Realism, Disciplinary History and European Union Studies –

From Integration theory to Normative Power Europe

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PhD

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Author’s Declaration:

I hereby declare that this project is entirely my own work and does not contain material previously published by any other author except where due reference of acknowledgement has been made. Furthermore, I declare that this research project has not been submitted for any other academic award, or part thereof, at this or any other educational establishment.

Signature: ________________________________

Date: ________________________
This thesis is a realist, disciplinary history of European Union Studies (EUS). It begins by examining a number of criticisms aimed at realist IR theory. By considering these criticisms it is possible to illustrate a more productive approach to realism. It will be shown that realism has two distinct uses, practical and hermeneutical, and that these are based on three core principles. These are the centrality of philosophical and ethical scepticism towards progress and naturalist epistemology; a belief in the centrality of power competition between all forms of social community; and a link to ‘reality’ as the foundation to any research. This part of the analysis is linked into a criticism of the dominance of unsuitable scientific divisions in IR Theory. Instead of the existing approach which assumes total explanatory power on the part of each theory, this research returned to the belief of many classical realists that realism alone was insufficient to understand and improve the practice of politics. Instead what is required is dialectic between realist and idealist modes of thought. This is argued to be the healthy condition of a discourse through the work of Karl Mannheim. Where this is not present, disciplinary history assists in understanding why this is the case. This realist disciplinary history framework deconstructs the development of EUS. Its Integration theory and polity-building phases show that the discipline is hegemonised by liberal, modernist thought. The extent of this hegemony and the impact of previous debates on the structure of disciplines today is shown by an analysis of Ian Manners’ Normative Power Europe thesis. In keeping with the tradition of Carr and Herz, the utility of a realist approach is outlined to promote dialectic in this part of EUS at least.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

In the face of the overriding empiricism of most doctoral research this dissertation attempts to do something more challenging for the researcher and the reader – not to take a particular theory and to apply it to a gap in the empirical wall, but to put forward a challenging narrative explaining the near complete domination of European Union Studies (EUS) by variants of liberal theory. Such empirical research is important for developing the support of certain theories and for increasing the knowledge of specific phenomena – knowledge gauged by a positivist metre. The problem is that the predominant modes of popular research are either hard rationalist, institutional or social constructivist\(^1\) – none of which contain a strong element of self-reflection. The ironic thing about the research here is that it develops the conservative theory *par excellence*, realism, to present a critical narrative of the development and structure of EUS. The narrative is based on an internalist understanding of disciplinary history (Schmidt,\(^1\)

\(^1\) This is certainly less the case with IR and IPE broadly and even more markedly so in EU Studies – See Peterson, 2001. Section 2 of this dissertation outlines the dominance of these theories in much greater detail.
1998) – rejecting the view that whatever happened or happens is because it reflects developments in the object of study and insisting that a considerable amount of what goes on within disciplines is because of internal dynamics, such as theoretical and epistemological inertia, the impact of professionalisation and similar forces not related to the object of study. This will be done using a classical realist framework possessing both practical and hermeneutical traits.

Before introducing this dual-purpose realist framework which accounts for Section 1 of the dissertation, a number of clarifications as to the exact purpose and position of the dissertation need to be made. Firstly, before getting involved in a deep discussion about the nature of specific IR theories it is necessary to set out what IR Theory is about? What then is the relationship between it and EUS? And subsequently, what is the nature of their relationship to the study of Politics as the overarching discipline? The second clarification which is required is an answer to the question: what precisely is meant by realism, and for that matter, its counterpoints utopianism and idealism? The third and final task to be completed before moving onto the analysis-proper is to locate this research in a broader theoretical and disciplinary backdrop. The chapter structure and some key themes will then be outlined to conclude the Introduction.

**IR Theory, EU Studies & Politics**

Buzan and Little (2001) argue that the discipline of IR has failed as an intellectual project because despite its success in becoming a popular area of study for students, the ‘node of identity’ that IR represents has exported
almost no ideas out of the field of politics and into other disciplines such as business, economics or sociology. This criticism is based on the idea that the intent of IR theory as an intellectual project, like any discipline, is to be recognised as the source of sound intellectual frameworks and models. This, however was not the original intent of IR theorists at the founding of the discipline, which was to identify the causes of war and modes of ameliorating these causes toward the goal of ridding the world of war altogether. The mandate developed into the explanation of international conflict in all its forms, followed by the study of international cooperation. Significant theorists in IR history expanded the study of these topics by introducing systematising concepts and frameworks such as international systems (Waltz), international societies (Bull) and World Systems (Wallerstein), or by arguing for different explanations of why conflict occurs in the first place. While the study of these problems was approached from a wide variety of angles using various theoretical tools, at all times the focus of IR has been on the key question of how conflict occurs in international politics and what can be done about it. What counts as IR today is a highly contested concept and is discussed in some detail in the following chapter. Suffice it to say, there has been a marked move away from the traditional focus on ‘war and peace’.

EUS is the modern disciplinary title for the study of the European Union\(^2\). Under this umbrella is the study of the EU’s sociology, economics, culture and the Union’s internal and external political processes. Cini (2006) argues

\(^2\) It is important not to confuse EUS with the even broader transdisciplinary movement described as European Studies which considers all aspects of what is described as European culture and therefore involves a great deal more disciplines than EUS.
that while it is an interdisciplinary project in theory, Comparative Politics and IR approaches have tended to dominate. This would lead some to suggest that EUS is ‘closely allied to politics literature’ (Cini, 2006: 41). This is unfair however as the EU is obviously more complex and multifaceted than to examine it from a purely political lens. This was not always the case however. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the original movement to study European integration was an explicitly IR based one. The subsequent move away from the belief that processes of integration seen in Europe were transferable to other parts of the world was the first step towards developing an understanding of European integration as a uniquely European experience. It is from this appreciation of the EU as being the result of a unique set of historical, geopolitical, economic and social dynamics that led to the description of the EU as *sui generis*. This, along with a number of structural reasons (Cini, 2006: 40-2), led to the isolation of the study of the EU from Politics, particularly in the European academy. However, the main vehicles of EU theory have all sprung from the North American academy and therefore, have a much clearer Politics base. The disciplinary boundaries are clearly fluid. Saying that the origins of EUS are in IR theory, stemming from its basis in international integration studies, is not debatable. After this however, the picture is less clear.

The predominant theoretical movements in EUS have a clear political basis – neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, Comparative Politics approaches and social constructivism. This however has not led to EUS research feeding into wider political research despite the opportunities of ‘learning from Europe’ (Warleigh, 2006) for IR, Political Theory and
Comparative Politics. The predominance of politics approaches to the study of the EU does not necessarily exclude it from describing itself as an interdisciplinary body of knowledge. However, EUS is obliged to recognise its place as predominantly stemming from the study of the integration process as a political process, followed by approaches which concerned themselves with the internal dynamics and construction of an EU polity. The appropriateness of an overarching political framework like that used here is therefore unproblematic.

There has of late been an increasing awareness in EUS of the question, ‘Where are we going?’ (Warleigh-Lack, 2008). As part of this discussion, great attention has been paid to the future direction of EUS as an increasingly transdisciplinary, or intradisciplinary, discipline (Warleigh and Cini, 2009). Warleigh-Lack has suggested that the study of global governance represents the prime opportunity for EUS scholars to export their research on a range of EU topics to the international relations market. Previously (2006), he argued that IR has a great deal which it can learn from EUS. On top of this willingness to export ideas to IR, the history of European integration to be described in Chapter 4 will clearly show the strongly international basis of the discipline. While Hix (1994) has famously argued that students of the EU would be better off reading the classics of comparative politics over IR ones, most engaged in the study of the EU would agree that IR is the home discipline of EUS, and this, despite how far apart IR and EUS’s research agendas may be today. Despite the separateness of their research agendas, one of the arguments to be made in Section 2 is that EUS followed epistemological and ontological
developments in IR more than has been recognised. EUS has been influenced by the same developments in social theory as IR has, thus supporting an approach to EUS as a sub-discipline of IR. EUS scholars might balk at the suggestion that it is a sub-discipline of a sub-discipline (assuming IR is a subset of the Politics discipline), but it is a relationship akin to Home Rule or confederalism.

EUS, while genealogically part of IR and Politics, has isolated itself from the source discourses and debates (Verdun, 2003), preferring to remain autonomous, with its own professional associations (EUSA and UACES being the most prominent), its own major journals (Journal of European Public Policy and Journal of Common Market Studies), and specialised Departments in many universities. Thus, while the relationship between IR, EUS and Politics is not straightforward, there is more than enough influence and importing from IR for there to be no problems in assuming that the models of disciplinary and intellectual appraisal used in IR are suitable for EUS also. Insofar as disciplines can be demarcated, while EUS is a subdiscipline of IR, and IR a subdiscipline of Politics, because they both have their own systems of rules, their own nomenclature and ‘disciplinary histories’ it is right to describe them as disciplinary ‘dominions’ in their own right despite their debts to their parental discipline or disciplines. The relationship between IR theory and EUS is not straightforward but there is clearly enough evidence of significant interaction particularly in the

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3 The term dominions is a particularly illustrative phrase as these bodies of knowledge/areas of study are entirely independent but retain a very significant link to the ‘Commonwealth’ of Politics.
direction of EUS from IR to suggest that the two share an important, almost inseparable, connection.

Their relationship to the discipline of Politics adds to the murkiness of the picture, as they both share a traditionally interdisciplinary approach with Politics being just one discipline from which they draw. If we use the maxim that the study of politics is about explaining, ‘Who gets what, where, when and how’, then it is easy to see that both have a clear basis in the Politics discipline. However, if we open politics up to normative or philosophical questions – ‘should’ questions – then the relationships become less clear. As mentioned IR was originally not a purely political field and only with the growing professionalisation of the discipline through the setting up of Chairs and Departments of IR – especially in North America – did it become more clearly associated with Politics. This alignment has come and gone to a certain extent however, as current IR research has returned to many of the concerns which were addressed as a normal part of understanding international politics such as identity, culture, geography, demographics, political philosophy and most significantly economics. This is not to suggest that these bodies of knowledge were never addressed in the ‘second age’ of IR\(^4\), but that they were not widely accepted frameworks for approaching international relations with the possible exception of economics\(^5\). This situation has changed markedly and these are

\(^{4}\) Ashworth (2009: 17-20) outlines three ‘ages’ of international relations. The first of these ages is the founding period, when IR was studied in a pluralistic and multidisciplinary way. The second phase represents the period where IR was at its most ‘political’ which coincides with the period of realist hegemony of the discipline. The third age is the current period which has seen IR return to its pluralistic and interdisciplinary roots.

\(^{5}\) Without wanting to muddy the waters further, it is necessary to briefly mention the place of International Political Economy (IPE) as an extension of IR theory. IPE exists in a similar location as IR, experiencing the same trends in method and popularity of specific
all seen as normal parts of IR Theory today. However, unlike EUS where there is a strong focus on interdisciplinarity as an ideal (research drawing on insights or theories from a number of disciplines), as Ashworth points out, IR research tends to be based on one of these disciplines with only passing reference to others. Therefore, IR should more appropriately be described as multi-disciplinary with Politics as one of a number of disciplines which IR scholars draw from, although it is the dominant discipline. What is important to stress when considering the disciplinary positions of each of the relevant disciplines is their interdependence and intermingling. They are each separate in their own way through their attention to a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena. At the same time it cannot be avoided that the notion of particular disciplines being exclusive is a tenuous ideal.

Peter Burke’s (2000) excellent treatment of the development of the history of knowledge provides some context to the discussion of the relationship between disciplines and sub-disciplines. The notion of disciplines and the categorisation of knowledge into specific fields dates back to the foundation of the first libraries and was caused by the need to arrange libraries in more orderly fashion due to the explosion in the number of books being produced. However, there was always conflict over the accuracy and validity of the divisions made. This leads one to the conclusion that arguing that there exists a clearly defined discipline that is not in some way indebted to or overlapping with another would be difficult. Even in different parts of social theories. It has a mixed parentage between IR and International Economics. It accounts for a significant part of the analysis of international politics and while it is not addressed in this discussion of disciplinary formations, this research considers it a subset of IR, similar to International Security Studies – both of which contain truncated forms of IR theories along with an attention to a specific area of international politics.
the world, the same discipline may share different relationships with other disciplines. By way of example, Bell (2009: 7) points out that the North American IR academy considered itself a subfield of Politics. British and European scholars on the other hand saw themselves as engaged in an ‘interdisciplinary venture, drawing on but moving beyond political science’ (Bell, 2009: 7). Despite this criticism it is still useful to state clearly where this research positions itself, sensitive to the fact that the divisions between the disciplines in question are not insurmountable or implying a disciplinary purity.

**Location of the research in IR Theory and EU Studies**

Having gone some way to clarify the relationship between the study of IR and EUS, it is necessary to set out precisely where this research fits in relation to these separate but complimentary fields. Firstly, as has been mentioned earlier, this work is a piece of theoretical criticism, disciplinary history and empirical analysis. The research is based on a number of assumptions stemming from the hypothesis. The research assumes, informed by Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, that competition between ideas is required for the maintenance of an intellectually healthy discourse but also, that groups who share certain modes of thought resist this, preferring monopolistic or hegemonic scenarios. If this statement is considered in relation to the EUS discipline, a summary review will suggest dominance by forms of liberal thought and an absence of a realist alternative or counterpoint in the major phases of the discipline’s development. The third and final assumption is that realism is not absent from the discourse because it is unable to contribute, but for sociological
reasons its absence is best understood by examining the development of the discipline. This research is therefore best described as being at the intersection of disciplinary history, IR theory in its purest sense (the study of theories of IR) and EUS.

In order to say something meaningful about the development of discourses and the extent to which they are influenced by debates which have occurred in the past we must first look at the theories, in this case theory, which have been absented. Aside from the allegations against realism for being insufficient for understanding the EU which exist within EUS, there is a considerable literature suggesting that realism is an anachronistic theory for the study of politics generally. This rejection receives attention in the following chapter. Chapter 2 is a purely IR theory related chapter and while not specifically on EUS, its significance for the research becomes clearer as the dissertation progresses. Chapter 3 examines the interconnection between realism and a method of disciplinary history described as the sociology of knowledge. This chapter, in developing the theme of the interconnection between modes of thought and the way scholars tell stories about the development of disciplines, contributes to a discussion about the context of the work of disciplinary historians in IR and how such a mode of analysis can be applied to EUS. Section 1 therefore is placed at the intersection of disciplinary history and IR theory in keeping with the work of Long, Ashworth, Wilson, Schmidt and others.

The chapters in Section 2 all relate to specific issues in EUS. The first is a reconsideration of the narrative of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist dichotomy which is the basis of European Integration theory. This chapter
questions the basis of these theories and argues that they are greatly similar, especially when their epistemologies are considered. The debate between the two theories is allegedly reflective of the realist-idealist debate of the founding of IR theory. The interrogation of this idea by illustrating the differences between realism and intergovernmentalism builds on the framework from Section 1 but has an EUS debate as its focus. The same is true of Chapter 5 which examines the role of constructivism in the move away from an interest based understanding of integration to an idealist, sociological one. The argument is based on the conservative basis of realism outlined in Chapter 2, which cautions against the error of mistaking change in form for a change in essence. This theme is developed further through an analysis of the *sui generis* gene and how it has affected the discourse. This chapter emphasises the interconnection between IR theory and EUS, in particular how developments in social science theory filter through IR theory into EUS. This pattern will be shown in Chapter 4 with reference to behaviouralism and integration theory and is developed further by illustrating the entry of constructivism into EUS in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 engages with the relationship between the operation of a genetic trait of EUS which causes it to over-emphasise the uniqueness of the EU and the way in which liberal-constructivism has magnified parts of the tendency despite serious epistemological and ontological tensions. This chapter therefore contains a critical analysis of constructivism within IR theory, and a problematisation of its use in EUS, focusing on what is described here as the *sui generis* gene. The final chapter is an explicitly EUS related chapter but once again the framework of analysis is an IR
theory one as it focuses on the gap between the EUS analyses of the EU’s international affairs and a more explicitly IR based one. Thus, it will become gradually clearer that a clear disciplinary boundary between the two disciplines is illusory. However, certain parts of the dissertation fit into the literature of one or the other discipline better at times than the other.

In adopting such a transdisciplinary analysis there is a danger that what is gained in scope is lost in the depth of analysis. In fact, when consumed as a whole, it is clear that the dissertation contributes to discussions in three distinct parts of the EUS/IR theory intersection. It advances the work of IR theorists on the realist tradition by developing a post-paradigmatic form of realism which rejects the naturalism of the positivist tradition, arguing for an understanding of realism as only one part of a dialectic between it and utopianism. The second major part of the research is the proposing of an alternative framework for studying disciplinary histories based on Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. In order to test the utility of such an approach, the framework is applied to the work of disciplinary historians in IR. It is argued that their work is a reflection in changes in the balance of power in IR theory today without taking away from the importance of their research in any way. The analysis then contributes to a series of debates in EUS, particularly relating to integration, enlargement and polity building, and the EU as an international actor. These three themes intertwine to build up a narrative which is tested in the final chapter, contributing to a number of different theoretical arguments at the intersections of EUS and IR theory; theory and practice in politics and its study; and most importantly between political realism and political idealism. While the first two of these couplets
have been introduced here, the latter requires some description. These will be presented in order to avoid any confusion which may occur when these terms are used later in the work.

**Realism, Idealism & Modernity**

Thus far, the term realism has been used a number of times. While Chapters 2 & 3 will outline the sources and rationale behind the form of realism used here, it is necessary to briefly summarise its main components in order to clarify what is to follow in the Introduction. Realism is traditionally seen as the theory of power in political theory and IR. As a result of this it is largely compatible with a ‘wide range of positions, ranging from conservatism to radical forms of political critique’ (Bell, 2009: 10). Stemming from this focus on power, a view of realism has developed as an anti-ethical position - placing issues of power and interests above ethical considerations. Within policy discourse, realism is seen as the theoretical embodiment of the *machtpolitik* or *realpolitik* diplomatic tradition. In academia it is considered the paradigm most closely associated with conservative views of social and international progress, or more generally the difficulties of achieving international progress. This scepticism is based, depending on who one reads on a variety of psychological, ethical, social, and political ontologies.

To understand the scepticism inherent in the version of realism used here, it is important to understand that it exists in an internal and external dialectic with optimistic modes of thought, described as idealism or utopianism⁶. We cannot describe one without reference to the other. However, the failure of

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⁶ Unless specified as relating to philosophical idealism, idealism and utopianism will be used interchangeably from here on.
scholars who have adopted these headings in their work has been to misunderstand the vitality of their interaction. However, these modes of thought are not simply psychological positions – akin to a devil and angel on either shoulder – but also represent competing epistemologies and ontologies when seen in their theoretical manifestations.

Realism will be shown to be a dual-purpose theory of practical and hermeneutical use. Herz’s definition of the relationship between realism and idealism best describes the core of the conceptualisation used in the dissertation. In its practical form realism ‘recognises the phenomena which are connected with the urge for security and competition for power, and takes their consequences into consideration’ (Herz, 1950: 158). Realism, for Herz, is a tendency or predisposition (‘urge’) to emphasise the difficulties of surpassing the ‘egoistic instincts and attitudes of individuals and groups’ (1950: 158). Conversely, the practical form of idealism, ‘starts from a more “rationalistic” assumption, namely, that a harmony exists, or may eventually be realised, between the individual concern and the general good, between interests, rights and duties of men and groups in society; further, that power is something easily to be channelled, diffused, utilised for the common good, and that it can ultimately be eliminated altogether from political relationships’ (Herz, 1950: 158). However, these are ideal-types to Herz, representing the gamut of political trends and phenomena in some form or other. The distinction between realism and idealism is not impenetrable but is ‘rather one of emphasis’ (1950: 158). If the two exist in a dialectic, realists are those scholars who, accepting the dialectic, emphasise the power
and security related aspects of politics\textsuperscript{7}. In emphasising these forces over rationally or ethically based ones, realists are fairly depicted as pessimistic and sceptical about the opportunities for human progress (Dienstag, 2009). This is a major theme of the research and is given much greater attention in the following chapter. What is important to make clear is that the realist framework developed here is the theoretical manifestation of pessimism held by many about the prospects of humankind’s progress and a serious scepticism about epistemological naturalism. The opposite of this ideal-type is idealism. While not always liberal, idealism has a faith in humankind’s potential to progress and to analyse human interactions in a rational and scientific manner. Despite their blurring in various IR textbooks (Brown, 2001; Burchill et al, 2003 and Baylis and Smith, 2001), idealism and liberalism are not automatically linked. They do however share a faith in progress and rationality; a tendency toward adopting universalist moral or ethical discourses; and a concern for limiting the exercise of power over people. In sharing such similar foundational traits the two (three when including utopianism) are often used interchangeably to denote progressivist approaches to IR based on modernist sensibilities – rationality, progress and freedom from oppressive forces be they physical or ideational. Dienstag writes (2009: 161):

\textsuperscript{7} The fact that the dialogue between realism and idealism occurs internally and externally in academia and in policy contexts leads to the suggestion that there were no such thing as idealists or realists ever – scholars were all essentially the same, simply placing different amounts of emphasis on one side of the dialectic or the other. While the argument is possibly correct, particularly when the move to describe every realist as an idealist and every idealist a realist is seen. This argument may have a certain merit but if taken too far leaves too messy a picture of IR theory’s past. Some disciplining framework is required. The ‘poverty of paradigms’ (Ashworth, unpublished) and the attending need for some form of ordering system is developed in the following chapter.
Instead, such political theory attempts, at least at the domestic level, to produce a blue-print of the good society which, if implemented, will solve fundamental political problems once and for all. The contemporary incarnations of this optimism are found principally in the liberalism of Rawls, Habermas, and their followers who, while correcting or dissenting from the theory of Kant in many particulars, continue in this general project. Indeed, if anything, they are more insistent on the capacity of reason to restructure the world, or rather, on the amenability of that world to rationalist reconstruction.

The significance of the dialectic between realism and idealism, and pessimism and optimism, is greatest on the issue of progress. Dienstag makes this point when he writes that it ‘surely makes more sense to speak of political theories as optimistic or pessimistic in relation to where they end up, so to speak, rather than where they begin’ (2009: 162). The question which they disagree on most fundamentally is the nature or possibility of progress, and the extent to which transformation of form means a transformation in essence. It is here that the issue of modernity arises. Liberal theories are modernist in so far as they emphasise the potential of human rationality, see progress as the natural way of things and believe that progress to be related to human freedom. By placing human reason and rationality to the forefront of their ontology, liberal theories, as Dienstag suggests, are connecting to their Enlightenment precursors. For example, Kant writes on the inexorable spread of constitutions ‘governed by natural right’ that, ‘the human race will achieve this end, and that it will henceforth progressively improve without any total reversals… Only nature and freedom, combined within mankind in accordance with principles of right, have enabled us to forecast it; but the precise time at which it will occur
must remain indefinite and dependent upon chance’ (2009: 78-9). Realism’s scepticism does not present an opposite to this proposition – that regression occurs – but that the teleology of progress seen in modernist theories is overly optimistic and that this unbridled optimism can lead to the overlooking of dangerous, regressive phenomena or forces. It is important to say however, that this statement represents the philosophical ideal-type, and in the same way that realists are being ‘resurrected’ (Sylvest, 2008) to show that they had liberal and idealist traits, many liberals equally reached realist conclusions at times. Kant represents a prime example of this as he recognised the regressive aspects of politics (human nature, the weakness of reason in the face of passion and the naturalness of war), while at the same time maintaining that progress would eventually occur. Kant’s peace project was an attempt to address the problem posed by Rousseau of the structural causes of conflict. He accepted the principal problems facing humankind but believed that these could be surpassed or relieved through democratisation of communities. This supposed antinomy between Rousseau’s conclusions relating to the problems of conflict between communities and Kant’s faith in reason to lessen or surpass this problem represents an excellent early model of the realism developed here. It is not that one person matches a ‘pure realism’ but an attitude that an author can adopt and trade-off with alternative ideas. Many examples of variants of this apparent contradiction have been shown (See Long and Wilson, 1995

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8 For more on the dialectical nature of Kant’s international thought see Waltz (1969) and for a discussion of the relationship between Rousseau and Kant’s approaches to international order see Ashworth (2003) ‘The Limits of Enlightenment: Inter-state relations in Eighteenth Century political thought’.  

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for example) leading some to go far as to suggest that realism does not in fact exist, as all liberals are realists at some level.

Realism is therefore not a post-modern/structuralist theory. Although it has elements conducive to a poststructuralist or critical theory approach - through the routes of Nietzsche to Morgenthau (Molloy, 2006) or the Frankfurt School theorists to Herz (Hussey, 2007) – it is important not to overstate these characteristics. Realism in its purest sense is an ‘immodern’ theory grounded in Counter Enlightenment thinking, haunted by the spectre of the ‘decadent liberalism’ of the Weimar Republic, and the memories of European death camps fresh in the minds of the tradition’s modern founders\(^9\) (Bell, 2009: 7-11). Despite this deep scepticism about the modernist teleology implicit in liberal and idealist theories, described and rejected by Herz as the civilisational process (1976: Chap. 7), they do not reach the radical relativism of the poststructuralist position.

It is this dialectical aspect of realism that was erased from its intellectual project with its hegemonising of the discipline in the Post-World War 2 period. Instead of a dialectic between realists and idealists, a tale was increasingly told of a debate which had occurred between the two positions in the period leading up to and during the Second World War. The debate was ‘won’ by realism and that was the legitimisation of its hegemonic power.

\(^9\) Duncan Bell’s introduction to his edited volume *Political Thought and International Relations – Variations on a Realist Theme* subtitled ‘Beneath empty skies’ presents a good summary of the interaction between pessimism, optimism and the realist tradition along with a useful discussion of the problems of what he describes as a modernist approach to interpreting realism - based on how it is understood today - versus a reflexive, historical approach which returns to the original texts and their context to describe realism.
position. The problems with this narrative were threefold. The first, and least problematic, of these is that the narrative did not empirically occur. There were responses to Carr’s criticism of utopianism but it did not develop into a full blown ‘debate’. The second issue is that it allowed for the dismissal of all forms of transformative IR theory to be dismissed as ‘utopian’ (Wilson, 1997). The third and most damaging affect of this narrative was that it appeared to legitimise the realist dominance of the discipline, despite the paucity and ‘barren’-ness of a parsimonial realism. This issue is developed further in Chapter 3 when the role of disciplinary history in the research is developed, and the re-examination of the First Great Debate myth analysed.

Outside of the description of politics as tending to to-and-fro between the predictions of realism and idealism, realism also contains within it a critical hermeneutic facet. This is most clearly seen in Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* and is developed in Chapter 3. This aspect of realism questions the way political ideas are formed and how these ideas interact with the study and practice of politics. In *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* Carr deconstructs the ideology of idealist internationalism in its theoretical and practical guises. This attention to the way in which ideas are formed and their influence on political actors is a necessary part of realism in its role as political inquisitor. Thus, realism is used here as the alternative to forms of modernist theory and their manipulation into ideologies – a process described here as ideologising. It possesses two roles here – a practical one and a hermeneutical one. With these set out further in the following two
chapters the liberal hegemony in EUS can be shown to exist and then pierced.

**Why realism?**

A criticism which requires addressing before going any further is the logic of using realism in relation to an institution that has, according to the standard narrative, repeatedly disproved and confounded it. At a series of conferences where papers on the EU and realism were presented, the point was repeated that any use of realism in studying the EU, particularly the EU as an international actor, was automatically blocked by the statist assumptions of realism. This attributed assumption that the only actors in international relations worth consideration are states appears to be a major stumbling block. Realism’s alleged statism will be given an overdue obituary in Chapter 4. While this might possibly have appeared earlier in the dissertation as part of the discussion of what realism is in Chapter 2, realism’s statism is not of great concern until the discussion of the neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist debate, and realism’s problematic association with intergovernmentalism which is the focus of Chapter 4. Therefore, while it requires an act of faith on behalf of the reader up to that point, it is assumed that there is no reason why realism should not be used in relation to the EU.

Some argue that realism is still dominant in the shape of rationalism and positivist science, particularly in the North American academy but this is to misunderstand the nature of realism. As a base theory for empirical research, realism was surpassed by liberalism as the dominant IR theory in
the mid-nineties (Walker and Morton, 2005). Added to this, Walker and Morton show that the use of realism has been declining steadily since 1970. Guzzini’s title *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy – The continuing story of a death foretold*, may not be dramatically wrong. In the context here, realism, like an individual, can only be considered critical and challenging when it has either something to gain or nothing to lose. If it has something to gain it is because it is not part of the status quo. If it has nothing to lose the same can be said as it is already marginalised to the point of impotency. Because of this, the marginalisation of realism offers it a reprieve from its post-Cold War obsolescence. As will be dealt with in far greater detail in the next two chapters, currently, realism fits in neither part of the ‘Fourth Debate’ between rationalism (which it either rejects out of hand, or accepts but at a much lower level than this paradigm would accept) and reflectivism (with who’s abstractions it would quickly tire of and who’s philosophical idealism it could only ever partially support). As a result of this, realism is now liberated from its hegemonic position and is capable of more self-reflection than was possible during its dominance over IR theory during the Cold War. As a result of this, not only is realism liberated from its purely practical use and a case for its use as a hermeneutical tool justified in this context, the opportunities provided by this liberation to return to the original modes of analysis used by realists is thereby significant.

The most important of these as mentioned earlier being realism’s problematisation of the impact of ideologies on politics; its epistemological scepticism; and the importance of interaction between it and forms of
utopian thought. These strands of realist thought are introduced in the following chapter under the brackets of technical and practical realism. These headings do not intend to overly stricture understandings of realism but to make some effort to distinguish practical applications of realism as a theory of international relations from the hermeneutical use of realism as a framework of analysis of modes of thought and disciplinary patterns. Accepting that there exists a relatively clear understanding of the practical application of realism, the basics of which are summarised above, Chapter 3 expands on the form and use of technical realism, introducing the sociology of knowledge and its constituent parts – most notably, competition as a cultural phenomenon and the opening up of categories such as theories and paradigms to the fundamental distinction in form of ‘modes of thought’. It is this hermeneutical framework that Carr, based on the work of Karl Mannheim, applies when considering the dominance of utopian thought in the practice and study of international relations in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*. As mentioned earlier, it is a key part of the hypothesis of the dissertation that EU Studies is suffering from a similar imbalance, and it is for this reason that a realist framework is particularly useful and appropriate in this research.

Not only does realism have a technical use here for examining the internal developments of the discipline as a part of the sociology of knowledge/disciplinary history aspect of the research, in Section 2 it also has a practical role as part of the discourse which it is analysing. While it will be seen that it has played far less of a role in the debates than is suggested in most summaries of EUS’ development, realism here has a dual
role – as participant in, and observer of, the development of EU Studies. The dual role of realism as participator and observer in the analysis is starkest in Chapter 4 on the development of the integration theory discourse. Here, realism’s relationship to intergovernmentalism is discussed. After this chapter, its practical role is greatly diminished as there is little or no place for realism in discussions of the EU’s polity building processes discussed in Chapter 5. Realism is then arguably nonexistent in discussions of the EU’s international affairs in Chapter 6, but the utility of realism in the study of the EU’s international affairs is developed. The role of realism in the analysis is developed further now in a summary of the dissertation’s structure.

Argument synopsis & structure

The research is divided into two sections. The first section develops the ontology and methodology of the research. The framework is based on a post-paradigmatic description of realist theory – focusing on its strengths as a critical voice, calling for balanced dialogue between the utopian and realist urges in forms of political discourse. The link between realism and sociology of knowledge will be outlined to show how the sociology of knowledge was a core pillar of Carr’s method. It will be seen that this framework is the source of a great deal of the most interesting aspects of Carr’s thought – in particular his insistence on the relativity of thought and his criticism of the operation of functional ideologies in the research of, and practice of, politics. Carr’s use of the sociology of knowledge represents within classical realism the best example of the belief that there exists a dynamic interplay between the urges of political realism and political
idealism. Herz’s most significant work of theory, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (1951), echoes this, along with diverse examples throughout the works of Morgenthau and Niebuhr. Realism is not simply a guide to statecraft as some would argue (Guzzini, 1998) but an intersection between practical, material politics on one hand, and hermeneutics on the other.

Realism’s hermeneutical and critical potential is liberated in Chapter 2 through a rejection of the strict paradigmatic definitions of realism seen in many textbooks. This is then expanded upon and developed in Chapter 3 where the relationship between Carr’s method and Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, what Carr describes as ‘modern realism’, is developed. The sociology of knowledge is then linked to the movement towards more critical examinations of the disciplinary history of IR theory. The sociology of knowledge is then used as a tool for dissecting the work of the disciplinary historians of IR theory, showing that far from being an attempt to emancipate IR theory from a regressive and limiting myth, it is a reflection of the changes of the balance of power within IR theory.

Section 1 develops a number of themes in classical realism which will provide the research with its theoretical base and framework of analysis – namely scepticism (moral and epistemological) as a fundamental part of the dialectical political process; and the sociology of knowledge as a mode of analysis of political discourse. This framework of analysis will then be applied to the case study contained in Section 2.
Section 2 is an in-depth analysis of the two phases of the development of EUS, culminating in an overarching critique, in its philosophical sense, of the Normative Power Europe theory. These will be examined, using the framework developed in Section 1, in terms of their connection to, or conformity with, the proposition that healthy and productive political discourse should match the inherent dialectic between realism and utopianism. The hypothesis of the research is that the development of the discipline through its integration and polity-making phases has had a direct impact on the study of the EU as an international actor, not simply in the form of theories used but in the structure of the discourse – dominated by forms of liberal theory and bereft of any realist corrective. As has been identified in IR, these periods greatly influence the operation and politics of the discourse. Chapter 4 aims to overturn a founding myth of EUS. As Cini (2006) has written, the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate is ‘well-rehearsed’. This ‘debate’ represents a foundation stone of the EUS discipline and its mythology. The chapter presents the narrative as is normally seen and then identifies the flaws in the straightforward version of the debate through an analysis of the bases of these theoretical positions.

Section 2 is broken into three chapters. The first and second chapters represent two phases in the development of EUS – the integration theory phase which examined the role of rationality and interests in the integration process, and the polity-making phase which is marked by the use of social constructivism. It will be shown that in both cases, a commitment to rationality, positivism and most importantly progress existed. These two chapters will identify theoretical and methodological continuities between
the two phases. These continuities and ‘dis-continuities’ will be then held up against the study of the EU as an international actor in order to test the hypothesis that the study of the EU as an international actor is dominated by liberal theory and that this domination is the result of the discipline’s history.

The third chapter in Section 2 (Chapter 6) is the centrepiece of the thesis. The development of the framework of analysis in Section 1 and then the examination of the two phases of the development of EUS culminate in an analysis of the dominant discourse in the study of the EU as an international actor. This is followed by the demarcation of an alternative to the hegemonic force within that discourse based on the practical realism developed in Chapter 2. Underlying this second part of Chapter 6 is Mannheim’s argument that competition is required to promote healthy discourse and to restrain the potential of such dominant ideas to become ideologised. This is consistent with the framework developed in Chapter 2 on the constant, non-teleological dialectic which exists in discussions of politics – in practice and theory. The alternative proposed is an attempt to stay in keeping with the normative element of classical realism. It argues, not that utopian thought is ‘wrong’, but that it requires a counterpoint in order for the practice and explanation of politics to remain productive and useful.

The hypothesis of the dissertation will be declared true if it is seen that the development of the discourse on the EU’s international affairs is seen to be the embodiment of the dynamics described in Chapters 4 and 5, and showing an absence of the dialectic between the realist and utopian ‘urges’
proposed in Section 1. It is important to say that the research has a strong normative intent towards encouraging a more balanced and critical approach to the study of the EU’s international identity. With the fundamentals of the dissertation outlined the analysis will now begin with the re-examination of the realist tradition and its relationship to idealism.
Chapter 2:

Post-paradigmatic realism: The realist-idealist dialectic recovered

Any attempt to describe or define realist International Relations (IR) theory from the existing literature is faced with a set of disparate and competing categorisations, from within and outside the tradition. Whether the categorisations are practical (for clarity) or philosophical (based on the fundamental differences between scholars’ work), the problem remains the same – not simply what is realism but questions such as, which realism, or possibly who’s realism require attention. The problems involved in such a project reveal an underlying problem of the discipline. The narrative of the discipline-defining ‘Great Debates’ has created a scenario where theories are the foundation and walls of a conservative and argumentative (as opposed to dialectical) IR theory. Within this approach it is assumed that a certain theory is capable of describing the entirety of the international reality – a unitary theory of every international phenomenon so to speak.
Even the predominantly used name of the study of international politics, International Relations theory, promotes and preserves the ‘theoretical’, disciplined basis of all knowledge. This urge to categorise is, according to psychologists, a natural one, helping to systematise and create comparisons between what is ‘known’. This process of categorisation and comparison is almost always dichotomous. Thus, when one examines a single IR theory, one is faced with layers of problems stemming from this categorisation problem – within realism the question of what is realist and what is not is contested, and thus, externally – from the outside looking in, the same process of classification is in action. ‘Is this realism? No? Then it is liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, or post-structuralism etc’. As Jack Donnelly once wrote, ‘we may not be able to define it, but we know it when we see it’ (2000: 8). This chapter aims to set out to reveal some problems of a strict paradigmatic or ‘theoretical’ approach to realism and other traditions of thought within IR theory generally, along with a discussion of the opportunities raised by this dilemma via less strictly enforced rules of identification. It is important to stress from the outset that there are many different descriptions of realism and the nature of the tradition is hotly contested. Therefore, when the term realism, and more specifically realists, is used, it is most often used in the sense developed here, as opposed to a universally accepted categorisation. This might appear obvious but it is important not to walk into a contradiction by claiming that IR theories are not clear-cut categorisation and then to use language that would suggest that all realists are the same. While it is fair and important to argue that one description of realism is more accurate than another through the
development of a framework which is sympathetic and compatible with a variety of authors, this does not mean that there can be only one accepted narrative. How though can one come to a point to describe realism? In examining criticisms of realism it becomes possible to clarify the nature of realism via an assessment of the arguments merits.

With such an enormous body of literature at one’s disposal, a successful strategy for structuring a characterisation is to pose the literature with a problem to solve. This is in the tradition of Karl Mannheim (1952) who saw academic debates as defined by competition between competing bodies of knowledge which do not merge in a dialectic, but develop through competition with one another for dominance. Therefore, by addressing some recent criticisms of realism, linked into longer standing ones, realism’s self-understanding can develop through reflection and contemplation on its own nature even if that requires accepting the difficulties realism faces in an environment of increasing division between rationalism and reflectivism where classical approaches to realism fits neither.

A recent set of criticisms based on realism’s connection to a historical tradition of European diplomacy are outlined by Guzzini (2004). He describes its tradition/justification dilemma; along with a problem of coherency stemming from the need to ‘justify’ its existence in a world it no longer fits. These two dilemmas, along with specific reference to Cox’s (1981) now famous critique of realism as a problem-solving theory will be examined and critiqued, or perhaps more appropriately, criticised. They will be rejected for being overly narrow in definition and overly optimistic in
relation to realism’s coherency at the same time. This chapter aims to interrogate Guzzini’s approach to realism, which is by no means unique to Guzzini alone, and to help provide an illustration of the multiplicity, maybe even duplicity, of realist thought. In doing this, the goal is to illustrate that attempting to speak of a single realism makes the task of defending realism from its multitude of detractors almost impossible.

Then, cautioned by the problems of a straightforward definition of realism as \(x\) or \(y\), the division between what has been described as practical and theoretical realism (Ashley, 1981) will be developed, starting with, but differing markedly from Ashley’s original approach. This chapter, it is hoped, will provide an introduction to some of the key debates between the bulldozer of methodological positivism and the traditional elements of realist international thought giving an idea of its contested nature and the problems of the modernist/scientific approach. This will then assist in the project to characterise\(^{10}\) realism and IR theories in more generalised terms than before.

**What is an IR Theory?**

Before discussing the practicalities and impracticalities surrounding any attempt to present realist IR theory in any summary way, a more fundamental question should be asked – What is an IR theory? The question is important as only by an appreciation of the nature of IR theories and how they are formed and influenced by externalities and the study Social

\(^{10}\) The word characterise is used specifically after some degree of reflection. Most discussion of the traits or defining features of a theory uses the closed ‘define’ but because of its connotations of closure, finality and a supremacy over other versions, stemming from its etymology (from the Latin *definires* to set boundaries or limits). Wherever it is used in this analysis it is in this ‘closed’ sense.
Sciences broadly can we come to a conclusion as to the politics and sociology of the structure of the discipline. Obviously various theorists will offer disparate answers to such a question based on their allegiance to normative or analytical research ethics, the philosophy of science, their epistemology and ontology. It is a question that became more significantly addressed during and as a result of the Third Debate\textsuperscript{11}. In many ways this was due to the fact that up until the entry of Marxist-inspired theories (Critical Theory, World Systems Theory and Neo-Gramscian thought) to IR theory (what is generally seen to be the beginning of the Third Debate), the assumption was that international relations existed as a guide for policy with little thought given to the sociological or metatheoretical questions relating to the exact nature of theory or theorising. While the Second Debate was focussed on the division between traditionalists and behaviouralists, and therefore on the question of method and epistemology, in the Third Debate on the other hand, the ‘discipline was the debate. “International Relations” was this disagreement, not a truth held by one of the positions’ (Waever, 1996: 155). Waever argues that the Third Debate has passed (like the others, passing before there was an awareness that it was taking place) –

\textsuperscript{11} While Waever’s narrative of the series of Great Debates is a popular teaching method and also a useful conceptual framework for appreciating the general development of the discipline, even the author mentions the dangers and problems of such an approach, writing, ‘there is a tendency in it to produce straw men, not least of the realists. But more importantly these debates and the ideas about the debates are part of the self reflection and thus self management of the discipline. Thus, there are dangerous effects of counting [the debates] wrongly’ (1996: 174). He goes on to suggest that his reading of the debates should be seen as a metaphor for the reality, more as a ‘constellation, an implicit picture’ of what occurred, and thus should be used cautiously. While the First Debate’s existence has been almost obliterated from the discipline’s history, one can arguably be more sure as to the reality of the Second and Third debates as metaphorical summaries of actual debates which had implications on developments in the discipline, particularly relating to the epistemological and ‘scientific’ direction the discipline took from the ‘behaviouralist revolution’, on. This move will now be discussed in the context of Waever’s parameters but the problems inherent in the ‘Debates’ narrative remain and will be discussed further below in the current chapter while the First Debate will be looked at in some detail in the following chapter.
and that the discipline is now in a fourth or possibly fifth significant debate. Despite its passing, the subject of the Third Debate significantly influences the epistemological and philosophy of science questions to hand on what constitutes a theory in IR.

Answers to this question Waever believes can be ascertained by the responses of the two most powerful corners of the Third Debate triangle - realism and liberalism. Both responded to the challenge posed by the entry of Marxists into the IR theory market, by moving, not closer but further from a normative or emancipatory research agenda. In a development which would support the argument that the ‘debates’ themselves are not productive, rather than adopting more elements of a normative or emancipatory approach à la a dialectical synthesis, instead - supporting Mannheim’s argument on the implications of theoretical competition within disciplines¹² - realism and liberalism fell back on normatively barren and even more scientific and rationalistic positions. This is at least how we can conceptualise part of the sociology of the development of neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism¹³, as both place great emphasis on

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¹² That is, rather than adopting elements of the “competitor’s” argument or principles, positions entrench and develop strategically, towards the goal of defeating the opponent. Mannheim’s argument on ‘Competition as a Cultural phenomenon’ will be discussed in the next chapter.

¹³ Neorealism is the structural realist theory with an assumption of methodological individualism (rationality) at its base. It argues that international conflict and cooperation are influenced primarily by structural factors – structure being the distribution of power across the units in the international system. It was developed by Kenneth Waltz in The theory of International Politics (1979) and is still considered the best example of an IR ‘theory’ in its scientific sense even by detractors of such an approach. For a full discussion of the utility of a neorealist approach and its shortcomings see the classic Neorealism and its Critics (1986), Baldwin’s Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate and the International Relations special issue (2009: Vol. 23, No. 3) on the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of TIP. Waltz’s approach to the philosophy of science will be dealt with later in this chapter. The version of realism developed here is not entirely incompatible with Waltz’s realism as it is fundamentally a form of structural realism in its practical form. Where it differs however is the distinction between realism as a practical form of
rationality, a more rigorous approach to the construction of theory and epistemologically, greater use of modelling and quantitative methods. In the face of the Marx-inspired assault on status quo, bourgeois IR theory, this epistemological paradigm shift matched that which had occurred in Economics in previous decades – attempting to place the subject (analyst) ever further from the object of study in the hope that at some stage perfect distance could exist between subject and object to create pure ‘knowledge’ as in the ‘physical’ sciences sense.

This move towards ‘imitative scientism’ in Economics was identified by Galbraith in 1970 (8), and Cohen describes a similar shift in International Political Economy (IPE) as creeping economism, writing, ‘[a]n enthusiasm for the methodology of economics is understandable, offering as it does both technical sophistication and intellectual elegance. Who wouldn’t like to be able to predict something large from something small?’ (2008: 43)

This aping of Economics’ dominant methodology and epistemology by those within the neo-neo synthesis has its source in the essential primacy of Economics in American social science. According to Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1999: 23), three key authors in the development of rationalism in the eighties and early nineties, Economics is the ‘reigning king of social sciences’. While this view has always been rejected by ‘traditionalists’ and realist/mercantilist political economists (e.g. Morgenthau, 1955 Bull, [1972] 1995; & Gilpin, 1987: 43-7), the knowledge and as a technical or philosophical tradition with interesting things to say about the nature of political thought, epistemology and the philosophy of science. These issues are developed further later in this chapter.

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14 For clarity, rationalism will refer to group of scholars working in areas of rational choice theory in IR theory and particularly with IPE, rather than the English School tradition which, while originally defined as rationalism by one of its founders Martin Wight, is the less well known ‘form’ of rationalism.
predominant move towards imitative science has progressed largely unchallenged by those who do not subscribe to strict post-positivism – i.e. classical realists, non-economic liberals and most Marxists. This epistemological shift created a consolidated view of the scientific parameters of IR theory in method, ontology and intent.

The methods adopted were clearly those of positivist economics. Behaviour modelling and quantitative analysis took precedence over grand theorising. Waever argues that from its very inception American social science was empiricist, ‘abstaining from studying underlying (allegedly “metaphysical”) causes and searching for prediction and control’ (1998a: 713). This fundamental belief in the ability of researchers to identify objective truths through empirical analysis of observable data is fundamental to the American academy of IR and in the social sciences in general\(^\text{15}\). Linked to this faith in positivism as a source of knowledge of an external reality, is the assumption that a researcher can apply the same logic as the natural sciences to the social. In making this assumption, researchers can then aim to find the sorts of objective laws of behaviour which can apply to all scenarios with the same set of reducible variables – the essence of the scientific method and indirectly reflecting the esteemed place

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\(^{15}\) Louis Menand’s (2001) Pulitzer Prize winning *The Metaphysical Club – The story of ideas in America*, counters this view arguing that the founding fathers of North American philosophy believed that ideas were key to understanding the shape and processes within society. The book focuses on the interconnections between Wendell Holmes, William James, C.S Peirce and John Dewey, but many others are discussed in the narrative. ‘They believed that ideas are produced not by individuals but by groups of individuals – that ideas are social. They believed that ideas do not develop according to some inner logic of their own, but are entirely dependent, like germs, on their inner human carriers and the environment’ (2001: xii). Menand’s book is, along with being an excellent narrative of the development of pragmatism as a philosophy, an excellent treatise on the gradual professionalisation and intellectual enclosure movement that occurred in US universities from the late nineteenth century on.
Enlightenment liberal ideals are held in the US academy. This then links into the question of ontology.

The belief in an environment inhabited by rational actors is a key ontological assumption of rationalism. In assuming rationality, the international sphere becomes a much tidier and manageable laboratory for theory and it gives encouragement to researchers that, like in the natural sciences, with enough work and the right intellectual tools, the world can be ‘known’. The final question is then one of intent – why do IR theory? By making IR a science in the way described, it supports the description presented by Patomäki and Wight (2000: 223), as ‘the attempt to identify… relatively enduring structures, powers and tendencies, and to understand their characteristic ways of acting. Explanation entails providing an account of those structures, powers and tendencies that have contributed to... some already identified phenomenon of interest’. This definition of science suggests that the aim of the social scientific endeavour is one of power, power through accuracy of prediction. The purpose and intent of rationalist research is to understand and better predict the behaviour of international actors, with the end goal being a set of universal laws of behaviour in the international system. Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) balancing proposition in *Theory of International Politics* is the prime example of this.

What was most important about this development in the neo-neo synthesis\(^\text{16}\) however is the concept of science that it brought to IR theory, although major differences ultimately developed between Waltz and the neoliberals

\(^\text{16}\) Waever (1994) defines the neo-neo synthesis as the amalgamating of the two dominant rationalist approaches to IR – neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. For an in depth analysis of the relationship between the two see David Baldwin (ed.) (1993)
on the subject. ‘General speculation and reflection is no longer sufficient, reality has to express itself in form of theory, of a system of clearly specified sentences’ (Waever, 1996: 162). Burchill summarises the situation thus: ‘[a] theory selects and organises facts, processes and relationships into a separate domain so that importance and significance can be identified. The isolation of one domain from another in order to study it is artificial, but this is an intellectual strength rather than a weakness. Although the effect of such a process is to simplify complex forces and relationships, this is the only way meaningful explanations can be reached’ (Burchill, 2003: 89).

This is generally accepted as being the basis of what is described as Weberian social scientific method. However, what Burchill misses in this definition, is the difference Waltz attributes to varying conceptions of theory and how they should be tested. Waltz’s conception of theory in social science stems from Lakatos, who argued that theories cannot be judged based on ‘simplistic notions of testing that have and remain part of the intellectual stock of most students of political sciences’ (Waltz, 2003: vii). Elsewhere Waltz writes, ‘[a] theory depicts the organization of a realm and the connections among its parts. The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. Reality is complex, theory is simple. By simplification, theories lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate necessary relations of cause and interdependency’ (1997: 913).

This may provide theories, such as neorealism, with greater freedom by focusing on explanation over a simple Popperian mode of testing.

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17 Popper’s falsification is straightforward. Think of a simple statement. All American IR scholars are rationalists. If you find an American IR scholar who is not a rationalist, your theory is false. Under Lakatosian falsification, the explanatory power of your theory is what is tested, so if for example almost all North American IR scholars are rationalists then
However, the problems of a Lakatosian or Kuhnian approach to the construction of theories and paradigms has proved enormously problematic for methodologically and epistemologically traditional IR theories. Theories such as classical realism and English School liberalism which do not share such faith in the possibilities of a ‘science’ of politics tend therefore to be more cautious in their predictions of future behaviour and place more emphasis on the identification of general trends and themes than on findings or results.

So what is exactly meant when reference is made to a paradigm or a theory? Outside of those particularly influenced (mostly indirectly via Waltz, either supporting or attacking him) by the thinking of Lakatos or Kuhn who held strict and clear rules about the definition of each, there isn’t any agreement on what the divisions of knowledge should be called within IR (Burchill, 2003: 8). Despite this disagreement on the nature of theories, one rarely reads of the intellectual traditions referred to in any other terms. How could it be the case that despite the fact that while most would agree that those lumped together in IR textbooks under the titles of realism, liberalism or Marxism are often far more complex intellectual characters than suggested and their combination problematic, there has been little movement towards

your theory is essentially ‘true’ (See Elman and Elman, 2003 Chap.2 for a full discussion of the implications of Lakatos’s writing in IR theory broadly speaking). Kuhn on the other hand focused on the development of scientific knowledge within disciplines. He argued that what passes for knowledge at any given time is not objective but paradigm dependent, or a reflection of the dominant paradigm. The dominant paradigm dictates the sorts of questions asked within the discipline thus possesses great agenda setting power (1970). For much of the seventies and eighties realism was seen to be the naturally assumed dominant paradigm but this was rightly seen as a negative position as implicit in Kuhn’s logic was the assumption that theories became dominant as a result of their ‘rightness’ rather than the socio-political context of the theories in question, and also because a hegemonic paradigm was seen to be a normal and desirable thing.
less ‘theoretically’ structured textbooks? What defines liberalism for example when under the same chapter title there is discussion of liberal idealism, liberal internationalism, economic liberalism, and neoliberal institutionalism? Or more prescient to this discussion, what sort of basic traits can be garnered from the thought of Niebuhr and Morgenthau which match closely the thought of Carr and Herz for example? The growing impression is that the idea of identifying a coherent tradition of thought - never mind a Lakatosian research program, scientific theory or Kuhnian paradigm - becomes more difficult as more research is done into the darker, less well tread paths of various theorists’ writings. Whereas Burchill writes that ‘[w]e may have to live with the fact that there are categories of theory... which are incommensurable and perhaps incompatible’, this chapter aims to reject this deterministic, out-dated and misleading approach to the discipline as bound by traditional theoretical divisions, or the Kuhnian dominant paradigm approach, defined by the narrative of the Great Debates and pushed and supported by unreflexive positivists in the North American tradition of the social sciences.

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18 Some exceptions do exist such as Neumann & Waever, (eds.,1997), especially, Chap. 1 ‘Introducing People not Paradigms’, and Michael Griffiths (1999) ‘Introduction’, have pointed out the problems of a theory-based approach to teaching based on the degree to which it is possible to be faithful to the message of a diverse range of theorists in a single textbook. However, this is certainly not the prevailing approach.

19 Perhaps mistakenly, there is a perception that the positivistic study of the social sciences is an ‘American’ phenomenon, and while the source of this perception is perhaps justified when one looks at the sorts of analyses being done and published in US IR and Poli-Sci journals, in reality there are large numbers of scholars working within the positivistic method globally. That said, the reference to the American tradition is perhaps best understood as the opposite to the Continental European approach which has been greatly influenced by Marxist, existentialist and Counter-Enlightenment thinking in general. This has led to a more philosophical and metaphysical approach, in so far as we can generalise. Thus, the characterisations are not absolute, but they are understandable to a point.
The ‘imitative scientism’ inherent in the application of the philosophy of science approaches to knowledge is broken and needs replacing. IR theory is not simply an area of practical knowledge aimed towards making policy recommendations for those in power as it was originally taught and studied but a reflexive, pluralistic body of political thought, with contributions to make to discussions of the politics and theory of political research and its practice. Through a discussion of realism’s most oft-cited technical problem – conservatism – an alternative view of realism as an IR ‘theory’ will be suggested, one that supports less exclusive forms of division between approaches.

Some effort should be made to propose what such a situation would look like and what the benefits of such a move away from the current situation would be. As is mentioned the current system of theories tends to bull-doze and flatten the differences between diverse theorists with only low levels of commonality between them. Logically, the alternative must do either of two things – either create a more specific system of classification of theorists; or, create an open-ended classification system which is based on only a very general notion of classification. The first of these options has its merits but a tighter system of classification seems like a step closer to a scientific approach than the converse. Not only would this raise higher barriers

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20 Herz’s blistering criticism in ‘Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the study of International Relations’ (1976) is a fantastic assault on the unnecessary complication of terminology and method, all in the name of this ‘imitative scientism’ (although Herz does not use this term, preferring hyperfactualism and hyperabstraction to describe the move towards ever more scientific and rationalistic research methods) but yet producing largely trivial results. By way of illustration, Herz describes how he heard Karl Deutsch describing at APSA in 1969 how three-fifths of wars started in the nineteenth century were won by their initiators, while three-fifths of wars after 1911 were lost by their initiators. ‘The obvious conclusion would be that starting a war “paid” in the 19th century but no longer does so in ours. But what does it prove?’ (1976: 262) Very little of note he suggests.
between theories and theorists leading to a further ghettoisation of IR, it would also lead to the growth of a ‘classification’ literature. This would not be a welcome development. It is important to understand the writings of IR theorists in all their depth and breadth when possible, but engaging in discussions as to whether theorist-x was a liberal-socialist or an international socialist could develop into overly ‘art for art’s sake’ discussions. The alternative to this is the development of broader categories where the commonalities shared by theorists would be at low levels, whereby only fundamental similarities would be shared. A x-y axis could suffice for example, whereby theories are defined based on their epistemology and their pessimism or optimism toward global progress. This approach would still lead to disagreements and the classification game would develop nonetheless. What alternatives are there then?

Ashworth’s recent work on Galison’s concept of ‘trading zones’ (1997) may be a possible escape route from the problems of the two alternatives outlined above. According to Ashworth, different groups of IR theorists exist which share an anthropological existence – not simply judging them from the ‘written word’ and assessing their similarities and differences but as ‘social practices’ (Ashworth, Unpublished: 4). In examining the divisions of the discipline in such a manner far greater depth of understanding of the network of connections which various theorists share can be developed. As Ashworth admits however, this approach is not cheap as it requires a ‘cadre of scholars willing to do much detailed work in archives. In the case of more recent scholarship it would require analyses of citations, conferences and the collections of Grazia-style gossip’ (Unpublished: 5). This type of
research will then allow scholars to develop ‘microhistories’ within which trading zones and subcultures of IR theory will be identified. This form of classification allows for three important insights into the disciplines history and politics. They allow the scholar to understand the rise and decline of IR approaches; categorise current communities of scholars and the degree of cohesion within them; and finally, concentrate on the interaction between these subcultures both ‘within IR subcultures and with the world beyond IR’ (Ashworth, Unpublished: 5).

This approach has its merits but tends to fall into the first alternative to the strict system of theories and paradigms mentioned above. The microhistories developed would tend to overstate the difference between theorists by examining their interactions anthropologically. This would lead to the identification of different subcultures of different theories despite their showing broad similarities in their writings. Thus, while an interesting alternative no doubt, its tendency to build higher walls between ideas and theorists leads to its rejection. Instead, without going as far as Burchill’s suggestion that we are stuck with the division we have, it seems that rather than a new set of divisions or ‘institutional structures’ per se, a different mindset is required. This new mindset needs to emphasise the partial nature of all narratives of reality and their interdependence. Thus, while the general divisions of the discipline into paradigms has its drawbacks, a concerted effort to convince scholars of the problems of an overly-scientific mentality towards such divisions and the need for greater awareness of the differences between theorists within specific groupings. This will however be a laborious task, with no guarantee of success. It is however, a strategy
worth adopting, as it would solve some of the problems discussed above without leaving the discipline devoid of order. The issue of what amounts to a theory and the problems of such a system of divisions in IR dealt with, the analysis will now turn to the main issue of characterising realism in the face of its critics.

**Whither realism?**

Realist theory has been the focus of continued criticism and rejection on such a variety of issues and over such a period that to try to account for all the criticisms aimed at it would be to attempt the impossible. They range from practical problems like the failure of realists to account for the power of new types of political actors in the international sphere and the perceived assumption of rationality in realism; to metaphysical critiques which described realism as an amoral legitimiser of the naked power politics of great powers. Two major criticisms appear regularly however. The first is the criticism that realism is fundamentally an annunciation of an out-dated and irrelevant mode of thought about international politics which relies on an unsatisfactory notion of its essential practicality. In this conceptualisation realism is seen as being the reflection of the shared practical knowledge of international diplomacy (Guzzini, 1998 & 2004), or that ‘of an agent acting on behalf of history – or rather, on behalf of an historically established tradition’ (Ashley, 1981: 211). Based on this understanding, realism seems to not need any justification because its proponents believe it will be proved right eventually. The second, which Guzzini (2004) argues results from responses to the first dilemma, is that realism either is, or has become, incoherent (Vasquez, 1997 & Legro and Moravcik, 1999). These two
criticisms are chosen to examine as they have a fundamental importance to the discussion of the purpose and imaginative boundaries of IR theory as a discipline and realism’s place within it. By proposing an escape route from the ‘conservative dilemma’ and the problems of realist coherency, an alternative definition of realist IR theory will develop based on realism’s research ethic and intent. Along with this, realism’s assault on ideology and their impact on politics and its study will be introduced here. The relationship between realism and ideologies of practice and study.

The important point is that utopianism or idealism are at the same time a part of realism and its opposite. They are not simply theories with specific policy implications, but states of mind engaged in perennial disagreement - one optimistic for the possibility of change and progress, the other sceptical of the ‘reality’ of change – focusing instead on the continuity of essence over the ephemeral form. They exist in a productive but never-ceasing struggle over all forms of politics. Realism’s criticism of idealism and liberalism is not that they are wrong but that bad things can occur when these ideas become ideological or hegemonic. It is this which will be dealt with in the following chapter. What this chapter attempts to do is to liberate realism from the criticisms aimed at it, especially in relation to its ‘backward-conservative’ dilemma, so it can be liberated from the purely ‘practical’ part of politics. This creates a situation where realism can provide a more hermeneutical and critical voice on the nature of politics and

21 The ‘conservative dilemma’ as defined by Guzzini is ‘the choice between tradition and justification, [and] results from the fact that realism is a form of practical knowledge, which needs some form of justification other than the mere recourse to tradition’ (2004: 533).
its study without passing into the extreme relativism of a poststructuralist position.

The approach used in this research differs from most realists’ responses to the various criticisms posed. The main approach has been to retreat/return to the ‘classical’ texts of realist IR showing that the caricatures do not fit the tone or message of the main authors – Morgenthau (Bain, 2000; Williams, 2000, Molloy 2004, 2006 & 2008 for example) and Carr (Jones, 1997 & 1998; Molloy, 2003, 2006 & 2008; Linklater, 1997 for example) in particular, but also more recently John Herz has seen a surge in interest (Stirk, 2005; Hacke and Puglierin, 2007 & International Relations special issue Vol. 22, No. 4) based on this approach. This literature has argued convincingly that these authors were far more nuanced and less susceptible to caricature than they have been made to appear. The result of this critical return to realism’s history, accompanied by the practical, defensive response to realism’s perceived failure to account for the end of the Cold War has left realism open to a major criticism over its coherency. According to writers within the philosophy of science, theoretical coherency – a hard core or matching set of research questions and assumptions – is a must for knowledge to progress. Without theoretical coherency – coherence within a theory – hypotheses and core principles cannot be compared across the research area. The discussion to follow will focus on authors firmly associated with realist IR theory – Carr, Morgenthau, Herz, Niebuhr and Kissinger - but the defence of their differences and similarities occurs in a context informed by a rejection of the strict disciplining of thought into

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An act best described as fire-fighting - leading to the development of neoclassical realism (Schweller, 1997 & 2003; Rose, 1998; & Zakaria, 2003).
theories and paradigms seen in IR. Sometime-realist/sometime-liberal
Hedley Bull describes the essential nature of the traditionalist approach,
writing that the application of the ‘rhetoric of scientific progress... to a field
in which progress of a strictly scientific sort does not take place... has the
effect of constricting and obscuring the sort of advance that is possible’
(Bull, 1995: 202). By freeing realism from the strictures (and structures) of
IR’s paradigms and the problems of imitative scientism, the dialectic between
realism and idealism is more clearly seen as they are not simply two
competing sets of policy prescriptions but two ‘urges’ to use Herz’s term.
To support this approach to realism, and to show that it is more than a
conservative theory of political practice, the dual-criticism of realism’s
backwards and forwards conservatism will be dealt with the following
section. A useful distinction of realism as possessing both practical and
technical (theoretical) characteristics will follow this.

The conservative dilemma

The conservative dilemma to be considered here is bipartite. There is the
conservative dilemma as described by Guzzini – a perceived inescapable
backwards conservatism based on historical traditions of praxis upon which
realism is based. This will be referred to as backwards conservative
dilemma. The second form the conservative dilemma takes relates to the
problems within realism of accounting for change in the structures or
ontology of the international system. This form of the dilemma will be
referred to as the forwards conservative dilemma as it relates to progress
and transformation in the future. Defined by Cox (1981), via Critical
Theory, this part of the dilemma refers to the predicaments of problem-
solving theory which implicitly denies the possibility of major political progress or an emancipatory project. In this sense then, this dilemma refers to conservatism as a political view which emphasises the importance of tradition, historical norms and their continuity along with the difficulty of change in politics and its mode of practice – matching closely many of the ideas of the father of conservative thought, Edmund Burke\(^ {23} \). Putting its faith in the relevance of an ideal-type of political behaviour based on a norm of eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomacy obviously places an enormous strain on the framework to maintain its relevance. It is this problem of relevance that is considered here, and thus why Guzzini’s work is the primary focus as he has consistently argued (1998 & 2004) that it is doomed to irrelevance\(^ {24} \).

Similarly, the degree to which realism is tied to problem-solving theory, while widely accepted in Critical IR theory, is not beyond interrogation. This section will firstly expand upon Guzzini and Cox’s problematising of realist theory in terms of this backwards-forwards conservatism. Particular attention will be given to Guzzini’s argument that realist theory stems from this historical tradition; and to Cox’s criticism of realism as a problem-solving theory. The examinations of these linked dilemmas frees realism

\(^ {23} \) For a brief introduction to the philosophy of Burke along with some excerpts from his most famous works see Hampsher-Monk’s (1987) *The political philosophy of Edmund Burke*, and for a thorough discussion of his most famous set of writings which include the canonical discussion of conservative ideals, those on the French Revolution, see L.G. Mitchell’s (1998) introductory essay to *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Volume 8, The French Revolution (1790-1794)*. There are a number of studies of Burke’s theory of international relations, most which discuss whether Burke would subscribe to variously realism, idealism or even some form of neogramscian theory. David Armitage’s (2000) ‘Edmund Burke and Reason of State’ is a useful introduction, including an exhaustive bibliography of examinations of Burke’s ‘international’ theory with a wide variety of conclusions.

\(^ {24} \) This view has also been developed by Michael Sullivan (2005), although his is at base an empirically based argument rather than a theoretical consistency argument.
from some of its perennial criticisms, if perhaps just in this admittedly broad understanding of both the dilemmas posed and realism’s potential as a frame for thought. The discussion of the coherency/identity dilemma will then follow. This criticism also appears in Ashley’s (1981) examination of realism and human interests, but is there seen as an opportunity rather than a weakness, contra Guzzini. The final section will then revisit the discussion of scientific theory in IR and repeat the claim for a less-structured form of academic discourse in the discipline, based on the preceding discussion of the dilemmas realism faces.

Guzzini begins his argument, following Kissinger’s reading of Metternich in *A world restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Era*, on the basis that the realist tradition is based on ‘maxims of realpolitik [which] have ceased to be commonly shared knowledge or understood as legitimate politics’ (2004: 535). From here his argument focuses on the problems that realists have justifying their knowledge as relevant as a result of changes to international politics and its processes. These arguments are based on an extremely narrow understanding of the source of realism as a form of ‘practical’ international knowledge. They are also based on an understanding of IR theory realism as being distinct from other forms of political realism, a position that reinforces the false divisions between the various forms of political study - be it international relations, international political economy, domestic politics or philosophical approaches. Guzzini’s definition of realist IR theory as separate from other forms of political realism is telling. ‘I [Guzzini] define realism in IR as a scholarly tradition characterised by the repeated, and for its basic indeterminacy repeatedly
failed, attempts to translate the practical rules or maxims of European diplomacy into the scientific laws of a US social science’ (2004: 546). From this definition Guzzini argues that realist IR scholars ‘have always faced the same basic dilemma: either they update the practical knowledge of shared diplomatic culture, but then lose scientific credibility, or reaching for logical persuasiveness, they cast the maxims in a scientific mould, but end up distorting their practical knowledge’ (2004: 546). By characterising realism’s base so narrowly and then basing his dilemma on realists’ attempts to remain faithful to the historical tradition of international diplomacy as the basis of their writings, Guzzini makes escape from this dilemma highly complex, as the analyst is required to perform two major tasks. The first of these is proving the invalidity of Guzzini’s perceived foundation of realist IR theory or showing that current realist theorising remains faithful to the practical, historical norms he identifies. The second task requires the analyst to deal with the question of the logical persuasiveness and degree to which realism is a body of purely practical knowledge.

Guzzini develops his argument on the efforts of Morgenthau to ‘preserve the rules of a conservative diplomacy of the 18th century in a 20th century in

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25 Nicolas Gouliot, while sympathetic to this vision of a conservative realism, rejects this view of realism as purely a practical theory by showing that Morgenthau and others were distinctly not preoccupied with diplomacy, but questions of science. The move by realists to create a distinct discipline of IR disconnected from the dominant developments in the US Politics academy was ‘a separatist movement, meant to insulate the study of international politics from the behavioral revolution that was transforming the practice of political science in postwar America’ (Guiet, 2008: 281). At the same time however, while their move was a conservative inspired one, it was quite a radical departure from the dominant liberal method and epistemology of the time. Despite the eventual adoption of this method and epistemology by realists in the fifties on, this is a clear example of something to be discussed in Chapter 3 whereby utopian ideas (those interested in transformation), even conservative ones, can become ideological (status quo legitimising) and visa-versa.
which nationalism, and to some extent democracy, had destroyed the very
basis of its rule’ (2004: 247). Morgenthau, having packaged the ‘realist
maxims of scepticism and policy prescriptions into a rational and
“scientific” approach’, was then allegedly faced with the conservative
dilemma. Arguing that this is how things should be done because this is how
things are done, in order not to make decisions or adopt strategies
deleterious to the state’s interests, does indeed have a cyclical and self-
fulfilling nature to it. Also, if the second half of this assumption is no longer
self-evident - that realism’s prescriptions match the external reality – then
realism is faced, certainly, with a need to justify its positions empirically.
International relations as a policy relevant body of knowledge had to
correspond to the ‘same intuitive insights of history as do statesmen’ (1998:
37).

Thus, realism is for Guzzini the literal reflection of a tradition in its purest
sense – a set of customs or practices (norms) developed over time and
followed by a succession of generations. This tradition as mentioned, is a
distinct notion of what international politics is about - advice for
policymakers – and therefore it is important for the practice to match the
theory. To argue that realist IR theory is so narrowly focused is short-
changes its utility and depth as a body of literature and also makes the
examination of a ‘successful’ realist IR theory a difficult, and possibly
impossible one. This tightrope-like test is surprising considering the depth
of his knowledge and the amount of time and thought clearly invested in
such a book as Realism in International Relations and International
the difficulties involved in Guzzini’s approach, the question of the ‘tradition’ in the realist tradition of international politics requires a response.

The criticism that realism is a static theory tied to its tradition of a ‘highly embellished ideal-type of eighteenth and nineteenth-century international relations’ is not new (Hoffmann, 1959: 351). Perhaps it is a reflection on the acuity of the author or on the unnecessary complications and contractions of modern IR theorists but arguably, Hoffmann’s ‘The Long Road to Theory’, represents one of the most complete and well argued analyses of realism’s weaknesses. In it, its reliance on the aforementioned ‘ideal-type’ of international diplomacy; its double evasion ‘from the empirical duty of accounting for change, and from the normative task of assessing whether the present system should indeed continue’ (1959: 353); its relationship to reality and normal science; and finally to its troublesome relationship with history as its agent are discussed in flowing and illuminating prose. Hoffmann’s warning to realists regarding their use of history to support their conclusions deserves quoting. ‘If we set our standards outside and above history, we must avoid trying to prove that history will eventually recompense policies that meet our standards. Otherwise, we become salesmen for a philosophical stand who travels the roads of history in search of a clientele of confirmations, rather than scholars testing a hypothesis or philosophers interested in an ideal which history cannot promise to bless at all times’ (1959: 353). These themes, stemming from a variety of sources but combined by Hoffmann in ‘The Long Road to Theory’ have
subsequently been taken up by many others, but Hoffmann’s disparaging analysis of realism is important to note as it will be returned to in Chapter 4.

**Realism’s tradition as its conservative dilemma**

As mentioned, the problem, Guzzini argues, is that for realism to remain faithful to its tradition it must prove that its tradition is still relevant as a form of practical knowledge. However, in doing this, it is forced to adopt traits which no longer match the tradition, leading to incoherency. The solution is therefore straightforward. In showing that Guzzini’s approach to the *source* of realism is incorrect, the second level of the dilemma (the conservative dilemma) is bypassed. However, this does not solve the problem of justification, it merely means that realism requires justification for its existence based on alternative criteria, the issue of coherency being a separate question relating to the ‘science of realism’. Ashley’s description of practical knowledge, is perhaps the most illustrative example of the expectations placed on realism as a set of rules to be learned about how to ‘behave’. He writes:

The aim is to undertake interpretations that make possible the orientation of action within a common tradition. In the practical realist aspect, valid knowledge entails, not so much an improved capacity to control one’s object environment, but an improved capacity to be and behave as a worthy member of one’s traditional community, with its intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms, rights, meanings, purposes, and limitations on what the individual participants can be and might become (Ashley, 1981: 211-2).
Guzzini takes this theme further writing that ‘[t]hough diplomatic culture could no longer be reproduced by a transnational and often aristocratic elite, science was there to help the new elites to come to grips with the nature of international politics as conceived by realists’ (Guzzini, 2004: p547). Such a statement could easily be applied to Medici Florence and Machiavelli’s goal in writing *The Prince*: ‘[S]ince my intention is to say something that will prove of practical use to the inquirer, I have thought it proper to represent things as they are in a real truth, rather than as they are imagined... the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done moves towards self-destruction rather than self-preservation’ (2001: 50). Thus, Guzzini could more correctly have dipped into the deeper history of realism to find proof of his practical tradition argument. What is missing however from this is a justification, or explanation as to why these are the norms of behaviour to be learned in the first place? Why is it that Machiavelli, Metternich and Morgenthau suggest such maxims should be followed?

By positing that the practice creates theory is fine and in keeping with the Machiavellian tradition (Carr, 1961: 63), but by ignoring the philosophical, anthropological or psychological spurs to the theory-creating practice, realism is a shallow pool and intellectually barren. By viewing this tradition, Machiavelli’s, as simply a guide to policy is of course going to lead it into a problem whereby its justification is simply ‘matching’ the way politics is done. When Machiavelli writes that ‘since men will always do badly by you unless they are forced to be virtuous’ (2001: 77), it may be a

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26 Aside from the more practical aim of getting back on good terms with the reinstated Medici rulers.
straightforward statement for the Prince to follow, it is also a
philosophically loaded one too and whereas the second generation of realist
scholars have focused on state strategies and improving the link between
academic knowledge and international politics, the first generation of
modern realists certainly did not devote themselves to Guzzini’s tradition –
but to the question of why? Why is this the case? How is Machiavelli so
sure of the self-interested intentions of political actors in their domestic and
foreign affairs as to write such a book as The Prince? Why is Hobbes driven
to conclude that the only way of stabilising society is the leviathan? Why is
Carr sure that the harmony of interests is an ideological position and hence
an unsustainable and illusory basis for international society? Why does
Morgenthau describe the world as one of ‘opposing interests and of conflict
among them’? The list goes on.

The reason these questions are mentioned is that the focus of realism has
not been tied to the tradition of diplomacy, but of examining the operation
of the international system\(^\text{27}\) as an anarchic state and recounting various
explanations of the behaviour within it, with particular attention given to the
occurrence of conflict and war. The tradition of realism is more
appropriately divided in three. The first group are those who believe that
conflict occurs as a result of something innate in man, the *animus
dominandi* or a theological explanation linking the Fall of Man with
international conflict. These, Waltz (1959) describes as First Image
theorists. The second group are those who argue that the cause of conflict is

\(^{27}\) Obviously excluding Hobbes outside of his discussion of the nature of anarchy and its
application to the international system; and less so Machiavelli, who has been used more
than perhaps his broader writings would suggest is fair, and especially considering how
little of his writings cover issues relating to the international, or foreign, arena.
anarchy and the absence of hierarchy in the international sphere (e.g. Rousseau, Montesquieu and Waltz). This understanding of realism is described by Waltz (1959) as the Third Image of international politics. Although their assembling as a particular group of realism is rare, a third body of realist theorists that can be identified comprising Carr, Herz and Gilpin. Via a non-teleological Marxism, or a meeting between historical materialism and realism, as Guzzini (1998: Chap. 11) has described, these theorists view international relations as a struggle over limited resources between communities. While Gilpin is probably more often described as an IPE scholar, the concerns of Carr and Herz - the case for Reinhold Niebuhr’s inclusion herein could also be made - relate largely to questions of resources reflect such a materialism. Like all historical materialists they put resources at the core of their analysis but also hold an awareness of the role of ideologies, their source and their power that is absent from most realists’ work. This focus on resources is reflected also in Waltz and other third image realists so the borders between them are not clear-cut; nor perhaps should we expect them to be.

The intent is not to suggest that each of the three groups is distinct. The materialist realists, Carr, Herz and Gilpin would all subscribe to a greater or lesser extent with Waltz’s third image over the first. However, Niebuhr outlines partly a first image, theological explanation for conflict which is then manifested by structural third image dynamics, while all the while within his work materialist themes can be seen. Thus, the picture is far from clear for all the realists mentioned here. These general classifications are provided simply to show that while there is deep heterogeneity within the
realist tradition, there are themes than run through it nonetheless – anthropological, structural and materialist themes. Above this however is the importance of the dialectical nature of realism. Realists appear to have attempted to outline an ideal type realist position, believing this to be the opposite of idealist theory in various forms – Herz, Niebuhr and Carr represent the prime examples of this but come to this conclusion via different routes.

Niebuhr and Herz believed that the human psyche was in a dialectic between feelings of empathy and avarice, or some variation of this. Essentially, they believed that both the sources of, and solution to, many of man’s problems lay at humanity’s feet, and while Herz’s definition of the security dilemma suggested a structural understanding, he never for one minute assumed that it was an impossible dilemma to circumvent or lessen28 (Herz, 1951: Chap. 1 & 1959). While he remained pessimistic to the very end of his life (see Herz, 2003) he still thought that there was an opportunity for salvation from global catastrophe and it could be gained through a broadening of the definition of the concept of interest to include a ‘minimum survival ethic’. Kenneth Thompson, (1979 & 1980), Peter Stirk (2005), and Puglierin and Hacke (2007) all have argued that Herz was torn between his idealism and realism – described by Thompson as (1979: 942) a ‘despairing and anguished romanticist desperately clinging to Rene Dubos’s axiom, “Trend is not Destiny”’. Whereas these analyses argue that Herz’s realism is something particular to only Herz, his position as an ‘ameliorist’ is certainly not unique. The idea of improving international conditions

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28 However, it is important to emphasise that it would never be totally gone as long as man lived in communities.
based on the immutability of the essence of politics is common to all realists. This is the dialectic to which realists subscribe. On the one hand the identification of the need for transformation and ways in which this can be achieved and on the other the identification of the forces which will impede or damage such processes.

Niebuhr, a prime example of Waltz’s first image (1959: 20-41), was also quite sure that while conflict and war, in particular, stems from ‘dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche’ (Niebuhr quoted in Waltz, 1959: 25). He believed also, that the context and circumstances of time dictated the degree of social stability, thus suggesting that there are internal and external causes of conflict. This is not simply to suggest that the individual is cautioned from misbehaviour by the degree of stability in the Hobbesian sense, but that the morality of man is a dialectic which can as much be dominated by the urge to create and cooperate as to destroy. Niebuhr’s ultimate argument regards the ‘basic difference between the morality of individuals and the morality of the collective, whether races, classes or nations’ (1932/2001: xxiii). This is certainly not to suggest that the state is free from any moral questions but that, despite man’s propensity to act in individualistic, atavistic ways, it is easier for the individual to behave according to the Christian ethic than for a community. Returning to the question of context and circumstances he writes, ‘[w]hether the cooperative and moral aspects of human life, or the necessities of of the social struggle, gain the largest significance, depends upon time and circumstance. There are periods of social stability, when the general equilibrium of social forces

29 That the needs of your neighbour be met without a careful computation of relative needs (Niebuhr, 2001: 51).
is taken for granted, and men give themselves the task of making life more beautiful and tender within the limits of the established social system (Niebuhr, 1932/2001: 275). Niebuhr also argues that because of this, the concept of interest is a fluid one which would potentially transform itself over time to include or exclude different actors depending on material and contextual changes.

Outside of the moral realm, Niebuhr writes that the strategies of the ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’ in US policy making circles are both necessary parts of the discourse, but that neither are sufficient in isolation. Describing the two competing visions of US policy towards the USSR as two horns, he writes that the goal of the statesman is to navigate a route between them, ‘while our anxious guides bid us to make a choice between the two obvious forks’ (1950: 338). The discussion of the alternate visions of a future US strategy towards the USSR clearly reflects Niebuhr’s preference for a dialectic between the two from which a balanced policy could be garnered. This short article encapsulates well the notion, proposed by others, that the realist and the idealist positions provide incomplete narratives of reality – one that suffers from an imbalance of scepticism and belief in the cyclical nature of politics; the other hampered by an overestimation of mankind’s historical progress and his ability to control external realities.

These examples are certainly not exceptional and while one could continue in this vein further the intention is not to try and present a case for

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30 See Thompson, 1955 for a discussion of Niebuhr’s international politics writings, in particular his position on interest – both national and individual.

31 Examples abound of ‘hardened’ realists adopting positions on a wide variety of realist traits such as the future of the state, the promises of international functionalism and
the diversity of realism, this would be neither new nor relevant to the issue
to hand. The intention is to show that far from being entirely concerned with
the continuation of an historical diplomatic tradition, realist theorists have
been more concerned with the search for the fundamental causes of conflict
and strife, both in the domestic and international context – be they inside of
man or around him. Not only have realists concerned themselves with the
causes of conflict, their writings cover the gamut of philosophical and
technical issues – both material and ideational. The dominant method of the
political realist is hermeneutic – that is of texts and history, certainly not
pedagogical (Bain, 2000; Molloy, 2004 & 2006, and Williams, 2004). What
this means in practice is that while realism has definite ‘practical’
application and origin, its intent was generally one of exposure and a search
for truth, even in the awareness of the limitations of mankind’s capacity and
the relativity of thought.

The question of realism as tied to a tradition of practice dealt with, the
forward-conservatism problem, stemming from the Critical Theory position
on realism requires some attention. Cox’s original attack differentiated
between certain approaches – specifically the historical, hermeneutic
approach of Carr, and what he describes as the ahistorical and ‘ideological’
realism of Morgenthau and Waltz. He writes that since ‘the Second World
War, some American scholars, have transformed realism into a form of
problem-solving theory. Though individuals of considerable historical
learning, they have tended to adopt the fixed ahistorical view of the

positivism in politics (Carr, 1945; Morgenthau, 1966; Waltz, 1997). For further discussion
of the these ‘anomalies’ see Bain, 2000; Molloy, 2004 & 2006; Williams, 2004.
framework for action characteristic of problem-solving theory, rather than standing back from this framework, in the manner of E.H. Carr, and treating it as historically conditioned and thus susceptible to change’ (1981: 131). Aside from the enormously problematic lumping together of Waltz and Morgenthau, this question of the ‘fixed ahistorical view of the framework for action’ is the focus of this discussion, as it has a direct link to the question of realism’s perceived static view of international politics. Cox argues that the ‘framework for action postulated by this new American realism (neorealism)’ is based on three essences, or ‘fundamental and unchanging substrata of changing and accidental manifestations or phenomena’ (1981: 131). These are the nature of man, the nature of the state as fixated with power and self interest in a similar way to man, and the nature of the state system, which places constraints on states through the mechanism of the balance of power.

The logical progression of the interplay of these essences is that international politics remains functionally stagnant, or that it continues to operate in a similar way all the time, thus producing consistent outcomes, or highly similar outcomes. This determinism, similar to that of traditional Marxism, has brought upon it much criticism. If realism is based on an assumption that the past - patterns of behaviour abstracted from historical study - reflects how international politics now operates, realism legitimises and promotes the status quo. Compared to the historical materialism developed by the likes of Gramsci and Braudel and used by Cox, realism does not account for the production process. It is here that the problem-solving bias of realism is most clearly seen according to Cox. ‘Historical
materialism examines the connections between power in production, power in the state and in international relations. Neorealism implicitly takes the production process and the power relations inherent in it as a given element of the national interest, and therefore as part of its parameters’ (1981: 137).

This criticism however expands beyond the deterministic approach to the identification of national interests. Unlike the historical materialist approach which accounts for the way in which the economic sphere can mould ideas and institutions, Cox criticises the way in which neorealism simplifies the entire state-society complex into a static system of states. This criticism of the exclusion of ideational, economic and institutional factors – and importantly, their interconnection, is certainly true of pure neorealism but is debatable when we consider the wider realist cannon – certainly the realism of Herz, Morgenthau, Gilpin, Niebuhr and of course Carr. So, whereas neorealism posits an essentially unchanging operation of politics due to the socialisation process – creating ‘like units’ – leading to an essentially unchanging world politics, historical materialism accounts for change and predicts it by stressing the way in which social forces, forms of state and world orders interplay and shape the international system. This then raises a vital question which links into the criticism of realism’s tradition/justification dilemma, does realism believe that international politics, or politics in its most general sense is unchanging, and therefore, represents a denial in the idea of progress? To what extent is realism tied to its tradition, not as Guzzini argues, but by stressing the inexorable structures or essence of humanity’s power-drive is a slave to the immutability of all

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32 Which, deliberately in the name of parsimony, excludes these variables, but stresses their importance outside of the theory itself.
aspects of politics? If the causes of war or conflict are ‘essential’, and these essences have been in operation for the whole of civilisation where are the opportunities for escape from the tragedy? And importantly for the discussion to hand, is this the ‘essence’ of realism? Is this unchanging message bound to be repeated and repackaged as long as there are humans to form into communities? These questions will be answered more fully in the next section and the conclusion.

The short answer is no, but, as Bain writes in a response to Jim George’s attack on realism, through defining realist theory as practice it ‘affirms realism as a set of rituals replete with predetermined means meant to achieve pre-given ends. These rituals subsume the concerns of individual human beings to the necessities imposed by an anarchical world “out there” and which entail the use of violence in a commitment to an objectified ideal, such as maintaining the balance of power’ (2000: 448). Continuing his discussion of George’s assault, Bain makes the important point that by defining realism as practice and existing solely as a body of practical knowledge it supports the idea that realism is enslaved by the cyclical, tragic nature of politics. Paraphrasing George’s post-structuralist argument, Bain (2000: 448-9) writes, ‘[r]ealism knows no other image of the world and can conceive of no other: realists think and act in terms of, and in response to, the ‘reality’ of a world constructed in realism’s own image.’ This prevalent view of realism as practical knowledge while narrow, is inescapable. Despite the previous rejection of both the conservative dilemmas which realism faces in relation to its tradition/justification problems and also to its inability to account for changes to the international
order; there is no avoiding the clear fact that realist IR theory has a very real connection to the world ‘out there’. While realist theory shows a deep and varied philosophical interest in the nature of politics, its connection to the material world is important not to ignore. This is something which a number of modern realist ‘archaeologists’ could be considered guilty of. Despite the importance of rescuing realism from the tired, dried-up mummies of IR theory textbooks, it is also important not to drift too far beyond the genuine material problems which they dealt with. Be they the outbreak of World War II, the Cold War and the threat of nuclear holocaust, ethno-nationalism, environmental degradation, overpopulation, or food shortages these problems were to the forefront of realists’ minds. In the same way that one cannot extract the occurrence of the French Revolution from the writings of Burke or Montesquieu, repeating Cox, you cannot extract the context from the theorist. That said, Cox’s idea that the context – socially, economically, institutionally and ideologically constructed – dictates the purpose of the theory is self-serving, as it leads to the conclusion that should a theorist not be conscious of the impossibility untainted theory - a failure of reflexivity if you will - it is incapable of being anything other than problem solving theory. One route out of this problematic is suggested by Richard Ashley (1981) in ‘Political Realism and Human Interests’ in his division between practical realism and technical realism.

**Practical & technical realism**

Responding to John H. Herz’s (1981a) ‘Political Realism Revisited’, Richard Ashley’s reading of Herz offers a useful break between the practical and the philosophical trains of thought operating within realism.
From the outset, Ashley shows that his reading of realism is far more sympathetic than many other postpositivists such as Jim George who took up aggressively critical approaches to realism in all its forms (see for example George, 1989 & 1994, and George and Campbell, 1990) writing, ‘I am concerned with the deeper relation between realist’s concepts, knowledge claims and modes of inquiry and grounding on the one hand and the world of social action that realism would inform on the other. Here, at the deeper level, I will contend, realist scholarship is far from being an internally harmonious tradition. At this deeper level, realist scholarship in fact contains some genuine antinomies – some critical tensions that make realism – at least potentially, a vital, open-ended tradition (1981: 206-7). It is important to say at the outset that Herz (1981b), Waltz (1986) and Gilpin (1986) all criticised Ashley’s interpretation of their writings and views, although Herz in a much less disparaging manner\footnote{Both Waltz and Gilpin lambaste Ashley’s criticism of both realism and neorealism. At one point Waltz writes, ‘I find Richard K. Ashley difficult to deal with. Reading his essay is like entering a maze. I never know quite where I am or how to get out. He is sometimes elusive, shifting from one view to another... Some of Ashley’s comments bewilder me. Like John Herz, I often fail to recognise myself in what he writes about me’ (1986: 337). And Gilpin in even more acerbic, and amusing, terms: ‘Under Ashley’s close scrutiny no one turns out to be what they seem or thought themselves to be – including, I suspect, the classical realists for whom Ashley claims to speak and whose besmirched honour he seeks to uphold. They would no doubt be as perplexed as I regarding Ashley’s characterisation of their views (and everyone else’s for that matter)’. It is fair to say however that Ashley’s 1981 article holds more water, both in terms of the logic of its structure and patois, than his ‘Poverty of Neorealism’ contribution of 1986, which analysed the issue of structure and agency within neorealism.}33. Despite the fact that Ashley praised Herz’s approach to realism, writing, ‘[a] second way to resolve the tension [between Herz’s realism and his liberal hopes mentioned already] has more to commend it, however. It is to give Herz the benefit of the doubt, and then once done, find in Herz’s argument a basis for reflective examination of our own prior understandings of realism’ (1981: 206), Herz,
while grateful, failed to see Ashley’s version as a true reflection of his own thought. Thus, while Herz may not have recognised himself in what was said, and Gilpin and Waltz rejected his analysis almost in its entirety, his description of the ‘dialogue’ between practical realism - the focus on the practice of international politics - and technical realism - the effort towards the scientific study of international politics towards the goal of the ‘development of information... that can expand powers of technical control over an objectified environment’ (1981: p210) – is a useful and suggestive division to use as foil and focus for this analysis of realism as an IR theory which helps provide answers to the series of questions about whether realism is capable of escaping the forwards conservatism outlined in the previous section.

Ashley’s definition of the two terms should be briefly discussed. Firstly, ‘the task of practical realism is clear. It is almost that of an agent or acting on behalf of history – or, rather, on behalf of an historically established tradition. Practical realism strives to examine history, to distil an understanding of the practical consensus, to communicate this distilled understanding to each and every participant and therefore to situate all in a transhistorical normative-practical order’ (1981: 211). Thus, practical realism as described by Ashley is all to do with understanding and explaining that the ways of doing things have developed historically and that there are certain ways of doing things that assist in the maintenance of a stable international society. Ashley suggests that this norm, informed by what he describes as practical realism, is ‘essential to the integration of society, the maintenance of order, the mutuality of interaction and the
avoidance of severe, dislocating social conflict’ (1981: 212). As a result of its focus on the practicalities of international relations, its knowledge claims are focused on their utility to the ‘traditional’ community of statesmen. ‘If proposed terms, concepts and knowledge claims are not warranted and meaningful within just this frame... then they have no place in practical realism’ (1981: 213).

As we can see this form of realism focuses on the actuality of international affairs of statesmen and the practice of diplomacy. The problems of such an approach – focusing on the historical tradition of diplomacy but perceiving it to have a transhistorical relevance - has already been discussed above in relation to Guzzini’s critique of realism’s ‘conservative dilemma’ but it is an important if rather obvious statement to make, that practice is an important part of IR theory. It is a point made over fifty years ago by Morgenthau, that there is a danger that the study of politics and IR could vanish into abstractions and a gulf could develop between the study of and the practice of politics. What Morgenthau hoped in making such a point is to remind students of IR that there is an important moral requirement on their part to not vanish into ‘a realm of self-sufficient abstractions’ (Morgenthau, 1955: 443), either through the denial of a substantial reality (‘the boundary of negativity”) or through the overly scientific, dehumanising method of positivism (“the boundary of boredom”) (Patomäki and Wight, 2000). More importantly, it is key not deny ‘reality’, with which realism has an absolute and indivisible union. The reason for this is an ethical one.
Despite the widespread and repeated criticisms of realists for being variously immoral, amoral or utilitarian (a form of immorality to some), realist authors have never attempted, or perhaps intended, to present an immoral description of international politics. What they have stressed are the difficulties of placing the possible over the morally desirable but never did they suggest that the political sphere is one of amorality. This view is perhaps best seen in Morgenthau’s chapter ‘The Moral blindness of scientific man’ from *Scientific Man Vs Power Politics*. Morgenthau lambastes the purely scientific approach to the study of man, not only because it methodologically dubious to attribute ‘to man’s reason, in its relation with the social world, a power of knowledge and control which man does not have ‘(1946: 179) but also as an ethical one. For Morgenthau, the decoupling of the analyst from the subject, as the scientific method would insist upon, is morally bankrupt when the subject is humanity. ‘To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil of one is moral judgement. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage and moral judgement, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny. That this conciliation is nothing more than a *modus vivendi*, uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss over and distort the tragic consequences of human existence’ (1946: 201). Thus, the rejection of the possibility of decoupling the study of politics from its vital, practical task is made on the grounds of its unfeasibility when humankind is the object due to the acceptance of the relativism of thought, but also on these ethical and moral grounds. This
issue of the practical and ethical difficulties of separating the analyst from his subject raises the issue of epistemology for the first time. It has already been outlined that classical realists sided in favour of the traditionalist forms of political analysis during the debate between behaviouralists and traditionalists – Guilot (2005) goes so far as to argue that the move to separate IR from behaviouralism was the goal of early realists, but its epistemology should be developed more fully. This will be addressed now.

**Critical realism and classical realism – closer positions than expected?**

Although not part of the realist tradition, Patomäki and Wight propose an approach to the epistemic theory of critical realism which matches many of the concerns of the realism characterised here. Stemming from the writings of Roy Bhaskar (1979) and influenced greatly by the philosophy of truth of Kant, they argue that the current ‘debate’ between positivists and post-positivists has left the discipline of IR without an empirical and ontological position capable of producing interesting and relevant research. Patomäki and Wight begin by describing Kant’s response to Hume’s scepticism regarding the possibility of knowledge beyond experience, thus:

Awoken from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’ by Hume’s scepticism, Kant systematically collected the pieces of the ‘problem field’ together. Kant was concerned to refute Hume’s scepticism of an external reality and in a widely influential solution, posited two worlds – that of phenomena/noumena. At the level of phenomena... Kant’s reality is ultimately Humean [impossibility of knowledge]. But this phenomenal world we inhabit was not the real world for Kant... Kant also introduced the noumenal world – the site of reason and morality (2000: 220).
Hume and Kant’s study of the possibility/impossibility of knowledge of the world and truth, according to Patomäki and Wight (2000) created the ‘problem-field’ of IR theory today – the conflict between positivism and postpositivism. While this has been discussed above in part, critical realism offers a productive ontology and epistemology and also fits agreeably and logically with Ashley’s breakdown. The main intent of Bhaskar (1975) and other critical realists was to question the extent of social knowledge – what can be said to be known (Reed, 2008). A ‘deep ontology’ was proposed whereby ‘it [critical realism] thus distinguishes between the real (the ontological level of structures and causal mechanisms), the actual (that which occurs in the world is potentially open to observation), and the empirical (that which is observed and brought within scientific knowledge as fact) (Reed, 2008: 103). What this amounts to is a commitment to ‘ontological realism (that there is a reality, which is differentiated, structured, and layered and independent of mind), epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced and hence potentially fallible) and judgemental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is possible, in principle to provide justifiable grounds for preferring on theory over another’ (Patomäki and Wight, 2000: p224). This ontology and epistemology fits with the sort of realism attempted to be characterised here. Ontologically, it fits as it stresses the inexorable link between the ‘reality out there’, theory and theorising; and epistemologically it works as it matches the relativism of the tradition already referred to above (See also Carr, 1961: p50-62, Herz, 1971 & Herz, 1981a). This is not the adoption of foreign concepts to realism but a useful framework for
summarising the sort of realism which a number of key realist figures would probably subscribe to. It also ensures that the tradition does not lean towards adopting the traits of other theories in the name of a ‘middle way’, as suggested is possible - but not necessarily desirable - by Samuel Barkin’s (2003) ‘Realist Constructivism’. While they are not usually considered together assuming that the deep ontology of critical realism is incompatible with realism’s alleged materialism, it is possible that realism in the ‘critical’ form developed here matches critical realism’s epistemology closely. This makes it possible that realism is capable of filling the gap in IR that Patomaki and Wight identify. By expanding the understanding of realism outside rationalism and reflectivism, it is in position to say something interesting and critical about the nature of IR Theory today. This is not something that has occurred systematically among modern realists, occurring here and there in analyses (Molloy, 2006 & Der Derian, 1994). When the ‘resurrection’ literature becomes repetitive or the field saturated, this is an area of opportunity for the current wave of realists and would be a welcome change from the tendency to navel-gaze in the current literature, eschewing the wider IR theory context of their writing or the ‘real-world’ issues which could be considered.

This perhaps unorthodox approach to the epistemology and ontology of realism is important as it links up with the second part of Ashley’s dichotomy. Critical Realism’s deep ontology suggests a world where anything that could be considered to have causal influence over a phenomenon is significant, and therefore, should be included in our
analysis. In adopting Kant’s phenomenal/noumenal dichotomy, Critical realism also supports the difference between the practical/phenomenal – technical/noumenal divide. This variety of realism will now be addressed.

**Technical realism**

The reason why this discussion of technical realism is situated at the end of this wide discussion of some significant criticisms that have been levelled at realism is that it represents the development of realism in a direction away from the practical and the study of that which can be experienced sensually. Once identified as separate to the practical form, technical realism bifurcates into one form which focuses on creating a scientific, abstract mode of analysis for realism and another which focuses on the realm of morality and ethics. Ashley writes that technical realism is the ‘scientific’ aspect of the realist tradition and is best represented by the Waltzian and Morgenthauian effort to create some objective, technical knowledge of international politics. It attempts to place a rational ordering system on an assumed to be rational external world for the furthering of control over the externalities of international politics. In spite of Carr and Morgenthau’s talk of a science of international relations, in reality, only Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* has come close to this. This is not a criticism. Simply put, when Carr and Morgenthau spoke of science, they did so in the same way as Machiavelli and Thucydides, meaning that they

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34 Herz proposes this sort of deep ontology in (1981a) and (1971) but admitted that IR could suffer from having too many variables to account for, but that this is preferable to the parsimonious, uni-causal investigations of the approaches he criticises.

35 Phenomena being objects which are experienced through the senses and noumena being non-sensual objects. Not only are they non-sensual, they also tend to be in Kant’s view, unknowable, so therefore they tend to be focussed on objects of human understanding or inquiry.
believed that there should be a method of interpretation with common terms and concepts – not the strictly developed theory of Waltz. Molloy writes that ‘[t]o criticize Morgenthau, Carr and other classical realists for a lack of science is equivalent to criticising George Best and Pele for being poor rugby players or to stress Michael Jordan’s incompetence as an ice hockey player. The pseudo-scientific interpretation of IR was not their language game. To attack them for not playing by rules developed after their involvement is as inappropriate as putting them within that framework’ (2006: 34).

The technical realism of Waltz focuses on the impact of anarchy on a system of like units. He argues that due to the security impulse the units quickly adopt matching modes of behaviour which they perceive to be successful or effective. This process he describes as socialisation. The model of neorealism stresses that the cause of conflict is anarchy and its resulting vulnerabilities. A key part of the theory he develops is the balance of power thesis. This is, as mentioned above, one of only a handful of truly systemic, scientific (in conception) theories of international politics. The thesis predicts that certain distributions of power are less or more stable than others and that power vacuums and imbalances will be balanced eventually. Waltz’s theory of international politics is unique in IR theory in its being the only truly scientific theory of IR. Its parsimony and theoretical elegance is also unrivalled in IR but is, like all economic theories, lacking depth and agency on those within the system to a great extent. Waltz’s dispute with John A. Vasquez (1997) over neorealism showed the impact of scientism on the academy, as while the text is replete with examples of
Waltz mediating and attempting to soften the blow of structure on the behaviour of the units by, for example writing that many other aspects of political life must be included in a full analysis but that for the purposes of theory building they are omitted. Despite this, he was pilloried for attempting to epistemologically and methodologically have his cake and eat it. Positivists were not content with his adopting a scientific method of theory building, also needed to match its standards of falsification. Having developed the closest thing IR theory has ever had to a scientific theory, detractors expected it to go ahead and behave like a hard science theory or be damned. Waltz, attempting to apply a structural, scientific approach, knew that his theory would not serve as a hard science theory (i.e. be falsifiable through simple falsification as mentioned above) but wanted his theory judged on Lakatosian principles of explanatory power. Of course this is problematic, as many would argue you cannot have a scientific theory without a scientific commitment to falsifiability – this point Waltz has never accepted, leading Guzzini to write that Waltz’s ‘recent anti-positivism can... no longer be considered to be representative of mainstream, contemporary IR realism’ (2004: 546). The main point however is that the systemic forces which are the basis of Waltz’s theory, are, unlike the focus of practical realism on diplomacy and the international affairs of states, noumenal rather than phenomenal. Structure cannot be experienced and thus while we know it exists in some form or another, being created by the interaction of the units, it is not a sensual object.\textsuperscript{36} As a concept, to use Kant’s phrase to

\textsuperscript{36} The same can be said of morality and ethics, and while Ashley describes the intersubjectivity of the practical form through the establishment of norms of behaviour which could also be considered noumenal, they would be more likely considered phenomena as the norms are often played-out and actualised, thus phenomenal. Scientific
describe noumena, it is a ‘thing in itself’. Thus, while neorealist theory does represent realism’s attempt to categorise and discipline knowledge in a far more scientific way than previously, Ashley’s division, stemming from Habermas, between the practical and technical realisms is not purely a question of epistemology – what can be studied and how - but also of intent.

The opposite side of the bifurcation in technical realism as mentioned is the study of the ethical and moral aspects of international politics. This point has been discussed already above so will not be dwelt on. However, it is vital to the discussion of the division of realism into practical and technical realism, and thus technical realism’s division in two between scientific and ethical knowledge, to acknowledge the ethical concerns of realist thought. Realism’s normative intention has always been to stress the difficulties of consistently applying a short term morality or a priori ideology to political scenarios without an awareness of the important consequences which can stem from such an application. Molloy’s (2008) discussion of the competing ethics of Morgenthau and Carr is a prime example. Morgenthau, offended by Carr’s relativist and situationist ethic, argues for a transcendental ethic based on restraint and moderation. Many others can fit into this discussion of realist ethics, and realism’s normative intent, Herz and Niebuhr in particular as already mentioned, what is most important to take from this is the fundamental concern with ethics and morality which realist thought has always had. Even if you consider realism to be barren and cold – Machiavelli without the concept of virtu, to borrow Morgenthau’s phrase in describing Carr’s ethics – this denial of a transcendent ethic is a very strong concepts used in theory building are generally going to be noumenal as they are often creations or ideal-types.
ethical statement in and of itself. However, most realists would not fit such an accusation – in fact, realism is and always has been in a mental struggle over and between ethics and power.

A discussion of realism’s intentions as a tradition will serve as conclusion to this discussion of realism as an active, diverse mode of thought about history, ethics, politics and progress, which does not lend itself to characterisation with a single word such as theory or paradigm.

**Conclusion**

What does realism seek to do and say about international politics? What is its epistemology and ontology? These are the central questions of an analysis of what realists have tried to do in IR. There have been those within the practical realist tradition who have focused on diplomacy and examined the importance of ensuring a common view of how things should be done. There are those who have ignored the practical issues of everyday diplomacy to seek ways of explaining a very large amount from something very small. What unites the range of theorists mentioned here in this discussion which has addressed the possibility of progress, emancipation and change, morality in international politics, questions of epistemology and ontology in the context of this thing we know as realism? What also is the link between realism’s alleged diplomatic foundations, history and its views on change in the international system and the nature of politics? Very little in reality but the very little that unites them has a very profound importance for the development of IR Theory and the world of practice in international politics. This small common thread is the belief in the
importance of scepticism – not simply as a state of mind, as some have
described realism to be, but an active philosophical and ethical endeavour; a
belief in the cyclical nature of power competition which is identifiable
throughout history between all forms of social community; and the link to
‘reality’ as the foundation to any research.

This chapter intended to do two things. Firstly, to show that the concept of
theory in IR was overly influenced by unsuitable scientific discourses and
has lead to oversimplification and a ‘levelling’ out of differences between
various theorists considered to represent certain theories. In doing this an
alternative is not offered. Instead, it is suggested that paradigmatic
approaches to bodies of theory, as is the current state of IR, is generally
damaging and raises many problems. A less structured, more individual-
centred approach is suggested as it will not lead to the overlooking of
important and challenging antinomies within and between theorists.

Adopting a commonly-used definition of realism’s basic characteristics as x,
y and z, and then discovering that no one meets this ideal-type should not be
a negative point against the theorists or the definition, but the act of
attempting to define theories, of any sort in politics in such a way.

Having used Ashley, Guzzini and Cox’s descriptions of realism as a
conservative, anachronistic and legitimising discourse as a foil, the chapter
can be said to have identified a basic theme which is common within the
framework adopted here – the division between practical and technical
realism. These are the question of scepticism as a philosophical endeavour;
the strong, if pessimistic, statement relating to the possibility of progress;
and a belief in a reality which can be studied and described with certain
descriptions being more correct than others. These will be briefly discussed.

What exactly does scepticism as a philosophical tradition suggest in this
context? Outside of Hume and Descartes problematising of knowledge,
which represents a major part of modern scepticism, the classical
understanding of it refers to the questioning of the current order or system.
This is not a denial of any knowledge outside of experience but to question
the unquestioned foundations of the current system of practices and norms.
This is best seen in Carr’s and Herz’s earliest work where they question the
dominant, liberal belief in the promise of international institutions. This can
only be truly achieved through a depoliticised approach. By being critical of
all ideologies, realism is capable of placing itself above the current political
dialogues – those of praxis and academic study. This position has only
become possible with the decline of realism as a hegemonic discourse. This
scepticism is a valuable and important contribution to politics and its study,
as unlike liberal or Marxist accounts, which have explicit transformative
goals, realism does not have a policy-orientated normative goal. Generally
speaking, its proponents can be considered to have attempted to place
themselves above the level of ideology to analyse, and sometimes criticise,
existing political systems and practices.

This leads into an ontological statement which stems from this scepticism
and the substantive point to be extracted from this discussion. Realism, in so
far as one can speak of such a thing, is dubious regarding the concept of
historical progress. This links into the scepticism towards ideology and the
goal of identifying the underlying power relations between actors. In
maintaining a belief in the inherent power competitive nature of politics, any progress which is observable is inherently superficial, as the nature of politics remains constant – that of power competition. In making this assertion, realism balances the teleological narratives which are notable in liberal and Marxist accounts of progress. This however is not a denial that things can improve, merely that it is far more difficult for change to occur at the foundational level than others would assume. This also being a stanchion of classical political conservatism. This point is made perhaps most strongly in Herz’s discussion of the security dilemma in ‘Idealist Internationalism and the security dilemma’ (1950) and Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951). Herz’s basic argument is that wherever a transformative or revolutionary political phenomena occurs, the security dilemma forces actors into power-seeking behaviour which ultimately undermines the revolutionary potential of the movement. Herz focuses on truly revolutionary moments, the Russian and French Revolutions, but his argument is essentially Burkean. Coming from either the Burke influence or the critical Marxism of Carr or Niebuhr, the belief in progress is not a denial but a cautious and sceptical statement that progress occurs in a highly competitive environment.

The third important thread to identify is the unbreakable link between realism and ‘reality’. While this may seem to be a most obvious statement, it is important to remind ourselves that not only is realism epistemologically connected to reality, it also has a moral and ethical link to another form of reality – the actual over the theoretical and the abstract. While realist concepts are as abstract as those used by other bodies of theory,
Morgenthau’s caution against the abstraction of the subject from the object of study has enormous practical importance, a position set out earlier by Herz (fn. 9). It is a moral stance with a practical implication. Realists claim that as ‘real’ as academic discourse may appear, it is never as significant as the efforts to understand the reality of politics. Outside of ideology and a priori belief systems however significant they may be the goal of those studying politics should always be towards making life safe and more prosperous by understanding and solving the enduring problems of political life. Thus, not only is realism an attempt to illuminate the ‘essential’ aspects of politics, it is also an ethical stance opposed to overly abstract or scientific approaches to political knowledge. In this sense it presents scholars with a stance against the abstractions of academia. Herz describes this moral point when he argues, even from his ‘relativist’ position, that there are certain global/universal problems which require the consideration of all those engaged in thinking: ‘We can no longer afford a l’art pour l’art type of assembling facts and analysing data for their own sake... More, such an approach is liable to divert attention... away from the relevant issues and thus have a politically conservative, quietistic effect. What we need is discussion of great issues on the basis of precise method and exact analysis’ (1976: 257). This link between realism and an external reality brings on a criticism relating to realism’s simplicity, and its being ‘intellectually unsatisfying’ as a result of this. This does not go away, and while some have attempted to develop a more complex picture of what reality is to realism (Molloy, 2006 and Der Derian, 1994), this alleged simplicity is ultimately not really negotiable. The link to reality which realists call for is
not for simplicity’s or parsimony’s sake, but based on an research ethics judgement call. By maintaining a link between itself and the actual goings on in the ‘real world’ realists are ensuring that politics remains focused on the goal of improving people’s lives by eschewing abstractions and dehumanising research methods.

Like all narratives, the realist ‘story’ is subjective. This point as mentioned is a major part of Carr and Herz’s work. Each body of theorising, whether scientifically defined or more vaguely formed as suggested here, represents a narrative of its own, which within its own frame of mind is complete and coherent, is in fact only ever a partial truth. The following chapter looks at the competition between different political ideas, where they come from and how they can be broadly identified. What is important to try to understand is that what has been identified here as a description and defence of certain ideas relevant to realism is an important but partial truth. No theory is absolute, in fact any theory which makes such a claim should be treated with great caution, but theories can described certain phenomena better than others. What analysts are charged with is identifying which is more accurate and where and when can this be used to ameliorate conditions. The next chapter focuses on the competition between ideas and how problems can arise when certain ideas are dominant over others. The chapter will put forward a model or ideal-type for academic discourse whereby there is a dialectic between the two alternate urges of utopianism and realism. It is important to note that this is a dialectic which is called for by realists. The notion of a dialectic between political realism and political idealism is strangely only called for by realists who accept the limitations of their
insights, and understand that their narrative of politics alone is not a full picture. The criticism of idealism is partially linked to the hubris of not accepting the need for dialectic. It is not that their narratives are incorrect but that they account for only part of the process of politics by generally failing to account for the factors of power or self-interest in some way, and place too much faith in rationality and ‘scientific’ solutions to political and social problems. This is the nub of the criticism aimed at EUS which is outlined in Section 2.
Chapter 3:

The sociology of knowledge, realism and disciplinary history

In *Philosophical History*, Hegel states that the ‘ordinary, the “impartial” historiographer, who believes and professes that he maintains a simply receptive attitude; surrendering himself only to the data supplied him’ (1947: 408) is fundamentally false. Hegel chastises this view writing that he ‘is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his thinking powers. He brings his categories with him, and sees phenomenon presented to his mental vision, exclusively through these media’ (1947: 408). The *Zeitgeist* inhabits all. Hegel’s intention was not simply to caution against the false consciousness of objectivity, but to prove that reason is at the base of history and that the process of history is progressing with the development of reason. Faith in progress, as an idea, is most often attributed to the Enlightenment and modernity and is therefore a largely liberal stanchion. Despite Hegel being part of the Counter-enlightenment, this model of
historical teleology is arguably the basis of liberal thought. Marxism is also essentially teleological, Hegel ‘stood on his head’ as Marx wrote. Marx believed that liberty can only be achieved through the achievement of communism. Marx’s understanding of historical development is evolutionary and broadly deterministic. This logically means that, from these two (Liberal and Marxist) perspectives, decisions made in the past were ultimately the ‘right’ ones as they brought man closer to the millennia of either a liberal or communist state and world. Within History this sort of evolutionary thinking is often described as Whig history (Butterfield, 1931). Despite the prominent view that the promises of modernity and its vision of evolutionary progress are not infallible, scholars have adopted a largely ‘Whiggish’ mentality to their formation. The logic of evolution is a fundamental part of this understanding, as it assumes that certain ideas and theories are naturally selected in place of other ‘weaker’ theories. It is argued that a discipline is based on a series of struggles between ideas or sets of ideas, and that which is in existence today is the result of these struggles. Ultimately, this approach does not account for the broader merit of theories which were ultimately ‘defeated’, nor does it account for how or why these ideas existed in the first place.

This chapter will therefore set out to do three tasks, ultimately towards the goal of identifying the type of questions which need to be asked of EUS. What type of theories can be identified as present, and conversely what theories are absent and why? What sorts of power dynamics exist between the theories and paradigms within the discipline? To identify these questions, disciplines as instances of discourse will be examined, based on
Karl Mannheim’s ‘Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon’ and *Ideology and Utopia* - the first of which outlines the competing intellectual forces of realism and idealism as a vital and productive process and the second which aims to force scholars into understanding the social context of knowledge, and how the intersubjectivity of knowledge can lead to distortions and aberrant functional ideologies developing. The discussion of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge will be the first task. This will then lead to the second task of this chapter to discuss the nature and role of ideology in the development of academic discourse, based on Mannheim’s work. It will be argued that certain theories, through a hegemonic position, become ideological – unreflexive and absolute. It will be further argued that this is an essentially negative development, showing how this fits into the realist critique of ideologies discussed in the previous chapter. To do this, the disciplinary history of IR theory will be examined in order to expose the way in which power is exercised by certain theories and how this can impact on the development of the discipline. Ironically, this part of the discussion occurs in the context of the realist domination of the discipline throughout the Cold War. How this affected the shape and mythology of the discipline will then be outlined. The analysis will then move to subsequent efforts by critical disciplinary historians to undermine the legitimacy of the previous order by illustrating the hollowness of its institutional and theoretical ‘myths’. The final task will be to clarify the relevance of disciplinary history to IR theory and the lessons which can be drawn from such studies for EUS, raising the obvious question of whether they are in fact suitable comparators. This section will discuss specifically
the question of whether the lessons of the need for balance within disciplinary discourse, argued by Mannheim, based on a Weberian ideal-type discourse, and illustrated by the disciplinary history of IR theory, are practically applicable to the development of EU Studies. Thus, the chapter can be succinctly described as covering three areas – the theoretical, the historical and the practical issues relating to the structure and politics of a discipline.

**Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge and Ideology and Utopia**

Before discussing the specifics of Mannheim’s thought, it is important firstly to explain why he is to be examined at all. Mannheim’s influence on the thought of E.H. Carr is fundamental to the dialectical nature of the realism outlined in the Introduction and developed further in the previous chapter. The dialectic Carr refers to is that relating to the nature of the ‘dichotomy of purpose and fact’ that is ‘embedded in the human consciousness’, political thought and political action (1961: 20). The reason why this is of significance to an analysis of the sociology of IR theory and the subsequent criticism of the development of EUS to follow, is the important questions Mannheim’s focus on the role of ideology and utopianism in the development of social theory raised for early realist scholars, either directly, or indirectly through Carr. What Carr and other realists - were influenced by was not simply developments in the world of practice, but the deeper metatheoretical issues which led to the conclusion that thought and practice are intertwined and that within the two of these spheres a similar dialectic is present between reality and utopia. What made Carr’s seminal text so outstanding are the metaphysical propositions which
it attempted to clarify for those engaged in the study of world politics. Carr writes, ‘[p]olitical science must be based on a recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice, which can be attained only through a combination of utopia and reality’ (1961: 13). Carr, in a chapter titled ‘Utopia and Reality’, poses a series of dichotomies between free-will and determination, theory and practice, the intellectual and the bureaucrat, left and right, and finally ethics and politics towards the end of reinforcing the oppositional and relative nature of being. While Carr does not cite Mannheim directly for this ontological position, in fact he cites Jung’s distinction between ‘extraverted’ and ‘introverted’, and William James’ ‘pairs of opposites’ as an analogy for the dichotomies discussed, the approach is starkly Mannheimian, a point recognised and discussed by Jones (1997: 234). It is significant to point out that while Carr uses the language of a traditional Hegelian, i.e. dialectic, the opposites he presents are more mutually constitutive than dichotomous – they exist because of one another, not in spite of. But whereas Carr is extrapolating Mannheim’s dialectic model to the realm of international relations and IR theory this of course cannot be extrapolated directly to the study of academic disciplines. Therefore, Mannheim’s discussion of the roles of relativism, utopianism and ideology in thought, all of which are present in The Twenty Years’ Crisis explicitly or implicitly, are addressed here on their own terms. The discussion here is cyclical as it will return to Mannheim’s influence on Carr, and subsequently Carr’s impact on this research.

Turner summarises the basic argument of Ideology and Utopia, writing ‘[t]he political belief systems of society can be seen as a struggle between
ideologies and utopias. Ideologies therefore refer to the systems of belief and ideas which give a positive affirmation to either the existing social order and the dominant political and economic interests of elite groups within it, or to some historic order of society’ (1995: 719). What Turner, a sociologist of note, focuses on in this summation is, unsurprisingly, the social side of Mannheim’s thought – the way that dominant sections of society create ideologies surrounding the status quo and how these ideologies are then resisted by utopians, who push for an alternative, improved society. Mannheim’s starting point however, before being capable of examining the source of both the utopian and the ideologue’s ideas was what he described as the sociology of knowledge, or, the implicit social nature of political thought. Thus, to understand Carr’s use of Mannheim, we must first begin by examining the exact nature of the sociology of knowledge and then, its relationship to ‘reality’ and realism.

Mannheim’s theory of the sociology of knowledge was based on three propositions (Turner, 1995: 721-3). Firstly, political thinking is a collective exercise. Secondly, political thinking is a social exercise and is influenced by every day experience. Thirdly, political thought emerges out of social conflict. Verging almost on social constructivism, Mannheim’s argument that all thought is a reflection of a particular political or social group angered many. ‘The sociology of knowledge is concerned not so much with distortions due to a deliberate effort to deceive as with the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to differences in social settings. Thus, mental structures are inevitably differently formed in different social and historical settings’ (Mannheim, 1960: 238). The
sociology of knowledge produces two methods of analysis – one an empirical investigative method for ascertaining 'truth' through description and structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships influence thought. The second approach concerns itself with the epistemological inquiry into the problems which lead from the ‘interrelationship’ between thought and social relations, and the ‘problem of validity’ (1960: 239). This can however be made clearer. The second mode inquires whether the social construction of theories and ideologies automatically leads to a problem of accuracy or validity – whether the claims of the theory are proven to be true or not. Mannheim makes the point that one can accept the first point without necessarily accepting the second which is important as many would happily accept the prior but might feel that the latter is not a productive question to ask, leading as it does to an almost Neitzschean position on abstract knowledge. It is important to make clear that Mannheim was not arguing a proto-post-positivist position, that all thought was relative and therefore (although it has been argued that despite his resistance to this perspective, he is bound to the problem of relativity37) all a priori reasoning is futile, but that the sociology of knowledge is an important tool for understanding and identifying some ‘truth’ or reality in spite of the existence of ideology and utopianism. Mannheim’s goal is to show that some reality can be found, but only through an appreciation of the sociology of knowledge, or the social nature of meanings. He writes, ‘[t]he attempt to escape ideological and utopian distortions is, in the last analysis, a quest for reality. These two

conceptions provide us with a basis for a sound scepticism, and they can be put to positive use in avoiding the pitfalls into which our thinking may lead. Specifically they can be used to combat the tendency in our intellectual life to separate thought from the world of reality, to conceal reality, or to exceed its limits’ (1960: 87).

However, while Mannheim clearly considered truth of some variety a possibility, this was what Mannheim described as an ontological position rather than an epistemological one. There is, Mannheim points out, ‘far reaching consequences’ to every ontological judgement. By accepting a reality but stressing the social construction of every groups own ‘reality’, Mannheim is accused of a contradiction – one of objectivism versus subjectivism\(^{38}\), but in fact this is a fundamental part of the argument of *Ideology and Utopia*. Jones (1997: 234) describes the context in the form of two linked questions, ‘[i]f all this were as Mannheim and his followers supposed, how could empiricism and its individualist account of knowledge ever have gained currency? How, more specifically, did the application to social science of a positivist methodology parasitic on empiricist epistemology take hold?’ Mannheim argues that this was the result of the need for individualistic and absolute forms of knowledge, focusing largely on the development of liberal thought in tandem with the capitalist economic system (1960: 25-30 & Jones, 1997; 234-5)\(^{39}\). What this means in

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\(^{38}\) A similar contradiction could be levelled at the previous chapter’s reliance on the Kantian escape route of Critical Realism, but as has been argued previously, this is not a contradiction as it is a deliberate recognition of a fundamental dilemma in a question of knowledge.

\(^{39}\) Richard Ashcraft disagrees with this point, writing that the ‘historical-sociological approach should have directed him towards the problem of private property as an obvious bridge linking the concept of the individual to the development of liberalism as a political theory... Mannheim did not approach the crisis of liberalism from the standpoint of
practice is that the dominant approach to the social sciences, even in Mannheim’s time, was dominated by an uncritical positivism and empiricism, and this Mannheim argued was inappropriate and insufficient to the study of society and political groups. This is argued in the fourth essay in *Ideology and Utopia*, titled ‘The Prospects of Scientific Politics’. Again, Mannheim poses a synthetic solution – combination of both individual and collective referents and ideas are required to understand social realities (1960: 90-4). Because of this position, a straightforward empiricist social science is obviously deemed inadequate.

The social nature of thought, and subsequently theory, can be summarised as being ‘concerned not so much with distortions due to a deliberate effort to deceive [as the study of ideology has tended towards] as with the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social settings. Thus, mental structures are inevitably differently formed in different social and historical settings (1960: 238). In differentiating his approach from that of Marxists who had diligently studied the development of certain ideologies as ‘false consciousness’, Mannheim summarises well what his approach is to this matter and how it focuses on, not validity, but form. In other words, not how true a reflection of reality or the possible is a theory, but to how great extent can it be described as socially constructed.

Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that any single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in supplying the standpoint of supplying a defence of individual rights of private property. *Property, rights or the individual*, are not the key terms in Mannheim’s conception of liberalism [in its broadest, ‘modern’ sense]. Rather his emphasis is upon social exchange of ideas and the systemic factors which provide support for this exchange’ (1981: 34-5).
thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation and attempts to elaborate further the inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in order to deal more adequately with the new challenges which have arisen out of shifts and changes in his situation (1960: 3).

And elsewhere the difference between a straightforward history of ideas and a sociology of ideas is differentiated:

For future reference, we state here that the sociology of knowledge... does not aim at tracing ideas back to all their remote historical prototypes. For if one is bent on tracing similar \textit{motifs} in thought to their ultimate origins, it is always possible to find precursors for every idea. There is nothing which has been said, which has not been said before... The proper theme of our study is to observe how and in what form intellectual life at a given historical moment is related to the existing social and political forces (1960: 60 fn1).

The sociology of knowledge does not aim to provide coherent answers to the exact development or operation of ideologies, utopias or competition, but to ‘facilitate discussion’ to use Mannheim’s phrase. Accepting that the sociology of knowledge is a feasible approach to the development of knowledge and society, the three key targets of his examination will now be discussed – ideology, utopia and competition as a cultural phenomenon.

\textbf{Ideology}

Mannheim identifies two basic types of ideology – the particular and the total. The particular conception is linked closely to the concept of ideology as some form of concealment from the truth. They are ‘regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation’ (1960: 49). Conversely, the total conception of ideology is concerned with the
ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group’ (1960: 49). Mannheim believes that this difference flows from the ability of the particularist approach to provide insights only into the psychological level – individuals reacting to stimulus individually – whereas the total conception can provide noological insights – or developments into the very development of mind. This is problematic. As mentioned, Marxists have traditionally focused on the former, believing that ideology is essentially an aspect of the superstructure and therefore dictated by production, but experienced by alienated individuals contemporaneously rather than through groups. Mannheim on the other hand elevates ideology to a role far greater than the Marxist arguing that for the Marxist, the basic social unit, or group, was the class, which is economically specific and essentialist. Mannheim’s theory examines the broader range of groups – ‘not merely classes, as a dogmatic type of Marxism would have it, but also generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups, schools, etc.’ (1960: 248). Of course, many Neomarxists, Gramscians in particular, went on to examine such groupings and their interaction with each other in the formation of ideology, at the time of publication, however this was still a relatively fair statement. That said, the difference still remains, as the Marxist, particularist, analysis will focus on ideology as something akin to a lie – the operation of an economic system in the interest of all, for example - Mannheim, rejects this arguing that the ideology comes after the ‘lie’ – it is the closing off of alternatives and the legitimisation of the lie, it is the passing off of something temporary as universal and immutable (1960: 77).
It is important to note however that Mannheim is not necessarily rejecting Marx in this conception of ideology, in fact he makes it clear that his basic conception of ideology relies on a number of Marxist scholars such as Lukacs, Simmel and Marx himself. *The German Ideology* for example contains many statements relating to ideology that echo Mannheim’s argument. For example: ‘[i]n direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here one ascends from earth to heaven. In other words, to arrive at man in the flesh, one does not set out from what men say, imagine or conceive, nor from man as he is described, thought about, imagined or conceived. Rather one sets out from real, active men and their actual life-process and demonstrates the development of ideological reflexes and echoes from that process’ (1994: 112). Thus, as Richard Ashcraft (1981) sets out to show in ‘Political theory and Political action in Karl Mannheim’s Thought’, there is much cross-over and commensurability between Marxist and Mannheimian conceptions of ideology and its importance. It is important to stress that while ideology was not invented by Marx, as Mannheim makes clear (1960: 53-7), it is an essentially Marxist preoccupation. Purvis and Hunt (1993: 474) support this, writing ‘[ideology] has in contemporary usage become closely associated with the Marxist tradition and takes its places within what we suggest is the broad problematic of modern western Marxism, namely, the attempt to understand how relations of domination or subordination are reproduced with only minimal resort to direct coercion.’ Mannheim’s conception of ideology is undeniably within this vein of thought.
An ideology develops, according to Mannheim, out of the wish ‘to induce others to hold onto the status quo because he feels comfortable and smug under conditions as they are’ (1960: 78). Turner mediates this point slightly, writing that Mannheim’s conception of ideology represents ‘cognitive maps or frameworks which are relevant and appropriate to this everyday world. Ideologies are collective attempts to give expression to the fundamental structure of our everyday world experiences’ (1995: 722). This divergence is understandable due the sheer number of times Mannheim refers to the nature of ideology in the book – reflective of the fact perhaps that the book is a collection of separately written essays rather than a coherent monograph. Ultimately, Turner sides with the more generally accepted approach to Mannheim’s ‘ideology’ as the viewpoint or interests of the dominant class, whereby ideology is the viewpoint that ‘change is either impossible or undesirable’ (1995: 722).

In examining the total conception of ideology, Mannheim argues that ideologies are, at core, the interests of a group codified in a logical set of principles or rules, which begin as common sense and then become ideology. The aim of this approach to the collective formation of ideology is the ‘reconstruction of the systematic theoretical basis of underlying the single judgement of the individual’ by identifying how the judgements made are influenced by ideology, and subsequently how practice and ideology are interlinked. It is of great significance, even as mere conjecture, to argue such a point as it radically challenges existing narratives of the development of all aspects of academic history from one of intellectual discovery to a less linear and undoubtedly less intellectually
satisfying position - a point which drew much of the criticism from liberal political theorists and philosophers of science that he received.

To illustrate Mannheim’s conception of ideology more explicitly, it will help to provide an example from the text. In *Ideology and Utopia* Mannheim does not offer a discussion of a specific ideology to serve as an example, rather he provides passing references to certain periods whereby political thought was ideological. In fact, the discussion of conservatism contained in *Ideology and Utopia* is in fact a discussion of the approach in terms of its subsequent utopian role – that geared towards reversions of events to reinstate previous historic institutions or norms, where it becomes an activistic conservatism. In this way Mannheim outlines the way that conservatism developed ‘organically’, as a reflection of the response to the revolutionary crisis – as a response to the utopian, universalist ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, or as a response to the liberal, utopian process of rationalization.

A key point to take from this is that certain positions which are ideological – conservatism in Britain or Germany for example – can be outstripped by utopian thought – socialism or liberalism for example, and thus become utopian. And similarly, formerly utopian thought becomes ideological as it seeks to reinforce its dominant position. While this may paint a near-contradictory, moving-but-static picture of intellectual development, the competing discourses (in its ideological sense) are evolving constantly with developments in the reality from where the ideologies stem. Even in its

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40 The best discussion of an ideology is in *Conservatism – A contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* (1986) where Mannheim describes the development of European conservatism.
utopian form, ‘the notion of an idea embedded and expressed in reality, is in the last analysis intelligible only in the light of its struggles with the other coexistent forms of utopia’ (1960: 211). This notion of the ‘idea’ stems from the conservative experience of politics – how it is experienced and how it is reflected upon. This attitude, Mannheim argued had always existed to some extent, but the liberal challenge then forced the conservative attitude into this ‘arena of conflict’. Hegel is therefore considered the founder of the conservative response to this challenge. The conservative romantics ‘provided an intellectual interpretation of an attitude toward the world which was already implicit in actual conduct but which had not yet become explicit... It was Hegel’s great achievement to set up against the liberal idea a conservative counterpart, not in the sense of artificially concocting an attitude and a mode of behaviour, but rather by raising an already present mode of experience to an intellectual level’ (1960: 208). We see here then the way in which certain attitudes, or ‘ideas’, exude from experience and action or develop through a challenge to the status quo, rather than developing spontaneously in a context, but the ‘situation which exists at any given moment is constantly being shattered by different situationally transcendent factors’ (1960: 185).

What is key to take from this discussion - and it is difficult to see exactly the context of this without considering the opposite side of the competition between ideology and utopianism - is the fundamental difference between the Marxist conception of ideology and Mannheim’s. For Mannheim, and
others sympathetic to conservatism\textsuperscript{41}, time is of great significance in its broadest sense. He writes, ‘for liberalism the future was everything and the past nothing, the conservative mode of experiencing time found the best corroboration of its sense of determinateness in discovering the significance of the past, in the discovery of time as the creator of value’ (1960: 211). But while the issue of time is key, it is important to recognise the fundamentally conservative, \textit{status quo} orientation of Mannheim’s ideology – even if it is based on utopian principles, as it is the development of an attitude of what is here, is right, and change is opposed. We will now go onto describe Mannheim’s theory of the development of utopian ideas and how these are also constructed from shared social experience.

\textbf{Utopia}

Mannheim’s description of utopianism is at times complex and scattered through a range of often-repetitive essays. Despite this, he never strays far from the statement, ‘[a] state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs’ (1960: p178). It is useful to return to Turner’s clear distinction between the two dominant modes of thought. According to Turner the competition between social groups gave rise to

\textsuperscript{41} Despite being heavily affected by Marx and Weber, he ultimately was most akin to Hegel in relation to his sympathy for what can be described as a sort of Romantic conservatism. Kettler, Meja and Stehr (1984:76) write that Mannheim’s ‘earliest writings lay out a project which he never relinquished. The task for his generation... is to acknowledge the findings of the preceding one, that cultural and social history are constitutive of social experience and social knowledge, and then to transform that acknowledgement itself into the starting point for a way beyond the reductionism and relativism bound up with ‘historicism’. But this awareness of the importance of time and generations does not dictate his conservatism entirely, as they point out that despite his ‘sympathetic treatment of conservatism’ and the almost pejorative use of ‘conservatism’ in “The problem of a Sociology of Knowledge” (1952), this could however be a case of context or an issue of translation. It is not relevant to the discussion. Mannheim’s discussion of the importance of generations in the shaping of ideas, and more often the challenging of ideological ideas is best seen in ‘The problem of generations’, also in \textit{Essays} (1952).
ideology, ‘characteristic of the dominant groups or classes which sought to protect the status quo through promoting the viewpoint that social change was impossible or undesirable’, and utopianism which ‘gave expression to a social desire for change and radical transformation, undermining the existing political order through violent action and social criticism’ (1995: pp722-3). What is important to Mannheim, outside of the social construction of utopian thought which is covered in the sociology of knowledge already discussed, is the relationship between reality, ideology and utopia. The relationship between these three tenets of the sociology of knowledge are important here because they are the concepts which Carr proceeded to adopt and adapt for his own writing. Because of this, this relationship will be focused on most prominently.\(^4\)

Mannheim stresses that utopianism is not necessarily that which cannot be achieved, or is transcendent of reality, but is a view of reality which is less prevalent, and basically opposed to the existing social order. ‘What in a given case appears as utopian, and what as ideological, is dependent, essentially, on the stage and degree of reality to which one applies this standard. It is clear that those social strata which represent the prevailing social and intellectual order will experience as reality that structure of relationships of which they are the bearers, while the groups driven into opposition to the present order will be orientated towards the first stirrings of the social order for which they are striving’ (1960: 176). The relationship between the three – ideology, utopia and reality – is important to

\(^4\) Carr is not discussed with Mannheim here as it is important to illustrate the basis of Mannheim’s thought before fully appreciating the impact on Carr, and subsequently, for understanding the avenues which Mannheim opens to the disciplinary history of IR.
Mannheim’s analysis as the three are strongly malleable terms and are bound up in questions of perspective. As has already been discussed, this is not a denial of the possibility of reality but in fact the insistence that reality is perspective plus some objective material world. Mannheim therefore writes that ‘[t]he very attempt to determine the meaning of... ‘utopia’ shows to what extent every definition in historical thinking depends necessarily upon one’s perspective’ (1960: 177). Thus, because utopianism is bounded in perspective and therefore blocks absolute definitions like, ‘utopia shall signify such and such...’ (1960: 182), Mannheim errs on the side of generality, saying that utopianism is, like ideology, not necessarily a coherent body of ideas but an attitude or ‘mentality’. The reason for this focus on the utopian mentality is that the ‘utopia’ may change but the urge remains the same – that is to transform the existing order (188). Thus, we can see two clearly defined ideal-type identified; one conservative and the other radical and activistic. The competition between these two urges will now be discussed.

**Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon**

While competition is not discussed explicitly in *Ideology and Utopia* it is a key part of Mannheim’s broader conceptualisation of the operation of politics and society, and is the most significant influence on the sociology of knowledge. The short section in *Ideology and Utopia* which discusses the role of competition draws on an earlier essay written in 1926, published in English in the 1952 collection *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* titled ‘Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon’. In this Mannheim argued that for knowledge, ideas and society to develop competition is required. He writes,
‘[c]ompetition controls not merely economic activity through the mechanism of the market and not merely the course of political and social events, but furnishes also the motor impulse behind diverse interpretations of the world which, when their social background is uncovered, reveal themselves as the intellectual expressions of conflicting groups struggling for power’ (1960: 241). It simply cannot be underestimated the importance of competition as an instigator of the development and evolution of theories and ideas. This is the process which brings the attitudes of ideology and utopia into a stronger focus as only through social competition (competition between groups) as a result of some sudden or gradual change do the two become clearly discernible. The ideology of a time, the Geist, only becomes clear when utopian attitudes begin to challenge it. Without competition ideology is unchallenged and social structures become heavily embedded. Mannheim discusses such a period in history, namely the Middle Ages, when the position of the Church was unchallenged across Europe and social and political structures from it, and a similar scenario existed with the Chinese literati (1960: 10 & 1952: 201).

Mannheim argues that this is an unappealing political and social scenario – a position that most academics and non-academics would concur with. Within the field of ideas, this type of dominance or hegemony which a theory or attitude can hold is a naturally negative position, as ideas that are held to be true become ‘true’ unreflexively. This can occur in two social contexts: a period of consensus and a period of monopoly. Mannheim

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43 Mannheim writes, ‘sociological analysis shows that this public interpretation of reality is not simply there, nor on the other hand, is it the result of a “system of thinking out”: it is the state for which men fight. And the struggle is not guided by motives of pure
goes to some length to distinguish the two. Under the first the dominance of a single attitude is caused by ‘spontaneous cooperation between individuals and groups’, whereby all members of society adopt a single interpretation of reality. The other scenario is one where there exists a monopoly and like all monopolies this is a deliberate, enacted policy. This is the sort of context where ideological attitudes rampage, shutting off possible alternatives and providing a poisonous atmosphere for utopian, radical ideas to flourish. Whereas monopoly ‘preserves its uniform character by artificial means’, the consensual system is ‘able to maintain its uniformity, homogeneity and inner stability by virtue of socially-rooted factors of an organic kind’ (1952: 201). In this way, Mannheim suggests that periods of intellectual homogeneity, or dominance, occur in two contexts, monopoly and consensus. The first of these is a deliberate ideological project and the second, a ‘spontaneous cooperation’ of groups and individuals. It is important to emphasise that such periods of dominance have a negative impact on the intellectual climate, leading to the acceptance of social structures (and their connected knowledge systems) as ‘common-sense’.

...contemplative thirst for knowledge. Different interpretations of the world for the most part to the particular positions the various groups occupy in their struggle for power’ (1952: 198). He goes onto describe four scenarios of competition which will co-determine (Mannheim rejects the idea that competition determines the shape of ideological struggles. 1958: 192), the public’s collective interpretation of reality: consensus and monopoly being discussed above, the remaining two will be briefly outlined. The third is a scenario, compared to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, where many groups are attempting to ‘impose their particular interpretation of the world’ (p198). This scenario Mannheim describes as ‘atomistic competition’ and can lead to further fragmentation under certain circumstances but will not reach a point where ‘atomisation is complete, so that individuals compete with individuals, and completely independent thinking groups with others equally isolated’ (p198). The fourth is a synthesis (226). Based on a choice of the most important, but not necessarily compatible, aspects (which Mannheim believed to be the nature of dialectic) – selection of competing groups of thought around a number of ‘formerly atomistically competing groups, as a result of which competition as a whole is gradually concentrated around a few poles more and more dominant’ (1952: 198). This final scenario is probably the best suited to describing the attempts to classify the debates in IR theory in terms of dichotomies between positivists-post-positivists, behaviourists-traditionalists, and the current trend of rationalism versus reflectivism.
This will become more significant when the contribution of disciplinary historians is analysed in the context of the assault on the myth of the First Great Debate.

**Mannheim and Carr**

Before heading down the well-trodden path of the link between Carr and Mannheim, some effort seems necessary to summarise Mannheim’s thought. Mannheim’s approach is undeniably problematic. It is overly deterministic on the issue of the social construction of knowledge and while the concept has not been overly criticised here, it is unquestionably an overly structural account of the development of ideas and political theories. It has removed the individual from the analysis, however hard Mannheim attempts to convince us otherwise. From any perspective on the political spectrum discounting almost entirely the attitudinal agency of groups, and the individuals within them, is stark and automatically unsatisfactory. Why so unsatisfactory? Telling a reader, however sympathetic, that their attitudes are fixed by social structures is bound to lead to resistance and the question that surely all political thought is not predetermined by social grouping? Even with the mediation that the analysis of ideology and utopia is based on Weberian ideal types, the model of the sociology of knowledge, while possessing an elegance often found in such broad theorising, ultimately fails to convince logically on the *validity* of the argument – that is to say, on its own terms, it ‘makes sense’ but outside of that context it is problematic.. The model leads to too great a tension between the innate ability of an individual to either change their mind or possess two separate but contradictory views at once – as mentioned by Turner citing the research of
the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. In its *reductio ad absurdum* the social construction of knowledge seems to challenge the basis of western philosophy – *Cogito, ergo sum*. If indeed one’s thinking is being done at a structural level, does one actually exist as an individual? Descartes answers this question, responding to the possibility of the existence of a ‘deceptive’ deity, ‘If I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all] then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something’.

While these are important criticisms, there is still an important and useful framework which stems from the text and his other works. In addressing the debate on the source of political ideas beyond the Marxist base-superstructure model, Mannheim opened many important avenues for consideration and debate on the issue of the nature of social knowledge and the extent to which ‘thinking’ is determined by context. Answers to these questions are sparse in Mannheim’s writing. More often, Mannheim presents the reader with more questions but this was, after all, his ultimate goal. Accepting the imperfections of the model in its extreme form, it still retains value.

Like many influenced by Hegel and the German social science tradition more generally, the vulnerability of absolute or universalist theories and attitudes is emphasised. If a theory is socially constructed, or worse, exists as a reflection of the interests of a social group, it cannot be considered
universal or absolute to any but those within the group. This is an important if obvious point, as Carr and others based their political theories on the dialectical and relative nature of politics. They did not deny some absolutes and a material reality, but also believed that politics is a realm of subjectivity and dialectic between discourses. Mannheim’s positing of ideology and utopia as two competing attitudes represents an all-embracing image of a productive, competitive dialectic – not the unsatisfactory ‘middle-ground’ which Weber warns against – but a genuinely productive dichotomy. It is this model that Carr explicitly applies in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, and Herz implicitly supports in *Political Realism and Political Idealism*.

Carr writes in the introduction ‘The published sources from which I have derived help and inspiration are legion. I am specially indebted to two books which, though not specifically concerned with international relations, seem to me to have illuminated some of the fundamental problems of politics: Dr Karl Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia* and Dr Reinhold Niebuhr’s *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, but despite this Mannheim is cited only twice and in rather unimportant contexts to the broader argument – once in a discussion of the role of intellectuals and again in a discussion of the harmony of interests relating to the need for traffic controls. Thus, one needs to look deeper into the form of Carr’s argument to ascertain and appreciate the significance of Mannheim. That said, in ‘The Realist Critique’, Carr includes the sociology of knowledge as a part of the realist approach, writing that the:
‘outstanding achievement of modern realism, however, has been to reveal not merely the determinist aspects of the historical process, but the relative and pragmatic character of thought itself. In the last fifty years... the principles of the historical school have been applied to the analysis of thought; and the foundations to a new science has been laid, principally by German thinkers, under the name of the “sociology of knowledge”. The realist has thus been enabled to demonstrate that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute a priori principles are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interests (1964: 67-8).

Thus, we clearly see place of the sociology of knowledge within the realist ‘toolbox’ for deconstructing the absolute and universal pretences of utopian ideologies.

An equally significant contribution to realism is Mannheim’s developing of a framework for interpreting or analysing the sources and structures of debates within academic disciplines. It is here that the discussion returns to the relationship between Carr and Mannheim, and classical realism more broadly. One of the less discussed aspects of The Twenty Years’ Crisis is the aspect of disciplinary history within it. The text is lauded for its groundbreaking discussion of the metaphysical foundations of international politics – without, it may be added any major reference to human nature,

44 It is rarely focused on but Carr’s essays on the theory of history and the role of historians, What is History? (1990), where he outlines a variety of avenues for expanding the disciplinary analysis of IR theory - including the place of the individual in history, causality, progress in history and epistemology in history. These essays, perhaps because of their broadly historical focus have received less attention than The Twenty Years’ Crisis, and contain a wide variety of important insights for ‘Carr-ists’. Many of the important points Mannheim makes which are mentioned in some way here, all appear in some way or another in What is History? – particularly in relation to the rejection of positivist science and its impact on society and the individual.
unlike many subsequent realists – but the way in which Carr manipulates Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia*, to create a disciplinary history of liberal thought is less renowned⁴⁵. Carr turned Mannheim’s concepts on their head, describing the attitude of ideology as ‘utopianism’, the radical ideas for change and revisionist states as utopian, and utilising the method of radical genealogy provided by the sociology of knowledge, under the title of ‘modern realism’⁴⁶. Modern realism, Carr writes, has demonstrated ‘that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute and *a priori* principle, are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interests’ (1961: 68). This was, Jones writes, the uncovering of the ‘rationalisation by those in power, of their privileged positions. The supposedly beneficent social outcomes of self-regulating social systems like the market or the balance of power were taken as evidence of fundamental harmony of interest, while unequal distributions of gains between established and new actors played down’ (1997: 236-7).

Carr, in short, adopted the method and epistemology of the sociology of knowledge to assault the ideology of liberalism, which was, he believed the cause of the crisis. Jones writes that Carr makes realism bipartite – the

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⁴⁵ But of course certainly not ignored. Sean Molloy and Charles Jones have both written extensively on the less-well-trod avenues of Carr’s writings, in particular his link to Mannheim (Jones, 1997 & 1998, and Molloy, 2003 & 2006) and also on his conception of ethics international politics (Molloy, 2008). The edited volume on Carr, titled *The Eighty Year Crisis*, also includes discussion of his connection with Mannheim. This link of course is not new nor necessarily interesting but provides us with a linkage between the ontology outlined in Chapter 2 and the method to be outlined here based on Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, as mentioned in the long quote in footnote 1 of this chapter.

⁴⁶ Herz also argued the same point in *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, but argues that Mannheim is at base an idealist as he infers that the repeated disintegration of ‘historical trends towards “cooperation” and “integration”’ is caused by the ‘wrong direction of political will’, whereas Carr would likely argue that Mannheim is at base a realist as he offers very little normative prescription other than the search for truth.
sociology of knowledge being one and the actual policy implications of this being the other. It is this form of realism which this dissertation seeks to replicate, but with a broader scope of theoretical sources. To show the inherent ideological nature of interwar liberalism Carr used the sociology of knowledge allied with an ontology based on the dialectic of human empathy and atavism. In doing so he provides us with a model of a complete realist critique, linking the practical to the theoretical and visa-versa, showing the innate power relations existing within discourse and discourses and illustrating the need for critical analysis of \emph{a priori} assumptions about politics and its operation. This model has been surprisingly under-utilised, with many theorists discussing and analysing either the practical Carr in a policy oriented context, or others who focus on Carr the proto-post positivist, post-Marxist predicting the passing of the nation state and arguing for the need to transform political community. Somehow it seems important to apply both aspects of his thought. By examining the source of ideas, some clarity can be achieved which can then be used to apply practical, non-ideological solutions, to problems.

This approach will now be tested on the discourse on the topic of IR’s disciplinary history. While mention of it was made in the previous chapter, this analysis does not aim to outline the exact content of the growing literature on IR disciplinary history but to examine how it fits into the model provided for by Mannheim and Carr.

\textbf{Ideologies and utopias in IR’s disciplinary history}
Since the mid-1990s there has been a growing attention paid in IR theory to what has been described as disciplinary history. The development of this interest can be attributed to, aside from the academic interest which we can assume to be constant, the end of the Cold War, when the end of history had been declared and IR theorists were wondering what to study next (Schmidt, 1998: 433). With the end of the Cold War, realism’s hegemonic rule over the discipline evaporated and it floated awkwardly until the popularisation of discourses surrounding unipolarity. The decline of realism however left a vacuum of sorts, into which marched liberalism. This attitude provided an opportunity not just for the increased publication of liberal IR theory research into institutions, regimes and norms, but a whole smorgasbord of normative, critical approaches to international politics became feasible in a way not previously. The reason for the infeasibility will be discussed in the following chapter, but in brief the hegemony of realists was a deep one and the practice of “gate-keeping” is important to understand the problems of publication in an epoch of professionalised academics. Among the wave of alternative approaches that became prominent was disciplinary history – described by Gerard Holden as a ‘critical intellectual project’ concerned with exposing ‘misconceptions about the past and thereby to open the way to more emancipatory academic practices’ (2002: 255).

While Holden proposes an interesting narrative of the development of the critical intellectual movement it is predicated on the assumption that the process of intellectual history is an emancipatory one. Making a claim that,
based on the work of Quentin Skinner⁴⁷, the critical history movement traces its roots back to certain significant intellectual movements spurred by events, such as the Vietnam War or the student protests of 1968, is essentially uninteresting. All this provides us with is a dubious contextualisation of the attitude rather than a clear model for interpreting its implicit purpose. Accepting that, and admitting that Holden is being illustrative, the “critical” IR emerged as part of an attempt to formulate new conceptions of intellectual radicalism within Western academies during this period. Ideas from Continental European philosophical traditions find their way into Anglo-Saxon literary and cultural theory, and to some extent the social sciences of the 1970s and 1980s’ (Holden, 2002: 269). This is far from a copper-fastened argument, and while the goal of the article is to ‘contextualise the contextualisers’, context is nothing without some reference to implicit intent. Mannheim’s structural sociology of knowledge, provides us with a model for reaching this goal more effectively than contextualisation alone, although it is of course a vital aspect of the analysis.

Holden goes on to argue that the disciplinary history we have seen is, in Skinnerian terms, involved in a search for positions from which to voice more radical but non-Marxist opposition within higher-education systems that were becoming increasingly liberal and diverse (2002: 269). Holden clearly presents a context for developments of a broadly critical nature in academia broadly is important to be aware of but is unquestionably restrictive. On top of this in discussing the work of Tim Dunne on the

⁴⁷ Skinner argued that the historical context of ideas is key to understanding their implicit meaning.
English School, and Brian Schmidt on the broad exclusion of liberalism in IR theory, he does not show beyond reasonable doubt that they in fact fit into this critical moment.

Opposing Holden’s simple contextualisation this analysis seeks to identify the nature of the existing disciplinary history literature, asking, what sort of questions does it ask of IR’s history; upon what assumptions is it based and finally, to what extent can disciplinary history be considered utopian or ideological. While the first two of these questions are of great importance to Part 2 of this dissertation, the third question is important as a way of considering the degree to which this rethinking of IR’s history is utopian. If, for example, disciplinary history provides an alternative account of IR’s history which legitimises or supports the current status quo this would therefore pose a serious problem to the emancipatory project to which Holden connects it to. To deal with these questions the main contribution of disciplinary history will be considered – the myth of the First Great Debate

Before asking why it became the focus of such criticism, it is necessary to outline the reason for its existence and the purpose it served – not as an analytical device but ideologically. Schmidt describes it well writing that in the immediate aftermath of World War II, realists set about systematically attacking the ‘discredited’ stanchions of liberalism (1998: 438). According to the standard narrative, the disciplines agenda was set in the 1940s and 1950s and only with the end of the Cold War did the hegemonic discourse

48 The content of the debate is discussed in its philosophical form in the Introduction, and its ‘mythical’, historical sense in Chapter 2.
let slip their grip. Schmidt writes that ‘[a]lmost every student of international relations has been led to believe that the field experienced a fundamental transformation in the 1940s in which the discredited ideas and beliefs of the interwar idealists were replaced by a different paradigm defined by principles of realism (438-9). This myth has been debunked through the efforts of a number of scholars who set out to rescue idealist scholars of the interwar period from caricature, oversimplification or downright misrepresentation (Long and Wilson, 1995; Ashworth, 1999 & 2002; Ashworth and Long 1999; Wilson, 1998; Long, 1996; and Schmidt, 1994, 1998a & 1998b). The more important issue, for this analysis at least, is the reason for the development and maintenance of the myth.

Ashworth writes that the myth ‘justifies the marginalisation of liberal internationalism’ (2002: 34) and all other forms of liberal thought for that matter. Wilson concurs, writing that the impact of The Twenty Year Crisis was the foundation stone of the ‘myth’. He goes on to say that it ‘had a devastating impact on the discipline. Idealism, the predominant mode of thinking about international relations, was revealed as “bankrupt”, “sterile”, “glib”, “gullible”, “a hollow and intolerable sham”. The rout... was so complete that some authors contended that it led to a Kuhnian-style paradigm shift; idealism... was thrown into crisis’ (1998: 1). Wilson’s use of the term impact is significant, as what people thought it did and said, was quite different from what it actually said. As has been argued here, and elsewhere (Jones, 1997 & 1998; Molloy, 2006), Carr emphasised the need for both parts of the dialectic but this insight was excluded from the realist hegemony which developed. Instead, a parsimonious and dogmatic realism
developed – one that was subsequently coopted by behaviouralists and covetous political scientists, anxious to have the same respect that Economics Departments were receiving from scientists. Accepting that realism was a hegemonic discourse for much of this time, the repetition in scholarly work, and perhaps more importantly its repetition in the lecture hall, supported the development of a realist ideology. It served to maintain the status quo and certainly undermined the possible academic alternatives to the realist perspective. Quirk and Vignaswaran (2005) provide probably the best narrative of the development of the myth and conclude that while it certainly was not a conspiracy of realists intent on legitimising ill-got-gains, it certainly had this affect at a structural level.

Within a structural analysis, the myth of the First Great Debate legitimised the narrative of the victory of realism over idealism due to the failure of appeasement and the ‘idealist’ policies adopted in the interwar period (an ironic position considering the policies that Carr was marketing - See Wilson, 1998 and Thompson, 1980: 72-8). This failure of appeasement was then expanded to include the key targets of early realists’ paradigmatic assaults, such as laissez-faire economics, international law, the harmony of interests and ‘war-doesn’t-pay’ argument of Angell. But of course we know now that most of this analysis is flawed, and predicated on an assumption about the interwar years that was incorrect. How did this occur? The sociology of knowledge provides some tentative solutions to this question. Far from a faulty interpretation of the development of the discipline as Thies (2002) has argued, the understanding of the First Great Debate as
presented by the standard narrative raises two issues based on Mannheim’s structural framework.

The first of these is the consideration of it as a defensive response as part of the ideological project of realism. If we accept that ideology represents the argument of the established group or elites in society this means that during realism’s immediate ascendency in the post-war period it developed a common sense, or mythology, which argued that its position was natural and right. As part of this mythology, its position was granted after a debate which occurred, and was won based on the perceived veracity of realism’s policy prescriptions and its being the closest match to the way things ‘really are’. The propagation\(^\text{49}\) of this view was assisted by the utility and clarity of the model for the purposes of teaching, although this was essentially a secondary phenomenon in Mannheim’s framework. This is an inferred part of the framework as Mannheim does not make any major statements relating to the maintenance of an ideological attitude. The maintenance of a hegemonic position as Gramsci and Gramscians have argued is a constant, dynamic process. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is not incompatible as a part of the sociology of knowledge, although obviously they were writing at a similar time about a similar topic – the interaction between conservative and radical ideas and their interaction with the political and social spheres. In this way, the existence of the myth of the Great Debate is a reflection of realism’s hegemonic position and the process of re-creation that every hegemonic order is required to engage in.

\(^\text{49}\) Any great piece of propaganda must be easily repeatable and simple, overly complex ideas cannot be summarised for internalisation quickly. The myth of the idealist-realist debate is theoretically satisfying and quickly understood, with clear protagonists, narrative and conclusion.
The problematising of conventional narratives as the disciplinary historians have performed can thus be conceived of in two ways. The first of these is as part of the utopian attitude – akin to Holden’s broad conception. This is perhaps the most straightforward approach as not only are these scholars releasing theorists who opposed, and would oppose, the ‘new’ hegemonic order of the forties and fifties from parody in the form of the debate, they are also liberating marginalised ideas which realistically could challenge the status quo, hegemonic power in some way.

The second possible understanding is a non-utopian one. This is clearly the emancipatory form of critical historicising. As mentioned, these analyses began, despite Wilson’s claim that disciplinary history began in 1972 with Hedley Bull’s *The theory of International relations 1919-1969*, in the early 1990s. These works set out to outline the ‘false-consciousness’ that had existed in IR for over half a century or more. In the wake of the Third Wave of democratisation, globalisation and ‘the end of history’ (i.e. the failure of, or deep-set rejection, of realist thought) this research was a welcome contribution for liberal theorists, from mainly liberal scholars. Theoretically at the end of the Cold War, the ball was in liberalism’s court. Thus, the second interpretation available could argue that the piercing of the ‘myth’ marked the switch from a period of hegemonic dominance by the realist ‘group’ to either a period of contestation (bipolarity perhaps) or a switch in the balance of power to liberalism. Under either scenario, if not dumped, the ‘myth’ would represent a major stumbling block to a new liberal theoretical order (ideology). The contributions of the disciplinary historians therefore can be seen as an important, if not vital, intervention in the creation of a
new era of liberal international theory dominance, either in its traditional or evolved ‘Post-positivist’ sense (constructivism). This view is justified by the absence of the classical realism of Carr, Herz, Niebuhr or Morgenthau – in the rationalist/reflectivist divide that seems to be the new ‘Great Debate’. Interestingly, recent literature on realism deliberately attempts to resurrect classical realism in a non-hegemonic form, emphasising, at once, the plurality of its sources, and the clarity of its intellectual project as one half of an important discourse.

How and ever, the existence of the ‘Myth’ and its subsequent destruction\(^{50}\) represents an important moment in the transformation of the realist hegemony in IR theory. While liberalism is now setting out on its own ideological project, including perhaps the effort to debunk the myth of the interwar debate, realism is now placed in a difficult position, akin to that suffered by the Romantic conservatives discussed by Mannheim. Their attitude is no longer dominant and only through the passing of time and the contradictions inherent in the liberal idea as an ideological position will another utopian, or perhaps un-utopian\(^{51}\), position become dominant. Realists must now endeavour to adopt a critical position like that of Carr and Mannheim, questioning the status quo and the assumptions upon which it is built.

\(^{50}\) It is fair to say that it is now totally rejected as a historical reality – still used in as a mythological narrative – but even scholars who represent perhaps the most ardent defenders of realism in all its guises admit that this period in the discipline’s history has been misrepresented and the narrative of the Great Debate is a myth (Mearsheimer, 2005: 143). Proof of the strength of the argument and evidence put forward by the disciplinary historians.

\(^{51}\) Dystopia is unsuitable as it would almost imply that realists campaign for such a situation.
Conclusion

The chapter set out to address three specific issues. The first was the link between Carr and Mannheim and why it requires attention. This was addressed by examining in some detail the basic tenets of the fundamental parts of *Ideology and Utopia*, a text mentioned by Carr has heavily influential on his approach. These were then linked to Carr’s method of deconstruction of the liberal tradition. The second task was to clarify the extent to which Mannheim’s approach is useful for any disciplinary history. In order to achieve this, a Mannheimian analysis of the major contribution of disciplinary history in IR theory was performed, showing, that an argument can be drawn on the structural sociology of knowledge method which justifies the existence of the myth of the First Great Debate and its destruction within certain models of the sociology of knowledge. Thus, the three tasks have been achieved in an over-lapping manner, but the grander reason for this discussion of IR’s disciplinary history, realism and the link to the sociology of knowledge was in order to identify the questions which need to be asked of the discipline of EUS.

Tentatively, three questions are evident. First, stemming from Mannheim’s model of ideology and utopia – ‘What is the Mannheimian structure of the discourse? Is it consensual, monopolistic or atomised?’. The second coming from Carr, via Mannheim’s discussion of generations, ‘What phase of development is the discipline in? Is it in a stage of infancy, and if so is the discipline accordingly utopian in its expectations?’ The third stems from the discussion of disciplinary history and the predominant method of analysis which can be described perhaps not in a question but an inquisition. ‘Ask
first what is assumed to be true. Who then are the protagonists and what are they thought to have said and is this the case? Then consider those voices who are present. Why are they here and not someone else?’ Only through a series of logical and connected questions can some understanding of the discourse be found. The answers to all these questions must be combined and compared. No one method mentioned here will suffice as they all suffer from weaknesses – Carr and Mannheim’s questions focus too much on structural determinants; the historical approach too much on content without reference to intent or context. While it would be foolish to argue that the two are complementary - they have too many differences to be so - they still provide a set important questions to pose when addressing the disciplinary history and nature of EUS.
**Entr’Acte**

**Section 1 summary**

As mentioned in the Introduction, the dissertation is divided into two sections. The first section has set out to achieve two tasks. The first of these is to present a discussion of realism’s source and to consider the opportunities of liberating realism from its hegemonic and Cold War, rationalist legacies; the second to outline a method and rationale for analysing discourses and disciplinary politics. A bi-partite version of realism was developed with a focus on practical and hermeneutic politics. The two parts of the realist approach stem equally from three foundational propositions. The first of these is a belief in the importance of scepticism in political discourse, not simply as a state of mind, but as a philosophical and ethical endeavour in response to the other important part of political discourse – optimism embodied by modernist, idealist theories. Realists see themselves as providing one part of a discussion about politics, and see debate between competing narratives as the healthy state of academic discourse. The second, stemming from the first, is that realism is highly pessimistic towards the possibility of transformation of the essence of politics – it always being engaged in struggle between distinct groups over resources. The third and final of these propositions relate to realism’s inescapable connection with an ‘external’ reality from which narratives may
be developed, analysed and tested against one another. It is important to say, that while realism has such an unbreakable link to the real world, it is still imbued with a epistemological and ethical relativism, without reaching the radical levels of poststructuralists.

A framework was then developed from the work of Karl Mannheim on the study of ideologies and utopias in social discourse. According to Mannheim, ideas do not spring from the rock, nor do they stem from individuals as liberalism would have us believe, but are in fact, social constructs reflective of specific economic, social and historical factors. On top of this important point, it was argued that debate between actually competing theories is a more productive structure than any form of homogenous or hegemonic one. This is the source, through Carr, of the notion that realists see themselves as one side of a dynamic and productive dialectic with idealism. The next section will use this framework in the analysis of the development of EUS. This development is divided into two phases. These will be described as the integration theory phase and the polity-building phase. It will be seen that the development of the discipline through these two phases has had a marked and negative impact on the study of the EU as an international actor by legitimising an approach that sees the EU as unique, the need for a critical alternative as unnecessary, and supporting a confused and at times contradictory ontology and epistemology.

Broadly speaking, the previous two chapters have related to the general issues of social theory, in particular, how ideas are ‘disciplined’ into
theories, paradigms and disciplines; and the politics among such ideas. In order to do this the mode of analysis of the disciplinary historian will be adopted. The examination of recent work on the First Debate between realism and idealism in IR was not arbitrarily chosen. Two important additions stem from the analysis. The first of these is an appreciation of the rationale, intent and utility of such a mode of thought and the rejection of the evolutionary version of disciplinary development. The second supplement to the research which this brief analysis provided was a clearer understanding of the need for and role of founding myths of disciplines and the way in which they subsequently affect developments in the discipline. This realisation becomes particularly important when the issue of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate is addressed in the following chapter.

Within EUS, being a relatively young discipline, such reflexive, historical approaches are rare. This is normal for a discipline in its early years. Mannheim and Carr would agree that disciplines in the ‘youth’ tend to be radical, ideological and tending to lack a great degree of self-criticism. The one exception to this is the work of Ben Rosamond (2007 & 2008) on EUS disciplinary politics. EUS has not yet engaged in a wide ranging examination of the current structure’s relationship to the past. Rosamond writes that rather than accepting the whiggish, evolutionary narrative of EUS’ development, ‘progress… may follow from an honest intellectual audit of the many and varied strands of the field’s past’ (2007: 251). In the spirit of this statement the analysis will now occur. What will be seen is the
negation of realism from two key phases of the development of EUS. In showing the absence of a realist alternative within the discourse, a symptom of this imbalance will be presented in the final chapter of this section in the form of the debate surrounding the study of the EU as an international actor and the Normative Power Europe theory in particular.
Section 2

Chapter 4:

Phase 1- The modernist hegemony of European Integration theory

This chapter aims to illustrate the role that realism played, or, more specifically did not play, in the development of the study of European Integration. While this may appear a strange focus for those familiar with the literature (realism not being considered a part of the debate by way of irrelevancy), it is important to understand the development of Integration Theory to appreciate the subsequent development of EUS. This chapter argues that realism, as outlined in this work, has never been present in European Integration discourses. To do this the traditional narrative of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist divide will be examined, along with their implicit connections to IR theory and wider social scientific developments. In examining these two pillars of the integration theory
debate, the chapter will argue that the difference between the two is overstated when considered from a social science standpoint - they are both essentially and in its truest sense, modern, liberal approaches to politics. While this is not a totally novel suggestion, it is absolutely key from the perspective of the argument attempting to be resolved here that the absence of realism from the Integration theory debate and the resulting absence from EUS entirely has had a major impact on the discipline.

This argument is therefore based on the framework developed in Section 1 that realism is not just a theory of international politics but is a state of mind which exists as part of, and opposite to, forms of utopian thought. The ‘healthy’ dialectic between the two ‘urges’ and the ideas which develop out of them, is the natural way of things intellectually - at least according to the realists discussed in the previous section. However, as was argued in Chapter 3, competition is vital to the development of our understanding of politics. Thus, in proving that realism is absent from the academic debate, an imbalance is shown – an imbalance that has had a major impact on the tone and structure of the discipline. What is missing however? What aspects of the integration of Europe have gone unaddressed? The usual answers to such questions are issues like the centrality of power to the EU’s politics and the role of national interests in the integration process but this is only part of realism – the more interesting question which is missing from EUS is the interrogation of the EU’s moral hubris in its international affairs. The bases of the debates outlined in this chapter and the following one will describe why a consistent examination of these claims has failed to materialise.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first, and most substantive, section will examine the development of European Integration as a specific area of study for students of politics. It will set out the parameters of the integration debate and its basic structure, building somewhat on the discussion about the nature of EUS in the introduction to this dissertation. This section will place these parameters within the context of IR theory and broader social theory to identify to some extent their origins. What will be seen in this section is that the intergovernmentalist paradigm, in so far as it can be identified, represented for the discourse the realist representative to integration theory. This was based on the insistence of intergovernmentalists on the primacy of the nation state in the integration process and its obstinacy in the face of its much discussed obsolescence.

The scene set out, the second section will then examine the realist-intergovernmentalist link in detail. This proposition will be interrogated and realism’s oft-discussed statism will be examined and ultimately rejected as a mythological, attributed assumption rather than a part of the tradition. The two will be differentiated in more ontological and epistemological detail but fundamentally it will be shown that the two are quite different and thus the analogy of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate reflecting the similar dichotomy in IR theory is false. The third section will then discuss the implications of this misleading assumption in the terms set out in Chapter 3 on the Sociology of Knowledge asking what sorts of inferences can be drawn from the myth of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist

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52 Accepting of course that while a debate in a formal or informal sense may not have occurred, following the discussion of the realist-idealist ‘debate’ in Chapter 3 that there is a dynamic interconnection between the two IR traditions which still retains a logical connotation despite its mismatch with the actual historical reality.
debate and its masking of the fundamentally liberal basis of both parts of the integration dichotomy, and EUS broadly speaking.

Before beginning the analysis in earnest it is necessary to return briefly to an area raised but not addressed in the scene-setting introductory discussion on the disciplinarity question in EU Studies – that is, the relationship between IR and Comparative politics in the context of the study of the EU. Hix has famously written that scholars of the EU will always learn more about improving the circumstances of those living within the EU by examining the ‘ideas of Madison, Dahl, Easton, Rokkan, Olson, Lijphart, Schmitter, Rose and Majone than either from the likes of Morgenthau, Haas, Hoffman (sic), Waltz, Keohane and Moravek, or from the likes of Lodge, Wallace, Wessels and Nugent’ (1996: 804). Hix’s eschewal of ‘grand theory’ (2005: 14) is reflective of the attitude of those who favour the comparative method in EU Studies. To a great extent it is a fair argument that the political processes within the EU have now developed to a point too complex for traditional theories. However, Hix does admit that integration theory is the bed-rock of the entire sub-discipline and writes that despite their irrelevance to the every-day politics of the EU, ‘the “integration theories” are the intellectual precursors of any theory of EU politics’ (2005: 15). He goes on to say that integration theory and its offspring – liberal intergovernmentalism, supranational governance and rational choice institutionalism – may seem a rather arcane debate’ (2005: 18) but that it remains ‘essential’ for understanding the comparative method as applied to the EU. Or, as mentioned in the introduction, the way in which the study of the EU was transformed from the study of the general
trends of European integration to the empirical study of the every-day politics of the EU. The realisation even among those who favour the comparative method for understanding things ‘as they are’, that some reference to things ‘as they were’ is required – even if they leave this act of contemplation and reflection to others, is key to the study here. In this context, the analysis then aims to place the integration theories within the context of the broad traditions of IR theory in order to contextualise and deconstruct them. This is a vital task as while one is not arguing the inherently ‘international’ nature of the EU53, in accepting that the foundation of modern EUS stems from integration theory, ending the analysis at that point is flawed as it accepts integration theory as-is, without placing it in its own context. This chapter aims to resolve this problem to some extent, particularly in relation to the source and nature of intergovernmentalism.

The overall intent of this chapter is to address the early history of EUS’ development. This could be described as being from functionalism to the renaissance of European Integration theory from the late eighties to the growing use of constructivist approaches in the mid nineties. The following

53 Certain authors still maintain this argument – Paul Magnette’s (2005) *What is the European Union? Nature and Prospects* represents an excellent example of a complete analysis of all aspects of the EU in terms of its being a highly complex international organisation. Many others who stress the role of the Council and Coreper as the central institution of the EU would go some of the way to making this point, but not to the extent that Magnette goes in dismissing the power and importance of the Commission in agenda setting, the Parliament’s steady rise to prominence through its entrepreneurship which has been codified in the Treaties; not to mention the Central Bank, Court of Auditors and Court of Justice. Suggesting that the EU is simply a highly complex international organisation is simply unsustainable in the face of the vast empirical research on the EU’s institutional dynamics. See Wallace, Wallace and Pollack (eds) (2005) & Peterson and Shackleton (eds) (2006) for a wide range of examples to the contrary to, or at least complicating of, Magnette’s vision.
chapter will continue this narrative from this point when the study of the EU became less interested in questions of economic and political integration, and more concerned with questions relating to the social construction of Europe through its social and ideational integration.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{The myth of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate}

To comprehend the inherently ‘international’ nature of the integration debate we must understand the source of neofunctionalism and to do this we must examine Mitrany’s ‘functional approach’. At the outset it should be mentioned that Mitrany never used the term functionalism in any of his original work, it stemming from Haas’ differentiation between what Mitrany had developed and his adaptation of it – functionalism and neofunctionalism. This is significant because we see how theoretical positions in the European integration literature are defined by their opposition, or in Haas’ case supposed opposition, to certain other theories. This is a problem as already seen in relation to realism (Chapter 2) but this problem is magnified when we come to discuss the role of statism in the relationship between realism and intergovernmentalism.

Mitrany developed his functional approach in two texts, \textit{The Progress of International Government} (1933), and \textit{A Working Peace System} (1943). The works stem from a liberal-socialist (Ashworth, 1999) perspective, with elements of proto-institutionalism. He writes that, ‘[o]nly by guiding

\textsuperscript{54} Diez and Wiener (2004) suggest that the phases of the development of EU Studies can be described in three phases; explaining integration, analysing governance and constructing the EU, stretching from the 1960s to the 1980s, and from the 1990s onwards respectively. But because the second two stages have continued in tandem since the mid 1980s they are taken as two parts the same development – the rationalist and constructivist study of the EU post-integration theory. Therefore, for this analysis two phases are identified.
material and technical resources into joint international activities and services could we possibly hope to meet the social needs and claims of the world’s surging population, with fair provision for all’ (Mitrany, 1966: 20). Of course one of the clear lessons to be learned from this intellectual project is the problem of pigeon-holing theorists into specific theoretical boxes, or at least doing so with sensitivity and temerity, but for the purpose of this section of the analysis a certain amount of this is required – perhaps reflecting the necessity for, and impossibility of avoiding, summary in one way or another.

Many would mistakenly assume Mitrany was a federalist of sorts, but in reality he was directly opposed to the European federalist movement on the grounds that the federal system as proposed by Spinelli and others (See Rosamond, 2000: Chap. 2 & Dinan, 1999: Chap. 1), involved the creation of a regional polity which would operate exactly as the existing, and in his opinion, fatally flawed Westphalian system of states with the matching atavism and self-interest of that system (Mitrany, 1966). In particular he opposed the idea of regional organisations because they were inherently exclusionary, the logic being that a region must have a boundary, thus creating another form of division from which conflict would stem. This does not mean that Mitrany opposed all forms of regionalism *per se*. Mitrany adopted a go-local attitude to functional organisations. If a problem could best be solved by a set of local actors then this form of integration was encouraged and if a functional logic develops amongst them this is to be welcomed. However, the integration of Europe was to Mitrany a false
effort to solve certain structural global problems but only within Europe, thus was not to be welcomed due to its exclusionary basis.

The ideas of functionalism are fraught - logically satisfying and near-impossible to implement at once. At base, functionalism believes that cooperation on technical or economic issues between states and other international actors creates an internal logic of cooperation in solving problems of global needs – which could be described as integration. Mitrany believed that ‘it was on specific technical issues that cooperation would advance first and fastest. Cooperation would be embodied and facilitated through international organisations concerning themselves with the specific function that was their given mandate’ (Long and Ashworth, 1999: 6). Underpinning this belief of course is the assumption that states are not as capable of providing for citizens as well as functional institutions due to the transformation in the nature and responsibilities of the modern state.

It is vital to emphasise that the primary concern of Mitrany, and other liberal international theorists, is the citizen. The required transformation of the roles of the state, roles which the state as a single actor was failing to satisfy, were caused by what could be described as the globalisation of human interactions which created a new set of needs. Not only is this geared towards creating a more peaceful world, it is also geared towards a

\[\text{Mitrany’s functional approach was always focused on the satisfaction of needs and he uses the term repeatedly in his work where one might expect other, more specific terms. This is not because Mitrany is deliberately being unclear, but that his argument is a normative one. He is not predicting that international functionalism will spread inexorably, but that its spread is a necessity to protect individuals’ freedom and what is now described as their human security – specifically the provision of basic needs for human existence. On top of this is the need to guarantee the continuance of the world’s liberal democracies.}\]
more efficient, democratic and equitable world\textsuperscript{56}. Unfortunately, while examples of functional cooperation abound in small instances – post and telegraphs, international civil aviation, UNESCO and other specialised areas – the accompanying ‘internal logic’ never developed to the extent predicted and hoped for by Mitrany. Obviously, Mitrany’s writings came before clearly defined notions of liberal institutionalism existed, but Mitrany’s focus on institutions to manage and regulate needs is a fundamental part of institutionalism’s \textit{Weltanshauung}. The belief in the ability of institutions to regulate needs into more peaceful international politics through trade-offs and information sharing have long existed in the liberal tradition – liberal institutionalists’ discussions of the ability of institutions to influence states into accepting absolute gains over relative ones is a mere complication of the very straightforward logic of Mitrany’s functionalism.

Despite the sparse examples of functionalist integration – global integration - the model itself is unquestionably a reasonable one. States, along with other international political, economic and social actors, should be encouraged to cooperate on non-sensitive, non-political matters which will then create linkages and reflexes of cooperation between peoples – this is, in and of itself, a logical proposition – a forerunner of sorts to Deutsch’s transactionalism and Nye and Keohane’s conceptualisation of complex interdependence. It is the logic of functionalism – the elegance of the idea

\textsuperscript{56} Ashworth (1999) points out that despite what many have subsequently thought, Mitrany was not arguing for a global technocracy whose prime directive was efficiency. For Mitrany, this notion of efficiency was something that only bureaucrats and managers thought in terms of – basing an international order on notions of efficiency would bring a different sort of totalitarianism to the world and was utterly undesirable. As mentioned (fn.4) Mitrany was primarily concerned with the liberty of individuals and human needs and these are not necessarily commensurate with efficiency.
that ‘an international community must grow from the satisfaction of common needs shared by the members of different nations’ - that drew such praise from Morgenthau in the introduction to the reissue of *A Working Peace System*. It is also telling that Morgenthau sets the real-world debate in 1966 to be between nationalism and functionalism. Functionalism represented for Morgenthau the rational response to the sheer terrors of nationalism – a ‘political religion, a nationalistic universalism which identifies the standards and goals of a particular nation and the principles that govern the universe’ (1961: 8), which realism simply could not explain or manage in any way. World War II had shown that nationalism was not only a productive ideology for mobilisation of the masses, it was also totally irrational in the worst way – unconcerned or inattentive to the realities of any sort of political or geostrategic reality, and thus highly threatening to the stability of the international system. While remaining cautious as to the possible implications of the full development of functionalism – some variety of ‘one world’-ism, Carr also stresses the dangers of nationalism and the opportunities of the ‘technical’ arms of the League of Nations as a means of stemming the excesses of nationalism and expanding into other areas (Carr, 1945: 42-45)\(^{57}\). However, despite the support of Carr and

\[57\] Carr does not cite Mitrany in his work but unquestionably covers some ground that Mitrany had written on at that stage, particularly in the final chapter of his *Nationalism and After* ‘The prospects of internationalism’ and in *Conditions for Peace*. Carr’s reference to technical organisations and the regional and global centralisation of the management of planned economic development smacks of the functionalist model of a working peace system and like Morgenthau he is terrified by nationalism. He writes in the final paragraph, ‘[t]he best hope of achieving them in the next period lies in the balanced structure of international or multi-national groupings both for the maintenance of security and for the planned development of the economies of geographical areas and groups of nations. This seems the surest prospect of international advance open, at one of the crises of history, to a world bewildered by the turmoil of nationalism and war’ (1945: 70). Carr often cited
Morgenthau, it is clearly not a proto-realist model for peace and prosperity. It is a model which Morgenthau, Carr and Herz were all explicitly supportive of as a solution to the world’s problems. The association between the two approaches (realism and functionalism) draws attention toward the heterodoxy of realist thought in their willingness to support ideas which contain elements that are perceived to be at odds with their own approaches. The point could also be made that it is a reflection of the pragmatism of functionalism by focusing on a problem-solving mode of integration. This allows for the distortion of conceptions of a simple and monolithic national interest into shallow, global ones in a similar sense to Herz’s conception of universalism. Most of all however, it strengthens the vision of the interplay between realist and idealist thought outlined in previous chapters. Realists’ support for such an approach suggests that the dialectic between them is not simply a construct of the classical realists, represented here, but a real and productive intellectual project.

Criticisms of functionalism, like those of classical realism, cannot be based on any sort of scientific base – which was part of Haas’ criticism, as, like most early IR theory, its audience was not the formalised academy of recent times and its purpose was wholly normative. Problems do however arise when we examine the founding principle of functionalist thought – that cooperation on practical/functional issues will lead to cooperation on major, sensitive areas of international affairs. This logic was based on the classic liberal notion that conflict occurs and cooperation breaks down due to a lack of knowledge and lack of cooperative and integrative fora where more

Keynes with whom Mitrany shared many ideas and proposals – particularly in relation to economic problems.
democratic forms of what we would now describe as global governance can occur\(^58\). However, these need to be developed gradually through the development of sufficient interconnections (increasing the costs of reneging on agreements to intolerable levels) and increased knowledge of the intentions of other actors. This can then reduce the endemic security dilemma of such interdependency. This, as was discussed in Chapter 2, is not always true due to the intolerable security dilemma and the problems of irresolvable resource imbalances. Thus, while functionalism is an important and useful framework for examining the development of many forms of global governance if we are to attempt to salvage it, its corner stone is very much the assumption about the damaging role of the nation-state in international politics. From this ontological position, the framework develops\(^59\).

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\(^58\) That said, Mitrany maintained an absolute opposition to the *laissez-faire* capitalism that had led to The Great Depression, and indirectly to World War 2.

\(^59\) Ashworth and Long’s (1999) edited volume on international functionalism presents a series of discussions interpreting a number of modern day examples of integration and international cooperation based on Mitrany’s ideas. But while the use of functionalism has often been to try and identify ‘functionalist’ institutions or dynamics at play – in the EU or the UN’s specialised agencies in particular - Mitrany’s normative intent has been lost or glazed over. This is arguably the result of the added ‘scientific’ focus of neofunctionalism and its behaviouralist background. While behaviourism does not deny normative questions, by nature of its more rigorous and structured approach, it, by its nature, focuses on identifiable and observable phenomenon over normative, metaphysical concerns such as ideological and identity questions. In a re-examination of neofunctionalism’s relationship to modern EU Studies scholarship, Haas (2001) argued that neofunctionalism and constructivism were compatible in many ways, sharing a concern for cognitions, perceptions and identity, Rosamond (2005) and others (Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener, 2001 & Risse, 2004) have pointed out the inherent problems of emphasising the similarities when the ontologies of rationalism, of which neofunctionalism is part, and reflectivism, of which constructivism is part. This view however will be examined and largely rejected in the following chapter – but on different grounds to Haas’.

The loss of the normative element, a vital part of Mitrany’s theory makes in a strange sense, his approach closer in some ways to the classical realists than the behaviourists who claim his legacy as their own. Mitrany’s response to Haas’
Neo-functionalist theorists departed from Mitranian functionalism on three basic counts; firstly, they rejected his global outlook as totally unmanageable; secondly, they reassessed the influence of domestic politics, specifically in terms of pluralism, on the integration process after Mitrany had rejected it; and finally they strengthened the methodology by making the approach more empirical. This is often thought to be the most important aspect, as coming from the American behaviouralist tradition, it changed functionalism from being prescriptive to descriptive or depictive, or at least aimed to but in reality this was a natural result of the up-take of any idea into the American academy. Neofunctionalists were interested in the production of testable hypotheses, a complete and coherent theoretical framework and rigorous methodology. Its claim to a scientific mandate rested on its objective approach to the data and distancing itself from the normative intent of Mitrany’s work, but while it did distance itself from the normativity of functionalism it appeared to adopt much of the enthusiasm for the European project of federalism, often appearing to be the theoretical home of Europhiles. Its practical codification, Duchêne might suggest confiscation, of the ‘Monnet Method’ of integration is a definite factor in this phenomenon. Although now accepted as being insufficient to explain EU politics in isolation, even by its founder member Ernst Haas in works in

publication is interesting. He disputes the distinction which Haas draws between technical and practical and the ‘reliance’ on ‘voluntary’ bodies for the performance of voluntary tasks. He writes: ‘Neither is true of my thinking and writing’. The key point he makes, as mentioned, is that functionalism is a response to the changing needs of citizens. Mitrany argued that the needs of people had transformed to the point where traditional state formations were no longer capable of maintaining democratic support. On top of the need to maintain these systems he believed it was also vital to ‘widen the basis for a cooperative peace’ (Mitrany papers, ‘Note to Ernst Haas’, 14th November 1963).
the early 1970s, neofunctionalism has affected the agenda of the discourse and its lexicon more than any other. Unquestionably, it represents the ‘authorised version’ of European integration. This is enormously significant as one of the foremost criticisms to be levelled at EU Studies is its overly close connection to the political project of European integration and will be contemplated in the conclusion. What is important however is that the ontological basis, the problems of the nation-state, remained constant.

Haas of course was not the only neofunctionalist and while he did unquestionably frame the integration theory debate, others, spurred on by the real world success of integration projects worldwide, developed, modified and rejected parts of his framework – all under the neofunctionalist banner. However, while it is of course difficult to summarise an entire body of theory in a couple of paragraphs a number of points can be made for the development of the argument relating to the state and intergovernmentalism. Three major points should be made about neofunctionalism in the context of its development out of functionalism – spill-over; the role of supranational organisations as an independent, self interested actor encouraging integration; and the regionalisation of the functionalist approach. Outside of these three practical points, it is important to say that whereas functionalism looked towards a telos of effective global governance, neofunctionalists changed the focus to what they considered to be more realisable problems of the conditions for integration. For example, one of the criticisms of neofunctionalists and integration theorists in general is the failure to provide an account of how
international developments affected the integration process, or that their analyses are overly reductionist or inward-looking, particularly in Hoffmann’s ‘Obstinate or Obsolete – The nation state in Western Europe’ (1966).

However, Haas accounts for this in his early work – in one of the defining pieces of neofunctionalist literature ‘International Integration: the European and Universal Processes’ – writing that while, ‘external environments produce motives favouring integration, they are never sufficient in themselves to explain the rate and intensity of the process’ (1961: 376). What is important in this is the focus that neofunctionalism has on the internal conditions. By rejecting or at least sidelining the importance of global factors such as the balance of power, alliances or security consumption, Haas makes it clear that integration will rise or fall based on the internal conditions. This is reflective of the neofunctionalists’ behavioural vision of politics, stemming from the work of David Easton (1953) on political systems theory – thus, if the conditions were correct, integration will develop with suitable stimulus; if the conditions do not match, integration will perhaps develop in an early stage but will eventually flounder.

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60 While not a key addition to the received version of neofunctionalism, Haas (1975) and Schmitter (1971) both realised that the external environment did play a far greater role than originally expected but despite their Hegelian re-examination of the original works, this is generally not seen as major part of the canon.
The conditions identified by Haas were threefold. The first, and most important, was a pluralistic political system in operation in the involved states. The second factor was that a high degree of economic and industrial development was required. The third and final factor was that there must exist some level of ideological convergence between the integrating actors (1961: 374-8). Thus, whereas Mitrany relied on the logic of cooperation to develop on its own terms, Haas and others, unhappy with the automaticity inherent in this idea, set out to suggest that while the functionalist logic is accurate, it requires levels of commitment at the individual state level. Such levels of commitment to integration must be satisfied for integration to occur. Along with this, key environmental factors must be present. The identification of these environmental factors is perhaps neofunctionalism’s most significant development/expansion of Mitrany’s work aside from the purely practical point of focusing on regional over global integration.

Before then going on to the development of intergovernmentalism, the key tenets of neofunctionalism require clarification. The first as mentioned is the concept of spill-over. This is described as an essentially Mitranian concept but it is certainly not central to his writings. Mitrany saw further cooperation develop organically between those involved in cooperative agreements – further technical integration would result from the problems inherent in the state system, solutions would be reached because of the increasing pluralism within states which encouraged them towards more cooperation (Cram, 1996: 46-7). Neofunctionalism on the other hand was dissatisfied with this evolutionary and vague image. Haas instead described
the development of further integration and cooperation as developing by the process of spill-over - whereby, to integrate on a single technical area which states seek to cooperate on, coal production for example, you cannot simply cooperate on coal production for the project to operate as it requires integration in both economic policy and transportation policy. This often unintended, second-step integration is the core of neofunctionalism and its differentiation from functionalism as whereas Mitrany saw the technical areas as exclusive to a great extent, or at least it was possible to isolate such areas, Haas focused on the linkages between technical areas. He then argued that with sufficient spill-over in technical areas, and the creation of linkages between the supranational institutions set up to regulate the behaviour of the functional organisations, political spill-over can then develop within a suitable environment (1958: 283-317). This leads us to the second major aspect of neofunctionalism – the role of institutions.

Despite Mitrany’s criticism that regional supranational authorities ‘would in effect be hardly less than a world government; and such a strong central organism would inevitably tend to take unto itself rather more authority than that originally allotted to it’ (1966: 75), the power-urge of the institutions created is a fundamental part of the integrative dynamic in the neofunctionalist narrative. Haas’ believed that much of the stimulus to integrate stems from the institutions themselves. This has been a major aspect of much of the study of the EU, not simply in terms of do the institutions, particularly the Commission, spur integration, but also questions about the complex distribution of and struggle for power between
the separate institutions of the EU. So whereas Mitrany was anxious that institutions created operated in the form of technocracy – government as a set of managerial tasks and therefore non-ideological, or apolitical as Haas argued – neofunctionalists saw the institutions created as paramount to the integration process, or ‘agents of integration’ (1958: 29). They act as agents by facilitating bargaining between members and aim to stimulate transfers of loyalty from the national to regional within elites (Cram, 1996: 45). In saying this, neofunctionalism gave a major role to what has subsequently been described as the ‘policy entrepreneur’ or a specific powerful and enigmatic figure that can, through force of personality, encourage policies to be adopted to further integration. This foreseen transfer of loyalties from the national to the regional – a fundamental requirement for any political integration - leads us to the third major point to mention about neofunctionalist though – namely the regionalisation of functionalism.

The creation of regional political organisations flew directly in the face of Mitrany’s normative intent. When analysing the development of the European Communities in 1975, Mitrany described the project as a federal and regional fallacy, by creating new states in the form of a ‘United States of Europe’ and in the drawing of imaginary, but nonetheless exclusionary boundaries across the continent. Mitrany’s position on the regional organisation is best described by Rosamond. He writes that such forms of

61 It is important to mention, that Mitrany supported the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM as they presented solutions to the management and stability of production and prices in the region. These were essentially Mitranian organisations. Their subsequent combination with the economic community was a neofunctionalist development of sorts.
integration are inherently ‘atavistic because they generated antagonisms and... recidivist because they took governance back to the anachronistic foundations of statehood and territory’ (2000: 38). Ashworth and Long echo this sentiment writing, ‘[t]he functional approach emerged as a first sketch of an alternative conception of peaceful change to the territorial perspective of the realists and idealists... The functional approach, then, was a direct criticism of the territorial basis of the realist approach to peaceful change. Mitrany fervently wanted to get away from the primacy of states. He did not want to abolish states; rather he wanted to subvert their primacy in international relations’ (1995: 6-7). Neofunctionalists on the other hand could not tolerate the impracticality, as they and many others saw it any case, of Mitrany’s global vision and saw regional integration as the only possible route for widespread integration, and successful empirical research. As mentioned this is perhaps the biggest indicator of the divergence between functionalism and neofunctionalism, as it marked the derogation of the normative intent of the original framework, which was never intended to be a theory and only became one in response to Haas’ theory (Ashworth and Long, 1995: 2-4). Gone was the global vision of a ‘working peace system’ and in its place, a practical, self-interested technocracy whose very existence reproduced the inequalities and atavism of the state system, all for reasons based on a method that was utterly foreign to Mitrany’s work and intent.

It must be clearly said that the disparate work of neofunctionalists such as Haas and Schmitter was not perceived as a single theory, or
paradigmatically, until it became the stated ‘enemy’ of the statist, intergovernmentalist approach in the early 1970s. Previously, it had represented the entire study of integration and debate and differences between theorists was considered the debate – other theoretical positions were not present. This then changed with the development of a specific alternative to neofunctionalist integration – intergovernmentalism. Of course, the term intergovernmentalism had been in existence for much longer than its specific integration theory use but despite that, the term in this context refers to the statist critique of neofunctionalism that developed in the early 1960s and which came to prominence theoretically during what is referred to as the ‘Decade of De Gaulle’ (Dinan, 1999: 37-57). What is important to take from this short discussion of neofunctionalism and its connection to, and disconnection from, functionalism, is the fundamentally liberal nature of the two frameworks. While neither fit firmly within specific international relations theories – integration being a very specific and complex political interaction in comparison to the normal use of liberal theory – they both contain strong bases in liberal theory – through their critique of the state system; the blurring of the lines between what is erroneously called ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics; the fundamental internationalism of their vision; the idealism of their intent to create systems of peaceful and prosperous interaction based on absolute over relative gains; the strong emphasis on institutions as modes of managing disputes, and in the case of neofunctionalism, the focus on domestic political processes such as pluralism as a basis for political action. In the case of functionalism, the emphasis on the individual as the starting point for the analysis and
resolution of global needs. On top of this is the strong normative element in Mitrany’s work which is flattened to a great extent by the behaviouralist basis of neofunctionalism. These would all be familiar to any undergraduate student as being liberal, modernist theoretical traits. While this is of course an act of stating the obvious, it is important to make clear for the purposes of the argument to follow regarding the paternity of intergovernmentalism and the impact which the disclosure of the true pater familias on our understanding of the sociology of the European integration theory debate, that while functionalism and neofunctionalism have differences in epistemology and normative intent, they both rest firmly within the liberal international tradition.

This brief discussion of the relationship between functionalism and neofunctionalism is in fact a key part of our understanding of the development of intergovernmentalism and the skewed references to ‘realism’ in subsequent years. With the development of neofunctionalism and subsequently intergovernmentalism, a battle line was drawn across the integration process. The line was drawn, not on the reasons for the process or the economic, social, or cultural dynamics within European integration which caused it, but on the role of the nation-state in international politics. The conflict between the two approaches was over the perceived flaws of the Westphalian system and the debate between those who thought that the nation-state was obsolete and dangerous on one side, and those who defended its relevance and relative success as a means for the management of domestic and international affairs on the other. Our attention now moves
to those who rejected the neofunctionalist vision. The analysis of intergovernmentalism will outline, firstly, what could be described as traditional intergovernmentalism before going on to liberal intergovernmentalism. The narrative of the combination of these two approaches as being ‘EU brand realism’ will be the main overall focus but it will remain in the background as its essentially ‘unrealist’ basis will be developed. This discussion will conclude the first section of the chapter and lead into the next section which will discuss the exact nature of the relationship between realism and intergovernmentalism. This raises previous points made about different varieties of realism made in Chapter 2. At this point it is important to cut off a criticism relating to the ease of proving this theoretical argument correct by defining realism so narrowly, (so as to allow entry for only a tiny number of scholars and even then with caveats and the turning of blind eyes to certain aspects of their work) – and conversely defining intergovernmentalism so as to fit a preordained notion of what constitutes a liberal theory.

This problem however is not going to vanish with a sufficient number of quotes or references - it is a theoretical argument and therefore it suffers from the same problem of any theoretical argument structured in this cumulative way. This criticism will be addressed in far greater detail in the Conclusion of this dissertation but suffice to say, the possibility of such a criticism has not gone unnoticed. On that note, and to tip one’s hand slightly, the discussion does not simply aim to problematise the realist-intergovernmentalist connection, of which uncritical reproductions of the
concept abound\textsuperscript{62}, but to stress the liberal nature of intergovernmentalism. To do this, summarising is once again required, along with a limiting of the

\textsuperscript{62} The title of Mark Gilbert’s (2003) \textit{Surpassing Realism – The Politics of European Integration since 1945}, is perhaps the pinnacle of this trend. With no more reference to realism than ‘interpretations of European integration, with their emphasis on what J.H.H Weiler calls “cold calculations of cost and benefit to its participating member states,” he risks missing the wood from the trees. “Realists” concentrate on the facts that they find in the archive documents and dismiss the \textit{thousands} of books, pamphlets, articles and speeches by postwar statesmen in favour of European unity as windy rhetoric, or even propaganda designed to disguise the economic consequences of the decisions they have taken’ (2003: 10). Aside from the rather strange criticism that Gilbert lays at the EU-realists’ feet, a definition of realism is non-existent. Other than this reference to some sort of economic cost-benefit analysis and a mention of ‘power politics’ and ‘immediate interests’ the author fails to provide justification for use of the term realism. For evidence of these alleged ‘realists’ Gilbert points to Moravcsik and Milward (2003: 10 fn.10). The problems inherent in this will be discussed further below. Laura Cram’s discussion of the ‘realist/intergovernmentalist’ approach, involves a similar sleight of hand. Referring to the dominance of realism within IR theory and the influence of Morgenthau, she cites \textit{Politics Among Nations}, but the source of her definition is Keohane and Nye’s 1977 \textit{Power and Interdependence} which stresses the balance of power, military force and the maintenance of ‘military security’ as the ‘apex of a states hierarchy of goals (1996: 48). Not only is this a mendacious definition of Morgenthau’s politics – one of Machiavelli without \textit{The Discourses} – by sourcing scholars who while respectful, are ultimately rejecting Morgenthau, we see the \textit{concentration} of the myth of realism being a theory of states and war and little else.

Michael O’Neill’s textbook (1996: 56-64) reinforces the view that not only was intergovernmentalism engaged primarily in a debate with neofunctionalists, it also drew its theoretical support from realism, which is a described as a ‘state-centric’ paradigm. While showing a better understanding of realism’s broad conservatism and hesitancy to assume that transformation of form is change in process, he eventually comes to the conclusions that realists are incapable of accepting even transformation in form writing ‘sovereign states… remain… the only legitimate source of authority and the fount of political obligation in the contemporary as they were in medieval and ancient worlds’ (1996: 57). O’Neill’s summary of the ‘state-centric’ paradigm is the model example of the trends identified here. The perceived place of realism in relation to the range of integration theories and explanations of both integration theory and EU governance literature is shown wonderfully in a graphic presented by Schmitter (2004: 48). In it realism is situated in a corner of an epistemology/ontology table, surrounded by intergovernmentalism which is in turn surrounded by liberal intergovernmentalism. In the furthest corner from it, is functionalism, surrounded by neo-functionalism and then Schmitter’s neo-neofunctionalism. The problem of all this of course is that this consolidates the connections between the intergovernmentalism and realism without any justification – or reflection on the basic rationalist assumptions in neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalism – which is an ontological assumption, not an epistemological one. The growing conclusion is that realism has more in common with functionalism than any other theory involved in the integration debate. In the chapter on liberal-intergovernmentalism written by Frank Shimmelfennig (2004), realism is correctly not mentioned as a forerunner but the
scope of the authors covered. It is interesting to note also that in the same way that functionalism and neofunctionalism exhibited considerable divergence, similarly intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are highly differentiated. This in itself is an interesting point, one supportive of the problems surrounding the often lackadaisical combination of highly differentiated bodies of theory together for simplicity or logical coherency as discussed in Chapter 2. The problem it causes however are serious, as it breeds and foments utterly false perceptions of certain theories or ideas - realism having certainly suffered most as a result of this problem. However, while this is a major problem and of no little concern in this dissertation, the intergovernmentalist tradition – including Moravcsik’s *explicitly* liberal adaptation – can be dealt with contemporaneously because of their common ontological positions. These commonalities are the obstinacy of the state and a belief in the rational operation of politics in some variety. Underlying the approach however is an attempt to explain and to some extent, justify, nationalistic behaviour. Before tilting at that particular windmill, the basic traits of the approach will be outlined – statism and rationality – Hoffmann’s criticism of statism of IR theory, broadly speaking, is. However, Michael O’Neill (1996) describes liberal-intergovernmentalism as neorealism which is highly problematic. What is clear is that the conceptualisation of realism is firstly statist and rationalist – the exact traits identified by Schimmelfennig (2004: 74-8) of liberal intergovernmentalism – but yet, as mentioned realism is rightly eschewed in his discussions. The waters become only cloudier. Many other examples exist but this is in no way aiming to be exhaustive – more illustrative of the enormous inconsistency in references to and understandings and descriptions of realism within this literature. It is this muddle which the chapter aims to clear up to some small extent but mainly to show that the connections which have been traditionally drawn between the theories of European integration are unclear, and on top of that, have left realism bereft of meaning other than a by-word for those ‘non-believers’.
neofunctionalism’s blurring of the lines between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics already dealt with above.

Gilbert’s definition of the classical understanding of the term intergovernmentalism will begin the discussion: ‘Intergovernmentalism… is the conviction that cooperative government in Europe is difficult or impossible unless one gives decisive institutional weight to the interests and voices of the national governments’ (Gilbert, 2003: 12). Thus, as we know, for integration to occur it has to be at the agreement and behest of the Member States and is not significantly affected by the institution’s desire for integration – not ambivalent to the interests of the central institution, but believing that it is a much less significant actor than neofunctionalism allows. It is significant to stress also that traditional intergovernmentalists – Hoffmann and Milward being the most significant examples – stress the international/external formation of states’ national interests; that they stem from the relative power relations of the states involved - the classical realist conception of the national interest. These interests, for Hoffmann at least, also matched the interests of the dominant elite of the Member States and not the pluralistic community of interest groups and stake-holders argued by the neofunctionalists.

The intergovernmentalist stance on Europe was always present in the minds of the practitioners it was argued, as while integration could occur on the technical issues of ‘low’ politics, on sensitive ‘high’ politics states were not
satisfied to accept the deferred returns which neofunctionalism expected them to. Not only was this idea of deferred returns based entirely upon trust, it still could only work up to a point and solely within non-sensitive areas – i.e. outside of areas of taxation and foreign and security policy (1964). Rosamond summarises Hoffmann’s stance writing, ‘[h]igh politics was virtually immune from the penetration of integrative impulses... Permanent gains over loses might work in the arena of economic integration, but... it could never prevail for political integration’ (2000: 70). Hoffmann’s clear delineation between the functional, mainly economic and social aspects of integration and the ‘political’ integration of Europe could never lead to the transcendence of the state by a supranational authority in the full sense as states would never trust anyone but themselves with their own fate. He writes:

‘My own conclusion is sad and simple. The nation-state is still here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed because the nations in Western Europe have not been able to stop time and to fragment space. Political unification could have succeeded if, on the one hand, these nations had not been caught in the whirlpool of different concerns, as a result both of the profoundly different internal circumstances and of outside legacies, and if, on the other hand, they had been able or obliged to concentrate on “community building” to the exclusion of all problems situated either outside their area or within each one of them’(1966: 863-4).

Hoffmann describes how the state, supported by the legitimacy of the fundamental principle of self-determination, remains within its own orbit of the actors around it – experiencing the noises and smells emitted by
neighbouring houses to use his metaphor. And because of this, and the divisions and policies of the internal space, the state is obstinate in the face of the expected, eventual obsolescence of neofunctionalism. On top of this internal decision not to perform ‘hara-kiri’ – integrating the nation-state away – the member states failed to agree a role that the EC had to play internationally. By failing to provide a vision of the international role it would play (1966: 867) the Member States are not going to leave themselves regions lost within a neo-medieval order with little or no strong external presence.

Thus, Hoffmann falls back on the problem of the national interest. He defines it as the outcome of the sum of the national situation multiplied by the outlook of foreign policy makers. ‘It is obvious also that national interests of different nations will not be defined in easily compatible terms if those respective outlooks are nationalist, even when the situations are not so different’ (1966: 869). Hoffmann’s point was strengthened by the developing ‘Empty chair crisis’ and the failure of the Member States to further the integration process throughout the sixties and seventies. De Gaulle’s nationalistic recalcitrance backed up Hoffmann’s argument but ultimately, for EU Studies, it was seen not simply as an empirical conformity argument, but that it ‘signalled the opening of the field to some of the broader concerns of International Relations. Indeed, the history of integration theory since the mid-sixties is usually presented as a conversation between these two broad schools... So, it should be remembered that the intergovernmental ‘turn’ in the study of the EC was not just a matter of empirical conformity, but was also a question of
disciplinary ‘catch up’ [with IR theory]’ (Rosamond, 2000: 80-81). Because of realism’s dominance of IR theory Rosamond argued that the appearance of the intergovernmentalist position, possessed of ‘great disciplinary weight’, created a sense of ‘theoretical crisis’ (2000: 81).

In being fundamentally based on the primacy of states but also on the right of national self-determination – the legitimisation of nationalism – Hoffmann’s theory, while rejecting the pluralism of the neofunctionalists and stressing the difficulties of finding easy cooperation on areas of sensitivity, is still more in tune with classical liberal internationalism, or Wilsonian liberalism, than the realism discussed in this work – a form of idealist nationalism to use Herz’s classification. Herz defines it so:

as a ‘system of thought [that] amalgamated pacifist-humanitarian with liberal-democratic elements. The doctrine of national self-determination had as its source the same ideology that produced the idea of the right of individual self-determination. Rationalist individualism was opposed not only to restrictions enforced upon the individual but also to “cabinet politics” that disposed of populations with their consent. Thus, the “fundamental” rights of nationalities were considered to be the same as those of man, namely, freedom from interference and oppression’ (1950: 161)

The argument Hoffmann makes therefore is not simply an empirical one – (he was too complex and interesting a theorist to simply rely on

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63 This discussion descends into a fudge. Rosamond cannot explain the relationship between integration theory, intergovernmentalism and realism so he dodges the question - making reference to the Second Debate between realism and the English school, but this is a secondary question. *International Organisation* may have been set up to offer an opportunity to liberal scholars but this has got very little to do with Hoffmann – particularly since he weighed in on the side of the traditionalists of the English School and outwith in the critique of the extreme positivism which was developing in the liberal & realist parts of behaviouralism and economism.
straightforward empiricism) - but is also a theoretically interesting one. Hoffmann’s insistence on the limits of the integration process and the tenacity of the nation-state is invariably described as realist in EU Studies literature (Cram, 1996; Gilbert, 2003; George 1996: 31-3; O’Neill, 1996). On one level this is not surprising but, as will be discussed in the conclusion, it is an important point to make about the development of EU Studies. While this approach contains mainly explicitly liberal aspects, it is still portrayed as a direct descendant of North American realism, when in fact it goes deeper into the mists of IR history and the earliest IR theories, those of Kant and subsequently those inspired by rational individualists such as Adam Smith. There is nothing, for example, to distinguish greatly between the approach of Nye or Keohane from that of Hoffmann, both of whom had studied under Hoffmann (Cohen, 2008: 23). They both concur on the primacy of the state, some external process of interest formation mediated by an internal situation, and geared towards the more efficient and peaceful management of international affairs. Let it be very clear – Hoffmann was not arguing that international cooperation was doomed to failure, simply that the neofunctionalist argument of political integration was based on an unsustainable act of faith. The economistic, behaviouralist approach of the neofunctionalists allowed them to assume that actors will accept deferred pay-offs on specific areas today with the guarantee of returned gains in the future. Hoffmann, Milward’s 64 (1992) The European

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64 Milward’s text outlines the development of the integration process as an evolutionary rather than teleological process. He believed that the nation states of the continent were evolving in function and form, but not being undermined by the process. Milward’s analysis describes how the integration of states was the ‘adaptive response of Europe’s medium sized and modestly resourced states, as they faced daunting global pressures beyond their immediate control’ (O’Neill,
Rescue of the Nation State, and subsequently Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism\textsuperscript{65}, illustrated and argued for an alternate rationality to the one argued by the behaviouralists. This alternate rationality will be discussed now as the second main pillar of intergovernmentalist thought.

The question of rationality is the basic ontological difference\textsuperscript{66} between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. It was not a divide of the rationalist/reflectivist divide, but between two highly rationalist approaches. As outlined already, neofunctionalism stemmed from the behaviouralist revolution of the late 1950 which based itself entirely on the economic, rational actor assumption – but it was a rational actor who was capable of accepting long-term pay-offs and absolute gains within specific institutional

\[1996: 55]\). Cooperation and integration provided a means for the survival and rather than the obsolescence of the state. What is most important about this approach to integration is the perceived sanctity of the state, echoing the neo-Hegelian approach to the state as a sacred historical trust. What is important to note about Milward’s text however is the fundamentally un-theoretical nature of it. Milward is inspired by a dislike for the grand theorising of neofunctionalism and wants to show that far from the integration process being teleological and possessed of an unassailable internal logic from which integration will stem (2000: 17), it is led by states. This to Milward was too much – as perhaps many political theories are to historians. Milward goes on to argue that the process firstly has stemmed entirely from the decisions of states – with little role played by the institutions themselves other than as fora for negotiation.

\textsuperscript{65} Without going into too great detail, Moravcsik’s theory is a parsimonious one which unlike neofunctionalism aims to explain the gradual integration process, and looks to explain within a statist framework the history making decisions. Moravcsik describes the sources of integration as being part of the national interest - towards which he adopts a traditional approach. Subsequent products of integration stem from traditional approaches to intergovernmental bargaining, thus linking the liberal with the intergovernmental. ‘National interests emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form and new policy alternatives are recognised by governments. An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 481). Member state governments, who are concerned with staying in office, bring these ‘negotiated’ national interests to interstate bargaining, a process which can extend the scope of government control, paradoxically strengthening the position of the state (1994).

\textsuperscript{66} It is an ontological difference in terms of the fact that the rationality is constant – simply the directives which limit the rationality are different.
settings. The intergovernmentalist logic is essentially the same in its classic, Benthamite and ‘liberal’ sense, as it is based on the same rational actor assumption – but this time within the same basic directives, the bounds of that rationality are quite different. For intergovernmentalists, as has been mentioned, the rationality involved is one based on the identification of clear national interests decided an assessment of the internal situation and the external context. While the essential similarity in ontology is downplayed it is referred to indirectly in a couple of places. Schmitter (2003: 72, fn.2) suggests that despite the efforts of Moravcsik to define his liberal intergovernmentalism as a unique addition to the discourse, ‘[i]f Moravcsik were to concede that the calculations of member-states was affected not only by “domestic interests”, but also (and even increasingly) by transnational firms, associations and movements working through domestic channels, then, his approach would be virtually indistinguishable from neofunctionalism – just much less specific in its assumption and hypotheses’. He goes on to admit that the intrusion of integration on ‘high’ politics from the ‘low’ would require some attention, along with the notion that transformation was occurring also and not simply an iterated and identical game. Elsewhere, Diez and Wiener write that, ‘Two theoretical approaches came to dominate the debate. Both were based on rational actor assumptions, while locating the push and pull for the integration process at different levels and in different societal realms’ (2003: 8). While the differences between the two rationalities are important from a practical point of view in that they both produce specific testable hypotheses and research questions they represent almost matching thought styles.
Mannheim writes, ‘that it is not, as one would be tempted to assume at first sight, one epistemology that struggles with another, but the struggle that always goes on between various theories of knowledge... In the historical and social framework, theories of knowledge are really only advance posts in the struggle between thought-styles’ (1952: 228). Thus, the point is not so much the specifics of the two theories, although of course, they have great practical importance as mentioned, but whether the two actually represent two separate approaches. Of course, they have specific practical differences but the resounding impression which the issue of rationality suggests is that the two theories represent part of the essentially North American approach to theories which stemmed from the behaviouralist school – which is an inherently modernist and liberal one. The fact that both of these theories rest on this principle is to a great extent normal – this sort of epistemology is, to a great extent, normal science. However, as Lebow and Lichbach’s (2007) excellent Theory and evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations shows, the dominance of the rationalist, empiricist method has led to a great deal of not just homogeneity in research output but a normative and ethical hollowness.

The hegemony of positivist empiricism hangs over European integration theory like a pall. The fact that the two theories stemmed out of two of the major developments in North American political science in the last half century or so – behaviouralism and liberal institutionalism67 – has an

67 Realism is probably the third on the list However, the form of realism discussed here is a form which attempted to remain separate to the two approaches mentioned. It is a brand that deliberately avoided a sort of intellectual pluralism, based as it was on the dialectic between itself and liberalism and not a joining
enormously important part to play in the study of the EU. The reason it is so significant is that these two approaches share many of the same methodological, epistemological and ontological assumptions. This leads to highly homogenous types of research – with mildly divergent outcomes. To use a scientific analogy – neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism use the exact same apparatus and the exact same ingredients but produce two quite different products through the alteration of one part of the process – i.e. the formation and actualisation of the national interest. This is not a criticism of European Integration in itself; it is not the fault certainly of the theorists involved that they adopt the particular theories popular in their time and place – however it has had a very significant impact on the way the EU is studied today. It is useful to repeat the mantra that the discipline of today is shaped by the debates that went before. The final section will discuss some ideas as to how this false perception of a debate affected the development of EU Studies, but before that, the second aspect of the intergovernmentalist/realist link requires permanent severing.

**Realism’s statism – an overdue obituary**

This rejection of the statist assumption within realism is an important one for the study of realist theory as it offers an alternative to the mythological\(^68\) interpretations of realism as a theory of states and war, and nothing else. Realism has an unquestionable association with states and statehood as the

\(^68\) Like with any myth, there is an element of truth – many realists were entirely committed statists – both as the only thing worth studying for IR scholars, and also as a sacred trust of sorts – particularly those who might be described as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) realists such as Wolfers, Kennan and Aron.
primary unit of analysis of IR theory, but it has developed mythologically, not through any founding assumption or proposition. Most would be familiar with the 3 S’s of Realism – statism, self-help and survival, as the basis of realist thinking in introductory courses to IR Theory\(^{69}\) but where is this actually coming from? This association with the state is often put forward in an either-or choice for prospective research. Use either realism for analysing just states, or any other theory for the inclusion of any other actors. This view pervades IR and Integration Theory and subsequently, greatly influenced the use of realism. As Warleigh writes in ‘Learning from Europe: EU Studies and the Rethinking of International Relations’, ‘IR involves the the study of formal and informal practices, processes and actors and has the scope to investigate both state and non-state actors. The fact that its orientation has often been rather more restricted than this implies is a function of the dominance of the realist tradition within IR rather than an indication of IR’s necessary limits’ (2006: 34).

This could easily be turned around to say, the scope of IR is broad but the scope of realism is narrow. Or alternatively, the scope of IR is broad, but because of the dominance of the state as the primary unit of analysis realism, being concerned with states, has tended to be the most used tradition of IR. Either way it is approached it does not lessen the state-  

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\(^{69}\) Chris Brown’s (2001) textbook *Understanding International Relations* and Baylis and Smith’s (2001) *The Globalisation of World Politics* are two prime examples of this trend and are certainly two of the most used texts in the field at undergraduate level in the British Isles. Even at advanced undergraduate/postgraduate level this is reproduced by Burchill (2003) in his chapter on Realism and Neorealism in *Theories of International Relations.*
centrism of realism. Rosamond (2000: 164-6) similarly notes that IR has shown that it is more than capable of looking for ways of getting past the ‘state’ problem, citing neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, but again the implication is that realism is incapable of doing so - the Hobbesian millstone that is ‘the state’ forever around its neck. Strangely, the connection of realism to the state is a relatively simple one to overturn, although the cause of the development of the myth is more difficult to identify. One possibility is that the state-centrism stems more from that traditional conservatism of realists and their access to state-level decision makers during the Cold War, than any necessary theoretical trait or assumption. Morgenthau writes very clearly on the subject, that, ‘[w]hile the Realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action should be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and moral requirements of the contemporary world’ (1963: 10). This can be built on with reference to work by Carr (1942 & 1945) already discussed, but arguably the realist scholar who wrote most specifically on the state is John Herz. His treatises on the territorial state are perhaps the most likely basis for much of the statist assumption in realism, based on his articles on ‘The rise and demise of the territorial state’ (1957) and ‘The territorial state revisited – Reflections on the future of the nation state’ (1968), in the conclusion to the
Politics in the Atomic Age (1959), and subsequently in his later writings about his intellectual project. To summarise, in an atomic age national borders are meaningless. Not only is Herz a key part to the statist myth – having coined the ‘hard shell’/territorial analogy, he is also a fundamental part of Waltz’s approach which is seen to have stressed the statist proposition harder than any before. This is of course mythical as when Herz’s thought is considered in its entirety he sides with the ability of political communities to transform totally. This argument will be developed now.

Herz’s study of the state in world politics permeates all aspects of his work to some degree. He examined its Reginald-Perrin-like rise in history; its decline, through the development of forms of world government (but not to the extent expected); its rise again through territorialisation; and more recently again its decline through the permeability of nuclear powers and also the development of global threats to man’s survival, such as environmental damage and overpopulation. Although Herz’s writings only covered the first three of these peaks and troughs in the state’s importance and immutability, in the introduction to his collection of articles The Nation State and the Crisis in World Politics (1976), he writes that were he to revisit the fate of the nation state that it would be again in doubt in its current form. ‘The ability of nations – both old and new – to fulfil the minimum functions lending them internal and external legitimacy has become more questionable; in particular, my assumption that industrialisation would render nations more independent from outside
resources has been drastically disproved (oil and energy crises!). Reading over [‘The territorial state revisited’], I am tempted to write a third one on ‘The territorial state re-revisited’!. It would have to take into consideration the whole gamut of nonstrategic and nonnuclear factors that now imperil the functioning of the states big and small, from food and energy crises to the pollution of the environment in which we live, threats that do not respect either boundaries or the sovereignty of states’ (1976: 18-9). Herz, unlike many realists since – particularly those in the FPA tradition - in no way, to use Marx’s phrase, fetishised the nation state and was quite comfortable with the idea that it would be replaced by larger or more efficient forms of political community. In fact in his earliest published article on the possible scenarios of world organisation in the post world war era, ‘Power Politics and World Organisation’ (1942), he makes a number of extremely interesting statements about the possibility of such global projects and also of the fate of the nation state. A close reading of this article, with an eye on the eventual path of Herz’s thinking, provides us with a number of salient propositions about Herz’s, and a realist, theory of the nation-state.

In his 1942 piece Herz writes, ‘[t]hat the forgoing discussion has been concerned with federalism as a proposal for world government, and not with the various plans propounded for one or another regional federations of existing states. Such schemes may be entirely practicable, but obviously would leave the major problem, that of competing power units, unsolved. (1942: 1046 fn.5). This has two notable implications – firstly, as seen elsewhere in this discussion, that the state is not sacrosanct and eternal, and secondly that ‘power politics’ inhabit any form of political community and
affect the interaction of all forms of community in much the same way – a straightforward but vital point to understand realist thought. Thus, with some foresight, Herz agrees with the predictions of George Orwell in *1984*, seeing the future of bigger political communities, if or when they develop, as ‘ever tied to the politics of power and conflict’. As mentioned, Herz’s analysis of the nation state passed through three stages – a prediction of decline from a position of great importance and impenetrability, a prediction of non-decline or relevance, and then decline again. His final reading of the nation state however reflects the original, 1942 point; that is that the nation state may come or go, but that the basic nature of all political community will remain the same – larger is not better and neither is smaller, but that all communities behave in a relatively egocentric way, not as a result of their inherent egocentrism but because of the nature of political interaction and the nature of the system. It was in the late 1960s that Herz realised that the problems which the world faces do not respect ‘either boundaries or the sovereignty of states’ (1976: 19), rendering questions of territoriality and sovereignty relatively moot.

The title of his 1976 collection, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics*, might be interpreted as there being a connection between the nation-state and the problems of international politics but in fact the book covers Herz’s examination of the nation-state, and then once Herz realises the problems of the international community are beyond the remit of states, his examination of the crisis in world politics. The idea that the nation state is the cause of the problems of world politics is one which Herz would have disagreed with, his political theory being based on the power competition
between all forms of community, so while Herz believed in the expanding and shrinking nature of political community, he fundamentally believed that in whatever form, communities would compete – a message which would have echoed significantly that of Mitrany.

‘The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’ (1957) and *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (1959) conclude with discussions of ‘universalism’ and the change required, as Herz saw, in the operation of international politics if human survival is to be guaranteed. While he discusses the ‘Alternative of universalism’, it is in effect an imagined scenario, or ideal type. Herz does not conclude either piece optimistic of achieving universalism, insisting instead that there are traces of it in existence but that there are too many barriers to its development. He writes in the concluding chapter of *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (1959: 319-20), ‘[i]t is true – and no realist should belittle it – that a genuinely universalist spirit reigns more often in… “technical” fields and problems than when it comes to politics… Solution of some technical problem, hampered though it may be by political factors, if it can be arrived at, may, in turn, facilitate the solution of political problems. Even in the technical fields, however, universalist solutions presuppose a universalist approach and thus require universalist minds.’ There is no better rejection of the clumsy link between the nation-state and realism as that of Herz – mindful of the fact that the same sorts of messages, to a slightly lesser extent – are found in Morgenthau and Carr. While it can perhaps never be shown beyond any doubt, there is surely enough evidence of leading, formative realist scholars rejecting a pure, unmitigated statism for such slack use of
the term realism in EUS to be eradicated? One would hope at least that scholars may perhaps engage with the enormous body of classical realist literature which is infinitely more nuanced and useful than the versions currently available in EU studies literature. Although, it must be said that myths are enormously difficult to shift, particularly when they are discipline defining and as self-serving within this EUS context.

Conclusion

What exactly has been shown in this argument? Three things have been illustrated: Firstly, intergovernmentalism has been shown as a fundamentally liberal theory. This was done by illustrating the inherently modern, rationalist basis it possesses, in both its traditional sense, and then in its explicitly liberal form. Having discussed and presented the source and development of neofunctionalism and, building on the first point relating to intergovernmentalism, the second achievement is the piercing of the idea that there exists at the foundation of EUS a debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, akin in some way to that of the First Debate in IR. This EUS “Great Debate” represents the legitimisation of the uncritical acceptance of the ‘difference’ of the two theories. This is an enormously important point as by showing that, with a tiny few non-influential exceptions, there is a methodological and basic ontological consensus (hegemony) within European Integration, the health of the discourse is totally undermined. If the research is essentially homogenous in approach, even if its separate parts produce different outcomes, it still greatly undermines the development of the discipline. The absence of competition as has been argued in Chapter 3 is nothing but a negative in
Politics as, while it may appear that some sort of consensus has developed, it is largely due to circumstance rather than empirical prescience. The third part of this chapter attempted to show beyond any doubt that realism is not a theory of states or simply the interaction of certain types of political communities but something more fundamentally about the use and search for power. This is a key part of the dismissal of the notion that realism and intergovernmentalism have a direct link as in doing this it becomes even clearer that intergovernmentalism is closer to rationalist, liberal approaches than the realist approach outlined in Section 1.

To understand the discussion here we need to return to the three questions identified as key in the previous chapter; namely: what is the structure of the discipline – dialectical, consensual, monopolistic, synthetical, or atomised?; what phase is the discipline in in its development and does it match Mannheim’s expectations?; what is assumed to be true, who are the protagonists, what have they said and is it true?; why are these voices present and not others? Only by synthesising the answers to these questions can we come to a conclusion as to the state of the discipline at this point in the development of EUS. As has already been mentioned EUS has passed through two phases – the international theory phase of integration theory and the subsequent comparative and ‘community building’ phase, when the focus of scholars moved from the causes of and vicissitudes of the integration process to the political dynamics within the organisation and the extent of community building that was going on. What this chapter has aimed to do is to set out the basics of this first phase, illustrating the liberal hegemony over the discourse.
At this point in the narrative the discipline is in a monopolistic position, whereby the dominant theories are clearly part of a broader rationalist hegemony. While neofunctionalism claims a legacy dating back to Mitrany’s functionalism, this is seriously questioned by Mitrany himself. Neofunctionalism without this ‘legacy’, is a straightforward pluralist theory of interest formation with some added assumptions about the integration process and all firmly based on a strong positivist footing. Intergovernmentalism is based on a very similar rationalist framework; it simply changes the prime directive of the rationality of the actors – fully rational actors they are nonetheless. The battle line between the two was shown to be their respective approaches to the utility of the nation state. This part of the analysis shows who the main protagonists of the piece are– two groups of liberal scholars differing on the outcome of integration and the role of the state in politics.

This however, was shown to be a debate purely between these two rationalist theories despite the endless references to the statist assumption in realist IR theory, which found itself part of this debate without quite being conscious of it. Thus, while they provided separate accounts of the integration process, they cannot be removed from their social theory context, which is the same. The idea that intergovernmentalism is ‘negative’ because it is sceptical as to the depth or longevity of integration is a moral stance, quite separate from the actual social theory question of ontology and epistemology – where they are both almost identical. The absent voices from this original debate are those who might have legitimately questioned the impact of the integration on the citizen of a European nation-state,
which has arguably been mixed. While his or her prosperity has certainly increased immensely and the chances of their being involved in a war with another European state has reduced measurably, whether, for example, the liberal democratic state was being usurped by a plutocratic trans-European elite is not so clear. This issue has subsequently been examined in the more recent ‘democratic deficit’ discourse, but at the beginning of the integration process, within academia there appears to have been a broad ideological consensus on the value of integration.

This raises an important issue which will be raised but not solved in Chapter 6 which is the relationship between those who study the EU and their support for the integration process. This is a key part of the discussion of EUS here, as there always appears to be an underlying assumption that the EU is a ‘good’ thing, along with being a ‘force for good’, and this has had a major impact on the study of it. This issue will be returned to in the Conclusion having considered the next phase in the integration discourse and the in-depth analysis of the EU’s international affairs.
Chapter 5:

Phase 2 - The cooption and cooperation of social constructivism in EU Studies

European integration theory had up to the late 1980s adopted what in the social sciences has normally been described as an individualist approach to social action. As has been argued in the previous chapter, the only difference between the dominant paradigms within Integration Theory lay in the alternate forms of rationality at their core. Neofunctionalism on the one hand had argued that actors were capable of identifying the benefits of integration for their long term interests and that the institution itself had a part to play in the integration process. Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, argued that while integration was possible, it could only be explained by examining the interests of the dominant Member States and had little or nothing to do with the institution itself. The two dominant paradigms are rationalist, and therefore, individualist. This is not problematic in and of itself as the two propose two different narratives of the same phenomenon. However, the rising tide of social and cultural approaches to politics posed a challenge to these modernist, individualist narratives from the mid-1980s.
on. Sociological and cultural scholars were posing two straightforward questions – where do ideas come from and to what extent do they matter? While a variety of ideational approaches existed and were developing, the social ontology of constructivism became an important mainstream approach for answering these questions. According to constructivists, only by understanding the role and creation of social structures, based on their readings of sociological movements such as symbolic interactionism and socio-linguistics, could clarity be achieved on the impressionist canvas of the European integration narrative.

What this chapter seeks to do is to examine what impact the advent of social constructivist approaches had on the liberal hegemony over EUS as described in the previous chapter. To deal with this question, the chapter will be divided in three. The first section will outline the source and basics tenets of social constructivism. This is a major task in itself as the nature of constructivism, its purpose and its epistemology in particular, is greatly contested even among constructivists. Having described the sources of its ontology, six pillars of constructivism will be presented. This section will also deal with a number of key problems with the constructivist research agenda from both a rationalist and a critical perspective. The second section will then examine the *sui generis* concept in both its rationalist and ideational form, arguing that the rationalist form is unproductive and that the ideational form presents some interesting avenues for consideration. The final section of the chapter will examine the role of the *sui generis* gene in EUS, how this has become a part of EUS genetic make-up and has become particularly noticeable with the growing dominance of the constructivist
ontology in EUS. The reason for the discussion of *sui generis* in EUS is that it still remains an implicit and genetic part of the liberal hegemony over EUS - it being the meeting of the modernist notion of progress and the constructivist’s belief in the importance of intersubjectively held ideas about what ‘Europe’ represents. Whereas Chapter 4 examined the response of Europe’s states to the ‘state problem’ based on varying conceptions of the states’ interests, this chapter aims to examine the second phase in this development relating to the role of ‘ideas’ in the integration of Europe – a move which cannot be fully separated from the ‘real-life’ integration story of the end of the Cold War and the reinvigoration of the integration process under Jacques Delors, culminating in the Treaty of European Union (1992) and the creation of EU citizenship within it.

Before the analysis begins however, it is incumbent on us to clarify exactly the purpose of this analysis. One of the conclusions of the discussion in Chapter 2 is that realists have long argued that there is an important distinction to be drawn between form and nature. They attempted to argue that the form of politics is unimportant as its nature is constant. By emphasising the distinction between transformation of form and transformation of nature or essence, realists have attempted to ensure that the natural development of form is not mistaken for human progress. Building on this point, this chapter aims to develop the Mannheimian framework which sees the hegemony of EUS changing from one of rationalist, liberal dominance, to a liberal-constructivist one. This chapter will outline the change from the basic hegemonic, or monopolistic pattern of the individualist and rationalist ontology described in the integration
period of EUS’s development to the development of a consensual one. The difference we will see is that whereas the first phase represented an ontological and positivist ‘collaboration’ between the neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist theories, the second represents a far more complex epistemological and ontological picture, whereby the pre-existing disciplinary structures were changed but the underlying intent and research concentration remained largely constant. Thus, the narrative presented here of the second phase of the development of EUS is concerned with the extension of the modernist hegemony over EUS through the cooption and manipulation of the possible constructivist challenge. This wasted critical potential will be the predominant focus of the conclusion of the chapter as it has undeniably interesting and challenging things to contribute to the discourse on European integration.

**Social constructivism – a primer**

Before starting, it is important to differentiate between social constructivist thought and Constructivist IR theory as both have a part to play in the narrative to be outlined. This division is quite similar to the distinction drawn between realist IR theory and realism as a broad paradigm of political analysis as described in Chapter 2. Social constructivist theory stems from the sociological, ‘structurationist’ thought of the likes of Anthony Giddens which seeks to explain the relationship between agents (individuals) and structures (society). It is an explicitly sociological theory (Jackson, 2002) – relating to the relationship between individuals and society. IR constructivism attempts to transpose the ontology of social constructivism onto the relationship between states, as the relevant actors,
and the international system, representing structure. While the notion of ideas being socially constructed has a long history\textsuperscript{70}, Giddens and others sought to take this and apply it in a broader sense to all social phenomenon, not simply to how ideas are formed in a collective or structural way, but how all things stem in some sense from the relationship between the individual and society – particularly in the shape of shared forms of knowledge such as culture, norms and traditions.

Constructivist IR theory has yet to reach its full potential. Some effort has been made in bringing forward the explanation of international societies (Bull, 1977)\textsuperscript{71} and a wide variety of other ‘international’ phenomena, but overall the constructivist approach has served mainly to develop under a different name much of the regime and institutional theory of the late 1970s and 1980s. However, it has been used extensively in EUS in a wide variety of contexts. Its use has been most systematically described by Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (2001), Checkel (2001) and Risse (2004) and its use can be summarised as focusing on the development of EU norms and practices (regime) and the creation of an EU demos (identity). Many notable

\textsuperscript{70} As was argued in Chapter 3, Marx and subsequently Mannheim for example both argue that norms, values and ideologies do not spring from the rock but are formed by social forces and interactions. Many other examples exist - within post-structuralism it could be said to be the very foundation of its ontology, Foucault being the exemplar of this - but what is most interesting to note is the differentiation between the identification of this ontological statement and the relationship to epistemology. Whereas post-structuralists have adopted a radically critical epistemology, social constructivists have adopted a generally mixed epistemology, in line with the critical realist epistemology outlined in Chapter 2. This is not problematic in itself, but it does require an amount of attention and will be dealt with later in the chapter. The intersubjective nature of norms was arrived at by an alternative route, one not based on Marx’s historical materialism, by the American pragmatists in the late 1800s from which developed the symbolic interactionist movement in sociology. Symbolic interactionism is a key component of Wendt’s constructivism (1992: 394) which is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{71} For discussions of the relationship between the English School and constructivism see for example Reus-Smith, 2002; Buzan, 2004 & Bellamy, 2005.
scholars have applied constructivist theory to the development of norms of international practice in the international field\textsuperscript{72}, but it is not as logically satisfying as EU-focused applications, as in the EU we have an unmistakable nascent polity and thus a prime case for constructivism’s examination. In the international setting this notion of the interplay between agents (states) and structure (power politics or institutions) is unsatisfactory as the assumption that the agency of a state is comparable to that of an individual, in his or her totality, is a bridge too far. To describe the interplay of agency and structure Wendt uses the Marxist analogy that men make their own history but not under the circumstances of their choosing. However, many constructivists have suggested that Wendt’s constructivism is overly structural. The agent-structure problematique will be returned to below.

Throughout the literature we see it clearly stated that constructivism is a different kind of theory from realism, liberalism or Marxism and operates at a different level of abstraction. ‘Constructivism is not a substantive theory of politics. It is a social theory that makes claims about the nature of life and social change... [I]t does not by itself, produce specific predictions about political outcomes that one could test in social science research’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393). Palan's unsympathetic evaluation of constructivism supports this view. He writes that while there are definite idealist epistemological associations which all variants of constructivism

\textsuperscript{72} Some of the most important and notable empirical examinations are Katzenstein’s edited examination (1996) of the development of ‘culture’s of national security’ and Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) edited volume on the role of ideas in foreign policy. Checkel’s ‘The constructivist turn in International Relations theory’ (1998) is both a comprehensive review of a number of key international constructivist empirical studies and a good presentation of the social constructivist framework.
share, it is not a fully operating theory, representing more of a loose
association of scholars who 'show an interest in culture, identity, norms and
accept the notion that actors' “interests” are not fixed but change and arise
out a social context' (2000: 576). Accepting that it is not a theory in its own
right, what then, is it?

Checkel writes that it is not a theory, but ‘an approach to social inquiry
based on two assumptions: 1) the environment in which agents/states take
action is social as well as material, and 2) this setting can provide
agents/states with understandings of their interests (it can “constitute”
them)’ (1998: 325-6). Finnemore and Sikkink describe it as an approach to
'social analysis that asserts the following: a) human interaction is shaped
primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; b) the most
important ideational factors are widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs,
which are not reducible to individuals; and c) these shared beliefs construct
the interests and identities of purposive actors’ (2001: 392-3). Guzzini, in
probably the most coherent effort at creating a clear constructivist meta-
theoretical framework73 sees constructivism as a double hermeneutical
project – epistemologically about the meaning of meanings, and
ontologically about the meaning of reality. He, like Checkel (1998) and
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) identify three key tenets to the constructivist
approach. Firstly, knowledge and meaning are socially constructed (2000:

73 As opposed to the number of high-impact Review articles which all focused on the wide
variety of different constructivisms being used by scholars. Adler (1997), Checkel (1998)
International Relations’ but similar review articles and book chapters reflect this same
quirk of identifying the heterogeneity of the approach without coming to a broadly
accepted conclusion on how one ‘uses’ constructivism, even at a very general level. This
issue is returned to below.
Second, borrowing from Giddens, the social world is an already interpreted world and therefore reality is in fact a ‘social reality’. This ‘double hermeneutical twist’ means that constructivists are required to ‘think about the two levels of action involved in a scientific explanation – the level of action proper and the level of observation. In both instances we interpret, at the one time making sense with the life-world actor, and at another time making sense within the language shared by the community of observers’ (2000: 162). The final tenet of constructivism is based on the acceptance of this double hermeneutic, in that, if knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive, then constructivism’s theory of action must be an intersubjective one. Accepting that knowledge (epistemology) and reality (ontology) are both socially constructed and mutually constitutive, purposive actors must also be engaged in the coding and de-coding of reality. Therefore, their actions must be considered to be based on an ‘intersubjective, and not individualist, theory of meaningful action’ (2000: 162). Thus, Guzzini argues ‘a coherent position of constructivism implies a constructivist epistemology... and double hermeneutics. It argues that constructivism is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about the... construction of the social world. On the level of action it assumes an intersubjective unit of analysis. And since constructivism relies on a problematisation of how reality is constructed, it must theorise the link between these two levels’ (2000: 174-5).

Rather than the conventional tri-partite breakdown of constructivism, this
examination of constructivism identifies six propositions about constructivism: a) constructivism rejects the individualism (economism) of rational choice as a theory of action; b) ideas are key to the formation of actors’ interests; c) ideas are at their most powerful when they are shared – thus becoming intersubjectively held; d) ideas are formed through discourse and therefore constructivists must be cognisant of socio-linguistics and semiotics, especially structuralist approaches; e) structures are conditions which all actors live in but are not fully formed or static, therefore, agents and structures are in a constant process of making (structure) and being made (by structure); and finally, f) constructivists reject the relativism of poststructuralism but also the naturalism of the neo-neo synthesis, aiming to find an epistemological ‘middle ground’ (Adler, 1997) between relativism and positivist tyranny – described by Pouliot (2007) as ‘sobjectivism’. These will be briefly outlined before moving onto their relationship to the \textit{sui generis} gene and the continued modernist dominance over EUS.

All theories used in the social sciences in some form or another are individualistic or social (structural) theories, what Barry (1970) described as the difference between economic or social theory. On the one hand we have a conception of agent behaviour which is based on ‘reflexive, goal-directed subjects, such as rational choice theory, generate agent-explanations... that are cast in terms of goals, beliefs, and self-understanding of agents’ (Wendt, 1987: 340). Opposing this is the structural approach which conceives of agents as being constrained in their actions by structural imperatives. Thus, we see the conflict identified by Barry. ‘At some level, every social theory
is either an “economic” theory interested in motivations and individual activity or a “sociological” theory interested in patterns of activity and their implications’ (Jackson, 2002: 440). Constructivists, taking their cue from Wendt’s extended analysis of the agent-structure problem and his reading of structuration theory (1987: 355-61), attempt to link the two forms of theory, and ontological assumptions about social action, into a “‘dialectical synthesis” that overcomes the subordination of one to the other, which is characteristic in both individualism and structuralism’ (Wendt, 1987: 356). He writes elsewhere, ‘Each is in some sense an effect of the other: they are “co-determined”’ (1987: 360). This ‘dialectical synthesis’ and mutual constitutiveness of agent and structure - the traditional distinction between classical realist and liberal theory in the first place, and the neo-neo synthesis and World Systems theory in the second – creates the opportunity for a middle-ground which constructivists constantly return to. This first pillar of constructivism is not overly controversial as all theories and theorists would admit that in practice we cannot demarcate the two surgically. The constructivist attempt to account for endogenous and exogenous factors of agent behaviour is one of the most widely accepted tenets of constructivism but is so unremarkable and widely accepted, that its being described as a solely constructivist tenet is questionable, particularly among less theoretically imprisoned international politics analysts.

The second and third propositions can be dealt with simultaneously. These are that ideas are a key aspect in any understanding of actors’ behaviour. This idealist, in its philosophical sense, move was a significant change from
the explicit materialism of realists, liberals, Marxists and Gramscians, and
the implicit materialism of post-structuralism. By arguing that international
politics was affected not solely by material influences but by the power of
ideas themselves, constructivists claim to open up an important thinking
space\textsuperscript{74}. While Jakobsen’s conclusion that constructivism is duplicating
much of the research of international critical theorists, this criticism may be
unfair, as there appears to be some merit in at least having a discussion
about the difference between ‘sponsored’ ideas (ideas which are linked to a
powerful actor’s interests) and a truly idealist ‘idea’ (which pre-empts
material conditions). The danger however is that ideas become fetishised
and their significance is greatly over-emphasised (Jakobsen, 2003: 49-50).
Based on this idealist approach, constructivists believe therefore that ideas
have a very important and under-examined ‘reality’ of their own. An idea,
self-help for example, which is shared by all of the agents in a system
influences their behaviour and is therefore said to be structural. Wendt
writes that this ‘dependence of social structure on ideas is the sense in
which constructivism has an idealist (or “idea-ist”) view of structure. What
makes these ideas (and thus structure) “social”, however, is their
intersubjective quality’ (1995: 73). Constructivism argues that the values
and norms of a state greatly influences how it defines and identifies its

\textsuperscript{74} John Kurt Jakobsen’s (2003) ‘Duelling Constructivisms’ is an excellent discussion of the
relationship between critical theory and constructivism and how constructivists appear to
claim a novelty of approach that ignores the long tradition of ‘social constructivist’ in much
neo-Marxist theory and Gramscian theory. This is an enormously important criticism as
one of the big questions which this chapter will ask of constructivism is ‘So what?’.
Theories and analytical frameworks must bring something to the party – they must explain
a problem that either hasn’t been properly explained or explain it in a different way to
existing approaches. If an analyst does not know ‘what to do with constructivism’
(Checkel, 1998: 348) this is because its propositions are indeterminate and not unique to
constructivism. This is the central focus of Moravcsik’s (1999 & 2001) criticisms of the
use of constructivism in EUS which will be dealt with below.
interests. However, not only are these agency norms important for influencing the behaviour of certain actors, such norms become even more powerful when they are intersubjectively held. Thus, for Wendt (1992), states behave in self-centred and survival-orientated ways not because the international system is anarchic but because the agents (states) believe it to be. This is the basis of Wendt’s argument that ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, and while it has been attacked on a number of fronts, there is a growing acceptance of the power of intersubjectively held ideas in international politics. Suffice it to say, ideas matter, and when the idea is shared by large numbers, they really matter.

The fourth tenet of constructivism is the importance of discourse in understanding and transforming agents’ interests and identities. Communication can obviously occur on a verbal or non-verbal plain and through such communication, or discourse, norms and ideas are created, contested and disseminated. As mentioned earlier, social reality is formed by the collective acceptance of ideas by a number of separate actors and this can only occur through communication and convention. Constructivists in placing a great emphasis on the ‘social construction of reality’ and social hermeneutics, are developing in an international way the socio-linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure argued that meanings are not inherent in objects but are developed socially through communicative acts. This observation of the social nature of langue not only opened up the door for a wide variety of new sociological analyses of previously objectively approached phenomena, it also presented constructivists with great
methodological challenges – challenges they have arguably failed to meet.

The argument runs thus - if meanings develop over time and are influenced by a great many different factors\(^7\) in sign-systems (language, customs, symbolic rites, and polite formulas for example), how can observers be sure that social-construction is occurring. Within constructivism, it has not been clarified as to how this process works, although a number of suggestions have been put forward. If ‘language is a social institution’ and ‘a system of signs that express ideas’ (Saussure, 1974: 65), this only serves to make the identification of interests and identities even more difficult than when the framework was based on a parsimonious view of agents as rational and interest driven actors. Checkel (2001) writes that the process of social construction in EUS appears to rely on an understanding of change linked to time and space (exposure to certain ideas and practices). Checkel offers an understanding based on persuasion within the EU case (2001: 220-3), while others have offered understandings based on ‘argument’ (Risse, 2000) and communicative action (Schimmelfennig, 2001). This move to include language and communicative acts, often described as the ‘linguistic turn’, into the mix of variables of political analysis has created many opportunities for broadening the scope of explanations for political action and has spurred greater acceptance across the Social Sciences of the role of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity in the ‘creation’ of reality, however, some cost has been incurred in the clarity of causal factors and evidence. Some of the problems involved in such a move to include language and the social ontology of

\(^7\) Such as geography, climate, population, proximity to other communities and class structures.
reality referred to by Guzzini (2000) will be returned to in the discussion of constructivist epistemology which is the sixth and final tenet of constructivism to be identified. Before that, the fifth and perhaps most important aspect of constructivist thought will be discussed – the agent-structure problem in international relations theory.

Wendt writes, ‘[s]ocial structures... constitute the conditions of existence of states and state action; indeed, without social structuring principles once could not meaningfully talk about the fundamental building blocks of international relations: “states,” “state powers,” “foreign policy,” and so forth. Put in another way, international and domestic structures generate the “rules of the game” within which states interact’ (1989: 360). Wendt argues, stemming from Giddens, that both parts (structure and agents) of the international equation should be given equal ontological status. To be more straightforward, they both matter equally. The crucial ontological insight of constructivism is the notion of mutual constitutiveness of agents and structure. Constructivists believe, based on their reading of structuration theory, that agents are created and recreated by the structures which they exist in, but at the same time have control over the existence and formation of the structures within which they exist. Risse describes the ontology of constructivism well when he writes, '[t]he social environment in which we find ourselves defines... who we are, our identities as social beings... At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces and changes culture through our daily practices. Thus social constructivism occupies a - sometimes uneasy – ontological middle ground between individualism and
structuralism by claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each other (Risse, 2005: 161). We can see here in Risse’s description how Wendt and other constructivists use the analogy of human-agents, society and its norms to describe what is occurring on the international plane. This is not without its problems.

Despite Wendt's defence of the use of the social metaphor based on the notion - matching neorealism - that states are ‘individual choice-making units which are responsible for their actions’, this does not mean that the internal politics of the unit should be taken as a given or unexamined. Wendt claims to be responding, and equivalent, to the approach of neorealism and world-systems theory, as both have at their core assumptions about the behaviour of actors and the role of structure. Wendt however rejects the ‘negative individualism’ of these approaches for structurationism. The problem of using either of these IR theories for support of the sociological approach is that they have parsimonious explanations of state behaviour based on a simple economistic set of interests. So much of the criticism of Waltz and other neorealists is aimed at their failure to open the ‘black box’ but this was never Waltz’s intention. His objective was to develop a theory for understanding the role of structure, defined by Waltz as the distribution of material force, on the behaviour of states which have a small number of prime directives – i.e. survival and self-help. Responding to Ruggie’s criticism of his key work (1986: 131-57), Waltz writes that when Ruggie suggests that power does not tell us enough about the placement of states in the system – ‘He is right, but he draws the
wrong conclusion. Structures never tell us all that we want to know. Instead they tell us a small number of important things... Clean and simple definitions of structure save us from the pernicious practice of summoning new systems into being in response to ever salient change within a system’ (1986: 329). Wendt’s defence of his sociological approach therefore is a mismatch of intentions – Waltz is trying to say something straightforward about something complex and he has simplified considerably in order to do so. Wendt and other international constructivists are attempting to say something complex about the role of ideas, values and norms as structural forces in the constitution of states and their behaviour in the international system, but still adopt the image of the state as a coherent, purposive actor.

The reason this is problematised here is that the state is an infinitely more complex entity than the individual. While the individual is complex in his or her own way - being subject to emotions, faith, cultural diktats and many other inherently human traits - the notion that the state, or any political community is comparable to the individual is specious. The anthropomorphism of constructivism to suggest that the complexity of the state is truly ‘knowable’, even based on the most generous interpretations of that which can be ‘known’ is difficult to accept. It is the complexity of the state and the acceptance that only at an abstract level can true ‘international’ theory arise – i.e. at the level of generalised concepts such as security and interest, that the discipline was originally founded. What international constructivists are in fact talking about when they refer to the impact of ‘ideas’ on state behaviour are the attitudes and identities of the elite and not
the ‘state’ at all. A change in policy, for example, as a result of an election surely does not represent a transformation of the identity, nor for that matter the interests of a state. It is the change, in a bounded way, of elites.

This may sound like the debate is about to descend into a familiar defence of materialist positivism, but this criticism is not of major significance to the discussion here as the constructivism under consideration here is a slightly less universal form, being concerned with the EU polity. However, this criticism deserves more attention and would be a useful addition to the many meta-theoretical examinations of constructivist theory which exist (See Smith, 1999; Palan, 2000 and Jakobsen, 2003 for example). Due to the complexity of constructivism’s answers and the breadth of agents it is trying to account for at an almost unparalleled level of complexity, it is fair to say that it is at its most convincing in its attention to the politics of single actors. It is for this reason that the EU is a most appropriate case for constructivism's application and perhaps explains why it has been so enthusiastically adopted within EUS. The polity presents constructivists with a dynamic mix of both ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics and is still developing as a political system without being too constrained by custom or practice. Thus, while the proponents use a similar set of texts and concepts as their succour and support, on the one hand there exists an IR theory constructivism which is relevant to the development of global norms and regimes, and on the other, a guide for social formation which is relevant to the creation of political organisms. A somewhat similar distinction is presented in Finnemore and Sikkink's (2001) analysis of the use of
constructivism in IR theory and comparative politics.

The sixth and final tenet of constructivism is the epistemological ‘middle-ground’ that constructivism occupies between post-positivist, reflectivist approaches and positivist ones. Its adherence to the ‘deep ontology’ of critical realism, raises significant epistemological implications. By putting forth what has been called a ‘neo-Kantian’ (Adler, 2002) argument regarding the reality of ideational forces, constructivism automatically is placing itself in a difficult epistemological position, or so it would appear at least. To make such a move constructivists have had to argue their bona fides at length at a meta-theoretical level. So much however, that they are sometimes criticised for only meta-theorising (Moravcsik, 2001). While Moravcsik’s criticism is justified to an extent with those who have been to the forefront of developing and attempting to systematise the strands of empirical work (Wendt, Hopf, Checkel and Adler for example), there are many less epistemologically engaged constructivists doing a great deal of conventional research. Such ‘trailblazers’ are always vulnerable to such criticism - particularly with such a challenging (to the status quo position) epistemology - as it is incumbent upon them to justify and discipline the research project. Such acts of theorising and organisation are vitally important for clarifying and ‘normalising’ adherents’ research agendas. The key works of such an approach should provide a link between most subsequent works in that particular ‘space’. Aside from the partially true criticism that some constructivists are ‘in the clouds’ and need to be brought to earth, more pressing issues arise from the issue of causality and
coherency which will be dealt with below. What is important to stress is that constructivism, ‘allows us to be critical towards, or at least innovative with regard to, the mainstream. And yet it does not succumb to the sirens of poststructuralism, which critics have turned into a radical idealist position, increasingly emptied of any intelligible meaning’ (Guzzini, 2000: 147-8), or at least this is the epistemological statement of intent.

Wendt (1987) argues that the constructivist epistemology challenges the existing order, especially relating to the notion of what ‘normal science’ should look like. He argues that ‘the hegemony of empiricist discourse in social science has led social scientists into an apparent dichotomy between “science”… and the allegedly “un-scientific” paradigms of hermeneutics and critical theory. Whatever the limits to naturalism in the social sciences, scientific realism undermines this dichotomy by challenging the core of the empiriciricist’s argument, the interpretation of natural science upon which her appropriation of the mantle of “science” rests’ (1987: 370). Despite Wendt’s attempt to offer an alternative to rationalist science in IR, most constructivists have tended to side-step their critical realist basis and attempt to make their research palatable to the mainstream. Symptomatic of Wendt’s constructivism is the overlooking of the methodological and epistemological concern of structuration theory and critical realism Wendt’s meta-theoretical position is not unproblematic but it is generally consistent and has a self-contained logic. Other theorists who similarly describe themselves as constructivist, come to the same general conclusion but use aspects of social theory which is at odds with the aspects of social theory used by other constructivists. Palan for example, describes how Wendt’s use of symbolic interactionism is contradicted by Onuf’s use of Wittgenstein’s language theory which evolved in part ‘in repudiation of Symbolic Interactionism’ (2000: 577). Palan goes on to argue that these tensions are not problematic in themselves but that constructivists have tended not to engage in justifying or explaining these tensions but rather reproduce them. However, overlying this is the epistemological tension outlined here whereby Wendt argues for a critical approach to the ‘hegemony of empiricist discourse’
can be summarised thus – constructivists in an effort to bridge the gap between critical and positivist approaches adopt elements of both using structuration theory as a legitimisation of providing ideational factors an objective, social reality. At the same time, in an effort to remain part of the mainstream of IR Theory, they made methodological concessions to positivists by adopting an explicit interest in evidence, causality and research design. The challenge therefore is to systematise the analysis of ideational forces in a way that is conducive to their positivist, objectivist colleagues. It is not clear whether this has actually happened but this is not of too great significance as it raises a more practical problem for constructivists – if everything ‘is in’ and they are attempting to utilise objectivist positions to understand social, ideational phenomena, can constructivism ever be anything more than a very loose association of theorists, who are engaged in international idealist research? In attempting to examine both structural and agental factors, based on a social epistemological position which requires attention to both material and ideational forces, constructivists are left with such a variety of possible variables that they are in danger of inundation.

Proving the process of social construction occurs and impacts on actors’ behaviour is the framework’s greatest challenge, particularly for conventional or modern constructivists who have adopted an essentially positivist epistemology. By doing so they open their analyses up to appraisal based on conventional positivist concerns, in particular questions of

(1987: 370) but constructivists subsequently reproduce the empiricist discourse albeit in a modified way.
evidence and causality – ‘How can you show this has happened?’ Such a commitment to traditional falsification reflects leading constructivists’ fear of being lumped into the gamut of ‘critical’ approaches (cf. Mearsheimer, 1995). Constructivists are required to show that ideational factors transform actors’ interests but how should they start to show such a thing? The first problem is the systematisation of the endogenous and exogenous factors based on the social epistemology argued for by constructivists. The second difficulty is showing that the ideational explanation matches or surpasses a materialist explanation by testing their explanation against others. To perform this second task however, some lingua-franca must exist between competing theoretical explanations. Those who take constructivism’s mainstreaming very seriously, Checkel and Adler, for example, believe this to be a vitally important step and therefore have stressed the issues of evidence, causality and research design. However, there are many constructivists and reflectivists who believe this methodological formalism is little more than a ‘soft-rationalism’ and reject the cloaked positivism which mainstream constructivists support.

It is at this point that the difference between critical and conventional constructivist positions should be mentioned. If one does not accept the argument that constructivism represents a distinct approach separate from rationalist and reflectivist positions (Hix, 1998), contrary to Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (1999: 532), constructivists have happily placed themselves on both sides of the positivist-post-positivist divide. The

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77 As described in Chapter 2.
willingness of constructivists to adopt a wide variety of epistemological positions, lauded by Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (1999: 542-3) and others (Hopf, 1998 & Adler, 1997), is not seen by constructivists as a weakness. However, when it is hard to say what constructivism ‘is for’ - even from a forgiving, post-paradigmatic perspective, it is difficult to say what differentiates it from other approaches which have an ideational focus such as critical theory, Neo-Gramscianism or various poststructuralist approaches. While constructivists have defended their position as part of a ‘conventional’ or ‘mainstream’ IR, this position is based on an assumption that non-rationalist epistemologies are automatically isolated as ‘critical’ and such labelling should be avoided. Adler (2002), Checkel (2004) and Pouliot (2007) have all argued for example that clearer methodological conventions should be developed in order to benefit dialogue ‘with other IR theoretical approaches by making its standards of validity more explicit and amenable to non-constructivist ways of doing research’ (2007: 360). Pouliot goes on to say that interpretivism and positivism probably cannot be reconciled but, ‘there is much to be gained by learning how to make constructivist and mainstream works speak to each other on fundamental issues of validity, falsifiability and generalisability’ (2007: 360). This mainstream approach to method and epistemology is arguably already present (Hopf, 1998: 182) in the intent of some constructivists to create testable hypotheses based on conventional understandings of falsifiability and causality.

Some constructivists however, have been less concerned with ‘fitting in’ to
mainstream IR circles; these are the so called ‘critical constructivists’. The division between critical and conventional (Hopf: 1998) or modern and postmodern, (Price and Reus Smith, 1998) is relatively clear as critical constructivism refers to theorists who do not utilise an empiricist, positivist methodology. According to Hopf, conventional constructivism ‘is a collection of principles distilled from critical social theory but without (critical theory’s) more consistent theoretical or epistemological follow on’ (1998: 181). Hopf argues that the two forms both ask the same sorts of questions – ‘both aim to “denaturalise” the social world... Both believe that intersubjective reality and meanings are critical data for understanding the social world. Both insist that all data must be “contextualised” that is, they must be gathered in order to understand their meaning. Both accept the nexus between power and knowledge, the power of practice in its disciplinary... mode. Both, also accept the restoration of agency to human individuals. Finally, both stress the reflexivity of the self and society, that is, the mutual constitution of actor and structure’ (1998: 182). However, while they may ask similar questions and have similar intentions78, they differ most in terms of epistemology. The question therefore must be asked, but will remain unanswered for the moment, to what extent is constructivism an alternative to existing approaches? Soft-rationalists have utilised the social ontology to support arguments made using liberal and regime theory; and critical constructivists have used the social ontology to reach conclusions about social formations without any of the criticism of the status quo or commonsense which critical theory, feminist or post-structural examinations

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78 This is a vital part of understanding any theory as was discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 2.
would provide. It is on this pessimistic note that this examination of constructivism moves onto the role of the *sui generis* gene in EUS.

**Tracing the *sui generis* gene**

One of the unexamined areas of European integration and its theoretical description in the previous chapter was the relationship between it and other regional integration movements. As was mentioned, Mitrany’s functional approach provided for some form of shallow universal integration and neofunctionalism developed in a very loose way some of Mitrany’s ideas to explain integration in Europe and elsewhere. Neofunctionalism was an explicitly international theory, and while it has remained a dominant approach to European integration, its failure to predict, or more precisely its incorrect prediction that integration would occur smoothly in Latin America, African and East Asia, led its founding member to deem the approach obsolete. Haas writes: ‘The theories we have developed for describing, explaining and predicting this phenomenon, however, have a tendency either not to predict events very accurately or not explain very convincingly why events which were predicted did in fact come about. We can probably devise better theories which might overcome these weaknesses. But the effort is probably not worth our while. Events in the world and conceptual developments in social science have jointly conspired to suggest that the name of the game has changed and that more interesting themes ought to be explored’ (1976: 174). While Haas believed the bell had tolled for neofunctionalism, this view was based on his reading of the
behaviouralist project. It was not that neofunctionalism was a failed or obsolete theory. It was that the scientific pretensions of behaviouralism were bound to come up short and despite its flaws is still a vital and important theory in EUS\textsuperscript{79} (Rosamond, 2005). The realisation was however, that while neofunctionalism was relevant to the European context, it was a unique case of regional integration and therefore, generalisation was fruitless.

Haas’ belief in the failure of the project, and the move away from IR based approaches to the EU (Hix, 1994), brought EUS to an impasse. If neofunctionalism is a framework that only explains the integration of Europe, while it may have been a failure to its key proponents – it still has an enormous amount to say about the politics of the EU. Why did the theory, based on the formation of the ECSC (Haas, 1958), explain and systematise the experience in Europe so well and come up so short in the other regional contexts? The conclusions drawn were that the background conditions, discussed in the previous chapter, had to be correct (see previous chapter’s discussion of the fundamentals of neofunctionalism). Without such conditions, integration can only reach a certain point and will not be deep or capable of withstandng crisis. Thus, the conclusion was drawn that the European experience was unique.

\textsuperscript{79} See the \textit{Journal of European Public Policy} Vol. 12, No. 2 which examines the neofunctionalist legacy in EUS. A number of the articles (Rosamond, 2005 and Risse, 2005) deal with Haas’ attempt to conciliate neofunctionalism and constructivism. Haas (2004), in his last published work on European integration, suggested that there were certain commonalities between neofunctionalism and constructivism, particularly in relation to the transfer of allegiance between government and business elites from the national level to the supranational level. However, this is obviously problematic if they are removed from their meta-theoretical principles.
William Wallace (1994) comes to this same conclusion in *Regional Integration: the West European Experience*. In it he analyses the European integration process and concludes that while comparison and learning can occur by examining European integration in contrast with other regions, the neofunctionalist\(^8^0\) idea that different regions would follow similar trajectories was ultimately incorrect. Wallace does not discount some elements of learning which could occur from the European experience, his conclusion is one which embodies the mode of analysis for EUS scholars for the decade and a half which followed. He firstly points out that the integration process was not inspired as a response to increasing economic interdependence, but that it was spurred by the need to reconstruct Europe. This historical, economic and political scenario was unique to the continent. ‘Its framework was set forty years ago by governments rebuilding their national economies under American leadership after a devastating war. Nor do its underlying rationale and impetus provide a model for other regions of the world. The motivations of its founders were fundamentally political – the containment of a divided Germany – and its driving force has been that of Franco-German reconciliation. The historical context within which West European integration got under way was highly specific, set by the aftermath of war, the presence of a benevolent American hegemon and a malevolent external Soviet threat’ (1994: 11). This realisation, summarised

\(^8^0\) It must be said that Wallace does not couch his analysis in terms of Integration theory, showing a preference for the application of practical solutions to real problems versus abstract theorising – a position he outlines aggressively in ‘Monks and Missionaries – Theory and Practice in International Relations’ (1995). While he gives short shrift to explicit theorising, if his analysis was placed within a theoretical context, it would have to be seen as a rejection of neofunctionalism’s determinism.
by Wallace, and very much a realisation shared by neofunctionalists at the
time, was that neofunctionalism, the ‘home theory’ of the EU, had failed.
The European experience was *sui generis* and the theories of integration
which had developed to describe the first phase of regional integration
globally were now considered ‘obsolete’. This is a key founding myth of the
discipline and is arguably the cause of a great deal of insularity in EUS. It is
however, like all such founding myths, difficult to quantify its precise
impact. Despite this, it is important to attempt at least an assessment of the
underlying impact of such a factor on the discourse.

The idea that the EU needs ‘new eyes’ stems from this realisation of the
uniqueness of the integration process. Scholars of the EU were then faced
with an embarrassment of riches, being able to draw from IR Theory,
normative Political Theory and Comparative Politics literatures to explain
what was ‘going on in Europe’. Some of EUS’ most prominent approaches
stem from combinations of levels (both international and domestic), such as
regional policy and multi-level governance\(^81\). The various theories which
developed over time are not of the greatest of importance here however, as
the intent is to examine the impact of the *sui generis* gene on the
development of EUS.

\(^81\) Although Warleigh (2006) suggests that IR has a lot to learn from EUS for examining a
number of IR ‘problems’ - rethinking the possibilities of IOs; rethinking locations and
meaningful uses of authority; growth trajectories of IOs; impact of IOs on non-state actors;
rethinking democracy and polity-making beyond the nation-state; and the role of law in IR
- presumably because IR does not deal with them sufficiently well. It must be said *en passant*,
that it appears that not only does IR deal as well as with these problems as EUS
has, but also, that EUS scholars have broadly failed to acknowledge the importance of
historical reflection on the development of their discipline – with the possible exception of
the re-examination of Haas in the *JEPP* Special Issue referenced above (fn. 11).
To truly appreciate the impact of such a concept we need to make a socio-linguistic detour. The term *sui generis* has two distinct connotations but a single denotation. The first connotation reflects the rationalist perspective that the EU is qualitatively different from other regional organisations and therefore, comparison is unproductive. In this sense, *sui generis* connotes what is also referred to as the ‘n=1 problematique’ (Warleigh, 2004). Accepting the premise that the EU is not comparable to other actors based on this connotation, reflects that it is not possible to create testable hypotheses on a population of one (n=1). A second, associated problem is that any observations about the EU will not be generalisable as the observations were not created based on the comparative method (Pollack, 1997). This reflects the notion that there are no other political actors like the EU, but understands it from a rationalist perspective. The alternative connotation, and the one which is developed in this analysis, is that the EU’s essence is different to other actors. This difference encourages scholars to use radically different frameworks for understanding the EU as it is unlike anything before. As can be seen, they have different connotations but the same denotation – the EU is unique. It is important to distinguish the two as they are often interchanged (Corporaso, 1997), but have different connotations.

Such problems of comparison are essentially only problematic from a strict positivist position. Outside of this stance, two propositions reject the ‘n=1’ issue. Firstly, research can be done on populations of one but still be empirically, methodologically and logically sound. The important point is to
be cautious when attempting to draw generalisations from the EU case to other polities. Sensitive and modest conclusions can always be drawn from what may appear to be a unique phenomenon. This is an important point as all social phenomena are unique in some way or another; the intent of the social scientist is to identify the areas of commonality between agents (Marks, 1997). If the unique aspect of agents were to be focused on at all times, we would be left with bland empirics or descriptions of characteristics. Thus, only by radical positivist standards is the EU subject to the ‘n=1’ problem.

At the opposite end of the positivist spectrum, the very notion of agents being impervious to comparison and examination, however differently formed, does not have any purchase, for while post-positivists certainly do not reject the utility of comparison, by nature of the expanding of the scope of political analysis into the realm of ideas and norms, such issues are less pressing. It may also be fair to say that at an empirical level this problematisation of comparison may be increasingly dubious – particularly with the rapid increase in the significance and depth of integration in Africa, North and Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. However, while the integration of these regions is still nowhere near the level of integration of the EU’s Member States, soft-rationalist approaches to New Regionalism have undoubtedly placed this connotation of *sui generis* in unsustainable peril\(^2\). What is important to emphasise here is that this connotation of the

\(^2\)The relationship between the EU and the New Regionalist (NR) scholars is an interesting one. Originally, NR scholars were anxious not to have endless comparisons made between the object of their study and the far more established EU. In some ways this was also an admission of the problems of comparison between the *sui generis* EU and other
denoted singularity of the EU, while significant, has largely focused on the form of the institutions and the management of interests and bargaining in Member State-institution relations.

While it is not totally straightforward, if we accept a neat division between the material, phenomenal realm and the noumenal, the ‘n=1’ understanding of *sui generis* can be described as focusing on a positivist epistemology. An understanding of the *sui generis* gene based on a broader conception of ‘the known’, has more analytical depth and has had a far more influential role in the development of EUS. This second reading of the *sui generis* gene provides us with an understanding that within EUS the EU is considered unique to other political actors, not in form but in essence.

This noumenal approach to the *sui generis* gene is vital for developing a clearer understanding of the progressivist approach to the study of the EU. The impression that the EU’s difference provides for a different type of political actor in essence had existed as far back as the 1970’s with the development of the notion of the EC as a civilian power (Duchêne, 1972) and of its civilising role in world politics. However, this liberal view that the
EC marked a move away from traditional power politics had little theoretical support until the growing use of constructivism in IR and EUS. In constructivism, scholars now had a theoretical toolbox which justified an understanding of the EU as not simply a unique case (the ‘n=1’ approach) but also as a new type of political actor which both in its existence and its behaviour proved the realist ‘case’ wrong. What is significant here is the progression of the analysis from the EU’s form and self-stated nature and role, to the theoretical framing of the EU as a unique and progressive force in world politics. This move must be attributed to the addition of constructivism to the existing liberal, modernist hegemony within EUS. Whereas constructivism could focus on investigating the problems of creating a European identity, instead it appears to set out developing and justifying the progressivist view of the EU and its political project. As has been mentioned, this view of the EU is not an explicit ontological assumption but has become part of the genetic make-up of EUS and is reflected in four interconnected ways; the commitment to a Hegelian teleology of change and progress; the reproduction of the EU’s own view of itself; the absence of criticism of the power dynamics of the institution; and the repudiation of any form of realism from the analysis of the EU’s international affairs. The next section will deal with these problems referring heavily to the previous discussion of constructivism. By doing so, it will become clear that the sui generis gene remains an implicit and

83 Mearsheimer’s (1991) ‘Back to the Future’ article – perhaps the most unhelpful addition to the realist analysis of the EU and its study, argued that with the removal of the US security umbrella in Europe, the continent was going to revert to historical type and that Europe’s institutions would be powerless to prevent it. Having shown such a shallow understanding of Community politics, his incorrect predictions heaped more misery on a realism still rocking from its alleged failure to predict the end of the Cold War.
The genetic part of the liberal hegemony over EUS - it being the meeting of the modernist notion of progress and the constructivist’s belief in the importance of intersubjectively held ideas about what ‘Europe’ represents, how European citizenship norms will develop and how the EU’s internal norms and values dictate its international affairs. In the same way that the ontology of rational choice became appended to realism in the Cold War period (leading to the creation of the synthesis between realism and forms of liberalism, which remains so dominant in ‘mainstream’ IR), the synthesis of liberalism and constructivism, which the ideational understanding of the sui generis gene constitutes, dominates EUS.

**Sui generis and the liberal-constructivist ideology in EU Studies**

Liberals have long argued the importance of certain conditions, in particular democracy and the market economy, for the improvement of peoples’ lives. However, not only are these endogenous factors important, specific values embodied by liberal states are given preeminent importance. Such values as respect for human rights, the decentralisation of power and the pacific settlement of disputes are seen as the continuation of the teleology of liberalism dating back to the Enlightenment and before. Fukuyama’s optimism about the inexorable spread of liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War is the modern manifestation of the liberal belief in progress which is so vital to its ontology. He writes of history, ‘that there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for all human societies’ (1992: 48). The EU, being to many the very
embodiment of all these values, is therefore seen as a reflection of the
teleology towards the end of history which Hegel\textsuperscript{84}, Kojeve\textsuperscript{85} and
subsequently Fukuyama (1992) discussed. As was outlined in Chapter 3, a
fundamental tenet of liberalism is faith in the progress of universal history\textsuperscript{86}
towards a peaceful millennium. While Europeans and Europeanists have
rejected the ethnocentrism and objectivism of this form of liberalism, they
have rejected it not on theoretical grounds but on an empirical one.
Strangely, the difference between the American model of world order and
the European is often cast in terms of the clash of a Hobbesian and a
Kantian one (Kagan, 2003; McCormack, 2006 & Morgan, 2005). The US
world order we are told is one of perennial conflict whose only reference
point is the national interest. On the other hand, the EU’s commitment is to
the pacific settlement of disputes, the spreading of liberal political economy
and the reformation of political community upwards and downwards from
the state to sub-national regions and supranational institutions\textsuperscript{87}. Despite the
numerous criticisms of both Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and Doyle’s
democratic peace theory for being overly universalising and absolutist the
European trend has not been to reject liberalism, but to point out that
Fukuyama and Doyle’s faith in the state, even the liberal democratic one, is

\textsuperscript{84} It is important to remember that while Hegel was a counter-enlightenment thinker who
criticised the Enlightenment’s universalist faith in science and abstract individualism, and
despite its dubious use as a legitimiser of nationalism, totalitarianism and statism, his
description of progress as teleology is used as a modernist model of progress.

\textsuperscript{85} Alexander Kojève is the link between Hegel and Fukuyama as it was he, in the 1940’s,
who declared that the end of history had arrived in the combination of socialism and
capitalism in the integration of Europe. For a discussion of the link between Hegel, Kojève

\textsuperscript{86} Although like all theories, discussed or simply mentioned here, there are some who do
not fully accept the progressivism of Hegel or Fukuyama such as Shklar, Gray and
Rengger.

\textsuperscript{87} Brigid Laffan’s term a ‘distinctive model of internationalization’ (1998) is useful as it
describes the way in which the EU represents the move away from the state towards forms
of supranationalism and regionalism, a process which developed a unique mode of analysis
– multi-level governance.
anachronistic and dangerous. The EU represents a unique idea and a singular institution – an extra-national, post-modern (Smith, 2003) agent in international politics. Despite the growing use of comparative methods in analysing the politics of the EU, the impression still remains that, if pushed, even Simon Hix (1994 & 2000), CP’s foremost proponent in EUS would admit that while the methods 88 are sound, the actor remains new and different from the states and the state institutions to which it is compared. As we have seen the *sui generis* gene, is not a question of comparability, but of essence, which leads us back to the role of the social construction of ‘Europe’ as an idea.

The question then returns to the essence of the EU, or more accurately, how is the EU’s essence described in EUS? Most discussions of this have occurred in analyses of the EU’s international affairs 89; in texts written for a mass audience (Leonard, 2005; Haseler, 2004 and Reid, 2005); and then threaded through the whole range of EUS activities. While a small number of examples exist to the contrary (Magnette, 2005; and Gill, 1992, 1997 & 1998), the EU is usually understood to be the embodiment of certain liberal principles – ‘a community of values’ 90. These values are perhaps most explicitly outlined in the accession, or Copenhagen, criteria for EU membership. They are: stable institutions, guaranteeing of democracy, rule

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88 Warleigh (2006: 37) has noted that the EU is most often compared in EUS’ CP literature to federal systems such as Germany rather than other regional organisations, supporting the suggestion earlier that not only are NR scholars slow to use the EU as a comparator, EUS scholars are similarly slow to compare in the opposite direction.

89 Evidence in itself of the constructivist dominance of that particular part of the sub-discipline it would be fair to conclude.

90 A substantial amount of the literature to be examined in the next chapter on the CPE and NPE theses have this at their core. Manners (2002 & 2006), Whitman (2002) and M.E. Smith (2004 & 2008) are good starting points.
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. In the economic sphere, Members must have a functioning market economy capable of competing in the EU market. Finally, Members must have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Dinan, 1999: 191). The conditions of membership of the EU represent the institution’s self-determined identity, an identity created by the interaction of the Member States. This understanding of the EU’s identity is not problematic in and of itself – all international actors perceive themselves ‘positively’ – what is problematic is the way this view is embodied in analyses of the EU which accept automatically the EU as a progressive force, and more importantly, evidence of progress in human history. Nicolaidis and Howse (2002: 774) discuss how the Copenhagen Criteria are notable in that they are a prime example of a narrative of projection rather than a particularly accurate statement of the actual shared norms of the Member States. However, because they are concerned with the depiction of the EU by itself, they miss the point that the Civilian power discourse they are examining also matches precisely the description of the essence of the institution provided by scholars. How then does such an identity become formed?

Remembering the importance of 1) agent-structure relations; 2) discourse in the construction of identities; and 3) the power of intersubjectively held ideas, all discussed above, Diez (2001 & 2004) and Waever (1998b) provide the most interesting examination of the construction of the EU identity.

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91 And part of the broader civilian power discourse which will be dealt with in the following chapter.
Most identity formation is based on territoriality, and therefore geographic (Diez, 2004: 325), but when examining the EU – a territory with borders but not fixed ones or in the traditional sense92 - Diez and Waever suggest that the EU’s ‘other’ is its history. This is made possible Waever (1998b) argues, because of the constitutive dialectic which exists in the EU case, where the essence of the EU is always contested between the Member States and their populaces and what he describes as the ‘presence of the outside (EU) in the inside’. Because the EU’s essence will always be ‘something impossible to fill, always incomplete’, where its ‘identity’ can be recognised, it is most likely formed in ways other than in geographic or ethnic terms.

The essence of the EU, outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria and in countless other EU policy documents and of course the Treaties93, is formed not in a Second Image liberal sense (by the internal politics of the actor) but by the rejection of the recent history of Europe and its ‘war torn’ past and how that feeds into its interest in spreading decentralised liberal democracy, market economics, mixed constitutionalism (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003), ensuring the stability of institutions, rule of law and the respect for minorities. One does not need to be an advanced student of history to recognise the significance of these values in contrast to the experience of nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance of the past millennia or more in

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92 Although this is a problematic conclusion in itself as almost all borders are illusory, socially constructed and subject to change so there is no particular reason to say the EU is not a territorial actor. This, however, is just an aside as the process of the construction of the EU’s essence is what is at stake, not the essence itself – which many have reached using constructivism via different routes – Manners and Whitman (1998) for example have arrived at the EU’s identity in a Second Image, internalist way, with little or no reference to external or structural influences, and Diez (2004) and Waever (1998b) arrived, by utilising the process of ‘othering’ of Europe’s history, at much the same point, with a modicum more normativity in the former scholar’s conclusions.
Europe. This commitment and belief that the EU represents not just a new geopolitical entity but one that is based on the rejection of its constituent parts’ histories strengthens the modernist constructivist notion of the EU as a new, progressive political actor. The different ways that the EU’s identity is arrived at, and the similarity of EUS scholars’ conclusions as to what it is, illustrates the homogeneity of their view of the EU’s essence.

What is greatly concerning about this view of the EU’s identity is not that it is geared towards a ‘EUtopian’ view, but that it matches the EU’s ‘narrative of projection’ so closely. It is difficult to systematise this accurately, but if the narrative of projection of an actor is reproduced by the academic community who are engaged in the analysis of it, we are obliged to wonder whether this is because of an overly close relationship between the academic community and the policy makers themselves, coincidence or perhaps even a case of academia getting it ‘right’. Academics should always be available to help out in the policy making process but there is a sense that EUS scholars are operating not simply as students of the institution and its processes but also as advocates for it. To understand this, the link between academia and the institution must be considered. There is no question, for example, that the neofunctionalist theorists were both involved as advisors and being read by practitioners in the late fifties and sixties. The link is clear and while it can be given significance based on the ‘microhistorical’ method discussed in Chapter 3, it is difficult to systematise such a connection. Very little work has been done on this link, but the little that has been done has suggested that while difficult to quantify, the Jean
Monnet Programme, DAAD funded centres, EUCES and national European Union centres represent a spur to research on the EU, although there is certainly no requirement for the publication of ‘positive’ examinations of the integration movement (Keeler, 2005). The numbers of scholars from a whole range of disciplines and from across the world researching the EU is growing, but this can be explained in part by the financial involvement of the Commission and the Member States. This however does not resolve the issue of advocacy. Further research should certainly be done on the attitudes of EUS scholars towards the EU a la the occasional Foreign Policy surveys of North American IR scholars towards the various aspects of the US’s foreign policy. Anyone who has ever attended a UACES conference cannot but be struck by the overwhelming enthusiasm for European Integration amongst the delegates – it is quite like attending the party conference of a political party. The production of a microhistory of EUS could not include extensive attention to such issues, but the problem of systematising such a narrative is obvious. The problem of proving a causal impact on politics and its study is always difficult.

What does this mean for the study of the EU then? By partaking in the creation of the ‘idea’ of Europe, academia is part of the ‘narrative of projection’, a narrative that is explained using constructivist tools and intellectual argument and supporting a value-set of modern liberalism and the rejection of the realist claim for the continuity of political life. While Wendt, Checkel and Hopf all write that constructivism is ‘ambivalent to change’ in one way or another, this is not played out in EUS, or IR for that
matter. Constructivists, as a result of their inherent interest in new forms of politics\textsuperscript{94} – because their social ontology argues that politics is constantly being created and recreated – have examined and explained progressive politics rather than the politics of exploitation and oppression, two forms of politics which the EU is unquestionably engaged in (see Chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of examples). For this reason, we must conclude that while there is an element of meta-theoretical critique in constructivism, when it comes to the practice of study, and especially the EU, constructivists have returned to a liberal position and supported liberal values through their research. They do this by examining and theorising the creation of an EU demos and polity through describing the modes in which it can be fostered. Instead of this, such constructivists who are meant to be part of a theoretical critique in IR, fail to reject the superiority, conditionality and neo-imperialism of the EU’s liberal project. This faith in the EU’s essence and its reproduction by scholars who are theoretically hyper-sensitive to the production and reproduction of identities, values and norms, is therefore – using their own framework – a key part of the EU ‘idea’. Thus, in a very acute way, Jackson’s rejection of the notion of a ‘critical’ constructivism and the failure of constructivists to live up to their intention to ‘critique’\textsuperscript{95} (Wendt, 1999) is seen. By failing to examine or explain the social

\textsuperscript{94} Wendt and Hopf discuss the relevance of constructivism for looking at certain traditional IR’s concepts such as the security dilemma, security communities and anarchy for example for examining how these all operate based on intersubjectivities of ‘normal’ state behaviour. However, Wendt’s most recent publications have raised the concept of ‘quantum politics’ or the politics of the possible, showing a clear utopian vision of progress and the positive role constructivism can play in assisting the in the achievement of such new forms of politics.

\textsuperscript{95} To use his term.
construction of exploitation, imperialism and universalising discourses, constructivists have failed to come to terms with the heart of darkness of political life and failed to criticise the power relations at play within the institution and between the EU and its international partners. Such a situation renders constructivism little more than an ontological addition to the liberal hegemony seen in the previous chapter. Its potential to examine and develop narratives of the EU as a universalising, neo-imperial power – the beginnings of which are so self-evident when the EU’s own narratives are examined - when its own ontology promotes the functional and qualitative difference between actors is a serious flaw in the research and a sign of the continued dominance of EUS by a liberal, and more recently liberal-constructivist, ideology.

Conclusion

In Mannheimian terms, the rise and cooption of constructivism into the liberal family is a natural part of the sociology of knowledge (Chapter 3, fn. 3). Constructivism, when examined in-depth shows a faith in change and the spreading of intersubjective norms (which happen to be universalising ones) which place it ultimately on the side of, rather than opposing, the modernist hegemony described in the previous chapter. What then is the Mannheimian landscape of EUS in this liberal-constructivist phase? By way of conclusion, this will be set out in preparation for the concluding chapter.

Edward Said was retrospectively adopted as a constructivist and his conceptualisation of orientalism represents the explanation of such relations par excellence, but today, such examination of the social construction of regressive or oppressive processes or phenomena is avoided.
which attempts to bring the threads of the realist critique, disciplinary politics and the liberal-constructivist hegemony together in an analysis of the discourse surrounding the EU as an international actor.

Attributing political opinions to political scholars is always a risky business. The role of constructivism in EUS is to bring the integration process back to the federalist debate in developing the debate about European integration beyond the economism of the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist divide and into the realm of identity and normative politics. Whereas the first phase of the integration debate focused on competing individualist understandings of material interests, constructivism brings philosophical idealism and social construction into the mix. It may seem like a benign suggestion but such additions may have posed a challenge to the liberal modernist dominance of EUS. Other social and cultural theories such as critical theory, Neo-Marxism and poststructuralism, contain the ingredients for coherent and challenging examinations of the EU order, however under the title of constructivism the tools of critical theory and poststructuralism were used to reinforce the idea of the EU as a sign of progress in political life, when alternative, supportable narratives are clearly available\(^7\) (Mayer, 2008). What this chapter set out to do was to analyse the development of constructivism as an approach in EUS, using the *sui generis* gene as the focus of the discussion, towards the goal of showing that constructivism consolidated in EUS the idea that the EU is unique in its forms and essence, which therefore justifies theorising the EU with ‘new eyes’, particularly in

\(^7\) Obviously, alternative materialist (Marxist and realist) narratives would also be available but these will be dealt with in the next chapter.
the formation of its identity and its international affairs. It has been shown how the EU’s identity previous to the addition of constructivism’s double hermeneutics was largely an economic and material one; and how it changed to a mix of idealist and liberal materialist traits. EUS is now dominated by a mix of theories of the same source, constructivism and liberal institutionalism – creating a soft-rationalism, heavily influenced by discourse analysis and idealism. The costs have been dear however. While Jupille may argue that a thousand methodological flowers may be blooming in EUS (Jupille, 2005), using a variety of methods to support a small theoretical range is irrelevant. While the number of methods used are diverse, if the ‘flowers’ are engaged in testing hypotheses based on a narrow ontology, diversity of method is immaterial. Constructivism serves its new master well for strengthening the view that the EU is unique and consolidating the modernist hegemony. However, it has suffered as a consequence of its indeterminate use and its unclear epistemology. In trying to be all things to all men, it has become almost nothing to everyone and in attempting to say something really new about the EU – no doubt the best example of a laboratory for constructivism – it has fallen foul of cooption, through a deliberate effort to be accepted by the mainstream, and possibly to promote a political project which scholars themselves are both involved in (historically) and advocating. This new cooperative dominance of EUS will be demonstrated in detail in the next chapter. It will be shown that that the study of the international affairs of the EU has developed along the same lines as the two phases of the integration theory debate, but it is also the manifestation of the liberal-constructivist hegemony over the discipline.
Chapter 6:

Case Study: The anti-realism of the study of the EU as an international actor and a proposed alternative

To show the impact of developments in the previous two phases of EUS, a number of things need to be considered in the discussion of the EU’s international affairs. The first of these is the extent to which the EU is considered a new sort of political actor internationally. This will reflect the presence, and significance of the *sui generis* gene. The second point to consider is the dominance of the discourse by a liberal, and liberal-constructivist framework. These will be shown to be the basis for all approaches to the EU’s nature as an international actor. The third and final point, clearly linked to the previous two points, is to assess the extent to which the Normative Power Europe (NPE) thesis represents the apotheosis of the two trends identified in Chapters 4 and 5. If the hypothesis is to be proven true, these three ideas must be shown to be present. This will be done by assessing the development of the discourse on the EU as an international actor. It will be clearly shown how the trends in the study of
the EU shown in the first two chapters of Section 2 reflect the discourse on the EU as an international actor. It will be outlined how in the early phase of the EU’s development the discourse presented a view of the EU as the epitome of a liberal (civilian) actor. Subsequently, with the constructivist turn in IR and EUS, the EU’s nature was then described as a normative, civilising one in keeping with constructivism’s social ontology. In developing this narrative, the very obvious negation of realism will be shown. In illustrating this and in identifying the lacunae left in the study of the EU’s international affairs by the liberal-constructivist dominance of the discourse, two points should become clear.

The first of these relates to the idea developed in Section 1 that dominance of a discourse by a single paradigm or narrative leads to imbalance and will be incapable of explaining all of ‘reality’. In this sense, the dominance of NPE and the holes which exist in its narrative are proof of the need for dialectic between competing narratives. Without it, gaps in the explanatory wall are inevitable. The second point which will become clear as the narrative of the liberal-constructivist hegemony is developed, is that not only is there a need for debate within discourses as a rule and in the case of the EU’s external relations in particular, it will be obvious that a relativist, materialist and power-centred alternative is required here. Into this breach must step realism in order to, not simply describe the ‘missing pieces’\(^\text{98}\) of the EU’s empirical external relations, but also to interrogate the elements of universalism and absolutism present in the EU’s narrative of projection, of which the academics who study it, are part.

\(^{98}\) Those interactions which do not fit into the existing narrative and therefore have been left unexamined.
To recount Mannheim, theories that are *en vogue* at any one time are not so because they provide the most accurate description of reality, they are so because of an array of economic, social and historic factors. Thus, theories are not neutral but value-laden lenses through which our conceptions of reality are formed. This is not to suggest that within EUS studies a mass-deception is taking place in the Marxist sense of ideology, but that the dominant approach to the study of the EU represents a functioning ideology. The NPE theory is not simply a theory that describes the EU’s international actorliness, but is a manifestation of the dominant ideology in EUS outlined in the previous two chapters. It is an ideology that is the amalgam of aspects of the modern, teleological liberalism of the first phase of the integration theory debate, and the deeper epistemology and ontology of the constructivist turn with a large portion of sympathy/support for the institution and its goals thrown in. This has left the discipline bereft of any trace of realism.

The chapter will be structured in three sections. The first will examine the forerunner to NPE, the civilian power framework of which NPE is at once an extension of, and a move away from. The second will focus on the three aspects of the thesis described by Manners. He writes that the ‘EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be *conceptualised* as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quality to it – in that the EU *acts* to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU *should* act to extend its norms into the international system’ (2002: 252). Therefore, it will involve, firstly, a methodological and ontological assessment of NPE’s
claims; secondly, an empirical examination; and thirdly, a problematisation of the normative basis of the theory. This quote provides the structure for the examination of the theory.

The discussion of NPE will be geared not simply towards chastising the exuberance of the thesis for certain metatheoretical or methodological flaws, but to illustrate the lacunae left by the civilian and normative discourses in the study of the EU as an international actor. This will then highlight the need for an alternative voice in the milieu. The final section will build on the argument made in Chapter 2 and in the spirit of Carr’s original assault on liberal international theory and practice that an alternative must be put forward in order to ensure that the important normative element in the theory retains its vigour. Without a strong alternative, as opposed to the growing number of criticisms of aspects of the

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99 It is important to remember (See Chapter 3) that while Carr did not follow Mannheim on the issue of the clear interconnectedness of between theory and practice, writing ‘theory does not create practice, but practice theory’ (1964: 63), his assault of the liberal policies of the time was dominated by the rejection of principles such as the harmony of interests and free trade as disseminator of peace which can be considered as largely academic, or theoretical, constructs. Therefore, returning to part of the argument in Chapter 2 on the relationship between realism and diplomacy, the relationship between practice and theory is far more complex than Carr claims in this passage. It could be said that in the tools he employs for his critique of liberalism he shows a more nuanced and Mannheimian attitude towards the relationship between the two. The relationship between the two is even more deserving of our attention when it comes the EU case, as it is not simply the interplay between practitioners and policy on one hand; and ‘objective’ observers arriving with their analytical frameworks in tow (as we would expect from traditional IR or CP scholars) on the other. The influence of the *sui generis* gene on this makes the relationship between policy, international outcomes and EUS scholars more important to examine. They are not just analysing the procession of activities parading before them, but creating the context and the structure of the policy debate *de novo*.

100 Carr puts this argument most forcefully in Chapter 2 of *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* and should be quoted at length.

'The utopian fixing his eyes on the future, thinks in terms of creative spontaneity: the realist, rooted in the past, in terms of causality. All healthy human action, and therefore all healthy thought, must establish a balance between utopia and reality, between free will and determinism. The complete realist, unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality which he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. The characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility’ (1964: 11-2)
theory (Hyde-Price, 2006 & 2008; Pace, 2007, Diez, 2004 & 2005; Merlingen, 2007 and Sjursen, 2006a), the theory will become embedded, regressive and overly utopian. It could easily be argued that this danger has already been realised. An alternative to the civilian and normative power discourse will therefore be presented. The alternative outlined will be based on the practical aspect of realism which was outlined in Chapter 2. It will present what many would suggest is a ‘normal’ realist approach to studying any international actor, because in many ways, that is what is required. This concluding section represents the culmination of the disparate strands of the analysis and the completion of the realist circle. It completes the realist circle by finally bringing realism into the analysis in its ‘normal’ interpretive guise – not as a hermeneutical device, as it has represented in the analysis up to here, but a practical one.

This realist approach is a unique realist effort at systematising the EU’s global affairs. The importance of competition and dialectic in a discourse cannot be undervalued. Only through this can new and challenging ideas arise. Coherence and agreement among scholars may be considered a strength in the natural sciences, but within the discourse at question here, and in other areas of social study, it produces docile research, unchallenging of the status quo of academic structures or to the object of study itself. Such a situation, as will be seen in the discussion to follow, is unhealthy and

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101 Hubert Zimmermann (2007) in ‘Realist Power Europe’ provides a narrative of EU action based on a mercantilist, Gilpin inspired, framework examining the EU’s relations with China and Russia in their respective attempts to join the WTO. This analysis has at its core the assumption that as the EU becomes more centralised (with the increase of the Commission’s control over international trade negotiations) or in some way ‘normal’, the more it behaves as we would expect a state to act. Thus, Zimmermann’s analysis, while an important challenge and certainly not starkly at odds with this analysis still retains an underlying statist assumption for realism, and indirectly, reproduces the attitude that the EU is, or has been for some time, a *sui generis* actor.
untenable. This chapter will offer a solution to the problem by examining the genealogy of the theory showing its tracking of the developments shown in Chapters 4 and 5; by showing the theory’s limitations; and finally, by providing a robust competing framework for the study of the EU as an international actor – the ‘necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism’ (Carr, 1963: 10).

Before going onto the main discussion it is important to make an important distinction about what this chapter does and does not set out to examine. Foreign policy and its making (in the EU context) and the actual interaction of the EU with other actors are two starkly different things. The first is the stated policy of actors as seen in policy documents and declarations by policy-makers and government officials. Foreign policy has more of an identifiable reality than discussions of the EU’s international identity, in that it exists in the policy declarations and documents of the institutions and in the statements of officials and representatives. Whether analysts analyse the impact of the EU and evaluate its performance first, before then describing its essence, or a constitutive approach to identify its identity, or some combination of the two, we are still dealing in generalisations – important generalisations, but generalisations nonetheless. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) on the other hand is firmly based in the actuality of the policy and the policy making process.

Developed by scholars interested in the impact of bureaucracy and organisational processes on policy making, it traditionally placed enormous emphasis on actors’ rationality and the ability of actors to implement policy
decisions – although this approach was challenged by Allison’s influential *Essence of Decision* (1971). Those engaged in FPA focused on a number of specific factors in their research such as the impact of ‘non-state’ actors, capabilities and instruments and policy contexts. However, while these issues are important and provide significant insight into specific areas of EU FP it is important to remember that ‘foreign policy is not international politics’ (Waltz, 1986). Due to the problems of implementation and coherence across the large number of policy actors even in archetypal unitary acting states like the USA, China or Russia it is important to approach foreign policy carefully and especially carefully in the EU context\textsuperscript{102}. It is always a danger, particularly in EUS, that scholars are drawn into unnecessarily complex discussions of the process of foreign policy making. To say that the making of CFSP positions is a complex process is as obvious as it is irrelevant to the discussion here – a prime example of not being able to see the wood for the trees. However, despite the problems it faces FPA has developed a coherent mode of analysis of the domestic decision and policy making processes (White, 1998 & 2004). White has argued that an approach to the EU’s international affairs based on its impact is flawed on a number of issues (the assumption that the EU is a unitary actor, the focus on outcomes rather than process) and that the purely institutional approach is guilty of the fetishising of institutions especially

\textsuperscript{102} See Nutall (2005) for an analysis of the coherency of policy implementation within the EU context in terms of vertical (between the EU and Member States), institutional (between the EU’s institutions) and horizontal (between different EU policies) coherence. The very complexity of these relationships should be a point in favour of the ‘impact’ approach of M.E. Smith and Whitman (1998) and perhaps most notably, Bretherton and Vogler (2006).
the CFSP and CSDP, altogether telling us little of the actual policy itself (2004: 45-7).

The FPA approach, while providing interesting and useful insights into the process of policy making and the distribution of power amongst the Member States on particular issues and how on specific issues certain members are more powerful than others, tells us little about what should be the most important issue which is the impact of the institution on the world outside. It is in this, FPA sense, that Hill and Smith (2005: 8-9) describe the EU as a sub-system of International Relations. Interesting and important questions are raised by this approach but overall, the problems of foreign policy’s implementation and coherence make it of less importance to the world than the EU’s actual interactions and impact. This impact can only be identified by including a whole variety of areas which are not covered by a CFSP analysis as many internal policies have major external ramifications – such as CAP, CFP and environmental policy for example.\footnote{This position is supported by throughout the work of Manners. He writes, ‘[m]y focus of analysis is a holistic approach to the EU in world politics, including the international dimensions of internal policies, enlargement and external actions, rather than an exclusive focus on the EU’s ‘weakest link’, the CFSP/CSDP’ (2008: 45).}

One important point to make of this FP-centred approach is that this has been a locale where ‘EU-realists’ have been able to make a certain amount of an impact on the discourse, mainly because of the EPC’s, and subsequently CFSP’s, relative failure to produce coherent and significant outcomes (even at an internal-EU level). That said, Tonra and Christiansen (2004) argue that such analyses of EU FP (Pijpers, 1991) are incapable of including any sort of ideational variable in their analyses, and so, such
analyses have tended to be applications of some form of structural, rational-choice ontology onto the EU-FP context.

The application of such frameworks to the EU, either in the form of an integration theory or as a putative theory of EU foreign policy making, is faulty. Waltz’s framework as discussed in the previous chapter relates to the interaction of units in an anarchical system which under no circumstances be used to describe the EU foreign policy making forum. Such efforts at applying neorealism as an integration theory (Grieco, 1995) or chastising it for not being a theory of integration (Collard-Wexler, 2005) are therefore misplaced. Wilga (2009) argues for a multi-level analysis of the CFSP realm but his combination of neofunctionalism, modified neorealism and liberal intergovernmentalism produces such a complex and ontologically tense mix of variables and actors it is not so much a ‘multi-causal and multi-level’ theoretical analysis as much as complex description of reality. In ‘juxtaposing those theories in sequences, the new model used their respective analytical advantages to studying CFSP institutional development in a synergetic way’ (2009: 88). Such an analysis matches closely, Hyde-Price’s approach in Tonra and Chirstiansen’s (2004) edited text. However, the problem of elegance, or inelegance remains. If such an approach includes such a variety of competing and complex variables (as constructivism is probably guilty of) it becomes so that we are no longer dealing with theory in its traditional, ordering and arrangement sense, but involved description which so much of the foreign policy approach is. The distinction between FPA and alternative approaches made, the analysis-proper will proceed.
The genealogy of a theory - Civilian power Europe

Any discussion of NPE must begin with Duchêne’s (1972 & 1973) description of the EU as a ‘civilian’ power. Duchêne’s conceptualisation of the EU as a global economic force and the connected question of a European ‘civilising process’ still is an extremely popular and discussed approach despite its being surpassed, some might say simply extended, by Manner’s NPE framework. The argument here is that the two theories are essentially similar in their intent – theorising the EU’s commitment to certain ways of doing business and drawing conclusions on the EU’s role in the world and its nature based on liberal, modernist frameworks. We will first examine Duchêne’s description of the concept of civilian power, showing its basis in liberal international thought, and how it was then developed by those interested in the EU as an international actor to understand not just the EU’s nature/essence but also its role/purpose. This will then feed into the main analysis of NPE.

Duchêne writes that, ‘Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a major center of the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not a colonised victim but an exemplar of a new stage in political civilisation. The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power’ (Duchêne, 1973: 19). Duchêne was not simply describing the resources available to the EU - ‘if it is not military then it must be the opposite of military = civilian’ – but also developing a prescriptive concept for the EU
in its relationship with the world. Duchêne believed that the interaction between the Member States through the EC/EU framework had ‘domesticated’ their relations. In doing so, the politics of Europe had been demilitarised but under the strange circumstances of an abundance of military power on the continent. The success of European integration gave the EC/EU an interest and a model for international politics based on their own existence. ‘This means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have been in the past associated exclusively with “home” and not foreign, that is alien, affairs’ (Duchêne, 1973: 19-20). Elsewhere he wrote in the same vein, that the 'EC will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteristics. They are primarily civilian ends and means; and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance’ (Duchêne, 1972: 20). Thus we see, at the outset that the concept was not simply a description of the power resources available to the EC – ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’ - but also how it should use such resources in a normative, progressive way. Even if the EU fails to achieve any of its civilian goals, Nicolaïdis argues, it is still ‘valid as a goal‘ (2003: 99). It is significant that Duchêne is not linking the form of the EU’s power resources in an automatic sense, but that this non-

\[^{104}\text{It is important to remember that this process of integration and demilitarisation occurred as a result of the security guarantee provided by the US (Wallace, 1994 & Dinan, 1999: Chapter 1). So, while Duchêne was correct to say that the relations between the members had been demilitarised, or civilian-ised (“civilised”) this was more to do with the devaluation of military power as a result of its abundance and super-destructiveness, rather than being based on a moral distaste for it. This argument on the obsolescence of war and military power and its being replaced by civilian forms was a forerunner to the work of John Mueller, author of }\text{Retreat from Doomsday- The Obsolescence of Major War} (1989)\text{ and his subsequent work }\text{The Remnants of War} (2004).\]
militaristic, structural power allows actors a wider scope of opportunities for doing good and convincing other actors of your benign intentions than if the threat of military conflict is present in the context of an interaction.

The distinction between the automatic functioning of power resources and the version put forward by Duchêne is an important one as while some have confused non-military power as inherently more moral than military power, this is a mistake. This error is most clearly seen in erroneous references to soft power as less nasty than hard power and therefore a ‘better’ form of power to use, a repeated error that Nye himself was moved to correct (Nye, 2006). To summarise civilian power thus far, the concept has descriptive/empirical and prescriptive/normative connotations. This has been identified by most writers on the subject and the ‘intermingling of these two elements has been the hallmark of discussions about the notion of civilian power Europe’ (Whitman, 2002: 4). These will be examined now.

Civilian power has most often been ascribed three traits or characteristics from which the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of the theory stem. The first is the acceptance of the need for collaboration with other actors for the management of global affairs. In the EC/EU case this is clearly seen by the EU’s commitment to the UN, Bretton-Woods institutions and the growing number of inter-regional organisations. A linked characteristic of a civilian power is ‘a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management’ (Maull, 1990: 93). The civilian

\[105\] The error of anthropomorphising forms of power will be returned to later as part of the theoretical and ethical appraisal of NPE.
power has at the core of its international affairs a commitment to formalised relations (diplomacy) between international actors as the primary means of settling international disputes. The third and perhaps most significant characteristic relates to power resources. The civilian power possesses a ‘concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of interaction’ (Maull, 1990: 93)\textsuperscript{106}. In this combination of the emphasis on diplomacy and the pacific settlement of disputes through formalised and \textit{ad hoc} multilateralism and on the importance of non-military, mainly economic, power, we see an unmistakable statement of the liberal institutionalist framework which was developing at the time. The clearest statement of this approach is Keohane and Nye’s (1972 & 1977) work on interdependence which they were developing around the same time as Duchène was proposing this concept as a guide for scholars of the EC.

Considering the real-world circumstances is illustrative. They were all writing during détente; the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty had been signed and preparations for Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty 1 (SALT1) were ongoing. Along with this, the perceived failure of military force in Vietnam to achieve national interests reinforced the liberal view that military power was a totally inefficient mode of statecraft\textsuperscript{107}.

\textsuperscript{106} It has been noted in a number of works that this aspect of civilian power matches almost identically, Rosencrance’s (1986) description of the ‘trading state’.

\textsuperscript{107} Bull in his famous assault on the concept of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ argues that while the failure in Vietnam was certainly a reflection of a certain type of military power, that for every defeat of military power it was a victory for a different type of military power (1982: 150). Bull’s argument is often seen as a ‘realist’ rejection of the EC’s potential to have any
Such characterisations of civilian power are almost always based on the development of the concept by those other than Duchêne. While Duchêne first coined the term, most rely on the definitions of Kenneth Twitchett (1976) from his edited text, *Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market* and Hanns Maull’s 1990 article ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’. As Orbie remarks, ‘[a]lthough references to Duchêne’s 1972 and 1973 articles are ubiquitous (though rarely elaborated on)… they only offer a short and descriptive account of Europe’s possible role in the world’ (2006: 123). This is, Orbie offers, because of the imprecision/openness of the concept. This is often seen as a weakness of such social science frameworks of analysis but in this case it has allowed for diverse readings of the concept and its widespread use. ‘The enduring resonance of the CPE role is thus because of, rather than in spite of, his rather imprecise description. From this perspective, diverse readings of the CPE concept also reflect a discursive struggle (e.g. about the desirability of European defence and of normative foreign policy goals), where ‘historical’

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influence on international politics – his famous line, “Europe” is not an actor in international affairs and does not seem likely to become one’ is quoted regularly – but this is to misconstrue his argument. Bull suggested that the EC should develop its own military capacity to free itself from dependence on the US as a security provider and provides a course of action to do so. He writes that ‘the power or influence exerted by the EC and other civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control’ (1982: 151). Thus, in a militarised world civilian powers, like the EC/EU are only powers in so far as they are permitted to be so by military ones. Based on any definition of power one would like to consider such power is a ‘contradiction in terms’. However, Bull was writing at the beginning of the Second Cold War when military power appeared to be at the peak of its importance and citing Bull’s criticism of civilian power in the modern context appears mendacious. Bull did not live to see the end of the Cold War, unipolarity, neoliberal globalisation and the growth of the New Regionalist movement and it is unlikely he would have fallen for the error of the absolute character of power referred to by Morgenthau (1981: 157) in such a blithe way. Like Morgenthau, Bull would certainly have been amenable to the changing nature of power based on changes to workings within the international system. Thus, Bull’s criticism of civilian power does not have an eternal quality but was of its own time and cannot and should not be transplanted directly into the present discourse. While this may not fit smoothly into the discussion, it is vital to address the repeated citing of Bull in current debates on civilian and normative power even though his argument is no longer relevant.
references to Duchêne’s articles may give the author’s interpretation some legitimacy’ (Orbie, 2006: 124). Duchêne certainly set the tone of the discourse for EUS, but the characteristics and systemisation outlined here - examined and rejected by Manners and his acolytes - are based on the writings of Twitchett and Maull, and upon occasion Christopher Hill’s (1990) examination of the concept in ‘European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop’. Hill’s tripartite examination of civilian power differs slightly but amounts to the same thing whereby there is an ‘emphasis on persuasion rather than coercion;... discussion rather than seeking exclusively to reinforce the European institutions; and the relative willingness to envisage open diplomacy and to encourage a more sophisticated public discussion of foreign policy matters’ (1990: 41). Not discounting the added significance of his inclusion of the liberal internationalist call for more open and democratic foreign policy making, Hill goes onto to emphasise that the main locus of the EU’s power is its economic power. Thus, while his division is slightly different to Maull’s, civilian power is summed up similarly – diplomacy, economic power and an interest in ‘civilising’ politics.

It is because of this that, despite the acuity of Orbie’s conclusions relating to the imprecision of the concept, his overall argument is undermined. Civilian power is a straightforward concept which can generate testable hypotheses, coherent explanations for past behaviour and clear normative recommendations. It requires little enough description – any imprecision is brought only by the analyst. What is unclear, as Orbie writes, are the normative conclusions which civilian power help analysts reach – whether
for example the EU’s growing military force undermines its civilian credentials\textsuperscript{108}. The question of the normative prescription in civilian power, or the question of ‘civilising’ is the next stage in the analysis.

\textsuperscript{108} Karen Smith (2000 & 2001), Whitman (2002) and a JEPP Special Issue edited by Helene Sjursen (2006a) all considered the impact of the ‘militarisation’ on the EU’s ‘civilising’/normative power, and while some, Karen Smith (2000) for example, argued that this marked the ‘death of civilian power Europe’, in reality it matters little whether the EU is armed or not for two reasons. Firstly, assuming the EU has a civilian identity which is formed, according to Duchêne, by the shared values of the Member States – this redistribution of resources from the Member State level to a centralised institution does not affect the essence of the EU as an actor. As McCormack writes, ‘civilian power need not be taken literally; as much as anything it is about a difference of attitude. The EU can still be a civilian power... so long as it emphasises non-military tools in its foreign policy, and promotes the military as a peacekeeper rather than a peacemaker’ (2007: 70-1). This argument is repeated by Stavridis (2001) who argues that civilian goals, not resources are key. Sjursen also makes this point writing, ‘[m]ost importantly, perhaps, civilian instruments, although often referred to as ‘soft’ instruments, are not necessarily benign and neither are they necessarily non-coercive. Economic sanctions can cause serious harm, and what is more, their effects are often indiscriminate. They may hit civilians and in particular children very hard. So the use of non-military instruments cannot on its own be enough to identify a polity as a ‘normative’ power (2006b: 239). This represents a pretty good example of a liberal perspective of the EU’s international behaviour as it assumes that the EU’s identity is given, rather than constituted and reconstituted. It exists through a pluralistic process of policy making and is justified by the intent and outcome of such actions.

From a constructivist perspective the development of the CSDP and its attending military capacities could have some impact, but ultimately should not greatly affect the EU’s international identity as it stresses the ideational formation of identities over materialist explanations. According to the ontology, while material resources have a social reality (Wendt uses the example of British nuclear weapons to reject the purely objective existence of such items – having as they did a different ‘meaning’ to Soviet and American policy makers and therefore have a part to play in the perception of the EU as an ‘Other’) argumentation and communication of an ideational nature have a far greater impact on identity formation on balance. The perception of the EU as a military power however is faulty as a result of two common perceptions about the EU’s security policy. The first is that the EU’s military is still insignificant and is only capable of very small peacemaking or larger peacekeeping missions. This perception, particularly held in Russian, Chinese and American policy circles, is given credence by the fact that the EU is still behind the schedule for the Helsinki Headline Goals and with the fiscal crisis throughout EU-27 increased defence spending is unlikely (See Howarth, 2005 for a full discussion of the development of the EU’s security and defence policy). The second perception which is particularly prevalent in Russia again, is that Member States have forsaken military integration at an intra-institutional level for further cooperation and alignment with NATO. Whether these are factually true or not is academic because the important thing about such a discussion is the perception and misperception of intent and potential – the basic components of the security dilemma. (Herz, 1950: See Jervis, 1976: Chap. 1&2).

While this may appear a secondary issue to the discussion, it, like the use of Bull, requires attention in any such discussion of the dominant debates on the EU as an international actor. As has been mentioned elsewhere (Hussey, 2009), the ascribing of ethical value to an inanimate resource (anthropomorphism) is problematic and cannot be supported by any major social theory uncontested.
Whenever such a phrase as civilising is used it is important that it is approached with great caution. One of the major criticisms of liberal thought is that their conceptions of democracy, human rights and political economy are ‘culturally specific, ethnocentric and therefore irrelevant to societies which are not Western in cultural orientation’ (Burchill, 2001: 43). Such a phrase as civilising is so loaded with imperial connotations as to be avoided at all costs perhaps. However, this is slightly unfair to Duchêne and those who have subsequently used the concept. The element of change and ‘domestication’ of ‘alien’ politics which Duchêne calls for is not as utopian as it may appear. In arguing that the EC should attempt to encourage the domestication of international politics and the cooperative management of international affairs, he is not suggesting an imperial project but a means for a wide variety of political actors to coordinate their relations in means which are less likely to end in armed conflict – as was the case in Western Europe. Thus, civilian power is not necessarily a utopian project for a more peaceful world, but an increasingly ‘demilitarised’ international realm, where power is exercised in economic or structural ways. Conflict still occurs in this context but is at an economic level rather than a military one, what Nicolaidis describes as the diffusing of ‘habits of peaceful change’ (2003: 99).

Once again, this description of the mode of transformation matches very closely the conclusions of Nye and Keohane’s complex interdependence framework and the liberal internationalism of Mueller and Doyle. It is on this basis that Manners dismisses civilian power as an inherently materialist framework (2002: 236-8). While there is the ‘civilising’, normative aspect
to civilian power based on the shared values of the Member States, the spreading of these norms is done through the material support of such ideas—through the use of its economic and structural power. This normative projection is, for Manners and others, a form of conditionality/bribery rather than genuine norm expansion where the EU’s norms are accepted by actors with whom it is ‘doing business’. It is in this context that Manners argues that Bull and Duchêne were essentially arguing for the same thing by a marginally different route. He writes that they argue for the ‘the strengthening of international society not civil society’ and ‘the maintenance of the status quo in international relations which maintained the centrality of the nation-state’. On top of this he argued, ‘they both valued direct physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities’ and that ‘they both saw European interests as paramount’ (2002: 238).

For Manners, these arguments became outdated by the transformations brought, or possibly simply marked, by the end of the Cold War, and ‘the collapse of norms rather than the power of force’ in particular. He goes on to say that a ‘better understanding of the EU’s role in world politics might be gained by reflecting on what those revolutions tell us about the power of ideas and norms rather than the power of empirical force – in other words normative power’ (2002: 238). In the original article on NPE Manners suggests that the ‘empirical’ power approaches are not unimportant but that the EU’s ability to shape what is ‘normal’ in international affairs ‘needs to be given much greater attention’ (239) but in later works (2004 & 2006), his position on EU militarisation is significantly less forgiving, arguing that it
will ‘increasingly lead to the implosion of the EU’s normative status in
world politics’ (2004: 18) particularly if it is done in an unreflexive way.

The rejection of pre-existing approaches to the EU as an international actor,
based on the materialism of the civilian and military approaches leads
Manners to propose an alternative based on a liberal-constructivism.
Whereas the original arguments of Bull and Duchêne related to some form
of material European interest, as if there existed a ‘nation writ large’ to use
Wight’s term, Manners argues that the interests of the EU lie with the
spreading of more peaceful and democratic norms of international
behaviour globally.

This change in the dominant approach to the EU as an international actor
from the liberalism of Duchêne and Bull to the normative constructivism of
NPE matches precisely the progress in the integration theory debate seen in
the previous two chapters. On the one hand we have conceptualisations of
economic and material interests in the original integration debate, and on
the other the ideational impact of norms on social constructions and
behaviour. Duchêne and Bull focused on interest unquestionably. While
their formulations were at odds in many ways, they shared a common
intellectual purpose – to understand the collective material and security
interests of the EC/EU. This fits well with the ‘Debate’ seen in the
neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist divide over conceptions of interest
and where interest-primacy lay. The civilian power discourse fits this mode
of analysis (‘style of thought’ to use Mannheim’s phrase) very closely. The
modernist social theory of the original integration theories is matched in the
civilian power discourse. The next section will show how the liberal-constructivist move towards a broader understanding of integration was matched in the discourse surrounding the EU as an international actor. To recap, the constructivist turn led to the EU being seen not simply as an economic union or security community but as a constitutive polity. The polity was based on norms developed through the interaction of the Member States and structurally through the constitutive effects of institutional structures. It is these norms and values, constructed over time through learning and communication if constructivists are to be believed, which has created the normative power discourse to be examined now.

**Normative Power Europe**

It is difficult to illustrate the dominance of NPE in the EU External Relations discourse without becoming involved in some form of citation measurement or other. The number of citations and references would then need to be examined in comparison to other important concepts in the discourse in order to contextualise the figure. This however seems unsatisfactory as a great many texts might reference the concept of NPE and Manners without necessarily discussing or examining the concept in any depth. On top of that, what texts or authors should Manners’ work be compared against to illustrate a dominance which informally most involved in the field would broadly accept as present\(^{109}\). But surrounding these

\(^{109}\) For example, ‘Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’ receives just under 400 citations using Google Scholar (All figures correct for July 25\(^{th}\) 2009). This fares better than a previously dominant question in the discourse, Christopher Hill’s capabilities-expectations gap, which received just over 320. Bull’s ‘Civilian Power Europe: A contradiction in terms’ receives 122 citations, which instinctively seems about fair considering his criticism of the existing discourse was significant but not paradigm shifting. If we then compare these figures to the broader discipline, no greater clarity is
statistical questions, a more fundamental question arises relating to the reliability of the statistic gathering process. Anecdotally at least, the much used Google Scholar citation figures are less than reliable. Clearer indications of the concept’s significance may reside in the special issues devoted to the concept in the Journal of European Public Policy (2006, Vol. 13, No. 2) and International Affairs (2008, Vol. 84, No. 1). Perhaps a more illustrative example again, is the wide range of uses of Manners framework and the scholars who have adopted it within the discourse. In 2005, in response to Thomas Diez’s criticisms of the concept, Manners reviews the framework he had developed five years earlier. Along with being a useful artefact to add to the discourse’s disciplinary history files, Manners mentions the various uses of his theory up to that point.

He writes, ‘[a]s Diez’s reconsideration of the NP thesis illustrates, the development of constructivist theory-informed EU external/foreign policy studies has led to a wider engagement with the NP approach. These include book-length volumes using the NP approach to study EU foreign policy; EU actorness; the Euro-Mediterranean partnership; EU values and principles. In addition to these volumes, work on international political theory; global governance; environmental studies research; the transatlantic relationship; achieved. Ben Rosamond’s Theories of European Integration, certainly the most comprehensive text on integration theory, receives 692. Moravcsik’s Choice for Europe fares particularly well with almost two thousand references, thrashing comprehensively Haas’s The Uniting of Europe which scores a surprisingly low 692. The problem with all of this however, as mentioned, is that the figures still aren’t dependable or truly comprehensive (in terms of the population of comparators). Instead of utilising such a dubious system, and without the interest or inclination in proving something that is already commonly believed to be true through some alternative methodology (counting the number of articles published in major journals since 2002 which use NPE as either the basis or part of a theoretical or empirical study of the EU’s international identity is a possibility) this is taken as a given.
and Turkish security studies have also used the NP approach’ (2005: 169). What is more difficult to illustrate is how after each major use (e.g. EU values and principles), in the original context there is a footnote, which in some cases includes as many as seven references. For those familiar even in passing with the major voices in this corner of EUS, the names included in these footnotes are the glitterati of the discourse (see 2005: 169 fns 10-8) - not to mention those who went unmentioned by Manners who have presented significant critical appraisals of the framework but who still operate within the confines of the debate such as Thomas Diez (2004 & 2005), Michelle Pace (2008), Tim Dunne (2008), Adrian Hyde-Price (2006 & 2008) and Richard Youngs (2004). It is not an exaggeration to say that Manners’ NPE thesis now dominates the empirical and philosophical debate about the EU as an international actor. Even when heavily criticised\textsuperscript{110} none are forthright enough to distance themselves entirely from the ongoing discourse. The criticisms made by others will be referred to and these will be accompanied by some of my own, but these will be more in passing than the basis of this section of the Chapter. What will be shown is the way in which Manners’ theory is the pinnacle of the theoretical trends identified in the work so far – the liberal dominance of the discipline and the belief in the EU’s unique essence which has ultimately created an unbalanced, utopian and regressive discourse. The various criticisms of the theory already in existence are points in a debate within the context of the NPE discourse.

Within the study of the EU as an international actor, in the words of Bob Dylan, “Beyond here lies nothin’”.

\textsuperscript{110} Hyde-Price (2008) and Zimmermann (2007) are articles which come closest to rejecting the NPE thesis but instead criticise it and then make their contributions fit within the discourse of the
1) **Ontological NPE**

The first part of normative power Europe is its ontological quality. To what extent does the EU have a ‘normative basis’, how has this basis been formed and what is the significance of it? To understand the description of the EU’s as a normative power in its ontological sense we must clarify what Manners means when he writes that the ‘concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’ (2002: 252). While Manners does not engage explicitly with social constructivism in any of his articles which deal with the NPE thesis, his description of the EU’s normative basis is overtly constructivist. His first move is to outline the norms which have been detailed in the policies and statements. He identifies five core norms and four minor norms and writes that these allow ‘the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts’ (2002: 244). The development of these ethics Manners examines in detail in ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’ (2008) but does not provide a

111 He describes his approach as part of critical social theory. He draws on a wide variety of theories and accounts of social formation including ‘liberal construction of norms (Mead and Blumer), the critical construction of norms (Foucault), [and] the hegemonic construction of norms’ (2004: 4). While he points the reader toward the writing of Rumellin (2004) on the differences between liberal and critical constructivism, Manners makes no clear attempt to show that his approach is one or the other – merely pointing to the fact that the differences between the various forms of social formation theory provide different explanations of the role of norms.

112 Peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights – All of which are outlined in various Treaty Articles (2002: 243)

113 Social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (2002: 242-3).
clear view of how these norms are arrived at in the first place which is unsatisfactory. These norms, which now constitute the EU, are then spread through a series of different ‘social’ means. ‘Accepting the normative basis of the EU does not make it a normative power, so we need to ask how EU norms are diffused’, he writes (2002: 244).

Manners identifies six methods through which these norms are exported. It is in this part that we can see the clearest, but still underlying, use of constructivism. The modes of norm diffusion are contagion; informational diffusion; procedural diffusion; transference; overt diffusion and ‘cultural filter’ are the basis of the EU’s power. Through various forms of interaction between the EU and external actors, that which is considered normal international relations (based on the combination of cosmopolitan and communitarian norms identified by Manners as the EU’s normative base) is set. While two of these methods do rely on some form of materialist involvement – transference ‘may be the result of the exportation of community norms and standards... or the ‘carrot and stickism’ of financial rewards and economic sanctions’; and ‘overt diffusion occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations’ (245) – the other four can only occur within some form of social constructivist ontology as at their base they predicate interaction and communication as prime forces of ‘construction’. As mentioned earlier, Manners does not outline exactly the process, by which the EU’s norms are accepted by third states – this process has been left to others to develop in more detail – Rumelili (2004) is a useful example of this – and it is this ontological position which opens Manners up to the criticisms of
constructivists in the previous chapter. However, below the problem of causality within the normative power discourse, a more pressing problem arises. This is the description of a coherent social or individualist ontology for why things are as they are. In this very important sense, the EU is, as mentioned in the previous chapter the laboratory of constructivist theory *par excellence*. What does this mean in practice?

For NPE to work as a theory, it has to accept that ideas are central to the processes of politics. Along with this is the accompanying need for a vision of how these norms are spread. Manners presents six norms, of which four exist within a social constructivist ontology, insofar as they are predicated on the acceptance through example, procedural norm, cultural progression or simply contagion. However, he provides no clear causality between the existence of a norm in the EU (which we only have scant, declaratory evidence of) and its appearance elsewhere. Manners and his acolytes, in accepting the social constructivist ontology, even in an un(-der)stated way, have, in looking towards the future and to transformation, failed to deal with the causality between what was (EU norm) and what is (international norm), or at a lower level, between what was (disparate Member State norms) and what is (the EU norm). It all occurs within what is best described as ‘an act of faith’.

This criticism, developed by Moravcsik (2001) and outlined in the previous chapter, relates to those using social constructivism who do not provide either a causal mechanism for change nor any form of hypothesis testing versus a competing explanation or null-hypothesis. Manners’ efforts at
empirically proving his thesis on the issues of the international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty (2002) and more recently, his examination of the EU’s role in spreading norms on the rights of the child (2009), both suffer from this significant problem. This does not render the effort to prove his case correct useless, but it reflects the major weakness of the critical and conventional constructivist approaches whereby scholars are attempting to bring together competing epistemological positions – aspects of post-positive epistemology with a positivist desire to prove causality and that their narrative is ‘true’. When this difficult concoction of epistemology and unproven ontology is mixed in with an active interest in normative theory as in the case of Manners, we have such a combination of metatheoretical detritus as to render the theory ontologically and epistemologically porous. How can we accept that norms are actively shaping the actor’s behaviour when, not only can we not be sure that the norms exist, we cannot be sure that they are shared by the Member States or the EU either?

For a coherent ontology to be present, and not simply a list of declaratory norms, it is necessary to ask where these ideas have come from and why are they present over other ideas. If we accept it to be the case that the norms are socially constructed through the means outlined in the previous discussions on social construction, these ideas then must be ‘good ones’. Within the idealist, social-constructivist narrative, the actor who now is constituted by those values should interact with other actors based on the principles it embodies. As we know that interaction and communication are modes through which social construction occurs, if this social ontology is empirically correct in its claims, in order to prove social constructivism
correct, you need only ‘prove’ the process of norm diffusion. However, if at any of these stages the ontology is seriously challenged or rejected, the logic of the system of social construction can fall in on itself. This version is based on a positivist, utilitarian approach to evidence which places all of its emphasis on outcomes – a position broadly rejected by adherents of critical social theory. Instead, constructivists’ focus is on processes of communication and interaction, along with the EU’s normative impact rather than on an outcome-orientated approach – all of which are processes which are obviously less suited to empirical identification. Because of the difficulty of identifying the impact of such processes, the absence of a ‘normative’ outcome within the discourse does not disprove NPE, rather it is blamed on either ineffective or incorrect strategies used by EU actors, or the recalcitrance and primevalism of the third party or parties.

Manners and others engaged in post-positivist research on the EU reject the positivist approach to its international role arguing that a purely materialist approach is totally unsuited because of the nature of the EU’s power and the goals it seeks. The EU’s difference – in constitution, historical experience, institutional structure etc – from nation states, individuals, TNCs and even NGOs means that it is not engaged in a power-amassing project but a universalist, cosmopolitan one. It is because of this difference in intent, that existing theories of international relations are eschewed in favour of formulating a new theory inspired by cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, all of which is supported by a social constructivist ontology of action and meaning – the double hermeneutic suggested by

\[114\] The EU has a major structural influence even where it is not directly involved as many issues, in particular those relating to the GPE, are greatly affected by the EU’s existence.
Guzzini (2005). It must be said that the NPE thesis is not bad theory insofar as it provides an organisational structure for the wide variety of EU interactions and presents researchers with a predictive framework\textsuperscript{115} - this is something that constructivism in itself fails to do. However, it would not be right to discuss it without pointing out its meta-theoretical premises, which arguably impact on its ability to account for the wide range of material, interest-based behaviour which the EU does engage in. It is this issue of the NPE’s ‘positivist’ quality that the analysis now moves.

Up to now, the analysis has focused on the ontology of the NPE thesis and it has been argued that the entire project requires an ontological coherency which is not present. The examination will now move onto the empirical aspect of NPE. Does the EU spread its norms and how successful is it – to what extent is Manners correct in suggesting the EU’s normative power is an empirical matter?

2) Positivist NPE

The basis of the civilising, civilian power and normative power discourses is the concept that the actor has not simply internalised certain norms, but also acts upon and attempts to spread these norms. Manners argues that because of the commitment to a catalogue of norms, listed above, the EU is predisposed to act based on them, supporting this argument by pointing to the EU’s commitment to the European Charter on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. ‘The EU has gone further towards making its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of

\textsuperscript{115} However, it is difficult to point to one article which engages in a clear act of prediction based on the framework – scholars preferring to test it \textit{post facto}. 
norms which come closer to those of the ECHR and the UDHR than most other actors in world politics’ (2002: 241). It is statements such as this that lead Sjursen (2006b) to suggest that the academic debate has become increasingly similar to the statements and positions of the EU’s representatives. This is a worrying trend, as it ‘leaves researchers vulnerable to the charge of being unable to distinguish between their own sympathy of the European project and their academic role as critical analysts’ (2006b: 170). Here, Sjursen raises an important problem for testing whether the EU is a normative power or not. According to the EU, it places these norms at the core of its foreign policy and this is broadly accepted by scholars in the area – dutifully reproducing the policy statements of the EU, thus consolidating the EU’s normativity through repetition – a process identified by Pace (2007) in ‘The construction of EU Normative Power’. While neither Pace nor anyone else can explain the precise constitutive effects of this repetition other than to suggest it reinforces the view, it does appear to mark a lack of reflexivity on the part of both policy makers and academics – reflexivity on the goals of the EU, its success rate of achieving these goals and the mismatch between normative goals and material interests of the Union (Diez, 2004; Pace, 2007 and Sjursen, 2006a). Pace argues that within academia and the polity, the acceptance of the narrative that the EU is a ‘force for good’ has been too readily accepted, without any ‘unpacking’ of the concept. In terms of the ‘positivist’ aspect discussed here however, the ‘unpacking’ that requires doing, is the unpacking of the relationship between the metaphysical impact of the EU on its partners, which has been
given great attention and the ‘actual’ material impact, which has not received the attention it deserves.

An enormous amount of work has been done on the diffusion of EU norms to third countries, troubled regions and the campaigning of the EU at IO’s. What is clear from this research, and the statements and policy documents of the EU, is that this is broadly the case. Either through explicit conditionality, diplomatic pressure or example, the EU is certainly attempting to export its norms particularly in relation to democracy and human rights – making these an important part of most of its bilateral trade pacts. The range of empirical work on the issue suggests that while the EU does not always reach the high normative standards it sets itself, broadly speaking in the context of CFSP the EU is a normative power empirically. This is particularly clear when it is involved in global negotiations where it is widely seen as a major power in pushing the global acceptance of norms of sustainable development, cosmopolitan international law, environmental policy and human rights (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007; Manners 2009). This however is simply not enough because not only does the EU not reach the high standards set it by academia (Lerch and Schwellnus, 2006; Youngs, 2005, Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005 & Zimmermann, 2007), in many areas the NPE framework simply does not account for the EU’s impact on third parties. These areas are most often

116 Although it is important to repeat that while these prominent examples and many other do point out that there is a gap between the expectations of the EU’s normative commitment and coherency and the outcomes achieved, they remain sure that the NPE framework is the base theory of the discourse. Rather than testing these case-studies on an alternative framework the approach seems to be – ‘it’s not perfect, but it’s close enough’. Thus with echoes of a criticism of neorealist theory which Vasquez championed, NPE is an insufficient theory to base the entire study of the EU on, but despite this, the use of Manners concept goes unchallenged in so far as it is not matched by a competitor. It is certainly in this usage that the hegemony of NPE is most conspicuous.
those areas that do not come under the auspices of the CFSP (Council) structure but the Commission.

This supports the argument of Zimmermann (2007), who argues cogently that the more the EU becomes more like a centralised government, and powers of international negotiation are passed from Council to the Commission, the less of a normative power the EU is and the more like a state it is – a ‘Realist Power Europe’ (RPE). This once again reinforces the argument that NPE is hegemonic within the discourse as we see that despite the clear fact that the EU eschews all traces of normativity when negotiating the conditions of Russia’s and China’s accession to the WTO\textsuperscript{117}, the author has as his base, the idea that NPE is the norm of EU behaviour. This view is interesting in that it reinforces the functionalist and neofunctionalist assumption about the competitive and damaging nature of the state – the more the EU becomes like a state, the less like a normative power it is, indirectly reaffirming the NPE thesis and reinforcing the presence of the \textit{sui generis} gene. Mike Smith (2006) also makes this point when he suggests the study of the EU’s international identity will become ever more based in IR theory as the ‘practice of EFP is seen increasingly as a ‘normal’ part of the global arena rather than as something exceptional and \textit{hors de concours’} (2006: 327).

The ‘positivist’, empirical aspect of Manners theory is not totally flawed – there is too much evidence supporting his stance to say so, however injured

\textsuperscript{117} Zimmermann writes, ‘the EU pursued a consistent strategy based on overarching and geopolitical interests, partially at the expense of societal interests (at least for some time). And nobody pronounced the word ‘Chechnya’ during the talks. Human rights concerns were unimportant’ (2007: 827).
by the methodological problems mentioned above. That said, there are major parts of the EU’s international presence which cannot easily be explained by an ideational, normative approach, such as the EU’s energy policy, the impact of EU protectionism on textiles and agricultural goods on developing countries and the EU’s inter-regional associations. To fully understand these interactions, a framework that describes the EU as a coherent, interest-driven actor is required. Civilian power can to some extent do this in its ‘trading state’ form, but in its more common ‘civilising’ guise, the EU’s continued part in suppression of the economies of developing and newly industrialising states’ economies goes unaccounted for. Manners’ framework is incapable of explaining a wide variety of the EU’s interactions relating to trade and the EU’s place within the global political economy. As mentioned this may be because of the EU’s coherence on this issue having given the Commission the right to negotiate and make agreements relating to trade on behalf of the Member States. While Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004 & 2005) in particular have provided a number of excellent overviews of the variety of approaches to the EU’s trade policy and its place in the GPE; these have tended to be more on the side of description over theorising. Considering Nicolaidis’ work on the EU’s normative power on her own and with others (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002 & Nicolaidis, 2003), this may be understandable as there is no easy way of matching the EU’s commitment to sustainable development and the Doha Round, with its protectionism and its pushing

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118 This is certainly not to fall for the sin of economism. Simply because the issues at hand are related to economics or trade does not mean they have no ideational aspect, the study of the neoliberal economic ideology is one of the foremost concerns of IPE specialists, not simply the material results of free trade and liberalisation.
liberalisation on developing countries (Oxfam, 2006). However, even between the EU’s international trade policies it is difficult to ascertain whether there is a coherent strategy or not. This image becomes even more complex when the tensions between the material and the metaphysical aspects of the EU’s international affairs are compared. It is this dilemma and the tension between the normative and the strategic that the framework proposed at the end of this chapter aims to organise.

3) Normative NPE

It is important to note that outside of the EUS tent there are trenchant criticisms of the EU’s behaviour in Africa, in particular their efforts at liberalisation of markets in the continent. What is significant is that despite these critical analyses appearing in major journals and being authored by respected IPE and Africanist scholars in the large part, they do not appear in the work of those operating within the NPE discourse. Despite his partial use in Manners’ NPE framework, Galtung has of recent times, been a trenchant critic of the EU’s interactions with Africa. Others have also pointed out the structural violence, to use Galtung’s term, that the EU has perpetrated on the Continent and in developing regions. However, most of these analyses are found in either development organisations’ publications or in African regionalist literature. A prime example of the overlooking of the very obvious structural problems of the EU’s agricultural policies is Scheiper and Sicurelli’s (2008) article on the EU’s attempts to empower Sub-Saharan African nations in relation to the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol. Opening their article with a quote from a 2005 statement from the Council of the European Union that reads, ‘Europe has an interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this’ (2008: 607), the authors proceed to analyse the EU’s attempts to empower Africa and to consolidate EU norms without reference to the major impact of EU protectionism on the instability and economic stagnation of Africa even once. This is clearly insufficient. It is a long-standing stanchion of developmental politics that economic development leads and supports political development. For the authors to consider the normative impact of the EU on these nations without reference to the obvious contradictions of their normative policy is representative of the problems discussed here. It is important to stress however that while the argument here assumes there is a contradiction present, it is aimed at the academics who consider such normative developments without consideration of the EU’s material impact on these nations. Perhaps this is reflective of the huge popularity of normative and constructivist approaches in EUS. Mary Farrell’s (2005) article, ‘A Triumph of realism over idealism: Cooperation between the European Union and Africa’ supports the view that while the EU has attempted to support regionalism in Africa and promoted EU-norms through this support, ultimately, the EU has not maintained support for African economic development which had been started by the Lomé Convention and other post-decolonisation agreements.
One of the most striking things about Manners’ work is the prescriptive basis of it. While Duchêne had a similarly normative element to his original description, the prescription (demilitarisation while accepting the variety of international actors) was significantly less radical project than Manners’ proposed level of cosmopolitanism. As he wrote in his response to Diez’s critique of the normative aspect of his theory:

‘It was, and is, a statement of what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement which needed to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU *should* be (doing) in world politics... [T]he construction of the EU is not just a European project – it is part of a global effort to coordinate and reconcile human differences under conditions of globalisation (2006: 170).

This is the very basis of normative theorising – describing how things ought to be rather than as they are. While some are purely utopian when writing normatively, Manners’ believes that his framework is an achievable standard. As has been mentioned, Manners put enormous emphasis on the ECHR and the UDHR as the basis of the norms the EU spreads. To Manners this is an important distinction, as rather than the norms being described as European norms, the norms which the EU attempts to spread are universal norms based on aspects of cosmopolitan (individual liberties) and communitarian (social) thinking. In this way, Manners and other believers are able to argue that there is not a utilitarian norms criticism to face. Manners position on this aspect of his theory is clear. The nine norms stem from a wide variety of intergovernmental sources, including but not exclusively the UN and Council of Europe, and are not unique to Europe but are held to be valid in a large portion of the world community already – thus there can be no criticism for cultural imperialism. On top of this
defence of the source of the norms in question is the reality of spreading such norms. As referred to above – is it a ‘good thing’ to spread norms to parts of the world where such norms are not present? And also, what is the relationship between the EU normative project and other actor’s normative projects? Manners clearly believes that it is part of the EU’s project to do so.\footnote{See Williams (2006: Chapter 1) ‘Liberalism and the first great liberal century’ for an excellent review of competing liberal justifications for intervention and interference in non-liberal states or conflicts. These discussions are directly applicable to the discussion of the EU’s role in spreading its norms as it is a question of appropriateness and imperialism, but at a much lower level.}

In an interesting argument, Diez correctly questions whether the EU is so unique in being a normative power, suggesting that all major powers in history have had a normative project (2005). This automatically appears as a paradox of EU policy, as from the preparations for the invasion of Iraq in 2002 – the EU appeared to identify itself based on the US as ‘other\footnote{Although the very public family feud undermined this ‘othering’ process.}. Whereas the EU is multilateralist, non-martial, secular and intellectual; the US administration was exceptionalist, hyper-martial, religious and \textit{apparently}\footnote{One of the most frustrating aspects of the Bush era is the total reluctance on the part of European analysts to question these depictions critically. Not only was the term neo-conservative bandied about with abandon without the critical attention such a important term required, academia allowed the media and politicians to assume that the Bush administration was a purely opportunistic power-grab informed by garbage-can strategising. This is not a defence of the administration, although Iraq appears to be an increasingly stable country and less of the quagmire it had appeared to be, but is an important insight into academia’s ability to take sides during periods of political strife. It is important to stress that the disagreement between Europe and the US on the issue was a conflict between two forms of liberalism, and not a disagreement between an atavistic, realist and a benevolent, liberal Europe. Try as some might to say otherwise (Leonard, 2004; Reid, 2005 and McCormack, 2007), the disagreement over Iraq was very much a liberal family feud. For a detailed discussion of the competing liberal values in operation during this and other conflicts see Williams (2006) \textit{Liberalism and War: Victors and the Vanquished}.} intellectually void. Thus, because of these differences, comparison of the EU’s normative project through the means discussed.
above, to the US’s justification of its actions in Iraq based on democracy promotion and human rights norms is moot. The US clearly had a normative project in Iraq, and in the Middle East generally, along with the desire to ‘normalise’ preemptive war and aggressive unilateralism. Tocci’s edited collection *Who is a normative Foreign Policy actor? The EU and its global partners* (2008), brings together a number of scholars’ analyses of the normative pretensions of other great powers. The fact that these scholars had such little difficulty applying the framework to all of the major states would suggest that the concept, or at least the discourse of doing the right thing by the world seems to be a common practice – a point identified by Morgenthau decades earlier in *Politics Among Nations*¹²³. However, while Morgenthau believed there was a transcendental ethic, and hence left the door open for some form of universal moral standard, Carr and Herz were wholeheartedly relativistic towards such moral campaigning. Carr, as is discussed in Chapter 3 described the relativity of thought as the tool with which realists could overturn the very foundation of utopian thought by showing the hollowness of such universalist ideas as the harmony of interests (1964: 67-71).

Herz in a similar but more radical way rejects the entire notion of the civilisational process or the gradual spreading of Western, modernist values

¹²³ “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry... There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgement of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and that what one wills oneself, cannot fail to be willed by God. This equation is also politically pernicious, for its liable to engender the distortion in judgement which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilisations – in the name of moral principle, ideal or God’ (1964: 51).
and norms, and calls for its reversal. A spiralling analysis of the development of ever more rational forms of government, social living and technology, Herz argues that the civilisation process, based on the modernist faith in rationality, science and individualism causes humans to become alienated from their natural, traditional environment; to become integrated into the ‘gigantism of the machine world’ and indoctrinated with a ““futuristic” mentality’ (1975: 197). The seeming victory of rationalist, universalist thinking has led, Herz argues, to the ‘[l]oss of sense of differentiation and the unique, coupled with the acceleration of new scientific findings and technological data’ (1975: 201). This relativism, developed more systematically in Chapter 2, illustrates the realist opposition to such universalising discourses, and it is in this way that Molloy’s argument (2006) on the interconnection between realism and postmodernism becomes particularly clear. In this way, there is more in common here with parts of the critical constructivism of Diez (2004) and the stronger position of Merlingen (2007), than with Zimmerman (2007) or Hyde-Price (2006), through their rejection of such universalising discourses as the EU offers in its normative NPE guise. To such suggestions Manners replies that ‘[f]rom a relativist perspective it could be argued that all ‘particularist’ claims to normative power are relatively similar – from the American and French revolutions to those of the Russian revolution. It is the lack of exceptionalism, rather than the claim to being special, which characterises most of the normative claims in the EU – particularly those located in past European failures and crimes (such as colonialism, nationalism, world wars, the Holocaust and inequality). Generally implicit
in any EU claims to being *sui generis* are built on humility for historical failures such as injustice, intolerance, and inhumanity’ (2006: 174). Such positions are not reconcilable so there is no great need to state the case on either side other than to say that for the realist and the postmodernist such universal moral discourses are problematic, if not dangerous as a result of magnifying the perception of otherness between groups, as has arguably happened at some level in the current (highly overstated) tension between parts of Islamic culture and the West. In a similar way, the perceived normative project has lead to a strong backlash against EU’s normative imperialism in Russia – who with China - is pushing a New World Order with a sovereigntist state and non-interventionism at its core (Hussey, 2008).

Manners and the adherents to his theory are committed to this vision of the EU as a force for good. The problem however is that while the first two of the categories adopted by Manners and discussed here are analytical ones, the third turns academics into advocates. No one is fooled by the notion that an observer can be totally objective in observing a process, but it should still be a norm to be striven towards. By inserting this fundamentalist normative position into the theory, a gut-instinct that haunts EUS becomes real in the form of true EU-normative theory. It has come to fruition that the EU is no longer an object to be observed but a political phenomenon that academia is an important part of. Within the discourse of disciplinary history, the support given by certain key academics and their theories to a narrative that the institution itself is engaged in projecting is enormously significant.
From a Mannheimian perspective, the ideological confluence of academics, advocates and practitioners reflects a perfect example of the social nature of political thought. The study of the EU’s external affairs supports the description of the discourse as hegemonised by liberalism and liberal-constructivism more than anything else discussed up to here. It would be extremely difficult to find a group of scholars that would disagree that this is not a good state of affairs. Utopian thought is a vital part of the social sciences, it is a key part of the dialectic outlined in Chapter 2, but when theoretical descriptions of a possible reality become part of the actor’s narrative of projection and ideological project, it must be countered and interrogated. Having seen that the discourse is not simply hegemonised by a liberal-constructivist theory but also is engaged in an ideological project (reflected by the strong normative part of the theory) the discourse surrounding the EU’s international affairs becomes even more in need of an alternative, realist (utopian in Mannheim’s framework) narrative to challenge NPE. It is needed in order to challenge a discourse over-influenced by ideas, agency and cooperation with an alternative focused on material interests, structure and competition. NPE is the pinnacle of the ideology which developed through the two phases of the Integration theory debate and a utopian alternative is painfully required, at least within the discourse of the EU’s international affairs at least.

**A realist alternative to the liberal-constructivist ideology**

An alternative framework for describing the EU is required. This alternative framework, like Manners’, assumes that the EU is in many areas of
international life a relatively coherent actor, and thus, for clarity, should be analysed so. Differing from Manners’ framework however, this alternative rejects the social constructivist focus on means to an outcome-orientated approach. This is because while, the *process* of politics - the shape or constitution of international actors, the nature of power or the predominant form of conflict - may change over the course of history, the *nature* of politics remains constant. This is not to say that international politics will always be marred by conflict and instability but that while interests can be managed and egos placated, underlying tensions remain based on what are generally unfairly described as realist motives (Morgenthau, 1961: 9). Periods of stability and free trade in the liberal political economy have suggested the passing of *realpolitik*, but in fact we can see there the dialectical nature of politics - identified by mercantilist political economy theorists on the cyclical nature of the political economy (Krasner, 1976; Gilpin, 1987 & Kirshner, 1999). Not only are liberal-constructivist examinations of the area not engaging with the material aspects of international competition, they also ignore the inherently exogenous nature of much but not all international political life. In doing this an alternative to the liberal-constructivist narrative can be developed, one based on the insights of practical realism outlined in Chapter 2.

While it will undoubtedly be argued that a realist approach is incapable of accounting for the complexities of the multi-causal and multi-level system that the EU represents when the totality of the EU’s interactions are examined, there is little question that the EU has both motive and
opportunity for interest-led, strategic behaviour. This is particularly clear in areas where there are definite EU-level outcomes, such as bilateral trade relations, matters relating to the multi-lateral trading system (particularly in relation to the WTO), and the political questions surrounding the rise of the euro as the world’s currency. All of these are areas where there are high-levels of EU competency on behalf of the Member States and high incentives for achieving outcomes favourable to the EU’s material base. The key props of the development of a realist narrative are described below along with some suggestions on how these concepts fit into different areas of the EU’s international affairs. In summary however, it can be said that the realist narrative to be developed provides an outcomes-based approach over a declaratory and ideational one.

The problem of the existing narrative is that it examines only the ideational impact of the EU on third parties and rarely concerns itself with the material concerns of politics, insofar as they can be separated. What this is talking about in particular is the search for ways of increasing the prosperity of EU industry and citizens by gaining access to markets around the world. This trend is at its clearest in the EU’s efforts to encourage liberalisation of Russian, Chinese and many African markets. This trend has been identified by charities such as Oxfam (2006) and by academics such as Zimmerman (2007) but how does this fit into a realist framework versus an alternative materialist framework? In truth there is little to separate the realist narrative

124 To be clear, it is impossible to separate the EU from its Member States in its international affairs, however, some areas of interaction lend themselves to attempting this than others – such as inter-regional relations, energy policy and matters relating to the Bretton Woods institutions where the EU has full responsibility for negotiations.
of this analysis from what a Marx-inspired assessment would look like – in particular the question of the EU’s neoliberalising project outlined by Stephen Gill, referred to earlier. The difference being that whereas Gill argues that the EU is a neoliberal organisation run for and by a Transnational elite, this analysis is within a mercantilist political economy framework. This means that the increased wealth of the actor’s industrialists and financiers is a reflection of the power of the actor itself (Gilpin, 1987: Chapter 2). Thus, realism in its mercantilist guise provides a framework for understanding the behaviour of the EU in trade negotiations, at WTO negotiations\(^{125}\) and in its Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

On top of this mercantilist approach is an outcome based understanding of the EU’s existence. In examining the impact of the EU’s internal policies on third parties this would also provide a significant challenge to the NPE thesis. Where is the universal morality and respect for the basic conditions of survival when the EU ensures that Third World agricultural markets remain stunted by the continuation of its system of subsidies through CAP? Once again, this is not a starkly realist insight but by including it in an alternative narrative of the EU which rejects its moral novelty is an important part of the challenge to the NPE thesis and the blithe acceptance

\(^{125}\) The best way for understanding the goal of the EU at the WTO and in the global political economy broadly is to examine Robert Gilpin’s (1981: 23-5) outline of the three goals of an international actor in the international system. The first is to expand its territory but this can easily be dismissed as an anachronism. The second is to increase its market size, thus increasing its control over the GPE through market share. The third and most important goal is to set the rules of the international trade, in this context, the rules of the WTO. It is for this reason that a thorough study of the EU’s relationship with the WTO and the Bretton Woods system broadly would be hugely interesting from an interest-centred analysis. While they account for only a couple of pages in a major work about the process of international change, they are particularly useful guides for assessing exactly what actors are seeking in their international affairs.
of the EU’s declaratory policies. Such an approach as Michael E. Smith’s (2008) understanding of the EU’s grand strategy which includes positive ‘special attention for LDCs’ within the context of global wealth is clearly more informed by the EU’s stated desire/intentions rather than the reality of the interaction.

A third way in which a realist understanding of the EU’s global affairs may help is in the realm of the EU’s energy security. The EU’s near-total reliance on Russian energy resources has created an interesting and obvious example of the security dilemma in operation between the EU and another party. This matter has been dealt with elsewhere (Hussey, 2008) but by using a realist approach the relationship between the EU and Russia is arguably doomed to remain in a state of chass. The EU is seen in this analysis as a self-interested and security-driven actor, similar to any other in an analysis of bilateral energy relations. Had a declaratory and normative (in the NPE sense) approach been used, vast portions of the material and security concerns of the actors would be overlooked in place of discussion of the competing ideological and normative differences which the actors share. Such similar thinking led to the spiralling of the Cold War between the US and the USSR. A realist analysis can pre-emptively bi-pass such concerns, and ensure that through openness and a non-ideological discourse, stability of supply can be maintained.

Thus, the differences between the declaratory and ideational approaches of those using the NPE framework, and the outcome-based analyses are stark.
What is important from the perspective of this piece of research is that the use of the interest and outcome-based analysis of the EU as an international actor provides a competing narrative to the EU’s normative power pretensions and this in itself is hugely important for the discourse. It is not enough to simply criticise the hegemonic, ideological discourse but to provide an alternative which contests the ontology and intent of that hegemon. Such a body of thought Mannheim would describe as utopian. Only through the competitive process of dialectic can a discourse develop greater theoretical and empirical frameworks for describing the EU’s international affairs beyond the hegemonic normative power discourse. Even with this small number of practical applications of a realist analysis illustrates the possibilities of such an analysis of the EU’s international affairs, and the difficulties of the NPE hegemony which is present. Without such a dialogue between the two aspects of political thought the utopian and the realist - it is in reality no discourse at all – it is a monologue of the converted. Thus we see, the ‘one hand clap’ of EUS.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has endeavoured to show that the discourse surrounding the EU as an international actor is dominated by a strongly utopian discourse, based on traces of the liberal international values of its forerunner (CPE) and spurred on by the widespread use of social constructivism in the EUS broadly from the early 1990s on. It was shown how the discourse in question from its inception was based on modernist premises of the
integration debate in its rationalist, as seen in Chapter 4 and then ideational, outlined in Chapter 5 phases. It was shown that there is a clear modernist hegemony, with little or no relativist, materialist alternative of the EU’s international affairs. It is too easy to simply accept that because of the EU’s being the epitome of a liberal, post-national polity, that in order to understand it, post-national, liberal theory is required. The shortcomings of the normative and civilian power discourse outlined, an alternative framework for describing the EU as an international actor is proposed. This alternative is based on the practical realism described in Chapter 2. The other part of the realism described in Section 1 represents the methodology and intent of the entire project. The inclusion of a practical realist alternative to the NPE thesis is more an illustration of realism’s bipartite nature and the potential of such an approach. The need for this balance is inspired by the need for dialectic in discourses as described in Chapter 3.

Thus, while some monographs will wait to the final chapter to tie together the disparate, or not so disparate parts of the research, this chapter was very much an effort to take the theoretical, practical and normative aspects (its vision of how politics should be studied and talked about) of realist thought and to apply these to the study of the EU’s international affairs.

It was clearly shown that the trends within the discourse surrounding the EU as an international actor matched closely those in the two phases of integration theory. Thus, NPE was shown to be at once the manifestation, and apotheosis, of the trends in the broader study of the EU. The more
important ‘discovery’ of the chapter however, is the total absence of realism from the discourse and the linking of the academic narrative to the ‘actual’ narrative of projections occurring. This is an exact match of Mannheim’s description of an ideological movement as we see the confluence of the academic discourse and the political. The progressivist approach to the EU as the embodiment of universalist, liberal values and norms, along with its difference (sui generis gene in operation) is a precise match to the target of Carr’s bi-partite realist approach in the interwar period. The success and significance of these conclusions will be addressed in the concluding chapter to follow.
Section 3

Chapter 7:

Conclusion

This research project set out to test the hypothesis that the development of EUS through its integration and polity-making phases has had a direct impact on the study of the EU as an international actor, not simply in the form of theories used but in the structure of the discourse which is dominated by forms of liberal theory and bereft of any realist corrective. My research was based on the idea that discourses require balance between the two parts of political thought, realism and idealism, and the conclusion that EUS lacked this balance. The rationale for the research stemmed from the discovery that on studying the area of the EU’s international role in some depth, there was a severe shortage of alternative frameworks in the discourse. Having been queried over the use of realism as a framework for describing the EU’s international affairs at conferences and seminars it appeared that not only was there a lack of debate in the discourse, there was hostility towards anything with the realist tag. The argument that realism was incapable of explaining the EU, or any aspects of its existence, was
frustrating as it limited it to a bland statement of the state’s primacy in international politics. This view ignored many aspects of the tradition and denied its significance in political analysis. Due to the prevalence of this view and its reproduction, a problem developed in the discourse of the EU’s international affairs which could not be explained simply by realism’s explanatory impotency. This was because there are a number of significant areas of the EU’s international affairs which would be best described using a realist framework. This problem reflected the straightforward ‘practical’ application of realism which represented only part of the realist method. On top of it lay the more significant philosophical contribution realism makes as a sceptical voice in political discourse. When all around are ‘thinking of the future’ and how things can and should be better, this research maintains that realists are charged with reminding those around of the dangers and difficulties of unreflexive change, and the error of mistaking change in form for change in essence. This fundamentally conservative role may appear unremarkable when discussing every day scenarios of social or political life but when the location changes to academia then the role realism and realists play is of great significance. This is seen particularly in the light of developments in social theory in the last five decades. Convinced of its importance, aware of its absence and surprised by the resistance to its entry, the gap in the ‘theoretical’ wall had been identified. What was then required was a framework for examining this problem.

This was not simply a EUS problem but also an IR Theory one. Realism was misrepresented in almost all contemporary IR texts. The few exceptions to this were a small number who were revisiting the works of the founding
fathers of the realist tradition. Almost en masse, these scholars concluded that contemporary references to realism did not match the intent or message of the ‘fathers’ writings. At the same time, another group of scholars were considering the history of the discipline with particular attention to the narrative of the series of Great Debates, which plotted the development of disciplinary IR. These two subgroups of IR Theory provided the inspiration and theoretical basis of the current analysis. It was clear that in order to utilise realism in an analysis of EUS, the work of IR’s disciplinary historians and the major criticisms of realism would need to be addressed.

Section 1 outlined the nature of realism in its practical and technical (hermeneutical) sense and illustrated the link between disciplinary historicising and the realist-utopian dialectic.

The first task required from the analysis of realism was to free realism from the highly problematic constraints of its perceived paradigmatic assumptions, illustrating instead its critical and hermeneutical potential. To do this a heterodox image of realism was sketched, one that focused on the issues of change and ideology. Using the criticisms of Guzzini and Cox over realism’s “forwards and backwards” conservatism as a framework, it was shown that realism, while necessarily conservative in ways, was not tied to a diplomatic tradition or denied the possibility of change in the political system or the actors within it. This alleged attachment to a diplomatic tradition was rejected by outlining the importance of human nature and structural forces in realism’s ontology. Thus, realism was shown to be far more than a codification of diplomatic tradition but a set of ideas about the impact of anthropological and structural forces on social and
political life. This represented the practical contribution of realism to the analysis, to be applied ultimately in Chapter 6 to illustrate the utility of realism to the study of the EU’s international affairs.

In addition to this, the belief of realists in the importance of the dialectic between the utopian and the realist aspects of human thought was outlined. Thus, realism is by nature within the dialectic, an ideal-type conservative form of thought. It is necessarily conservative however, because it is charged with the duty of being the corrective to the utopian urges of discourses, particularly those in their nonage. Perhaps one of the most important points however is the insistence by Carr and Herz on the fundamental relativity of thought, with which realists are capable of claiming to get past the ideological levels of other normative theories – Marxism and Liberalism in particular. It is this relativity which is a major part in realism’s claim that politics is defined by dialectic and not universal or absolute ideas. This relativism and the need to bypass and reject ideological thinking in the study of politics, links the first chapter of Section 1 to the second.

Questions of realist ontology and epistemology were also considered in Section 1. It was shown that not only is realism not a rationalist theory of politics, but it is also largely ambivalent towards questions of philosophical idealism and materialism. To understand the epistemology and ontology of realism, the ‘deep ontology’ of critical realism, similar to that used by constructivism, was suggested. In examining these questions of epistemology and the philosophy of science the issue of the series of ‘Great Debates’ was examined. These disciplinary divisions which have provided
the study of IR with a structure and narrative, are vital to all disciplines as
the ‘story’ of the discipline very often has an immense impact on how it is
studied. In the case of IR, as was seen in Chapter 3, the first of these debates
most likely never truly occurred, but despite this the story of the First
Debate remains an important part of the discipline’s collective psyche. It is
this particular point which became so central a part of the analysis of EUS
in Section 2 of this thesis. The impact of such disciplinary myths has been
shown by the disciplinary historians of IR to be of fundamental importance
in shaping the development of the discipline. EUS has only begun to
consider its past (Rosamond, 2007 & 2008) and this research has attempted
to further push it in a critical historical direction.

The second task performed in Chapter 3 of Section 1 was an examination of
the extent to which the sociology of knowledge is a part of the realist
framework and assists the realist in his efforts to analyse the dominance of
certain ideas. Mannheim’s framework was identified as being overly-
deterministic and verging on paradoxical, however, it does provide a
method for understanding the development of and politics within
disciplines. In Carr’s case it was the politics and study of international
relations and his link to Mannheim was outlined here also. Carr’s argument,
reversing Mannheim’s terminology, was that utopianism (idealism) had
become a functioning ideology and that the idealist policies and theories
required correction.

He also provides a framework for defining the structure of disciplines and
discourses, from which we can understand the relationship between
competing and complementary narratives. Mannheim’s greatest
contribution to this research are the insights he provides for understanding the need for competition in discourses, and the result of having domination by a single ideology or small, close set of ideas – social and intellectual stagnation. The discourse of the disciplinary history of IR was used as a part of the changing structure of IR theory from the realist hegemony to a new, liberal one. This was included to illustrate firstly the importance of disciplinary self-reflection for understanding the underlying, self-contained dynamics of the discipline; and secondly to show the way in which even the analysis of these processes have a politics of their own. In the case of the rejection of the First Debate, this was a method of consolidating the liberal hegemony over IR. As was argued, in showing that the First Great Debate never happened it meant that realism ‘never won’ and that the new era of liberal dominance of IR in the form of social constructivism and rationalism is further legitimised. Within Mannheim’s framework, the study of the discipline’s history and internal politics is not simply an act of ‘emancipation’ from the discipline’s myths (Holden, 2002) but also a key aspect in the passing of the realist era of domination of the discipline to the liberal. The sociology of knowledge legitimises an understanding of disciplinary developments not in terms of their academic significance, but on their implications on the politics of the discipline. It is in this vein that the examination of EUS occurred.

This understanding of disciplinary development, the need for dialectic between idealist and realist forms of thought, philosophical scepticism and pessimism towards the chances of transformation of the essence of politics, were then taken into the analysis of EUS in Section 2. This section was
structured on the basis that EUS has passed through two phases. The first phase was the integration theory phase – marked by the ‘debate’ between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists and their competing narratives of political and economic integration. The second phase in the development of EUS is the polity-building phase which was marked by the addition of social constructivism to the analysis of the EU’s integration.

It was argued that the first of these phases was marked by an over attention to two essentially un-realist forces – rationality and the state. What was shown clearly in Chapter 4 was the similarity between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, versus the alleged similarity between intergovernmentalism and realism. Firstly the relationship between functionalism and neofunctionalism was examined showing that the basis of neofunctionalism was more of an epistemological and ontological commitment than a true extension of the work of David Mitrany. The bleaching of Mitrany’s normative interests from neofunctionalism in an ironic way placed functionalism closer by nature of their normative intent and their traditionalist methodology and epistemology with realism. The second task of the chapter was to consider and ultimately debunk the link between realists and intergovernmentalists. Traditionally seen as the ‘realist’ representative in the debate between idealists and realists that had allegedly taken place a decade or two before in IR Theory, intergovernmentalism was shown to possess more liberal characteristics than realist ones. In addition to this was shown that intergovernmentalism was a statist theory. Realism, while often dismissed as a statist theory, was shown not to be through descriptions of realist approaches to the state and
their ambivalence to its existence, placing more emphasis on the underlying essence of politics than its form. Thus, Chapter 4 illustrated the absence of realism from the early stages of the debate and showed the modernist, liberal dominance of the discipline – with its focus on rationality. Another important finding stemming from this is a disciplinary point which relates to the alleged presence of realism. According to many of the examples quoted in the chapter, realism is considered the same thing as intergovernmentalism. In arguing this, it can be said that realism is present at the formative debate in EUS. This provides EUS with a legitimacy vis-à-vis the perception of the importance of such a founding debate at the formation of the IR Theory discipline. However, this is clearly seen to be false. Thus, we see two important findings stemming from this chapter; the first, that EUS at its foundation was hegemonised by liberal theory and the second that a disciplinary sleight of hand had been performed by associating realism uncritically with intergovernmentalism despite their significant differences.

These conclusions were then taken into the analysis of the second phase of the development of EUS – the polity-building phase. It is referred to as the polity-building phase as, whereas the first phase focused on the economic and political integration of the Europe, this phase moved beyond these to the social integration of Europe and the ways in which social integration (social construction) leads to different modes of behaviour. Chapter 6 involved the detailed description of constructivist theory showing its tense relationship with positivist and post-positivist epistemology and ontology. Despite the intent of Wendt in his early writings, it was shown that
constructivism’s desire to be part of the ‘mainstream’ politics has led to its losing much of its critical potential and for the predominant approach to be on the ‘conventional’ or ‘modern’ side. This is not problematic in itself but when this situation is applied to EUS, this exacerbates and reproduces the liberal hegemony illustrated in Chapter 4. However, it is no longer a straightforward liberal institutionalist position that is dominant but a more complex mix of modernist, progressive thinking and the social constructivist ontology or double hermeneutic of meanings.

It was then shown that social constructivism, because of its philosophical idealist basis, brought not just a greater awareness of the importance of ideas and norms in politics, but how these are formed and subsequently impact on the behaviour of the actor. Once again this is not problematic in itself – realism was shown to be primarily concerned with material affects but does not dismiss ideational ones – however, this led to an overstatement of the EU’s metaphysical difference from other actors. The notion of the EU’s metaphysical difference was then developed. It was argued that within EUS sui generis has two distinct meanings – the first being a rationalist understanding whereby the EU is formed differently from other actors and therefore comparison to other actors is unhelpful (also known as the n=1 problematique); and the second, more significantly is that the EU is formed differently and in a different way (integrated states) to other actors so therefore it is a new type of political actor entirely and requires new frameworks for interpreting it. This belief in the EU’s difference stems from the alleged failure of the neofunctionalist project for interpreting global integration. Faith in the singularity of the EU consolidated the liberal view
that progress in form (particularly away from the state) reflected and promoted a move away from previous, historically oppressive modes of behaviour. This view existed at a low level prior to the constructivist phase. Duchêne, for example, made such an argument in his original works on civilian power, but with the addition of social constructivism to the discipline this sui generis gene became legitimised and spread more broadly. The irony is that while the idea that the EU was unique and beyond comparison, or study by comparative methods, was rightly rejected by Simon Hix and other comparativists, at the same time, the metaphysical connotation of sui generis was taking hold at a deeper level – nowhere more so than in the discourse of the EU’s international affairs. What is important about this approach to the EU, aside from its impact on the topic of the final chapter, is its Mannheimian significance. The belief that the EU represents a new and progressive Jerusalem and a move away from old (bad) forms of politics was not simply an analytic position but also an ideological position. Sadly, there are not figures to use to analyse the commitment to the EU amongst academics but it is arguable from the willingness to focus on the ‘good’ parts of the EU amongst scholars, and the pro-EU attitude at EUS conferences that this belief is certainly an ideological position. This almost certainly was the trend prior to the second phase (cf. the proximity of EC bureaucrats to neofunctionalist scholars) in EUS but was less accentuated due to the fact that EUS only became clearly distinguished (insofar as it is distinguished) from IR in the mid-to-late eighties.

Chapter 6 as mentioned is intended as being the culmination of the number of threads of the research. It sees the closing of the realist circle. After two
chapters of theoretical realist analysis, imbued with all the necessary epistemological and ontological scepticism, the chapter concluded with a number of avenues for realist research of the EU’s international affairs particularly in relation to security and mercantilist policy actions. Before this however, it was clearly shown that the debate surrounding the EU’s international affairs has followed an identical trajectory to the dominant debates in EUS. Firstly, it was shown that the civilian power discourse contained many of the same priorities and concerns as the liberal integration theory. It was largely a materialist theory of EU interest but also with a significant quantity of normative intent also thrown in. With the arrival of social constructivist theory into the EU as an international actor discourse, the EU’s normative nature was given even greater precedence. This trend manifested itself in the development of the NPE thesis.

The dominance of the NPE thesis was illustrated with reference to the two special issues on the matter and the wide usage of the thesis on a wide variety of topics. The dominance of NPE in the discourse is clearly a manifestation of the liberal hegemony over EUS. The absence of a clear alternative to it and the reluctance of the few scholars who have criticised it to reject it entirely reflects the clear hegemony it possesses. The thesis was critically examined on the three levels that Manners argues the EU is a normative power – ontologically, positivistically and normatively. A number of problems with the theory were then shown, both new and old. This however was not the sole intention of the chapter. The real objective of the chapter and the most important revelation is the clear dominance of the theory in the discourse and the absence of an alternative in the discourse to
it. Not only does the discourse ape the dominant modes of theorising and epistemological developments in EUS, it reflects the total negation of realism in an area that realism can clearly contribute much. Thus, returning to the hypothesis – ‘The development of the discipline through its integration and polity-making phases has had a direct impact on the study of the EU as an international actor, not simply in the form of theories used but in the structure of the discourse – dominated by forms of liberal theory and bereft of any realist corrective’, is clearly proven. Through the development of EUS, realism became increasingly marginalised and ultimately excluded altogether. This was made possible by the ideological collaboration of EUS scholars on behalf of liberal forms of thought, based on the misconstrual of realism’s supposed denial of the possibilities of the European integration process through its statism.

In advancing the argument of the thesis contributions were made to three distinct literatures. The first and most obvious is the contribution to the study of the EU. If it is increasingly recognised that there is a modern imbalance in EUS then more scholars may be attracted to critical perspectives on aspects of the EU’s affairs, particularly realist contributions to the study of the EU’s international affairs. The three chapters of Section 2 all represent significant contributions to the study of EUS disciplinary history and add to the understanding of the source of and structure of EUS. At a more general level, the identification of the liberal hegemony over EUS puts an onus on scholars to question the assumptions of their work on the EU, and will possibly emancipate them from certain oppressive theoretical assumptions. Thus, as Mannheim described, the conservative
theory (realism) is utopian and forces the ideological, status quo orientated theory (liberalism) to be taken to task by its adherents, or so would happen in an ideal world. As has been seen with the myth of the First Great Debate, they can be very, very hard to shift.

The second area where the research contributes is the work on the delimitation of realism by the likes of Der Derian, Molloy, Williams and Bain by expanding the range of those considered in the critical realist literature (esp. John H. Herz). It is also one of the first extended applications of this decentred realism to a ‘case study’, even though the case study relates to the study of politics rather than the practice of it. This is not entirely unwarranted or unprecedented. As was argued earlier, realists have always insisted that practice creates theory. The fact that the study of the EU appears to have a less clear-cut relationship between its theories and practice, is both an opportunity for realists to consider, and a threat to the traditional realist explanation of the source of theory. In examining the stages of the development of EUS, this research has attempted to walk in Carr’s steps most of all. His critical and anti-ideological rejection of the utopian dominance over the international politics of the interregnum in The Twenty Years’ Crisis represents the model of what has been examined here. The use of Mannheim’s model of disciplinary politics although imperfect also helps invigorate a realist mode of disciplinary historicising, in particular for examining disciplines with an overriding modernist hegemony. The alternative narrative of the meaning of the writings on the First Great debate myth is an important contribution to understanding, not simply the debate but the role of the contextualisers and the ‘political’ job
that they are doing in rejecting the debate and undermining the legitimacy of the long period of realist hegemony of IR Theory throughout the Cold War.

The third distinct contribution made through the dissertation is to the discourse on the study of the EU’s international affairs. As mentioned, there are a number of realist examinations of particular parts of EU external affairs but they tend to remain within the confines of the NPE theory - as an addendum to it rather than a challenger. In showing the dominance of the theory, its flaws, its moral imperialism and failure to account for material policies most significantly, along with the possibilities of a realist alternative, it is clearly shown that another ‘world’ is possible. There is no empirical or theoretical reason for NPE’s dominance, and the continuation of this scenario is utterly unnecessary as alternative, IR Theory approaches are available.

What would such a ‘New World’ of EUS look like? It is clearly never going to be a realist one. The EU, and EUS, would be a stranger to us all if it ever is. This research project was based on a strongly normative project of identifying in a systematic way the liberal dominance of the discourse surrounding the EU’s international affairs in order to call for an alternative. The alternative came fully formed in practical realism, but the route by which realism could be legitimised in the discourse would be a long one as the arguments that set realism to one side appeared deep set. As the research progressed this was proved to be true and despite the likely reluctance to let an immodern, pessimistic realism ‘spoil the party’, the need for debate between the optimistic and the pessimistic, the modern and the immodern,
and the old and the young is eternal. Only through such a dialogue can learning continue. Without it, the exuberance of the young and modern are always in danger of forgetting that apparent progress almost invariably is change of *form* but not of *essence*.
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