charlemagne as an historical necessity for survival (Ladner 1947; Einhard 1880).

Aside from the growing cultural and linguistic divide between Constantinople and Rome, the Eastern Emperor could no longer protect the Latin Church. If Latin culture, the Church, and the intellectual and moral leadership of the Bishop of Rome were to survive in Europe the investiture of imperial power by the Pope to a willing military and political ally was of the highest strategic importance (Ladner 1947). Though Charlemagne’s imperial title set a single precedent of the Catholic Church’s investiture of political authority, it did not strike a balance of church and state permanently, or even solidify a concept of what that balance ought to be (de Mesquita 2000; Hicks 1973).

While the Church’s monopoly over philosophy in Western Europe may have been fortified, by no means was its control over politics and production entrenched. Most of the 9th-11th centuries were marked by continued environmental difficulties and pestilences, as well as continued warfare between factions in not only Western Europe but particularly within the Papal States amongst the peninsular aristocratic families28 (Meier 2001; Stiros 2001; Brook 2003). Eastern Christendom remained at impasse with the Church of Rome throughout this period, predominantly over the primacy of the Pope

28 Most notably the period of the Pornocracy of the House of Tusculum (Brook 2003)
as well as theological matters\textsuperscript{29} (Bathrellos 2004). The Pope continued to crown the descendants of Charlemagne as kings and emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, but his ability to control his regents was continuously challenged (Montesquieu 1989; James 1988; Goffart 1988; Gregory of Tours 1916).

The \textit{Constitutio Romana} (824) gave the Holy Roman Emperor the power of validation over any Papal election result, as well as more oversight by the Italian nobility in Papal affairs (Noble 1976). Papal elections had traditionally involved the patricians as well as the Roman people, but the ascendency of the nobility in such affairs gave rise to corruption within the Roman church (Brook 2003). This produced oscillating periods of papal authority, Italian aristocratic control, and imperial supremacy over the power of the Church (Noble 1976; Brook 2003). Along with continuous waves of Viking invasions, continued Church corruption and depravity instigated by elements of the Italian aristocracy, the Church, under Nicholas II, initiated a series of structural and cultural reforms at the turn of the first millennium (Tout 1909; Brook 2003; Zema 1941). These reforms sought to wrest control of the Church away from secular elements, and included the establishment of the College of Cardinals as the new administrative leadership of a growing Church bureaucracy (Tout 1909; Zema 1941). The Curia would also assume control of papal successions after this authority was taken back from the Emperor and the Italian aristocracy (\textit{ibid}). In terms of its constant need for military protection, the Church found a new willing ally in the Normans (Tout 1909).

Building on the reforms of Nicholas II, Gregory VII (1073-1085) sought to extend the power of the Church back over the politics of Western Christendom (Tout 1909). The Gregorian Reforms attempted to politically raise the power of the Church above western political realms, which immediately sparked the Investiture Crisis between the Vatican and Emperor Henry IV, who Gregory subsequently excommunicated for his backing of a rival antipope\textsuperscript{30} (Zema 1941; Hicks 1973; de Mesquita 2000; Tout 1909). The Emperor adamantly asserted that he had control over investitures of power with regard to church

\textsuperscript{29}Such as Monothelitism (Bathrellos 2004)

\textsuperscript{30}Clement III
and state structures, and sought to bend the Vatican to his own political will (Hicks 1973). Gregory, in attempting to assert the political will of Rome, claimed sovereignty over Corsica, Sardinia, Spain and Hungary, as well as formed a strong alliance with the Croatian king Dmitar Zvonimir in the Balkans (Pavlicevic 1996).

Gregory VII, in strengthening the office of the papacy, relied heavily on the military protection of his Norman allies, who maintained their political stronghold over southern Italy and Sicily (Tout 1909). His predecessor, Alexander II (1061-1073), blessed the Norman conquest of England towards this same end (Tout 1909; Loud 1999). In return, Robert Guiscard of the Normans did much to Latinise the culturally-Greek remnant of southern Italy that had been present in the region since the Hellenistic period (Loud 1999). The papacy of Urban II (1088-1099) continued to oppose Henry IV on the issue of investiture (de Mesquita 2000; Hicks 1973). The Investiture Crisis would not be resolved until 1122, during the papacy of Calixtus II and reign of Emperor Henry V (de Mesquita 2000; Hicks 1973; Tout 1909). The resolution came through the Concordat of Worms, which was the first recognition of the Vatican of the principle of state sovereignty in terms of reducing Church interference in the affairs of the state, which established an early legal precedent for the modern state-system on the issue of sovereignty (de Mesquita 2000).

The powers of church and state (or, ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society), though not always adhered to afterwards, were clearly demarcated by the Concordat of Worms (de Mesquita 2000; Tout 1909). Emperors were given the right to invest secular powers in clergy within their own geographical domains, but it was made clear that the so-called ‘divine right’ of secular kings did not include the right to invest power in the clergy in terms of clerical matters—particularly with regard to the papacy itself (ibid). The power of execution had never been in dispute and had always been invested, following trial and sentencing, on issues such as heresy, by the Church in the secular authorities who would carry out the death sentences of the Church (ibid).
The *Concordat of Worms* by no means permanently ended disputes between Church and political realms, but it did lay the groundwork for further disputes and agreements which would eventually produce the modern state system in Western Europe (de Mesquita 2000). All of these disputes would hinge on what role the political authorities had within the Church, and the role the Church would have within the political realm (de Mesquita 2000). The Gregorian Reforms did much to provide the Church with autonomy over its own bureaucracy and policymaking (Tout 1909). Urban II (1088-1099) took two specific measures in order to fortify this growing church power over the secular world. Firstly, he established the Roman Curia as a separate political entity from the western kingdoms. Secondly, he initiated the First Crusade in 1095 as a means to unify and expand Western Christendom in terms of philosophy, politics, and production (Tout 1909).

By the dawn of the 12th century, the church-state partnership of the Holy Roman Empire had fragmentised through the Frankish royal custom of dividing kings’ realms amongst their children and subsequent rivalry (Agobard of Lyons 1981). The Western Franks, or Robertians, had grown into a separate dynasty from the Holy Roman Empire (Tout 1909). The Capetian Dynasty, beginning with the election of Hugh Capet (987), marked the beginning of statehood for modern France (Ogg 1972, pp.178-80; James 1988). Eastern Francia (modern Germany, much of Eastern Europe, as well as much of modern Italy) continued to be regarded as the “Holy Roman Empire,” which came to be ruled by the Ottonian Dynasty31 (Tout 1909). The rapid ascendance of the Normans as Church protectors saw their kingdoms increase beyond Normandy, to Sicily/Southern Italy, England (1066), and Ireland32 (Watt 2005).

By the 12th century, the Scandinavian kingdoms of Norway, Sweden and Denmark had all also become firmly Christianised. The Kingdom of Hungary was established, with the Church’s blessing of the Arpad Dynasty in the 10th century, and the Kingdom of Croatia, under Dmitar Zvonimir, was blessed by Pope Gregory VII in the 11th century (Tanner 1997; Pavlicevic 1996). In southwestern Europe, the kingdoms of Portugal, Navarre,

---

31 Est. by Emperor Otto I (962); followed by the Saliens and Hoenstaufens (Tout 1909).
32 Conquest blessed by Adrian IV—a Norman/English Pope (Tout 1909).

96
Leon, Castile, and Aragon (the latter four later amalgamating as the Spanish Empire) stretched from the Pyrenees, across the Iberian Peninsula and down to the Muslim border in the south of the peninsula (Tout 1909). The Italian Peninsula was divided into cities, principalities, duchies, kingdoms, and the Papal States. All of these Western realms made up a multilingual, multicultural realm that was the basis for medieval feudal production (ibid).

The Church of Rome was the cultural organisation that attempted to unify this realm of Christendom under one system of intellectual and moral direction (Gramsci 1992; 1995; 1996). The pestilences and wars of the Dark Ages had produced myriad political realms of control dotted with Catholic institutions and communes of both clergy and peasants who were often victimised and pillaged by roving knights and warlords whom had emerged from the tumult of the previous centuries (Tout 1909). The Peace of God (989) and Truce of God (1063) were the first attempts by the Church to codify a system of thought and practice in order to intellectually and morally govern these primitive feudal structures (Thatcher & McNeal 1905, pp.412; 417-418). These structures had been degrading since the time of Charlemagne, and the subsequent anarchical environment characterised by swelling numbers of violent warlords necessitated such an intervention (Cowdrey 1970; Tout 1909). Such interventions, however, were met with limited success and relied on inciting a metaphysical fear within the hearts of medieval warlords.33

It was to this same end, of Western European unification through fear and salvation, that Urban II promulgated a common cause of conquest and Latin expansion (Tout 1909). The Crusades and subsequent Renaissance-era initiated what can best be described as a mercantilist phase of the Catholic Church and of Western Christendom as a collective socio-cultural and bureaucratic entity. Expansion of the Catholic enterprise brought immeasurable wealth to both the Church and those laymen contracted in the execution of its expansion. As Gramsci points out, the seeds of a new class, the bourgeoisie, were sown by the Church through its co-option of the laity in terms of facilitating the growing

33 Using the bones and relics of saints, as well as the threat of eternal damnation for violating the peace of Christendom (Cowdrey 1970).
logistical necessities of the decadent Renaissance-era Church—which was characterised by a burgeoning of trade and architectural projects (Gramsci 1996, p.327). There remained many political schisms between Church and political entities in the West, but this period marked the rise of the *economic* supremacy of the Catholic Church.

4.2.3 The mercantilist phase of the Catholic Church and the Renaissance-era

Diverse religious orders grew alongside the economic and territorial expansion of the Catholic Church. Many of these orders represented the homogenisation between the holiness of poverty and the protection of economic interests. Pope Honorius II, in 1129, officially endorsed the Knights Templar. This militant religious order was dedicated to protecting the economic interests of the Latin Church and providing physical protection for a burgeoning Middle East tourist industry for Latin pilgrims (Brundage 1962). Whilst, as individuals, the Knights Templar took oaths of poverty, the order as a whole grew into a financial powerhouse that would continue to grow in numbers and wealth (Gilmour-Bryson 1996). The Knights Templar would eventually establish an intricate and powerful system of credit and banking that operated from Southwest Asia to the British Isles (Gilmour-Bryson 1996). The power of the order grew beyond the control of the Holy See and was eventually disbanded following multiple charges of heresy.

---

34 Particularly the ambivalent relationship between Crusader Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Church during the mid-to-late 12th century (de Mesquita 2000; Tout 1909)

35 Or, the Poor-Fellow Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon (Brundage 1962)

36 The military and economic power of the Templars grew so large that, eventually, Philip IV of France and Pope Clement V (based in France) resigned to dissolving the order—excommunicating and executing as many as they could in 1307 (Veitch 1986).
The Knights Hospitalier, or Knights of Malta, was established following the 1st Crusade as a militant order of warriors dedicated to the protection of the growing economic interests of the Catholic Church, and has persisted hitherto (Sire 1994). Both orders’ primary purpose was to protect the territorial gains of Latin expansion and the management of subsequent Church spoils (Sire 1994; Brundage 1962; Veitch 1986). Contrary to the original mission of expelling the Muslim Saracens from the Holy Land, Pope Innocent III signed the License to Venice to Trade with the Saracens (1198), which reveals that economics were a higher priority than reclaiming Jerusalem for the Vatican (Cave & Coulson 1936, pp.104-05). Pope Celestine III, in 1192, officially recognised the Teutonic Knights, a German religious military order with a similar purpose as the Hospitaliers and the Templars (Urban 2003). The Teutonic Knights were never as influential in the Levant as their counterpart orders but they would eventually have a special purpose on the fringes of Europe (ibid).

The Northern Crusades were sanctioned by Pope Gregory IX in 1232 (Tout 1909). This series of military expeditions combined the forces of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword, the Teutonic Knights, and the kings of Denmark, Sweden and Norway (Urban 2003; Delanty 1996). This campaign against the pagans and Eastern Christians of northern and northeastern Europe would secure the entire Baltic Sea region for Western Christendom (Delanty 1996). The Pskov and Novgorod Republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia all became key ports and centres of trade in this process (Gaimster 2005). All of these cities and ports were subsequently linked with German trading cities and were all eventually subsumed into the Hanseatic League (Lindberg 2008; Andren 1989; Gaimster 2005).

The Hanseatic League grew into an even wider German-led trade guild of cities and ports that monopolised trade throughout the Baltic region and the North Sea, remaining

---

37 Which had fallen back under Muslim control by 1197 (Tout 1909)
38 Subsequently merged with the Teutonic Knights (Urban 2003)
39 The League had been founded by Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony (cousin of Frederick Barbarossa) and the Teutonic Knights in the 12th century. The League was based in Lubeck in northern Germany—and members/cities were allowed to operate freely through their dedicated allegiance to the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Emperor (Cave & Coulson 1936, pp.231-233).
an economic powerhouse until the 17th century (Cave & Coulson 1936, pp.231-33; Braudel 1981, pp.506; 541). This monopoly led to wars between this corporation of Teutonic Knights and the emergent power of the Netherlands, as their monopoly had stifled the Hollanders’ ability to trade effectively in the North Sea region40 (Lindberg 2008; Andren 1989). The Kingdom of Poland & Lithuania also warred with the Teutonic Knights throughout the 15th century over the monopoly and tariffs held by the League, which had preserved its prominence, whilst holding back Poland & Lithuania’s economic freedom and ability to compete (Lindberg 2008).

These militant and mercantilist religious orders of the Catholic Church did much to increase the wealth of not only the Church, but also the wealth of Western Christendom as a whole. The Crusades and the subsequent exposure of the west to the cultural life of the east saw a rebirth of classical ideas, including Aristotelian and ancient Greek philosophy as well as advanced mathematics and architecture which found expression in the Renaissance-era Catholic Church (Gilson 1954). Latin intellectuals, such as Thomas Aquinas, inspired by Aristotle and classical culture, greatly shaped the overall philosophy of the Church in terms of the nature of the relationship between church and state, or, ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society (Gilson 1954; Nelson 1996). Aquinas would offer an intellectual and moral system of thought and practice that would serve to progress Western Christendom into the Renaissance-era.

Unlike Augustine, Aquinas believed that the Church could indeed have a positive and active role in the affairs of politics and the state (Nelson 1996; Gilson 1954). As Gramsci points out, the Catholic Church has undergone a number of internal periods of reform and philosophical evolution throughout its history (Gramsci 1995, p.24). The era of scholasticism (or Thomism), inspired by Aquinas, was one such period of internal Church reformation. Gramsci cites41 its continued importance and influence as a source of intellectuals and institutions within and between states and societies, up to the twentieth-

40 Resolved by the Treaty of Copenhagen in 1441—after which the monopoly of the Hanse cities ended and the Netherlands rose as a world economic and military power (Lindberg 2008; Andren 1989).
41 Ex: (1995, pp. 42-44; 67; 94; 297; 329; 339-40; 367; 411; 418; 440; 526; 531; 537; 564; 566); (1985, p.192); (1971, pp. 364; 368; 387)
Thomism defined a new articulation of the Church’s position within both state and society. Aquinas articulated a concept that ‘Natural Law’ dictates that humans are, by nature, reasonable and social creatures (Nelson 1996).

Unlike Augustine, Aquinas insisted that monarchical statecraft is a means through which humans are attempting to replicate the divine order of the universe (Nelson 1996). Unlike Augustine, Aquinas insisted that humans are creatures driven by reason and not by sin (Gilson 1954; Nelson 1996). In other words, for Aquinas, there was no need of a separation between political structures and the church, or civil and political society, as they were both part of a larger universal order (Nelson 1996). For Aquinas, even worldly philosophies and sciences were a reflection of Divine Law (Gilson 1954; Nelson 1996). Thomism catalysed the Renaissance-era as the predominant philosophy and ideology of Catholicism. As a repackaged form of classical Aristotelianism, Thomism/Scholasticism served as the intellectual and moral apparatus for the conventions of the material world (Nelson 1996). In essence, Thomism reaffirmed and renewed the monopoly over Western philosophy, spirituality, and scholarship (Gramsci 1995; 1971).

The rebirth of scholasticism and logistical growth of the Catholic Church enabled the Church to reach its apex during the Renaissance-era. The growing wealth of the Church also catalysed the growth of artisan and merchant segments of the laity (Gramsci 1996, p.327). Political authorities within Christendom, however, also became enriched during the Renaissance-era of expanded trade and travel (Tout 1909). This simultaneous growth of power and wealth, in terms of the Church, the laity, and political authorities, produced many conflicting interests with regard to the distribution of wealth, political and papal power throughout Christendom. Christendom became complicated by growing national interests and the interests of church bodies within those developing nation-states.

The most obvious example of this church-state and interstate competition was the Great Schism of the West. This occurred after the Curia had moved the operations of the Catholic Church to Avignon during the 14th century in order to avoid German secular interference in Church affairs (Salembier 1907). This schism gave expression to a power
struggle within and between the spiritual and secular powers of Europe. France, Scotland, Aragon, Naples, Leon-Castile, Burgundy and the Knights of Malta all sided with the Avignon Papacy (Salember 1907). England, the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, Hungary, the Scandinavian realms, and most of the peninsular city-states and realms of Italy all sided with the Church in Rome (ibid). The Church remained fractured for decades, with Christendom divided between two papacies and increasingly competitive national interests.

The schism ended in 1414, but other major factors contributed to popular resentment of the Renaissance-era Church. Popular resentment for the Church was centred on its lavish decadence, the ineptness of the Church to effectively deal with the bubonic plague outbreaks of the era, and growing national interests (Machiavelli 1950; Gramsci 1992; 1995; 1996). All of these had done irreparable damage to the popular image of the Catholic Church and to its intellectual-moral authority and power structures (Machiavelli 1950). This popular resentment and competition between secular powers, which had long been brewing in many circles throughout Christendom, grew to a point that could no longer be contained. The need for material goods, the transportation of those goods, and the Thomist-Church’s expression of blatant decadence created competition within and between the nations of Christendom (Gramsci 1995; 1971). Thomism had reintroduced classical reason to Western Europe, but also the belief that divinity can be expressed by humans within the material world, through monarchical statecraft and artistic expressions of decadence, such as architecture (Gilson 1954; Nelson 1996). All of these factors only highlighted the ambiguity of overlapping jurisdictions, characteristic of the medieval feudalistic period of Western Europe (Cerny 2010).

Issues of taxation, both the attempts by the Church to extract tithes from the laity and the lay-rulers’ attempts to excise taxes from church structures within their realms, had led to a greater estrangement of church, state, and society throughout the Renaissance period of Christendom (Henderson 1910, pp.432-434). Playing favourites, with regard to Church and states, and the growingly separate realms of political power in Western Europe, had

---

42 Operating from Cyprus (Urban 2003)
done much to expedite the nationalisation of church structures within a once-united western “Body of Christ,” as evident by the Great Schism (Salembier 1907).

With regard to the Italian Peninsula itself, Machiavelli\textsuperscript{43} lamented about the Church’s bland political effects in simultaneously insuring its own survival in the Papal States and retarding national unity because of its dependency on foreign powers for protection (Machiavelli 1950, pp.151-153). Furthermore, Machiavelli asserts that the Church of Rome had failed to live up to its position in providing intellectual and moral leadership because of the lavish and sordid lifestyles which came to be associated with the clerical hierarchy (\textit{ibid}). Thus, the Catholic Church was no longer representative of the sets of laws and values of Christianity—putting the entire system of feudal Christendom in jeopardy (\textit{ibid}).

The Eastern Empire, it can be argued, remained intact from the 5\textsuperscript{th} to 15\textsuperscript{th} centuries precisely because of its system of \textit{Caesaro-Papism}, which had clearly drawn a balance between the powers of church and state, or ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. This balance had never been firmly established in the West, which was subsequently crippled by internal factors rather than external ones throughout the same time frame (Gramsci 1971, pp.17-20). In Western Christendom it was never made clear what role the Church had in political affairs and what role, if any, the political world had in the Church (de Mesquita 2000; Hicks 1973). Encroachments were constantly made by both superstructures of medieval feudalism (de Mesquita 2000; Gramsci 1971, pp.17-20). The lines were perpetually blurred and challenged, most blatantly characterised by the decadent humanism of the Renaissance-era church and the establishment of Thomism as the dominant political philosophy of the Catholic Church during this time, which advocated a dual role of the Church in both the material and spiritual affairs of Christendom.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{The Prince}, Ch. XI
4.3 “Scission”: Reformation & Counter-Reformation

This section examines the counter-cultural Christian conceptions of the world which sprang forth from Western Christendom during the Reformation-era. These alternative conceptions of the world were born of popular resentment towards the Renaissance-era Catholic Church and its hegemony in relation to philosophy, politics, and production (Gramsci 1995, p.10; 26; 1996, pp.140-44; 1985, p.192; 390). Lutheranism, as an emergent Christian conception of the world, will be addressed in terms of its creation of a popular culture, its reconfiguration of church and state (or civil and political society), and its role as a template for early-modern statecraft within the Holy Roman Empire (Gramsci 1971, p.18-19). The conception of the world expressed by Calvinists will also be illustrated, which saw the rebirth of Augustinian philosophy. Calvinist/neo-Augustinian philosophy established a template for both man and the modern state as an alternative to both Catholicism and Lutheranism (Gramsci 1995, p.389). This theoretical alternative was put into practice in several early-modern states and had far-reaching implications with regard to political development and changes in economic production.

Both Lutheranism and Calvinism will be portrayed as major catalysts for the ascendancy of the European bourgeois classes, the development of liberalism as an ideology, and the rise of industrial capitalism as the dominant form of global production (Gramsci 1996, pp.362-74; 1995, p.389). This section will then examine some of the myriad anarchical sects associated with the Radical Reformation and their respective conceptions of the world which were also produced during an era of religious warfare. The social forces associated with these movements emerged onto a newly-fragmented Western European landscape, and came to challenge early-modern statecraft in several places (Gramsci 1971, pp.17-21). Lastly, this section will analyse the response of the Catholic Church to the aforementioned challenges and changes during the Counter-Reformation as well as the position of loyally Catholic realms in these structural and cultural adaptations.
4.3.1 “Scission” and the popular rejection of Latin hegemony

Early dissidents of Renaissance-era Church decadence included the Waldensians and the Cathars. Peter Waldo (1140-1218) espoused a conception of the world that true Christianity and wealth simply could not coexist (Kaelber 1995; Robinson, J.H. 1905). The Waldensians, with their advocacy of the virtues of poverty, flew in the face of Renaissance decadence and the spreading Catholic clerical practices of simony and indulgences (Kaelber 1995). These practices were tantamount to a system of *spiritual comparative advantage*, and blatantly relegated the popular classes of mediaeval feudalism to a subaltern and alienated position in relation to the Church and the ruling classes. Simony, or the practice of buying clerical offices, had long been an issue of contention within the Church, but became entrenched during the Renaissance period (Fanning, D. 2003). Indulgences, or the act of pre-emptive purchases of absolution for sin, also became commonplace during this period (Fanning, D. 2003).

Since only those with the necessary wealth could participate in buying clerical positions and absolution from sin, self-imposed poverty became unpopular from the Church’s financial viewpoint. The virtues of poverty had characterised the monastic movements of the Early Church and the Augustinian period (Gramsci 1992, p.100). Even some factions within the Catholic enterprise, particularly the Franciscans, continued to extol the virtues of poverty and a-materialism (Gramsci 1992, p.223). During the early phases of the Latin Church’s development, however, the material world and wealth was still suspect to the Church, if not despised (Gramsci 1995, pp.93-94; 119-20). This worldview of the Church, however, had changed greatly along with its own wealth and during the Renaissance-era. Thomism became the philosophy that contextualised the Church’s evolution (Gramsci 1995, p.24). The virtue of poverty also tended to retard the economic gain of the Catholic Church, which it required to finance its decadent building projects (Gramsci 1996, p.327).

The Cathars, a group that persisted in the Languedoc during the same period (11th-13th centuries), maintained the Gnostic conception that the material world was evil, created by
a false god and, like their 3rd century namesakes the Katharoi,[^44] that neither the Church of Rome nor the Pope were legitimate in the eyes of the true God (Maitland 1832; Robinson, J.H. 1905). The Cathars were hunted down and exterminated during the mid-14th century during the Albigensian Crusade (Maitland 1832; Robinson, JH 1905). Nevertheless, dissidents continued to grow throughout Western Europe during the Renaissance period, promoting alternative Christian conceptions of the world. During the mid-to-late 14th century, John Wycliffe (1320-1384), an English lay intellectual, was openly defying papal authority and the divinity of the Church of Rome with his Lollard movement (Hudson 1997). The defiance of the Lollards, however, would have far reaching theological consequences. Johannes Hus (1372-1415), a Bohemian intellectual, was inspired by the teachings of Wycliffe and imported Lollard ideas to the Holy Roman Empire (Thatcher, O.J. 1907). Hus was subsequently executed for heresy in 1415 (Hus 1904).

Seeds of defiance towards a Catholic hierarchy, characterised by decadence and humanistic materialism, had, however, taken root in the heart of Christendom. The introduction of the printing press, by Johannes Gutenberg in 1440, would add to a gathering perfect storm that could not be avoided by the Catholic Church. Gutenberg proceeded to print the Latin Vulgate, which had long been read only by the Catholic Clergy and withheld from the laity (Eisenstein 1979). Ideas, particularly new interpretations of biblical scriptures, were then enabled to become material forces in ways and expressions that Rome could no longer control (ibid). Coupled with growing popular resentment towards the Renaissance-era Church, an explosion of dissidence took place within the Holy Roman Empire that quickly spread throughout Western Christendom.

Gramsci refers to Sorel’s concept of *scission*, or moments when the popular masses become coherent and collective with a new conception of the world leading to an emergence of their own system of thought and practice, to effectively divorce themselves from the “ruling order” (Gramsci 1985, pp.192-94; 389). The practices of simony and indulgences had created a system of comparative spiritual and material advantage,

[^44]: Or “Novatianists” (Butler 1905)
systemic in the way in which the Latin Church interacted with the popular masses. This led to resentment and class-consciousness in many areas throughout Christendom.

Through centuries of hegemonic feudal production, the Catholic Church and their secular leaders/partners had organically fused the realms of philosophy, production, and politics across the class spectrum (Gramsci 1971, pp.17-20). The Church had provided a conception of the world that merged the philosophy of Chalcedonian Christianity with temporal power in the material world and the structures of everyday life (Gramsci 2007, pp.74-75). Within Western Christendom, the folklore and common sense of the popular masses was affixed to the religions of Catholic intellectuals. Latin was the language of the clergy and intellectuals, which united the multilingual realm of Western Europe under an umbrella of Roman intellectual and moral supremacy.

Corruption and the mismanagement of this class balance produced the scission between the Catholic ruling classes and the Catholic popular masses (Gramsci 1985, pp.192-94; 389). This was most evident in examples such as the practice of simony, the practice of indulgences, growing national interests, and popular linguistic alienation from the Latin mass (Gramsci 1971, pp.17-19; 2007, pp.74-75). All of these factors eventually led to the split of the folklore/common sense of the popular masses from the Catholic religion(s) of intellectuals (Gramsci 1985, pp.192-95; 389; 1971, pp.17-20). Scission resulted due to the loss of the Catholic monopoly on Biblical interpretation, which was replaced by a series of subaltern/popular movements which further divided local popular religious forces from the religions of Renaissance-era Latin intellectuals. These moments of scission were largely spearheaded by the establishment of new Christian conceptions of the world, or new cultural and practical approaches to the fusion of philosophy, politics, and production. Each conception of the world prescribed a different structural balance between the institutions of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, which produced different state-society formations.

45 Ex: Thomism and other areas of theology and philosophy engaged in by the educated classes of feudalism (Gilson 1954).
4.3.2 Lutheranism

Martin Luther, a German Catholic priest, expressed the popular contempt for simony and indulgences in his *95 Theses* (1517), and set off a chain of events that led to a popular mass movement, or an emergent philosophy of praxis (Luther 1915). Lutheranism codified a message that God’s grace alone (*Sola Gratia*) could save an individual, implying that individuals cannot buy their way out of sin (Fanning 2009; Luther 1915). This also had implications that individual salvation was not to be held accountable to any earthly authority, but is held accountable solely by God’s ultimate judgment. The northern European peoples and countries that adopted Lutheranism as a mode of thought and practice enshrined this nucleus of individualism (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-44). Towards this end of individualism and self-help regarding redemption and Grace, Luther translated the Latin Bible into the common tongue of the German people and disseminated the intellectual power which was once closely-guarded by the Church of Rome throughout Northern Europe (Luther 1915).

The rapid advancement of German rationalism and philosophy owes much to the organising principles of the homogenous blending of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. This resulted in advances in the world of production ushered in by the structural application of the Lutheran conception of the world. As Gramsci points out, these advancements were a result of the popular “scission” and the subsequent production of a new “popular culture” that sprang from Luther’s reforms (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-144; 1971, p.394). Gramsci’s main points are that the popular scission for the Germans came first, from the bottom-up, and the development of a subsequent intellectualism and national identity came as a result of Luther’s programme of intellectual and moral reforms. In other words, in terms of Lutheranism and the German Enlightenment, ideas acted as a material force, or a change of consciousness led to subsequent developments in the world of production and not the other way around.
According to Gramsci:

“the historical bearers of the Reformation are the German people, not the intellectuals. But this ‘cowardice’ of the intellectuals explains the ‘sterility’ of the Reformation in high culture, until a new group of intellectuals surfaced slowly from within the reformed popular masses—and then came the German philosophy of 1700-1800” (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-44).

A new form of common sense was subsequently developed into an intellectual philosophy, which led to innovations in the world of production and acted as a catalyst to the formation of the modern state in Protestant countries (ibid). This intellectualism was spearheaded by the linguistic uniformity of Luther’s Bible and the Book of Concord as the basis for literacy and the dissemination of a national language for the German people across class lines. Lutheranism’s emphasis on literacy laid the foundation of the German Enlightenment, characterised by successive philosophers such as Wolff, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-144).

The rapid advancement of German rationalism and philosophy owes much to the organising principles of the homogenous blending of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, as well as the resultant advances in the world of production ushered in by the structural application of the Lutheran individualist conception of the world (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-144). The Kingdoms of Sweden, Denmark & Norway (including Iceland), and other northern European realms and ‘free cities’ within the Holy Roman Empire which adopted Lutheranism as the practiced thought of the land experienced a homogenous blending of church and state whereupon the Lutheran Church became the official state church, or a system of ‘church = state’. According to Gramsci, Lutheranism was successful precisely because it “created a popular culture,” and “because of its popular development, the Reformation was able to resist the armed assault of the Catholic coalition, and thus the German nation was founded” (Gramsci 1971, p.396; 1996, p.142).

The Augsburg Confession (1530) was the key document that articulated Lutheran civil/state philosophy and allowed for the homogeneity of national ‘church’ and ‘state,’ 118 years before sovereignty was defined at Westphalia, for the free territories of the
Holy Roman Empire (Melanchthon 2004). Article 16 of the Augsburg Confession explicitly condones secular authority as being ordained by God (Melanchthon 2004). Furthermore, Lutheran Christians are free, if not encouraged, to serve in a stately capacity (government; military; etc.), and in civil society with specific reference to business (ibid). The underlying premise enshrined in Article 16 was that Lutherans were obliged to follow secular law, as secular authorities were ordained by God (ibid). Thus, to follow the Lutheran ‘church’ was to follow the political authorities of the ‘state’.

It is argued here that this theological development, once put into structural practice, effectively reversed the often contested equation of mediaeval feudal Christendom that prescribed a ‘state = Church of Rome,’ in terms of the structural balance between civil and political societies. Gramsci specifically alludes to the difficulties this structural balance of institutions and intellectuals posed in the national developments of both Italy and Germany (Gramsci 1971, pp.17-19). The mediaeval ‘state = Church of Rome’ equation, when contested, had produced problems such as the Investiture Crisis (de Mesquita 2000). Following the German Reformation, the tithes of the parishioners of Lutheran realms would, instead of being channeled into the transnational bureaucracy of the Church of Rome, be funneled directly into the hands of the states/sovereigns and their respective hierarchical episcopates. The new ‘church = state’ balance of institutions and intellectuals in the northern European realms which adopted Lutheranism, as the organising principle of their respective state-society formations, produced a subsequent tide of rationalism which was widely precipitated amongst the popular masses of the Lutheran countries (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-44).

4.3.3 Calvin, Arminius, and the Calvinist/Arminian impasse

Jean Calvin (1503-1564) took Luther’s conception of the individual several steps further. Calvin ushered in a radicalised popular brand of intellectual and moral reform (Gramsci 46 Article 16 allowed a degree of adaptability for individual Lutherans and Lutheran communities in terms of forming themselves to the varying natures of states (Melanchthon 2004)).
1995, p.11; 389). With his treatment of the issue of “Original Sin”, Calvin expands upon Augustine’s ontology in which souls are immortal and predestined (Steele & Thomas 1963; Beveridge 1845). Furthermore, Calvin expresses that some individuals, an ‘Elect,’ are born to God’s grace, whilst some are destined for damnation (Steele & Thomas 1963; Beveridge 1845). Calvin’s revival of Augustinianism in the reforming churches was, thus, to the Reformation what Aquinas’ revitalisation of Aristotelianism had been to the Renaissance-era Catholic Church. Both come from opposing ontological standpoints: predestination and freewill.

The five “points” of Calvinist theology are as follows: (1) the total depravity of humankind resultant of Original Sin; (2) the unconditional election by God of the specific individuals who are predestined to receive Grace; (3) a belief of limited atonement, meaning that Christ died for the sins of others, but not for all, and God already knew who the subsequent “elect” individuals would be who would receive this pre-emptive atonement; (4) irresistible grace is immanent within “Elect” individuals, so as to awaken those individuals to their destiny of Grace; (5) the “Elect” are fortified by God throughout all time through the perseverance of the saints, “saints” referring to “elect” individuals (Steele & Thomas 1963; Beveridge 1845). The fifth point also enshrines the Calvinist conception of destiny, or Providence, as it dogmatises the idea that the unfolding of time, human events, and natural events are all according to an ultimate plan and represents a covenant with the “Elect” (ibid).

Primitive constitutionalism is both implicit and explicit within Calvin’s Covenant theology in terms of the ideal balance between church and state, or civil and political society (Martinez 2002/03; Van Kley 1999). Calvin’s balance between these two superstructures stands as one of the main Calvinist critiques of Lutheranism. Like Luther, Calvin emphasised the notion that the civil authorities were pre-determined and ordained by God (Steele & Thomas 1963). Calvin, however, placed more emphasis on the notion of “Original Sin,” and articulated that the popular masses also had a pre-ordained role to

47 The doctrine of mankind’s initial fall from grace in the Garden of Eden, which dictated human nature hitherto being totally depraved (Beveridge 1845).
act in the capacity of checks and balances in terms of the authority of the political state (Martinez 2002/03; Van Kley 1999).

Two of the earliest criticisms raised in the initial reforms proposed by Luther included both the practices of simony and indulgences (Fanning, D. 2003). With equal disdain, early Calvinists viewed the emergent Lutheran religious structures as a danger for the continuation of these practices at a national level rather than at the transnational level of the Church of Rome (Walzer 1965; Steele & Thomas 1963). The episcopates created by the national churches, according to Calvinists, operated bureaucratically no differently than the Catholic Church (Walzer 1965). The only difference was that a national sovereign and aristocracy would continue a mixture of spiritual and state business-as-usual, which would effectively cancel all of the gains won for common/subaltern Christian individuals through the initial break with Rome.

It was, according to Calvin, because of “Original Sin” that all individuals and institutions, irrespective of size or class, are equally subject to fallibility. This condition warranted checks and balances within and between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society (Walzer 1965; Steele & Thomas 1963). This is reflective of his articulation of the presbyterian form of polity with respect to both ‘church’ and ‘state,’ or ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. The individual, common or otherwise, according to Calvin, had a role within the functioning of the church congregation (Walzer 1965; Steele & Thomas 1963). The church congregation then had a role within the larger polity and functioning of the regional and national bodies of the church.

With its implicit and explicit theological emphasis on the individual congregation, the Calvinistic conception of the world naturally stood in contradiction to the hierarchical bureaucracy that characterised the Catholic Church (Steele & Thomas 1963). Likewise, the Lutheran Church placed far too much power into the hands of the political/state authorities for Calvin (ibid). Calvin’s Augustinian ontology, with regard to the inherent depravity of worldly institutions, did not allow for such blending between church and state. All individuals and institutions within both civil and political society are believed to
be equal through the common condition of inherent depravity, according to Calvin (Steele & Thomas 1963).

Calvinist Covenant theology and its presbyterian form of polity emphasised the role of individuals, congregations, and the political authorities in a covenant (or constitution) between individuals, ‘civil’ society, the political ‘state,’ and the grace of God (Walzer 1965; Van Kley 1999). Towards this end, Calvin prescribed a model of state/societal-craft that directly involved the following components: the individual parishioner, each and all, equally members of God’s ‘Elect’; the local congregation; the presbytery, being a panel of elders elected by the local congregation; a synod, or regional body of these elected presbyteries; a general assembly at a national level (Walzer 1965). Calvin’s presbyterian form of polity would serve as an organisational template for structuring a balance between individuals, church and state—or individuals, civil society, and government (Walzer 1965; Van Kley 1999). In comparison to both the Lutheran and Catholic systems of structural hierarchy and bureaucracy, this Calvinist model can be viewed as much more democratic in terms of the power of the individual participants within it. Calvinism emphasised civil society, and was thus envisioned to produce a much more associational and organic form of state with limited governmental powers (Walzer 1965; Steele & Thomas 1963).

This structuring of civil and political society can be described as neither ‘church = state’ nor ‘state = church’. It is asserted here that the Calvinist/presbyterian polity represents an organic harmonisation, or ‘Covenant’, of God, the individual, society, state and sovereign as ‘Church & State’. It represents a harmonious balance between the two spheres of superstructures precisely because of the limitations it puts on the political ‘state’ by the church/civil society. In turn, the power of the ‘church’, or civil society, places limits on itself through the layers of checks and balances within it, as well as the activism and participation of all individuals which comprise it.

It was this presbyterian form of polity that theologically prescribed a limited separation of ‘church’ and ‘state,’ or ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, by providing an alternative
system of intellectual and moral cohesion as part of the ‘Covenant Theology,’ or primitive constitutionalism, implicit within Calvinist doctrine (Van Kley 1999; Martinez 2002/03). Presbyterian polity and statecraft represented an attempt to structure philosophy, politics, and production according to the Calvinist-individualistic worldview. This radical conception of the world prescribed a system of spiritual equality, through common inherent depravity amongst men, and a revolutionary polity based on grassroots associationalism (Walzer 1965).

Thus, Calvinism had implicit and explicit democratic tendencies (Walzer 1965; Van Kley 1999) Calvin’s philosophy also catalysed a “spirit of initiative,” as a component of its intellectual and moral reform (Gramsci 1995, p.389). This added a specific economic component to Calvinism which gave rise to a more individualistic outlook with regard to production at the level of the popular masses (Gramsci 1995, p.389; Friedrich 1957, p.59). In terms of Calvinist doctrine and practice corresponding to the world of production, Calvinism prescribed that the “Elect” are to live humbly, productively, and frugally (Steele & Thomas 1963). This corresponds to the worship practices of Calvinist churches which rejected the decadence of the Renaissance-era Church and sought to simplify liturgies, as well as to expunge materialism from the realm of the sacred (ibid). Gramsci echoes Weber (2002) in saying that “Suffice it to mention the theory of predestination and grace characteristics of Calvinism and its giving rise to a vast expansion of the spirit of initiative” (Gramsci 1995, p.389). Hume, as well, credited the Reformation with the rise of commerce and industry because as it unbound the potential of the individual (Hume 1998, pp.49-56).

Calvin’s conception of the world set into motion a series of popular mass movements with a viral idea that spread as a material force throughout many areas of northern/western Europe, and would also be disseminated throughout the known world via Calvinist refugees (Walzer 1965; Fischer 1989; Augelli & Murphy 1988). Calvin’s brand of theology would take root, not only amongst the French Huguenots, but also amongst the people of Scotland, the Puritans of England, the Netherlands, and was disseminated throughout their subsequent colonies (Walzer 1965; Fischer 1989). The
presbyterian polity grew largely from the experimental Geneva municipal reforms which Calvin led, and would greatly affect the attempts at state/societal-craft undertaken in Switzerland, the Dutch Republic, and Scotland (Walzer 1965).

In the Netherlands, out of Calvin’s own movement, grew a separate conception of the world that rejected Calvinist philosophy through the agency of Jacobus Arminius and the Remonstrants (Bangs 1985). Arminius had taken exception to several tenets of his teacher, Calvin’s own successor, Theodore Beza. The five criticisms of Calvinist philosophy put forth by the Remonstrants included the following: (1) that predestination was a conditional mystery and, by no means, absolute; (2) ‘General Atonement,’ or the notion that Christ’s death served to absolve everyone—not simply a predetermined ‘Elect’; (3) because of the condition of ‘Total Depravity,’ that individuals cannot exercise a saving faith; (4) an individual gaining God’s divine grace requires effort—i.e. ‘works’ as well as faith; (5) that no individual is either beyond redemption or beyond a fall from God’s grace (Bangs 1985; Steele & Thomas 1963).

Thus, Arminius rejected the Calvinist point that divine grace and atonement are limited to an “Elect,” and argued instead that the crucifixion of Jesus saved humanity as a whole (Bangs 1985; Steele & Thomas 1963). The Arminian rejection of irresistible grace being immanent within “elect” individuals implied that all individuals are equally as capable of coming to salvation on their own (Bangs 1985). The “Elect” can thus be anyone who accepts the faith, and faith alone is what saves an individual. This represents a complete rejection of pre-destination and enshrines a conception of the world that implies human choice, or free will. That human nature is not predetermined means that anyone can receive divine grace and/or atonement (ibid). The Calvinist philosophical critique of the Remonstrants, however, ties the philosophy of Arminius to the Renaissance-era Catholic philosophies of Thomism and Erasmus; i.e. that Arminianism enables legitimacy for decadence and worldliness that defies the Augustinian conception of the world implicit and explicit in Calvinism (Sproul 2001). Calvinists also viewed Arminianism as a

---

48 1560-1609
49 The so-called ‘Five Points’ of Calvinism grew out of this debate and were designed to stand in contrast to these ‘Five Remonstrants’ of Arminianism (Bangs 1985).
worldview that allows for centralised state power and the ability of sovereigns to exercise control over congregations through episcopates in an effort to fuse the ‘City of God’ with the secular world (Steele & Thomas 1963).

By re-asserting the importance of the temporal ‘works’ of the individual, Arminianism effectively promotes a conception of the world that extracts Augustine’s separation of the laws, structures, and conventions of the temporal world from the transcendental, Platonic perfect ‘form’ attributed to the realm of God (Steele & Thomas 1963; Bangs 1985). The removal of Augustine’s ontology opens the door for not only the importance of individual temporal ‘works,’ but also for the role of the ‘state,’ as a worldly institution in terms of the redemption of the human condition (Steele & Thomas 1963; Sproul 2001; Bangs 1985). In other words, the “City of God” and worldly institutions were not necessarily in need of separation and, thus, were not fundamentally in contradiction to one another. According to the Arminian conception of the world, the world is what humans make of it and, through human goodness and free will, can be shaped for the betterment of mankind (Bangs 1985). Thus, Arminianism was a repackaged and Protestant version of Thomism and the Renaissance-era Catholic Church.

Not only did the Arminian-Calvinist conflict of worldviews create schism and political violence in the Netherlands at the time of the original debate, but it also created massive problems that have hitherto existed throughout the Evangelical-Protestant world (Sproul 2001; Steele & Thomas 1963). It raged throughout the Church of England during the 17th century, later split the Methodist denomination in both England and North America, and continues to be the most contested issue amongst the Baptist denominations and between Evangelical sects throughout the world (Leonard 2003; Sproul 2001). The Arminian-Calvinist schism will persist, in terms of the body of this dissertation as one of the main points of divergence within global Evangelicalism. For some, however, the Calvinist separation of civil from political authority did not go far enough.
4.3.4 Radical Reformers and “moral anarchy”

Many of the popular movements which sprang forth from the scission created between feudal Christendom, Lutheranism, and Calvinism sought to thoroughly shed the historical baggage of Western Christendom. Other emergent social forces attempted to recreate a more primitive form of Christianity. The printing press played no small part in this back-to-basics reproduction, as the wider availability of the Bible allowed for the antiquated texts to be interpreted far more subjectively by ordinary individuals and communities amongst the popular feudal classes (Eisenstein 1979). For such individuals and emergent sects the Bible became the sole text of philosophy, and God the only temporal authority. Such groups would shun both the dawn of Enlightenment-era rationalism and any form of political authority in their respective attempts to reproduce the examples of early Christian communities found in the New Testament, such as the community based form of production portrayed in the *Book of Acts*:

“All the believers were together and had everything in common. Selling their possessions and goods, they gave to anyone as he had need. Every day they continued to meet together in the temple courts. They broke bread in their homes and ate together with glad and sincere hearts, praising God and enjoying the favour of all the people. And the Lord added to their number daily those who were being saved.”

Premillennialism, fatalism, a-materialism and eschatology, all quintessential features of primitive Christianity in Southwest Asia, became retro-popularised during the Radical Reformation. Gramsci addresses “primitive Christianity,” in his critique of Maurras, and defines it as:

“the conception of the world contained in the Gospels…whose fundamental belief that the coming of Christ had heralded the end of the world and that it therefore caused the Roman political order to dissolve into moral anarchy that corroded away every civil and state value” (Gramsci 1995, p.93).

---

50 Chapter 2; Verses 44-47--New International Version text.
Gramsci is criticising the implicit fatalism he believed to be inherent within the early Christian sects, which renounced materialism in favour of anticipating the perceived-imminent return of Jesus and the eventual establishment of an eternal metaphysical kingdom (Gramsci 1995, p.95). Maurras pessimistically refers to this aspect of early Christian ontology as being “Judaic residue” and, clouded by his own bias towards a nostalgia of classical Roman greatness, viewed such fatalism as a catalyst for a type of “moral anarchy” which stood in the way of enabling classical Rome’s cultural and political superiority (ibid). For Maurras, Christianity and Rome eventually perfected one another in a dialectical fashion and this “Judaic residue” was something he perceived to have delayed this classical fusion (ibid).

Gramsci expresses the Reformation via Calvinism and Lutheranism as progressive by creating scission between the ruling order and the popular masses, as well as spearheading historical progress, rationalism, and productive innovation (Gramsci 1995, p.10; 20-24; 389; 1996, p.300). He does not, however, make mention of such reactionary Reformation movements which rejected the rationalism produced by mainstream Protestant movements. Nietzsche, on the other hand, viewed religious trends as much more cyclical than that allowed by Gramsci’s teleology, and recognised that the same religious zeal that could produce rationalism could just as easily lapse back into irrationalism (Nietzsche 1989, p.62). Nietzsche’s concept of ‘eternal return’ thus allows for molecular elements of folklore and/or popular religion to surface centuries later and stifle what Gramsci would perceive to be rational and dialectical human progress which would challenge Gramsci’s progressive view of the Reformation. This phenomenon would be more akin to what Adorno (1983) described as a “negative dialectic”, as sects emerged during the Reformation which favoured the ‘moral anarchy’ of primitive Christianity over statecraft and rationalism.

For the separatists of the Radical Reformation, there was no path towards the reconciliation of ‘church’ and ‘state,’ of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. This was viewed as an impossible feat and promoted the belief that no truly-Christian conception of the world

could achieve this without compromising the core principles of Christian and/or Augustinian ontology (Hostetler 1974). Production, for many separatist sects, was never to exceed the subsistence needs of the community. Thus, they represented everything that Gramsci, and Maurras, despised about “Primitive Christianity”: political indifference and “moral anarchy” (Gramsci 1995, p.95). Within the religiously-fragmented Holy Roman Empire, the German Baptists, Dunkards, Schwarzenau Brethren, and other sects, expressed their defiance by respectively condemning the taking of oaths, warfare, and participation within civil/worldly governmental institutions (Hostetler 1974).

Each sect espoused principles of pacifism and equating worldly structures to ‘Caesar’ and the sinful realm of mankind (Hostetler 1974). From them grew the Amish, the Hutterites, the Mennonites, and the Anabaptists, who all added to the subsequent mass ideological and physical migratory patterns to both Britain and North America (Hostetler 1974). The continental Anabaptist ideas fused, in a more political fashion, with the Puritans and Congregationalists in England & Wales, producing the global Baptist faith as well as the transnational Quaker movement (Hostetler 1974; Fischer 1989; Leonard 2003).

All of these radical and characteristically-subaltern class sects which emerged during the 16th century promoted systems of credo-baptism, or adult “Believer’s Baptism,” as opposed to predo-baptism, or the christening or baptism of infant children (Leonard 2003; Hostetler 1974). In other words, the responsibility of an individual to accept God’s divine grace in order to become part of God’s ‘Elect’ came from within the individual, him/herself as opposed to being bestowed upon one by an institution of state/society (Leonard 2003; Hostetler 1974). It was, in essence, a choice an individual had to make oneself in order to be ‘born again’ (Leonard 2003).

For such individuals and sects, in terms of their conceptions of the world, the humanistic Renaissance-era virtues of lavishness and worldliness were replaced by frugality, temperance and humility (Leonard 2003; Hostetler 1974). Veneration of temporal

---

52 For some groups this ‘choice’ was predestined, according to Calvinistic ontology, whilst others articulated a ‘free will’ choice (Leonard 2003).
superstructures, such as the monarchy, aristocracy and episcopacy, was deemed sinful and equated with ‘Caesar’. Radical reformed sects, irrespective of where they laboured, advocated a policy of ‘Church Invisible,’ and stood opposed to ‘Church Visible’ (Leonard 2003). A ‘visible’ church being associated with the material decadence promoted by Renaissance-era Catholic and Lutheran churches, as well as the leadership roles taken by political authorities (Leonard 2003). The political authorities of a ‘visible’ church were namely sovereigns, who invested their authority invested in bishops through the establishment of episcopates (Leonard 2003).

As a theory in practice, ‘Church Invisible’ grew directly out of the continental Radical Reformation and was largely generated by a melting pot of radical and popular theologies rooted in common-sense subjective readings of Biblical scriptures (Leonard 2003; Hostetler 1974). Such sects stood opposed to the new national churches which were, in essence, state superstructures reflective of the material world. These emergent anarchical Christian sects will be the subject of further inquiry throughout this dissertation, as many represent the roots of independent groups which maintain a singular congregational polity (Leonard 2003). At the very least, these early groups attempted to set a precedent for complete separation of church and state, or civil and political societies. These groups established a lasting tradition, which persists hitherto, of congregational isolationism and the use of the Bible as the sole source of their respective conceptions of the world in relation to philosophy, politics, and production.

4.3.5 The Counter-Reformation and the Catholic Coalition

The response of the Catholic Church to this onset of new bodies of Christian thought came in the form of the Counter-Reformation, which was implemented in several stages beginning with Pope Adrian VI (1522-1523). Pope Paul III (1543-1549) called the Council of Trent in 1545 to address the growing tumult the Reformation was causing
throughout Christendom. In 1540 he recognised the Jesuit Order\(^53\), which became the primary intellectual instrument of the Catholic Church during the Counter-Reformation (Gramsci 1995; Waterworth 1848). The purpose of the Jesuits, according to Gramsci, was to assimilate the new sciences, which the Church had long retarded from developing, and adapt them to the Catholic world (Gramsci 1995).

This was coupled with the Jesuits’ attempt to create a popular culture to rival that produced by the scission of the Reformation, as exemplified in Gramsci’s persistent subheading “Father Brescianì’s Progeny” (Gramsci 1992; 1996; 2007). According to Gramsci, “Catholics hold that the Church of Rome has been reformed on a number of occasions from the inside, while in the Protestant concept of ‘Reformation’ there is implicit the idea of rebirth and restoration of the Primitive Christianity stifled by Romanism” (Gramsci 1995, p24). The purpose of the Jesuit Order was thus two-fold: (1) spearhead one such period of internal Catholic reform; (2) create a popular Catholic culture to rival those which had been produced by the Reformation.

At the Diet of Worms (1545), Emperor Charles V, who had his own issues with Rome in previous decades, agreed to rein in the Lutherans in the Empire, and fleetingly succeeded in regaining political control over most of his realm (Reinhard 1989). France, however, was torn asunder by the conflict between the Huguenots with their Calvinist patron, King Henry IV\(^54\), and the majority-Catholic population of France (Turchetti 1991). This conflict was, however, tentatively settled by the Edict of Nantes (1598), which allowed religious tolerance within France (Turchetti 1991). The Edict of Nantes would later be revoked Louis XIV (1685), driving the Huguenots out of France and into Protestant safe havens around the world (Turchetti 1991).

For the remainder of the 16\(^{th}\) century, the Catholic Church necessarily shifted its focus away from Renaissance humanism and turned its attention to containing the Reformation that was tearing Western Christendom asunder (Reinhard 1989). Pope Julius III (1550-

---

\(^53\) Or, the Society of Jesus, founded by Ignatius Loyola (Waterworth 1848)

\(^54\) Ruled from 1589-1610
1555) was the last of the Renaissance popes and was followed shortly thereafter by the highly reactionary Giovanni Pietro Carafa, or Pope Paul IV (1555-1559), who sought to eradicate the existence of Protestant ideas and paraphernalia\textsuperscript{55} in the regions that the Church still had firm control over (Reinhard 1989).

The strongest ally of the Catholic Church in the 16th century became the Habsburgs, particularly through the patronage of Philip II—combining forces to form the Catholic League, which was spearheaded by the papacy\textsuperscript{56}, the Jesuits, and Philip II (Reinhard 1989). Philip was the political and military leader the Church invested most of its hopes in, as his titles and realms included the following: King of Spain; King of Portugal; King of England and Ireland\textsuperscript{57}; Kingdom of Sicily (including southern Italy); Duchy of Milan; Franche Comte; the Seventeen Provinces\textsuperscript{58} (Parker 1976; 1998). The result of this alliance, combined with the Religious Wars of France and the (Protestant) Dutch Revolt (1568-1648) against the Habsburgs was total war.

The wider scope of religious wars included civil wars, wars between princes, and wars between the incubating-states of a once united Western Christendom. The entire continent of Europe was ravaged by continuous sectarian warfare until the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648. This is, of course, the arbitrary date upon which the modern state system was founded; a system that has existed hitherto and serves as the basis for state-sovereignty and principles of international relations (Philpott 2000; Fox 2001). In terms of the Holy Roman Empire, each prince—for his own state—was recognised as free to practice the religion of his choosing. In the case of Protestant states within the Empire, this meant that church tithes would go directly to each respective

\textsuperscript{55} Ex: Carafa enacted the \textit{Index Librorum Prohibitorum} (list of forbidden books) throughout Europe, and particularly enforced in the financial and cultural centre of Venice—which had become a hotbed for the exchange of contemporary ideas (Reinhard 1989).
\textsuperscript{56} Gregory XIII (1572-1585); Sixtus V (1585-1590); Urban VII (1590); Gregory XIV (1590-1591); Innocent IX (1591); Charles VIII (1592-1605); Leo XI (1605); Urban VII (1623-1644)—twenty-one years of the Thirty Years’ War
\textsuperscript{57} Through marriage to Mary Tudor
\textsuperscript{58} Includes parts of modern northern France and the Low Countries (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) until the Dutch Revolt resulting in the 80 Years’ War.
state-church. With regard to Catholic states, each had the prerogative to sign concordats with the Vatican.

Gramsci goes into great detail as to the nature of such concordats:

“A concordat, however, is not an ordinary international treaty; a concordat constitutes, de facto, an interference with sovereignty in the territory of just one state: all the articles of a concordat apply to the citizens of only one state, over whom the sovereign power of a foreign state claims and exercises certain rights and powers of jurisdiction.”

“Does the state get anything in exchange? It certainly does, but what it obtains pertains only to its own territory with respect to its own citizens. The state gains the following: that the church will not interfere with but rather approve and uphold the exercise of power by the state. The church promises to obtain for the state the consent of a segment of the governed that the state implicitly acknowledges it cannot obtain on its own: thus the capitulation of the state; thus the state places itself under the tutelage of a sovereign that it acknowledges to be superior” (Gramsci 1996, pp.220-225).

The Peace of Westphalia also saw the independence of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Milan, Genoa, Mantua, Modena, Tuscany, Lucca, Savoy and Parma from the Holy Roman Empire (Gross 1948; Winham 1977). King Louis XIV, later a steadfast champion of the Catholic Church, was only ten-years old during the negotiations and France’s interests and stake in the treaty were secured through the agency of Cardinal Mazarin, who had done much of the painstaking legal work involved in the Peace of Westphalia as a whole (Gross 1948; Winham 1977). Mazarin’s work would later be chastised by Pope Innocent X (1644-1655) for going too far in his compromises with the Protestants, namely on the issue of sovereignty (ibid). The continental map that resulted from Westphalia would, more or less, however, remain in place until the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). Notably absent from Westphalia, however, were the realms of Britain & Ireland, which were experiencing their own religious wars and
contested state formation based on many of these same conflicting Christian conceptions of the world.

4.4 “Court” & “Country”; “Scission” & “Suture”—contested state formation and “passive revolution” in Britain & Ireland

4.4.1 Britain as an incubator of contradictory Reformation conceptions of the world

More than a century before the Peace of Westphalia effectively ended the religious wars on the European continent and catalysed the emergence of the modern state system, Henry VIII, King of England & Wales and Ireland, effectively created the first truly sovereign modern western state. This was done by his monopolisation of both church and state, or ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, in England & Wales (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). This innovation of modern statecraft was, at least in the beginning, an inadvertent advancement. Henry, himself, was organically linked to the Catholic coalition of Europe via his marriage to the Hapsburg Catherine of Aragon, aunt of Emperor Charles V (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994).

Henry, in 1521, had ardently defended the Church of Rome against Luther’s criticisms (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). His break with the Catholic Church came less than a decade later, but only as a result of the refusal of Pope Clement VII to annul the king’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon. The Pope’s reluctance partly stemmed from the fact that Catherine’s nephew, the Holy Roman Emperor, was the main actor with whom the Catholic Church and the Papal States depended on for security as well as the suppression of Luther’s radical ideas and theological criticisms (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). Thus,
Henry’s dissent was not rooted in theology but, rather, in fundamental principles of raison d’etat: sovereignty and self-help.

Henry’s first steps in creating a national church for England & Wales included the seizing and nationalisation of all of the properties of the Catholic Church within his realm (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). The Act of Supremacy (1534) established the Church of England with the monarch as the temporal and spiritual head with complete powers of investiture with regard to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the episcopate, church property, and the collection/redistribution of the tithes rendered from the body of the church (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). The power of the monarch over the Church of England, and the structural hierarchy of the episcopate that served under the crown, almost immediately sowed seeds of discontent that would later emerge in the young national church, particularly amongst the subaltern classes who would be much more attracted to the social equality and ritualistic simplicity (purism) implicit within Calvinism and other radical theological variations (Walzer 1965; Bernard 2005).

Unlike the reforming monarch Henry IV of France, who later broke with Rome and established religious liberty in his realm via the Edict of Nantes, Henry VIII established what can best be compared to the ‘caesaro-papacy’ of the Byzantine Empire. In establishing himself as the political and moral head of this new national order he also broke the oath he took upon his coronation to uphold the Magna Charta, which explicitly stated that the church be free from the crown (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). Nevertheless, the break with Rome was initially made by Henry via the Ten Articles, penned by Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Cranmer, which established the guidelines for the Church of England in 1536 (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994). Henry’s Church of England, however, still very much resembled the liturgy, ritual and structural hierarchy of the Renaissance-era Catholic Church (Leonard 2003).

In establishing a 16th century quasi-Protestant rogue-state, however, Henry opened up his realm to the already-developing, often contradictory, continental conceptions of the world which were attempting to articulate a system of living in a world without the Catholic
Church. More so than Lutheranism, the conception of the world espoused and promoted by Calvin and his disciples took root throughout the island of Britain (Bernard 2005; Rex 1994; Walzer 1965). Cranmer took a keen interest in these ideas, along with widespread elements of the popular masses and subaltern classes.

Cranmer collaborated with Calvin and John Knox59, as they were all developing their own theologies and systems of thought and practice, with regard to philosophy, politics, and production (Bernard 2005; Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). Thus, the early Church of England was essentially a laboratory for a wide range of contradictory conceptions of the world. This would produce many schisms implicit within the development of both the church and state of England & Wales, and many knock-on consequences in the same regard in terms of the developments of Scotland, Ireland, and the eventual establishment of the United Kingdom as a collective international actor.

It was during the subsequent reign of Edward VI that Cranmer corresponded and interacted with reformers such as Calvin and Knox in councils which sought to further reform and uniformly develop the Church of England (MacCulloch 1998; 1995). His convictions inspired the Book of Common Prayer as a guide for worship, and went even further with the Forty-two Articles (MacCulloch 1998; 1995). These reforms, however, were short-lived, and the Forty-two Articles were never adopted when Edward VI died in 1553 and was replaced by the Catholic Queen Mary Tudor60 and her husband Philip II of Spain, head of the continental Catholic Coalition (Parker 1998).

Mary’s reactionary regime was short-lived, however, and, upon her death in 1558, Henry’s thoroughly Protestant daughter, Elizabeth I, ascended to the throne. Elizabeth would do much to restore the Anglican body to the caesaro-papacy established by Henry VIII, but would also alienate many of the Puritan, Calvinist, and/or separatist sects growing within her realm (McGrath 1967). At the same time Ireland remained popularly Catholic, whilst Scotland was ruled by the Catholic Mary Stuart. Scotland, however, was

59 Through whose agency Calvinism was brought to and institutionalised in Scotland (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960).
60 The daughter of Henry’s union with Catherine of Aragon (Parker 1998; Bernard 2005; Rex 1994)
simultaneously experiencing a popular tide of Calvinism (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). All of these contradictions would eventually amalgamate to produce the religious and civil wars of Britain & Ireland, as each conflicting conception of the world present throughout these realms articulated structuring a different balance of statecraft with regard to philosophy, politics, and production; civil and political societies.

4.4.2 “Court” v. “Country”; “Scission” & “Suture”: the religious wars of Britain & Ireland

Short of articulating a detailed narrative of the religious and civil wars that ravaged Britain and Ireland during the middle and latter half of the 17th century, this sub-section will instead build upon what David Hume describes as the “Court” and “Country” divide in order to highlight the important moments of scission between the ruling classes and the popular masses in Britain and Ireland (Hume 1998). Hume articulates the processes through which two conflicting factions came to a settlement upon which the modern British political and party system was founded (Hume 1998). These key moments characterised this period which encompassed the “Personal Rule” of Charles I, the regicide, the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, and the Restoration (Hume 1998). The historical processes described by Hume in the construction of the modern British system are akin to Gramsci’s own concept of “passive revolution” (Gramsci 1971, pp.106-120; 175-85).

Gramsci’s describes passive revolution as the process through which a Sorelian historical moment of ‘scission’ is effectively repaired through a “suture” of the conflicting social forces; i.e. those social forces which have become alienated from one another in a crisis of hegemony (Gramsci 1971, pp. 18; 106-114). As Gramsci points out, no matter what revolutionary forces emerge, “no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room for further forward movement” (Gramsci 1971, p.106). In relation to the development of British state and society,
Gramsci acknowledges the two broad factions of “the old land-owning aristocracy” and the “industrialists” (Gramsci 1971, p.18).

These directly correspond to Hume’s “Court” and “Country” factions which were the two broad blocs engaged in the 17th century religious wars, as a result of a feudal hegemonic breakdown, or scission in a Sorelian sense. Both Hume and Gramsci are used below because they both came to similar conclusions as to processes which brought a compromise to the breakdown. With regard to British hegemony, Gramsci argues that “the old land-owning aristocracy is joined to the industrialists by a kind of suture which is precisely that which in other countries unites the traditional intellectuals with the new dominant classes” (Gramsci 1971, p.18).

Whilst the aristocracy may have lost “its economic supremacy”, it long retained “a politico-intellectual supremacy”, and was “assimilated as ‘traditional intellectuals’” within the larger context of British socio-cultural and political relations (Gramsci 1971, p.18). It is precisely the moments of both ‘scission’ and ‘suture’ which will be addressed here, as they had far-reaching effects on the development of the statecraft of the United Kingdom, as well as the United States (Gramsci 1971, pp.18-21). In other words, the conflicting conceptions of the world, which produced ‘scission’ and ‘suture’ between the social classes of England & Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, directly affected the ways in which civil and political societies were balanced in both the UK and the US (Gramsci 1971, pp.18-21; Tocqueville 2001). Thus, the aim here is to reveal the incompatibility of the respective conceptions of the world held by key actors as a catalyst for violence during Britain’s contested state formation.

Hume uses the term “Court” in order to illustrate the direct links to the social forces, in their earliest manifestation, which amalgamated to form the royalist Cavaliers of the 17th century (Hume 1998). Hume displays that the Tory political party of his own historical period, which favoured both the monarchy and its episcopate with regard to a ‘visible’ Church of England, is the direct descendant of the “Court” faction (Hume 1998). He uses the term “Country” in order to describe the Roundheads who favoured constitutionalism,
republicanism, and a presbyterian polity in terms of the structure of the Church of England and Church of Scotland, respectively (Hume 1998). Hume argues that the “Country” faction is historical source of the Whig party of his own time (ibid).

For Hume, it was these two conceptions of the world that were, in the 17th century, incompatible. Subsequently, however, during the 18th century, they became the basis of party politics in the mixed government that evolved into the structural character and nature of the unitary British state. Mixed government was the compromise that allowed both conceptions of the world to persist and grow into modern party politics. Both “Country” and “Court” groups, Hume argues, carried with them respective factions based on “principle” and “interest,” in that “the heads of the factions are commonly most governed by the latter motive; the inferior members of them by the former” (Hume 1998, p.33).

Calvinists and separatists throughout England, Wales, Scotland, and Ulster, using their popular conceptions of the world, represented the ranks of the “principle” element of the “Country” faction (Hume 1998). Landed parliamentary-oriented men represented the “interest” faction. Catholic peasants (particularly in Ireland), the Anglican episcopate, and aristocratic elements represented the spectrum of the “Court” faction (Hume 1998). Each faction, however, was a loose alliance at best, and the volatile cohesion of each is demonstrated in the occasional breakdowns from within, particularly with regard to the Leveller movement during the Protectorate and the marginalisation of the Scottish Covenanters during and after the Restoration (Hume 1998). As Hume points out however, despite these marginalisations and occasional cohesive crises, these factions, for the most part, remained in tact well into the era of modern party politics in the UK. This corresponds with Gramsci’s own elaboration of cross-class movements and party formation in terms of the ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’ factions of such developments61.

---

61 The popular element ‘feels’ but does not understand or know; the intellectual element ‘knows’ but does not understand and, above all, does not feel. The two extremes, therefore, are pedantry and philistinism on the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other. Only if the relationship between intellectuals and people-masses, between the leaders and the led, between the rulers and the ruled is based on an organic attachment in which impassioned sentiment becomes understanding and hence knowledge (not mechanically but in a living manner), only then is the relationship one of representation, and only then
Thus, the eventual mixed government of the United Kingdom managed to encompass both “Court” and “Country” factions, and most of the contradictory conceptions of the world within and between each following the Restoration. The key here is to pinpoint the moments of scission which led to the violence which was settled by the “passive revolution”, or “suture”, of the Restoration and the so-called “Glorious Revolution” of which this compromise of mixed government was the outcome (Gramsci 1971, p.18).

Some of the major catalysts for the initial division of “Court” and “Country” in the 17th century were the vastly different Christian conceptions of the world held by widespread elements of the popular masses and respective elements of the ruling classes of England & Wales, Ireland, and Scotland (Hume 1998; Gramsci 1971, p.20). These contradictory conceptions of the world were lumbered all together into one polity upon the succession of James I as ruler of those territories collectively.

We can break these conceptions of the world down into three broad categories. Firstly, there was the Arminian-Episcopal, which articulated a ‘Church Visible,’ ‘church = state’ balance of civil and political societies. Secondly, there was the Presbyterian/Calvinist-Puritan conception of the world, which asserted a ‘Church Invisible’ position, or a ‘church & state’ covenant balance of civil and political societies. Thirdly, there was the Separatist-Puritan conception of the world, which fought for ‘Church Invisible’, or a separation of ‘church’ and ‘state’ (civil and political societies). It was within this paradigm that religious social groups/denominations and political actors factionalised. Each of these three categories encompassed different groups with respective approaches to the fusion of philosophy, politics, and production. James I managed these lines as best as politically possible, but the tensions between these three broad conceptions of the world, coupled with the fact that “an ambitious, or rather a misguided, prince arose” (Hume 1998, p34).

does one get an exchange of individual elements between the rulers and the ruled, the leaders and the led; in other words, only then does a life of connectedness; which alone is a social force, become a reality; and the ‘historic bloc’ come into being (1996, pp.173-74—Q4:33; see also Gramsci 1971, pp.418-19).

62 With which the Catholic remnant were tentatively allied.
Charles I succeeded James in 1625 and, with immediate effect, asserted his rule as a personal ‘divine right,’ which he legitimised with Arminian theology (Todd 1995; Tyacke 1987). Structurally, he spearheaded an Arminian makeover of the Church of England into a truly ‘High Church,’ in the image of the Renaissance-era Catholic Church as a decadent ‘Church Visible’ with himself at the head (Todd 1995; Tyacke 1987). His marriage to a Catholic Bourbon princess was enough to alarm the Protestant masses of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ulster in terms of fears about succession. As Calvinist theologians warn, with regard to Arminianism, Remonstrant-theology may not specifically advocate monarchical tyranny, but it leaves such a loophole between free will and grace (Sproul 2001; Steele & Thomas 1963).

Hume agrees, in specifically comparing Calvinism and Arminianism, that:

“….if a prince have the choice of both, it is easy to see that he will prefer the episcopal to the presbyterian form of government, both because of the greater affinity between monarchy and episcopacy, and because of the facility which he will find, in such a government, of ruling the clergy by means of their ecclesiastical superiors” (Hume 1998, p34)

Much to the distaste of the Scottish Presbyterians, the English Puritans, and the separatist sects, he appointed his closest advisor, and staunch Arminian, William Laud, as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633, upon which these systematic reforms became known as ‘Laudianism’ and the ‘Caroline Captivity of the Church’ (Tyacke 1987). Charles and Laud were vehemently anti-Puritan, anti-Calvinist, and anti-Parliament (Tyacke 1987). During the 1630s, Charles and Laud systematically ejected Puritan ministers from the Church of England, and neutralized Puritan, anti-Arminian leaders such as William Prynne, John Bastwick, and Henry Burton (Todd 1995; Tyacke 1987). This sparked a diaspora of Puritans to Massachusetts, popularly referred to as the ‘Great Migration’ (Fischer 1989; Tocqueville 2001; Gramsci 1971, p.20).

Taxation and the dispute between Charles and Parliament over the power of the national purse should not be isolated from these conflicting conceptions of the world in terms of
Britain’s state formation (Hume 1998). Traditionally, the crown required Parliament to allocate funding for crown expenditures (Hume 1998). Arminianism inspired Charles to use the Church of England, through the tithe system, as a means of revenue and as a means of marginalising Parliament (Todd 1995; Tyacke 1987). In other words, a strong Parliament, coupled with a Church of England based on a presbyterian polity and not an episcopate, would have given more power of the purse to Parliament. As Hume points out, with the exception of the Magna Charta, the constitutional gains of English subjects had never been institutionalised other than through custom (Hume 1998, p.34).

Thus, in terms of the “Country” faction, parliamentarians had always had a customary understanding of their rights and liberties. Charles, however, viewed these privileges not as ‘rights,’ but as “concessions of his predecessors, revocable at pleasure; and, in prosecution of this principle, he openly acted in violation of liberty during the course of several years” (Hume 1998, p34). In this respect, Charles alienated and angered the “interest” element of the “Country” faction. In terms of the “principle” element of the “Country” faction, the Presbyterian Scots, Puritan elements of the Church of England, and the Separatist sects no longer held conceptions of the world conducive to any ruler asserting a ‘divine right’ to rule neither realm nor Church. Calvinists argued should be structured according to a non-episcopal, presbyterian polity as a ‘Church Invisible’ (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960; Walzer 1965). Scission, at both ends of the class spectrum, with regard to Hume’s “Country” faction, was inevitable.

The first moment of scission occurred in Scotland in 1638. James I had already left seeds of rampant discontent amongst the Presbyterian masses by reintroducing bishops and implementing the Five Articles of Perth (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). Charles I went even further in agitating the Scots by forcing the Church of Scotland to adopt the English Book of Common Prayer as the official liturgical guide (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). The immediate result was popular rioting, followed by a meeting of the General Assembly. Presbyterian nobles met with clergy and representatives of the Scottish commoners to produce the National Covenant, which outlawed both bishops and the Book of Common Prayer (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960).
By rejecting the rule of Charles I, abolishing the episcopate, and inciting the Bishops’ Wars, the Church of Scotland finally achieved the ultimate aim of Calvin’s ‘Covenant Theology’: a national church with a presbyterian polity (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). Thus, for the Covenanters, religious revivalism and nationalism became inseparable. Through the National Covenant, the nobility became organically linked with the popular Presbyterian masses in a republican style to fuse philosophy, politics, and production according to Calvin’s (and Knox’s) worldview (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). By 1640, the Scots had routed Charles’ forces in the south of Scotland, and had even occupied Newcastle. For eleven years, Charles had left Parliament dormant and many of its members seething (Hume 1998). His disastrous losses to the Covenanters in Scotland had put him in a position where he had no other financial choice than to turn to those he had marginalised for over a decade.

According to Hume:

Necessity, at last, constrained him to call a parliament: the spirit of liberty arose and spread itself: the prince, being without any support, was obliged to grant every thing required of him: and his enemies, jealous and implacable, set no bounds to their pretensions. Here, then, began those contests, in which it was no wonder that men of that age were divided into different parties…The hopes of success being nearly equal on both sides, interest had no general influence in this contest: so that ROUNDHEAD and CAVALIER were merely parties of principle, neither of which disowned either monarchy or liberty; but the former party inclined most to the republican part of our government, the latter to the monarchical. In this respect, they may be considered as the court and country party, inflamed into a civil war, by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, and by the turbulent spirit of the age (Hume 1998, pp.34-35).

In 1643, following the outbreak of violence in England between the Parliamentarians and the forces of the monarchy, the Solemn League and Covenant united the Scottish Covenanters with the Roundheads against their mutual enemy when the prospect of Charles being aided by an Irish Catholic army became a real and present danger (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). This was, at best, an uneasy alliance of necessity for these
disparate groups in the “Country” faction. Many of the independent-separatist Protestants of England were suspect of Presbyterianism, but resigned to form the alliance based on a mutual repudiation of both Catholicism and Anglican episcopalianism (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). It was, however, never made clear within the “Country” faction what the nature of the Church of England would be following the conflict (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960).

In other words, this tentative alliance within the “Country” faction did not guarantee the prospect of a unified settlement involving both England and Scotland, or even ensure the future of presbyterian polity for the Church of Scotland. Thus, the Solemn League and Covenant was a temporary plaster over some of the implicit cracks within the “Country” faction during the period of the civil and religious wars. For the Scottish Covenanters, this was an alliance made that would have ideally ensured that the Church of England and, more importantly, the Church of Scotland would never again have a state-imposed episcopacy (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960).

The other phenomenon of popular scission, which is vital to this historicism, is with respect to England: that is, where the ‘principle’ or ‘feeling’ faction of the “Country” party overtook the ‘interest’ or ‘knowing’ faction. English popular scission, unlike the Scottish Covenant, did not come in a single moment, but rather in a series of cascading instances: the rise of the zealously-Puritan New Model Army; the ascension of Cromwell; the Self-denying Ordinance of 1645; the regicide of Charles I (Cotton 1977). This series of events was essentially England’s Reformation-era ‘scission,’ in the Sorelian-Gramscian sense. They represented instances in which the popular classes took control of philosophy, politics, and production according to their conceptions of the world. This led to the ascendancy of Cromwell and the establishment of the Puritan-inspired Commonwealth. These events still live on as residual elements of ‘common sense’ and ‘folklore’ within descendant Christian separatist traditions, even in what is now the United States (Fischer 1989; Leonard 2003).

---

63 Forbidding Parliamentarians from holding officer-positions in the New Model Army (Cotton 1977).
According to Southern Baptist theologian, B.H. Carroll:

“To ignore that period seals up history. Ignorance of it makes it impossible to understand the Baptists of today. It was a colossal strife for civil and religious liberty. Victories were won in that day whose laurels will never fade and whose influence will never die. Wherever Cromwell’s armies marched, the Baptists, who constituted a large, heroic, and influential part of them, deposited the imperishable seeds of their principles” (Carroll 1999, pp.46-47).

Amalgamated with the eventual Act of Toleration (1689), the instigation of foreign missions, the creation of the United States, and the commissioning of the English translation of the Bible by James I, these represent what Carroll refers to as “the milestones and sign boards along the highway of human progress” (Carroll 1999, p.46). It is not the purpose of this research to validate Carroll’s weight of importance on historical events. It is, however, part of the overall aim of this dissertation to reveal the residual importance of these events with regard to the perception and philosophy—including common sense, folklore, popular religion, and theological religions of intellectuals— which Carroll proudly admits to be inherent within the modern Baptist faith.

Cromwell, however, experienced a key moment of scission from within the heart of the “Country” faction’s radical ranks. John & Elizabeth Lilburne’s dissenting voices inspired the Leveller populist/separatist movement from within the “Country” faction, largely with their opposition to the Solemn League and Covenant (Brockway 1980). Many of the separatist-Christians within the New Model Army, manifested collectively in the form of both the Levellers and the Diggers and began to argue for land rights and congregationalism; that is, the complete independence of church congregations from any form of polity outside of the congregation itself (Brockway 1980). Separatism can be best described as a form of primitive Christianity, with community-based social anarchism as the desired mode of production (Gramsci 1995, p.95). The message of “Freeborn John” began to quickly spread throughout the New Model Army and the countryside, but particularly in London through both word-of-mouth and the printed word (Brockway 1980).
Other charismatic preachers within the Leveller movement included George Fox, who condemned the tithe system of revenue, within both the episcopacy and a presbyterian polity, as a tool of the state and not of God (Brockway 1980). Fox would go on to found the Quaker (Society of Friends) separatist sect (Brockway 1980; Barbour & Bainton 1964). Fox’s brand of Christian anarchism, that is his separatist approach to philosophy, politics, and production, would go on to convert “Freeborn John” Lilburne and other Levellers who would join the Quakers (Brockway 1980; Barbour & Bainton 1964). Many Quakers took refuge in the Low Countries, whilst others, such as William Penn, would take their separatist conception of the world to the American colonies64 (Barbour & Bainton 1964; Fischer 1989). The Leveller movement was also characterised by the leadership of empowered women, such as the charismatic preacher Katherine Chidley (Mack 1992). The Levellers’ sentiments, which included disdain for Parliament and increased voting and land rights, spread through the ranks of the New Model Army to the point where Cromwell had to put down an open mutiny led by Captain William Thompson (Brockway 1980).

The Westminster Assembly (1643-49) was called by the Long Parliament in order to come to some sort of compromise between the conflicting conceptions of the world held by the four dominant umbrella-sects at that time. Firstly there were the Anglicans, who still advocated a monarchical episcopate within the structure of the Church of England as a ‘church = state’ polity (Paul 1985). Secondly, there were the Presbyterians, including representatives of the Scots and the Puritan factions, which favoured a presbyterian-reformed polity for the Church of England and the Church of Scotland (Paul 1985). This would forbid an episcopacy by establishing a ‘church & state’ covenant. Thirdly, there were the separatists/independents, or the multiple sects, including the Baptists, which argued for a congregationalist polity (Paul 1985). In a congregational polity there would be no state church and local congregations would be given complete autonomy. Fourthly, there were the Erastians, who favoured the supremacy of secular law and state power (Paul 1985). The main issue at hand for the Westminster Assembly was trying to get all

---

64 Present-day Pennsylvania and the Middle Atlantic region being the primary safe haven (Fischer 1989).
of these religious factions on the same page in terms of defining the relationship between ‘church’ and ‘state’ (Paul 1985).

The product of the Westminster Assembly was the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646), a Reformed/Calvinist document that would later be amended by different factions separately so as to modify it more toward their specific conceptions of the world (Leonard 2003; Paul 1985). It is not that the Westminster Confession of Faith became the dominant creed of the English-speaking religious world, but its importance rests in the fact that it tends to have some place in religious doctrines of most English-speaking denominations throughout the world (Leonard 2003; Paul 1985). It served as a doctrinal departure point for myriad English-language denominations, which subsequently shaped different approaches to the fusion of philosophy, politics, and production in different sets of social relations. The Anglican faction was, however, largely marginalised. Its loyalties resided with Charles I, who had not authorised their participation in the Westminster Assembly (Paul 1985). Thus, the “Court” faction had little to do with the construction of this Reformed document, and it was largely the product of a fragile compromise reached between the factions of the “Country” party.

4.4.3 “Passive revolution”: the Restoration for England, the Glorious Revolution for the Covenanters, and the flight of the separatists

The “Country” party began to unravel during the Interregnum and Cromwell lost much of his popular and parliamentary support (Hume 1998). The Scots, as early as 1655, were already initiating overtures to Charles II to come and rule the islands on the condition that a presbyterian-Reformed polity would prevail in the national churches (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). Cromwell’s death (1658) paved the way for this to become reality. The Restoration, for England & Wales, was tantamount to a “passive revolution,” where the
group that *should* have been leading[^65], the Parliament of the Commonwealth, found itself incapable of leading. The Parliament was forced to turn back to structures it believed to be capable of leading the disparate social groups which had failed to produce a cohesive state-formation for England & Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, collectively.

In order for Charles II to centralise rule effectively and forge a unitary British state, he had no other political choice than to marginalise and isolate the more radical elements of the “Country” faction. This was a political necessity if he was to forge a compromise with the more moderate parliamentary faction and the “Court” faction. The 1660 *Indemnity and Oblivion Act* thus pardoned everyone, with the exception of those who were intimately-instrumental in the regicide, who had taken up the cause of the Roundheads (Roberts 1986). This, of course, was the consensus-building aspect of the Restoration, which largely benefited moderate English Puritans. The coercive aspect of the restoration of Charles II targeted those dissident and separatist groups which were unwilling to compromise with the new civil and political arrangements (Roberts 1986). This included groups and religious sects with non-conducive conceptions of the world, with regard to the return of monarchical rule and an episcopate.

The *Clarendon Code* and *Penal Laws* represented a systematic attempt to purge all such groups from both ‘church’ and ‘state’ during the Restoration (Watts 1978). The first casualty of the “Country” faction was the *National Covenant of Scotland*, even though the Covenanters had been instrumental in restoring the Stuart monarchy (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960). The *Corporation Act* (1661) forced all municipal officials to take communion with the Church of England and reject the Solemn League and Covenant (Watts 1978). It also excluded all separatists (Nonconformists) from taking public office of any form (Watts 1978). The *Act of Uniformity* (1662) required the use of the *Book of Common Prayer* in all religious services, which was met with the refusal of hundreds of Nonconformist clergy members and their subsequent removal from church leadership, also known as the “Great Ejection” (Watts 1978).

[^65]: Gramsci makes this distinction in terms of the Italian Risorgimento, by distinguishing the incapacity of a revolutionary movement to govern with the same stability as the group it had attempted to displace (1971, p.105).
The *Conventicle Act* (1644) and the *Five-Mile Act* (1645) forbade, under penalty of treason, the assembly of Nonconformist congregations and prohibited Nonconformist clergy from coming within five miles of towns and/or their former sites of ministry if they refused to take an oath of allegiance to the crown and implement communion with the Church of England (Watts 1978; Leonard 2003). Equally as important, in terms of these reforms, was the restoration of the episcopacy of the Church of England, thus making null and void the Reformed-creed of the *Westminster Confession of Faith* (Watts 1978).

These reforms included the purging of Calvinism from the Church of England; so as to make the Anglican Church once again an Arminian-inspired ‘Church Visible’ with a polity of ‘church = state’ (Todd 1995; Tyacke 1987). Nonconformists, such as the Quakers and early Baptists, were resigned to meet secretly or flee to the Low Countries and/or the Americas during this period (Gramsci 1971, p.20; Barbour & Bainton 1985; Fischer 1989). The Scottish Covenanters reacted by continuing their religious practices through what became known as “Covenanticle services,” which took place in open-air venues throughout the countryside and moors of Scotland (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960).

What Charles II failed to grasp was that Calvinistic and/or radical-separatist sects, and their corresponding conceptions of the world, embraced both persecution and martyrdom (Steele & Thomas 1963; Walzer 1965; Brockway 1980). Thus, struggling for the Calvinist and/or radical-separatist faith outweighed any fears of death to the believers, or the “Saints” (Walzer 1965). Thus, no statutory measures would stop the Covenanters and other radical sects from their nonconformist worship and, if anything, such statutory measures encouraged belligerence. Many of the Scottish and Ulster Covenanters immigrated to the Appalachian frontiers of the American colonies in search of religious freedom, and would play an instrumental role in the state-formation of the United States.

---

66 Residually still seen in the tent/open-air revival services which hitherto have taken place in Scotland, Ulster, and various parts of the United States (Fischer 1989; Leonard 2003).
(Fischer 1989; Leonard 2003). This can also be said of the English Puritans of the northeast American colonies, and other nonconformist sects, such as the Baptists and the Quakers (Fischer 1989; Leonard 2003; Tocqueville 2001; Gramsci 1971, p.20).

The other major issue that remained unresolved for all parties was the issue of succession. Parliament and the popular masses were adamant that a Protestant succession be guaranteed, particularly since the King’s brother\(^{67}\) was Catholic (Childs 1980). This raised fears that all of the gains made by Parliament and the settlement of the Restoration would be put in jeopardy (Childs 1980; North & Weingast 1989). Parliament and the popular masses still weary from years of war, however, were out-politickeck by Charles II and his reassertion of monarchical power, as James II was named his successor and took the throne upon Charles’ death in 1685 (Childs 1980). Parliament and popular support again fused into a unified “Country” faction, which demanded a Protestant succession (Hume 1998).

James’s own Protestant daughter Mary, and her husband, the staunchly Protestant William of Orange, were summoned to jointly seize the throne and ensure Protestant succession (Childs 1980). Popular support for William & Mary, coupled with their military strength, caused James II to flee without a fight, and the so-called “Glorious Revolution” prevailed (Childs 1980). The province of Orange had long been allied with Calvinistic factions\(^{68}\), and the Scottish Covenanters were given concessions which allowed for the Church of Scotland’s independence, Scottish civil law, and presbyterian polity (Greaves 1980; Donaldson 1960; Hume 1998). The only popular support James II still had within his realm was in Catholic Ireland, from whence he unsuccessfully sought to reclaim the whole of his kingdom (Childs 1980). With the ascension of William & Mary, the “Country” faction was at last pacified, at the expense of Catholics, and through the enshrinement of the Protestant succession in Britain (Hume 1998).

\(^{67}\) The Duke of York—later James II

\(^{68}\) See: Hume 1998, p34.
As Hume points out, the Protestant monarchs from William & Mary to the House of Hanover were largely supportive of elements of the “Country” faction’s conceptions of the world, particularly with regard to those liberal ideas which lived on and precipitated in the Whig Party agenda of the 18th century (Hume 1998). Thus, the ‘interest’ element of the “Country” faction stood to gain the most from the Protestant succession, whilst the “Court” faction, through historic feudal loyalty, would have gained more by an institutionalised Stuart-only dynasty in Britain (Hume 1998). With the Hanoverian support for the Whigs, however, came the institutionalisation of their conceptions of the world, with regard to the relationship between state and society. This transcended denominational religion and permeated the economic philosophy that grew from the Whig party that had naturally grown from the “Country” faction (Hume 1998, pp.32-38; 274-301).

Free-trade, ‘laissez-faire,’ and the eventual development of the so-called “Anglo-Saxon” economic model can be seen as residual products of the “Country” faction when one applies Hume’s historicism. The “Country” faction, after all, was the umbrella-group that consisted of all those elements of Presbyterian Scottish and presbyterian-inclined English society which had demanded a stronger Parliament and a reduction in the visibility of the political state in everyday life (Hume 1998). This naturally equated to lower taxes and a weaker monarchy. Thus, Hume has illustrated a very natural trajectory from which the “Country” faction of the warring period grew into the British application of Scottish Enlightenment principles regarding ‘state’ and ‘society’ (Hume 1998).

As Gramsci points out, the root system of these principles rests in the Calvinist conception of the world and Covenant (constitutional) theology (Gramsci 1995, p.389). The result of this harmonisation of “Court” and “Country” was the United Kingdom and its constitutional-monarchist state-formation (Hume 1998). The Whig/Tory two-party system was thus the ultimate product of the dialectic of Calvinistic and Arminian conceptions of the world (Hume 1998). For Gramsci, this product was the proverbial “suture” for the scission that had caused the religious/class wars of Britain (Gramsci 1971, p.18). The “land-owning” aristocracy, or Hume’s “Court” faction, retained
political and religious power, whilst the emergent industrial classes, which had sprang forth from Hume’s “Country” faction, gained economic “supremacy” (Gramsci 1971, p.18; Hume 1998).

The observations of Tocqueville record the exported-remnant of both Hume’s “Court” and “Country” factions in the early United States: “two branches may be distinguished in the great Anglo-American family, which have hitherto grown up without entirely comingling; the one in the South, the other in the North” (Tocqueville 2001, p.41). They “differed from each other in many respects; their aim was not the same, and they governed themselves on different principles” (Tocqueville 2001, p.40). He accuses the Southerners of lacking a conception of the world guided by any intellectual or moral ethic, but rather by fortune-seeking and an attempt to reproduce English feudalism in the settlements.

When cross-referenced with Hume, it becomes clear that this is due to the fact that Virginia, and the South as a whole, was initially a mercantilist colony, which blossomed into a semi-feudalistic system of plantocracy. Where Puritanism grew into an organically middle-class system of state & society in the Northeast, the Southern plantocratic order was governed and maintained until the mid-19th century by a landowning semi-feudalistic Anglican-minority ruling class. In New England, however, Tocqueville (2001) credits Puritanism as the seed of American political philosophy as “Puritanism was scarcely less a political than a religious doctrine,” which led bourgeois Puritans “to constitute a society” based on liberty and associationalism (p.43). Tocqueville (2001), later echoed by Weber (2002) and Augelli & Murphy (1988), argues that “it must never be forgotten that religion gave birth to Anglo-American society” (pp.144-145). Gramsci refers to this faction of North American civil society as a “moral elite”, but with far less checks on their collective initiative in lieu of the absence of European aristocratic cultural baggage (Gramsci 1971, p.20).
was naturally linked to the Arminian and aristocratic ‘visible’ Church of England, and the North to the dissident bourgeois Puritan groups that had fled religious persecution (Fischer 1989; Tocqueville 2001). Fischer (1989) offers an even more complex picture of these cultural and regional population movements. Like Tocqueville, he recognises the migration of the Puritans from East Anglia to New England, and the Cavaliers (and their indentured servants) to the Southeast. Fischer, however, also recognises the population movements of Separatists and Quakers to the mid-Atlantic/Delaware area, as well as the Covenanters from Ulster and the Borderlands to the Appalachian frontiers (Fischer 1989).

When we add English & Welsh Baptists to New England/Rhode Island, exiled French Huguenots to the South, Catholic aristocrats from England and Ireland to Maryland, and Lutherans from both Scandinavia and Germany to Pennsylvania and the Appalachian frontier, we begin to gain a more accurate picture of the religious contradictions that took root in the early North American colonies as well as the Caribbean (Fischer 1989). Many of these social forces retained and fostered transatlantic agency and institutional ties. These ties became institutionalised and supra-nationalised through the establishment of transatlantic associations, missionising societies and denominational educational institutions. These were established, maintained and strengthened through intellectuals representing each respective denomination. Every denomination and tradition discussed in this chapter would grow to establish agency within and between early-modern states and societies through these activities, which were conducted through such transnational channels from the 16th century to the present. It is argued here that this phenomenon represented the nucleus of global civil society, which is as old as the modern state system itself.

**4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has displayed how the contradictory conceptions of the world which produced and/or grew out of the breakdown of feudal Christendom played key roles in
the historical development of states, societies, and markets. Different sovereigns and
sects attempted to reconfigure the parameters between their respective civil and political
societies. These attempts to set a balance and fusion between the realms of philosophy,
politics, and production, were largely reflective of different contradictory Christian
conceptions of the world. Sovereignty, as the organising principle of international
relations and the modern state system, also emerged from this period. Sovereignty was a
prerequisite for early-modern states to rebalance civil society, political structures, and
markets within a defined set of territorial boundaries, and without outside coercive
interference from the Catholic enterprise and/or other states. Early-modern state
mercantilist activities, as well as refugee religious social groups which dissented from the
way in which early modern states were structured, very rapidly globalised all of the
contradictory conceptions of the world discussed in this chapter.

Religious intellectual and institutional networks established between the major powers
and their respective satellites facilitated the connection between not only the satellite and
the mother-country, but also the colonial satellites with the intellectual and institutional
activities which grew with the advent of the European Enlightenment-era. The Spanish,
French, and Portuguese took with them the Catholic Church, traditional/Italian
intellectuals, the Counter-Reformation, various orders, educational institutions, and
popular Catholic culture. Likewise, where Britain ventured so did the myriad
denominational groups which operated within Britain: Anglican, Methodist, Unitarian,
Baptist, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, etc. Scandinavian and German Protestants—
through trade and immigration—established Lutheran societies throughout the world.
Scots, Puritans, Ulster-Scots, and Huguenot refugees from France and the Low Countries
all spread the Calvinist conception of the world. Many groups, such as the Moravian
Brethren, Quakers, Baptists, Amish, and Mennonites moved about globally, and
established societies independent of the political entities from whence they emerged.

It is argued here that global civil society was born alongside the modern-state system, out
of the contradictions produced during the Reformation/Counter-Reformation period. This
chapter has illustrated the contradictory development and fragmentation of Western
Christianity. It has provided the historical context from which all of the subsequent Christian conceptions of the world discussed in this dissertation emerged from. Section 4.2 displayed how the Catholic Church acted as the vanguard institution that protected Latin culture after the geopolitical decline of Rome, as well as the hegemonic production of Western Christendom. It illustrated the uneasy alliances built between the Church and political actors during the Dark Ages and the mediaeval period, as well as the perpetual struggle between the Church and political actors in striking a balance between civil and political societies.

Section 4.2 also highlighted the economic, political, and cultural expansion of the Catholic Church, leading up to the Renaissance-era. This period, it was argued, represented the mercantilist phase of the Catholic Church, and of the hegemony of Western Christendom. Ultimately, this section displayed the contradictions produced within and between the realms of philosophy, politics, and production, all of which brought about the demise of Western Christendom as a singular hegemonic entity. Section 4.3 illustrated the “scission” between the popular masses and the ruling classes of feudal Christendom during the Renaissance-era, whereby vast popular segments of Western Christendom became alienated from the ruling classes. This alienation took place along the levels of philosophy, politics, and production, and it produced new Christian conceptions of the world which sought to create new balances between these sectors. Section 4.3 displayed Lutheranism, Calvinism, and the separatist sects of the Radical Reformation, as well as how each of these emergent conceptions of the world affected the development of states, societies, and markets.

Section 4.4 revealed how many of these Christian conceptions of the world took root in Britain, producing subsequent conflicts and religious warfare. The conflicts produced by these interacting contradictory Christian social forces were largely centred on how best to configure the balance between civil and political societies. It was displayed that these conflicts, and the compromises which resulted from them, were instrumental in the state-formation of both the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and radical separatist sects all interacted and influenced the
development of early-modern states, societies, markets, and even the modern state system of international relations as a whole. Each of these contradictory Christian conceptions of the world emerged from a once-singular Western Christendom, and each was subsequently globalised via the agency of states and/or social forces. It is argued here that these Christian social forces constituted the genesis of global civil society at the dawn of the modern-state era of international relations.
Chapter Five: The convergence of Traditional Christian forces and the separate development of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement

5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to illustrate a widening divergence between two large segments of global Christianity. An ideological and cultural gap has grown between two broad and distinct Christian conceptions of the world. These two conceptions of the world are diametrically opposed to one another with regard to their approaches to philosophy, politics, and production. These are differences can be observed through the analytical sublevels of folklore, common sense, theologies (religions of intellectuals), and expressions of popular religion. This divergence led to many of the mainline Protestant institutions, the Orthodox churches, and the Catholic Church back towards common ground during the 19th and 20th centuries (Carter 1998). It is argued in this chapter that the convergence of these traditional denominations, comprised of traditional intellectuals, constitutes a Traditional Pan-Christian Movement within the larger context of globalisation and global politics. This bloc of traditional global religious forces has been involved in a series of socially-progressve global movements (Carter 1998; Gaines 1966).

It is also argued in this chapter, however, that many fundamentalist, charismatic, and Pentecostal groups have emerged as an equally powerful singular bloc within global Christianity. This faction of global Christianity is explicitly socially-conservative, and implicitly neo-liberal, at both the popular and intellectual levels (Hunt 2000a). The institutions of these converging groups are comprised of organic intellectuals, in that they represent a conception of the world which emerged from the post-mediaeval, industrial bloc of power and production (Gramsci 1971, p.20). This faction of global Christianity will be referred to as the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. This chapter displays the
different Christian groups which comprise this increasingly uniform conception of the world, its globalised popular culture, and corresponding forms of activism. Furthermore, it displays the specific belief-sets which are componential to its conception of the world, as well as the forms of activism engaged in by its adherents within and between states, societies, and markets worldwide.

Section 5.2 follows on from Chapter 4 by illustrating the growth of transatlantic denominationalism within and between the specific Christian groups which emerged from the Reformation-era, and how these groups engaged in collective activism, internationalism, and institutional cooperation on specific issues of philosophy, politics, and production (Carter 1998; Duff 1956). This international, interdenominational cooperation led to the establishment of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in the mid-20th century (Gaines 1966; Duff 1956). The institutions and intellectuals involved in this amalgamation constitute a Traditional Pan-Christian Movement within world Christianity. Section 5.3 illustrates the growth of a younger set of global proselytising networks, and the development of institutions, intellectuals, and trends which were largely isolated from the transatlantic trends and culture of the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement. These isolated groups include ‘fundamentalist’, ‘charismatic’, and ‘Pentecostal’ groups as a singular Organic Pan-Christian Movement. Despite very separate origins, this group of denominations shares many supra-denominational trends, which will be highlighted (Pew Forum 2006a).

Section 5.4 analyses the growth and development of specific denominations of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. These include Southern Baptists, Pentecostals, and other emergent charismatic Christian movements. Section 5.5 will illustrate the ties and trends which homogenise the shared conception of the world amongst the groups, intellectuals, and institutions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. It is argued that these convergences constitute a growingly uniform conception of the world within and between states, societies, and class structures. This convergence has produced what is increasingly being considered as a global demographic group (Pew Forum 2006a; Martin, D. 2006). The Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, bound by shared elements
of folklore, common sense, religions of intellectuals, and expressions of popular religion have produced a transnational popular culture with corresponding forms of activism.

5.2 Global civil society, the modern state-system, and the Pan-Christian Movement

5.2.1 Mainline Protestantism

Chapter 4 illustrated the development of Western Christianity alongside the modern state system of international relations. Christian institutions and intellectuals comprised some of the earliest structures and agents within global civil society. The Catholic Church and many of the emergent Protestant institutions were key players in the development and dissemination of the Enlightenment-era dialectic of Western Europe, which catalysed changes in the interrelated realms of production, politics, and philosophy (Gramsci 1995). Both the modern state system and global civil society were born of sectarian warfare within and between the realms of Europe. Laissez-faire economics was likewise born of Calvinist ideology in which the state was mistrusted, perceived as fallible, and prescribed certain limits with regard to its presence in the institutions of civil society (Gramsci 1995, pp.10, 26; 1996, pp.300; 389). Thus, the Reformation provided the historical impetus for the development of industrial capitalism.

Lutheranism laid the groundwork for the German Enlightenment in its establishment of a national language and its educational organisation (Gramsci 1995, pp.20-24; 1996, p.243; 1971, p.396). Lutheranism, within many Northern European states, provided an intellectual and moral apparatus for national unity and participation in the operations of the state and industry (ibid). Lutheran immigrants brought these institutions and values with them to the New World and influenced the development of both states and societies
throughout North America (Fischer 1989). Calvinism led to the establishment of presbyterian/Reformed polities in Scotland, Switzerland and the Netherlands. More so, the principles of the limitations of the state, the individual Doctrine of Grace, and Calvinism’s condoning of usury greatly influenced the development of modern capitalism (Gramsci 1995, p.389). Calvinist immigrants from across Europe, many fleeing religious wars, transplanted their institutions and principles throughout the world.

The Anglican enterprise, encapsulating factions of both the Arminian and Calvinist conceptions of the world, brought its contradictions to every outpost of Britain throughout the world. Methodism represented one of the earliest proselytising forces within global civil society. The Methodist movement grew as a transatlantic denominational offshoot from the Church of England, and included both Calvinist Methodists and Arminian Methodists (O’Brien 1986; Smith 1997). Groups with congregational polities, such as the Mennonites, Quakers, Baptists, etc, took root and/or refuge wherever they could in the tumult of the European religious wars and became firmly entrenched in colonies, states, and societies around the world as well (Fischer 1989).

The Lutheran, Anglican, Congregational, and Reformed denominations represented historical continuity between the feudal European bloc of power and production and the emergent capitalist historical bloc of industrialism and the modern state system (Gramsci 1971, pp.17-20). Each denomination emphasised the importance of intellectualism, and established educational institutions globally which would disseminate the Enlightenment-era trends of rationalism and reason worldwide to its outposts and satellites of westernisation. The institutions and intellectuals of these denominations constitute the core of mainline Protestant Christianity. Neither ‘Evangelicals’ nor ‘Fundamentalists’, according to the Pew Forum, should be confused with ‘Mainline Protestants’ (Pew Forum 2006a, p.12).

The Pew Forum defines mainline Protestantism as “members of the once-dominant Protestant denominations,” whom affirm “many traditional beliefs,” but “are known for
their generally progressive theology and openness to new ideas and societal changes” (2006a, p.12). Thus, mainline Protestant institutions are those which were born of the Reformation, developed within the Enlightenment-era, and tended to have an official and evolving role in the functions of modern western states and societies. These include the Anglican\textsuperscript{69}, Lutheran, and Presbyterian/Reformed institutions (Pew Forum 2006a). Along with the global Catholic enterprise and the Orthodox institutions, the mainline Protestant denominations are defined here as being institutions fostered and maintained by “traditional intellectuals” (Gramsci 1996, pp.199-210).

The Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, and Reformed/Calvinist institutions served as global satellites for westernisation, Enlightenment values, and developments in the realms of philosophy, politics, and production (Gramsci 1995, pp.20-21, 24, 389). These institutions have been largely conducive to, if not fosterers of, change, progress, rationalism, etc. Collectively, the traditional institutions and intellectuals of the mainline Protestant groups, Orthodox communions, and global Catholicism have largely grown to promote internationalism, humanism, ecumenism, and progressivism (Duff 1956; Gaines 1966). They have come to express a unified critical humanitarian voice in global politics through international organisations such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) (Duff 1956; Gaines 1966). The WCC has participated in venues which advocate social justice and are critical of neoliberalism, such as the World Social Forum (Worth & Buckley 2009). In terms of this research, these groups collectively represent a singular bloc within global Christianity that will be referred to as the ‘Traditional Pan-Christian Movement’.

5.2.2 Catholicism and the Ecumenical Movement

Catholic scholars and Gramsci took notice of the global activities of what they termed the Protestant ‘Pan-Christian movement’ (Bacigalupo 1941; Gramsci 1996, pp.386-87; 1992, p.234). The concern for the Catholic Church was the growing worldwide tide of

\textsuperscript{69} Which includes offshoots such as the Methodist denominations.
ecumenism taking place from the late 19th century onwards. The Ecumenical Movement was growing within and between the global missionising channels and social networks of the mainline Protestant denominations and the Orthodox churches. Bacigalupo (1941) voiced the concerns of the Vatican that the Ecumenical Movement would instigate competition between the global Catholic enterprise and a new streamlined brand of Christianity, or a non-Catholic worldwide Christian bloc. Furthermore, the Vatican was concerned that the Ecumenical Movement could produce a worldwide tide of anti-Catholicism, as many of the denominations involved in the Ecumenical Movement held, at best, highly ambivalent sentiments towards the Catholic enterprise (Gramsci 1996, pp.386-87; 1992, p.234).

The scepticism of the Vatican, with regard to the Ecumenical Movement, can be traced back to the papacy of Leo XIII (1878-1903). Leo XIII believed that the Protestant denominations were amongst the chief promoters of the theories and practices of liberalism and capitalism. The papacy of Leo XIII was characterised by a constant offensive against liberalism, along with its fruits of industrial capitalism and myriad subsequent social injustices (Gramsci 1995, pp.42-43). Leo XIII attacked any and all sources of liberal ideology.

This included not only Protestant leaders and denominations of the world, but also institutions such as Freemasonry on the same grounds and in the same regard70 (Pope Leo XIII 1890). Leo XIII had attempted to foster a form of ecumenism of his own with the Orthodox Church, which had failed to materialise (Bacigalupo 1941). The alliance between the Orthodox structures and the mainline Protestant denominational institutions undoubtedly created unease with Leo XIII and his successors71 (Gramsci 1996, pp.386-87; 1992, p.234; Bacigalupo 1941). In a wider context, the period within which the Ecumenical Movement was growing and developing was a period characterised by

---

70 Examples of the implicit and explicit connections between Protestantism and the rise of liberalism are highlighted in the preceding chapter.
71 Pius X (1903-1915); Benedict XV (1915-1922); Pius XI (1922-1939); Pius XII (1939-1958); John XXIII (1958-1963)
oscillating periods of contesting ideologies, economic crises, world wars, and internationalism.

The aloofness of the Vatican from the increasing institutionalisation of the other mainstream branches of global Christianity would, nevertheless, endure until the papacy of Paul VI (1963-1978). Under Paul VI, the Vatican began actively participating in the Ecumenical Movement, and opened diplomatic channels and councils with Orthodox and Protestant intellectuals and institutions (Carter 1998). Thus, the term ‘Pan-Christian movement’ must be properly historicised as a term the Catholic Church and Gramsci used to describe the global Ecumenical Movement for three-quarters of the 20th century; before the First World War, during the interwar years, and the period after World War II (Bacigalupo 1941; Gramsci 1996; Carter 1998).

In 1948, the institutionalisation of the Ecumenical Movement finally came to fruition in the form of the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC constituted an amalgamation of many mainline Protestant denominations, each respectively equipped with their own global networks of intellectuals and institutions (Gaines 1966). Along with mainline Protestant institutions, the WCC also included Orthodox Christian institutions, as an official international organisation based in Geneva (Carter 1998). Thus, all of these disparate Christian traditions, and their respective structures and agents, established a singular institution with which to form common global policies and offer a unified voice to inform the process of international policymaking (Duff 1956; Gaines 1966; Carter 1998). Whilst the Catholic Church has yet to take up official membership in the WCC, it has participated with the international organisation in areas of policymaking since the papacy of Paul VI (Carter 1998). The Vatican, at an institutional level, has thus become an active component of the global Ecumenical Movement.

The Catholic leadership, which had once critically deemed the Protestant denominations as the perpetrators of liberalism and industrial capitalism, found common ground with mainline Protestant evangelicalism because of several key factors. With regard to pacifying the Vatican’s animosity towards liberalism, Mussolini is largely responsible.
One of the Church’s main problems with 19th century liberalism was the fact that, via the agency of Garibaldi, Mazzini, and Freemasonry, liberalism was the driving ideology of the Risorgimento (Gramsci 1971; 1995). Liberalism threatened the Church’s property and position on the Italian Peninsula. The compromise reached in the Lateran Treaty (1929) did much to unite the liberal industrial forces of the Peninsula, Mussolini’s regime, and the Papacy, with sovereignty being granted to Vatican City (Gramsci 1995). Italian fascism bound these forces, and established a common stand against communism, which did much to reinforce popular support for Mussolini and provide physical protection for the Catholic enterprise in Europe. In this respect, the anti-communist position of the Catholic Church was as good a starting point as any for fostering ties with Protestants worldwide.

Meanwhile, the mainline Protestant denominations in industrialised nations had taken a gradual step to the left, in terms of a growing solidarity in their collective efforts to alleviate the social ills produced by unfettered capitalism (Rauschenbusch 1997). This social convergence between mainline Protestant denominations grew out of the transdenominational Social Gospel movement during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The world wars and economic crises had only added to the social burdens of industrialised societies. The looming threat of communism, as a rival conception of the world for Christianity, only provided further impetus for international cooperation and institutionalisation in some capacity between mainline denominations (van der Pijl 1998). By the 1970s, mainline Protestant intellectuals and institutions, Orthodox churches, and the leadership elements of the Vatican, out of collective necessity, managed to meet somewhere in the global middle; politically and institutionally.

5.2.3 Traditional Western Christianity and the Enlightenment-dialectic

The mainline Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church held something else in common in a global historical and cultural context. Rationalism, a pillar of
Enlightenment-era philosophy, informed and proliferated amongst Catholic and mainline Protestant institutions and intellectuals (Gramsci 1995; Weber 2002). Co-opting scientific and philosophical trends gave Catholic and mainline institutions more adaptability with regard to changes in the worlds of philosophy, production and politics. As Gramsci points out, the Counter-Reformation was characterised by the Catholic Church adapting to the new sciences and forces of production that arose out of the post-Reformation Enlightenment period (Gramsci 1995; 1996). The Jesuit Order acted as an intellectual screen through which Enlightenment ideas, the sciences, and rationalism were filtered into a new educational programme and popular culture72 for the Catholic world.

The tide of new sciences, philosophies, productive capabilities, and rationalism that grew out of the popular cultures initially produced by Lutheranism and Calvinism all belong to the same ‘Renaissance-Reformation’ & ‘Reformation-Counter Reformation’ European dialectic that has been displayed in Chapter 4 (Gramsci 1996, pp.318-320; 1992, pp.167-169; 268; 276-278). Thus, the mainline Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church evolved within the same overarching dialectic, and produced channels and networks of intellectuals and institutions throughout the world during the 16th-20th centuries (ibid). These channels and networks acted as conduits through which the philosophies, advancements in the world of production, and political aspects of the European Enlightenment were passed through to wherever European settlements and cultures were planted (Fischer 1989; Tocqueville 2001; Gramsci 1971, p.20). The Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, and the original Protestant groups were the institutions which constituted global civil society during the early development of the modern state system.

Many of the disparate Protestant strands of global evangelicalism developed a rich tradition of interdenominational cooperation, which subsequently produced trans-denominational movements in relation to specific issues in international politics and global production (Carter 1998; O’Brien 1986; Rauschenbusch 1997). Congregationalist churches, Quakers, Methodists, Evangelical Anglicans, and others developed a history of

---

72 Ex: Brescianism, or ‘Father Bresciani’s Progeny’ (Gramsci 1992).
institutional cooperation that effectively brought an end to the transatlantic slave trade during the early 19th century (O’Brien 1986). These forces also spearheaded the trans-denominational, transatlantic Social Gospel movement that sought to neutralise the negative effects of industrial capitalism on the working and urban poor by exerting political pressure on governments to take action for social justice (Rauschenbusch 1997; O’Brien 1986). The Social Gospel movement streamlined many different denominational proselytising efforts towards alleviating social burdens in terms of civil societies in many countries.

Thus, the intellectuals and institutions of mainline Protestantism acted in unison as a social-progressive force in the realms of both politics and production, within and between states during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Carter 1998; Gaines 1966; Duff 1956). The driving philosophies which bound their collective efforts were abolitionism and the Social Gospel movement (ibid). In the context of modern global civil society, the WCC participates in venues such as the World Social Forum. It carries on its progressive tradition by acting as a pressure group within and between states, and articulating a Christian brand of social justice coupled with religious tolerance (Carter 1998). Some of these qualities can also be seen within different elements of the Catholic Church. Liberation theology, for example, had a huge impact in Latin American politics and production during the 1980s (Berryman 1987; Levine 1988). Within this dissertation, mainline Protestant, Orthodox, and Catholic institutions which participate in the WCC, and are characterised by these socially progressive tendencies, will be referred to as the ‘Traditional Pan-Christian Movement’.

5.2.4 Gramsci’s analysis of the Pan-Christian Movement

In his analysis of the ‘Pan-Christian movement’ during the 1930s, Gramsci identifies some highly significant contradictions regarding global Protestant evangelicalism

---

73 See: Worth & Buckley (2009)
Firstly, Gramsci takes notice of the fact that many of the global channels of civil society, which had been created and administered by Northern European social forces, were being effectively supplanted by North American and British intellectuals and institutions (ibid). He also points out that North American evangelicals appeared to him to be more fervent and aggressive in their proselytising efforts, particularly with regard to Latin America (Gramsci 1996, pp.11-12). This is what Gramsci, admittedly unto himself, fails to understand. His lack of understanding is rooted in his fundamental misconception of American Protestantism and his misguided assumptions about religiosity amongst the American population as a whole.

From his limited access to census data and periodicals, Gramsci formulated the assumption that the Christian faith amongst the general American population was declining during the 1930s (Gramsci 1996, p.116). In reality, however, the US remains one of the most religiously-inclined polities in the industrialised world (Pew Forum 2006a). Gramsci’s confusion, with regard to the proselytising operations of American evangelicals, rests in his inability to reconcile why a population, that he perceived to be characterised by a sharp decline in religiosity, which was undergoing a sweeping tide of rationalism amongst the populous, was so fervent in its missionising (Gramsci 1995, p.116). In his confusion, however, Gramsci did note a very important detail highlighting the contradictions of the ‘Pan-Christian movement,’ as a whole, in the context of global civil society. What he deems to be a strange contradiction is actually representative of an entirely different strain of global evangelicalism that is separate from the progressive rationalism being promoted by the international Traditional Pan-Christian Movement.

What Gramsci was unknowingly observing in his analysis were the proselytising operations of ‘fundamentalist’, ‘Pentecostal’, and ‘charismatic’ Christian groups, respectively. Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and charismatic Protestant denominations developed and emerged from within North American civil society (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose 1996). They each evolved into centrifugal global proselytising forces, such as those of the Southern Baptists, Pentecostals, as well as a host of other relatively new non-denominational charismatic congregations (Leonard 2003; Marsden 2008). These social
forces experienced a very different historical development than the traditional and mainline Protestant groups which comprised the Ecumenical Movement.

These fundamentalist, charismatic, and Pentecostal groups established their own unique sets of intellectuals and global institutions, which disseminate very different ideas and programmes from those of mainline Protestant evangelicalism (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose 1996; Maxwell 1998; 1999). Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and charismatic strains of evangelical Protestantism developed largely apart from the transatlantic interconnectedness of mainline Protestant denominations (Bailey 2006). Some were influenced only molecularly, if at all, by the developments and rationalism characteristic of the Enlightenment-era, and the subsequent trans-denominational social movements which produced both the Social Gospel movement and the Ecumenical Movement. Thus, from the peripheries of transatlantic denominationalism, and from amongst subaltern classes, emerged very different forms of evangelical, fundamentalist, and charismatic Protestantism, many of which have subsequently grown into very separate global networks of intellectuals, institutions, sources and generators of capital (Adogame 2006; Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a; Hunt 2000a, 2000b; Marsden 2008).

Many have established mass communications networks, which propagate distinctly different conceptions of the world and missionising aims from those of their more antiquated Protestant evangelical counterparts in global civil society (Marsden 2008). Most of these once-fringe denominations have emerged from mid-to-late 19th century hitherto, as the most rapidly growing Christian groups around the world (Pew Forum 2006a). In other words, these groups emerged from the post-feudal historic bloc of power and production, and remained isolated from the influence of ‘traditional intellectuals’. In Gramscian terms, fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and charismatic-evangelical social forces were led by ‘organic intellectuals’, or intellectuals who emerged in a new era of power and production (Gramsci 1996, pp.199-210). The organic intellectuals of fringe and subaltern Christian social forces, much like those separatist groups of the Radical Reformation, relied solely on folklore, common sense, and popular religion in order to formulate their respective conceptions of the world and corresponding lifestyles.
It is argued here that these forces constitute an ‘Organic Pan-Christian Movement’, within the larger context of global politics and production. In terms of Gramsci’s analysis of North Americans and the Pan-Christian Movement, he is unknowingly referring to a completely different branch of global Protestant evangelicalism. He is referring to one that has marked differences and explicit ideological conflicts with the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement, and related international organisations such as the WCC. Thus, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement and the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement operate two separate complexes of intellectuals and institutions functioning within the larger context of globalisation and global civil society.

5.3 Frontier Christianity: from isolated folk-groups to global centrifugal social forces

This section explores some of the popular and subaltern Christian movements which developed outside of the Enlightenment dialectic, mainline Protestantism, and Catholicism. It explores the cultural explosion of ‘revivalism’, which has come to characterise many of the Christian movements that emerged from more isolated groups and sets of social relations. This section will explore the differences within and between such groups, as well as the factors which led to very different historical developments within world Christianity. The separate development of many of these emergent groups has produced a large, diverse, and growing segment of world Christianity that has a fundamentally different meta-narrative, worldview, and corresponding lifestyle than the Catholic, Orthodox, and mainline Protestant churches.

Furthermore, many of the myriad fundamentalist, charismatic, and/or Pentecostal Christian groups throughout the world are rapidly converging through shared elements of this growingly uniform alternative Christian conception of the world (Pew Forum 2006a). This section highlights the historical development of the sets of beliefs which constitute
the nexus of this contemporary convergence. These include the following trends/traditions: evangelism; fundamentalism; revivalism/regeneration; premillennialist eschatology (Pew Forum 2006a). By displaying these areas of convergence, this section will establish a departure point from which the Organic Pan-Christian Movement can be contextualised as a singular transnational movement.

5.3.1 Evangelicalism, fundamentalism, and charismatic revivalism

In terms of defining the culture of global Christian ‘evangelicalism’, Bebbington (1989) emphasises several common features. Firstly, there is an emphasis on conversion—or a change in both consciousness and lifestyle. Secondly, there is a personal espousal of proselytising/evangelising as a conscious and personal form of activism. Thirdly, there is an affinity for the Bible as, at the very least, an organisational manual for living, and the belief in its dissemination. Fourthly, this includes the recognition and promotion of Christ’s death upon the cross as a sacrifice for some and/or all individuals (Bebbington 1989). According to Freston: “‘evangelicalism’ refers to a sub-set of Protestantism, distinguished by doctrinal and practical characteristics but not by denominational affiliation,” and that “evangelicalism cannot be subsumed under the category of ‘fundamentalism’ as suggested by many studies of religion in global politics” (Freston 2004, p.22). This is not to say, however, that an ‘evangelical’ cannot be a ‘fundamentalist,’ or that a ‘fundamentalist’ is necessarily an ‘evangelical’.

The British North American colonies brought Western civilisation and the Enlightenment dialectic to a geographically-limited sliver along the eastern seaboard of the North American continent (Fischer 1989; Bailey 2006). Likewise, the western expansion of the Anglican enterprise was largely limited by the barricade of the Appalachian frontier. The traditional intellectuals of the Church of England/Episcopal Church made very little inroads in penetrating this geographical boundary (Bailey 2006). Congregationalists,
Puritans, and independents (namely Baptists) established the society of what is now New England (Fischer 1989; Tocqueville 2001; Gramsci 1971, p.20).

Quakers, Congregationalists, and independents settled the Mid-Atlantic/Delaware region, and Anglicanism flourished in the plantocratic, semi-feudalistic southeast, as the religion of the planter class (Fischer 1989). Lutheran and Moravian immigrants from Northern Europe, Dutch and French Calvinists established enclaves throughout this landscape and settlements along the frontier (ibid). Scots and Ulster-Scots Covenanticle Calvinist Presbyterians were some of the first groups to settle within and beyond the Appalachian region (ibid). These settlements were, however, still largely isolated by proximity from the continued development of the Enlightenment dialectic (Bailey 2006). Furthermore, many of these settlements suffered a poverty of traditional intellectuals well into the 18th-19th centuries (Gramsci 1971, p.20).

The so-called ‘Great Awakenings’ are contextual historical periods of modern Christian revivalism (O’Brien 1986; Butler 1982). The activities of intellectuals and institutions within these periods served as the catalysts for the post-Reformation development of new Christian conceptions of the world, and new denominational formations. Many of these emergent denominations would grow to produce subsequent centrifugal missionising forces (Leonard 2003; Maxwell 1998; 1999). The First Great Awakening of Protestant evangelicalism was largely inspired by the Moravian Brethren (Smith 1862). The Moravian Brethren emerged as a global, non-state proselytising force from the European continent. The Moravian Brethren served as the inspiration for the Methodist offshoot of the Church of England (O’Brien 1986; Mathews 1969).

Methodism was established at Oxford by John & Thomas Wesley and George Whitefield, as well as what would become the evangelical wing of the 19th century Anglican Church (O’Brien 1986; Mathews 1969; Leonard 2003; Smith 1862). The Wesleys were inspired by Arminian theology, the Moravian Brethren, and the growing trend of evangelicalism. They provided the nucleus of what would eventually grow into modern charismatic Christianity, espoused a hopeful message based on continual individual spiritual
regeneration (Smith 1862). Whitefield, on the other hand, was inspired by Calvinism, and preached a more fatalistic, fundamentalist ‘fire & brimstone’ message of salvation (Leonard 2003). Whitefield’s message was based on ‘Original Sin’ and inherent human depravity. Both Wesley and Whitefield, respectively and collectively as the first ‘Methodists’, had a profound impact on the development of the contradictory nature of North American Christianity (Smith 1862; O’Brien 1986).

Whitefield’s role in shaping both charismatic revivalism and ‘fundamentalist’ Christianity, in Britain and North America, cannot be overstated (Leonard 2003; Carroll 1999). Through the agency of the lay-Methodist and itinerant clergy known as “Circuit Riders,” both Methodist messages spread rapidly throughout the Appalachian frontier and into the Old West74 (Bailey 2006). Many of the small frontier congregations, including Scots-Calvinist/Presbyterian, Germanic separatists, Baptist and otherwise, were uniquely affected by the evangelicalism of the Methodist Circuit Riders, as remote communities suffered from a profound lack of ‘traditional intellectuals’ connected to the European Enlightenment. In such remote places, the Bible became the only organising principle of worship and source of philosophy. Whitefield’s followers established charismatic open-air and tent revivals for the frontier peoples, which were often trans-denominational in orientation, but inherently ‘fundamentalist’ in the nature of its evangelicalism, and the Bible served as a unifying form of liturgy that could transcend ethnic and denominational residues (O’Brien 1986; Leonard 2003).

Whitefield’s brand of open-air, Calvinistic, charismatic revivalism also echoed and blended well with the already present influence of the Scottish Covenanters, who had long established a cultural presence on the frontier (Leonard 2003). Charismatic revivalism, which had been ignited by Methodism, became one of the first divisive movements within and between the original European Reformation traditions (Bailey 2006). The Cumberland denomination of Presbyterianism, which thrived in the frontier-Cumberland Valley & Plateau, represented a microcosm of the split produced within

74 Appalachia, the Ohio Valley, the Cumberland Plateau and beyond.
Presbyterianism sparked by the adoption of, or reluctance to, charismatic revivalism\(^7\) (Bailey 2006; Marsden, G.M. 1970). The First Great Awakening served as enough of a spark, imported from Europe and the early Enlightenment dialectic, to ignite religiosity within the North American frontier. The Second and Third Great Awakenings, however, represented an eruption of religiosity from a burgeoning cultural melting pot within a rapidly-developing North American frontier.

The periods described as the Second and Third Great Awakenings spanned the 19\(^{th}\) century and represented an expression of the unique conceptions of the world, which were developed and emerged from within the isolated frontiers of North America. This period was characterised by widespread trans-denominational religious movements and developments. In the tradition of Whitefield’s fiery Calvinist message, Calvinist intellectuals, such as Lyman Beecher, recreated the Scottish Covenanticle tradition of open-air camp revivals throughout the Appalachian, Cumberland, and Ohio Valley regions (Carroll 1999; Leonard 2003; Matthews 1969). Charismatic revivalism was such a controversial issue within Presbyterianism that it eventually saw the establishment of breakaway revivalist denominations such as the Cumberland Presbyterian Church (Marsden, GM 1970). Another significant popular cultural movement that emerged from the North American frontier during this period was Restorationism, which inspired and spawned a host of new emergent Protestant denominations (Casey 2006; Leonard 2003).

### 5.3.2 Restorationism

Restorationism represented a recurring cultural theme within Christianity as a whole, in its attempt to recreate and emulate the original ministry of Christ and the Apostles in the early church era (Casey 2006). This harks back to the separatist traditions discussed in Chapter 4, such as the Anabaptists, the Dunkards, the Schwarzenau Brethren, the Levellers, etc., and as the tendency described by Maurras as “moral anarchy” of

---

\(^7\) Exemplified by Presbyterian clergyman Lyman Beecher (1775-1863).
“primitive Christianity” (Gramsci 1995). Of course, reading the New Testament of the Bible and attempting to follow it verbatim in order to reproduce what is described structurally and culturally, after several translations over the course of two millennia, would also be clouded by subjective interpretations between respective intellectuals. The debates on how best to ‘restore’ Christianity to its original state were most personified by the Stone-Campbell Movement, which grew out of frontier Presbyterianism to manifest as several different denominations: Christian Church (Disciples of Christ); Churches of Christ; Evangelical Christian Church in Canada; Independent Churches of Christ (Casey 2006; Leonard 2003).

Restorationism also permeated the fiercely independent Baptist congregations across the frontier, and was rebranded as ‘Landmarkism’ (Leonard 2003). Landmarkism professed that it was the duty of Baptist congregations to recreate the early church of primitive Christianity and not share fellowship or communion with any Christians not committed to these standards set by Baptists. This gave most Baptist congregations in the southeast, and west of the Appalachians, an inherently ‘fundamentalist’ character (Leonard 2003). Other exclusionary religious movements produced from frontier Christianity during the 19th century, which are now centrifugal global social forces, include Mormonism/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints; Adventism/Seventh-Day Adventists; and eventually the Jehovah’s Witnesses/Zion’s Watchtower Tract Society.

Thus, frontier Christianity represented a series of religious movements which took place in isolation from the progressive rationalism experienced by mainline Protestant groups which were organically linked to the Enlightenment dialectic. From the 17th century to the mid-to-late 19th century, frontier Christian movements were largely reflective of one or both of two supra-denominational trends: fundamentalism, or the strict belief in biblical inerrancy and the use of the Bible as the only source of philosophy and as the sole organisational template for isolated congregations, due to a poverty of ‘traditional intellectuals’; charismatic revivalism, or more expressive forms of Christianity. Both trends tended to take root amongst subaltern/popular classes in isolated parts of the North American frontier or within booming population-centres (Bailey 2006; Holt 1940).
Frontier Christianity and Methodist-inspired charismatic revivalism continued to evolve throughout the 19th century. They eventually merged with the larger situational forces of the Industrial Revolution. The charismatic revivals, particularly within the lower-middle and subaltern classes of Wesleyan Methodism, quickly began to take on a life of its own on the fringes of the institutions of mainline Methodism (Holt 1940). It is from these fringes that the Holiness Movement of the mid-to-late 19th century emerged, and led to a gradual divergence of many charismatics from mainline Protestantism (Anderson 2004a). The denominational and congregational spin-offs of the Holiness Movement were socially liberal in one sense, in that the movement was started by two Methodist women^76^ during the 1830s, and catalysed the rise of female clergy (Dayton 1980). The Holiness Movement established the nucleus of what would become Pentecostalism and the conception of the world representative of modern charismatic Christianity, which is the belief in the omnipresence of the Trinitarian Holy Spirit within and between the spaces and structures of everyday life (Dayton 1980; Pew Forum 2006a).

Equally as important within the charismatic conception of the world is the omnipresence of Satan and Evil forces, which are believed to perpetually struggle with the Holy Spirit over control of the spaces and structures of everyday life, as well as over individual human beings in general (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Pew Forum 2006a). This is, in essence, what many modern charismatic Christian intellectuals refer to as a perpetual condition of extra-dimensional ‘Spiritual Warfare’ between the forces of God and Satan (Wagner, C.P. 2009). Regeneration and revivalism are the ways through which charismatic Christians believe individuals and congregations purify themselves, their structures, and their spaces (Pew Forum 2006a). This corresponds directly to Arminian ontology wherein ‘works’ are equally as important as ‘faith’.

Charismatic and Pentecostal Christians believe that the Holy Spirit is omnipresent in the modern world, but also that the Holy Spirit has the ability to bestow ‘gifts’ (Pew Forum

^76^ Ex: Sarah Worrall Lankford; Phoebe Palmer (Dayton 1980).
These blessings may include divine healings of physical and mental ailments, the exorcism of Satanic-forces, prophecy-channeling, speaking-in-tongues (‘glossolalia’), and individual material prosperity (Pew Forum 2006a). This stands in opposition to many fundamentalist groups within world Christianity, which are anchored by a conflicting residual tie to Calvinism in their belief in predestination and the doctrine of Grace for the ‘Elect’. Within the Calvinistic set of beliefs there is no need for individual regeneration because salvation and Grace have already been predetermined by God. For Calvinists, humans are born ‘dead’, and need only one rebirth, whilst Arminians believe that humans are born ‘sick’, with a constant need for rebirth/regeneration (Sproul 2001).

Thus, although biblical inerrancy provides a common base, many fundamentalist and charismatic groups differ greatly in terms of thought and practice. Many fundamentalist groups remain reflective of the Calvinist doctrines of predestined grace and election, and thus retain somber, non-charismatic expressions of popular religion. Many charismatic groups throughout the world, including Pentecostals, are ‘fundamentalist’ in their belief of biblical inerrancy, but articulate a perpetual need for individual and congregational regeneration, which they believe is facilitated through charismatic worship (Pew Forum 2006a).

5.3.4 Premillennialist eschatology and the Organic Pan-Christian Movement

Another trend which grew amongst both fundamentalist and/or charismatic Protestant groups during the 19th century was the popularity of ‘premillennialist’ eschatology. ‘Premillennialism’ is a term that represents a general belief that Jesus will return for the Second Coming only after certain cataclysmic events occur, in both the natural world and in global politics (Marsden 2008; Ariel 2001; Van Impe 1997). In essence, the planet must be brought to the brink of total destruction as a pre-requisite for Jesus to return, make the world anew, and rule the globe for 1000 years from Jerusalem, within the
premillennialist scenario (Van Impe 1997; Ariel 2001; Shah 2006). This scenario runs
counter to the ‘postmillennialist’ eschatology shared by many mainline institutions, in
which it is up to humankind to make the world into a suitable kingdom for Jesus to come
and rule (Shah 2006). The position of the Catholic Church is similar, in the sense that the
Church asserts that this is a ‘world without end’.

John Nelson Darby (1802-1882) was a Calvinistic Anglo-Irish theologian and Anglican
priest in Ireland who left the Anglican Communion, formed the Plymouth Brethren sect
during the 1830s, and subsequently wrote The Holy Scriptures: a new translation from
the original languages (Darby 1942). This has come to be known as the ‘Darby Bible’,
which was published incrementally in different languages throughout the latter half of the
19th century (Marsden 2008; Wagner, D.E. 1995). The Plymouth Brethren, established by
Darby, George Wigram, and Benjamin Wills Newton, promoted a new conception of the
world involving an imminent apocalyptic eschatology, or ‘End Times’ (Brock 1984;
separatist/congregational groups, shunned hierarchy, paid ministries, and sought a back-
to-basics approach to ecclesiastical organisation. The Plymouth Brethren grew into
separate denominations and factions, but continued to expand to the US, Scandinavia,
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and beyond (Brock 1984).

The Plymouth Brethren have remained apolitical because of their explicit belief that the
world will be ending soon. Besides the global branches of the Plymouth Brethren,
however, Darby’s premillennialist eschatology has created a lasting molecular influence
on the philosophies of a large segment of fundamentalist and/or charismatic
Protestantism, both at the level of theology (religions of intellectuals) and common
sense/folklore (Anderson 2004a; Marsden 2008; Shah 2006). Darby’s premillennialism
went on to inspire the larger tradition of ‘Dispensational’ theology, or the belief that God
has a special direct interventionist plan for the near future involving both the ancient
land of Israel and for Christians (Wagner, C.P. 1995, 1998a, 2003; Shah 2006; Marsden
2008).

167
Three separate, yet major, global evangelical sects grew out of the popularisation of the ‘End Times’ during the mid-to-late 19th century: the Jehovah’s Witnesses; the Seventh-Day Adventists, and the Mormons (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints). With regard to charismatic and many fundamentalist groups, Presbyterian theologian C.I. Scofield (1853-1921) published the *Scofield Reference Bible*, and made biblical prophecy the centerpiece of his translation (Shah 2006). This, too, has gone on to affect vast segments of fundamentalist and/or charismatic Protestantism worldwide, and has led to the development of modern Christian Zionism (Marsden 2008; Shah 2006). Premillennialism and Dispensational theology have increasingly become affixed to many fundamentalists’, Pentecostals’, and charismatics’ conceptions of the world and the expressions of their popular religion and shared global culture (Shah 2006).

The aforementioned trends of evangelicalism, fundamentalism, charismatic Christianity, and popularised premillennialist eschatology represent the basis of a convergence that has taken place amongst a large segment of world Christianity (Pew Forum 2006a). This convergence has occurred worldwide over the past century, but has been particularly expedited over the past three decades (Freston 2004; Pew Forum 2006a; Martin, D. 2006). This convergence has led to an increasingly uniform and popular conception of the world, sharing elements of folklore, common sense, theologies (religions of intellectuals), and is expressed through transnational forms of popular religion.

Nowhere is this convergence more evident than in the developing world—or ‘global south’ (Pew Forum 2006a). These converging forms of charismatic, fundamentalist, and Pentecostal Christianity collectively represent one of the fastest growing segments of the global religious economy (Martin, D. 2006; Adogame 2006). The following section will illustrate this convergence by analysing several of the factions of world Christianity involved in this consolidation of once-disparate worldviews and myriad denominational subcultures, and the increasingly uniform transnational popular culture which is subsequently emerging.
5.4 Factions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement

This section will highlight the global institutional & intellectual networks of three specific factions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. The following groups of intellectuals and institutions share specific sets of beliefs: the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC); global Pentecostalism; charismatic Christianity. This section will analyse the philosophical and institutional development of each into respective centrifugal global proselytizing forces, and explain how each impacts and is impacted by certain developments in world Christianity. It will also provide a departure point for Section 5.5, which will illustrate the ties which bind these three factions, in terms of common trends and the production of a common Organic Pan-Christian popular culture.

5.4.1 Baptists and Southern Baptists

Of all Protestant denominations, Baptists are certainly one of the most theologically and culturally diverse and disparate (Leonard 2003). This is due, in large part, to the fiercely independent congregational polity implicit within the early Baptist movements, which have developed from the 17th century to the present. From their origins in the Holy Roman Empire, which included German Baptists/Brethren, Dunkards, and Anabaptists, to the development of the Baptist faith in Britain and North America, Baptists have been more renowned for their differences than their unity.

According to Leonard (2003):

“Amid certain distinctives, Baptist identity is configured in a variety of ways by groups, subgroups, and individuals who claim the Baptist name. This identity extends across a theological spectrum from Arminian to Calvinist, from conservative to liberal, from open to closed communionist, and from denominationalist to independent” (p. xiii).
In 1640, Baptists represented one-tenth of one-percent of American colonists (Leonard 2003, p.70). By 1760, they represented only one-half of one-percent of American colonists (ibid). By 1900, however, “Baptists had become the largest Protestant tradition in the United States, numbering more than 30 million members represented in over forty discernible groups” (ibid). Today the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), encapsulating ‘fundamentalist,’ ‘evangelical,’ and some ‘charismatic’ independent constituent congregations, represents the second largest religious denomination in the US (Leonard 2003). The earliest schism between Baptist faiths grew out of the Arminian-Calvinist debates of the 16th-17th centuries and has persisted hitherto amongst Baptist congregations and Baptist denominations (ibid). ‘General Baptists’ and ‘Freewill Baptists,’ towing the Arminian line, believe in the ‘General Atonement’ of all human beings as a result of Christ’s death on the cross—in contrast to the ‘Particular’ and ‘Separatist’ Baptists, who have traditionally espoused the Calvinist doctrines of ‘conditional’ or ‘unconditional’ election (ibid).

The General Baptists of Britain shared this Arminian conception of the world with their continental German and Dutch Baptist counterparts (Leonard 2003). General Baptists of both British and continental origins assisted freed blacks and Afro-American slaves in founding the first African Baptist congregations in the US. Arminian-inclined Baptists during the mid-to-late 19th century also became thoroughly involved with the Social Gospel movement—largely spearheaded by the German-American Baptist leader Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918) (Rauschenbusch 1997; Leonard 2003). Progressive Arminian Baptist groups thrived largely in industrialised parts of the US, where the 19th century transatlantic Social Gospel movement was strongest.

Afro-American Baptists throughout the country, including the South, have historically allied with the General Baptists (Leonard 2003). These can also be contextually subsumed into the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement. Together, General and Afro-American Baptists aided in proselytising efforts worldwide (Sanneh 2001). The Afro-American Baptists played a unique colonial role in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Sanneh 2001; Leonard 2003). Global links between the
disparate Baptist denominations and congregations have been fostered since the Baptist Union of Great Britain was established in 1905 (Leonard 2003). The Baptist Union of Great Britain institutionally reconciled the General and Particular/Regular Baptists and led to the creation of the Baptist World Congress in 1905. From these links grew the Baptist World Alliance that institutionally links most Baptist congregations and denominations throughout the world (Leonard 2003).

Excluded from this structure, and from the WCC, are myriad fundamentalist independent Baptist congregations and the SBC. Baptists represent the largest Protestant denomination in the US (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003). Southern Baptists are equipped with the largest religious publishing house in the world77, its own series of colleges/universities, seminaries, and a vast global proselytising operation. The SBC formed in 1845 because of a schism over the institution of slavery within the Baptist denomination, which was largely reflective of the political landscape during that time in the US (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003). It was comprised of fiercely independent churches adhering to a congregational polity; some Calvinist, some Arminian. Southern Baptists’ ‘evangelicalism,’ however, was very much inspired by English ‘Regular’ or ‘Particular’ (Calvinist) Baptists such as William Carey (1761-1834) and C.H. Spurgeon (1834-1892). Carey lives on in Southern Baptist folklore as the main catalyst for the global proselytising efforts of Southern Baptists (Carroll 1999; Leonard 2003).

Carey had intensely struggled with more extreme Baptist and Congregational Calvinists over the relevancy of proselytising, in lieu of the exclusive Calvinist doctrine of ‘election’ (Carroll 1999; Leonard 2003). The theological issue at hand, between Carey’s supporters and the more extreme ‘Hyper-Calvinists’, was Carey’s adamant stance that there may well be members of God’s ‘Elect’ abroad and amongst un-Christianised peoples. The Elect amongst these peoples, it was argued, would spontaneously respond to the ‘Irresistible Grace’ of God once they heard the Gospel (Leonard 2003). It was, thus, a predestined and ordained mission for Calvinist-Baptist clergy, according to Carey, to

77 LifeWay Christian Resources, formerly known as the Baptist Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention (Leonard 2003).
preach to the peoples of the world, as there would inevitably be ‘Elect’ individuals amongst the unconverted who were predestined to receive the message preached (Carroll 1999; Leonard 2003).

Adoniram Judson, a Calvinist-Baptist, became the very first American foreign missionary in 1812, and still serves as a touchstone and folklore heroic figure in the Southern Baptist prehistory of evangelicalism (Carroll 1999, p51). Even as late as 1812, in relation to the American War of Independence (1776-1783), Judson still had to go through the proper transatlantic British-administered civil society channels, via the London Missionary Society and the Baptist Missionary Society, in order to be commissioned to proselytise with institutional legitimacy (Leonard 2003). This reveals the organic ties within transatlantic civil society which persisted and continued to grow even after the political divorce between Britain and the US. Supremacy and control were still being exercised by elements of British civil society over elements of US civil society.

Despite the Southern Baptists’ affinity for the early work of British Calvinist Baptist theologians like Carey and Spurgeon, however, the Southern Baptists, through their own self-segregation, would go on to found one of the largest, singular proselytising enterprises in the world today (Leonard 2003; Carroll 1999). The Board of Foreign Missions of the Southern Baptist Convention was established in 1845, which became known later as the Foreign Mission Board, and is presently entitled the International Mission Board (IMB) (Leonard 2003). It was created along with the Home Mission Board (now the North American Mission Board), and both served to propagate the quite contradictory Southern Baptist conception of the world (Leonard 2003).

The term ‘contradictory’ is used here not in a derogatory sense, but rather as a way to describe the theological incoherence and inherent decentralisation of the Southern Baptist enterprise as a whole (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003). First and foremost, the SBC was formed as a unified Southern political statement on the economic issue of slavery, and

78 To India (Leonard 2003).
79 Established in 1792 by William Carey (Carroll 1999; Leonard 2003)
not any sort of theological unity (Carroll 1999; Leonard 2003). It was a cultural and regional political statement by a diverse religious affiliation in the context of national politics on a specific issue relating to economic production (Rosenberg 1989). Fiercely independent Southern Baptist congregations came together in 1845 over the sole issues of perceived Northern aggression and hostility towards the established Southern identity, class structure, and way of life (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003). The SBC was an institution created out of necessity as a result of imposing situational forces.

Baptist churches in the South, because of their collective congregational polity of independence, had never (and still have never) taken a collective stand on many theological issues (Leonard 2003). This has hitherto divided not only the Convention, but also individual congregations on a range of issues. These persistent historical schisms include: the Calvinist-Arminian divide; pre-millennialism; the role of women in churches; race-relations; the role of the Convention in secular politics; the place, or lack thereof, of charismatic worship/revivalism in terms of worship style (Hankins 2002; Smith 1997; Leonard 2003). Nevertheless, these organisations effectively became the first uniquely homegrown ‘American’ global proselytising force, and the first major segment of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement.

Southern and independent Baptist congregations are some of the most dialectically contradictory forces in terms of global Christian evangelicalism (Rosenberg 1989). Baptist congregations and the SBC have been conflicting venues for almost every major supra-denominational religious movement and major political issue which has arisen from within Protestant denominationalism and American politics from 1845 to the present (Leonard 2003; Hankins 2002; Smith 1997; Rosenberg 1989). By and large, however, despite many ‘modernist-fundamentalist’ schisms and fragmentations, the SBC, as a whole, has remained steadfastly in the Organic Pan-Christian Movement camp on social issues and on the topic of biblical inerrancy. It has promoted this contradictory conception of the world, centrifugally, throughout the globe. The SBC is not a constituent of the Baptist World Alliance and has revoked its membership in the WCC (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003).
The International Mission Board (IMB) is the global proselytising institution of the SBC architectural structure. As of 2009, the IMB reports that there are 205,192 Southern Baptists congregations throughout the world, outside of the US and Canada (International Mission Board 2009). According to the IMB’s “church growth indicators,” this marks an increase of 25,650 new Southern Baptist churches since 2005. The annual number of baptisms, outside North America, has also steadily increased; from 577,150 in 2005 to 506,975 in 2009 (ibid). In terms of total church membership outside North America, the IMB claims 10,692,973 individuals as of 2009—up from 7,505,292 in 2005 (International Mission Board 2009). The global “church growth indicators” of the IMB are held accountable by the myriad and fiercely independent Southern Baptist congregations which comprise the confederal-polity of the SBC (ibid).

Southern Baptist global evangelism, as a whole, is funded and governed through the SBC’s confederal revenue mechanism: the Cooperative Program (Leonard 2003; Rosenberg 1989). Each independent congregation gives a percentage of its intake to the Cooperative Program, and each congregation receives reports as to how its money is being spent and redistributed at the global level by the IMB (International Mission Board 2009; Leonard 2003). The revenue is generated at the congregational level through the practice of the tithe, and is augmented by special fundraisers and revival weeks. Culturally, this process is reinforced in North American SBC congregations through various associations and societies in which members participate at congregational, provincial/state, and national levels (Leonard 2003). Such associations include the Women’s Missionary Union (WMU), Baptist Men on Mission (BMEN), Royal Ambassadors (for boys), Girls in Action (for girls), as well as a variety of events and programmes for adolescents (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003). This works at an organic level within and between congregations, state/provincial Baptist conventions, and the SBC as a whole by holding various annual funding drives in honour of missionaries80 whom have been entrenched within Southern Baptist folklore and popular culture (Rosenberg 1989).

80 Such as the Judsons, Annie Armstrong, and Lottie Moon (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003).
The ranks of ‘fundamentalist’ Baptists in the Organic Pan-Christian Movement were augmented during the 1950s with establishment of the Conservative Baptist Association of America. The global proselytising programme of the Conservative Baptist Association is WorldVenture, formerly known as the Conservative Baptist Foreign Missionary Society (Leonard 2003). The Conservative Baptist Association of America formed as a breakaway faction from the Northern Baptist Convention (NBC) during its ‘fundamentalist-modernist’ schism, largely on the issues of biblical inerrancy and the maintenance of traditional fundamentalist family values (Leonard 2003). Like the SBC, the NBC was comprised of fiercely-independent Baptist congregations (in regions outside of the South) into a loosely-coherent structural association (Rosenberg 1989; Leonard 2003).

The ‘fundamentalist-modernist’ schism within the NBC was far more divisive than the schisms which played out in the SBC (Leonard 2003). This is due, in part, because of a much wider gap of intellectualism between Northern Baptist clergy and the Northern Baptist laity. Many of the Northern Baptist clergy were still very much linked through associations and institutions to Britain. They had, thus, become open to modernist tendencies regarding biblical interpretation and social progressivism (Leonard 2003). Many of these clergymen were unable to effectively translate their religion(s) of intellectuals into popular religion and common sense for their parishioners. The ‘fundamentalist’ reaction of more conservative preachers, and a large faction of the lay-leaders (deacons, etc.), was to establish a more fundamentalist denomination in order to firmly keep within the framework of a specific meta-narrative.

This meta-narrative is tied to what is outlined here as the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world. ‘Fundamentalist-Modernist’ schisms were much less of an issue in the SBC because the theology of the vast majority of clergy, or the religion(s) of Baptist intellectuals, remained homogenous with the anti-intellectual fundamentalism of the laity (Rosenberg 1989; Carroll 1999). The shared Southern Baptist standpoints include biblical inerrancy and resistance to progressive trends (Leonard 2003; Rosenberg
Southern Baptist congregations have respectively responded in different ways to the advent of supra-denominational charismatic Christian popular culture (Smith 1997; Hankins 2002). Quite often, Southern Baptist congregations have served as battlegrounds between Baptists inclined towards charismatic worship and those attempting to retain a more somber, Calvinistic atmosphere in terms of worship style (Smith 1997; Hankins 2002). Nevertheless, the SBC is an observable microcosm of the dialectic of charismatic Christianity and Protestant fundamentalism.

5.4.2 Charismatics and Pentecostals: transnational Christian “Renewalism”

Whilst Pentecostalism is barely a century old, Pentecostals currently make up at least one-quarter of the world’s two-billion Christians. With 500-million strong, it represents a serious threat to the entrenched hegemony of traditional Christian institutions within and between many states and societies around the world, and particularly in the ‘global south’ (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010b). According to the Pew Forum, “Pentecostalism and related charismatic movements represent one of the fastest-growing segments of global Christianity” (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010b). In terms of core beliefs and liturgy, Pentecostal/neo-Pentecostal groups and charismatics emphasise the omnipresence and role of the Holy Spirit in modern everyday life. Charismatic and Pentecostal groups also believe in the omnipresence of Satan and demonic spirits within the structures and spaces of everyday life in the larger narrative of ‘Spiritual warfare’ (Pew Forum 2006a; Wagner, C.P. 2009).

The belief in the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit includes the Spirit’s ability to ‘renew’ individual believers and empower them with gifts such as speaking-in-tongues\(^\text{81}\), ‘holy laughter’, the power of prophecy, and miracles; including spontaneous divine healing (Pew Forum 2006a). Some of these ‘gifts’ constitute the habitus of the shared worship

\(^{\text{81}}\)“Glossolalia” (Pew Forum 2006a)
style of charismatic and Pentecostal Christians (Coleman & Collins 2000). Speaking-intongues, being taken with the Spirit, spontaneous prophecy channeling, and holy laughter all represent a universal liturgy for charismatic and Pentecostal congregations. Thus, many of the worship practices, and the culture of charismatic/Pentecostal groups, transcend language barriers through shared habitus (Coleman & Collins 2000).

According to the Pew Forum, “Pentecostals belong either to one of the historical denominations, such as the Assemblies of God and the Church of God in Christ,” which developed during the twentieth-century, “or to newer, largely independent churches, sometimes labeled as neo-pentecostal churches” (Pew Forum 2006a, p.12). The culture, intense beliefs regarding the presence of the Holy Spirit, and fervent worship practices of Pentecostals have, however, not been contained within this branch of contemporary Christianity.

‘Charismatics’, according to the Pew Forum’s definition, are believers of any denomination who believe in the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit and its ability to bestow the ‘gifts’ outlined above (Pew Forum 2006a). Within many places, such as Latin America and the Philippines, many Catholics now identify themselves within these belief sets. Many of the independent, non-denominational, inter-denominational, and even some Southern Baptist congregations are ‘charismatic’ in orientation, as well as many of the globalised ‘megachurches’. The Pew Forum has thus created the term ‘Renewalist’ to encapsulate both charismatic and Pentecostal, and the corresponding culture and belief sets shared by both.

Pentecostalism became the first full-fledged Protestant ‘denomination’ to grow out of the Holiness Movement (Lawless 1983). Because of its inherent congregational and decentralised structure as a movement, Pentecostalism must be understood here as more of a charismatic Christian phenomenon. It was a phenomenon that was rapidly spread worldwide both by and amongst subaltern and popular classes within and between states and societies across the world during the course of the 20th century (Maxwell 1998; 1999; Gifford 1993; Freston 2004; 2005; Anderson 2006). It is a movement that cannot be
associated with any single state, ethnicity, or derived from any specific ‘political’ movement. It grew, simultaneously, from amongst the rural and urban subaltern classes within the US at the dawn of the 20th century (Anderson 2006; Blumhofer 2006).

The Asuza Street Revival (1906-1915) is generally regarded as the epicenter of Pentecostalism’s rapid growth and global dissemination (Anderson 2006; Maxwell 1998; Lawless 1983). William J. Seymour, an Afro-American charismatic preacher in Los Angeles, led this spontaneous and organic revival, which very rapidly produced a global proselytising force, as well as myriad ‘Apostolic’ ministries throughout the world (Anderson 2006). One of the reasons that the number of Pentecostal missionaries throughout the world swelled so quickly was the fact that in order to become a charismatic missionary one only had to be spontaneously moved by the Holy Spirit. In other words, no education or training courses were required per se, as would be the case within the mainline denominations or even the Southern Baptists (Anderson 2006).

While Asuza Street may have set a precedent, Anderson argues that Asuza Street was “part of a wider series of revivals”, which were taking place in different areas throughout the world at the same time. All of these sites of charismatic revivals are of equal importance in the spread of the worldwide Pentecostal movement. According to Anderson, “the various centres and events in early Pentecostalism were part of a series of formative stages in the emergence of a new missionary movement that took several years to take on a distinctive identity” (Anderson 2006). Anderson points to three triangulated factors which were critical for the shaping of a common identity. Firstly, there were the establishment missionary networks, such as the Christian Missionary Alliance. Secondly, there was the emergence of the earliest Pentecostal periodicals. Thirdly, these periodicals helped to link together and establish the “foundation of a metaculture that arose in Global Pentecostalism in its earliest forms” (Anderson 2006).

All of these have evolved over time, but have, according to Anderson remained the three key roots and pillars of worldwide Pentecostal growth. They translate, according to Anderson, into Coleman’s (2000) contemporary argument that there are “three
dimensions of growth”: (1) “a social organisation that promotes internationalism through
global travelling and networking, conferences, and megachurches that function like
international corporations”, which grew from the early missionary networks; (2) “mass
communications”, which have evolved from the earliest global periodicals of the
Pentecostal movement; (3) “a global orientation” or “global charismatic metaculture that
transcends locality and national loyalty and displays striking similarities in different parts
of the world” (Anderson 2006; Coleman 2000).

As a movement, Pentecostalism quickly spawned several denominations\(^\text{82}\), independent
congregations, and has culturally, and often contentiously, affected the worship styles of
many other denominations through the popularity of charismatic worship. From the turn
of the 20\(^{th}\) century hitherto, it stands as the catalyst for Renewalist Christianity and
represents a major faction of one of the fastest growing faith-movements on the planet
(Pew Forum 2006a). The term ‘Pentecostalism’ is derived from the folklore of the New
Testament\(^\text{83}\), which the Pentecostal movement was attempting to conditionally
reconstruct. The ‘Day of Pentecost’ within Christian folklore represents an instance
where worshippers in the early Church were taken with the Holy Spirit and began to
individually and collectively speak-in-tongues and channel prophecies. This story
represents the foundation of folklore within the overall Pentecostal and charismatic
movements. Facilitating such phenomena, and the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit, are
the cornerstones of Renewalist worship practices (Pew Forum 2006a).

One of the more positive facets of Pentecostalism, from the very beginning of the
movement, was its inherent openness to both women and non-whites in leadership
positions (Anderson 2006; Lawless 1983). Unlike the Southern Baptists and other
Christian movements amongst the popular and subaltern classes, Pentecostalism
encouraged a place for women in the ministry, as they were viewed as just as open as
men to receive the ‘gifts’ of the Holy Spirit—prophecy and otherwise (Lawless 1983).

---

\(^{82}\) Assemblies of God; Church of the Nazarene; Church of God (Cleveland, TN); Church of God (Anderson,
IN); Pentecostal Assemblies of the Word; Pentecostal Holiness Church; Pilgrim Holiness Church;
Pentecostal Assemblies of Jesus Christ (Blumhofer 2006).

\(^{83}\) Book of Acts, Chapter II.
Anyone, regardless of race and/or gender, who has “true” faith, is susceptible to being taken by the Spirit—as the Holy Spirit is believed to be indiscriminantly with regard to the physical attributes of believers. Thus, there was a certain radical component affixed to the Pentecostal movement from its beginnings at the turn of the 20th century, at least in the context of the sets of urban and rural social relations from whence it grew into a worldwide phenomenon (Lawless 1983).

Many Pentecostal and charismatic congregations have long been racially integrated; even in areas which have been characterised by racial segregation, such as the US and South Africa (Anderson 2004a). As such, Pentecostalism has always been a ‘religion of the people’ in terms of race and class, with only the molecular Enlightenment-era influence of Wesleyan-Arminianism in its ascent as a popular global faith group (Blumhofer 2006). It represents a uniquely organic manifestation of world Christianity, as it has developed its own sets of institutions, intellectuals, philosophy, and lifestyle. It has developed these facets from the grassroots level of a subaltern social movement and popular culture (Holt 1940; Martin, D. 2006). What must be measured here, however, is how the charismatic movement has impacted and permeated Christianity as a whole, particularly in relation to traditional denominational institutions in the developing world.

As Maxwell (1999) points out:

“Pentecostalism is a global phenomena: a collection of vital and powerful idioms about illness and healing, evil and purity which make striking resonances with peoples sharing common historical experiences of marginalization from established religion and from the values of twentieth-century industrial capitalism” (p.255).

Furthermore, the movement is characterised by “a remarkable capacity to localize itself, taking on very distinct meanings in difficult local contexts” (Maxwell 1999, p.255). Equally as important factors in the proliferation of Pentecostalism are the core components of its conception of the world, which have come to be assimilated into these myriad and diverse sets of social relations. These components included all of the elements of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world illustrated above.
Pentecostals now comprise 25% of the world’s estimated two-billion Christians, not counting other Renewalist groups and movements (Pew Forum 2006a). Unlike the SBC, Pentecostal and other trans-denominational Renewalist groups, as a whole, have no overarching confederal institution that binds congregations across the globe. Thus, it is much more difficult to ascertain funding data for the Pentecostal and/or Renewalist movements worldwide. The most comprehensive empirical data, in terms of Renewalist populations and belief sets, is provided by the Pew Forum (Pew Forum 2006a).

These trends have spread into other denominations, including many Baptist congregations, as well as mainline Protestant and Catholic groups across the world. The Pew Forum defines ‘Charismatics’ as “those who practice the gifts of the Holy Spirit but are not members of historical Pentecostal denominations. Most belong to Catholic, Orthodox, mainline Protestant or evangelical Protestant denominations” (Pew Forum 2006a, p.11). While mainline Protestant and Catholic institutions “do not stress the gifts of the Holy Spirit,” they “are often tolerant of such practices and thus include charismatics in their ranks” (Pew Forum 2006a, p.12). Again, “Renewalists,” according to the Pew Forum is “an umbrella term used to refer to Pentecostals and charismatics” (Pew Forum 2006a, p.12).

Pentecostal/charismatic-inspired Renewalism is experiencing a meteoric rise globally and “nowhere is this more evident than in the ‘global south,’ where Pentecostalism is reshaping the social, political and economic landscape of many countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia” (Pew Forum 2010b). The trans-denominational and non-denominational Renewalist ‘megachurches’ which have experienced exponential global growth over the past three decades represent a direct offshoot from Pentecostalism. The worldwide wave of Pentecostalism and charismatic Christianity has been described by charismatic Christian intellectuals as a transnational ‘New Apostolic Reformation’ (Wagner, C.P. 1998).

---

84 Including Southern Baptists and other ‘independent’ congregations (Leonard 2003).
5.5 The shared meta-narrative, popular culture, and corresponding expressions of activism of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement

This section will illustrate the specific elements through which many fundamentalist, charismatic, and all Pentecostal groups are converging. This convergence is taking place through common trends which are rooted in folklore, common sense, theologies (religions of intellectuals), and charismatic expressions of popular religion. It is argued here that these convergences represent an emergent Organic Pan-Christian Movement, as a bloc within world Christianity. This bloc transcends national, racial, language, and gender barriers with a uniform conception of the world, common expressions of popular religion, and a corresponding popular culture, along with forms of social, political, and economic activism (Pew Forum 2006a; Martin, D. 2006).

The common elements from which this convergence has evolved include the following: the ‘fundamentalist’ belief in biblical inerrancy; a perceived need for individuals and congregations to evangelise without inhibition; a belief in the omnipresence of both God’s and Satan’s forces within and between the structures & spaces of everyday life; premillennialist eschatology (Pew Forum 2006a). This nexus of belief sets, across many groups and denominations within world Christianity, has produced several trans-denominational trends with regard to how Organic Pan-Christian groups, intellectuals, and institutions collectively engage the realms of philosophy, politics, and production. The trends which will be analysed here include the ‘Church Growth’ movement, the ‘Prosperity Gospel’, specific forms of socially-conservative activism, including the politics of the family and ‘Young Earth Creationism’, Christian Zionism, and the development of globalised forms of Organic Pan-Christian media in order to reproduce and homogenise its meta-narrative and conception of the world.
5.5.1 ‘Church Growth’, ‘Megachurches’, and the ‘Prosperity Gospel’

The trans-denominational philosophy of ‘Church Growth’, which grew out of California during the 1980s-90s, represents the initial neoliberal-turn of many institutions within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement (Perrin et al 1997; Iannaccone 1995; Wagner, C.P. 1984, 1981). The foundation of the philosophy of Church Growth is to effectively marketise a particular congregation. This involves congregational leadership studying and understanding the particular demographic dynamics in and around the local market of the specific congregation, and developing advertising and marketing techniques accordingly in order to promote the congregation to the local market (Perrin et al 1997; Iannaccone 1995). In applying the philosophy of Church Growth to a specific congregation, the desired outcome is to effectively operate a particular congregation as a small-business in order to, firstly, augment the numbers of church members.

As the congregation grows, the congregation will ideally expand its income, the quality, reach, and complexity of its services/ministries (‘outreach’), and its overall structures and material capabilities as a whole. Many congregations, particularly those of a Baptist, Pentecostal, and/or charismatic persuasion, adopted the philosophies of Church Growth and have grown into ‘megachurches’, with member rosters reaching between the thousands and tens-of-thousands. Once a congregation has established itself as a self-sustaining megachurch, it can then choose to engage in a second phase of church growth: ‘church planting’ (Perrin et al 1997; Iannaccone 1995; Ellingson 2003; Weiss & Lowell 2002; Chaves 2006).

Church planting allows a self-sustaining megachurch to proselytise independently and beyond the bounds of the home congregation. The process involves the establishment of satellite-churches in other sets of social relations within the national entity and/or globally in different states & societies worldwide. The proliferation of non-denominational, Baptist, and charismatic megachurches around the globe represents the fruition of church growth strategies. Over the past three decades, Church Growth has
been successful in both the suburbanising global North and in the urbanising ‘global south’ (Ellingson 2003; Weiss & Lowell 2002; Chaves 2006). Church Growth, at an institutional level, reveals the commodification and marketisation of a large faction of world Christianity. From the early 1990s hitherto, Church Growth has represented a key ‘religion of intellectuals’ amongst the clergy of the SBC, Pentecostal affiliates, and other Renewalist congregations around the world. As a ‘religion of intellectuals’, and in terms of production, it has been instrumental in the meteoric rise of global Christian Renewalism over the past two decades.

At the levels of ‘common sense’ and ‘popular religion’, the neoliberal-turn of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement can be seen through the ascendancy of the ‘Word of Faith’ movement, also known as the gospel of ‘Health & Wealth’, or the ‘Prosperity Gospel’. In terms of the individual charismatic Christian conception of the world, neoliberalism has found free expression and encouragement within the popular religious lifestyles of charismatic Christianity. Out of neo-Pentecostalism has grown the so-called ‘Gospel of Health & Wealth,’ or ‘Prosperity’ gospel (Hunt 2000a, 2000b). This has been defined by a religious emphasis on not only individualism and Christian independency, but also the Holy Spirit’s willingness and ability to improve one’s material status and social standing (Pew Forum 2006a; Hunt 2000a, 2000b). The Prosperity Gospel has permeated many denominations and institutions through the medium of increasingly global expressions of Christian popular culture. It largely grew out of Renewalism, and “emphasizes that biblical verses on health and wealth to make the point that God wants believers to prosper” in a materialistic, individualistic and earthly sense (Pew Forum 2006a, p11).

The Prosperity Gospel represents a popular and trans-denominational neoliberal-turn of a large segment of global Christianity. As a core belief within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, it stands in stark contrast to the messages long promoted by mainline denominations, the Catholic Church, and many fundamentalist traditions. Even more moderate intellectuals and institutions representing charismatic Christianity, such as Southern Baptist mega-church leader Pastor Rick Warren, reinforce the values of globalisation and the free market. Warren’s books, The purpose-driven church: growth
without compromising your message and mission (1995) and The purpose-driven life (2002), embody the neoliberal principles of Church Growth and individual prosperity being intertwined with faith. The purpose-driven life is a global bestseller, and has done much to popularise a more toned-down version of the ‘Prosperity Gospel’, along with Bruce Wilkinson’s (2000) The prayer of Jabez—breaking through to the blessed life. Both illustrate the trend of the Prosperity Gospel, which has flourished alongside neoliberal globalisation, and has permeated large segments of global evangelicalism.

There is a wide spectrum within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, in terms of how the Prosperity Gospel is articulated and understood. Pentecostal/charismatic rhetoric has been informed by the language of the Prosperity Gospel. Charismatic/Pentecostal intellectuals point to the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit and the Spirit’s ability to bestow ‘gifts’, which include financial betterment (Hunt 2000a, 2000b; Pew Forum 2006a). What believers are reminded of is the necessity to meet God’s grace halfway, or by making some form of effort or gesture of one’s faith. This is an aspect of Arminian theology, from Renewalist groups’ lineage from the Wesleyan Holiness Movement. The Holiness Movement emphasised the importance of works as well as faith. This Arminian theological kernel, however, has evolved into something entirely modern and crassly materialistic in some cases.

Many Renewalists are told of the importance of metaphorically ‘planting a seed’, or making a financial investment with God. Television and radio evangelists, many of whom are globally broadcasted, also facilitate this through a telethon-like format that compels viewers to ‘plant seeds’ with their ministries in order to receive financial betterment and a more comfortable material existence (Marsden 2008). The perceived rewards alluded to, from both pulpits and studios, include a return on their investment many times fold because they have allowed the Spirit into the inner workings of their everyday lives, and that the Spirit provides guidance, protection, and blessings when engaging with the other structures and situational forces they encounter in life. Target-audiences for this type of message and programming are primarily the subaltern classes (Hunt 2000a, 2000b; Marsden 2008).
Personalities associated with this incarnation of the Prosperity Gospel include Creflo Dollar and T.D. Jakes, both of whom share a main target audience of, but not limited to, Afro-Americans and Africans (Marsden 2008). They both share overlapping programming and participate in collaborative services with other proponents such as Paul & Jan Crouch, Paula White, Kenneth Copeland, Benny Hinn, Mike Murdock, John Hagee, Joyce Meyer, amongst many other television personalities from the global Organic Pan-Christian media (Marsden 2008). This version of the Prosperity Gospel is also referred to as the ‘Word of Faith’, or the ‘name it and claim it’ gospel (Hunt 2000a, 2000b; Marsden 2008). This is reflective of its goal-oriented nature, which is much in line with current popular self-help literature which encourages individuals to visualise what they want, set goals, and have the confidence to achieve it (Rosin 2009).

Another manifestation of the Prosperity Gospel is one targeted particularly at a middle class audience, and has a style embodied very much by Pastor Joel Osteen of Lakewood Church. Lakewood Church a non-denominational megachurch based in Houston, Texas (Rosin 2009; Marsden 2008). It has a daily/weekly global audience on GodTV, TBN, and other Organic Pan-Christian media outlets. Osteen’s ministry was started by his father, John Osteen, who was a Southern Baptist preacher-turned-charismatic (Rosin 2009). Lakewood Church and its globally-broadcast services feature no crosses or typical church paraphernalia. Osteen’s message is simple, articulate, tempered, and hopeful. His sermons are much more akin to contemporary motivational speakers’ seminars regarding confidence in the self, and in the market to work for the individual if an individual takes financial risks (Rosin 2009; Marsden 2008).

Never does Osteen mention premillennialist eschatology or even mention Satan, unlike all of the others listed above featured on the same media outlets. Osteen simply takes the template of contemporary motivational speakers, such as Dr. Wayne Dyer and Deepak Chopra, and adds faith in God to the usual line of faith in one’s self and the courage to

85 Including, Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN); GodTV; Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). See Section 5.5.4
take financial risks (Rosin 2009). Osteen constantly reiterates the point that God wants individuals to be financially prosperous and to lead comfortable lives without fear or material uncertainty. Osteen’s highly-popular brand of the Prosperity Gospel is one which is much more settling, subdued in tone, and expresses validation for already-established wealth.

The most toned-down and bourgeois manifestation of the Prosperity Gospel is best represented by Pastor Rick Warren. Warren’s worldwide bestseller, *The purpose-driven life* (2002), is a hopeful message much like that of Osteen. Warren’s Saddleback Church congregation emerged directly out of the early California CG movement (Warren 2002). Warren simply reasserts that every individual was born with a God-given purpose, and portrays God as a jovial old man who wants the best for his children whilst they are living in the material world. Unlike Osteen, Warren involves much more of the narrative of Jesus and the Gospels in his articulation, and represents the ‘middle’ within the wide spectrum of Prosperity Gospel articulations. Warren is a staunch proponent of free markets, but is quick to add that his view of markets is that they also represent a marketplace of ideas (Warren 2002). It is thus his position that Organic Pan-Christian ideas need to be clearly branded and be made visible, attractive, and accessible for mass consumption.

### 5.5.2 Socially-conservative expressions of activism

The global growth of the Renewalist Christian conception of the world has produced a brand of socially-conservative activism on the part of its adherents. This activism is exercised within and between states and societies at the local, regional, national and international levels. The types of activism organised by the institutions and intellectuals of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement fits into what Cox (1999, 2002) describes as examples of “exclusionary populism”. In relation to defending biblical inerrancy, fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and charismatic institutions and intellectuals have come to
challenge the scientific community, with particular emphasis on Darwinism and the
theory of evolution in general (Marden 2008; Pew Forum 2006a).

While this may have been taking place for many decades within pockets of the US,
‘Young Earth’ Creationist ideology has begun to take root across many societies
throughout the world. The core idea of ‘Young Earth’ Creationist philosophy maintains
the biblical account that the earth was created, by God, over a literal seven-day period
(Whitcomb & Morris 1961; Marsden 2008). This is strictly because that is the language
and folklore of the biblical account of Creation, in lieu of such groups’ literal
Therefore, fundamentalist and/or Renewalist Christians reject the position of Darwin and
the natural sciences that the world is much older than the six-thousand years accounted
for in the Bible.

Creationism represents a global, supra-denominational movement amongst the
intellectuals, institutions, and the laity of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. The
‘Institute for Creation Research’ (ICR) was founded in 1972 by Henry M. Morris and
grew out of the SBC-affiliated seminary Christian Heritage College (now San Diego
Christian College), but has been an independent NGO based from Dallas since 1981
(Morris 1984). Morris has represented one of the modern pioneers of Young Earth
ideology since he first co-authored The Genesis Flood (1961) with John C. Whitcomb.
ICR stands as one of the chief institutions in the US which develops Creationist
intellectuals, offering postgraduate educational programmes, curricula, literature, and
media productions which all promote the Young Earth ideology of Creationism.

The overarching goal of the ICR during the 1970s was to wage a culture war within the
US legal system in order to overturn or amend the Epperson v Arkansas (1968) and
Abington School District v Schempp (1963) US Supreme Court decisions. The former set
the federal legal precedent that states, counties, and municipalities in the US were no
longer legally allowed to prohibit curriculum regarding evolution or to discourage its
teaching. The latter rendered Bible reading in public schools unlawful. The ICR produced
a new body of Creationist curriculum with the hope that school systems would adopt such materials in order to offset the teaching of evolution. The political perception of many Creationist intellectuals rests on the idea that both God and the Bible are under assault by the forces of secularism, with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) labeled as one of the chief antagonists (Whitcomb & Morris 1961; Morris 1977, 1984). Within the US, this is one of the issues which led to the homeschooling movement over the past two decades. Through homeschooling, many fundamentalist and/or Renewalist families choose to shield their children from secular education and have made use of Morris’ curriculum for teaching science (Stevens 2001).

To argue that Young Earth Creationism is an ‘American’ phenomenon would be reductionist. Morris also founded Creation-Life Publishers, and the Master Books subsidiary, from which Young Earth publications and media are distributed to adherents worldwide. In 1985 the ICR assisted the Turkish Ministry for Education in augmenting Turkey’s national school curriculum with Creationist philosophy (Edis 1994). ‘Answers in Genesis’ (formerly the ‘Christian Science Foundation’) is an international NGO dedicated to pushing this worldview and challenging the global scientific community (Ham 2002; Batten 1999). It represents a cluster of several Young Earth Creationist organisations which were developed in Australia over the 1970s-80s, with Ken Ham as its leading intellectual. A similar global NGO, Creation Ministries International, was also founded in Australia by Carl Wieland in 1977. Both organisations now have offices in Australia, the US, South Africa, New Zealand, and the UK. Both organisations, respectively, develop curricula and generate publications which support and popularise the Young Earth Creationist conception of the world (Ham 2002; Batten 1999).

Answers in Genesis completed its project of building a Creationist museum/theme park in Hebron, Kentucky in 2007 (Long 2010; Moore 1999). The privately-funded ‘Creation Museum’ offers a variety of visual narratives which feature waxworks depicting humans living alongside dinosaurs, along with vignettes of the Biblical creation story (Long 2010). Thus, Creationism has thus become ‘common sense’ and is inherently bound up with the folklore, meta-narrative, popular culture, and popular religion of fundamentalist
and/or Renewalist groups. Furthermore, many institutions and intellectuals of these movements view the incorporation of evolution into educational curricula as a secular plot designed to discredit organised religion (Ham 2002; Batten 1999; Morris 1984, 1977).

Kenya, where Pentecostalism represents a high proportion of the total population, represents a key battleground between the Organic Pan-Christian Movement and the scientific community (Pew Forum 2006a). A prominent Pentecostal intellectual, Bishop Boniface Adoyo, representing the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, which is comprised of thirty-five denominations and nine-million constituents, declared that many of the fossil remains found East Africa were planted there by Satan as a ‘test’ of believers’ faith (McKie 2006). Furthermore, Bishop Adoyo and the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya waged a ‘hide-the-bones campaign’, which sought to remove evolutionary fossil displays from museums so as to shield children from the perceived ills of evolution (McKie 2006). This reveals that Young Earth Creationism, as a trend amongst Organic Pan-Christian forces, is an increasingly globalised component of fundamentalist and Renewalist conceptions of the world. It is simultaneously a ‘religion of intellectuals’, ‘common sense’, and ‘folklore’. It is also componential to the overall expressions of ‘popular religion’ within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement.

In terms of defending ‘family values’, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement has also produced widespread activism within and between states, societies, and markets. One of the core issues in this area is homosexuality. At an international level this has produced massive splits within the global Anglican enterprise (Lacey & Goldstein 2003). Conservative Anglican communities, particularly within the US, the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa, are increasingly becoming alienated from the social positions of the ‘mother church’ in the UK. While some progressive Anglican institutions are allowing homosexuals to join the clergy, many more conservative Anglican institutions are beginning to secede from the global Anglican enterprise because of this issue (Lacey & Goldstein 2003).
Furthermore, fundamentalist and Renewalist institutions and intellectuals are waging socio-political and legal campaigns worldwide in order to actively discriminate against homosexuals and their lifestyles (Kron 2009). This issue will be further explored in Chapter 6, but it is inherently bound up with the Organic Pan-Christian campaign to defend core Christian ‘family values’, which include the protection and promotion of the Christian institution of marriage. The Organic Pan-Christian Movement has grown to inform policymaking, particularly with regard to development aid, global HIV/AIDS prevention, etc. Its emphasis on abstinence-only education programmes will be further explored in Chapter 6 (Human Rights Watch 2005).

Linked with this issue are also the controversial stances of many Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions regarding women’s healthcare. This is an issue that will be further explored in the following chapter, but the crux of Organic Pan-Christian involvement in healthcare policymaking, in many states & societies, is the issue of abortion. This was never more evident than in Reagan’s (1985) ‘Mexico City policy’, which effectively withdrew all USAID funding from any healthcare facility in the developing world that provided advice for or facilitated abortions (Center for Reproductive Rights 2003; International Women’s Health Coalition 2005; Open Society Institute 2003). President Clinton, on his first day in office in 1993, immediately repealed the Mexico City policy, which had become known also as the ‘Global Gag Rule’, via the power of executive order. He was, however, forced by the socially-conservative congressional majority to re-enact many of the policy’s facets in exchange for Congress appropriating the UN dues of the US during mid-1990s (Cohen 2000).

Overturning the Roe v Wade (1973) US Supreme Court decision, which effectively legalised the practice of abortion throughout the US, along with the issues of the place of the Bible and prayer in schools, were some of the earliest causes which brought about the convergence of fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and charismatic social forces within the US (Eisenstein 1982). This is not, however, solely an ‘American’ issue, but rather one that encapsulates the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, and affects the global politics of the family as a whole (Human Rights Watch 2005). These core issues of social conservative
activism, led by Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals, have all combined to produce manifestations of ‘exclusionary populism’ amongst this growing global demographic group across states & societies throughout many parts of the world.

5.5.3 Christian Zionism & premillennialist eschatology in global politics

Another expression of this exclusionary populism has emerged from ‘premillennialist’ and ‘Dispensationalist’ eschatology, or the belief in an imminent ‘End Times’ scenario for the material world. Premillennialism is as old as Christianity itself, and harks back to the “moral anarchy” espoused by early Christians, as described by Maurras and Gramsci (Gramsci 1995, p.93). Over the past two centuries, however, this trend has re-emerged amongst Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions, and has been further theologically developed as a ‘religion of intellectuals’ by organic theologians. This scenario has been constructed from drawing on the book of Revelations and texts from the Old Testament, particularly the prophecies of Daniel (Bennis & Mansour 1998; Wagner, D.E. 1995, 1998a, 1998b; Ariel 2001; Haija 2006; Shah 2006).

This meta-narrative of eschatology, which has evolved from the works of early Christian Zionist figures, such as Darby and Scofield, represents another trend that has gained popular momentum in the conceptions of the world of many Renewalists and fundamentalists (Marsden 2008). Linked to this belief is the idea of the ‘Rapture’, an event which it is believed will result in the harvesting of the ‘true’ Christian believers through a spontaneous mass-removal from the earth by God just prior to the outbreak of a perceived global war between all nations & peoples (Marsden 2008; Wagner, D.E. 1995).

Within the Organic Pan-Christian premillennialist scenario, however, Renewalist and fundamentalist Christians become key actors within global politics, as advocates for the state of Israel and Israeli exceptionalism within international relations (Bennis &
Part of the Organic Pan-Christian eschatological meta-narrative is that Israel’s rebirth as a Jewish state is one of the key signs of the ‘End Times’ (Shah 2006; Ariel 2001; Chafets 2007). Furthermore, many Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals describe an imminent situation in which the nations of the world will rise and militarily surround Israel (Ariel 2001). The armies of the world will be led by the Anti-Christ, spoken of in the texts of St. John’s Revelation and the prophecies found in Daniel (Haija 2006; Stockton 1987). For many organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, the Anti-Christ will emerge from the European Union, or what they term as the “revived Roman Empire”.

Premillennialism had always experienced cycles of popularity within different historical periods. The Scottish theologian, Edward Irving (1792-1834), did much to establish premillennialism as a religion of intellectuals. Irving focused intensely on apocalyptic prophecies throughout the Bible and, like Darby, spawned an entire theological movement with an emphasis on eschatology. The work of Irving led to a larger supra-denominational movement, which involved many intellectuals working towards better understanding Bible prophecies with the intent to fulfill them through collective Christian action. What these intellectuals attempted to bring about, through their activism, was the return of the Jewish people to Palestine (Wagner, D.W. 1998a; 1998b). The essential belief was that, through Christian activism, Christians could expedite the Second Coming of Jesus by fulfilling the preliminary prophetic steps along the timeline of Christian eschatology.

This movement also spread amongst North American intellectuals during the mid-to-late 19th century, and became popularised through international conferences charismatic preaching. James H. Brookes (1830-1897), together with Darby, established the annual Niagara Bible Conference (Sharif 1976). The Niagara Bible Conference provided a venue in which different denominational leaders could debate and collaborate in defining what

---

87 Ex: Alexander Keith; Alexander Black; Andrew Bonar; Robert Murray M’Cheyne—all Church of Scotland clergy of the mid-19th century (Wagner, D.W. 1998a; 1998b)
the End Times scenario was, how it would play out, and what Christians needed to be doing in order to bring about the End Times (Sharif 1976). While these conferences may best be categorised as expressions of a religion of intellectuals, the message of premillennialism was effectively popularised by Organic Pan-Christian leaders.

Prominent and popular Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals who promoted premillennialism and Christian Zionism during the late 19th century included D.L. Moody, Lewis Sperry Chafer, Henry A. Ironside, and William E. Blackstone. The *Scofield Reference* emerged from this period as the document which best encapsulates this religion of intellectuals. The popularity of premillennialism, however, was waning at the turn of the 20th century. Both premillennialist eschatology and Scofield’s Bible were reduced to the fringes of popular religion until the mid-to-late 20th century (Sharif 1976). Premillennialism and Dispensationalist philosophies experienced a popular rebirth amongst the factions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement.

Over the past four decades, premillennialist eschatology and Christian Zionism have once again gained widespread popularity. In light of the establishment of the state of Israel, wars, global communism, widespread cultural conflicts, and social unrest, Hal Lindsey published *The late, great planet Earth* (1970). Lindsey’s publication did much for the re-popularisation of premillennialism and Christian Zionism. The concepts have been further developed by a range of Organic Pan-Christian theologians88, all of whom advocate unconditional support for the state of Israel and warn of a dire scenario for global politics. Within their common meta-narrative, these Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals articulate the place of Christians within the coming “New World Order” (Robertson 1991; Hagee 2006, 1999; Van Impe 1998, 1982). The “New World Order”, led by the Anti-Christ, will include a global government and currency. The currency will be microchip-based, and is correlated to the “Mark of the Beast” described in the New Testament book of Revelation (*ibid*). This “New World Order” and its leader will be hostile to both Israel and Christians (*ibid*).

---

This is has become a broad eschatological meta-narrative within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. Furthermore, it has been popularised and widely disseminated through forms of popular media (Marsden 2008; McAlister 2003). Tim La Haye and Jerry Jenkins’ *Left Behind* was a global bestseller, and was widely promoted and distributed by church congregations around the world, through mass screenings of the film adaptation via the TBN network (McAlister 2003). This eschatological meta-narrative has also been popularised by Organic Pan-Christian televangelists, whose telecasts and books reinforce this imminent ‘End Times’ scenario. Thus, premillennialist eschatology has become increasingly uniform amongst Pentecostal, charismatic, and many fundamentalist groups. It now stands out as one of the major components of the larger Renewalist worldview, amongst Pentecostals and charismatics around the world (Pew Forum 2006a).

This homogenous combination of folklore, common sense, popular religion, and theology, within the larger Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, has translated to Christian Zionist activism within and between states and societies across the world. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) have documented the influence of Christian Zionist groups within AIPAC89 and U.S. foreign policy. As will be illustrated in the forthcoming chapters, Christian Zionism is playing an increasing role in sub-Saharan African states and societies (Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a). Again, within the larger eschatological scenario of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, Christians take upon a collective role of activism within world order. Componential to the activism that is mandated is unconditional support for the state of Israel, and resistance to the New World Order.

This is a meta-narrative that has emerged from the supra-denominational collaborations which took place during the 19th century, and have come to be popularised into folklore, common sense, and popular religion (Marsden 2008; Shah 2006). Through global Organic Pan-Christian mass communications networks, this eschatological scenario has

---

89 American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a lobbying power operating in the US and Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007)
precipitated at the popular level through novels, films, television, Bible-study curricula, etc (Marsden 2008; Shah 2006) Furthermore, global Christian Zionist networks play a significant role in funding the establishment of Jewish settlement camps in Israel/Palestine (Chafets 2007; Marsden 2008). Settlement camps represent one of the most contested issues involved in the Middle East peace process. The involvement of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in such a sensitive issue of international relations reveals the significance of the movement within global politics.

In addition to the massive popular support base the Organic Pan-Christian Movement supplies for the state of Israel worldwide, organisations such as the International Fellowship of Christians & Jews (IFCI) have continued to generate capital from Christian Zionists (Chafets 2007). These funds are used in order to finance the ‘repatriation’ of Jews from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union to Israeli settlements in disputed areas which are quintessential to establishing peace in the region (Chafets 2007; International Fellowship of Christians & Jews 2010; Marsden 2008). While Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) portray this as a US-Israeli phenomenon, Dispensationalist theology and popular Christian Zionism have much wider global implications. Gifford (2001) observes Zionism to presently be one of the cornerstones of African Pentecostalism. Shah (2006) argues that the place of Christian Zionism within the popular culture of global Renewalism has implications for many countries’ foreign policies, particularly with regard to sub-Saharan Africa. Popular eschatology, and its expression through Christian Zionism, has become one of the cornerstones of common sense expressed through the popular religion of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement (Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a; Marsden 2008).

5.5.4 Organic Pan-Christian media

In addition to traditional proselytising activities, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement has developed its own global media, through which the meta-narrative and popular
culture of the movement are disseminated throughout the world. The growth of the global media over the past two decades has paralleled and intertwined with the rise of Church Growth philosophies and the Prosperity Gospel. Myriad Organic Pan-Christian publishing houses, record labels, radio & television broadcasters, and the world-wide-web have all worked towards solidifying and reinforcing the popular culture representative of the Renewalist conception of the world (Marsden 2008).

In terms of global television, the following networks reach many countries around the world. Firstly, there is the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), which is owned and operated by charismatic Southern Baptist Pat Robertson. Secondly, the Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) is owned and operated by charismatic neo-Pentecostals, Paul and Jan Crouch. TBN broadcasts a host of programmes involving faith-healing, prophecy, eschatology, Christian world news programmes, and worship programming 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (Marsden 2008). Thirdly, GodTV is a similar global network that provides both original content and overlapping programming with the aforementioned networks. GodTV was founded by Rory and Wendy Alec of South Africa in the UK during the 1990s (Marsden 2008). It is globally transmitted from its technical headquarters in Jerusalem, which the network claims is facilitated by the Israeli government (GodTV 2010). All three networks reproduce a conception of the world and generate a popular culture centred on the contradictory message of striving for personal wealth and an imminent ‘End Times’ scenario for humanity and global politics (Marsden 2008, p.90; GodTV 2010).

The Pew Forum found that in many places a significant majority of Christians, particularly in countries such as Kenya and Nigeria, make at least weekly use of such broadcasts (Pew Forum 2006a, p.22). In terms of Bible-based study groups, many are based on certain themes and curricula provided by global Christian publishing outlets, such as LifeWay Christian Resources of the SBC and many others. The Pew Forum finds that weekly attendance of Bible study groups is highly important within the charismatic Christian worldview—ex: 64% of Kenyans, 48 % Nigerians, 41% Guatemalans, 25% Philippines (Pew Forum 2006a, p.23). Some involve general fellowship, whilst others
feature issue-based themes such as relationship building, financial planning, proselytising seminars, sexual abstinence programmes for youths, etc. Similar issue-based themes, including individual economic prosperity, human relationships, eschatology, and Creationism, are disseminated through a wide range of means. Organic Pan-Christian publishing houses and media outlets produce books, periodicals, curricula, television/film resources, music, etc. Through such media, the intellectuals of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement promote the shared elements of the wider conception of the world throughout all aspects of everyday life (Marsden 2008).

With regard to eschatology and Christian Zionism, charismatic clergymen such as Pat Robertson, John Hagee, Benny Hinn, and Jack van Impe, dominate the airwaves of TBN and GodTV. They each share a message of an impending ‘End Times’ scenario and lead mass prayers and vigils for the state of Israel, Jews and Christians (Marsden 2008; Wagner, D.E. 2002; 2003). Minister Tim LaHaye (a staunch proponent and financier of Young Earth Creationism) and Jerry Jenkins encapsulated premillennialism, popularised eschatology, and the Rapture with their global best-selling *Left behind* series of novels and corresponding feature films (McAlister 2003). Many of these intellectuals often collaborate in reproducing and articulating the popular Christian Zionist message. Benny Hinn’s *Blood in the sand* (2009) featured forewords by La Haye, Pat Robertson, John Hagee, and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (Hinn 2009a; 2009b). Thus, the same message is filtered through television, radio, film, the world wide web, curricula, books, magazines, etc (Marsden 2008).

### 5.6 Conclusion

Section 5.2 displayed the further development of the traditional Christian institutions and intellectuals through the Enlightenment-era. It was argued that the Anglican, Lutheran, and many Reformed denominations developed international denominational and interdenominational cooperation on specific international social issues. Together, with
the Orthodox churches, these institutions established the WCC on the foundation of international interdenominational activism. Also displayed was the continued historical development of the Catholic enterprise, and its eventual participation in the Ecumenical Movement during the mid-to-late 20th century. It is argued that this amalgam of traditional intellectuals and institutions represents a unified bloc within global Christianity: the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement.

Section 5.3 highlights the development of a very separate faction of global Christianity. This faction of global Christianity was developed by organic intellectuals whom were largely isolated from the Enlightenment-era dialectic, and was characterised by a profound poverty of traditional intellectuals (Gramsci 1971, p.20). Emergent Christian social forces emerged from the North American frontiers and booming population centres, and were largely generated from amongst the popular and subaltern classes (Bailey 2006; Holt 1940). The impacts of trans-denominational trends and movements on these groups, such as biblical literalism, Restorationism, the Holiness Movement, and premillennialist eschatology were also displayed.

Section 5.4 displayed the growth of the Baptist denominations, as well as Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity. Also illustrated were their respective developments as global centrifugal forces, with the development of their own proselytising networks. Furthermore, it was displayed that the denominations and trends of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement are rapidly proliferating throughout the world. They collectively represent one of the fastest-growing segments of the global religious economy (Martin, D. 2006; Adogame 2006).

Section 5.5 analyses the overall meta-narrative and components of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement conception of the world. This growingly-uniform global conception of the world, its popular culture, and corresponding forms of activism are informed by specific elements of common sense, religions of intellectuals, habitus, and folklore. These elements are homogenised through specific global trends, such as the philosophies of Church Growth and the Prosperity Gospel, socially-conservative activism and forms of
exclusionary populism, and Christian Zionism. These common elements are expressed through increasingly common expressions of popular religion, across states, societies, and markets throughout the world. The homogenisation of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, across states and societies, has been aided by the development of wide-ranging forms of global media and culture creation.

The overall purpose of Chapter 5 has been to illustrate the two large factions of Christianity active within the larger contexts of globalisation and the global religious economy. The traditional institutions which emerged from the Renaissance/Reformation period have established venues for international interdenominational cooperation, such as the WCC. The cooperation forged by the Traditional Pan-Christian Movement was largely founded on Enlightenment-era rationalism, and shared expressions of progressive social activism during the 19th-20th centuries. The organic institutions, which were produced largely outside of the Enlightenment-dialectic, have converged on aspects of shared folklore, common sense, religions of intellectuals, and habitus, which are all animated through growingly uniform charismatic expressions of popular religion and corresponding forms of activism.

This emergent Christian conception of the world shares a common meta-narrative and view of world order, which is largely informed by premillennialist eschatology (Pew Forum 2006a; Shah 2006). The rapid global growth of many fundamentalist, charismatic, and Pentecostal groups constitutes an emergent and coherent popular global demographic group (Pew Forum 2006a). This demographic group is explicitly socially-conservative, with exclusionary tendencies associated with its populist activism and worldview. It is also, however, implicitly and explicitly neo-liberal in outlook. At the level of Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, the philosophy of Church Growth has effectively marketised proselytising strategies and congregational organisation (Ellingson 2007; Weiss & Lowell 2002; Chaves 2006). At the popular level, the Prosperity Gospel effectively fuses individual materialism, personal financial growth, and Christian faith (Hunt 2000a, 2000b).
Many of the componential elements of what has been defined in this chapter as the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, using the Gramscian conceptual framework employed throughout this dissertation, also emerged from the quantitative analysis conducted by the Pew Forum (2006a). These include biblical inerrancy and views towards the natural sciences, socially-conservative values (including the institution of marriage; homosexuality; pre-marital sex; abortion), the belief in the relationship between individual faith and personal material gain (i.e. the Prosperity Gospel), attitudes towards political activism, social welfare, and government in general, as well as eschatology and attitudes towards the state of Israel (Pew Forum 2006a). The findings of the Pew Forum provide a similar conclusion in relation to the analyses conducted within this dissertation.

There is a rapidly growing global demographic group based on a shared conception of the world involving most, if not all, of the aspects contextualised here as the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. All of these issues and, in particular, the report of the Pew Forum, have generated an academic debate as to how best to contextualize the worldwide growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity and situate the global Renewalism within the realms of politics and production. The forthcoming chapter will explore the various contexts in which scholars are situating the intellectuals, institutions, and activities of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. Chapter 6 will engage with these approaches to understanding and conceptualising the phenomena of Christian Renewalism, and will use these cross-disciplinary approaches as a departure point for situating the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a transnational social force in the context and discourses of critical IR/IPE. What is of importance here is to illustrate how this shared set of beliefs, despite cultural, national, ethnic, or class differences, is maintained and perpetuated at local, regional, national, international, and global levels.
Chapter Six: Transnational Christian Renewalism in relation to states, societies, and markets—contextualising the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in global politics and production

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 established many of the intellectuals, institutions, belief sets, shared trends, and global proselytising networks of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. It established that there is indeed a growing global demographic group within and between states, societies and markets (Pew Forum 2006a). This global demographic group has grown across class structures, ethnic and cultural divisions, and national boundaries (ibid). Its believers share a uniform conception of the world rooted in shared elements of folklore, common sense, theologies (religions of intellectuals), and is expressed through popular religion and socio-political activism. Organic Pan-Christian forces have produced a transnational popular culture of ‘exclusionary populism’, with corresponding forms of activism with regard to the interconnected realms of philosophy, politics, and production.

The nexus of its belief sets, includes the following: a belief biblical inerrancy; the rejection of science or any narrative of natural history that contradicts the absolute authority and narrative of the Bible; the belief that belief in Jesus Christ is the only path to salvation; the exclusion from salvation of any social groups, religions, or individuals which believe otherwise; the belief in the omnipresence of ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ forces within and between the structures and spaces of everyday life as part of a wider ontology of perpetual extra-dimensional ‘Spiritual Warfare’; a common premillennialist eschatology in which there is an imminent ‘End Times’ scenario in which both Christians and the state of Israel are provided exceptional roles in world politics; a common articulation of ‘family values’ and understanding of the institution of marriage, which excludes any alternative lifestyles. All of these facets of Organic Pan-Christian beliefs
were addressed and measured within the Pew Forum’s (2006a) quantitative report on the worldwide growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity.

One of the larger questions being raised by the phenomenon of Christian Renewalism is one of context. Is this phenomenon an expression of ‘Global Christianity’, ‘world Christianity’, or ‘American Christianity’? In other words, is the Organic Pan-Christian Movement merely a global extension of enclaves of US civil society and the Christian Right in the US, or is it a truly transnational phenomenon? An ongoing debate persists amongst scholars as to how to contextualise world Pentecostalism and global Christian Renewalism. The empirical findings produced by the Pew Forum (2006a), highlighting the numerical data and belief sets of Pentecostals and/or charismatics worldwide, has led scholars to further attempt to situate the phenomenon within a variety of contexts, and with various interpretations as to the source or impetus behind its global growth.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a singular transnational body of actors within IR/IPE. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to contextualise it as a social force that acts in tandem with the conception of the world of the popular movements which it represents in global politics and production. Towards this end, three key issues of context, with regard to situating Organic Pan-Christian social forces, must be resolved. Firstly, it must highlight the ways in which the Organic Pan-Christian Movement can be contextualized as a singular transnational actor in the larger picture of world order. Secondly it seeks to contextualise the interactions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement with states and political structures, including an illustration of the way in which states are viewed and engaged with by Organic Pan-Christian social forces. Thirdly, it seeks to contextualise the way in which Organic Pan-Christian forces view and engage with markets at all levels of global production. Reconciling these three areas will provide the necessary departure points for the forthcoming case studies of Chapter 7.

Section 6.2 provides an overview of literature from a variety of disciplines with regard to Organic Pan-Christian social forces. There are, of course, the highly important empirical
studied conducted by organisations such as the Pew Forum (2006a; 2010a). The results that the Pew Forum has produced have only added to academic debates on the contextualisation of the global proliferation of Christian Renewalism. Using these debates as a departure point, Section 6.2 illustrates these debates on the contextualisation of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. Furthermore, it seeks to establish an original profile of the movement as a collective, singular, transnational entity and social identity within the context of world order, production, and global society. This will be displayed in tandem with the overarching Gramscian conceptual framework of this dissertation.

Section 6.3 will deal specifically with the issue of the role and place of the state and markets, as other actors and venues in relation to Organic Pan-Christian forces. This includes an illustration of how Organic Pan-Christian forces view and interact with states, societies, and markets. This chapter will conclude the chapter by establishing the framework in which the Organic Pan-Christian Movement will be contextualised for the forthcoming case study chapter of this dissertation.

**6.2 Perspectives on contextualising Organic Pan-Christian forces**

This section explores the cross-disciplinary approaches to understanding and contextualising the growth and activities of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within world politics and global production. In 2006, the Pew Forum released its ten-country survey, and presented an overview on 6 October 2006 for the Templeton Foundation at the University of Southern California. Lugo (2006) provides the “contours of the survey” which include religion, socio-political attitudes, and standard demographic traits. Shah (2006) presented the findings of the Pew Forum specifically with regard to Christian Zionism amongst Christians worldwide. All of the trends, belief sets, and corresponding forms of activism discussed in Chapter 5 are rapidly proliferating across states, societies, and markets around the world (Pew Forum 2006a).
These trends and belief sets are either influencing or supplanting the belief sets and worship practices of mainline and Catholic societies in the global South (Pew Forum 2006a). Lugo (2006) reminds scholars that the report is written for the target audience of state officials, think tanks, and policymakers. Thus, we are left with the dilemma of how to contextualise the data that the Pew Forum has presented within the academic discourse. Scholars have emerged from a wide variety of disciplines, and have attempted to describe the global Renewalist phenomenon within different regions, or comparatively between regions, and even as a whole in the context of international politics and/or global production.

6.2.1 Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity as an extension of the United States?

Scholars, such as Marsden (2008), Breuwer, Gifford, & Rose (1996), and Shibley (1998) have portrayed fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and charismatic Christian social forces as being agents of US civil society and foreign policy. The role of these Christian social forces in relation to US foreign policy is a debated subject that must be addressed here in order to contextualise the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within world order. Augelli & Murphy (1988) explored the relationship between American religion and US foreign policy. Augelli & Murphy were, however, arguing that Christianity played more of an implicit role in the contradictory nature of US foreign policymaking. Augelli & Murphy (1988) provide a detailed Gramscian analysis of US foreign policy during the Cold War in which they invoke the contradictory root system of US civil society in seeking to better understand the complex, contradictory and multifaceted character of US foreign policy. They argue that whilst there are evangelistic qualities to US foreign policy, there are also Calvinistic isolationist tendencies which also represent the nucleus of American exceptionalism as a form of common sense.

90 Joining the Calvinist concept of an ‘Elect’ with national consciousness
These contradictory tendencies amalgamate to produce a three-fold strategy of US foreign policy: convert states to the American way, isolate states from the US or isolate the US from other states, or destroy or subdue states which come into conflict with the US (Augelli & Murphy 1988). According to Augelli & Murphy, it is the contradictory forms of folklore, common sense, and popular religion which produce the dialectic of US foreign policy. Unlike Marsden (2008), Augelli & Murphy (1988) do not portray US foreign policy as being dependent in relation to any specific modern Christian social forces. Augelli & Murphy (1988) are more concerned with the contradictory sets of folklore, common sense, popular religion, and religions of intellectuals which have amalgamated over several centuries to produce a contradictory unitary ‘American’ identity and a correspondingly contradictory style of foreign policy.

Some scholars, however, insist that the global growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity is predominantly led by elements of US civil society (Marsden 2008; Breuwer, Gifford, & Rose 1996; Shibley 1998). Such scholars frame global Pentecostal, charismatic, and fundamentalist groups as willing partners of the US government and foreign policy, or as extensions of the so-called Christian Right of the US (Marsden 2008; Breuwer, Gifford, & Rose 1996; Shibley 1998). The US-centric hypothesis has produced a subsequent argument that global Pentecostalism has simply become a proxy through which the US garners popular support for the global ‘War on Terrorism’ (Shah 2006). Another body of literature suggests that this line of thought is reductionist and ignores the actual agency of indigenous Christian forces within the developing world itself (Adogame 2006; 2003; Martin 2006).

Marsden (2008) has produced a valuable account of many of the groups discussed in this dissertation, in terms of providing empirical examples of Pentecostal, fundamentalist, and charismatic Christian agency within an international context. Marsden also uses the Pew Forum’s (2006) report in making his case. Marsden highlights nearly all of the trends and belief sets highlighted in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. These include premillennialist eschatology and Christian Zionism, the Prosperity Gospel, the increasing role of Renewalist and fundamentalist groups within the development/aid industry, Creationism

Marsden frequently refers to Renewalism and/or the Prosperity Gospel as “the American Gospel” (2008, pp.74-75). He points to examples of certain US Christian Right leaders collaborating with indigenous counterparts in Africa (Marsden 2008, p.78). Marsden points to this phenomenon and predicts “an increasing international conservatism”, which will inevitably lead to more support for the US from the developing world within “international forums” (ibid). He makes the normative claim, with regard to the 2008 US Presidential election, that “such a scenario, under a Republican administration, could lead to the further erosion of women’s rights and of toleration of political, religious, moral and lifestyle differences” (ibid). Likewise, Shibley (1998) argues that there is a direct American lineage from “conservative Protestant activism in the 1970s” to the rise of global Pentecostalism. Furthermore, Shibley argues that “born-again Christians are becoming more like their fellow Americans in their comfort with popular culture” (Shibley 1998, p.67). Marsden borrows the term “American Gospel” from Brouwer, Gifford & Rose’s (1996) Exporting the American Gospel (Marsden 2008, p.78).

Gifford (1994; 2001) has produced substantial research on the role of Pentecostal and charismatic movements in the developing world. Gifford’s research points to the actual ambiguity involved in attempting to contextualise Renewalism. Gifford states that, “the faith gospel is an American doctrine, devised by media evangelists in the 1950s and 1960s,” but that many of the facets of charismatic Christian worship were already componential within many African traditions (Gifford 1994, p.516). He goes on to question whether or not it persists to be an imported ‘American’ phenomenon within Africa, and whether or not it is now both an indigenous and global movement (Gifford 1994, p.519). Nevertheless, Gifford (1994) and Brouwer, Gifford & Rose (1996) have
constructed a conceptual lens through which they explain the complex phenomenon of global Pentecostalism, in which the global movement is anchored by both the US government and its civil society.

Walls (1991) also views the global growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity as being US-inspired. On the other hand, Walls points to the adaptability of these Christian social forces, which enable them to organically localise themselves. The evidence driving Walls’ portrayal is the rapid increase of North American missionaries over the course of the 20th century (Walls 1991). Walls, like Gramsci, points to North American missionaries eclipsing the number of the mainline Protestant institutions during the 20th century, as well as the supplanting of mainline proselytising networks by North American institutions (Walls 1991; Gramsci 1996, pp.386-387). With his focus on the time period between 1911 and 1926, Walls (1991) is describing the same phenomenon Gramsci discusses regarding his observations of the ‘Pan-Christian Movement’ (Gramsci, pp.386-387).

In terms of Pentecostalism, Walls argues that it was born of Europeans, via the Wesleyan Holiness movement, but that Americans very quickly assumed control of its growth and the character of its global expression (Walls 1991). He argues that “the United States is the base for many organizations that call or work for total Christian evangelization”, and that many of the new “unaffiliated missions” are “mainly Pentecostal in character, thus representing another tradition profoundly shaped by peculiarly American conditions” (Walls 1991, pp.151-152). In terms of Pentecostalism and charismatic Christianity during the late-80s and early-90s, Walls may indeed have merit with his claim of the US being the “base” for many such organisations. This was a period which saw a wide expansion of Pentecostal and charismatic social forces within the developing world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and was a period characterised by a massive influx of charismatic, Pentecostal, and fundamentalist missionaries (Gifford 1994; Freston 2004; Anderson 2004a).
Fundamentalist, charismatic, and Pentecostal social forces, based as a collective interest group within the US, have achieved a position of access and influence with regard to policymaking within the US (Rupert 2000; Marsden 2008; Jelen 1993; Leege 1992). Jelen (1992; 1993), Wilcox (1988; 1989); Wilcox, Jelen & Linzey (1991), Leege (1992), and Smidt (1989) all produced valuable empirical accounts regarding the socio-political mobilisation of the Christian Right within US politics and civil society. The lobbying power of such Christian Right institutions and intellectuals increasingly grew to be at odds with the free-trade direction of both major political parties during the 1990s. Rupert (2000) documents the ambivalent relationship between the US Christian Right, globalisation, and the Republican Party during the 1990s. Rupert (2000) points to a breakdown of the Fordist hegemony that once bound these contradictory forces and describes contemporary Christian Right figures as key players in the battle of “contested common sense” within the US following the Cold War.

Rupert (2000) has displayed the initial hostility of many Christian Right groups within the US towards the WTO, NAFTA, and globalisation throughout the 1990s. It was during the 1990s when iconic Christian Right figures and intellectuals such as Pat Robertson stood adamantly against internationalism and globalised capitalism. Such intellectuals stood as the defenders of the Fordist era of US production (Rupert 2000). In light of this ambivalence, George W. Bush, effectively co-opted the US Christian Right back within the fold of the Republican Party, from which it had been alienated on the issue of free trade. Bruce (2000), Guth et al (2003), Wilcox & Sigelman (2001), and Beyerlein & Chaves (2003) all empirically examine the co-option of such forces back into the fold of the Republican Party during the ascendancy and presidency of Bush II. Thus, within the context of the US political sphere, Marsden’s (2008) thesis remains valid to the extent to which he is documenting the domestic political activities of the American Christian Right, and the foreign policy desires which it articulates in the political arena.

For the Republican Party, the cost of this co-option and support was that elements of the Christian Right were allowed to add to the character of the party and the party platform as a whole. Concessions were made upon Bush’s ascent, however, involving foreign
policymaking with regard to sexual healthcare, HIV, and development aid (United States 2003). This influence has grown over the past decade to include even specific areas of US foreign policy, including development projects and the US-Israeli relationship (Marsden 2008; Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). For eight years (2001-2009), the US Christian Right indeed had access to foreign policymaking, but only in these specific areas were they allocated any government funding or executive-sanctioned powers. The Bush Administration was historically the only administration, Republican or otherwise, to officially bring elements of the Christian Right into the executive branch of the federal government.

In such respects, Marsden’s (2008) account neatly complements and caps a body of empirical literature\(^9\) that validates much of his narrative. Studies involving US politics and conservative Christian social forces grew from the 1980 election of President Reagan because of the unprecedented political activism of the Christian Right as an emergent force within US civil society engaging the national, state, and local political processes via its incorporation into the Republican Party (Lienesch 1982; Johnson & Tamney 1982). The brand of socio-political activism exercised by the Christian Right within the US increased and consolidated over the course of the 1980s via trans-denominational institutions such as Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, and emergent organisations such as Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition and James Dobson’s Focus on the Family (Leege 1992).

The lobbying power of the American Christian Right undoubtedly increased during the 2000 Bush campaign and during his presidency, in specific areas such as foreign aid (Marsden 2008; Burkhalter 2004). Mearsheimer & Walt (2007) validate Marsden’s claims regarding the Christian Right having a role in pushing a strong pro-Israeli US foreign policy. Mearsheimer & Walt, however, stop far short of making any claim that the Christian Right in some way is directing US foreign policymaking in this area, but that Christian Zionist institutions and intellectuals are componential to a much larger

lobbying operation (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). The value of Marsden’s (2008) work, similarly to that of Mearsheimer & Walt, comes through his identifying the Christian Right as a significant pressure group within the US, along with his rich and detailed empirical accounts of the many activities of Renewalist and/or fundamentalist institutions and intellectuals throughout the world.

Marsden’s (2008) hypothesis is also valid in the sense that some global proselytising networks are indeed funded and administered by elements of US civil society. As displayed in Chapter 5, the Southern Baptist proselytising network is based in the US, and is directly funded by congregations and distributed through organisations such as the IMB and the NAMB (Leonard 2003). The SBC was founded as an intrastate regional organisation amongst a group of states within the US federal system (Leonard 2003). The SBC’s ‘home’ missionary works are conducted through the North American Mission Board (NAMB), which includes the US and Canada (Leonard 2003). Thus, the NAMB is technically a regional organisation, and the IMB is articulated by the SBC as an international organisation. The SBC and the IMB represent a strong US-based institutional presence within what is articulated in this dissertation as the global Organic Pan-Christian Movement. The vast majority of its funding for its global operations is generated from within US civil society (Leonard 2003).

The SBC, however, is but one set of institutions and intellectuals within the larger mosaic of the larger global Organic Pan-Christian Movement. The SBC is a rare exception within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in the sense that its funding mechanisms are transparent and quantifiable (International Mission Board 2009). It is also one of the few structures within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement which can be justifiably argued as extensions of US civil society. The US-led nature of the SBC’s global proselytising operations stands in sharp contrast to the much more decentralised and multi-nodal nature of charismatic and Pentecostal groups operating within a global context (Martin, D. 2006). As highlighted in Chapter 5, the philosophies of Church Growth encourage congregational self-reliance and the use of marketing techniques in order to expand
congregational resources and organisational growth by adapting to the conditions of local markets in which congregations are operating (Chaves 2006; Iannaccone et al 1995).

These strategies serve as the means to developing the local congregation into a ‘megachurch’, which can then expand its operations elsewhere through ‘church-planting’ (Chaves 2006; Iannaccone et al 1995). Unlike the SBC, such independent congregations are not obliged to produce data on funding or expenditures for any outside oversight. Many such Pentecostal, neo-Pentecostal, and non-denominational charismatic congregational networks have developed independently within and between states, societies, and markets throughout the world (Anderson 2004a, 2006; Martin, D. 2006; Adogame 2006). Thus, such groups cannot be simply articulated as extensions of US society and/or US foreign policy.

In a larger sense, it is also problematic to portray the entire global Organic Pan-Christian Movement as being simply an extension of US power and influence within international relations (Martin, D. 2006; Adogame 2006). Fundamentalist, charismatic, and Pentecostal groups within the US comprise a large and important vein of the larger Organic Pan-Christian Movement, but certainly not the only vein. What is unfolding now, however, in terms of the growth of global Christian Renewalism should neither be divorced from, nor entirely confused with, the American branch of the larger, global Organic Pan-Christian Movement.

Van der Pijl’s (1998) analysis of ‘transnational class formation’ factors in Pentecostal, fundamentalist, and charismatic Christian social forces within his larger framework of the ‘Lockeian Heartland’ being the core of global neoliberalism. Van der Pijl gives a very detailed historical account of many conservative Christian activist elements throughout the Cold War period, but he makes no argument that such groups were somehow leading or guiding US foreign policy between 1946 and 1989 (van der Pijl 1998, pp. 122-132). Van der Pijl portrays such groups, including Pentecostals & charismatics, Alcoholics Anonymous, the Moral Rearmament Movement, televangelists, etc, as hegemonic reinforcements for US foreign policy during the Cold War, and not as driving forces of
foreign policymaking (*ibid*). Furthermore, van der Pijl’s analysis feeds into his larger framework of global neoliberalism, and is thus far less state-centric.

An example of the discrepancy of the portrayals of van der Pijl (1998) and Marsden (2008) can be found in their accounts of Korean Christianity. Paul Yonggi Cho’s Seoul-based Yoido Full Gospel Church is the largest Christian congregation in the world, with 750,000 members (Marsden 2008, p.79). Where Marsden (2008) portrays Yoido as an extension of US civil society, van der Pijl (1998) situates Korean Christianity within his larger portrait of transnational class formation within IR/IPE. Van der Pijl points to the reverse-agency involved with the meteoric rise of Rev. Moon of South Korea during the 1970s-80s, through the popular global ‘Mooney’ movement (van der Pijl 1998, pp.128-131). Moon’s reverse agency came in the form of the establishment of the *Washington Times* conservative daily newspaper, and his role within and between the US and the USSR involving student exchange programmes and proselytising in the Soviet Union during Perestroika (*ibid*).

Whilst Marsden (2008) acknowledges the potential and examples of reverse-agency, which runs counter to his overall state-centric portrayal of the US being the impetus behind global Renewalism, he makes no adjustment to his US-imperialist narrative. The overarching point to be made here is that for the duration of the post-1945 bipolar world order, when the US attempted to provide a style of international intellectual and moral leadership along with military supremacy, the Christian Right played no role whatsoever with regard to US foreign policy, other than as a supportive hegemonic reinforcement within US civil society and, at most, in a service-capacity in covert and overt assistance roles elsewhere (van der Pijl 1998). The problem of the US-centric hypothesis of Marsden (2008), Gifford (1994), and Brouwer, Gifford, & Rose (1996), with regard to the entire global Organic Pan-Christian Movement, comes into play with regard to the wider global portrait in which they situate the Christian Right of US civil society.

---

92 An offshoot of Pentecostalism
This goes back to Marsden’s normative claim that a future Republican administration in the US would inevitably lead to a more conservative character amongst other nation-states in the international arena which will lend themselves and the control of international forums to US supremacy (Marsden 2008, p.78). The problem with that hypothesis is that conservative Christian regimes\(^93\) and societies were growing in the developing world long before Bush II entered office (Maxwell 1999; Shah 2006). The findings of the Pew Forum (2006a) suggest that Pentecostals, charismatics, and some fundamentalists constitute a growing demographic group throughout the world. Thus, it is highly probable that several societies, states, and regimes will continue to produce socially-conservative Christian actors regardless of what political party is in control of US foreign policymaking at a given time.

Until 2001, the American Christian Right had historically exerted little or no power over US foreign policymaking. This was a partial factor in the perceived alienation from policymaking on the part of Christian Right leaders during the 1990s, with regard to globalisation (Rupert 2000). Presidents Carter and Clinton are the only two Southern Baptists presidents in history, and there have been no Pentecostal and/or charismatic elected officials in the executive branch of the federal government of the US (Leonard 2003). As a 2008 Vice-Presidential candidate, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin represented the first Pentecostal politician to ever stand for a national executive office for either major party (Goodstein 2008). Furthermore, it is foolhardy to assume that the eight-year period, during which institutions and intellectuals of the American Christian Right enjoyed unprecedented access to policymaking in specific humanitarian areas, represents a new immutable presence within US foreign policymaking, or that the areas of policymaking in which Christian Right representatives were employed were anything more than concessions stemming from party loyalty and electoral participation.

Portrayals of the global Christian media have also been articulated as extensions of US civil society and foreign policy (Marsden 2008; Hadden 1991). Marsden (2008) neglects to note and/or emphasise the truly globalised structure of the global Christian media. He

\(^93\)Ex: Frederick Chiluba’s presidency in Zambia from 1991-2002 (Shah 2006).
highlights GodTV, but does not emphasise that its proprietors, Rory & Wendy Alec, are South African and British nationals (Marsden 2008, p.90). They produce original content and organise the programming schedule and marketing of the channel, its associates, and their products for Europe and the rest of the world. The Alecs claim that GodTV is globally broadcast from Jerusalem, and is facilitated by the Israeli government—not the US (GodTV 2010). One of the leading Renewalist celebrities, Benny Hinn, whom Marsden (2008) points to as a mouthpiece of US foreign policy, is indeed a US national, but he was born in Jaffa and holds Israeli citizenship as well (Hinn 2009a). The foreword of Benny Hinn’s most recent Christian Zionist piece, *Blood in the sand* (2009), was written by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. In fact, Israeli political leaders have been far more explicitly involved with TBN intellectuals, such as Hinn, than US political leaders (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007).

As Marsden points out, TBN is based in Texas from whence it is globally transmitted throughout the world (Marsden 2008). Marsden also points to the fact that it is one of three terrestrial television channels available throughout Zambia (Marsden 2008, p.78). Most of the content produced for TBN in Zambia, however, is Zambian, and is only augmented by the global production content seen on TBN as well as CBN and GodTV. As Shah (2006) illustrates, Pentecostalism had much more of structural presence within the Zambian government during the presidency of Frederick Chiluba (1991-2002). Chiluba emerged, during the 1990s, as the very first Pentecostal world leader, and was largely responsible for the position of TBN within Zambian media (Shah 2006).

Whilst there has historically been varying degrees of overlap between the interests of the centre-right segment of the ruling classes of the US and the much more populist Christian Right, this dissertation argues that it is shortsighted to correlate the entire body of activities of approximately 500 million Renewalist Christians throughout the world to the minority-Renewalist and minority-fundamentalist populations of the US, which make up far less of the total of Renewalists worldwide than Renewalist populations within peripheral and/or semi-peripheral states. Furthermore, the population of Renewalist

---

94 Population figures provided by the Pew Forum (2006a).
Christians is growing rapidly in states such as Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Kenya, Uganda, etc (Pew Forum 2006a).

The notion that significant Renewalist populations within and between states and societies around the world are somehow dependent on the direction of US foreign policymaking and/or elements of US civil society negates the larger role of Christian Renewalism in global politics and production within and between a host of states, societies, and markets. One of the main claims of this dissertation is that Renewalist population of the world, which is growing most in the developing world, does not represent the ‘internationalisation of the state’, with regard to the work of Cox (1981). Contextualising global Renewalism as a form of US-imperialism depreciates peoples and societies within the ‘global south’ which represent the transnational populist core of the wider Organic Pan-Christian Movement (Adogame 2006). This is not to argue that US civil society does not play a significant role within the larger movement, but it is certainly not the singular impetus behind it. In fact, there have often been struggles which have taken place between social forces within American civil society and those of the developing world with regard to the overall leadership of the movement as a whole (Anderson 2000b).

Anderson (2000b) addresses an issue that can lend some explanation with regard to the complex and ambivalent relationship between North American Pentecostalism and the larger world Pentecostal population. Anderson (2000b) highlights many of the power struggles and crises which have historically taken place within Pentecostalism and its missiology. What Anderson argues is that, overall, American Pentecostals view global Pentecostalism in very a subjective context in which America is the intellectual and moral leader of the larger global movement. Anderson argues that whilst this is a subjective delusion of grandeur, American Pentecostals nevertheless perceive this as reality because of the ideological strength of ‘American exceptionalism’, or “America’s special place among nations” (Anderson 2000b).
Augelli & Murphy (1988) also analysed the root-system, nature, and contradictory expressions of American exceptionalism, and the popular/cultural subjective belief of Americans that the US has a “special destiny”. Anderson points to the semantics used with regard to a conference of world Pentecostalism that took place in the US in 2000 (Anderson 2000b). The conference title included the phrase ‘Home & Abroad’, which led to a general confusion amongst non-North American participants as to where “home” was meant to refer to (ibid). Non-American Pentecostal intellectuals and institutions were somewhat taken aback by the implicit American exceptionalism at what was supposed to be a world conference (ibid). This was particularly the case amongst Pentecostals because, unlike the SBC, there is no centralised funding mechanism for the myriad independent Pentecostal congregations of the world—most of which are self-funding. For Anderson (2000b), it revealed the subjective bias of many North American Pentecostal institutions and intellectuals. The reality is, however, that there is no financial or intellectual/moral leadership centre of global Pentecostalism (Anderson 2004a; 2000b).

Two assumptions are at play here, from Anderson’s perspective. Firstly, the idea of global Pentecostalism and charismatic Renewalism being US-led and constituting an ‘American Gospel’ is built on the idea that Pentecostalism was born out of the US and became a global centrifugal force that is somehow hitherto anchored from within the US. Anderson (2006) argues that it is reductionist to assume that Pentecostalism spontaneously began at Asuza Street in Los Angeles at the turn of the 20th century and somehow represents the sole source of the rapid worldwide spread of Pentecostalism. Anderson does not in any way diminish the historical importance of the Asuza Street Revival. He does, however, argue that Asuza Street was “part of a wider series of revivals” worldwide, which were occurring simultaneously and spontaneously (Anderson 2006).

The second assumption at play in American Pentecostals’ subjective view of world Pentecostalism is, of course, American exceptionalism (Anderson 2000b). This presents a highly contradictory character to global Pentecostalism, at least in terms of where US-based institutions and intellectuals are concerned. Anderson’s point is, however, that just
because many American charismatic and Pentecostal institutions and intellectuals view
global Pentecostalism subjectively, and perceive an American leadership role, does not
make this reality or reflect the actual complexity and transnational character of the
movement as a whole. It is but one subjective viewpoint on the part of one segment of a
much wider transnational movement; one which has caused several historical schisms
within the movement (Anderson 2000b).

The way in which the phenomenon has grown, particularly since 1991, lends cause to
widen the context in which we situate the growth of Christian Renewalism. Upon a
deeper review, we find that Pentecostal forces have long been established in societies
within sub-Saharan Africa, the Philippines, South Korea, Brazil, etc (Freston 2004;
Maxwell 1999; Anderson 2004a). The versatility and adaptability of Pentecostal and
charismatic Christian social forces allowed for rapid “inculturation” and “indigenization”
in different sets of social relations worldwide (Martin 2006). Many of these forces from
the developing world, in their own right, have subsequently grown into global centrifugal
forces within the global religious economy (Adogame 2006; 2003; Martin, D. 2006).
Nevertheless, from the early-1990s there grew a widening interconnectedness which has
grown over the past two decades between many of these once-disparate movements
(Adogame 2006; Martin, D. 2006).

Another problematic factor for the hypothesis that the global Renewalism is merely an
extension of the US is that it blatantly ignores the role of indigenous and reverse agency
in terms of its rapid growth as a phenomenon (Adogame 2006; Maxwell 1998). As will
be displayed in Chapter 7, there is an increasing number of Pentecostal and charismatic
groups emerging from within areas of peripheral and semi-peripheral states and societies
(Adogame 1999; 2003; 2006; Freston 2005; Martin, D. 2006). Furthermore, many of
these indigenous charismatic Christian forces are now establishing their own missions
within developed/core states and societies (Adogame 1999, 2003, 2006; Freston 2005).
This is not to say that intellectuals and institutions based within US civil society have not
been instrumental in the proliferation of the global Organic Pan-Christian Movement.
What is being argued here is that the charismatic Christian phenomenon is a much more complex, decentralised, and multi-nodal global social force (Martin, D. 2006).

6.2.2 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a transnational social force

The Pew Forum suggests that the growingly interconnected global popular culture of Christian Renewalism constitutes an increasingly coherent demographic group within states and societies worldwide, based on a common worldview (Pew Forum 2006a; Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2006). It is no coincidence that this growth has flourished alongside the myriad processes of globalisation and the proliferation of neoliberal ideology at the levels of states, societies, and markets (Martin, D. 2006). Furthermore, it not by chance that the global growth of Renewalist Christianity, and its transnational networks of resources, philosophy, and socio-political activism, have grown alongside the social changes and upheavals which have taken place within and between states and societies for rural and urban subaltern classes at the base levels. Previous studies have shown that Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity thrives amongst the subaltern masses and new middle classes (Holt 1940; Freston 2005; Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a). This is particularly so in places where people are experiencing changes in situational realities, such as rural-to-urban mass migrations (Holt 1940; Freston 2005; Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a).

One of the larger assertions of this dissertation is that Christian Renewalism and the growth of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement is indeed a transnational phenomenon. Furthermore, it represents a growingly popular, cross-class, demographic group that shares a common conception of the world and corresponding forms of activism and popular culture (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a; Pew Forum 2006a). It is argued in this dissertation that popularised expressions of neoliberalism are componential to the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world. Thus, it is essential that the empirical data provided by sources such as the Pew Forum (2006a; 2010a) be contextualised within
the larger discourses on social forces and world order in IR/IPE. The data revealed in empirical studies on global Christian Renewalism suggest a conception of the world that fits more into Cox’s more recent portraits of world order, as a stark and globalised example of what he calls “exclusionary populism” (Cox 1999; 2002).

According to Freston, many Pentecostal and charismatic groups are “bypassing the west and straddling existing ecclesiastical typologies,” which is “part of the growing transnationalisation of Third World evangelical religion” (Freston 2005, p.33). Maxwell (1999) further explores the complexities of global Renewalism with extensive historical analyses on the development of Pentecostalism and the spirit of “Christian independency” in Africa during the course of the 20th century. Sanneh has argued that the agency role played by indigenous African intellectuals and institutions has been largely neglected by scholars (Sanneh 1980; 1987; 1991; 1995; 2003). Like Gramsci, Sanneh points as well to the role of African-Americans in bringing subaltern worship practices from North America to Africa during the between the late-19th and early-20th centuries (Gramsci 1971, p.21; Sanneh 2001).

Ranger’s (2003) reports on the ‘Evangelicals and Politics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America’ panel95 at the International Fellowship of Evangelical Mission Theologians (INFEMIT) involved the participation of Gifford, Maxwell, and Sanneh. Ranger demarcates Christianity into two segments. Firstly, “‘Global Christianity’ means a contemporary extension of Western Christendom,” and represents a form of “spiritual neo-colonialism” (Ranger 2003, p.113). “World Christianity”, on the other hand, represents “the total of all the appropriations of Christian ideas and forms that have been made in every part of the world”, with specific regard to charismatic and Pentecostal evangelical movements in the developing world (Ranger 2003, p.113).

Ranger’s context and terminology is much more in line with the framework of this dissertation. Thus, Christian Renewalism represents a transnational social force, demographic group, and popular culture. The Organic Pan-Christian Movement extends a

specific conception of the world, popular culture, and corresponding expressions of “exclusionary populist” forms of activism within states, societies, and markets around the world within an evolving world order increasingly shaped by neoliberal philosophy and free market hegemony. Even Walls (1991), a proponent of the idea that such forces are inspired by the US, admits that:

“today, Christianity is no longer Christendom. Its territorial basis in Europe is broken and cannot be replicated in the new Christian heartlands with their plural societies and secular nation-states” (p.161).

In other words, Christianity is but a series of reinventions which have taken place for two millennia. Along with transitions between historic blocs of power and production, the geographical and cultural centers of Christianity have also shifted. According to Walls, “Christian history is a series of cross-cultural movements, which result in a succession of different Christian ‘heartlands’” (Walls 1991, p.160). What this dissertation argues is that, since the advent of globalisation from the late 1980s hitherto, an already-existent widespread global “shift” has gained more impetus and has rapidly altered the global religious landscape along with politics and production at every level within and between states, societies, and markets in which Christian Renewalists comprise a significant proportion of the general population. This position is supported by the data of the Pew Forum (2006a; 2010a/b), Coleman (2000), Anderson (2006; 2004a/b; 2005b), Martin, D. (2002; 2004; 2006), and Adogame (1999; 2006). Each contextualises global Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity as a transnational and/or global social identity. Coleman (2000) focuses specifically on the relationship between the spread of trends, such as the Prosperity Gospel, and the larger overarching processes of globalisation.

Anderson (2006), in critiquing Coleman’s framework, highlights Coleman’s “three dimensions” of Pentecostal/charismatic growth over the past 30 years: (1) “mass communications”; (2) “a social organization that promotes internationalism through global travelling and networking, conferences and megachurches that function like international corporations”; (3) “a global orientation, or a global charismatic metaculture
that transcends locality and natural loyalty and displays striking similarities in different parts of the world” (Anderson 2006; Coleman 2000). Anderson does not disagree with Coleman that this is not a solid framework with which to contextualise the growth of the movement over the past three decades. Anderson argues, however, that these triangulated variables have characterised global Pentecostal growth from its very beginning at the turn of the 20th century. Anderson (2006) emphasises the fundamental importance of understanding the historical roots of charismatic/Pentecostal Christianity within the different sets of social relations within which it has come to find expression, as a means of avoiding reductionism and negating western biases within narratives on the subject.

Anderson (2006) describes Pentecostalism as “a multidimensional global movement” that has “poly-nucleated origins”, and a strong “migrating tendency”. Furthermore, it is a movement that promotes a message of Christian independency and “individualism” (Anderson 2006). He argues that “something highly significant is taking place in the global complexity of Christianity as a whole, and of Pentecostalism in particular” (Anderson 2006). Pentecostalism stands as multifaceted transnational force that has effectively served as the key agent in the shift of world Christianity from western to non-western, or a shift from the ‘global north’ to the ‘global south’ in terms of where the geographical centres of world Christianity are situated (Anderson 2006). Part of the confusion with regard to how best to contextualise these phenomena rests in the fact that this is an ongoing and increasingly rapid transition within world religion as a whole, and at every level of society, politics, and production in which both Renewalist forces and the structural changes of globalisation share a presence (Anderson 2006; Coleman 2000; Martin, D. 2006).

McClymond states that “investigators of Pentecostalism face a challenge in defining the proper unit of analysis for their study—individual, family, village, tribe, city, nation, or multinational environment” (McClymond 2005, p.167). The way in which global Renewalism will be analysed in the subsequent case studies rests on the common components of a shared Renewalist conception of the world. The Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world unites individuals and groups within and between states,
societies, and markets across the world as coherent and collective social forces which share a common worldview and specific brand of popular culture based on folklore, common sense, and is expressed through a common form of popular religion. The roots of global Christian Renewalism, from within the revivalism amongst the subaltern classes of North America, on the frontiers and amongst the urban poor, expose a series of organic popular social movements (Shah 2006; Anderson 2004a; Martin, D. 2006).

Full Gospel, Holiness, Assemblies of God, and Church of God congregations all grew out of the charismatic revivalism which has become known as Pentecostalism (Blumhofer 2006; Anderson 2004a). These groups, and myriad independent charismatic congregations, quickly spread forth and took root in many parts of the world (Maxwell 1999; Anderson 2004a; Martin, D. 2006). This has produced an overall charismatic makeover for even traditional Christian denominations within many states and societies, particularly Catholic and Anglican institutions in the developing world (Pew Forum 2006a). Thus, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement has come to increasingly characterise the beliefs and worldviews of many constituents of both mainline and Catholic enterprises because of the popular appeal of the culture of Renewalism. C.P. Wagner (1998) describes this as a ‘New Apostolic Reformation’.

Charismatic institutions and intellectuals representing global Christian Renewalism have displayed a remarkable adaptability with regard to entering and thriving in new and different sets of historically-determined social relations (Martin 2006, D.; Anderson 2006). This makes Pentecostalism, and the transnational charismatic movement as a whole, ‘hegemonic’ in the highest Gramscian sense. It is hegemonic precisely because it represents a philosophy of praxis born of a popular culture with a coherent and emergent philosophy. This emergent philosophy is also organically tied to the larger economic direction of global production: neoliberalism and global free market hegemony, through popularised expressions such as Church Growth and the Prosperity Gospel (Coleman 2000).
While Organic Pan-Christian forces are able to assimilate themselves to new local, regional, cultural, and ethnic contexts, they also simultaneously assimilate segments of those same societies in tandem with the many elements displayed in this chapter which binds and reinforces the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world. Thus, its institutions, intellectuals, and popular mass elements constitute a transnational demographic group with a singular conception of the world, a corresponding lifestyle, and produces common forms of activism within states, societies, and markets worldwide. This has led to a highly diverse and decentralised, yet simultaneously uniform, series of socio-political and cultural movements within and between states and societies throughout the world. This is evident in the data produced by the Pew Forum (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a).

6.2.3 Economic and situational forces: the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within the context of globalisation and the “Global Religious Economy”

One of the most valuable analyses regarding the early growth patterns of Pentecostalism, in relation to larger economic patterns, reveals several key factors which, at the very least, encourage and enable the growth of Renewalism amongst population segments. Holt\(^6\) (1940) produced an empirical account for the growth of Pentecostalism during its first three decades within the context of the US. Holt illustrated a solid link between mass population movements and social reorganization with the growth of Pentecostalism from 1916-1939. Firstly, he identified the strongholds and epicenters of the movement as a whole, which were largely confined to the American South and Appalachian regions (Holt 1940).

The Great Depression-era mass exodus from the South of many individuals and families (both whites and Afro-Americans) played a key role in the growth of Pentecostalism

\(^6\) J.B. Holt produced his study in his capacity as an official for the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (1940)
throughout the US (Holt 1940). In other words, Holt found that, at least in the case of Pentecostalism within the US, there was a clear rural-to-urban immigration link in its growth. Holt does not limit his context of urbanisation solely to an influx of masses from rural areas to cities. Urbanisation, according to Holt, also takes into account the expansion of Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives into the South itself. Included in his expansive definition of urbanisation, he credits “the extension of good roads, consolidated school-systems, movies…other techniques for expanding the mental horizon and accelerating the pace of experience of the rural dweller” (Holt 1940, p.745).

The mass population movement taking place within the US during the 1930s was a phenomenon that was seemingly unknown to Gramsci, largely because it was taking place during his incarceration. This plays a role in Gramsci’s false assumption that religiosity in the US was on the decline overall during the 1920s-30s (Gramsci 1995, p.11; 111). Nevertheless, the 1930s saw the largest internal mass population movement in the history of the US (Holt 1940). Holt argues that this population movement was largely responsible for the widespread dissemination of Pentecostal and charismatic Christian ideas and institutions throughout the country. Holt describes the culture shock for the many which had flocked to the industrial cities of the US from rural environments during this period as “the disruption of social ties, the social disorganization in terms of industrial isolation from previously stable and durable personal ties” (Holt 1940, p.745).

Holt argued that this type of culture shock was generally characteristic of mass population movements. Equally as characteristic of a mass population movement, he adds, is that it “generally takes place at low economic and social levels” (Holt 1940, p.745). Furthermore, migrants who feel “segregated occupationally, economically, and by the social discrimination of the longer or better established families and groups in the new areas” eventually reach a sort of class-consciousness (Holt 1940, pp.745-46). Holt, citing the work of psychiatrists, concluded that this culture shock leads to religious revivalism as a collective way of dealing with the new and different social reality and social relations in which rural-urban transplants suddenly exist (ibid). Thus, a combination of factors worked in a synchronistic fashion amongst subaltern classes in
transition within the US, which led to a nationwide surge for the Pentecostal movement during its earliest decades.

Though Holt’s research focused solely on the growth of Pentecostalism within the US during its first three decades of development, some of these conditions and situational forces also reflect states and societies elsewhere in which Pentecostalism and Christian Renewalism have grown over the past century, which has been expedited over the past three decades. Gifford (1994) points to the period of the late 1980s onwards as the watershed period of the growth of Renewalism across sub-Saharan Africa. This is a period characterised by the end of the Cold War, a profound drop in bilateral foreign aid from the superpowers, increased and widespread poverty, and massive structural adjustments—all of which created mass migrations and a rural-urban transition for many families and individuals in the wider context of globalisation and the proliferation of free market hegemony. In this sense, Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals, in a similar synchronistic fashion, have come to absorb many of these families and individuals and assist in the transition from rural life to the new socio-economic urban reality (Martin, D. 2006).

Another factor that cannot be divorced from this picture, within the larger scope of critical IPE, is the essential privatisation of foreign/development aid in terms of adaptations made by wealthier states immediately following the Cold War period (Hoogvelt 1997). Gifford (1994) and Walls (1991) point to a massive influx of North American missionaries, many of which were Renewalist in persuasion, to sub-Saharan Africa during this same time period. State failure, regime changes, poverty, rapid urbanisation/mass population movements, structural adjustments, and increasing privatisation of development aid all acted in synchronistic fashion which has led to a “Pentecostal explosion” throughout sub-Saharan Africa over the past three decades (Gifford 1994, p.517). As Maxwell (1998; 1999) has illustrated, Pentecostalism has a history in Africa nearly as long as it does in the US, but the rise of Pentecostal and Renewalist groups during the past three decades establishes a degree of correlation
between the earlier work of Holt (1940) on the nature and conditions of growth of Pentecostalism and the meteoric rise illustrated by Gifford (1994).


Martin (2002; 2006) firmly argues that Pentecostalism is reflective of a global phenomenon, and represents a “portable identity” which is rapidly altering class dynamics across states and societies around the world, particularly in the global South. He points to the growth of charismatic/Pentecostal Christianity amongst the business classes of East Asia, which has gained popularity through its “reinforcing business and family values,” and provides a safe “space” and as a source of fellowship in a competitive business environment (Martin, D. 2006). Likewise, he points to the growth of Pentecostalism and charismatic Christianity from the urban slums and rural destitution of Latin American societies to its rapid ascendancy as a popular faith for the new Latin American middle classes (Martin, D. 2002; 2006).

Equally as important within Martin’s analysis is the role of the global economy upon migratory patterns. Martin argues that Pentecostal and charismatic ideas, intellectuals, and institutions are carried “hither and dither by persons on the move in the global economy” (Martin, D. 2006). Furthermore, “conversion spreads as part of the flow of people across borders as well as part of the great trek to the megacity” (Martin, D. 2006). At one point in history, Martin argues, missions were indeed carried by state and societal
forces from the west, but that “Pentecostalism corrodes the earlier boundaries” established by those previous missions. Martin is largely concerned with what he terms “two dialectics” (Martin, D. 2006). Firstly, there is the “dialectic within capitalism…of discipline and control in relation to consumerism” (ibid). Secondly, there is the “dialectic of an international movement represented by imagined communities across borders in relation to a search for identity” (Martin, D. 2006). This echoes and reinforces the early empirical work of Holt (1940), when Pentecostalism was still a very young phenomenon, in terms of class consciousness and a search for identity in the wake of a sudden absence of previous historically-determined social roles and relations of production.

Both Adogame (2006) and Martin (2006) point to “diasporic shifts” as one of the chief catalysts for the rapid spread of charismatic/Pentecostal forces within regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. These have all led to the establishment of transnational links and networks which go beyond those of a religious nature to ones of economic, political and social importance (Adogame 1999; 2003; 2006). Both Martin and Adogame point to a rapid increase of reverse agency and reverse missions, or examples of Renewalist institutions/intellectuals from within peripheral and semi-peripheral societies achieving successful exportation to other states and societies, including those within the global North, or the so-called core states and societies of global production (Adogame 2006; Martin, D. 2006).

Martin and Adogame, respectively, point to the specific ‘American Gospel’ hypothesis of Brouwer, Gifford, & Rose (1996) as being obtuse in light of these more recent phenomena. For Adogame, such reductionism within the discourse robs Africans of any religious innovation and completely ignores the potential and realities of African dynamics and agency (Adogame 1999; 2006). The framework of a ‘global religious economy’, coupled with the Pew Forum (2006a) data, is quite conducive to the discourse of critical IPE, particularly with regard to Coxian hegemony, the context of world orders and the debates on globalisation.
6.2.4 Establishing the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a singular social force in the context of a plural world order

Both Chapter 5 and Section 6.2 have sought to clearly establish that Pentecostal, charismatic, and some fundamentalist Christian social forces are increasingly converging through a growingly cohesive and shared conception of the world. This conception of the world is rooted through the shared, overlapping elements of folklore, common sense, expressions of popular religion(s), and the religion(s) of its intellectuals. This popular emergent conception of the world is bound and reinforced by a transnational popular culture, and is disseminated worldwide through a variety of means. These means include individual evangelism, institutional evangelism, the printed word, a variety of global media and publications networks.

The philosophies which bind these social forces have come to produce increasingly uniform brands of socio-political activism within many states, societies, markets, and class structures—particularly impacting many in the global South (Pew Forum 2006a; Anderson 2004a). The common expressions and character of this activism within so many different cultural, national, ethnic, and socio-economic settings indicates that there is indeed a rapidly growing transnational demographic group, an Organic Pan-Christian Movement, that is both shaping and being shaped by changes in world politics and global production.

It has been established in this dissertation that the proliferation of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity throughout the world has experienced a meteoric rise over the past century. It has also been established that this process has intensified globally in recent decades, particularly since the late 1980s. What this ongoing period of growth represents is a fundamental evolution of world Christianity, in which a polar shift is taking place in terms of culture, geography, and forms of expression. This shift represents the first modern transnationalisation of Christianity and the progress of the Christian

---

97 Theologies or ‘guiding’ philosophies such as the ‘Gifts of the Spirit’, eschatology, and/or the Prosperity Gospel.
religion beyond the cultural hegemony of Western Christendom. This section attempts to bridge the aforementioned academic debates with the larger discourse on critical IPE in order to qualify the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a singular, multifaceted social force within the context of hegemony, world order, and global production.

Anderson (2006) provides the departure point, that Christian Renewalism has “poly-nucleated origins”. It began as a widespread, global “series of revivals” during the early 20th century which underwent “a series of formative stages”, and “took several years to take on a distinctive identity” (Anderson 2006). This interpretation of the development of global Renewalism can be likened to Gramsci’s depiction of the Reformation, in which he argued that the Reformation represented a precipitation of popular and subaltern social forces which grew spontaneously and organically as a popular culture (Gramsci 1996, pp.140-144). It was from this cauldron of popular culture, argues Gramsci, which new philosophies emerged as a result of the “scission” between the popular masses and the ruling classes (ibid).

Similarly, Renewalism grew out of such spontaneous and organic revival movements amongst the urban and rural subaltern classes during the turn of the 20th century (Anderson 2004a; Martin, D. 2006). Like the Protestant Reformers, early Pentecostal/charismatic intellectuals and institutions experienced resistance and coercion from state authorities and rival socio-cultural forces alike (Anderson 2006). Due to the overarching belief within charismatic/Pentecostal Christianity that the Holy Spirit bestows gifts upon any and all who are open to it, intellectual roles within the movement were open to any and all who ‘received’ the Spirit—irrespective of race, class, gender, etc (Anderson 2004a; Lawless 1983). Thus, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement is an amalgamation of an entire series of continuously evolving organic, popular movements anchored by a common conception of the world.

As Maxwell (1999), Anderson (2004a; 2006), Adogame (1999; 2006), and Martin (2006) have pointed out, many of these institutional/intellectual groups and networks have grown independently in the global South. Many of these are now effectively proselytising
throughout the world—even within in core-economic states and societies (Adogame 2003, 1999; Martin, D. 2006). In light of the reality of reverse agency, or reverse missiology, global Renewalism cannot be accurately reduced to merely an extension of either the US state-society complex or of Western Christendom. Reverse agency essentially changes the context of this organic popular movement to the transnational level (Adogame 2003, 1999; Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2006).

Thus, what needs to be measured and displayed within this context are the following. Firstly, this dissertation seeks to measure the relationship between this phenomenon and the larger processes of globalisation. Secondly, it seeks to illustrate the nature of, and impetus behind, the convergence of Organic Pan-Christian forces within the global religious economy and the forces of global political economy. Thirdly, the interaction of the forces of the Organic Pan-Christian forces with states and political structures must be displayed. Fourthly, it aims to illustrate the interactions of Organic Pan-Christian forces and markets.

With regard to the relationship between global Renewalism with the larger processes of globalisation, it has been established that Renewalist forces had long been taking root within different sets of historically-determined social relations throughout the world during the course of the 20th century (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a; Maxwell 1999). The rapidly increased growth of the movement, over the past two decades, has taken place alongside and within the context of globalisation and has been expedited by the proliferation of free market hegemony and neoliberal macroeconomic philosophy (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2006). It is argued here that this is not by chance or coincidence.

Globalisation has fundamentally altered the nature and character of civil societies worldwide, as well as ways in which states administer services (Hoogvelt 1997; Okafor & Tella 1998; Cox 2002). Pentecostal and charismatic Christian forces thrive in socio-economic, political and cultural settings characterised by mass population movements and poverty (Holt 1940). It can also be said that these factors are byproducts of the
situational forces produced by globalisation (Martin, D. 2006). As states and societies have undergone massive structural political and economic changes, Organic Pan-Christian forces have grown alongside and become entwined with massive rural-to-urban migration, as well as filled voids left by retreating states within societies (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a).

Renewalism, as a phenomenon, represents specific types of structures created within the situational forces of poverty and/or mass migrations. Pentecostal and charismatic Christian institutions and intellectuals have, since the early 20th century, been born and replicated themselves in varying ways within these situational forces (Holt 1940). Pentecostal forces have historically found expression amongst subaltern classes in rural destitution and in urban centres characterised by a population influx (Holt 1940; Maxwell 1999; Martin, D. 2006). Charismatic and Pentecostal structures successfully attempted to make sense of these situational forces and ascribe a role to its adherents within the new socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts of their lives (Holt 1940; Maxwell 1999; Martin, D. 2006). Thus, the folklore, common sense, expressions of popular religion, and theology (as a religion of intellectuals) all provide a conceptual and emotional apparatus for individual consciousness, a sense of purpose, and a new collective identity, as well as an ascribed ‘role’ in relation to states, societies, and markets (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a). These roles include corresponding forms of lifestyles and activism with regard to politics and production.

Thus, there is a certain synchronicity involved in the relationship between globalisation and the growth of Christian Renewalism (Pew Forum 2006a). It can be argued that the forces of Christian Renewalism have been greatly augmented because of the side-effects of globalisation. These side-effects include increased innovations in communications, population movements, social upheavals, and changes in the way services are administered within states, societies, and markets (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a; Strange, S. 2003; Thompson 2003; McChesney 2003). Firstly, the general growing “interconnectedness” of states, societies, and markets throughout the world has greatly

---

98 Term put forth by Baylis & Smith (1997) in order to describe globalisation
aided in the dissemination and homogenisation of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. The interconnectedness of transnational Organic Pan-Christian social forces has also been facilitated by the augmented role of religious NGOs within the larger context of development since the early 1990s (Clarke 2007; Dawson 1998; Hargrove 1988). This increased role of religious NGOs within international development is characteristic of the wider trend of the privatisation of foreign aid (Hoogvelt 1997).

Furthermore, the growth of globalised forms of media has greatly increased the global outreach and homogenisation of the popular culture of religious social forces (Marsden 2008; Hadden 1991). As one of the fastest growing religious movements in the world, Christian Renewalism is aiding in its facilitation of and adding to the character and expression of globalisation within and between many states, societies, and markets worldwide (Pew Forum 2006a; Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a). Its growth is both separate from and interdependent with globalisation (ibid). One of the most important byproducts of globalisation, in terms of the growth of Christian Renewalism, is mass migration—particularly with regard to rural-to-urban population movements in the developing world (Martin, D. 2006).

As Holt (1940) illustrated, Pentecostal and charismatic social forces thrive within the situational forces of mass rural-to-urban population movements. As such movements have taken place, throughout the developing world over the past two decades, Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions have become entrenched, indigenised, and operational from within subaltern and new middle classes within booming urban centres (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a). Within mean of these rapidly growing urban centres, Organic Pan-Christian social forces provide institutions which help facilitate the transition between vastly different sets of social realities for economic migrants (Martin, D. 2006; Holt 1940). Organic Pan-Christian institutions operate within these situational forces, and provide rural-urban migrants with a popular culture conducive their new conditions (Martin, D. 2006; Anderson 2004a). What is provided is a globalised popular culture is based on a common conception of the world with which believers can engage states, markets, and societies (Pew Forum 2006a).
The remarkable adaptability of Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions to blend in and replicate this conception of the world and popular culture within different ethnic, cultural, socio-economic, and political conditions, whilst still retaining the core components of shared folklore and common sense, has given rise to a diverse and transnational, yet common, expression of popular religion (Anderson 2004a; Martin, D. 2006). Coleman & Collins (2000) have applied the concept of “habitus” in order to illustrate the subtler forces which link charismatic and Pentecostal groups worldwide as a whole.

The physical and emotional mannerisms, ritual practices, outbursts of laughter, and speaking-in-tongues are universal within Pentecostal worship (Coleman & Collins 2000; Pew Forum 2006a). The Holy Spirit, according to the Renewalist conception of the world, transcends language, gender, ethnicity, class, etc. Thus, according to Coleman & Collins (2000), global Renewalism has transcended beyond national boundaries, and even penetrated beyond language, which is one of Gramsci’s core components for any particular conception of the world. When “habitus” is applied to the Organic Pan-Christian popular culture, it adds a tangible, physical component, or a set of beliefs in physical practice, to its shared conception of the world.

The core component that links nearly all of the institutions and intellectuals of Christian Renewalism is the belief in the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit within the structures of everyday life, and the ability of the Spirit to bestow gifts such as prophecy, speaking-in-tongues, holy laughter, divine healing, material gain, etc (Pew Forum 2006a). Equally as important, in terms of the dualistic Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, is the presence of Satan and the omnipresence of coherent and collective forces of Evil (Pew Forum 2006a; Wagner, C.P. 2009). Thus, the essential shared worldview of all Organic Pan-Christian forces—Pentecostal, charismatic, and/or fundamentalist—affirms that the world, all life, and all structures represent a battlefield of extra-dimensional ‘Spiritual Warfare’ between the forces of God and those of Satan (Wagner, C.P. 2009). Global

---

99 As associated with Habermas, Mauss, and/or Bordieu (Coleman & Collins 2000)
proselytising, in terms of fulfilling the Great Commission\textsuperscript{100}, along with premillennialist eschatology, gives these different groups a specific and common outlook in terms of international politics and engagements with states, societies, and markets (Shah 2006; Anderson 2004a).

Thus, Organic Pan-Christian forces have an elaborate ontology and epistemologies through which they view and articulate global politics and production. Within this global context, Organic Pan-Christian forces have taken certain roles corresponding with their sense of purpose and worldview in relation to interacting with different states and societies in fulfilling these roles. While this has been increasingly realised for Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions in both thought and practice, the discourses within the disciplines of IR and IPE have been slow to cast a significant role to these forces within portrayals of international politics, global production, and world order (Fox & Sandler 2006; Philpott 2009). Worth (2008; 2010), Gill (1993a), and Cox (2002) have, however, left departure points from which phenomena such as the Organic Pan-Christian Movement can be bridged into the discourse of Critical IPE.

In terms of the debates within IPE regarding the usage of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in relation to global neoliberalism, there is no better example of global “neoliberal hegemony” than the Prosperity Gospel and its popularity around the world based on its ability to merge neoliberal philosophy with folklore, common sense, and popular religion. In terms of Cox’s (1999; 2002) more recent portrayals of global civil society, and a plural world order, wherein the structures and forces of neoliberalism are evolving and congealing as a “nebuleuse”, Organic Pan-Christian forces fit right in to his realms of “exclusionary populism” and the “covert world”. Thus, it becomes incumbent upon this research to take the empirical data produced by scholars across disciplines and contextualise the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a multifaceted singular social force representing a popular transnational demographic group, within the context of IR/IPE.

\textsuperscript{100} The mandate of Jesus, found in Matthew 28: 16-20, which mandates that Christian believers go throughout the world preaching his teachings.
Myriad charismatic, Pentecostal, and some fundamentalist bodies of intellectuals and institutions have converged through shared folklore, common sense, common expressions of popular religion, and religions of intellectuals. This convergence has effectively merged theology with popularised expressions of neoliberal economic philosophy, through such phenomena as Church Growth and the Prosperity Gospel (Hunt 2000a, 2000b; Marsden 2008; Anderson 2004a). Organic Pan-Christian forces cooperate and promote this conception of the world, corresponding popular culture, and forms of “exclusionary populist” socio-political activism within and between states, societies, and markets around the globe (Martin, D. 2006).

Despite vast differences with regard to culture, ethnicity, and class, this convergence has grown into a worldwide popular movement (Anderson 2004a; Martin, D. 2006). This is a movement which has grown to impact the interconnected realms of politics, philosophy, and production at every level within national politics, international politics, and global production in many ways (Martin, D. 2006; Marsden 2008). While the movement remains decentralised, and despite the great diversity within the movement, Organic Pan-Christian forces exert a universalised brand of activism in several specific areas of society, politics, and economics (Pew Forum 2006a).

It has been argued here that the Organic Pan-Christian Movement constitutes a growingly cohesive and coherent singular presence within global politics. Its activism remains uniform and based on a universalised package of beliefs anchored by the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit (Pew Forum 2006a; Martin, D. 2006). More than 500 million adherents of this transnational demographic group engage the world’s structures and superstructures individually, collectively, locally, regionally, and globally with this shared conception of the world, its corresponding uniform brand of activism, and through the intellectuals and institutions representative of this package of belief sets (Pew Forum 2006a; Anderson 2004a). Activism is conducted through the agency individuals, small study-groups, university associations, small/medium/megachurch congregations, denominational associations/organisations, inter-denominational organisations, trans-denominational

\[101\] Cox (2002)
associations/organisations, provincial organisations, national organisations, regional
organisations, international organisations, NGOs, and transnational networks and
associations within and between states and societies around the world (Pew Forum
2006a).

In terms of interacting with other structures and superstructures within international
politics and global production, engagements are conducted through individual Organic
Pan-Christian intellectuals, congregations, and the myriad other entities outlined above
here. Each congregation, association, proselytising organisation, activist
organisation/association within the movement carries with it a mission statement
reflective of the Organic Pan-Christian package of beliefs. Each also expresses its
purpose and intentions, which are based on those belief-sets. These belief-sets and
expressed mission statements serve as the rules of engagement with regard to the
structures and superstructures of the world-at-large. Organic Pan-Christian believers,
intellectuals, congregations, and organisations act through these conduits in fulfilling the
various ‘roles’ of believers in terms of politics and production at all levels. The
uniformity of these beliefs and actions gives this global demographic group a singular
presence within a plural world order.

6.3 ‘Purifying’ societies by engaging states and markets: putting
the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world into practice

This section will illustrate the activism of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in
relation to states, societies, and markets. Firstly, it must be established that Pentecostal
and charismatic Christian social forces view states, societies, and markets as contested
spaces, or temporal vessels of spiritual activity. This corresponds to the dualistic Organic
Pan-Christian conception of the world that the structures and spaces of everyday life are
sites of “spiritual warfare” between the angelic forces of God and the demonic forces of
Satan (Wagner, C.P. 2009). Every layer of philosophy, politics, and production,
according to this ontology, are permeated by this larger extra-dimensional battle between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ \( \text{ibid} \). This is a result of the belief in the omnipresence of both forces within and between the structures and spaces of the temporal world (Pew Forum 2006a). As such, states, societies, and markets become the sites of Organic Pan-Christian activism. Thus, every layer of political activity—local, state, regional, and international—is considered a venue for Organic Pan-Christian engagement. Furthermore, every market—local, state, regional, and global—is considered a site of struggle within the larger context of “spiritual warfare” (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Muthee 2005).

Chapter 4 of this dissertation illustrated some of the historical struggles which have emerged throughout the history of Christianity, with regard to establishing equilibriums between churches, states, and markets in different sets of social relations. In younger states and societies, particularly those within the developing world, there are far fewer precedents in establishing a balance between such forces and structures. Thus, the ways in which Organic Pan-Christian forces are engaging with states, societies, and markets continue to obscure the lines between civil and political societies in many countries. Nevertheless, Organic Pan-Christian forces have a clear worldview and styles of activism with which they engage the realms of politics and economic production which are reflective of the larger Renewalist popular culture and conception of the world (Pew Forum 2006a). Using the broader discourse of Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, this section will illustrate the rules of engagement with which Organic Pan-Christian forces interact with states, societies, and markets around the world.

### 6.3.1 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement and political structures

As a transnational social force and an actor within and between states and societies, Organic Pan-Christian forces view the political ‘State’ as an actor amongst a host of other entities, including God, angels, Satan, demons, the coming Antichrist, etc (Wagner, C.P.
2009; Muthee 2005). All of these entities, including the state, are players on the larger terrain of “spiritual warfare” within global politics (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Global Harvest Ministries 2010; Muthee 2005). Organic Pan-Christian forces interact with states and lesser political structures on many levels and in many different ways, depending on the particular state/political structure it is engaging with, and usually on a platform representative of a particular aspect of its package of beliefs or activism. Within states, Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions engage with a variety of different actors. These include kinship groups, families, NGOs, local and provincial political entities, etc (Clarke 2007). Again, with regard to central governments, the nature of the interaction between Organic Pan-Christian forces and state structures varies from case to case. At the basic level of engagement, however, they act as pressure groups representing the belief sets of Organic Pan-Christian constituents within the larger aggregation of interests (Freston 2004; Marsden 2008). From circumstance to circumstance, states can be viewed by Organic Pan-Christian forces as ‘partners’, or ‘antagonists’, ‘tools’, or even ‘vessels’.

With regard to states being viewed as ‘partners’ of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, there are a host of examples where charismatic, fundamentalist, and/or Pentecostal intellectuals and institutions have become key partners to states within the context of civil society. This can include community development projects, education, and administration of services (Clarke 2007). In some places, such as Uganda, such state-Organic Pan-Christian partnerships have controversially even extended into state healthcare policies and administrative services (Human Rights Watch 2005). During the Bush Administration (2001-2009), the White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives was created as a conduit between the executive branch of the federal government, churches, and religious community organisations at the local and state levels (Marsden 2008). The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) involved the structural cooperation with and funding of US-based Organic Pan-Christian institutions, as well as local Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions within the target-countries of the plan (United States 2003).
In Latin America, some states are being used as ‘tools’ with which Pentecostal and/or charismatic Christian forces can gain resources. Freston (2006, 2004) illustrates that, throughout Latin America, Pentecostal intellectuals are increasingly winning congressional offices and forming Organic Pan-Christian caucuses within congresses (Freston 2006, 2004). Thus, Organic Pan-Christian forces are adding to the overall character of many states within Latin America. Freston also highlights the recent ‘Blood Suckers’ scandal in Brazil as a tangible example of Pentecostal politicians as exceptionally prone to corruption and the draining of the state (Freston 2006). This was a scandal involving Pentecostal politicians embezzling healthcare funds from the state (Freston 2006).

The inaction of the state can also be used as ‘tool’ by the forces of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, as is the case where religious institutions are exempt from taxes and legal/financial oversight. A variety of means are used by Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals in the US in order to mobilise support for their endorsed candidates (Marsden 2008; Leege 1992). This engagement and mobilisation in national politics, for Organic Pan-Christian forces, began during the 1970s through direct-mail campaigns, voter-registration drives, and public candidate endorsements (Wilcox & Sigelman 2001; Wilcox 1989, 1988). These practices have subsequently evolved to include the formation of political action committees, lobbying organisations, trans-denominational NGOs, such as the Christian Coalition and the Moral Majority, and a variety of means which have grown through the rise of information technologies (Wilcox & Sigelman 2001; Marsden 2008). All of these means are channeled towards the common end of Organic Pan-Christian forces accessing and adding its character to the nature of the nation-state through an organic popular fusion between their philosophy and the realm of national, provincial, and local politics.

In terms of states being viewed as either ‘vessels’ or ‘antagonists’, the theological anchor of Renewalist worship must be reiterated. The belief in the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit within the structures of everyday life, and the Spirit’s ability to bestow ‘gifts’, is quintessential for understanding how the Organic Pan-Christian forces engage with states
and political structures at any level (Pew Forum 2006a). Equally as important to the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world is the omnipresence of Satan and the forces of Evil along the same terrain (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Pew Forum 2006a). Any object, structure, space, or living entity, according to the Renewalist package of beliefs, can be spontaneously filled with either the Holy Spirit, through belief, prayer and fellowship, or consumed by demonic spiritual representatives of Satan (Pew Forum 2006a). Freston (2006), with regard to Brazil, points to the power of Pentecostal rhetoric which brought many Pentecostal politicians to power. This rhetoric was built on the idea that the realm of politics was a “demonic space”, which needed to be exorcised through prayer, divine healing, and the election of Pentecostal politicians (Freston 2006).

Bishop Thomas Muthee, a transnational intellectual figure within Pentecostalism, outlined how Pentecostal beliefs can be transmuted into actual practice and action in a highly publicised sermon he gave to the Assembly of God in Wasilla, Alaska (Muthee 2005; Goodstein 2008). The purpose of the sermon was for Muthee to bless the gubernatorial candidacy of Sarah Palin, after which he performed a physical and verbal ritual with her which was designed to protect her from demonic forces in her ascendency to political power (Goodstein 2008). The topic of the sermon was community transformation, whereby Muthee listed several areas in which “God’s Kingdom” can “infiltrate” and “influence” in order to wage “spiritual warfare” (Muthee 2005). At the base level, he acknowledges the “spiritual aspect of society”, which includes the individual and congregation in terms of proselytising (ibid).

Secondly, Muthee points to “the economic area”, which he argues needs to be guided by “Christian businessmen and businesswomen”, as well as “Christian bankers” (ibid). He argues that running the economics of a nation is “part and parcel of transformation” (ibid). Thirdly, Muthee points to “politics”, whereby Christians should be constantly praying for politicians to be filled with the Spirit. He also encouraged everyone to vote in the gubernatorial election for Palin, and that they should be continuing to produce Christian politicians “who will change the laws”, and make them more reflective of their

---

102 One of the original Pentecostal denominations (Anderson 2004a; Blumhofer 2006)
set of beliefs (Muthee 2005). Fourthly, Muthee points to “education”, and states that there needs to be more believers who are “educationists”, so that schools throughout states and societies can be opened up for “revival” (ibid). Fifthly, he points to the media, stating: “we need believers in media…we need God taking over the media in our lives”, and that there needs to be a “Living Church in Hollywood” (ibid).

Ultimately, Muthee points to “government” as the final area of society that needs to be infiltrated by the forces of God (Muthee 2005). He then performed a healing/protection ritual on Palin, who was indeed elected governor of Alaska, and was subsequently nominated as the Republican Party’s vice-presidential candidate for the 2008 election (Goodstein 2008). Palin is the first Pentecostal in US history to run for a national office as a representative of one of the major parties (Goodstein 2008). The larger point that is being illustrated here, however, is that state structures, according to Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, are either viewed as filled with the Spirit, or as occupied by demonic forces which are in need of being filled with the Spirit. Secular forces, such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the US, or scientists in Kenya promoting evolution, are viewed as spiritual antagonists with which they do battle within the venue of the state (Morris 1984; McKie 2006). Again, however, this is the way states are viewed in terms of domestic politics. As illustrated with the case of Bishop Muthee, even non-national intellectuals are finding expression within foreign state venues.

The ontological belief in perpetual extra-dimensional spiritual warfare between the Holy Spirit and the minions of Satan taking place over the structures and spaces of everyday life, expressed by Muthee (2005), along with his corresponding beliefs with regard to society, politics, and markets are not exceptional. Muthee works closely with Global Harvest Ministries, which was founded by C. Peter Wagner (Global Harvest Ministries 2010). Wagner is an intellectual pillar of the early church growth movement (Global Harvest Ministries 2010; Wagner, C.P. 1981). Global Harvest Ministries was established as an umbrella organisation to serve the institutions and intellectuals of the ‘New Apostolic Reformation’

103 An emergent segment of charismatic Protestantism.
Muthee represents the East African division of the global Christian Spiritual Warfare Network, also founded by Wagner. Much of Muthee’s rhetoric regarding spiritual warfare is inspired by the work and ministry of C. Peter Wagner (1998; 2009). The relationship and convergence between Muthee’s and Wagner’s ministries is illustrative of a much wider trend of growing interconnectedness between Organic Pan-Christian forces.

In terms of global politics, there are many states viewed as ‘antagonists’ within the shared Organic Pan-Christian narrative and conception of the world. There is a long history, as van der Pijl (1998) has shown, of such intellectuals and institutions waging battles against global Communism and specific Communist movements and states—particularly the USSR and China. This was due to the perceived coercive atheism exercised by communist states in which Christians were perceived to have been persecuted by states. More pertinent to contemporary international relations, however, are the views of Organic Pan-Christian forces towards Islamic states and societies. The Pew Forum, in two separate reports (2006a; 2010a), has illustrated a growing hostility between charismatic, Pentecostal, & fundamentalist Christians and the Islamic world. Due to the premillennialist Christian Zionist component within the Organic Pan-Christian package of beliefs, all perceived enemies of the modern state of Israel are regarded as antagonistic state actors (Marsden 2008; Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a, 2010a).

In this regard, Iran and Syria, as well as non-state entities such as Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, etc., have all been the targets of many Organic Pan-Christian sermons and campaigns around the world (Hinn 2009a; Hagee 2007; Shah 2006). This has led to the formation of political action committees in the US between Jewish pro-Israeli pressure groups and Christian pressure groups (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). What is of relevance here is the way in which the modern state of Israel is viewed. Israel is viewed and portrayed by the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as the ultimate state ‘vessel’. Jerusalem is believed to be the future capital of the world after the Rapture and period of Tribulation within popular Organic Pan-Christian eschatology (Hinn 2009a; Hagee 2007; Marsden 2008). In this regard, Israel is viewed as a ‘vessel’. Israeli state
officials and private organisations view the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a valuable global public relations asset and the movement as a 'partner' on many levels (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). Furthermore, what must be illustrated here is the perceived immediacy of the Organic Pan-Christian eschatological belief in the ‘End Times’ amongst its believers (Marsden 2008; Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a).

A persistent message within the rhetoric of Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals/institutions, and belief within the hearts & minds of many charismatic, fundamentalist, and/or Pentecostal adherents, is that the planet is now at the threshold of the Rapture and Tribulation period (Hinn 2009a; Hagee 2007; Shah 2006; Pearson 2006; Robertson 2007). In other words, there is a belief that prophesied events are currently unfolding within global politics and the natural world. Tied to this belief is a popular sense of duty for believers to stand in solidarity with the state of Israel, as the larger narrative suggests that Israel is allied with God within the larger context of spiritual warfare (Hinn 2009a; Hagee 2007; Shah 2006; Pearson 2006). For non-Israeli believers, this prescribes a certain level of activism within their own political structures in ensuring that the state of Israel is supported rhetorically, politically, and financially (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007; Marsden 2008; Hagee 2007; Shah 2006).

Outside of the US, Zambia is an prime example of these beliefs being put into popular practice. Pentecostal social forces were an instrumental faction in the opposition which led to the downfall of the Kaunda government in 1991 (Shah 2006). The ascendancy of President Chiluba represented the rise of the first Pentecostal world leader (ibid). Thus, Zambia became the ultimate incarnation of an actual ‘state’ becoming a ‘vessel’ of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. As Shah (2006) points out, Chiluba effectively reversed the Kaunda government’s Middle East policy by opening diplomatic relations with Israel, and shutting down diplomatic relations with Iran and Iraq (Shah 2006). This was entirely due to the Pentecostal beliefs package (ibid). In this same vein, some of the emergent extreme right parties within the EU104 are producing platforms which enshrine these beliefs with regard to the state of Israel (Vossen 2010).

104 In particular, the rhetoric of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands (Vossen 2010).
On the other hand, much of the ‘End Times’ narrative expressed by Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, such as John Hagee, Benny Hinn, and Jack van Impe argue that it is from the EU, or “revived Roman Empire”, that the ‘Anti-Christ’ will soon emerge as the leader of a Satanic and secular one world government (van Impe 1997; Hagee 2000; 2007; Hinn 2009). This adds a regional dimension to the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, and its perceived global theatre of spiritual warfare. In this same regard, international organisations like the WCC and the UN are portrayed as secular internationalist forces which are hostile towards Christianity as defined by Renewalist standards (Hagee 2007; van Impe 1997). On the other hand, Organic Pan-Christian forces have become active partners with other international organisations, such as the World Bank, with regard to development aid areas (Clarke 2007).

Thus, the nature of interaction between Organic Pan-Christian forces and political structures varies from state to state, region to region, and case by case therein. In many ways, at the domestic levels, and from the Organic Pan-Christian subjective viewpoint, pluralistic states are treated as dependent variables, which can be rendered into ‘vessels’ filled with the Spirit, as well as ‘tools’ with which Organic Pan-Christian forces can reform state/society in their own image (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Muthee 2005). Also within pluralistic states, however, there often exists a power struggle between Organic Pan-Christian forces and those of secularism.

This contestation, according to Organic Pan-Christian forces, is an earthly reflection of a much wider ‘Spiritual warfare’ (ibid). Domestically, on the other hand, depending on the state and circumstances, states can be viewed by the Organic Pan-Christian forces as ‘partners’ on a variety of levels and social issues. In terms of international relations, it has been displayed how states can be viewed by the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as ‘antagonists’, in relation to popular eschatology. Throughout the forthcoming case study of Chapter 7, the perceived role of the state will be clearly defined in the terms outlined above.
6.3.2 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement and markets

In addition to interacting with state structures within the sphere of politics, Organic Pan-Christian forces also interact in uniform and layered patterns with markets in many ways and throughout many different levels of economic production. Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions are present forces within village, town, provincial, urban, national, regional, and global marketplaces (Martin, D. 2006). Again, Pentecostal and charismatic forces have historically thrived within and between places which are undergoing massive transformations with regard to the relations of production (Holt 1940; Martin, D. 2006). In order to contextualise the nature of interaction between Organic Pan-Christian forces and marketplaces, the shared philosophies which are componential to the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world must be displayed, with which Organic Pan-Christian forces engage marketplaces. Understanding the Organic Pan-Christian view of marketplaces serves as a departure point for contextualising the uniform behaviour patterns it displays at a variety of levels within the global production.

Again, we must revisit the nexus of the Christian Renewalist conception of the world in order to fully understand the way in which Organic Pan-Christian forces view markets. Any market of any size, like all other structures/spaces of everyday life, is viewed by Renewalists as a ‘vessel’ that can be potentially Spirit-filled and be made healthy and prosperous (Pew Forum 2006a). These vessels, of course, are equally as susceptible to demonic influences and nefarious practices without prayer, faith, and collective Christian action (Muthee 2005). In relation to the belief of the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit, according to the Renewalist conception of the world, all organisms, structures and spaces are open to either divine or evil presences in the wider context of ongoing extra-dimensional spiritual warfare (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Muthee 2005). This is certainly the language Bishop Muthee uses in his sermons throughout the world. For Muthee (2005), economics is one of the major realms in need of being Spirit-filled, and is “part and parcel” of the fabric of society along with state structures, education, media, and the
churches. All of these areas are equally important realms in need of being Spirit-filled for “community transformation” to be realised (Muthee 2005).

The economic philosophies of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement prescribe ‘roles’ to individual believers, intellectual figures, congregations, and larger denominational bodies alike. Almost universally, for individual believers, across charismatic, Pentecostal, and many fundamentalist groups within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, economic beliefs are rooted in Biblical folklore and centuries of corresponding common sense expressed through popular religion. As displayed in Chapter 4, the importance of the ‘tithe’ has persisted throughout the material history of Christianity. This practice has, of course, evolved over two millennia in a variety of different ways for many Christian groups. The evolution of the tithe, however, as being rooted in materialism, is easy to observe throughout historic blocs of power and production. Its evolution tends to be reflective of changing patterns in the relations of production in a given place at a given time. The practice of the tithe represents the nucleus of the Prosperity Gospel within contemporary charismatic/Pentecostal Christianity (Pew Forum 2006a). As displayed in Chapter 5, expressions of the Prosperity Gospel can be crassly materialistic.

For Southern Baptists, on the other hand, the practice of the tithe is quite institutionalised, with a whole host of SBC structures which administer and redistribute large amounts of money (Leonard 2003). Southern Baptists articulate the Biblical tithe as an individual believer giving 10% of his/her income—on either a weekly, monthly, and/or annual basis—to the specific congregation (Leonard 2003; Rosenberg 1989). The congregation, as a committee, then sets a percentage for how much of the congregational revenue will be allocated to the larger denominational structures of the SBC via the Cooperative Program (Leonard 2003; Rosenberg 1989). The Cooperative Program, as a subunit of the SBC, then allocates funding for proselytising enterprises to both the North American Mission Board and the IMB (Leonard 2003; Rosenberg 1989). As highlighted in Chapter 5, there is a great deal of transparency and accountability in these processes for the individual, the congregation, and the SBC as a whole.
Due to the dominant Calvinist contingent within the SBC community of congregations, the “Prosperity Gospel” is much more subdued than elsewhere within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. It is part and parcel of Calvinist ontology that one does not need to ‘plant seeds’ in order to curry God’s grace, because grace is already predestined and requires no constant need for works of faith (Sproul 2001). The tithe, within the more conservative majority of the SBC, thus remains an obligation to give back to God for the grace already bestowed. This is an act to show humility and to generally reinforce the finances of the congregation and to fund missionary activities (Leonard 2003). Calvinism, however, has not prevented the SBC from adding its own character to the overall culture of the Prosperity Gospel.

The SBC did, however, make key structural changes during the early 1990s in order to adapt to neoliberalism and the advent of globalisation. In 1991, the Baptist Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention (BSSB) hired R.W. Murray105, an advertising specialist, to help ‘rebrand’ the publishing division of the SBC. Murray worked within the Marketing and Planning department of the BSSB and helped to reinvent the way in which the SBC engaged markets and promoted itself in an increasingly globalising marketplace. Murray assisted in changing the complexion and overall character of the SBC. The BSSB was rebranded as ‘LifeWay Christian Resources’, and incorporated two key target market demographics. Firstly, it targeted the market of clergy and congregations. Secondly, it targeted the market of individual Christians. This was an effort to augment the popular culture of overall conservative Christian evangelicalism with corresponding products. Again, the timing of the SBC restructuring coincided with the larger structural changes taking place within global political economy during the early 1990s. This represents a tangible and structural neo-liberal turn of the SBC, reflective of the changes many institutions of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement were making at the time.

---

105 R.W. Murray has offered persistent, direct counsel and correspondence with the author during the production of this dissertation.
There is already present within the global, many national, local, and regional marketplaces an entire industry that caters to Organic Pan-Christian consumers. Thus, the movement is already considered a transnational demographic group within the global economy. Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions continue to produce fictional & non-fictional literature, periodicals, a thriving education industry, home-educational curricula, television, music, and film industry, greeting cards, internet businesses, Christian business associations, etc. (Marsden 2008; Pew Forum 2006a). These all cater to this transnational demographic group within the context of global consumerism, and create products reflective of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world.

Such products also generate a wide-ranging transnational popular culture. International travel, through mission projects and Biblical tourism are another way in which Organic Pan-Christian forces engage and enhance market activity. Package tours to the ‘Holy Land’ are marketed to church groups and are also advertised through Organic Pan-Christian associations and periodicals (Marsden 2008). The point to be made here is that Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals have created a niche within the global market for themselves, which is instrumental in the transnational culture-creation of the movement, through which trends can be disseminated worldwide.

In terms of congregations, megachurches, and some denominations, the philosophies of Church Growth and church planting represent congregational activity within markets (Weiss & Lowell 2002; Chaves 2006; Iannaccone et al 1995). Part and parcel of Church Growth philosophy is to analyse and understand the demographics of the market in which the congregation is situated (ibid). It is directly tied to the corporate philosophy of ‘infinite growth’, whereby continuous growth is viewed as the only option for any entity operating within a free market (ibid). While the statistics for Church Growth can be easily measured through structured denominations like the SBC, the sources, flows, and destinations of capital generated within and between independent congregations and megachurches within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement are innumerable and unquantifiable. Where independent churches are concerned, there is far less
accountability outside of (and often within) such congregational bodies due to a lack of centralised denominational/institutional authority presiding over Pentecostal, neo-Pentecostal, and charismatic congregations and globalised megachurches (Marsden 2008). What is certain, however, is that globalisation has greatly expedited the financial and institutional interconnectedness of the movement as a whole, at every level within the global market where Organic Pan-Christian forces are engaged.

Another way in which congregations engage with markets is through a widening practice of micro-lending schemes, particularly with regard to the developing world. Bishop Muthee’s Word of Faith Church, a megachurch located just outside Nairobi\textsuperscript{106}, and his Word of Faith Bible College, purports to be a training ground for young Christian businessmen and businesswomen (Word of Faith Church Kenya 2010). Word of Faith Church Kenya is a significant example of many of the aforementioned patterns in action with regard to engaging markets. Not only has Muthee’s ministry successfully planted 400 new churches throughout sub-Saharan Africa, but Muthee, like many other Organic Pan-Christian proselytising forces in the developing world, facilitates micro-lending schemes in an effort to kick-start a Christianised form of economic development (Word of Faith Church Kenya 2010). As will be displayed in the forthcoming chapter, this practice is not isolated to Bishop Muthee’s megachurch, but is an example of a much wider trend across sub-Saharan African satellites of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement.

Again, this relates back to the overarching beliefs shared by many Pentecostal and charismatic forces with regard to ongoing ‘Spiritual warfare’ (Wagner, C.P. 2009; Muthee 2005). Christianising and developing markets is one of the key components articulated by Renewalists in community transformation (Pew Forum 2006a; Anderson 2004a; Marsden 2008). Thus, for the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, the realms of politics, philosophy, and production are interrelated and interdependent realms of activity. This is not unlike the unifying Gramscian conceptual framework of this dissertation. For many elements of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, however, all

\textsuperscript{106} Kiambu, Kenya
three realms are viewed as sites of struggle, which can be consumed either by the Holy Spirit or Evil, in the wider ontology of perpetual extra-dimensional warfare.

6.4 Conclusions and departure points

Section 6.2 illustrated the different approaches within the academic discourse which attempt to account for the worldwide growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christian social forces. One body of literature suggests that the global proliferation of Christian Renewalism is merely an extension of US civil society and/or US foreign policy (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose 1996; Marsden 2008). Others, however, categorise it as a transnational movement representative of the growth of a global identity group (Anderson 2004a; Martin, D. 2006). Another body of literature suggests that the growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity has been largely driven by situational forces caused by massive economic structural change (Holt 1940). It has been argued in Chapter 6 that the latter two bodies of literature are most appropriate for contextualising the activities of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within the wider scope of IR/IPE.

This dissertation defines Organic Pan-Christian forces as a singular transnational social movement within the context of an increasingly plural world order, particularly in terms of the wider discourses on globalisation. The Organic Pan-Christian Movement represents an example of a widespread socially-conservative presence within and between states, societies, and markets. Section 6.3 explored the different ways in which Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions both view and engage with states, markets and societies in different circumstances. The overarching purpose of Chapter 6 has been to illustrate how these institutions and intellectuals, as a singular transnational actor within IR/IPE, view and engage with states, markets, and societies.

This serves as a clear departure point for the forthcoming case study. Chapter 6 has established the variables and the contexts in which the forthcoming empirical examples
will be situated. Chapter 7 will explore tangible examples of the exercising of the common Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, as an exclusionary populist movement within world politics and global production. Chapter 7 will analyse the growth of Christian Renewalism within and between sub-Saharan African states, markets, and societies. It will illustrate how many African Pentecostal and charismatic social forces have developed, in their own right, as centrifugal globalised social forces. The impact of Pentecostal and charismatic social forces in sub-Saharan Africa will be measured in terms of their activities and engagements with specific political entities, societies, and markets.
Chapter Seven: The Organic Pan-Christian Movement within and beyond sub-Saharan Africa—a case study

7.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of a case study involving Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions in relation to states, societies, and markets within sub-Saharan Africa. The overarching purpose of this case study is to illustrate and contextualise the activities and agency of Organic Pan-Christian forces within the discourses on world order and the globalisation of free market hegemony. This chapter provides tangible examples of the expansion of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, the multifaceted nature and character of its activism, and its corresponding popular culture. This case study measures the impact of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement with regard to the overlapping spheres of philosophy, politics, and production within and between specific states, societies, and markets.

What is revealed by the case study is that, despite massive cultural, ethnic, and class differences, Christian Renewalism has taken root and flourished within different sets of historically-determined social relations. Shared elements of folklore, common sense, and popular religion have catalysed the growth of a globalised demographic group that collectively engages in philosophy, politics, and production within and between states, societies, and class divisions. This case study attempts to illustrate these claims, which are central to the theme of this dissertation that the Organic Pan-Christian Movement represents a coherent global social force, and is a growingly important actor within global politics and production.

The conceptual framework applied to this case study is the Gramscian analytical approach put forth in Chapter 3, which involves separating and re-amalgamating the observable levels and sublevels of analysis prescribed by Gramsci with regard to
philosophy, politics, and production. Thus, it will analyse the role of specific Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals in each of these overlapping spheres within a specific regional context, as well as the relationship between regional forces and the larger transnational movement. It will isolate the same aspects of common sense, folklore, popular religion, and religions of intellectuals highlighted in Chapters 5-6 as being componential to the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world.

It will illustrate their common expression within and between African states and societies, as well as within the larger Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a whole. The three areas which will be analysed in this regard are those put forth in Chapter 5. Firstly it will reveal the manifestation, within sub-Saharan Africa, of conservative socio-political activism in terms of policymaking and development aid—with particular emphasis on sexual healthcare and HIV/AIDS policies. Secondly, it will demonstrate the fusion of neoliberal philosophy and popular religion through the Prosperity Gospel and Church Growth within sub-Saharan African states, societies, and markets. Thirdly, it will demonstrate the presence of premillennialist eschatology, as defined by the meta-narrative of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, within the popular culture of African Christianity.

Towards this end, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 7.2 provides a brief historical account of the growth of Christian Renewalism within the region, and the incorporation of many African Christian institutions and intellectuals into the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, particularly over the past three decades. Furthermore, it explores African political economy and the fusion of neoliberal philosophy with expressions of popular religion within sub-Saharan Africa in terms of both Church Growth and the Prosperity Gospel as two of the larger trans-denominational, transnational trends characteristic of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. Section 7.3 covers the conservative socio-economic and political activism exercised by Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals with regard to sub-Saharan African states, markets, and societies. This includes the role of Organic Pan-Christian forces in policymaking, its impact on the character and logistics of development aid, as well as the role of the
movement with respect to sexual healthcare and HIV/AIDS prevention strategies. Furthermore, it includes areas discussed in this regard in Chapter 5, including Creationism and other forms of exclusionary populism.

Section 7.3 also documents the rising trend of premillennialism and popularised Organic Pan-Christian eschatology amongst sub-Saharan African Christian groups, which is largely reflective of, and tied to, the larger conception of the world espoused and promoted by Organic Pan-Christian forces. Section 7.4 examines the structural and institutional ties which bind Christian Renewalism in sub-Saharan Africa with the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within world Christianity as a whole. This includes transnational institutional partnerships as well as the global Christian media. By shedding light on these points of nexus this section reveals examples and the further potential of ‘reverse-agency’, or examples of sub-Saharan African intellectuals and institutions achieving the status of transnational agency and exercising leadership roles within larger Organic Pan-Christian Movement, as well as within core-developed states and societies.

Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and/or charismatic Christian institutions and intellectuals have a long held an influential place within and between sub-Saharan African polities and markets. While Christianity has a storied place within Africa since the 1st century A.D., this analysis is limited to the role of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a singular transnational social force in sub-Saharan Africa over the past century, and particularly since the late 1980s. What are displayed here are the engagements between Pentecostal/charismatic institutions and intellectuals and sub-Saharan African states, societies and markets. The nature of the relationships between Organic Pan-Christian forces, political structures, and markets vary from case to case, but what are being measured here are the forms of agency of Organic Pan-Christian forces within these structures and spaces.

What is displayed are the patterns of activity and the exerting of a uniform brand of activism based on the folklore, common sense, popular religion, and intellectual religions of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world. These patterns of activism are
displayed in order to reveal the growing presence of a growingly global demographic group that is bound by these belief sets and corresponding forms of activism. It is important to note that this case study does not represent an exercise of comparative African politics, nor does it attempt to contextualise the entire religious, cultural, or ethnic diversity of an entire continent. What this case study is attempting to represent is precisely the uniformity of Organic Pan-Christian activism, and the adaptability of Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals within a vast and diverse regional context, as well as the ability of these institutions and intellectuals to grow into centrifugal forces which from within this wider context to become key actors within and between states, societies, and markets.

7.2 The Organic Pan-Christian Movement within the political and religious economies of sub-Saharan Africa

Both Holt (1940) and Gramsci (1971) analyse the dynamics between the rise of industrial production and corresponding forms of social organisation in response to widespread change. Gramsci was particularly interested in the politics of the family, including the roles of women within new industrial centres, with particular emphasis on the industrial areas of the US during the early-20th century (Gramsci 1971, pp.297-305). Gramsci observed that within these structures and relations of production, monogamy, marriage, and strong family values had emerged as the most conducive lifestyle for the subaltern classes in relation to their roles within production (ibid). He noted that these values were reinforced through a series of means between the subaltern classes and the ruling classes, including the encouragement, financing, and facilitation of religious institutions to promote these values as a means of hegemony and social control (ibid).

For Holt (1940), this analysis includes mass population movements and the rural-urban transition for individuals and groups adapting from isolated sets of social relations to the relations of industrial production within swelling population centres. Holt argues that
Pentecostalism and charismatic revivalism thrives in these conditions, as a form and expression of class consciousness (Holt 1940). In other words, charismatic Christianity helps individuals and groups which are experiencing culture shock to make sense of new situational forces. It defines the parameters of a new social reality and assigns roles for newcomers and believers within it.

Again, Gramsci was largely unaware of fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and/or charismatic groups within these situations. Thus, he viewed religious groups and institutions as hegemonic superstructures within the relations of industrial production which reinforced the interests of the ruling classes. On one hand, Gramsci was correct in his assumptions, as many of the mainline Christian institutions—particularly the Methodists—were very active within these types of social relations, and were indeed serving this function (Billings 1990; Bode 1971). However, by the 1920s-30s Pentecostalism began to take root within these situational forces (Holt 1940). Pentecostal and charismatic Christian social forces followed mass population rural-urban migrations, as well as responded and adapted to the same situational forces of poverty and migration in the new settings (Holt 1940).

Whilst both Holt (1940) and Gramsci (1971) were specifically analysing the industrial US during the 1920s-30s, it can be argued that these same situational forces of extreme poverty and mass rural-urban migrations have been characteristic of many sub-Saharan African states and societies in relation to globalisation over the past three decades (Martin, D. 2006; Okafor & Tella 1998). Both Martin (2006) and Anderson (2006) argue that these are indeed the types of situational forces which have aided the spread and catalysed the growth of Pentecostal/charismatic institutions within sub-Saharan Africa over the past thirty years. This is a sphere of the global political economy in which Organic Pan-Christian forces have developed and engaged states, markets, and societies across sub-Saharan Africa.

107 See Bode’s (1971) analysis of Methodism & hegemony in the newly industrialized North Carolina of the 1920s-30s, and also Billings (1990).
Pentecostal/charismatic Christian institutions and intellectuals had long established presences across the region during the colonial period of the 20th century (Maxwell 1999). Maxwell (1999) has analysed the history of Christian independency and Pentecostalism in Africa, from 1908 onwards. Maxwell (1999) illustrates a timeline from the Wesleyan Holiness Movement to the proliferation of revivalism and the practice of divine healing up to the 1906 Asuza Street revival. He argues that the Pentecostal tradition in Africa grew from an amalgamation of these roots, along with the Dutch-Reformed revivals which were taking place in the mid-to-late 19th century in South Africa (Maxwell 1999). Coleman (2000) has also pointed to the important role played by David du Plessis (1905-1987), both within the spread of African Pentecostalism and the proliferation of charismatic Christianity worldwide during the 20th century.

Du Plessis was very much involved at the international level within world Christianity, serving as the Pentecostal representative at Vatican II and as an official Pentecostal observer in the WCC during the mid-20th century (Coleman 2000). Anderson has also highlighted the development of Pentecostalism and charismatic Christianity within Africa, and notes its growing significance as a key cultural centre of global Renewalism (Anderson 1996, 2004a). The growth of Organic Pan-Christian forces in sub-Saharan Africa has been taking place for over a century, but has been increasingly expedited over the past three decades.

In the larger historical context of European empires, the world wars, revolutionary struggles, the decolonisation of the continent, ethnic/civil conflicts, violent regime changes, and the Cold War, Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals—both domestic and transnational—failed to find full expression within African states, societies, and markets (Gifford 1994). State failure, regime collapses, widespread poverty, famine, and the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis all cascaded as issues affecting the region as a whole parallel to the waning of the Cold War during the late 1980s (Oyebade & Alao 1998). The region was lost in the shuffle of a collapsing bipolar world order and the transition to the ‘new world order’ of liberal capitalism and global free trade, as frequently elaborated by President Bush I during this period (Oyebade & Alao 1998). Along with mounting
crises such as AIDS, poverty, famine, and debt, African regimes—some of which had been in power since the revolutionary era of the 1960s-70s—were advised by the Bretton Woods institutions to make profound neoliberal structural adjustments, cutting spending and subsidies across the board (Okafor & Tella 1998). These policies ran counter to those which had been prescribed for years by both Communist regimes and the Keynesian-inspired modernisation policies espoused and promoted by the West, including the Bretton Woods institutions (Okafor & Tella 1998).

These were the factors which the Kaunda government of Zambia failed to cope with. Kaunda could not strike a balance between popular domestic support and the larger macroeconomic changes being imposed (ibid). The Kaunda regime’s inability to balance these interests led to the ‘food riots’ of 1991 which brought down his regime that had been in place since 1964 (ibid). The popular uprising had been organised and led by a variety of groups within Zambian civil society, but particularly through the agency of organised labour and Pentecostal forces led by Frederick Chiluba, himself a Pentecostal labour leader (Shah 2006). The 1992 ascent of the Chiluba government, within a new political sphere of a multiparty Zambia, represents the first transparent example of Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals having a profound impact on the direction and overall character on the political structures of a modern state (Shah 2006). States and regimes quickly saw the value of appealing to such institutions and intellectuals within their own respective civil societies in light of the larger economic structural adjustment policy choices which had to be made; most notably Uganda and Rwanda.

Widespread privatisation did not just apply to the commanding heights of sub-Saharan African nations’ resources. It meant the privatisation of once state-led infrastructural projects, and the way in which development aid was administered throughout the complex anatomies of states, markets, and societies (Hoogvelt 1997). During the early 1990s, Uganda was experiencing an HIV/AIDS pandemic (Pumpelly 2005). The Museveni regime, which had been in place since 1986, made a willing partner out of
Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals in an effort to simultaneously address the crisis and reduce state spending (Pumpelly 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005).

Sharon and Larry Pumpelly, a Southern Baptist missionary couple working for the IMB, were given a special advisory role in relation to the Museveni regime. They were made active partners in addressing the nationwide HIV/AIDS crisis (Pumpelly 2005). Since the 1990s, many charismatic and Pentecostal forces within Uganda—both domestic and global—have gained an increasing influence over public policymaking in several key areas which will be addressed in Section 7.3 (Human Rights Watch 2005). Likewise, the Kagame regime of Rwanda, since the mid-1990s, has also attempted to incorporate facets of the Organic Pan-Christian character to its overall hegemony within a country recently-torn by ethnic conflict (Driscoll 2006). Kagame recently declared, alongside a visiting Rick Warren, that Rwanda will be a ‘purpose-driven’ nation, applying Warren’s moderate prosperity theme to the overall development of Rwanda (Driscoll 2006).

To date, Zambia, Uganda, and Rwanda represent the national political structures, or regimes, most impacted by Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals (Marsden 2008; Shah 2006). In terms of civil society, however, Organic Pan-Christian links and networks already had powerful presences within and between sub-Saharan African societies (Maxwell 1999; Anderson 2006, 2004a). Through reverse agency, many African-based Organic Pan-Christian forces have historically acted as conduits to the larger transnational popular culture of charismatic Christianity (Adogame 2006).

Again, what must be reiterated here is the impetus behind the activism of Organic Pan-Christian institutions, intellectuals, and believers. This impetus is the nucleus of all forms of charismatic Christianity, and is anchored by the steadfast belief in the omnipresence of both the Holy Spirit and demonic influences within and between the structures and spaces of everyday life (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a). These structures and spaces include every layer of states, societies, and markets. The profound and intense belief of Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals is the optimism that these structures and spaces can be filled with the Spirit and made into sacred spaces in the wider context of the perceived
perpetual conflict between God and Satan over humankind and the material world, or ‘Spiritual Warfare’ (Muthee 2005; Wagner, C.P. 2009).

Thus, it is the belief of transnational Renewalist groups, within and without Africa, that the development of sub-Saharan states, markets, and societies—at regional, national, provincial, and local levels—can be somehow assisted by the collective activism of believers and the perceived-power of the Holy Spirit (Muthee 2005). It is believed that the application of the shared elements of folklore, common sense, theologies (religions of intellectuals), and expressions of popular religion to the realms of politics and production can positively energise and transform developing states, societies, and markets. Such a widespread application, it is believed, can also render Evil forces from these structures and spaces, preventing them from instigating crises, corruption, etc. (Muthee 2005). For charismatic Christians, the application of this conception of the world represents the foundation for transforming states, societies, and markets (Pew Forum 2006a; Wagner, C.P. 2009).

This is a fundamental anchor of the Organic Pan-Christian ontology, meta-narrative, and the shared conception of the world which binds more than one-quarter of the world’s Christians as an increasingly singular transnational demographic group within and between states, societies and markets throughout the world (Pew Forum 2006a). The departure point for Organic Pan-Christian forces, in relation to its engagement with these structures and spaces, is that Christianity should represent the base of society, and all such spaces and structures can be made reflective superstructures of the Renewalist conception of the world and popular culture. The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life has produced two substantive reports on the status and growth of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a).

These empirical studies are quite telling in that they seem to indicate many uniform patterns of beliefs, trends and attitudes reflective of the overall Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, which were discussed in Chapters 5-6. The uniform political and economic activism displayed by many of these forces over the past three decades
indicates a growing presence of the singular Organic Pan-Christian transnational demographic group and its corresponding popular culture within and between states and societies across sub-Saharan Africa. Again, the anchor-belief of the overarching Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world is the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit, as well as demonic forces, within and between the structures and spaces of everyday life—including political spaces, markets, and societies (Pew Forum 2006a).

In its worldwide survey on global charismatic Christianity, the Pew Forum (2006a) analysed three states within sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya. The 2006 study has been augmented by a 2010 survey, which focuses specifically on sub-Saharan Africa as a region, in relation to the belief sets of Christians and Muslims—both respectively and in relation to one another as faith groups within specific states and societies (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a). These two studies give the most approximate portrayal of the realities of the current religious landscape and religious economy within sub-Saharan Africa. The Pew Forum (2010a) found that neither Islam or Christianity are cutting into either’s number of believers, and the survey concludes that there is a mixture of both ‘tolerance’ and ‘tensions’ between Islam and Christianity regionally. What the Pew Forum found in both studies, however, is the astronomical growth of conversions within African Christianity, from mainline or Catholic institutions to ones of a charismatic and/or Pentecostal persuasion (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a). This is a phenomenon which has largely taken place over the past thirty years (ibid).

More telling, from both studies, are the belief sets and attitudes measured amongst Christians across sub-Saharan Africa. These are manifesting with great intensity and are largely reflective of the overall Renewalist conception of the world and transnational popular culture (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010). According to the Pew Forum: “at least half of all Christians in every country surveyed expect that Jesus will return to earth in their lifetime” (Pew Forum 2010a, p.2). A vast majority of Christians in every country surveyed believed in Biblical literalism, or Biblical inerrancy: South Africa (73%); Nigeria (87%); Zambia (85%); Rwanda (83%); Kenya (79%); Uganda (71%); etc (Pew Forum 2010a, p.26). The Pew Forum also measured weekly church service attendance
amongst Christians, which reveals the personal commitment of believers in relation to their religious structures: South Africa (60%); Rwanda (75%); Kenya (80%); Nigeria (88%); Zambia (85%); etc (Pew Forum 2010a, p.27).

In terms of the attitudes towards political leadership amongst Christians in sub-Saharan Africa, the Pew Forum measured the percentages of Christians who agree that it is “important for political leaders to have strong religious beliefs”: Uganda (82%); Nigeria (83%); Rwanda (78%); Kenya (75%); South Africa (80%); Zambia (78%); etc (Pew Forum 2010a, p.52). These are statistics which help explain the growing importance of relationships formed between Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals & institutions and African regimes, such as Chiluba (Zambia), Museveni (Uganda), and Kagame (Rwanda). Correlating to the charismatic/Pentecostal belief that political spaces and structures are vessels which can be transformed by the Spirit, the Pew Forum found an intense belief-trend amongst Christians in sub-Saharan Africa with regard to the notion of politically-incorporating the Bible as “the law of the land” (Pew Forum 2010a, p.11). This includes 77% of Zambian Christians, 70% Nigerian Christians, 66% South African Christians, 64% Ugandan Christians, 42% Rwandan Christians, and 57% Kenyan Christians (Pew Forum 2010a, p.11).

The Pew Forum (2006a) also provides evidence which points to the belief that political structures/spaces are viewed as vessels and/or instruments through which believers can unite with the Spirit in order to transform states and societies. In Kenya, 37% of all Christians surveyed believe that God works, and his will is fulfilled, through elections and political processes; including 38% of Pentecostals surveyed, 35% of charismatics, and 22% of all other Christians (Pew Forum 2006a, p.64). In South Africa, 40% of all Christians surveyed believe that God works through elections and political processes; including 44% of Pentecostals, 49% of charismatics, and 39% of all other Christians surveyed (ibid). In Nigeria these figures are even more dramatic, where 52% of all Christians surveyed believe that God works through elections and political processes, including 57% of Pentecostals and 38% of all other Christians (Pew Forum 2006a, p.64). In all three sub-Saharan African countries surveyed, these rates are much higher.
proportionally than in the US, which is often mistakenly credited as being the sole source of these belief sets (Marsden 2008). In the US, only 24% of all Christians believe that God works and exercises his will through elections and political processes, though 46% of Pentecostals believe this, 33% of charismatics, and 22% of all other Christians (Pew Forum 2006a, p.64).

In relation to markets, the Pew Forum measured many of the economic attitudes of sub-Saharan Christians. According to the 2010 study, “in most countries, more than half of Christians believe in the prosperity gospel” (p.2). Furthermore, 56% of all Christians, as a median of sub-Saharan Christianity, believe in the Prosperity Gospel, with vast majorities in some countries: Nigeria (77%); South Africa (70%); Zambia (68%); Kenya (57%); Rwanda (54%); Uganda (52%) (Pew Forum 2010a, p.31). The Pew Forum attributes this intensity of belief, with regard to the Prosperity Gospel, as being directly linked to the overall influence and growth of Pentecostalism and other related independent charismatic congregations throughout the region (Pew Forum 2010a, p.13).

The 2006 Pew study points to a worldwide trend of mass-popular conversion from the ranks of mainline and traditional institutions over the past three decades, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Pew Forum 2006a, p.34). It also indicates a growing popular appeal for liberalised markets. In Kenya, 87% of all Kenyans surveyed believe that Kenya is better off with a free market system; including 83% of Pentecostals, 87% of charismatics, and 85% of other Christians (Pew Forum 2006a, p.57). In Nigeria, 88% of all Nigerians surveyed believe strongly in free markets; including 89% of Pentecostals, and 86% of charismatic and other Christians. In South Africa, 74% of South Africans believe strongly in the free market economy; including 74% of Pentecostals, 84% of charismatics, and 73% of other Christians (Pew Forum 2006a, p.57).

In Kenya, 88% of all Christians surveyed expressed that faith was a key to success, which included 92% of Pentecostals, 95% of charismatics, and 83% of other Christians. Of the Nigerians surveyed, 95% viewed faith as a key to financial success; with 94% of Pentecostals, and 91% of other Christians in agreement (Pew Forum 2006a, p.57). In
South Africa, 74% of South Africans also agreed with faith being a cornerstone of material success; including 89% of Pentecostals, 82% of charismatics, and 76% of other Christians (ibid). In both reports, the Pew Forum concludes that charismatic and/or Pentecostal groups/denominations and Renewalist belief sets are rapidly proliferating throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Pew Forum 2006a; 2010a). Furthermore, it is displayed below that Organic Pan-Christian forces are increasingly engaging in the expressions of socio-political and economic activism characteristic of the transnational Renewalist demographic group, many of which were highlighted in Chapters 5-6. This is evident in the precipitation and mainstreaming of trends, such as Biblical inerrancy, premillennialism, and/or the Prosperity Gospel, within African states, societies, and markets (Pew Forum 2006a, p.58).

Whilst Pentecostalism and charismatic Christian institutions do indeed thrive in conditions of social upheaval, poverty, and mass population movements, charismatic Christianity is rapidly gaining popularity amongst the growing middle classes across many states, markets, and societies (Freston 2006). In other words, many Organic Pan-Christian forces take root and develop within dire sets of social relations, but are adaptable enough to transcend class structures and organically grow into the middle classes from the subaltern. In the US, for example, 21% of all Pentecostals and charismatics come from low-income circumstances, 20% from lower-middle, 23% from upper-middle, and 21% from high-income financial circumstances (Pew Forum 2006a, p.37).

In South Africa, 17% of Pentecostals/charismatics come from the low-income bracket, 21% from low-middle, 18% from upper-middle, and 20% from high-income brackets (Pew Forum 2006a, p.36). In Nigeria, this trend of class fusion within the movement is becoming increasingly transparent, as 27% of Pentecostals/charismatics come from low-income situations, 14% from lower-middle, 8% from upper-middle, and 13% from high-income situations (Pew Forum 2006a, p.36). Kenya features one of the wider class disparities within global Renewalism; with 69% of Pentecostals/charismatics coming from low-income circumstances, 16% from lower-middle, 5% from upper-middle, and
only 1% coming from high-income financial situations (*ibid*). Nevertheless, 92% of Kenyan Pentecostals, and 95% of Kenyan charismatic Christians believe that faith in the Holy Spirit’s omnipresence is a prerequisite for financial success (Pew Forum 2006a, p.58).

This widespread proliferation of Renewalist beliefs and trends, across the region, indicates a regional manifestation of Organic Pan-Christian forces within and between sub-Saharan African states, societies, and markets. The Pew Forum (2006a; 2010a) has provided rich empirical studies regarding these belief-sets. These studies indicate a growing convergence of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world amongst Christians throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa represents a unique microcosm in which the growth of Christian Renewalism can begin to be quantified within a specific region undergoing the kind of massive structural and economic changes in which Pentecostalism and charismatic revivalism have historically thrived (Martin, D. 2006; Holt 1940).

The Pew Forum, in both studies, has documented the increasing prevalence, amongst sub-Saharan African Christians, of specific attitudes and beliefs which are part and parcel of the transnational Christian Renewalist movement. The Pew Forum’s documentation of the growth of these beliefs and attitudes provides a key departure point for contextualising the actual patterns of behaviour and actions, in relation to politics and production, or an illustration of how Organic Pan-Christian ‘thought’ has precipitated into popular ‘practice’, through various forms of activism within the region. Section 7.3 will illustrate the ways in which this conception of the world has been applied through socially-conservative activism and exclusionary forms of populism within sub-Saharan African states, societies, and markets. All of these engagements correspond to the overarching transnational Organic Pan-Christian popular culture and conception of the world.

These trends are reflective of a growing trend within world Christianity, generated by Organic Pan-Christian forces. This phenomenon represents an ontological shift in the
belief system within world Christianity away from the Augustinian-Calvinist conception of the world with regard to the separation of church and secular institutions, as discussed in Chapter 4. The emergent Renewalist conception of the world, by viewing states, markets, and societies as ‘vessels’ which can be filled with the Holy Spirit, advocates direct intervention of Christian intellectuals/institutions within these structures and spaces of everyday life.

This goes back to the crux of contention, discussed in Chapter 4, regarding the constant historical struggle amongst Christian social forces in relation to defining the appropriate balance between ‘church’ and ‘state’, or ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. The global rise of charismatic and Pentecostal institutions/intellectuals, being derived from Wesleyan-Arminianism, represents a rapidly growing trend within world Christianity in which this fledgling transnational movement is openly advocating a homogenous blending of not only ‘church’ and ‘state’, but also ‘church’ and ‘market’ through aggressive forms of activism and exclusionary populism.

7.3 Socially-conservative activism and “exclusionary populism” in sub-Saharan Africa

This section displays the nature of Organic Pan-Christian socio-political activism within sub-Saharan African states, societies, and markets. Firstly, the increasing role of Organic Pan-Christian forces with regard to healthcare policymaking is illustrated with regard to the politics of the family. This activism is demonstrated through the examples of Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals’ and institutions’ involvement with HIV/AIDS prevention and the institution of marriage. Secondly, in relation to the defence of Biblical inerrancy, the engagements of Organic Pan-Christian forces with the scientific community are illustrated. Thirdly, examples of Organic Pan-Christian activism within sub-Saharan Africa, with respect to premillennialist eschatology and Christian Zionism, will be demonstrated. All of the examples outlined below are reflective of the belief sets outlined
in Chapters 5-6 as being core components of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, which are expressed through various means of socially-conservative activism.

7.3.1 The politics of the family: ABCs and social exclusion as healthcare policy

One of the major responses of Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals, with regard to the global HIV/AIDS crisis, has been to emphasise the importance of the Christian institution of marriage as being a cornerstone of a lifestyle that can successfully prevent HIV/AIDS and eradicate it in the long run (Burkhalter, 2004). The emphasis placed upon the Christian institution of marriage has increased since the mid-1990s within the discourses on public policymaking, from international organisations, to bilateral aid conditions between states, and all the way down to implementing healthcare policies within localities in sub-Saharan Africa (Burkhalter, 2004).

Whether or not this has or has not been a successful approach to HIV/AIDS prevention in sub-Saharan Africa is a matter that has generated a great deal of concern and debate between secular and religious forces, between religious forces and organisations representing women and homosexuals, human rights organisations, etc (Human Rights Watch, 2005; UNDAW, 2005). The focus of these debates usually centres on Uganda and the Museveni government’s so-called ‘ABC’ strategy of HIV/AIDS prevention. The ‘A’ stands for ‘abstinence’, or refraining from sexual activities outside of the institution of marriage; ‘B’ stands for ‘being faithful’ in a monogamous relationship, with emphasis on the institution of marriage as being the structural/spiritual bond of fidelity; ‘C’ stands for ‘condoms’, usually worded as being a last resort in preventing HIV/AIDS (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

The name of the overall Museveni government policy of ABC is ‘True Love Waits’ (TLW), which is presided over by the ardent evangelical Janet Museveni, the first lady of
Uganda and an MP in the Ugandan government (Pumpelly 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005). The origin of ‘True Love Waits’ (TLW), however, is not found in Uganda, but in the US state of Tennessee. TLW began as a programme within youth Bible-study groups in Southern Baptist churches in the early 1990s (Bearman & Bruckner 2001). The programme was directed at preventing teen pregnancy amongst Southern Baptist youths, as much as it was geared towards disease prevention (Bearman & Bruckner 2001).

LifeWay Christian Resources, the publishing division of the SBC, developed an entire body of Bible-based curriculum for TLW, which was disseminated throughout SBC churches as well as marketed to other fundamentalist and/or charismatic institutions in North America. Part of the TLW course included signing a small card, as a pledge to God, whereby the individual teenaged participant promised to abstain from sexual relations until they are bound in a Christian marriage (Bearman & Bruckner 2001). The programme, and the trans-denominational culture that grew around it, was subsequently transplanted to the far reaches of the globe via the agency of missionaries.

The TLW programme was first brought to Uganda in July 1994 through IMB missionaries, Sharon & Larry Pumpelly. The Pumpellys converted the TLW programme from one that was curriculum based to an oral form, whilst retaining the core teachings regarding abstinence and the importance and sanctity of the Christian institution of marriage (Pumpelly 2005). Sharon Pumpelly and Jimmy Hester108 were both generous enough to correspond with the author during the process of this research. According to Sharon Pumpelly, “we asked to partner with TLW to use the name and to have the young people of Uganda feel like they were part of something worldwide”… “the ideals are the same, and the truths are the same—it is just [made] culturally appropriate for Africa” (Pumpelly 2005).

One of the key differences between the TLW programme in North America to the one fostered by the Pumpellys in Uganda is the level of access that the Pumpellys had

---

108 Hester is one of the founders of the TLW programme at the SBC. Hester provided the author with the contact details of the Pumpellys through then-LifeWay employee, R.W. Murray. Murray provided the author with the contact details in order to initiate a correspondence with the Pumpellys.
regarding mainstream educational institutions (Pumpelly 2005). TLW, within US civil society, could never (by law) become a programme that would be allowed to enter state-funded educational institutions (Bearman & Bruckner 2001). The Pumpellys were able to teach TLW throughout many of the Ugandan school systems. This access was made possible by the support of First Lady Museveni’s direct participation in the programme from the very beginning, which Pumpelly credits with catalyzing the media attention and nationwide scope of the project (Pumpelly 2005).

The aim of this partnership between Organic Pan-Christian forces and the Museveni government was to commit as many Ugandan youths as they could to sign the TLW abstinence pledge cards, as well as commit themselves to a life of Christian sanctity to be eventually consummated by a Christian marriage (Pumpelly 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005). Ultimately, the long term goal was to reduce the high HIV/AIDS rates amongst the Ugandan population. According to Pumpelly, “we targeted older elementary school students (ages 11-14) and secondary school students” (Pumpelly 2005). In terms of third-level educational institutions, the TLW programme was augmented by the university-campus ministries of Ugandan intellectuals, such as Pastor Martin Ssempa of Makerere Community Church at Makerere University in Kampala (Human Rights Watch 2005).

According to Pumpelly, the TLW presentation was typically made to “groups of youth and follow-up was done with those youth who signed commitment cards” (Pumpelly 2005). Pumpelly did not elaborate for the author as to the nature of the “follow-up” encounters with those young people (aged 11+) who had signed the commitment cards. In terms of outreach, Pumpelly provides the following numbers: “by the end of 1995 that was almost 10,000 youth and rose to over 30,000 by 2000” (Pumpelly 2005). Pumpelly claims that the IMB-sponsored TLW programme, partnered by First Lady Museveni, received no funding from USAID, but some minimal grants from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Baptist Union of Uganda for logistical expenses (Pumpelly 2005).
What Pumpelly is not taking into account, however, is that the TLW programme that she and her husband brought with them to Uganda quickly took on a life of its own, as the nationwide brand of Uganda’s HIV/AIDS strategy and the talisman of the success that the Museveni regime has boasted in this regard for nearly a decade (Human Rights Watch 2005; Ross 2005). In other words, the IMB-sponsored TLW programme would grow to impact and catalyse the development of similar programmes across Uganda and the larger character of the country’s overall approach to the politics of sexuality and the family, all under the auspices of the TLW brand (Human Rights Watch 2005; Ross 2005). TLW represented the Organic Pan-Christian foundation from which the entire Ugandan HIV/AIDS prevention strategy was further developed and subsequently branded as a global success story (Bush 2002; Human Rights Watch 2005).

The Museveni regime and Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals have touted Uganda’s success in drastically reducing HIV/AIDS rates over the past decade (Human Rights Watch 2005; Pumpelly 2005). The Musevenis have publicly downplayed the role of condom use in Uganda’s success, with President Museveni repeatedly and publicly discouraging condom use over the abstinence-before-marriage and being-faithful-within-marriage components of the overall ABC strategy (Human Rights Watch 2005; Bowcott 2005). Pastor Ssempa has gone as far as publicly burning a bonfire of condoms in the campaign against the idea of ‘safe sex’, whilst reinforcing the notion that the only true way to prevent HIV/AIDS is through the Christian institution of marriage (Bowcott 2005).

Women’s and human rights organisations, however, have challenged the success claims of the Ugandan government and Organic Pan-Christian forces in the reduction of HIV/AIDS rates (Human Rights Watch 2005; UNDAW 2005). Many argue that the overall rate has subsided due to the deaths of many of those early cases of the epidemic (Ross 2004). Others also point to the success of condom use becoming part of the general common sense of those engaged in sexual activity, but this has been complicated by ‘condom shortages’, which many believe to be strategic on the part of a Museveni
government which has long discouraged the effectiveness of condoms in relation to abstinence & marriage (BBC News 2004).

Human Rights Watch (2005) has highlighted several calls for concern with regard to the Ugandan programme, citing that there has been far more emphasis placed on the ‘A’ and ‘B’ of the strategy, whilst there has been active discouragement on the part of the government with regard to condom use. Human Rights Watch has also voiced concerns that many of the ways in which the ABC strategy has been administered could be in violation of the basic human rights of teenaged participants. In some places there have been reports of ‘virgin inspections’ being conducted in schools, which has even allegedly involved male teachers inspecting the genitalia of female participants (Human Rights Watch 2005). First Lady Museveni has gone as far as to call for a nationwide virgin census, a proposal that has been echoed by Joseph Zuma in South Africa as well (BBC News 2004). There has also been concern regarding the apparent favoritism awarded to seemingly-successful participants in TLW programmes. First Lady/MP Museveni has attempted to pass legislation that would reward virgins with university scholarships, though how the accuracy of their virginity claims would be measured remains a debatable topic (BBC News 2005).

In addition to these concerns, women’s and human rights organisations also point to what they see as the major flaw in the overall ABC strategy: the reliance of women upon men to adhere to certain standards of monogamous behaviour, even and especially within the institution of marriage (UNDAW 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005). The ABC strategy renders women completely dependent in relation to the sexual behaviour of their respective spouses. Many studies reveal that women in sub-Saharan Africa, in many cases, receive the HIV virus from their husbands and through their husbands’ infidelities (Meekers & Calves 1997). Thus, even if a woman refrains from sexual activity before marriage, and remains faithful within the institution of marriage, she is no less susceptible of acquiring HIV/AIDS if condoms are not used for sexual activity within her marriage. According to the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW):
“Rigid policies—based on ideological notions of limited morality—ignore scientific information and preclude adequate health interventions [and], the assumption that abstinence and fidelity offer better protection than condoms fails to address the real protection needs of vast numbers of men and women across the globe” (UNDAW 2005).

Also notably excluded from the overall ABC strategy are prostitutes and homosexuals (Human Rights Watch 2005). Prostitution is and will remain a reality across states and societies throughout the world, ergo Prostitution will remain one of the key conduits through which sexually-transmitted illnesses will be spread. There is simply no place for either abstinence or being-faithful-in-marriage (‘A’ or ‘B’) within the industry of prostitution, and condoms (‘C’) remain the only viable policy in this sector. Organic Pan-Christian forces and sub-Saharan African regimes, respectively, define the Christian institution of marriage as being strictly based on a covenant of fidelity between God, a man, and a woman. This automatically ignores the issue of homosexuals within the ABC strategy of HIV/AIDS prevention.

Uganda has, in fact, and not by coincidence, been the epicenter of a wider public debate on the role of homosexuals within society (Kron 2009). Organic Pan-Christian forces have been instrumental in Uganda with regard to a legislative campaign to criminalise homosexual behaviour and/or activism (Kron 2009). Pastor Martin Ssempa has been one of the leading voices within Ugandan civil society in a quest to outlaw homosexuality, with the penalty of death as a consequence for certain activities (Kron 2009; BBC News 2010). As part of this wider campaign, Ssempa hosted a screening of homosexual pornography at his megachurch, as a scare tactic and to incite public outrage against homosexuality (Kron 2009; BBC News 2010). In this way, the transnational Organic Pan-Christian politics of sexuality and the family have developed into an acute expression of exclusionary populism that has managed to find a clear voice within Uganda.
While the social exclusion involved in the overall ABC strategy of Uganda has drawn its fair share of critics, Uganda is still treated as a success story within the discourse of international politics/public policy, and especially by Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions (Bush 2002; Bowcott 2005). Pastor Ssempa was even brought to testify before a US Congressional committee, as an expert witness, with regard to the benefits and success of the ABC strategy (United States 2005). This was the same US Congress that, in 2003, implemented George W. Bush’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The PEPFAR legislation officially allocated funding directly from the USAID to Organic Pan-Christian institutions involved in abstinence-only education programmes as part of the overall US strategy for HIV/AIDS prevention in the developing world (United States 2003). Uganda, including President & First Lady Museveni and Pastor Ssempa, has been showcased at Rick Warren’s annual Saddleback AIDS Summit, which features world leaders, development-celebrities, politicians, and Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals.

There is something inherently progressive, however, in the rhetoric of Warren, particularly with regard to women (Warren 2002). Within this rhetoric Christian men are charged with being responsible for protecting their wives, but also to treat women as equal partners within the institution of marriage (Warren 2002). Thus, in an idealistic sense, many Organic Pan-Christian forces are very optimistic about the role of women and the level of women’s empowerment within marriage. In this sense, the ABC strategy can be viewed and articulated as ‘progressive’ from a certain point of view. In reality, however, the ABC strategy—as an instrument of public policy—still leaves women very vulnerable and dependent on the behaviour of men (UNDAW 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005). Likewise, it affords no consideration to those leading alternative sexual lifestyles—be it prostitution or homosexuality. The normative claim to be made here is that ABC is only useful as a supplementary component to a successful HIV/AIDS prevention strategy and not as the sole basis for one (Bearman & Bruckner 2001).

What is of importance for this dissertation, with regard to TLW and the ABC strategy, is the role and impact Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals is having on
healthcare policymaking within states. This has been reinforced by international organisations, core-developed states through bilateral aid, and the popular culture and networks of institutions and intellectuals of the transnational Organic Pan-Christian Movement on an issue of global importance (United States 2005; 2003; Human Rights Watch 2005). Furthermore, Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, including Ssempa, have campaigned to shift the ABC strategy away from condoms completely (Bowcott 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005). Ssempa’s proposed overhaul would effectively change the ABC strategy to simply the ‘AB’ strategy (Human Rights Watch 2005).

Academic inquiries, such as Bearman & Bruckner (2001), into the effectiveness or lack thereof of TLW and Christian-based abstinence-before-marriage education programmes in preventing and reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS are often ‘spun’ by both Organic Pan-Christian sources and women’s and/or human rights organisations which oppose them. For Organic Pan-Christian institutions/intellectuals, abstinence and faithful Christian marriage are the solutions in preventing HIV/AIDS. Bearman & Bruckner (2001) provided a study that has been pointed to by Organic Pan-Christian forces as proof-positive that abstinence programmes work in reducing the sexual activities of youths. What these sources fail to point out, however, are the full conclusions of the Bearman & Bruckner study. The findings indicate that “the pledge effect is largely contextual,” meaning that “pledging delays intercourse only in contexts where there are some, but not too many pledgers” (Bearman & Bruckner 2001).

Bearman & Bruckner believe that the measured success of the programme indicates that “the pledge works because it is embedded in an identity movement,” and “consequently, the pledge identity is meaningful only in contexts where it is at least partially non-normative” (Bearman & Bruckner 2001). Thus, while the study seems to validate the universal claims made by Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals on the effectiveness of these programmes, the Bearman & Bruckner study was only tested in relation to the sexual behaviour American youths. Furthermore, the other conclusion of the study, regarding the lack of inclination amongst TLW participants to use condoms when they do

succumb to sexual activity, spells a potential danger with regard to the results produced by such programmes—especially in areas of sub-Saharan Africa with disproportionately high rates of HIV/AIDS.

There is no doubt that Organic Pan-Christian programmes, such as TLW, have had a profound impact on the sexuality and sexual activities of young people who have participated in these programmes throughout the world, as Pumpelly (2005) has highlighted above. Indeed, abstinence and monogamous marriages are part and parcel of the lifestyle corresponding to the larger Organic Pan-Christian popular culture. To dismiss outright the contribution of these programmes in the overall fight against HIV/AIDS would be foolhardy. Organic Pan-Christian institutions/intellectuals do not advocate an oppressive, submissive role for women within the institution of marriage (Warren 2002). It must be reiterated that many of the forces which comprise the Organic Pan-Christian, particularly Pentecostal and many charismatic organisations, were some of the first institutions in modern world Christianity to be represented and led by female clergy (Lawless 1983).

The idea of marriage, promoted within the rhetoric and meta-narrative of Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals such as Joyce Meyer, Paula White, Marilyn Hickey, Pat Robertson, Rick Warren, and Martin Ssempa, involves an equal partnership between husband and wife—based on mutual respect (Warren 2002). It is, in essence, the mainstream, modern, bourgeois notion of the Christian institution of marriage within the Organic Pan-Christian popular culture. It is argued here that one benefit of programmes such as TLW is that they translate the idea that a woman has a right to control the destiny of her own body into common sense—which is a revolutionary concept in many sets of social relations, and particularly former sites of conflict, where this liberty has not always been ensured.

On the other hand, women’s organisations have made a substantial point in unequivocally stating that the ABC strategy of HIV/AIDS prevention—as a public policy—offers no real protection for women, particularly married women in sub-Saharan Africa (Meekers & Calves 1997). The strategy renders married women as dependent on the behaviour of
their husbands, and offers nothing for women who are not and/or choose not to be married. Many women’s organisations have outright dismissed the effectiveness of programmes like TLW in preventing HIV/AIDS (UNDAW 2005). This dissertation dismisses neither the purported benefits nor purported hazards of abstinence-education programmes in relation to the prevention of HIV/AIDS. As Gramsci has pointed out, new forms of ‘puritanism’ always emerge from social relations in which new forms of production are manifesting (Gramsci 1971, pp. 299-305). Gramsci even points specifically to the use of abstinence rhetoric as an example of neo-puritanism within such situations:

“In other situations the popular strata are compelled to practice ‘virtue’. Those who preach it do not practice it, although they pay it verbal homage. The hypocrisy is therefore a question of strata: it is not total. This is a situation which cannot last, and is certain to lead to a crisis of libertinism, but only when the masses have already assimilated ‘virtue’ in the form of more or less permanent habits, that is with ever-decreasing oscillations” (1971, p. 300).

“It might be seen that in this way the sexual function has been mechanised, but in reality we are dealing with the growth of a new form of sexual union shorn of the bright and dazzling colour of the romantic tinsel typical of the petit bourgeois and the Bohemian layabout. It seems clear that the new industrialization wants monogamy: it wants the man as worker not to squander his nervous energies in the disorderly and stimulating pursuit of occasional sexual satisfaction” (pp.304-05).

“The exaltation of passion cannot be reconciled with the timed movements of productive motions connected with the most perfected automatism. This complex of direct and indirect repression and coercion exercised on the masses will undoubtedly produce results and a new form of sexual union will emerge whose fundamental characteristic would apparently have to be monogamy and relative stability” (ibid).

Thus, Christian-inspired abstinence programmes are merely by-products of societies going through industrial transition. Gramsci attributed such values as being as being instrumental in the production of common sense, as well as being encouraged by the
masters of production\textsuperscript{110} (Gramsci 1971, pp. 297-305). For the forces of industrial capitalism, the promotion and subtle enforcement of these mores at the level of individual consciousness are componential to a wider strategy to pacify the working and subaltern classes within the industrial relations of economic production. Holt (1940) analyses some of the same US-industrial situations during the same era in which Gramsci was writing. Holt is used here to augment Gramsci’s articulation of the same situational phenomena. Holt specifically adds the dynamic presence of Pentecostal/charismatic Christian social forces within the same context. Thus, what many Organic Pan-Christian institutions offer women within these types of situational forces is a ‘role’ that is quite often progressive in relation to many of the roles from whence they have emerged.

7.3.2 Biblical inerrancy, premillennialist eschatology and Christian Zionism in sub-Saharan Africa

Another expression of the exclusionary populism associated with the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in sub-Saharan Africa is the controversy that has come about in Kenya in recent years involving its forces and the scientific community. Kenya has long been a key centre of natural science research on the origins of human development, particularly through the agency of the famous Leakey family. Kenya has been the site of many important discoveries of fossil remains of early humans and human ancestors. Pentecostal and charismatic Christian leaders, espousing and promoting the philosophy of Young Earth Creationism, have come to challenge not only the theory of evolution in principle, but have also engaged in activism directed at curbing the presence of the scientific community within society as a whole (McKie 2006).

Bishop Boniface Adoyo, the leader of the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, has publicly petitioned that fossil displays be removed from public museums (McKie 2006). Organic Pan-Christian forces perceive these displays to contradict the historical biblical narrative

\textsuperscript{110} Specifically, American industrialists such as Taylor and Ford (Gramsci 1971, pp. 297-305)
of a 6,000 year-old earth (McKie 2006). As detailed in Chapter 5, the ‘hide the bones’ campaign, led by Kenyan Pentecostals, in many ways mirrors similar campaigns which have taken place by Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals/institutions espousing the philosophy of Young Earth Creationism\footnote{An Organic Pan-Christian philosophy, as articulated by Morris (1984, 1977) and Ham (2002)}. The ‘hide the bones’ campaign serves as evidence of the fact of Young Earth Creationism spreading through the wider popular culture and uniform approaches to activism characteristic of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement.

Kenya has also experienced some minor unrest involving globalised premillennialist sects. One such group is the fundamentalist-premillennialist House of Yahweh, based in Texas and led by Yisrayl Hawkins. The House of Yahweh expanded into Kenya in 1997, and developed a small following in the central region of the country. Hawkins declared that the world would soon be engulfed by global nuclear warfare, and that ‘Doomsday’ would occur no later than 12 September 2006 (Karobia 2006). A small group of Kenyans belonging to the sect were found to be building underground shelters in preparation for the ‘End Times’, when the Kenyan authorities intervened on behalf of several children involved in the situation (Karobia 2006). This points to the fact that even fringe groups of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement have become increasingly globalised through missions and/or media. Other premillennialist subcultures, such as the Seventh-Day Adventists and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, also have an active presence within and between sub-Saharan African states and societies. Whilst these are all imported premillennialist religious phenomena, sub-Saharan Africa has also been the site of many indigenously-developed sects preparing for the ‘End Times’.

The Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments was established in Uganda by self-proclaimed prophetess Alice Lakwena. Lakwena served as the spiritual leader for an armed insurgency against the Museveni government from its beginning in 1986 (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999). Lakwena claimed to channel the Holy Spirit, which the movement believed was guiding them to victory against the Museveni government. The Spirit also informed Lakwena that the world would be ending. This prophecy failed to
materialise, which resulted in ritual murders and suicides amongst the members of the sect (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999). Lakwena’s successor, Joseph Kony, rebranded the insurgency movement as the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Kony also asserts that he channels the Holy Spirit and has the gift of prophecy, which has served as the inspiration of a continued campaign of resistance, which has lasted for over two decades (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999). The House of Yahweh in Kenya, and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, are hardly representative of mainstream Organic Pan-Christian activism in the region. It must be reiterated here, however, that a significant majority of sub-Saharan Christians believe that the Second Coming will occur within their lifetime, including 61% of all Kenyan Christians surveyed (Pew Forum 2010a, p.2). Tied to the premillennialist narrative of Organic Pan-Christian popular culture is the overall rise of Christian Zionism worldwide, and especially within Pentecostal circles in sub-Saharan Africa (Shah 2006).

One of the consequences of the anti-Islamic rhetoric implicit and explicit within the premillennialist narrative of Organic Pan-Christian popular culture is the uneasy balance between Christian and Islamic communities which share political spaces, markets, and societies (Pew Forum 2010a). Within the Organic Pan-Christian meta-narrative, Islam is regarded as ‘evil’, with Mohammed cast as a ‘false prophet’ and Muslims being the chief antagonists against Christians and the state of Israel (Marsden 2008). This rhetoric exasperates tensions in many places, such as Nigeria, with pre-existing problems regarding the harmony between Christian and Islamic groups. Benny Hinn (2009b), during a recent sermon in Kampala, told Christians to be prepared for a coming war with Iran in 2010, which will result in Israel’s ultimate triumph, the return of the Messiah, and the transformation of Jerusalem into the capital of a new world. Hinn’s rhetoric is typical of the premillennialist vein of the overall Organic Pan-Christian metanarrative, which is spread through mass-revivals, such as Hinn’s ‘Fire Conference’ revival crusade in Kampala, as well as over the airwaves of the global Organic Pan-Christian media network (Hinn 2009a, 2009b).
The 2006 Pew study revealed a rapid worldwide expansion of Christian Zionism within world Christianity, but particularly amongst charismatic and Pentecostal believers (Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a). One of the trends that the Pew Forum discovered within their worldwide survey was that Christian Zionism seems to be much more prevalent and experiencing more growth especially within Pentecostalism, but also amongst charismatic Christians of a Protestant persuasion, rather than ones involved with Catholicism. Indifference, amongst charismatic Christians, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was most prevalent in Latin America, where most Christians who identify themselves as ‘charismatic’ are still very much involved with the Catholic Church (Pew Forum 2006a).

The exception to this Catholic-charismatic trend of indifference was the Philippines. What the Pew study found, however, was that Christian Zionism, amongst charismatics (excluding Pentecostals) belonging to independent or Protestant institutions, is very much on the rise (Shah 2006; Pew Forum 2006a). This, of course, has implications for many communities within sub-Saharan Africa. Amongst sub-Saharan African Christians, Christian Zionism is a growingly important trend and, according to Gifford, has become one of the key tenets of African Pentecostalism (Gifford 2001; Pew Forum 2006a).

In Kenya, 42% of all Kenyan Christians surveyed proclaimed political allegiance to Israel over the Palestinians; including 43% of Pentecostals, 51% of charismatics, and 40% of other Christians (Pew Forum 2006a, p.71). These statistics are almost on par with those provided regarding the US on the same issue: 41% siding with Israel, 60% of Pentecostals, 37% of charismatics, and 40% of other Christians (ibid). When the Chiluba regime took charge of Zambia in 1992, President Chiluba almost immediately reversed the Kaunda regime’s pro-Palestinian policy, cut all diplomatic relations with Iran and Iraq, and initiated warm diplomatic relations with the state of Israel (Shah 2006). The reason Chiluba cited for this dramatic change in foreign policy consisted of a proverb, “those who bless Abraham will be blessed…those who curse Abraham will be cursed”, which has been used by Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectual for years in order to garner support amongst Christians for the state of Israel (Shah 2006).
Shah (2006) claims that Chiluba’s expression of Pentecostal activism is a warning that the implications for several countries’ foreign policies are “enormous” as Pentecostalism and charismatic-Protestantism continue to grow. Shah believes that Christian Zionist-inclined foreign policy changes, such as Zambia’s, is reflective of the overall “package of Pentecostal beliefs”, in which Biblical inerrancy has led to popular transference with regard to the “Israel” mentioned in Biblical texts being used interchangeably with the modern state of Israel, and has become amalgamated with prosperity theology (Shah 2006). What is evident, according to Shah and the Pew Forum, is that Christian Zionism is a growing trend across sub-Saharan Africa.

Another form of activism taking place, with regard to Christian Zionism, has to do with Ethiopia’s indigenous Jewish community. The International Fellowship of Christians & Jews (IFCJ), as mentioned in Chapter 5, is an organisation comprised of Organic Pan-Christian and Jewish-Zionist institutions and intellectuals. The IFCJ is led by Chicago-based Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein (Chafets 2007). The overall mission of the IFCJ is to raise money from amongst both Christian and Jewish Zionists in order to ‘repatriate’ Jews throughout the world to the state of Israel, and the subsequent establishment of additional Jewish settlements comprised of such individuals and families (Chafets 2007). Ethiopia, along with parts of the former Soviet Union, is one of the key target areas for this repatriation process to draw from (International Fellowship of Christians & Jews 2010). For several years, the IFCJ has raised countless amounts of funds globally, and has successfully made population transfers involving the Ethiopian Jewish community to Israeli settlements (Chafets 2007). This is a stark example of how one specific Organic Pan-Christian organisation, from outside sub-Saharan Africa, has managed to involve itself within a specific sub-Saharan African state.
7.4 Globalising African Christianity: reverse-agency

As Sanneh (2003), Gray (1982), Adogame (2006), and Martin (2006) have all argued, the role of indigenous African agency within the proliferation of Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity in the region has long been overlooked within academic discourses. The works of Gifford (1994), Marsden (2008), Walls (1991), Brouwer, Gifford & Rose (1996) all portray the rise of Organic Pan-Christian forces in the developing world as an extension of US civil society and foreign policy. It has been argued in this dissertation (see Chapter 6) that this portrayal obscures the larger complexities and global realities of Organic Pan-Christian culture and activism within and between states, societies and markets across the world.

Over the past three decades, sub-Saharan Africa has been the context of religious economy from whence many indigenous Organic Pan-Christian institutions/intellectuals have been produced (Adogame 2006; Martin, D. 2006). Many of these institutions have subsequently grown as centrifugal proselytising forces, which are now operating at the global level, with many of their intellectuals emerging as key figures within the larger overall transnational demographic group that is manifesting throughout the world (Adogame 2006, 2003, 1999). This section will highlight many of these sub-Saharan-based Organic Pan-Christian forces, as well as their centrifugal expansion throughout the region—and beyond.

Despite Gifford’s (1994) US-centric portrayal of the growth of the Organic Pan-Christian in sub-Saharan Africa, he has provided many empirical examples of what he terms a “mushrooming of new churches” across the region (p.515). Nigeria boasts three of the largest worldwide sub-Saharan proselytizing enterprises. The Church of God Mission International, founded in Benin City, Nigeria by Pentecostal Archbishop/televangelist Benson Idahosa (1938-98), which now claims to have over 4,000 churches throughout the region (Gifford 1994). The Redeemed Evangelical Mission was founded in Lagos by
Michael Okonkwo and boasts 4,000 members. Okonkwo’s ministry hosts the annual Kingdom Life Word Conference, which brings together over 150 different prosperity ministries throughout the region (Marsden 2008). David Oyedepo Ministries International, Inc. was founded in the 1980s with the establishment of the Winners’ Chapel by David Oyedepo. Oyedepo’s ministry has grown worldwide, with Winners’ Chapels now ‘planted’ and growing in both the UK and the US. Oyedepo bought a 54,000-capacity arena and, in 1999, established the Faith Academy as a charismatic third-level educational operation (David Oyedepo Ministries 2010). In December 2006, Oyedepo hosted the largest gathering of Christians ever recorded, with three-million in attendance (Marsden 2008).

The International Central Gospel Church was founded (1984) in Accra, Ghana by Dr. Mensa Otabil. Otabil’s ministry has since grown to over 4,000 members, and has engaged in what it calls “aggressive missionary church planting” throughout Ghana, as well as in both Europe and the US (International Central Gospel Church 2010). The Bread of Life Church International was founded in Lusaka, Zambia by Joe Imakando, and has subsequently ‘planted’ over fifty other branches throughout Southern Africa, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania.

Imakando’s ministry is intricately linked with the transnational Organic Pan-Christian Movement through its connections with Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN), through which Imakando has established a fledgling media-presence throughout the region. Imakando’s TBN affiliate is one of three terrestrial television channels available in Zambia (Marsden 2008; Bread of Life Church International 2010). The direct affiliation with TBN has brought Organic Pan-Christian megastars, such as Benny Hinn, T.D. Jakes, Kenneth Copeland, etc., as visiting intellectuals to Imakando’s Southern African ministry, which has done nothing but proliferate larger global PCR ideas and resources to the region (Marsden 2008).

In Zimbabwe, Pentecostalism has experienced an historical development that predates the charismatic/Pentecostal explosion of the past three decades (Gifford 1994). Zimbabwe’s
Pentecostal tradition began as a breakaway social force from South African Pentecostalism. It must be reiterated that the historical development of Pentecostalism in South Africa is as old as the worldwide movement itself. In 1959, Ezekiel Guti broke away from the South African Apostolic Faith Mission and established the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA), which has grown into the global Forward in Faith Ministries International (FIFMI) (Gifford 1994). Like many of these ministries, FIFMI has established a presence within the global Organic Pan-Christian media.

FIFMI airs programming in different African states, as well as in Europe, through its television channel, Ezekieltvchannel, which is planning a wider European expansion to the UK in particular. FIFMI is active in over 70 states, including many in core countries (Forward in Faith Ministries International 2010). Guti’s ministry has successfully planted over 2,000 churches across Southern Africa, and established seven third-level educational institutions (Forward in Faith Ministries International 2010. The Africa Multi-Nation for Christ Colleges (AMFCC) is represented by three Bible colleges in Zimbabwe, one in Ghana, one in Zambia, and two in Mozambique. Guti also facilitates ministries specifically for women and business leaders (ibid).

Like FIFMI, the Family of God of ‘Prophet’ Andrew Wutawunashe has emerged from Zimbabwe as a powerful and global centrifugal social force within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement (Gifford 1994). The Worldwide Family of God Church was established in 1980, around the time of independence, and grew out of the Southern African revivals of the 1970s (Worldwide Family of God Church 2010; Gifford 1994). It has grown over the past three decades, and expanded throughout sub-Saharan Africa, as well as to core countries including the UK, the Republic of Ireland, Australia, and the US (Worldwide Family of God 2010). Wutawunashe proclaims that he is both a ‘prophet’ and an ‘apostle’, and has augmented his ministry to an umbrella organisation, the Andrew Wutawunashe World Witness and Worldwide Family of God Ministries, of which he is titled ‘Founder and Overseer’ (Worldwide Family of God 2010). Music has been one of the key mediums of Wutawunashe’s ministry, as part of the overall charismatic character of the group. Wutawunashe’s brother, Jonathan, is the leader of the famed Family Singers
group, and has toured churches and communities around the world as a representative of the larger ministry of the Family of God (ibid).

The Redeemed Gospel Church Inc. was founded in the Mathare Valley in Kenya during the 1970s by Bishop A. Kitonga (Gifford 1994; Redeemed Gospel Church Inc. 2010). Bishop Kitonga’s ministry holds bi-monthly ‘crusades’ throughout Kenya and boasts attendance figures of 5,000-20,000 for each event (Gifford 1994). Again, like many of the ministries mentioned here, Kitonga’s ministry holds and participates in collaborative events, television programmes, and joint-crusades with many other Organic Pan-Christian ministries from both within and without sub-Saharan Africa (ibid). One of Kitonga’s corresponding ministries is the Redeemed Gospel Church Inc. Development Programme (RGCDP), which was also established during the 1970s (ibid). RGCDP focuses on a number of key areas, including those pertinent to all three realms of activity: philosophy, politics, and production. RGCDP includes specific programmes for youths, healthcare & HIV/AIDS prevention, “economic empowerment”, and an “income generating program” which includes third-level educational programmes (Redeemed Gospel Church Inc. 2010).

Word of Faith Church was founded in Kiambu, Kenya by Bishop Thomas Muthee. Muthee’s ministry has subsequently grown into one of the largest megachurches in East Africa, and has successfully ‘planted’ churches throughout the region (Word of Faith Ministries 2010). Muthee’s ministry has focused specifically on community development projects, such as well-drilling and the establishment of clean water utilities in slums and impoverished rural communities (ibid). Muthee’s ministry is one which espouses aggressive evangelism and, as those ministries highlighted above, an overall ontology of spiritual warfare (Muthee 2005; Word of Faith Ministries 2010). Muthee’s ministry also engages markets through a wide variety of micro-lending schemes in an effort to transform local markets and establish a Christian business community as part of the overall project of community transformation within the context of Spiritual Warfare (ibid).
As mentioned in Chapter 6, Muthee has gained a great deal of notoriety throughout Pentecostal/charismatic global circles in recent years. Muthee’s prominence within the movement attracted the attention of the mainstream media during the US presidential election in 2008, when video footage surfaced of his 2005 healing/protection ritual performed on Sarah Palin at the Assembly of God Wasilla, Alaska (Goodstein 2008). Palin followed Muthee’s speech on spiritual warfare and community transformation with a speech of her own, as a humble concurrence with Muthee’s sermon, and credited Muthee as a great spiritual inspiration in her life, both in general and as a politician (Muthee 2005; Goodstein 2008). This example, along with Muthee’s similar work in the UK, and within African states/societies outside of Kenya, illustrates Muthee’s global ‘intellectual’ status within the larger transnational Organic Pan-Christian movement.

As highlighted in Section 7.2 and in Chapter 5, Pastor Martin Ssempa of Makerere Community Church in Kampala has also gained a global ‘intellectual’ status within the larger transnational Organic Pan-Christian movement. Ssempa portrays himself, and is portrayed by other Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, as an expert on HIV/AIDS prevention (Ssempa 2010; United States 2005). In this capacity, Ssempa has been called as an expert witness for the US congress. He has also been a featured speaker at Rick Warren’s annual Saddleback AIDS conferences, which also includes heads of state, NGOs, international organisations, etc.

Ssempa tours the world, speaking to congregations, groups of clergy, government officials, students/educators, etc. regarding the role of Christian intellectuals/institutions in relation to the prevention of HIV/AIDS (United States 2005). He has offices in both Uganda and the US, as bases from which he operates, speaks, and tours globally. While Ssempa had long been a known figure within the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, like Muthee, he gained notoriety through the mainstream global media recently (Kron 2009). This attention centred on his role in pushing the controversial anti-homosexuality legislation in Uganda, which would put the death penalty on the table as a penalty for certain homosexual activities (Kron 2009).
The ministries of both Muthee and Ssempa, as well as the other examples listed above, are all indicative of the reality of ‘reverse-missions’ or the reverse-agency of many sub-Saharan Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals and institutions. All of these examples highlight the actual reductionism, discussed in Chapter 6, implicit within the portrayal of the entire global Organic Pan-Christian movement as being somehow an extension of US civil society and foreign policy. These examples illustrate that, in reality, many of these ministries have developed indigenously within sub-Saharan Africa and operate as centrifugal, global social forces in their own rite.

These ministries have proven their potential to shape perceptions within the overall Organic Pan-Christian transnational demographic group, as well as the ministries within even core-developed countries of the global political economy (Adogame 2006, 2003, 1999). The global agency which these sub-Saharan forces exercise is, however, largely uniform in relation to the overall Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world and popular culture. The point to be made is that, in reality, sub-Saharan social forces have gained ‘equal’ status to their core-counterparts.

Adogame (2006, 2003, 1999) has extensively explored the impact of reverse-agency, or “reverse-missions”, whereby sub-Saharan institutions/intellectuals are increasingly impacting religion within the societies of core-developed states. Adogame uses the empirical example of the Redeemed Church of God, based in Lagos, which now boasts over two-million members worldwide in sixty countries, including the US, in order to illustrate this phenomenon. Adogame (2006) accuses authors, including Brouwer, Gifford & Rose (1996) of obscuring the role of African agency and leadership within the larger context of this growingly transnational demographic group. He also blasts the reductionism of such authors in the context of their articulations of the Prosperity Gospel. Adogame (2006) argues that the Prosperity Gospel, as perceived by believers, is not simply an attitude of going to church to “get rich”, but rather it is componential of a larger and dynamic lifestyle and theology of total spiritual/material renewal.
The examples of the Prosperity ministries listed above are but a few examples of large and growing ‘prosperity’ number of ministries and megachurches. According to Adogame (2006), we must not misconstrue the actual intent of followers, or reduce the entire phenomenon to being US-led. These ministries are massive complexes of respective institutions and intellectuals which have grown organically within and beyond sub-Saharan Africa within the larger context of the “global religious economy” (Martin 2006; Adogame 2006). Furthermore, cohesion is built amongst such sub-Saharan ministries and, indeed, to the larger transnational Organic Pan-Christian movement through a wide variety of inter-denominational and supra-denominational global networks and associations.

Many of these ministries collaborate through international denominational associations, such as the Assemblies of God, various ‘Apostolic’ organisations, Independent Assemblies of God International, Revival Centres International, the Church of God for All Nations, the Pentecostal World Conference, etc (Pew Forum 2006a). There are also global supra-denominational associations, including the Association of Evangelicals in Africa112, the Interdenominational Foreign Missions Association, associations of African Initiated Churches, etc. Many of these denominations and associations are brought together in collaboration through revivals, events, and forums, such as the annual Saddleback AIDS conferences in California, various mass-crusades led by Organic Pan-Christian celebrities, such as Benny Hinn and Kenneth Copeland (Marsden 2008).

Links are also formed through perpetual proselytising efforts. As has been demonstrated above, these proselytising efforts are no longer reflective of the ‘one-way-traffic’ of North American missionaries to the developing world (Anderson 2004a; Martin 2006, D.; Adogame 2006). As has been displayed, many sub-Saharan ministries have long been proselytising and expanding even into core-developed countries of the world economy. Likewise, as Freston (2005) has illustrated, Brazilian Pentecostal forces have long maintained an aggressive proselytizing network in former Portuguese colonies, such as Angola and Mozambique. Thus, we have an example of Renewalist groups from semi-

---

112 With corresponding associations at state & regional levels.
peripheral countries, such as Brazil, expanding globally as well. Such examples are indicative of the actual transnationality of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement as a whole.

**7.5 Conclusion**

It has been displayed in this regional case study that sub-Saharan Organic Pan-Christian institutions and intellectuals are bound together and are indeed to the larger transnational Organic Pan-Christian Movement through a shared conception of the world. Section 7.2 situated the region of sub-Saharan Africa within the larger global and religious economy, illustrating the manifestation of Organic Pan-Christian belief sets throughout the region, and its growth over the past three decades, in tandem with the larger processes of globalisation. Section 7.3 illustrated specific forms of Organic Pan-Christian activism and expressions of exclusionary populism throughout the region, with specific emphases on the politics of sexuality & the family, as well as the growing prevalence of premillennialism in both thought and practice. Section 7.4 established specific sub-Saharan institutions and intellectuals, and revealed that many of these forces are now operating as global centrifugal proselytising forces within the larger context of the transnational Organic Pan-Christian movement.

The Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world represents an organic, transnational nexus, across states, societies, ethnicities, and class divisions. Within this nexus are shared belief sets, in terms of folklore, common sense, theologies (religions of intellectuals), and common expressions of charismatic popular religion. All of these sublevels of the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world correspond to Biblical inerrancy, the omnipresence of the Holy Spirit and Evil forces within the structures and spaces of everyday life, and premillennialism. Even language barriers are transcended by believers worldwide through common forms of ‘habitus’, or physical behaviours/mannerisms such as speaking-in-tongues, exorcisms/divine healings,
spontaneous physical practices related to being ‘Spirit-filled’, such as ‘falling-out’, mass-holy laughter, running around, and/or convulsing (Coleman & Collins 2000).

This conception of the world binds the whole of the transnational Organic Pan-Christian Movement through a growing corresponding popular culture. This popular culture is disseminated and reinforced through curricula targeted at all ages, a global Christian/gospel music industry, television/film entertainment, popular literature, revival events, mission works, development projects, and a vast global media presence. Corresponding to this transnational conception of the world and popular culture, sub-Saharan ministries have displayed the shared approaches to activism in relation to the political and economic structures and spaces which they engage—both within the region and at the global level.

Organic Pan-Christian institutions, in the larger context of the global political economy, have formed partnerships with community leaders, states, and even international organisations. The World Bank has expanded such partnerships over the past decade, with regard to “development policy-making, particularly with respect to HIV/AIDS, health, food security, and poverty alleviation”, as described by Katherine Marshall, Director of the Development Dialogue on Values & Ethics of the World Bank (Pew Forum 2006b). These partnerships assist in the overall facilitation of structural adjustment policies and are tantamount to the ‘privatisation of foreign aid’ (Hoogvelt 1997).

It should not be considered coincidental that the surge of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement in the developing world has taken place within the larger situational forces of globalisation as a whole over the past three decades. Christian independency, as a characteristic of Pentecostalism and many charismatic movements, is very much conducive to the philosophies of neoliberalism. Organic Pan-Christian institutions/intellectuals have done much in the way of translating neoliberal philosophy into common sense at the level of consciousness, amongst the subaltern/popular classes of many developing world states and societies. This precipitation occurs through such
conduits as the Prosperity Gospel, as well as specific Organic Pan-Christian ministries/programmes pertaining to generating Christian businesses and the general transformation of local markets through micro-lending schemes and support for entrepreneurship.

The meaning which can be ascribed to these transnational cultural phenomena, reflective of an increasingly globalised demographic group, manifesting across sub-Saharan African states, societies, and markets fits within the overall thesis of this dissertation. There is indeed a singular popular social force exerting influence in the overlapping realms of philosophy, politics, and production within and between states, societies, and markets throughout the world. This transnational demographic group is growing, particularly within the developing world, and is applying the folklore, common sense, popular religion, and religions of its intellectuals, which are all componential to its conception of the world, through forms of activism within states, societies, and markets in which it has a presence.

Empirical studies involving the proliferation of the Prosperity Gospel throughout sub-Saharan Africa, amongst the popular and subaltern classes, reveals the organic consensus-building processes and the production of global free market hegemony. Transnational culture and global communications/resource networks, spreading and promoting the Prosperity Gospel, have been the dialectical conduits through which neoliberal philosophy has effectively been translated through Biblical folklore into common sense amongst vast segments of sub-Saharan African populations. Belief and consent for neoliberal philosophy is ritualised through the expressions of popular religion corresponding to the Prosperity Gospel. The global proliferation of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement is tantamount to another ‘Reformation’ or ‘Great Awakening’, one that is conducive to a world order based on global neoliberal hegemony.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion

8.1 Summative conclusions

This dissertation has illustrated the historical development of two broad factions of world Christianity within international politics and global society. The Traditional Pan-Christian Movement has been described here as an amalgamation of Catholic, Orthodox, and mainline Protestant institutions, intellectuals, and social forces. International organisations, such as the World Council of Churches, represent the moderate and centre-left positions on which these traditional Christian denominations have converged over the past century, and collectively act as one unified body of world Christianity. The Organic Pan-Christian Movement has also been portrayed as a singular faction within world Christianity, but one that stands in sharp contrast on a host of issues relating to global politics and economic production. The rapid worldwide growth of Organic Pan-Christian social forces has taken place amongst the popular and subaltern classes—particularly within the developing world.

The Organic Pan-Christian Movement is highly decentralised, and is comprised of a whole host of Pentecostal, charismatic, and some fundamentalist congregations and denominations throughout the world. This widespread and decentralised movement is united by a singular conception of the world, expressions of popular religion, and corresponding forms of socio-economic and political activism. It has been displayed that these expressions of activism can be observed within and between states, societies, and markets throughout the world. They are tied to the larger ontological viewpoint of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, in which both the Holy Spirit and Satanic forces are omnipresent within and between the structures and spaces of everyday life, in the larger context of ongoing extra-dimensional spiritual warfare. Within this conception of the world, states, societies, and markets are contested structures and spaces between the forces of God and Satan.
Empirical studies, with regard to the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, indicate that it constitutes a rapidly growing transnational demographic group (Pew Forum 2006a). Individuals and social groups around the world, and irrespective of nationality, race, and language, are increasingly identifying with the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world, and are actively engaging in expressions of socio-economic and political forms of activism within and between many states, societies, and markets.

Componental to the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world are inherently neoliberal principles, such as individual independency and material prosperity. It has been argued and displayed in this dissertation that popular trans-denominational Organic Pan-Christian trends, such as the Prosperity Gospel and Church Growth, are effectively popularising neoliberal macroeconomic philosophy. This, it is argued, builds consensus for and assists in the production of global neoliberal hegemony—particularly at the levels of the popular and subaltern classes in many states and societies throughout the world.

Chapters 2-3 established a viable Gramscian conceptual framework with which to analyse world Christianity within the context of world orders and globalisation. A key standpoint, in this regard, is that neoliberalism does represent a form of global hegemony. In order to apply Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, however, the consensus-building processes of hegemony must be articulated. Much of the critical IPE literature has hitherto been lacking in this regard, as the precipitation of global neoliberal hegemony has often been portrayed as being ‘top-down’, or elitist, in nature.

This dissertation has sought to augment the critical IPE literature by showing how Organic Pan-Christian social forces, from the ‘bottom-up’, have assisted in the popularisation and precipitation of neoliberal philosophy, particularly amongst the subaltern and popular classes throughout the world. Furthermore, Chapters 2-3 have illustrated that Gramsci provided a valuable conceptual framework for analysing, understanding, and articulating the hegemonic processes of religion.
It has been argued in this dissertation that this framework is an appropriate and useful analytical tool for situating and contextualising religious social forces within the larger context of global politics, production, and the hegemonic construction of world orders. Gramsci’s analytical framework for understanding specific ‘conceptions of the world’ allows us to break down the complexities of different popular religions and worldviews—both within and beyond the bounds of the nation-state. Gramsci has thus provided a conduit through which we can analyse and elaborate specific transnational social movements, which can then be incorporated into Cox’s larger framework on world orders. This is particularly so with regard to Cox’s (2002) most recent portrayal of the current, historically-developed plural world order in which neoliberalism permeates many of the states, structures, and social forces within global politics and production.

Cox (2002) has argued that the forces of neoliberalism, including states, social forces, international organisations, multinational corporations, etc. constitute a “nebuleuse” of power within the present plural world order. It has been argued in this dissertation that we can better understand certain social forces involved in Cox’s portrait of world order by analysing popular social forces, such as those of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, and illustrating the role they play in precipitating neoliberal philosophy, and building consensus for neoliberalism at the popular and subaltern levels of global politics and production. In this respect, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement fits nearly into Cox’s portrait of the current plural world order, as Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, institutions, and social forces play key roles in the manufacturing of popular consent for neoliberal macroeconomic policies.

It has been argued in this dissertation that Gramsci’s analytical framework for understanding specific conceptions of the world can be used in order to illustrate how the worldviews of specific popular/subaltern social forces can be welded to larger philosophies in the production of hegemony. In the case of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, what has been illustrated is how neoliberalism came to permeate the Christian Renewalist conception of the world. The second task of this dissertation was to display how the Organic Pan-Christian Movement fits into Cox’s (2002) portrayal of the
current neoliberal, plural world order. The Organic Pan-Christian Movement constitutes a widespread example of popular consensus-building for neoliberal hegemony, and also as an example of what Cox termed "exclusionary populism" within global politics.

Chapter 4 illustrated the historically ambivalent relationships and struggles between Christian intellectuals, institutions, and social forces with political structures. The crux of these struggles often centred upon establishing the appropriate parameters between political and civil societies within states. This was particularly the case for the Catholic Church and political structures in Europe before and during the era of European feudalism, as the system of socio-economic and political organisation during the Dark and Middle ages. Nearly all of the Christian social forces which have been discussed in this dissertation grew, in some way or another, from the conflicting Christian conceptions of the world which were produced from the breakdown of feudal Christendom in Europe.

These conflicting Christian conceptions of the world played no small part in the structural development and nature of many modern states, the rise of industrial capitalism, and the development of the modern state-system of international relations. Traditional Christian denominations represented some of the earliest structures of global civil society, and represented key conduits through which the European Enlightenment dialectic was transmuted throughout the world from the very beginning of the modern state-system of international relations. Each emergent Christian conception of the world of the Reformation/Counter-Reformation era prescribed a unique balance between political and civil societies within early-modern states, as well as the development of liberalism and capitalist production as a whole. As has been displayed in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, however, the balance of political and civil society continues to be complicated by Christian social forces in many states.

Chapter 5 displayed the development of the two broad factions within world Christianity. It was illustrated that the traditional Christian social forces re-converged in relation to a host of social issues during the 19th-20th centuries. These issues included slavery, social justice in relation to industrial capitalist production, and the threat posed to Christianity
by international Communism. Furthermore, traditional Christian institutions, such as the Catholic Church and the mainline Protestant denominations, were culturally enjoined through the European Enlightenment dialectic. These traditional institutions played no small role in precipitating Enlightenment-era rationalism, the growth of modern education, and the proliferation of the natural sciences. The conception of the world of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, however, was largely born and developed in isolation from the Enlightenment dialectic.

Amongst the popular and subaltern classes of the frontiers and urban poor, denominations such as Pentecostalism, Southern Baptists, and many non-denominational charismatic groups, took shape and developed traditions based solely on Biblical inerrancy and the rejection of both the natural sciences and modernism. Many of these once-isolated social forces have subsequently emerged and rapidly spread as global proselytising forces. Over the past few decades, many of these institutions and social forces have converged through common facets of their respective conceptions of the world. These facets include Biblical inerrancy, the rejection of the natural sciences, the belief in the omnipresence of both the Holy Spirit and Satanic forces within and between the structures and spaces of everyday life, and premillennialist eschatology.

From these common components of worldview, Organic Pan-Christian social forces have produced a singular meta-narrative, geo-political worldview, and transnational popular culture. This popular culture is generated and reinforced by, not only myriad proselytising enterprises, but also a vast global media apparatus. Organic Pan-Christian social forces have come to collaborate with one another, as well as to collectively engage states, societies, and markets throughout the world through distinct expressions of conservative and exclusionary brands of socio-economic and political activism. To the detriment of many traditional Christian social forces within global society, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement is growing increasingly powerful—particularly amongst the subaltern and popular classes of the developing world.
Chapter 6 highlighted the issues presented by recent empirical studies on the phenomenon of Christian Renewalism. The tangible growth of this global wave of charismatic Christianity has presented scholars with difficulties regarding how best to contextualise the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within global politics and production. Cross-disciplinary academic debates have centred on whether or not the rapidly growing phenomenon of Christian Renewalism is an extension of either US civil society and/or US foreign policy. Many scholars, however, articulate Christian Renewalism as a fluid and transnational phenomenon.

It has been argued here that it is a phenomenon that is able to engage with and assimilate itself to a variety of national, regional, and ethnic sets of social relations, whilst still retaining the key components of a larger transnational meta-narrative and popular culture. This dissertation concurs with the articulations of Christian Renewalism as being a transnational phenomenon, which is not entirely anchored by the US, or even centralised within US civil society. Christian Renewalism is articulated in this dissertation as the meta-culture of the highly-decentralised, yet transnational, Organic Pan-Christian Movement. As a movement, it is bound by a shared conception of the world, a distinct global popular culture, and corresponding forms of socio-economic and political activism.

Furthermore, using the discourse and meta-narrative of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, Chapter 6 displayed how Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, institutions, and social forces subjectively view states, societies, and markets within global politics and production. States, societies, and markets are all viewed as structures and spaces, as sites of contestation, in the larger Organic Pan-Christian ontology of spiritual warfare. It was illustrated that the overarching viewpoint of Organic Pan-Christian social forces, with regard to states, societies, and markets, is that these structures and spaces can be purified and made into sacred spaces and venues. Both Chapters 5 and 6 revealed the philosophies and processes through which neoliberalism has been popularised by Organic Pan-Christian social forces. This popularisation has occurred through the precipitation of neoliberal philosophy into expressions of popular religion—particularly with regard to
Chapter 7 provided a case study based on the rapid proliferation of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement within sub-Saharan Africa, particularly over the past three decades. Chapter 7 illustrated how the larger meta-narrative and transnational popular culture of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement has found expression within many states, societies, and markets within sub-Saharan Africa. The larger meta-narrative and transnational popular culture of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement has been shown to find expression across sub-Saharan Africa through the same forms of socio-economic and political activism outlined in Chapters 5-6. These expressions have become increasingly transparent and observable through Organic Pan-Christian involvement in HIV/AIDS prevention, the politics of the family, challenging the scientific community with Biblical inerrancy, and the growth and impact of premillennialist eschatology and Christian Zionism.

Furthermore, the popularisation of neoliberalism within sub-Saharan Africa has been demonstrated by illustrating the growth of the Prosperity Gospel and Church Growth throughout the region over the past three decades. It has also been shown that the growth of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement has been catalysed and wholly bound up with the larger processes of globalisation. As sub-Saharan African states have fundamentally changed the way public services and development aid is distributed, Organic Pan-Christian forces have thrived within what Hoogvelt (1997) refers to as the 'privatisation of foreign aid'. Globalisation has sparked massive rural-urban population migrations within and between many states and societies throughout sub-Saharan Africa. As displayed in Chapter 6, Pentecostal and charismatic Christian social forces thrive within such a context, and sub-Saharan Africa has been no exception.

In addition to an influx of Organic Pan-Christian social forces within the region over the past three decades, more and more self-reliant indigenously-developed African Organic Pan-Christian social forces have developed. Through reverse-agency, such indigenous
Organic Pan-Christian social forces are developing global proselytising capabilities. Through reverse-agency, indigenously-developed African forces are increasingly adding to the character of the overall transnational popular culture of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. This only reinforces the academic argument that the Organic Pan-Christian Movement, as a whole, is indeed indicative of a transnational, multi-nodal phenomenon (Martin, D. 2006). Again, the diversity of this transnational movement is anchored by a singular conception of the world, which is expressed through uniform brands of socio-economic and political activism within and between states, societies, and markets throughout the world.

8.2 Research limitations and potential for further development

This dissertation has been empirically enriched by direct consultations and correspondences with certain Organic Pan-Christian agents, particularly those of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). Furthermore, the SBC is unique amongst Organic Pan-Christian social forces in the sense that its funding mechanisms and activities are centralised, coordinated, and are made transparent. The SBC is held accountable by its own constituent congregations, with regard to how its revenues are used and redistributed throughout the world. The SBC is not held accountable by political structures, but instead by its own congregational and individual constituents.

This cannot be said for the myriad charismatic and Pentecostal social forces which comprise the vast majority of Organic Pan-Christian social forces. This research has been greatly limited in its inability to obtain empirical data in terms of the overall funding mechanisms of the Organic Pan-Christian Movement. What is certain, however, is that the philosophies of Church Growth are exercised, and the activities of church planting occur through individual congregations raising their own revenues. They subsequently grow into independent global centrifugal social forces, which carry the singular meta-
narrative and popular culture of the larger Organic Pan-Christian Movement with their respective growth and proselytising activities.

In this sense, many of the independent megachurches throughout the world operate similarly to multinational corporations. However, these myriad independent megachurches, along with the proselytising and activist networks established between them, all work towards perpetuating the same overarching meta-culture in relation to engaging states, societies, and markets. In light of its empirical limitations, due to a lack of financial governance or oversight for these institutions, the value of this dissertation has been to illustrate the components of the larger singular conception of the world, meta-culture, and the corresponding forms of activism coordinated and engaged in by the overall Organic Pan-Christian Movement. This dissertation was able to effectively display this overarching global popular culture, and contextualise its believers as a growing transnational demographic group, through the empirical studies conducted by the Pew Forum and by using the Gramscian analytical framework for understanding specific conceptions of the world (2006a; 2010a).

Furthermore, the Gramscian conceptual framework utilised throughout this dissertation was the tool with which this phenomenon could be contextualised within the larger portrait of hegemony and world order. One potential for further development that has been established through this research is the potential for the further use of this analytical framework in relation to a host of different social forces within the larger context of globalisation. While the number or NGOs operating within the larger situational forces of globalisation is unquantifiable, we can better ascertain the nature of their respective activities within and between states, societies, and markets by using this analytical framework.

Most not-for-profit NGOs are driven by a mission-statement, reflective of the conception of the world espoused by their respective leaders and donors. By understanding the driving conceptions of the world of their intellectuals and institutions, we can better ascertain what their relation is to the larger processes of global neoliberal hegemony; in
the sense of whether or not they facilitate or contest global neoliberalism. In addition to this potential for further development, other religious social forces can similarly be contextualised within the larger Coxian portrait of world order through this analytical framework. In this sense, there is a certain predictive ability in relation to ascertaining the behaviours and interactions within and between different social factions of the larger global religious economy, as well as global politics as a whole.

With regard to the neo-Gramscian tradition within critical IPE, this dissertation has enhanced the applicability of Gramsci’s socio-political thought to global politics and society. While some neo-Gramscian scholars, such as Gill (1993a), have encouraged the type of scholarship conducted with this dissertation, the overall discourse of the discipline has gravitated largely towards resistance movements and/or the elitist superstructures of global capitalism within the context of globalisation and the proliferation of neoliberal hegemony. Some neo-Gramscians, such as Morton (2006), have argued that both critical IPE and the Gramscian approaches to the area must centralise class and the primacy of class struggle as the anchor for any scholarship.

Germain (2007), on the other hand, argues that historical materialism is a much wider tradition. He points to the fact that Cox’s work, which led to the neo-Gramscian schools, is founded on a much broader and eclectic theoretical base than solely Marxism. While class struggle is certainly componential to the portrait of world order that Cox (2002) has portrayed, it is not the overarching theme of the portrait he has given us. Germain (2007) argues that, while class struggle is still a highly important variable in how we approach subject matter within IPE, it is certainly not the only lens through which we should base our observations and studies of global capitalism. Morton’s (2006) assertions are reflective of the overall stagnation of the discourse of the neo-Gramscian tradition within critical IPE.

It must be reasserted that Gramsci used the term “hegemony” in several ways. Firstly, he used the term to describe the Machiavellian mixture of consent and coercion used by any ruler/ruuling class (Femia 1975). As such, and at the very least, using the term
“hegemony” in a Gramscian theoretical sense, must equally account for the consensual processes of hegemonic production as it does the use of coercion. In other instances, Gramsci also used the term “hegemony” to describe the agents, structures, and processes involved fashioning of consensus (Femia 1975). Despite the multi-layered complexities involved with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, the broader discourse of neo-Gramscianism has tended to centre on anti-globalisation resistance movements or towards the elitist superstructures of global capitalism. At worst, the use of the term by neo-Gramscians has gravitated back towards the more common use of the term hegemony in IR—that which denotes the supremacy of a state within the international system.

This dissertation has sought to reconcile the use of the term “hegemony” with the complexities Gramsci originally rooted the concept within. It has strived to renew the applicability of Gramscian theory within the wider picture of world order and globalisation by applying own Gramsci’s rigorous analytical framework to a specific global social force active within states, societies, and markets around the world. Rather than focusing on isolated groups resisting global capitalism or the states and superstructures which perpetuate it, this dissertation has focused on a widespread transnational identity group that actively assist in the precipitation of global capitalism at the popular and subaltern levels. While Morton (2006) rhetorically asks “where is class struggle” within critical IPE scholarship, it is argued here that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has always centred on those socio-economic and political forces which have succeeded in masking and/or pacifying class struggle.

For Gramsci, no social forces have been more successful at neutralising class struggle through successive epochs of power and production than those of a religious persuasion. Thus, this dissertation has centred on the role of global Christian intellectuals and institutions which facilitate and socialise the larger macroeconomic philosophies and policies of globalisation with popular and subaltern classes throughout the world. In analysing both its worldview and its expressions of activism, this dissertation has revealed how this globalised collection of social forces have not only been co-opted by
the forces of global capitalism, but also how this global demographic group has added its own character to the overall contradictory and multifaceted nature of global free market hegemony. Gramsci’s conceptual framework for analysing different conceptions of the world of specific social forces involved in the production of consensus has facilitated the ‘bottom-up’ analysis of global neoliberal hegemony illustrated in this dissertation. Thus, it is argued here that it is through such analyses that the neo-Gramscian schools could gain a fuller and more detailed understanding of the subtleties and complexities involved in hegemonic production and the precipitation of neoliberal philosophies within the context of globalisation.

8.3 Final thoughts

Overall, this dissertation has concretely displayed that Organic Pan-Christian forces constitute a rapidly growing transnational demographic group. The shared worldview of this transnational demographic group has been illustrated by using Gramsci’s analytical framework for understanding specific conceptions of the world, and how specific conceptions of the world are engaged with for the purposes of producing hegemony. The transnational Organic Pan-Christian Movement has been presented as an important popular bloc within the present plural world order, as it plays a key consensus-building role in many states and societies with regard to the precipitation of neoliberal philosophy into popularised forms and expressions. As has been displayed in detail, the involvement of Christian social forces in relation to the overlapping realms of philosophy, politics, and economic production is not a new phenomenon.

For over two millennia, Christian intellectuals, institutions, and social forces have played key roles in the construction and transition of successive historic blocs of power, production, and world orders. In this respect, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement is tantamount to a new Christian Reformation. This new and popular wave of Christianity is largely reflective of changes in the realms of philosophy, politics, and production. These
changes are directly related to the advent of globalisation and global neoliberal hegemony over the past three decades. Thus, the Organic Pan-Christian conception of the world is highly conducive to the socio-economic, political, and cultural changes associated with globalisation. In this respect, Organic Pan-Christian social forces are increasingly becoming active agents of global neoliberal hegemony. Organic Pan-Christian intellectuals, institutions, and social forces are actively engaging states, societies, and markets throughout the world in this capacity. As such, the Organic Pan-Christian Movement constitutes a key consensual bloc within global politics, production, and the current plural and neoliberal world order.
Bibliography


International Central Gospel Church (2010) *About us* [online], available: [http://www.centralgospel.com/?root=aboutus&PHPSESSID=cafe88c3088be0c93da58fa6cdabb91f](http://www.centralgospel.com/?root=aboutus&PHPSESSID=cafe88c3088be0c93da58fa6cdabb91f) [accessed 10 July 2010].


Worth, O. & Murray, K. (2009) ‘Re-visiting the old to unlock the new: a Gramscian critique of the neo-Gramscians’, presented for the annual conference of the Political Studies Association, 7-9 April, University of Manchester.